

PEACE BUILDERS NEWS



A NEWSLETTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTRE VOLUME 13, ISSUE 2 (01 JULY – 31 DECEMBER 2020)

Peace Support Operations amidst Emergent Pandemics and other Contemporary Threats



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Our Mission

To conduct training, education and research, informing military, police and civilian personnel in all aspects of peace support operations in order to improve the effectiveness of the response to complex emergencies.

Our Vision

To establish IPSTC as the premier Peace Support Training, Research and Education Centre in Africa.




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COVER PHOTO: The Director, IPSTC Brigadier Charles L Mwazighe (second from right) with the Ambassador of the State of Qatar to the Republic of Kenya H.E. Jabor Bin Ali Al-Dosari (Centre) at the Qatari Embassy holding IPSTC Research Products. This was during a courtesy call on the envoy by the Director on 16 October 2020.

MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR



Welcome to the second edition of the Peace Builders Newsletter for 2020.

This edition covers key activities and events that took place during the second half of the year 2020. The newsletter will have external contribution of articles as well as from IPSTC staff.

Peace Support Operations have been an integral part of conflict management and post-conflict recovery in Africa. This has been the bedrock of sustaining peace processes within mission areas in conflict environments in the continent. The activities involved in PSO have been galvanized by capacity building of personnel undertaking various roles at this level.

As a Centre of Excellence, the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) has been an integral part of this noble course informed by applied research and curriculum development. The COVID-19 pandemic has had an impact on these activities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in regards to capacity building. The Centre has not been immune to the effects of the

pandemic as our core mandate of conducting research and training at a regional level had been disrupted but partly resumed in the second half of the year. In this regard, we have been able to conduct training at both Karen and Embakasi campuses including but not limited to Countering Improvised Explosive Devices related courses, and the Female Military Soldiers Course.

The Research Department managed to conduct research activities including field research on Influence of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) Measures on Youth Resilience in Mombasa County, Assessing Maritime Security Coordination and Mechanisms, and Participation of Persons with Disabilities in Maritime Disaster Risk Reduction in Mombasa and Lamu Counties. The reports will be published soon. In addition, the 2020 Research Symposium will be held in Mombasa County as a culmination of the Research Agenda for the year which revolved around the coastal counties of Kenya. The Department also undertook curriculum development of various courses including Election monitoring and management, Dialogue, Negotiation and Mediation, and courses related to Countering Improvised Explosive Devices like All Arms Search Course, Improvised Explosive Device Mitigation course and Weapon Technical Intelligence Course among others. The Headquarters has been keen on bilateral and multilateral relations with IPSTC partners including partner states, international organizations, and, regional and sub-regional bodies. As a result, continuous engagement has continued with various visits, meetings and courtesy calls witnessed in this period.

All in all, it has taken a concerted effort from a dedicated team of IPSTC personnel representing the Headquarters, training platforms and research

department in Karen and Embakasi, to ensure that the milestones we have achieved against all odds can only serve to build our tenacity as the pandemic ravages on.

I would also like to offer my gratitude to our partners and friends who have always stood by the Centre to ensure that we continue being a premiere global research and training institution. I also wish to thank all external contributors who made time from their busy schedules to offer their insights and perspectives on the ongoing pandemic and the peace and security domain.

Finally, it is imperative that we continue observing laid down Covid-19 measures as directed by the

World Health Organization, our respective National Governments and the Ministries of Health. This will go a long way to ensure that we minimize the risk of exposure by breaking the chain of infections which would otherwise overwhelm our health facilities and frontline workers. This should be our individual responsibility first.

Thank you.



Brigadier C L Mwazighe

Director, IPSTC



The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) Headquarters, Karen-Nairobi, Kenya.



SILENCING THE GUNS: REMODELING STABILIZATION EFFORTS FOR 'A POST-AMISOM' SOMALIA

The origin of the war is traceable to the fall of Siad Barre. Various factors have in addition to this historic moment, exacerbated the situation. These are clan conflicts, emergence of groups such as the Islamic Courts Union, then to Al Shabaab. The spill-over effect of the conflict affected Somalia's neighbours including Kenya and Ethiopia. Irredentism, the shifto wars, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the refugee crisis among others were a constant threat to stability. Kenya was not a lone voice and actor in the calls for peace in the East African country. The international community either through individual state-sanctioned arrangements or through collective initiatives such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) saw attempts to ending the war.

The peacekeeping forces over the years, registered significant success as the AMISOM troops advanced, liberating territories from Al Shabaab control. These include Dhobley, Afmadhow, Tabda, Hosingow, Kismayu, Bardheere, Badhadhe, Kolbiyo, amongst other areas. The upholding of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 that are guiding documents to treatment of Prisoners of War and the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War were pivotal in tipping the scale in favour of the peacekeeping forces as they were able to gather intelligence on the activities of the enemy.

The above-mentioned advancement came at a price. Not only was the war chest

required to oil the peacekeeping juggernaut hefty, the counter-attacks by the Al Shabaab cost lives of our valiant troops. In El Adde, the force comprised of KDF troops registered significant casualties. Preceding attempts of similar attacks such as the one on Barawe Airport were however foiled. The ever-present threat of counter-improvised explosive devices (C-IEDs) was one that not only cost lives of the peacekeepers and humanitarian workers alike, it served a constant reminder of the asymmetric nature of the war. This compounded the actual measure of gains made in the fight against the Al Shabaab.

Just as there were mixed reactions to the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Somalia, similar reactions have been attracted by the projection by AMISOM to exit Somalia in 2021. Key questions are being posed to the concerned actors. With gradual drawback of AMISOM troops expected to continue, a myriad of questions linger in the minds of many; does the SNA have enough capacity in terms of personnel, equipment and finance to continue with the fight against Al Shabaab with the similar zeal and efficacy to that of the AMISOM forces? Who assures the safety of the local population in the liberated areas who at one point or another shared intelligence about the enemy to the peacekeeping troops? Are humanitarian agencies assured of the safety of their staff as they go about delivering vital services to the

Somali locals? If this is not assured, would the humanitarian agents be willing to operate in hostile environments? If not, then who assures the continuous access to these vital services for the vulnerable population? With the proliferation of small arms and light weapons a present threat within and beyond Somalia's borders, what happens to the gains made? What does the future hold in terms of sustainable solutions to the refugee crisis, being that Dadaab refugee camp is being shut down? These are just but a few questions that give a hypothetical projection of the 'life after AMISOM' for all to ponder.

Moving on to 'Silencing the guns by 2020'; the Flagship Project 5 of Agenda 2063, under aspiration 4 which calls for a peaceful and secure Africa is one of the main reasons as to why AMISOM on a planned exit from Somalia. Upon actualization, this Flagship Project envisions functional, multi-level mechanisms for peaceful prevention and resolution for Somalia as well as the entire African continent. This aspiration in my conviction is not an impossibility to achieve. A glimpse at my crystal ball reveals the following to me:

There is need for remodelling of the stabilization initiatives to a less of a 'barrel-oriented' approach to a more 'dialogue-oriented' one. In view of the fact that the war against the Al Shabaab in Somalia is asymmetric in nature, it makes sense to bring the group to the negotiation table where the 'delegate' is visible and can be

engaged within controlled confines, as opposed to meeting 'him' in the bush where not only is the enemy invisible, equipped with mastery of the war terrain, but there is no control of the terms of engagement. Major General (Rtd). Charles Mwanzia wrote an article that caught the attention of many in which he posited that Al Shabaab required to be heard so that their cause be understood. The best vehicle, according to his proposal was allowing them register a political party. Radical as it may sound, the effect of their recognition on the ballot has already seen a reduction in the number of attacks in Somalia.

Somalia has a people that need not be schooled on how to work hard. They have the acumen and intellectual fibre to stand on their own. What a majority of the youth however lack are the skills to allow them earn an income and further establish their own enterprises. Investment in Technical Training Centres in safe zones will allow them benefit from the training. The

repercussive effect is an empowered youth; a patriot who will have no reason to engage in activities that would destabilize his/her country.

Peace education is vital for the



AMISOM personnel in Somalia. Courtesy of peaceau.org

Somalia. With some of the conflicts being communal and clan-based, the need to equip the local/natural leaders with the skills to dialogue is key. This will go a long way in structuring the manner in which they approach conflict situations as well as how they raise their grievances. Further, for sustainability purposes, inclusion of peace education as part of their curriculum will nurture the future generations towards dialogue-oriented conflict resolution.

The presence of a big brother is key in mentorship. Somalia's Western allies such as EU, US, UK and so on have invested heavily

in the stabilization efforts in Somalia. They however face the challenge of trust on the basis of religion. The time has come for model states such as Qatar and Oman to assert their presence and goodwill in Somalia. Such would be ideal based on the fact that they have presented exemplary models of industrialization and development, putting the citizen's wellbeing at the centre. Mentorship towards sobriety in leadership and development would best be approached and delivered by them

The pursuit for stability in Somalia with the guns silent is no farfetched. The discussion on how long it may take would not be ideal, for the moment. Equally, the debate on whether to go federal or unitary is one that will play out at the right time, by the Somali people themselves. What is key at the moment is what needs to be done, by who, when and how for the sake of peace in Somalia. God bless the Federal republic of Somalia.

