



International Peace Support Training Centre Nairobi, Kenya

Nexus between Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorist Groups: Case of Mombasa County



OCCASIONAL PAPER: SERIES 10, N^o 2

MAJOR S D MWACHINALO
2019

*“Expanding Frontiers of Peace and Security:
Consolidating Lessons Knowledge and Skills”*

Compiled by

IPSTC Peace and Security Research Department
@ 2019 International Peace Support Training Centre
Nairobi, Kenya.

All Rights Reserved.

No part of this publication may be produced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, by any means; mechanical, via photocopying, recording or otherwise- without prior permission from the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC).

Information contained in this Occasional Paper has been obtained by the author from sources believed to be reliable and correct to the best of his knowledge. Further, statements and views expressed herein are those of the author and are not necessarily the views of IPSTC.

Published by

International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC)
P.O Box 24232-00502 Karen, Kenya
Tel: 254 791 574336 / 786 585167
Fax: 254 20 388 3159
Email: info@ipstc.org
Website: www.ipstc.org



@IPSTCKENYAOFFICIAL
ISBN: 978-9966-104-06-9

Editing by:

Dr Anita Kiamba

Layout, Design & Printing:

Liberty Brands

Cover Photos Courtesy of:

Intelligence Briefs (2017) & BBC News Somali (2019)

Preface

This study was motivated by various media reports on robberies, homicides amongst other crimes perpetrated by organized criminal gangs in Mombasa¹. The reports paint a picture of a populace generally apprehensive of organized criminal gangs high on drugs.² These concerns were further emphasised by the Kwale County Commissioner Mr Karuku Ngumo on 25th February, 2019 to the International Peace Support Training Centre's (IPSTC) Monitoring and Evaluation (M &E) team which was on inspection tour of the Centre's sponsored projects in Kwale.

The County Commissioner being responsible for peace and security expressed his anxiety about the rise of juvenile organized criminal gangs who were committing crimes in Kwale County without justifiable motive. He suggested that a research be conducted on the gangs whose members mainly emanated from the neighbouring Mombasa County. IPSTC seized on the matter made a research proposal to investigate the organized criminal gangs and their link to terrorist groups which was presented to the Centre's Research Agenda Workshop on 25th April, 2019. On presentation, the Workshop participants prioritized the proposal for further enquiry and investigation.

It is as a result of this, that IPSTC presents this occasional paper titled: *Nexus between Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorist Groups: Case of Mombasa County*. The study provides a framework for understanding organized criminal gangs within Mombasa County in terms of their; social economic characteristics, types of criminal acts committed, their levels of radicalisation and their linkage to terrorism. The study provides recommendations to key actors for effective management and control of organized criminal gangs.

1 Ahmed, M. (2018, December 14). Mombasa police pursue funders of dreaded gangs. *The Daily Nation*. Retrieved from <https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/mombasa/funding-of-criminal-gangs/1954178-4894210-ip04bz/index.html>

2 Kasuku, A. & Mudi, M. (2018, December 14). 15 killed as gangs reign terror in Mombasa amid police struggles. *The Star*. Retrieved from <https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/coast/2018-12-14-15-killed-as-gangs-reign-terror-in-mombasa-amid-police-struggles/>

Acknowledgement

The researcher would like to express gratitude to; Human Rights Agenda (HURIA) Kenya, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), HAKI Africa and Mtongwe Community Initiative (MCI) who greatly assisted the study to access organized criminal gang members and former terrorist groups' participants. The passion and dedication exhibited by the aforementioned Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) towards a crime free society that upholds Human Rights cannot be faulted. The researcher however takes responsibility for any shortcomings in the study.

The invaluable support provided by the IPSTC administration; the Director of IPSTC Brigadier Elmi, the Head of Research Colonel Mwangonga, the Head of Applied Research, Lieutenant Colonel Kiptoo cannot go unmentioned. The belief and the responsibility assigned to me in carrying out this study is humbling to say the least. I am truly honoured. Further, I wish to acknowledge members of the Research Department for being my peer reviewers. Your suggestions have greatly impacted on the study. Thank you team!

Lastly, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for making the editing and subsequent publication of this occasional paper possible.

List of Abbreviations

CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
EA	East Africa
ENACT	Enhancing Africa's Response to Transnational Organized Crime
ERG	Extremism Risk Guidance
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HCR-20^{V3}	Historical Clinical Risk Management -20 Version 23
HURIA	Human Rights Agenda
IAT	Institutional Anomie Theory
ICSR	International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IS	Islamic State
KI	Key Informant
KII	Key Informant Interview
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
MCI	Mtongwe Community Initiative
MUHURI	Muslims for Human Rights

NACADA	National Authority for the Campaign against Alcohol and Drug Abuse
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NCRC	National Crimes Research Centre
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NEMIS	National Education Management Information System
NIJ	National Institute of Justice
NPS	National Police Service
OB	Occurrence Book
PIE	Preparation of the Investigation Environment
SD	Standard Deviation
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SRIC	Security Research and Information Centre
TIJ	Thailand Institute of Justice
UK	United Kingdom
UNICRI	United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USA	United States of America
VAF	Vulnerability Assessment Framework
VERA 2	Violent Extremist Risk Assessment Consultative Version 2

Abstract

This study sought to examine the link between organized criminal gangs and terror groups in Mombasa County, Kenya. The study's main objectives was to investigate the nexus between organized criminal gangs and terror groups. It further sought to determine if the organized criminal gangs had been radicalised to terrorism activities. The study thus employed an exploratory research design and sampled a total of; 229 organized criminal gang members, 25 returnees and 27 Key Informants drawn from various sectors of the general public. Mixed methods of data collection were employed to gather data which were later evaluated using descriptive and inferential statistics and content analysis. The study findings indicated that organized criminal gangs were radicalized into terrorism only stopping short of identifying with terror related methodologies such as suicide