By Michael Sitawa Ph.D.

Michael Sitawa Ph.D. is a Researcher at the Applied Research Section of the Peace & Security Research Department (PSRD) at the International Peace Support Training Centre.

THE THREAT POSED BY IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDs) IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS

Somalia is a country plagued by internal turmoil that has consumed almost all social and political fiber that can make a functioning state. However, efforts have been made to address and restore order to a country that has been long thawing in to a lawless territory now sailing towards a redemption path.

As this efforts continue in earnest, the threat posed by Al Shabaab insurgents in Somalia is grave given the asymmetrical warfare they employ with total disregard of laid down International Law instruments pertaining to the conduct of hostilities including the Hague Conventions. In this case, the insurgents in Somalia on numerous occasions have disrupted the ongoing peace operations, political processes and humanitarian interventions in Somalia. They continuously breach Protocol 1 and 2 of the 1980 Geneva convention on Non-detectable fragments and on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices respectively. There is therefore a crucial need to train troops on pre-deployment or those already operating in-mission from various Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and Police Contributing Countries (PCC) operating in AMISOM on various rigorous and regular trainings related to Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (CIED) in response to these breaches. This will go a long way in 'preparing the forces (PtF), attacking the network (AtN), and defeating the device (DtD'.

To enhance this training, various

national governments including Kenya and the United Kingdom; International Organizations like the United Nations (UN) together with the African Union (AU) have partnered in order to build this capacity. UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has always played an integral part in capacity building on mitigating and responding to IED threats. They have trained peacekeeping personnel (military and police), PSO civilian personnel, and national government security forces working in an IED threat environment. UNMAS has also offered their expertise towards developing curricular on various CIED training platforms in eastern Africa and the globe.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

Improvised Explosive Devices are categories of unconventional explosive weapons that are assembled or constructed in various forms and can be activated in any number of ways. The sole purpose of IEDs is to disrupt military convoys and patrols, supply routes for humanitarian aid, and movement of local population. They are also used to inflict maximum bodily harm to injure, maim or kill its targets and victims. Due to their unstable nature, IEDs have been known to explode pre-maturely while under construction or before a perpetrator can set it up in a desired location. There are three different types of IEDs:

- a) Timed IEDs are initiated by a timing mechanism

that can be in the form of an electronic or mechanical timer set to trigger an explosion at a desired time decided by a perpetrator.

- b) Command initiated IEDs are initiated by a command wire, radio control or a suicide switch at the moment the terrorist decides. Hence, a terrorist can carry out a targeted attack.




An IED constructed to be initiated remotely. Courtesy of AOAV.org

- c) Victim operated IEDs are set by the perpetrator and mounted on a victim or the perpetrator. The mechanism used to initiate might be a trip wire or a pressure pad.

Components of an IED


Various materials make up the components of an IED and this is because perpetrators make use of materials conveniently

available and at their disposal to construct IEDs. IEDs also come in different forms and sizes and include pipe bombs filled with materials like gun powder; larger IEDs may contain more concentrated explosive materials that may be delivered as Vehicle-borne explosive devices. It is important to also note that IEDs have their own characteristics common to each type. These characteristics combined form the acronym PIES (Power source, Initiator, Explosive main charge, and Switch).



An illustration showing components of an IED using PIES. Courtesy of Pinterest.

The Power source is a device that stores or releases electrical or mechanical energy to close an IED's switch and activate the initiator. In this regard, the initiator ignites the process of detonation by triggering the explosive main charge through electric or non-electric means. The explosive main charge is quantity of high explosive, either commercial, homemade, or military-grade chemicals; or low explosives intended to detonate into an explosion.



An example of an IED and its components

The switch is used for making, breaking, or changing a connection between an IED's power source and initiator. It can be configured in various ways and operated on command through the use of a button or radio control according to time set on a digital clock or by a victim using tripwire mechanism. Enhancements such as shrapnel in form of nails, pins, marbles, and ball bearings may be deliberately added to IEDs in order to increase their physical and psychological effects. Further to this, fuel in the form of propane or other gas tanks, a chemical, biological, or radiological agent can be used.

Effects of IEDs

In Somalia, the impact of IEDs has been devastating on the national Government and the larger PSO environment affecting civilians and humanitarian workers. In 2016, a report by the Secretary General of the UN (A/71/187) titled Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices asserted that "...Annually, IED attacks kill and injure more people than any other type of weapon except firearms. ...from 2011 to 2015 [...] there were more than 6,300 recorded IED explosions, resulting in over 105,000 casualties." Between 2017 and 2019, IED attacks perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Somalia led to over 5,000 casualties and about 2,000 fatalities. This was capped by a truck-borne IED in an attack that targeted civilians claiming over 80 lives in Mogadishu, Somalia.

Responding to the Threat of IEDs

As IEDs continue to plague this

arena, the UN & AU operations, and individual states' military activities must remain prepared to fortify CIED programs in order to navigate these asymmetrical threats. It is therefore imperative to employ this through capacity building on understanding explosive hazards and hazardous materials like Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) which can be used as components of IEDs. They must also enhance capacity on search in terms of concealed explosives on humans, in vehicles and also those buried or hidden on the ground and riverbeds.

Ground Sign Awareness must also be instilled through training to ensure that troops on patrols are able to identify possible threat areas, and react accordingly to neutralize the threat. This can be in terms of disarming the device, cordoning off the threat area, and advising humanitarian actors and local civilians on how to react in situations where they come across suspicious packages or objects; and signs to look out for that warn of danger of IEDs in an area.



Aftermath of a Vehicle-borne IED explosion in Somalia. Courtesy of Criticalthreats.org

In addition, weapon technical intelligence must be instilled among military and police personnel in-charge of responding to these threats. This

helps to enable investigations and preservation of materials that can be potential evidence in defeating the network. To this effect, protection within the conflict environment of mission personnel will always remain a paramount priority for the sake of the mission, mission personnel and the local population and humanitarian actors who make up the civilian component.

IED Risk Mitigation

IED risk mitigation should ensure that all actors operating in an IED threat environment are protected. This means that they must be exposed to capacity building that will complement their main training. This will ensure they adapt and adjust to the changing nature of conflict and the dynamics that inform every theatre. The AMISOM IED-Risk Mitigation pocket handbook informs that it is also important to

have those responsible for IED risk management know that complacency in their actions can lead to an operation failing thus putting the mission objective in jeopardy. Their failure can also lead to casualties and fatalities. Vulnerable Points (VPs) and Vulnerable Areas (VAs) must always be protected through implementation of laid down tactical responses and counter-measures in case of an IED attack. While enacting tactical responses, all personnel earmarked for this activity must suit the terrain and those required to implement these tactics must have available sustainable equipment for the assessed threat picture to ensure that capability can match the potential risks identified. The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) has been at the forefront of ensuring that all relevant personnel are mission ready through the various

trainings at strategic, operational and tactical levels on CIED. The applied research and curriculum development sections are key players to informing and setting up deliverables for training dissemination. These courses have always complemented pre-deployment training and other mission preparedness oriented courses that are pre-requisite to embarking on any Peace Support Operations (PSO) related mission. IPSTC, partners and stakeholders have been consistently involved with ensuring that these capacity building avenues run the course informed by relevant materials geared towards achieving the set learning outcomes and module objectives. They have played a big role towards reaching for an environment of sustainable peace and security in Eastern Africa and beyond.

By Watson Karuma

Watson Karuma works in the Peace and Security Department. He has vested interests in Peace Support Operations avenues for sustainable peace and security in Africa. He has trained in Security Sector Reform, The Women, Peace and Security Agenda, and Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution. He has a Bachelor's Degree in International Relations with a Concentration in Peace and Conflict, and Development Studies.

COVID-19 IMPACT ON UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

Every year, thousands of civilians face numerous threats during armed conflicts. Millions get attacked, injured, killed, displaced, face starvation and sexual violence among others. Since its formation in 1945, the United Nations (UN) as an international organization, has been deploying peacekeeping missions to minimize the suffering of civilians in war zones, and to allow for ceasefires and political settlements. As such peacekeepers play a crucial role in promoting peace in different conflict zones across the globe. As of April 2020, there were 13 active peacekeeping missions with more than 82,000 UN peacekeepers drawn from 117 different countries. COVID-19 is a global pandemic and has affected UN member states with cases being reported in all troop or police contributing or host countries. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is a highly transmittable and pathogenic viral infection caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome, coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), which emerged in Wuhan, China in November 2019. The disease has since spread gradually to all parts of the world and has already affected UN peacekeeping missions. Historically, peace operations have responded to crises before, especially ones related to natural disasters and public health emergencies at a low to medium scale. For example, the earthquake and cholera outbreak in Haiti (2010), Ebola virus outbreak in Liberia and Sierra Leone (2014-2016) as well as the Democratic Republic of

Congo (2018-2020).

Indeed, from the very beginning of the crisis, several measures were adopted by the United Nations in order to avoid the spread of the virus. The UN Headquarters (HQ) in New York was severely affected by the coronavirus than any of the UN's peace operations. It introduced social distancing measures, and apart from a few essential staff, the rest were all working from home. The UN Security Council resorted to meeting remotely and voting in writing when needed. In most cases, where mandate renewals were due, they were technically rolled-over until the next renewal date. Similar steps were taken by the African Union (AU) and European Union (EU). On March 6, the UN stopped rotating its troops in and out of conflict zones until 30 June this year. Several missions have been forced to quarantine their personnel and impose teleworking means. These measures, although preventive, will have a proven impact on the implementation of the already complex mandates, because despite stretching the health crisis, peacekeepers must keep the peace. In these circumstances of forced confinement and reduced patrols on the ground, the COVID-19 crisis could give way to the creation of new militias and armed groups, accelerating the fragmentation already present in the territories affected by the violence. Additionally, the armed groups may take an advantage to gain ground and perpetrate more violence against the civilian population.

In response to the pandemic, the activities of peacekeepers have now been confined to critical functions in order to limit the impact and spread of the coronavirus. Peace operations have had to assess which functions and operational activities are critical and which can be paused until the crisis is over. Essential functions across missions include: patrols and activities related to protection of civilians, convoy escorts and other forms of support to humanitarian assistance, force protection, protecting key infrastructure, support to host state institutions and local authorities. For example, in the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM), all movement of personnel has been limited to that which is essential, all rotations and new deployments have been suspended, and civilian staff outside Somalia are working from home and non-critical staff were moved out of Mogadishu. The UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a whole battalion that recently rotated into the country is under 14-day quarantine. In the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA), staff have been further identified not only as non-essential or critical, but also location-based versus non-location based to adapt to COVID-19 restrictions. The UN peacekeeping mission The African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), Sudan has quarantined most of its staff because of fears the spread of the coronavirus. Some of these missions have had to initiate mandatory track and trace procedures that are part of the standard operating procedures

while providing medical monitoring of the situation.

Peace operations have also introduced measures including robust hygiene and social distancing policies, to avoid spreading the disease to host populations and to protect staff. Meetings have been minimized and even done virtually / remotely. Most national and international staff in all peace operations either work from home or in their accommodations. In some locations, working from home may mean no or poor internet connection and power failures. In many missions, non-essential staff or those with medical conditions were given the option to leave, but by now most borders have closed and staff are locked in place. This means that staff can no longer go on leave, including for medical reasons. Due to these travel restrictions and border closures, the civilian, police, and military components have had to make sacrifices with no option. For example, some units may have already been deployed for almost a year, and staying in the mission longer means that they cannot be reunited with their families for several more months. Missions have to make difficult choices to balance their duty of care to staff and their obligations to implement their mandates. The global reach of the pandemic, which means that all the missions have to manage this crisis simultaneously, is also placing enormous strain on headquarters. However, the recent UN reforms, especially the delegation of authority to heads of mission, have enabled UN missions to make these kinds of adaptations much more rapidly

than would have been the case in the past.

Some missions have suspended their quick-impact project plans and are now reallocating these funds to support the efforts of local and national institutions to contain the spread of COVID-19. Limiting operations to the essentials will help to prevent and contain the virus, but in the medium to long term, the ability of missions to achieve their mandated benchmarks and objectives will be impacted. In many cases, peacekeepers and observers are not able to access the conflict zone. As a result, women, children, displaced persons and other vulnerable groups who are affected by fighting in these zones are not able to receive humanitarian support on time. Since 23 March 2020, the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres called for an immediate ceasefire in war zones all over the world, such as in Yemen and Syria. This was designed to allow humanitarian workers to reach the most vulnerable populations affected by the coronavirus pandemic. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project report, armed actors took steps towards ceasefires only in 10 out of 43 countries currently fighting organized armed conflicts. Since the call for a global ceasefire, conflict incidents in some of these countries have increased instead of reducing. Civilians in war zones are forced to live in fear of both visible armed actors and the invisible coronavirus. The shared challenge has also resulted in closer cooperation among peacekeeping missions and the rest of the UN system. UN agencies are relying on missions for medical treatment,

protection, and evacuation, and missions and agencies are cooperating on the procurement and distribution of personal protection equipment and other COVID-19 related equipment.

There are very many complex interlinked dynamics that need to be factored into future planning. In the context of a global recession, peace operation budgets are likely to shrink. Troop and police contributing countries may prioritize domestic operations especially those countries that have contributed most peacekeepers in the past like Ethiopia, Rwanda, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. They may come under domestic pressure to reduce troop numbers for financial or coronavirus risk-related reasons. Missions may also not be able to support, supply and care for the same number of staff that was possible before COVID-19. Mandates will need to be adapted to the new risks, realities and needs.

Peacekeeping is entering a period of major change. As seen over the past four years, there has been a steady decline in the number of peacekeepers deployed worldwide and closure of two UN missions in Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia in 2017 and 2018 respectively while other mission may face draw down in the future. These developments hint that UN peacekeeping may appear poised to face a significant reduction in a medium term due to financial and practical challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2008 global financial crisis already contracted UN peacekeeping funds by approximately 20 percent, and

the COVID-19 pandemic may reduce it by a further 30 to 50 percent. The current budget places United Nations peacekeeping operations at \$6.5 billion for the fiscal year 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020. In comparison, the total world military expenditure was estimated at over \$1.8 trillion in 2018. According to the UN, the 2019-2020 budget represents an average of 1.9% reduction on the approved budget for 2018-2019 with top contributors being United States (27.89%), China (15.21%), Japan (8.56%), Germany (6.09%), United

Kingdom (5.79%), France (5.61%), Italy (3.30%), Russian Federation (3.04%), Canada (2.73%) and Republic of Korea (2.26%). The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations during the first meeting of its 2020 substantive session (17 February 2020) discussed on the need for greater funding of peacekeeping operations. This pandemic has equally affected the top contributors and their resilience even for the powerful states will temporarily inform the financial ability of future UN or AU missions.

Peacekeeping must therefore continue to be part of a holistic strategy that include prevention of conflicts and the building of a lasting peace. It must also be adaptive to realities and unprecedented crises both low and large scale in nature. There is need to strengthen the planning, crisis management and simulation of related scenarios for future coping mechanisms and preparedness. It is also high time to fully harness the use of technology in peace keeping.

By Catherine Cherotich

Catherine Cherotich is a member of Directing Staff at the Peace and Conflict Studies School (PCSS) at the International Peace Support Training Centre.

ENGENDERING PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: A CONTINUOUS AGENDA FOR THE MILITARY

In October this year, the international community will commemorate the twentieth anniversary since the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, generally accepted as the founding document of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. The case for the novelty of UNSCR 1325 as both a Security Council Resolution and a wide-ranging policy artefact has been interrogated and prosecuted by many gender enthusiasts as well as peace and security pundits. This and a host of related Resolutions have been domesticated and implemented by States, Regional Economic Communities and Mechanisms through Action Plans (NAPs).

Kenya launched her second generation NAP in May this year. The first NAP covered the period 2016 – 2018 and registered several successes in line with WPS aspirations. A key achievement by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was development of the gender policy which was the first in the history of Kenya's military and was launched as part of the Defence Ministry's WPS interventions. This led to the development of a gender-responsive communication framework. As a result, the use of 'service men/women' became institutionalised. It also led to an institutional commitment to the participation and promotion of women in peace and security work which led to more women officers being sent to peacekeeping missions. In addition, women were elevated to high-level leadership in the Ministry and enhancement of

training of the military on Sexual and Gender Based Violence.

With this appreciation, the interest of many keen admirers of the WPS agenda is to interrogate how well we have engendered the PSO theatre and what is the rationale behind the push for mainstreaming gender in PSO. While it is generally expected that a higher proportion of female peacekeepers will improve relations between peacekeepers and civilians, reduce levels of sexual violence and abuse, and advance the cause of peace building, female peacekeepers may of course also contribute to mission failure and to cultures of impunity, and may themselves engage in exploitation. This qualification goes directly to the distinction between gender balancing, which means increasing the number of women in a given role in a way that approaches parity and gender mainstreaming which means integrating a gender perspective into the activities of an organization, thereby institutionalizing an understanding of the myriad ways in which gender matters.

The call for more representation of women in peace operations tends to be essentialist in nature. A study undertaken in 1995 by the UN Division for Advancement of Women found that 'men behave well when in the presence of women from their own culture ... as it more closely resembles civilian society. Owing to the nurturing caring, empathetic and peaceful nature of women, the study showed that the pacifying presence of women

peacekeepers in PSO represent a significant improvement in the professional behaviour of male peacekeepers. These signs of improvement include reduced aggressiveness and hypermasculinity, and increased civilised behaviour among men sometimes while interacting with the local population. This brings a broadened repertoire of skills and styles available within the mission, often with the effect of reducing conflict and confrontation among others. Women presence in PSO also shows significant improvement in behaviour from local women such as improved access and support from the local women, and local women being able to confide in them on matters relating to rape, and other forms of violence. Ensuring gender balance in PSO may be one of the ways to approach the thorny issue of Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) because it may be easier for victims to approach a female peacekeeper than a male one. The hyper masculine culture that exists in most militaries increases the likelihood that peacekeepers will engage in acts of sexual exploitation and abuse of local populations. However, the problem is that peace operations, unlike war, often require the kind of sensitivity and empathy that may have been discouraged by military training.

The rationale for integrating gender in PSOs is immensely argued in peace and security discourse but how smooth is the gender mainstreaming road in PSOs? Severe challenges are evident before and during deployment. This explains why

despite an increase in absolute numbers, the overall share of women in peacekeeping – especially in the military components – remains small. As of May 2019, women occupied only 4.7% of military posts and 14.5% of police posts in UN peace operations. Some of the challenges include sexual and gender based harassment, stipulated years of experience to qualify for deployment, mandatory fitness tests, UN minimum criteria for deployment such as driving 4X4 vehicles, inadequate accommodation, facilities and equipment disproportionately affecting female personnel, lack of adequate family friendly policies such as child support for mothers among other challenges.

To conclude, UN peacekeeping has made considerable progress

in terms of inserting the experiences of women into its mandates and missions ever since UNSCR 1325 was authorized in 2000. Gender content in peace operation mandates has increased at a particularly high rate, indicating that understandings of armed conflict and priorities in peacekeeping have shifted radically. However, a view of gendered conflict that revolves primarily around sexual violence and women's protection still predominates. What is needed for a more comprehensive implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda is an approach that more carefully considers the plethora of other forms of violence and conflict dynamics that affect women differentially in situations of conflict and that, crucially, centralizes women's agency.

The less than impressive track record of women's deployment in peace operations further suggests that change is also needed in the armed forces of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), where such gender imbalances originate. Amidst such efforts to more actively involve women in peacekeeping in order to remedy their historical marginalization, it is important to remember that gender does not equate women. In the long term, a truly gender-sensitive approach to peacekeeping will need to move beyond the (often simplified and universalizing) focus on women and girls to consider also men and boys both victims of conflicts and agents of change.

By Daniel M. Wathome

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The Peace & Conflict Studies School (PCSS) at IPSTC-Karen where strategic level courses on the spectrum of conflict prevention, management and post-conflict recovery are conducted

BUILDING RESILIENCE IN THE FACE OF A PANDEMIC

“The future of peace and prosperity that we seek for all the world's people needs a foundation of tolerance, security, equality and justice” Kofi Atta Annan, Ghanaian diplomat.

The prevailing parley on peace and conflict in Africa depicts a conflict-ridden continent, characterised by continued conflict and having the worst refugee and internal migration crisis. 'Over 46 million people, almost twice the global number of refugees, have been uprooted from their own countries due to conflict and violence in Africa', remarked the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). These conflicts are often embroiled within complex local, national, regional, political, and economic policy structures. The increasing threat by Islamic extremism in some regions has made the continent more vulnerable to conflict. Over the past two decades, Africa has experienced numerous conflicts stemming from issues like political power, resources, insecurity, religion, and identity. However, we are unlikely to resolve them unless we pay serious attention to the instigators of violence which are illicit flow of weapons, internal political turmoil, lack of functioning government structures, and poverty, among others. As a result, the most critical among the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)- the end of all kinds of poverty by the year 2030, and SDG 16 could likely be missed by Africa, as the World Bank estimates that 20% of all people

in Sub-Saharan Africa will still be living in poverty by 2030 hosting 90% of the world's poor unless African governments significantly scale up their poverty alleviation efforts to which peace and conflict resolution are pivotal.

The already appalling situation has further been exacerbated by the highly contagious novel COVID-19 pandemic which in a period of ten months has spread across 213 countries vitiating over six million lives globally. Measures to curtail its progression have had both social, economic, and political implications on individuals, regional and global economies. With supply chains fragmenting, food supplies stifled, towering prices and economic indicators suggesting a deep recession, fragility is evident. Given the challenge that many East African countries face with weak health systems, the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on public health, peace and security in the region are atrocious. Not only will this construe into rising unemployment and food insecurity, but it could escalate into political unrest, violence, and conflict threatening peace in the region and the continent at large. Therefore, addressing peace and security in the context of a pandemic calls for a well-tailored socio-economic revolution aimed at building stronger and resilient societies, and these will premise the proceeding discussion.

The uncoordinated control measures both at regional and sub regional level are

detrimental to regional peace and security. In Eastern Africa, most countries in response to COVID-19 have declared a state of emergency and restricted movement except in instances of access to essential supplies such as food and medical care, among others. However, the World Bank, noted that communities relying heavily on humanitarian relief may face acute threats as particular populations may also face added dangers due to racial discrimination, age, and gender. Also, the gap stemming from uncoordinated responses has left regional borders porous creating room for terrorist activity and endangering innocent civilians in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, who have been victimized by terrorist attacks in the past. However, the current security situation in the region needs to be comprehended through a regional lens because a regional framework allows for a well-tailored approach that confronts the challenge, promotes economic development, upholds human rights, recognizes the contexts in which states operate and generates solutions consistent with regional norms which builds the necessary trust and confidence. Therefore, regional organizations could be extremely important actors in securing the regional territory.

The pandemic's containment measures could affect peace and stability due to their impacts on the socio-economic wellbeing of the people. Some of these measures like business closure, curfews have been

accompanied by limited or no strategies to address the unintended consequences. Harsh realities of high unemployment, inequalities, and poverty in most countries in the region could become a real security threat as some victims especially the youths and informal sector workers who constitute a significant percentage in the region could find themselves pushed into violent crime or extremism. Addressing the aforementioned threat necessitates a paradigm shift in the 'modus-operandi' of development practitioners towards addressing the intrinsic needs of the societies through a bottom up approach. According to the World Bank, inclusive engagement builds stronger physical infrastructure and government institutions at all levels. This further ensures that interventions are in line with the priorities and assets of the affected communities affected

by conflict which are important for rebuilding of economies, creating sustainable economic opportunities, allowing for social cohesion and building social capital which are pivotal for peace building.

Due to some response measures regarding the pandemic, gender-based violence and other forms of violence against minorities will increase. The UN reported that domestic violence against women and girls has intensified in countries where lockdown or stay at home orders have been implemented due to food and economic insecurities and forced school closure. This is set to intensify as at least 1.5 billion children and young people are sent home from their schools and universities. Also, incidences of violence perpetuated by security forces deployed to enforce curfews and containment measures are being reported across the region. Such aggression is

deleterious to peace and security as some may convert it to bad motives. Therefore, urgent action to protect women and children also addressing the socio-economic gaps created by the pandemic should be taken.

Conclusively, the COVID-19 pandemic with its far-reaching effects is revealing the weaknesses in every country socially, economically, and politically also, heightening security related problems, therefore, peace and security measures contextualized in the pandemic should be arrived at by developing comprehensive risk management strategies not solely centred on repressive military action but anchored on address the social, economic and political challenges among the citizenry through policy, government and private sector action.

By Ejoku Jireh

Ejoku Jireh is a Sociology graduate from the Catholic University of Eastern Africa. A passionate writer and researcher who holds the view that addressing issues affecting the African continent calls for a robust and inclusive discussion to which writing is paramount. He is a winner of the 2020 World Refugee Day essay published on the official UNHCR website. He maintains a Blogspot on Blogger - "QUICK READS" on which he discusses contemporary issues ranging from politics, economics, and social wellbeing.

KEY VISITS AND EVENTS AT IPSTC

During this period, the Centre had the privilege of hosting various dignitaries, subject matter experts and course participants who through their support and invaluable input have made IPSTC to scale the heights of striving to make the Centre a premier Peace Support Operations training centre.



Director IPSTC Brigadier Charles L Mwazighe received sanitisers by Total Kenya from the French Defence Attaché to Kenya Colonel Marc De Block on 29 July 2020.



The 22nd Regional Senior Mission Leaders (RSML) course was conducted at the IPSTC Peace and Conflict Studies School from 23 November to 4 December 2020.



The Deputy Ambassador of Japan H.E. Kitagawa Yasuhisa closed the Introduction to Maritime Security and Blue Economy Course on 9 October 2020. In attendance was Brigadier Charles L Mwazighe, Director IPSTC



The Director, IPSTC Brigadier Charles L Mwazighe hosted the British High Commissioner to Kenya H.E. Jane Marriot, OBE at HPSS on 25 August 2020.



Participants from the Female Soldiers course follow proceedings during the opening ceremony by H. E. Mrs Aline Kuster-Menager Ambassador of France on 19 October 2020.



The Director IPSTC Brigadier Charles L. Mwazighe hosted the Swiss Ambassador to Kenya H.E. Valentine Zellweger and the Swiss Deputy Head of Mission Ms Manuella Leimgruber on 26 November 2020.



Maj Mwachinalo gives his presentation during the IPSTC Annual symposium which was held at the Pride-Inn Town Centre Hotel in Mombasa on 17 December 2020.



The Tabletop Exercise on Design, Development, Delivery and Evaluation Course on disaster risk management ended on 16 October 2020 at HPSS. The closing ceremony was graced by Commandant HPSS Colonel H C Maghanga.

IS IT TIME FOR AN ADDITIONAL AFRICAN UNION DEPLOYMENT SCENARIO?

If there is one thing that the COVID-19 Pandemic has shown the world is that we are never really prepared on how to handle crisis. This has become more difficult especially in complex environment set ups that are already strained by conflicts and other pressing demands. Previously, disasters like the Haiti Hurricane in 2011 or the Japan Earthquake (2016) have shown us that they have potential to either destabilize or strengthen international cooperation for continued sustainable development. However, COVID-19 due to its global nature has tested the shared principles of cooperation across states. Moreover, within African states it has strained health structures, restricted trade and movement and even affected the interaction between the citizenry within their political and religious outfits thus triggering state instability and tensions. For states undergoing conflict reconstruction and peace building, the pandemic has threatened the relapse to conflict as peace talks have been stalled, resources have been reallocated to manage the bulging health crisis and

even postponed elections and constitutional changes.

PSO missions though civilian headed, are military guided, handled and conceptualized. Could this be the reason why they take the longer route to achieve their envisioned mandating objectives especially in Africa? The existing six Africa Standby Force ASF scenarios are linked to peace and security

mandate to address humanitarian disasters in Darfur (AMID) and the Ebola Assistance Mission to West Africa. This paper opens up a discussion to re-evaluate the existing six deployment scenarios and possibly conceptualize an additional one that deals with ASF within a HANDS mandate in a PSO set up.

The continent has experienced different types of disasters resulting from a diversity of hazards, such as pandemics, epidemics, landslides, droughts, fire, floods, locust and army worm invasions, collapsed buildings, ship and wrecks among others. To meet the needs of communities affected by such hazards, the ASF through a specified

scenario can support natural and human induced disaster relief operations by performing various roles and tasks in support to humanitarian actions. These tasks and roles include creating a secure environment, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, protection of civilians, humanitarian disaster relief operations, and training; that are not limited to just coordination of efforts but aimed at alleviating human suffering and supporting host nations



AMISOM troops offering humanitarian assistance to residence of a village in Somalia. Courtesy of Amisom-au.org

issues essentially, and do not per se mention the role of the ASF in Humanitarian Assistance and Natural Disaster Support (HANDS), in terms of prevention, response to humanitarian crisis and early recovery. Hence, they may not be necessarily the basis for intervention in HANDS, although ASF might already be deployed under one of those scenarios when requested to support in HANDS. Already the Africa Union (AU) has had some form of deployment that had the

fragile structures, emergency protocols and mechanisms in full respect of civil military coordination and humanitarian principles.


The proposed scenario seven will cover humanitarian and natural disasters and will be civilian heavy in all aspects but with support elements of military and police components to support and provide assistance. It will deal directly with provision of needed assistance and support to existing host nations capabilities, identifying areas of intervention and advocating for early warning and early

interventions to address the root causes so as to alleviate human suffering including meeting their immediate protection and assistance needs and supporting conditions. Support by the military component of the ASF should be envisaged as a last resort, especially in times of armed conflict as per the existing international guidelines like those developed by the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on the use of Foreign Military Civil Defence Assets. The role of the military in the facilitation of humanitarian assistance, should not contravene the promotion of core humanitarian principles in

crisis situations. Currently, in the situation of armed conflict, the ASF may rapidly intervene, when mandated, either on request of a member State or in the case of grave circumstances, and progressively deploy multidimensional peace support operations. Furthermore, in extreme circumstances, where no other alternative exists to alleviate the suffering of the population, ASF might justify the use of the military in such relief operations, as stated in the AU Humanitarian Policy Framework.

By Kelvin Karanja

Kelvin Karanja is a Security and Governance consultant with more than 5 years in experience and training with particular interests in Humanitarian Civil-Military relations, Conflict transformation, Observation and Analysis of policy guidelines. Kelvin is a rooster member of the Eastern Africa Standby Force as a civilian planner and facilitator. He works for a security governance consultancy firm called POLAD House. His academic background is Law from the Kenya School of Law and International studies from the University of Nairobi.



HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE)

Violent extremism is a common phenomenon, that is active even during the COVID-19 pandemic. A lack of vigilance and continued high alert can lead to attacks. The Violent extremist groups have been actively involved in local recruitment of youth, promising them incentives. Due to desperation and unemployment, the youth have fallen for their trap and become part of the extremist groups. However, in an effort to curb violent extremism, there is need to realize that the violent extremists are human beings too, and that they have human rights to be protected.

Measures taken by governments to prevent violent extremism are diverse and include a wide array of initiatives, which are intended to target different groups of individuals or local communities and involve diverse series of activities. Some measures target 'extremist' speech and restrict free expression, while some focus on building community resilience or addressing the underlying conditions that may drive individuals to join violent extremist groups. Some countries also provide programs involving individual interventions, such as counselling or mentoring (HRC, 2020). However, some of the measures have the potential to violate specific fundamental human rights and freedoms. From a human rights perspective, measures that target individuals or groups based on misconceptions about their susceptibility to violent extremism are particularly concerning as such an approach can be discriminatory

and stigmatize various groups and communities (minority, ethnic, religious or indigenous groups).

This approach is also in conflict with Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which guarantees equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground, as well as equality before the law and equal protection of the law (UN, 2017). Furthermore, initiatives to prevent violent extremism also carry some risk of negatively affecting the right to privacy, as well as the freedoms of expression, association, and religion or belief, which are also guaranteed by the ICCPR. Measures taken on the basis of suspicion may violate fair trial guarantees or other human rights standards such the presumption of innocence or due process, while measures that involve educational institutions can have a potential to infringe on the right to education. Some countries have also considered amending aspects of their national legislation to prevent the internal movement or entry of individuals considered to be "extremist", which can have a serious impact on freedom of movement of the individual and on the right of refugees from protection under the 1951 Convention (Busher, 2017).

While military campaigns and state capacity to counter terrorism are essential components of combatting groups such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, the question of how such force is delivered, and in particular its impacts on local populations, is critical to long-

term success. The Journey to Extremism dataset provides startling new evidence of just how directly counter-productive security driven responses can be, when conducted insensitively. It highlights widespread mistrust in the police and military in the countries under review, with skepticism particularly rampant among voluntary group respondents. State security agency conduct is a direct trigger for recruitment in the final stages of the journey to extremism, with as many as 71 percent of the voluntary group pointing to 'government action', including traumatic incidents involving state security forces, as the immediate reason for joining (UNDP, 2017).

UNDP's Youth Strategy (2014-2017), aligned with UNDP's Strategic Plan, the United Nations System-wide Action Plan on Youth and the UN guiding principles for youth participation in peacebuilding (2014) articulates UNDP's vision for youth empowerment and engaging with youth as a positive force for change. The new (2015) Resolution 2250 of the UN Security Council on youth, peace and security recognizes the rise of radicalization and violent extremism, and stresses the importance of addressing conditions and factors leading to their impact on youth. The Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism recommends youth participation, leadership and empowerment as core to the UN's strategy and responses. The European Union launched its Strategy on Counter-Terrorism in 2005, which placed emphasis on

the promotion of “good governance, human rights, democracy as well as education and economic prosperity, and engaging in conflict resolution” and on “targeting inequalities and discrimination where they exist and promoting inter-cultural dialogue and long-term integration where appropriate.” That strategy has since been updated in 2008 and, most recently, in January 2014, in line with evolving trends, means and patterns of radicalization (UNDP, 2016).

Preventing violent extremism is a high-priority policy area for which the European Union (EU) has a range of external action tools at its disposal that connect the internal and external dimensions of EU policy in Europe. While violent extremism is primarily addressed within the context of security-based counter-terrorism measures, all EU interventions to prevent violent extremism are bound to adhere to a ‘do no harm and do maximum good’ principle, meaning that no intervention should cause human rights violations, exacerbate divisions between institutions and communities or worsen existing grievances. Furthermore, all preventive measures undertaken by member states of the EU must be in compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and respect the right to private life, the right to security, the right to data protection, the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial and due process, freedom of expression and freedom of religion; while preserving the right to liberty and security of European citizens (ASEM, 2018).

The EU has issued several policies

and communications relating to violent extremism. In 2016, the European Commission issued a Communication on Supporting the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violent Extremism in which it calls for a comprehensive approach in “preventing radicalization to violent extremism”. The document stresses that violent extremism is a complex phenomenon that calls for an in-depth knowledge and a multi-faceted response across several policy areas and various actors, including authorities and civil society at a local, regional and European level. The communication identifies key areas related to the prevention of violent extremism, including the promotion of inclusive education and EU common values, and an open and resilient society, which reaches out to its younger generations (ASEM, 2018).

Turkey's current CVE strategy, which significantly erodes human rights, has led to an increase in violent extremism. In recent months, Turkey has seen an unprecedented rise in terrorist attacks prompting security forces to crack down on peaceful dissent under the pretense of combatting terrorism. Turkey's response has included arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings, torture and the restriction of freedom of speech. According to Weise (2016) at Foreign Policy, “besides endangering lives and rights, the government's anti-terrorism campaign appears to be woefully ineffective: Far from reining in terror, it may produce yet more.” The, PKK, the terrorist group responsible for the March attacks in Ankara, cited Turkish security forces' human rights

abuses at Cizre as the immediate motivation for the attack. The poorly designed CVE strategy's disregard for human rights has exacerbated already wide divisions between the government and dissenting groups, leading to an increase in violent extremism.

Education is one of the most important tools to reach young people and can be used to address some of the “push and pull factors” that may drive young people towards violent extremism. Education can act as a preventive measure by making young people more resilient citizens and by strengthening their emotional, intellectual and psychological development (Ratna Ghosh, 2016), but it can also play a role in promoting respect for diversity, inclusion and human rights. Furthermore, good education enables people to obtain jobs, qualify for higher income levels and generate productivity gains which fuel economic development. Education can also help youth to counter violent extremism narratives by helping them to become critical thinkers and equipping them with, for example, media and information literacy. At the same time, however, education can be leveraged to radicalize young people, and used to exacerbate existing tensions and divisions, foster exclusion and inequality, and promote harmful ideologies and behavior (Saltarelli, 2000). Thus, while it is important that education is inclusive, non-discriminatory and encouraging of participation and multiple viewpoints, education initiatives should also look beyond the classroom and into the broader mechanisms of governance and representation

to address the root causes that underlie different forms of violence and violent extremism (INEE, 2017).

Countries suffering from the growth of violent extremism often have rule of law systems ill-equipped to deal with this rising phenomenon or have failed to effectively implement the laws that are in place. Many countries that form part of this project lack the legal capacity to effectively prosecute those that have been engaged in criminal activities related to violent extremism. Due to the non-conventional way extremists engage in violence, many states respond by going above the law, thereby often making the State increasingly part of the problem, rather than the response: such actions easily feed into the narrative of extremists and exacerbate the perception amongst certain communities that they are treated unjustly by the state. The challenges are often amplified by the failure to develop regional wide approaches, helping to curb cross-border tensions and the tendency for problems to be displaced across national borders (UNDP, 2016).

On the security side, many countries are implementing strategies which are aggravating the problem. The tendency to be reactive and to over-react results in a situation where many vulnerable populations feel they are the target of politically motivated and often ethnically-biased

security practices and unjust judicial systems. The lack of inter-agency coordination and information-sharing between criminal justice and law enforcement sectors is further undermining due process, including the ability to effectively conduct investigation and monitoring of those accused and/or convicted of being engaged in activities related to violent extremism (UNDP, 2016).

The Kenyan government, with the support of the international community, has embarked on a wide range of efforts that seek to address the underlying drivers of violent extremism. At the broadest level, the implementation of reforms extending from Kenya's new constitution offers the most promising potential for addressing long-standing political and socioeconomic grievances. Among them are a process for devolution that provides a standard basis for revenue allocations from the central government to 47 new county-level jurisdictions, including weighted percentages based on poverty index, size, and population (Eelco Kessels, 2016). Although these allocations will account for only 15 percent of the national budget, appropriate investments at the national level may begin to alleviate some of the long-term structural marginalization experienced by many Kenyan communities. Yet, there are concerns that certain

marginalized minorities, such as pastoral communities, will not benefit from the trickle-down effect of the devolution process.

A vibrant and active civil society community in Kenya focuses on CVE measures and youth engagement. A number of civil society organizations are working actively with the youth populations, including through radio and cultural programming, community centers, and vocational training programs. Yet, youth participation in some of the more influential Islamic institutions and civil society groups is seen by some as lagging behind because the leadership traditionally has consisted of older men. Furthermore, the government has cooperated with civil society organizations; but tensions remain, particularly around reintegration and community policing issues. The government recently released an official list of 86 organizations that "sponsor terrorism," including credible human rights advocacy organizations such as Haki Africa and Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI). In June 2015, the Mombasa High Court ordered that Haki Africa and MUHURI be removed from the government's terrorist list. In November 2015, the court lifted the ban freezing the bank accounts of the two organizations (Eelco Kessels, 2016).

By Brighton Savayi Amuni

Brighton Savayi Amuni Brighton Savayi Amuni is currently a Project Officer and MEAL assistant of the Sisters Led Youth Empowerment Initiative (SLYI), at the Association of Sisterhoods of Kenya (AOSK). He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Social Work and a certificate in Peer Counselling from St. Elizabeth University of Health and Social Sciences; through a Kenyan Scholarship program at the Catholic University of Eastern Africa.

FACTORS THAT AFFECT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY SECURITY POLICY IN BURUNDI: AN APPLICATION OF THE 5 LENS ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK OF BYIERS AND VANHEUKELOM 2014

The 5 Lens Analytic Framework of Byiers And Vanheukelom (2014) is an analytical tool consisting of five political economy lenses that helps identify the actors and explain the factors driving or hindering regional processes. The Political Economy construct of the East African Community (EAC) has been affected by reforms, actors, and drivers as captured in the analysis. The 5 lens analysis framework brings out the delivery of the member states to address the question about when and why state and non-state actors resolve to support regional integration. Until recently the EAC started cooperation in other areas like Security that was deemed more sensitive due to vested national interests and national sovereignty of member states.

On 25 April 2015, Burundian President the Late Pierre Nkurunziza's decision to seek a third term in office in Burundi sparked the country's most weighty crisis since the end of the last Burundian civil war, and crushed the country's hard-won stability. Ever since the announcement, the country has experienced sporadic attacks and extra-judicial killings.

The first lens, Foundational/ Structural factors informs geographically, Burundi as a small landlocked country with a population of 8 million. Majority of Burundi's population is Hutu, However power rested with the Tutsi minority, which historically has controlled the army and most of the economy. The Cultural differences are

indistinguishable and both speak Kirundi. Such homogeneity is exceptional and emphasizes the historically close cultural and ethnic ties among the peoples in Burundi. Structural factors such as geography and shared historical experiences continue to have an on-going influence on EAC policy choices particularly on its Security Policy and the effectiveness of its implementation. For example in the shared historical past, a shared identity among EAC states have led to prioritization of policies in certain areas more than others. Countries only collaborate in areas where interests are vested and beneficial. However matters security not only touche on the sovereignty of the nation but requires political will to establish and implement a Security Policy.

The second lens, Formal and Informal Institutions informs the need to improve the weak legislation process that have culminated to the weak institutions in place. For instance, protocols are needed to put treaties into effect which in turn slows the implementation of agreed programs when members of a REC fail to sign or ratify a treaty or to submit the said document in time. Furthermore, some member states only see trade protocols and policy as more important therefore security policy documents are hardly brought up and if so they are at the national level which are rejected. In addition, it is noted that only 16% of ratifications take less than three months. In most

countries the process takes a year. Delays in signing and ratifying regional agreements contribute to a loss of momentum in integration. The formal enforcement of its mandate in the EAC to prevent conflict such as failure to apply sanctions and reiterate on strong brotherliness in the Community has been weak due to differences of views and opinions by the Summit and other institutions. This came with difference towards the constitutional legitimacy of a 3rd presidential term for the Late President Nkurunziza. The Tanzanian minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Membe stated that "the term put forth for sitting presidents is just two but the constitutional court has already ruled." This shows the lack of clear mechanism upon facilitation of summit decisions and recommendation from committees.

The third lens, Actors and Incentives informs how the EAC security policy is affected by actors and agency within the EAC structures, within member states, and through external actors. Within the EAC there appears to be conflicting opinions on the issue whether the EAC should have supranational authority. At the member state level, continued sustained progress towards EAC integration largely depends on Kenya as a regional hegemon. It is noted that it was until 2015 that EAC had to manage an internal crisis of its member state, nine years later after the EAC Peace and Security Strategy. This was

further fuelled by the rivalry between Rwanda and Burundi and disagreement with the other Partner States. The lack of political will and cry for protection of national interest made the EAC Community silent on the Burundi crisis.

The fourth lens, External drivers informs that external actors and donor support to the EAC play an important role however carries risks. In 2013/14 traditional donors contributed over 65% of the budget of the EAC. This strong dependency can lead to policies that reflect donor agenda's but have limited domestic constituency in the EAC, and thus, are not implemented. At the end of June 2015, the Government of Burundi boycotted the proceedings of the dialogue on the political, security, and

socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in its country, which were convened by different international organizations. This occasioned a growing divide between the international players where the UN special Envoy openly declared disappointment and expressed the view that the EAC summit had been 'below par' this derailed the implementation of the EAC Security Policy in Burundi.

Lastly the fifth lens Sectoral Characteristics identifies eccentricities of key sectors. An example is how monopolies in the transport or energy sectors infer limited incentives to improve productivity that is not just in Burundi but across the EAC countries. Infrastructural development also implies a vote

catch and also visibility of how policies are implemented. Burundi Infrastructure is limited and very minimal developments have been done. This is an indicator of poorly policy implementation and thus applying a Security Policy in the case of deployment of the Military, Police or Civilian to places in Burundi can be a major limitation. On infrastructure coverage, Burundi lags behind most other regional bodies across the continent. Comparing to its EAC Counterparts, Burundi also lags behind in access to basic infrastructure services. Infrastructure carries a political resonance that further implies that even basic implementation of policies are limited and are only of importance during an electoral process.

By Mandek Muhidin

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PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AMIDST EMERGENT PANDEMICS AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY THREATS

Peace support operations form an integral part to the growth and development of conflict and post-conflict countries. The peace operations main objectives are to avoid conflict, boost stability, promote economic growth and foster collective development. Police officers and the military are used to prevent armed conflict by proposing the use of peace processes. The police or military are also in charge of overseeing as well as enforcing the implementation of peace agreements between conflicting parties or states (Durch, 2006). Nonetheless, in the performance of these functions, peace support operations have encountered numerous challenges. Some of the contemporary challenges experienced include pandemics, natural disasters, corruption, security threats and economic instability. It is important to note that these challenges cut across Kenya, Africa and the world over and goes to show the interconnection that exists in the world. In relation to the Corona virus pandemic, many countries have been forced to close their borders thus limiting peace operations worldwide (Holt, 2009). For instance, the movement of peace support personnel has been limited, new deployments have been suspended and staff have been ordered to work from home unless otherwise required. These new changes have influenced negatively the manner in which subsequent peace operations have been conducted.

Similarly, the abovementioned challenges have threatened the very essence of human development, economic stability as well as poverty reduction initiatives that had previously experienced remarkable gains across the globe.

Peace Support Operations in Africa

To begin with, global peace operation initiatives involve the United Nations, the United Nations permitted operations and non-United Nations operations.

Regional organizations such as the European Union, the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities also get involved in peace operations after acquiring consent from the United Nations (Dembinski, 2015). That said, Africa is and continues to be a major beneficiary of peace operations owing to the fact that since time immemorial it has continuously been plagued by armed conflict. Many of the armed conflicts experienced in the African continent have led to disturbing outcomes more so on the civilian population. It is as a result of this that regional actors such as the United Nations and the African Union opted to institute peacekeeping presences in the form of military in Africa. A notable example of peace operations are the United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire as well as the United Nations Mission in Liberia. These peace operations are characterized by heavy military presence which

only proves that the situation in the two countries is still delicate (Holt, 2009). The two missions are integrated in such a manner that the short term mission objectives and long term development objectives of the host countries are achieved concurrently. Both missions are multidimensional in nature in the sense that they are able to undertake a number of functions at a go (De Coning, 2017). At the same juncture, the United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire and the United Nations Mission in Liberia entice foreign investment.

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that was involved in working to accomplish sustainable peace faced threats by organized groups. Organized crimes in Congo were prevalent due to feeble legal systems, unemployment and the failure of local authorities to effectively defend their borders against the crime. The effect of this is that it made it hard for the United Nations Stabilization Mission to effectively perform its duties.

Impact of Pandemics and Regional Security

As a result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, peace operations have been forced to suspend their project plans and give priority to the more critical operational activities while halting the rest of the other functions. Some of the key functions that are still in operation include force protection, protection of key

infrastructure, protection of civilians and carrying out patrols among others. Funds that were initially meant for planned projects have been rechanneled to support efforts by local and national institutions to curb spread of the virus (Hull, 2009). While the move will have a positive impact of reducing the spread of the virus, peace support operations will not be able to achieve their desired mandate. In instances where certain objectives are to be completed within a stipulated timeframe, this might not be possible owing to the fact that a lot of time, effort and workforce

have been redirected to fighting the pandemic.

Conclusion

To sum up, the increasingly changing security environment indicates that there is need for regional organizations in every peace support operation to engage proactively with the aim of addressing rising security challenges. The discussions will go a long way in achieving long term solutions that are applicable to most challenges. An important factor that the current COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated is that the emergence

and reemergence of pandemics have a major effect on not only the peace operators but also the host communities. So as to perform their functions effectively, it is recommended that the United Nations and the African Union formulate policies that merge with local laws so as to ensure smooth operations of peace keeping missions. Similarly, cooperation with member states on how to improve governance and regional stability must also be looked at.

By Regina Siliba Manyasi

Regina Siliba Manyasi is an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya. She underwent the Advocates Training Program at the Kenya School of Law and holds a Post graduate Diploma from the institution. She also holds a Bachelor of Laws Degree from Moi University. Currently, she is an ongoing Master of Laws student at the University of Nairobi. Regina is passionate about Constitutional Law, Devolution, Governance and Democracy and Public International Law matters among others.

IMPLICATIONS OF COVID-19 LOCKDOWN ON MENTAL HEALTH PROVISION FOR CHILDREN IN THE AGE OF 13 TO 21 YEARS OLD IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (UK)

Context

Towards the middle of March 2020, the United Kingdom finally joined most countries in the world in imposing a nationwide 'lockdown' limiting movement and shutting 'non-essential' services and activities for many months.

As I am writing this article, there is still a partial 'lockdown' across the country and a lot of services have struggled to reopen in their pre-lockdown format. Those that have re-opened including mental health services have done so with a significant element of remote working.

This study will focus on provision for 13 to 21 year olds often categorised in the U.K. as youth or young people. This demographic would often be expected to be in some form of education provision, training or early stages of employment, and would normally access mental health provision from these institutions.

Other sources of provision include private therapy, community organisations, and the National Health Service – NHS.

What Helps Young People Access Support

While a limited number of young people could access some of the above services by self-referral while in crisis, or when they identified they needed support, key gateways to access mental health services would normally be through referral to support agencies by education,

training, employment or youth service provision.

Gulliver A, Griffiths KM, Christensen H. 2010;10:113 infer that a key factor that enables young people to reach out was 'positive past experiences with help-seeking', with some evidence relating to 'social support' or 'encouragement from others'; and 'confidentiality and trust in the provider'. For instance, young people in need of mental health support would usually reach out to adults responsible for their care in any of the above institutions, and a referral to the appropriate service made. Having a relationship built via regular interaction would enable responsible adults like teachers, youth workers, or managers, to identify where young people in their care need mental health support and act to signpost or refer to services.

Barriers to Young People Accessing Support

Studies like Salaheddin K, Mason B. 2016, infer that a significant number of young adults 'did not seek any formal or informal help due to perceived stigma, difficulty expressing concerns and accessing help, alongside a preference for self-reliance.' Mitchell et al. 2017 Jan; 67(654): 8–9. add to this; suggesting that 'early interventions may improve the prognosis of primary mental health disorders in young adults and reduce the risk of chronicity and progression to more severe secondary disorders'

Therefore, where 'lockdown' is

concerned, inability to access services places young people in need of mental health support at a greater risk due to a delay in assessing, diagnosing and providing care and treatment can lead to an increase in severity and repetition of symptoms in patients.

How Has Provision Looked Like During 'Lockdown'?

During this period, places such as schools, colleges, youth centres, universities and places of employment were all closed as the primary focus of public health became shielding the public from the COVID-19 virus.

As reported in a news article on BBC Three 'appointments were cancelled, meetings with friends were indefinitely postponed – and some medical treatments, including those for mental health became harder to access.'

This is backed up by a study by the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP) and Roehampton University, suggesting that there has been a reduction in counselling services for young people with counsellors based in schools and colleges who previously averaged 13 sessions a week now delivering just over 1 hour per week since restrictions were introduced. The research found that reductions happened because schools had closed, had reduced or stopped the provision of therapy due to Covid-19 lockdown and subsequent restrictions. In other instances, children and young people were unable to access

online therapy because there was nowhere private that they could do it from.

The impact to provision as outlined above has clearly limited or changed what and how young people can access services and time will tell about the long-term impact of this on the mental health and wellbeing of the people who need services most.

Responses

Having been in the crisis for a while now, there are signs that young people and service providers are adapting and innovating new ways to tackle the challenges faced in delivering and accessing mental health services.

A quick review of mental health services websites suggests a shift towards delivering their services online or via the phone. GP practices and mental health services, including Child and Adolescent Mental Health

Services (CAMHS), are still working, although they are doing a lot of their work via telephone or remotely.

Charities such as YoungMinds have set up pages with tailored advice focusing on accessing support during lockdown as well as coping strategies for instance, a page targeting university students.

Services such as ChildLine, aimed at support for children up to the age of 18, have a specific page addressing topics such as coping with return to school after lockdown, managing anxiety and signposting to services.

Most are investing in new technology and equipping their staff and volunteers with the necessary skills to adapt to delivering services remotely wherever possible.

Conclusion

Mental health service providers need to innovate effective ways to continue reaching out to

those young people who are less likely to seek help themselves. This will ensure that those affected by closures of institutions that would normally refer them are given alternative opportunities to access help.

In the online environment, effective ways are required to ensure that young people are clearly guided to appropriate services. Particularly as some studies e.g. Rickwood, et al. 2015, conclude that young people who seek help for themselves are more likely to do so online.

As the world settles into living with the COVID-19 virus, it is clear as Holmes, et al. 2020;547–60. imply that more research is needed into the adaptations made to providing mental health services so as to measure their effectiveness.

By Floyd Waithaka

Floyd Waithaka is a Counseling Supervisor at Childline - National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) in London, United Kingdom (UK). He has an M.Ed in Child and Adolescent Psychotherapy and Counseling from the University of Cambridge. He has considerable experience delivering frontline support services to children and young people in various settings in the UK.

ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA'S PEACE DEAL: HAS THE DEAL REDUCED TENSION AND ENHANCED DEVELOPMENT?

The Basics

Eritrea is a small country situated in a strategic location with access to a 1000 km coastal line of the Red Sea. Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1991, after a 30-year war for independence.

Ethiopia is a landlocked country and its desire to use Assab and Massawa as its preferred port cities, due to their proximity and strategic location, is one of the key points for strategic alliance between the two countries.

Opening Assab and Massawa for use by Ethiopia would generate Eritrea a significant amount of revenue from transit fees, tariffs, local business opportunities, and a boost in the private sector. At the same time Ethiopia would gain easy access to an import/export outlet that offers processing efficiency due to the fact that the two countries share similar culture, history and population, and over a 1000 km of borderline.

What was happening before the peace deal?

Following Eritrea's independence in 1991, there was significant hope and excitement for development in both countries accompanied by bilateral cooperation in trade, politics and other areas of mutual interest. Both countries directed their human and capital resources to rebuild their economies. Unfortunately this period was short lived, as there was a sudden turn for the worst disrupting peace and the

momentum towards development. The war that erupted in May of 1998, which resulted from a border dispute, came as a shock to people from both sides and to the international community. In two years of fierce armed battle, over 100,000 lives were lost along with extensive infrastructural damage, massive displacement of people and disruption of livelihoods.

In 2000 Eritrean and Ethiopian Border Commission (EEBC) was established to resolve the dispute. The two countries signed a peace-deal on December 2000, in which they pledged to abide by the 'final and binding' decision of EEBC. In April 2002 EEBC released its verdict (giving most of the disputed territories to Eritrea); while Eritrea accepted the decision wholly, Ethiopia questioned certain aspects of the ruling. This one sided support of the decision made the physical demarcation by EEBC impossible. Hence, the EEBC decided to make a virtual demarcation in 2007 before it concluded its mandate.

The no peace, no war state hampered development efforts as both countries were forced to divert scarce resources towards strengthening their military and sustaining continuous border surveillance. Eritrea has seen a steady stream of its people, mostly youth, fleeing the country to avoid mandatory military conscription and lack of freedom to pursue personal aspirations. The strides made in development during the seven years of peace were mostly

undone by the twenty years of suspension in a no peace no war state.

Prior to the border conflict, Eritrea and Ethiopia had signed a trade agreement that would allow Ethiopia to use Assab, one of Eritrea's port cities. However, this arrangement lapsed due to the renewed conflict. Ethiopia was left looking for other options such as using ports in Djibouti and other neighboring countries. These ports, however, did not provide cost-effective alternative due to distance and other logistical challenges. Assab is only about 70 Km from the Ethiopian border. On the other hand Eritrea lost the revenue that was to come from Ethiopia's use of the port and other related business opportunities.

The Turning Point

After two decades in a state of 'no war, no peace' that shadowed the border dispute, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed a peace deal in July 2018. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a formal agreement on July 9, 2018 in Asmara Eritrea, (after a two day 2018 Eritrea-Ethiopia Summit), announcing to end the border standoff and to open their borders. The peace agreement came as a pleasant surprise to the people of both countries and the international community.

Ensuing the agreement, both countries opened their respective embassies and borders, resumed flights, and

restored telephone lines. People and goods started moving freely between the two countries and businesses started to boom.

Current Situation

The 2018 peace agreement was hailed for its potential to not only build strategic alliance of mutual benefit to both countries, but also to restore regional diplomatic relations. Indeed bilateral cooperation between leaders of both countries was able to mediate and rehabilitate relations with Djibouti and Somalia. Prime Minister Abiy's approach to building cooperative and peaceful relations with Eritrea earned him a Nobel Peace Prize. Similarly Eritrea had its sanctions lifted by the UN.

The resumption of flights and eased restrictions on movement and communication between the countries paved a way for further cooperation. However,

Abiy failed to secure support for the peace deal from the leaders of Tigray, the region with the longest border with Eritrea. Tigray's longstanding grievance with the government of Eritrea and internal political discontent with Prime Minister Abiy complicated the implementation of the peace deal. Eritrea ended up closing its borders again.


Indeed significant stride has been made towards improving diplomatic relations between the two countries. Prior to the peace agreement the people of both countries lived in constant fear that war may break again. The peace agreement eliminated this fear and the people have started to demand changes in other areas of leadership and development. Nonetheless, significant positive and productive relationship based on collaboration in economic growth and development is yet to come.

Long-term cooperation based on improving infrastructure such as roads and railways and bilateral trade agreements can only be achieved by involving not just the leaders but also the people of both countries. When the choice is between 'bad' and 'worse', 'bad' becomes a better choice. Although the much-anticipated race towards greater economic growth and developments is yet to come, what has been done so far is much better than the two decade prior to the agreement.

Meanwhile the current conflict between the Tigray region and the federal government of Ethiopia, which started in November 4 of this year, is expected to impact relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Whether the impact will be that of enhanced and improved relations or otherwise is something time will reveal.

By Fiori Redie

Fiori Redie is a Masters student at the Catholic University of Eastern Africa. She previously earned a graduate diploma in Planning and Management of Development Projects from the University. After graduating from the University of Asmara, Fiori served as a high-school teacher for four years in Eritrea.



TUONDOLEE KORONA (Rid Us of Coronavirus)

By **Maj Mbarak Hassan Mwaiha**

Limetufika kwa sasa, hili gonjwa la korona,
Halihitajii visa, lasambaa kila kona.
Katuletea mkasa, usokua na maana,
Twakuomba Mola wetu, tuondolee Korona.

Limeleta wasiwasi, jinsi linavyovuma,
Limezidisha tetesi, ukimwi kurudi nyuma,
Sababu yake virusi, dunia ikasimama,
Twakuomba Mola wetu, tuondolee Korona.

Dalili zake ni homa, nyuzi joto ukipima,
Viungo vitakuuma, na ladha itakuhama,
Mara huezi kuhema, pumzi zitakugoma,
Twakuomba Mola wetu, tuondolee Korona.

Korona sio dhihaka, uchumi kaathirika,
Metuletea mashaka, waja wahangaika,
Ni wengi tumewazika, na wengi wameteseka,
Twakuomba Mola wetu, tuondolee Korona.

Tahadharini jamani, kila mtu yampasa,
Kazini hadi nyumbani, zibebeni sanitaisa,
Tunaweni kwa sabuni, mikono kuitakasa,
Twakuomba Mola wetu, tuondolee Korona.

Barakoa tuvaeni, si mchana si jioni,
Makundi tuepukeni, hatua tuziwekeni,
Usafi tudumisheni, tuipate afueni,
Twakuomba Mola wetu, tuondolee Korona.

Usiku tukae ndani, sizunguke mitaani.
Tusijifanye kibavu, kapelekwa karantini,
Heri tuwe wasikivu, siingie matatani,
Twakuomba Mola wetu, tuondolee Korona.

Wakati umewadia, nadhani mumesikia,
Mikono nawapungia, mazuri nawatakia,
Tumuombeni Jalia, atupe njema afia,
Twakuomba Mola wetu, tuondolee Korona.

Maj Mbarak Hassan Mwaiha is a curriculum designer with the Curriculum Design Section at the Peace and Security Research Department.

RID US OF CORONAVIRUS (Tuondolee Korona)

It's got to us now, this Coronavirus disease, It doesn't need a visa, it spreads to every corner. It will bring us tragedy, and unwarranted loss. We ask you, our Lord, to Rid us of Coronavirus.

It has caused anxiety, how it escalates, It has exacerbated the threat, AIDS has taken a backseat, Because of the virus, the world stopped, We ask you, our Lord, to Rid us of Coronavirus.

Symptoms include fever, high temperature, loss of smell, and taste, Soon you have difficulty in breathing, gasping for air, We ask you, our Lord, to Rid us of Coronavirus.

Coronavirus is not a joke, the economy is affected, our hopes dimmed, livelihoods troubled, we have buried many, and many have suffered, We ask you Lord to Rid us of Coronavirus.


Let us all be beware, everyone must, At work and at home, carry sanitizers with you, Wash your hands with soap, let our hands be clean, We ask you, our Lord, to Rid us of Coronavirus.


Let us have our masks on, day and night we must, avoid gatherings, caution we must take, lets keep ourselves clean, and maintain our health, We ask you, our Lord, to Rid us of Coronavirus.

At night let us stay indoors, not wandering the streets. Let us not become difficult, lest we end up in quarantine, Blessed are we that hear, and do not get into trouble. We ask you, our Lord, to Rid us of Coronavirus

The time has come, I hope you have heard, As I bid you farewell, I wish you well, Pray to our creator, to give us good health, We ask you, our Lord, to Rid us of Coronavirus.

English version of Tuondolee Korona by Maj Mbarak Hassan Mwaiha





IPSTC continues to foster great relations with our partners including France and the European Union as we continue to contribute towards supporting Peace Support Operations through capacity building of regional actors including the Military, Police and Civilian components within eastern Africa and the globe.





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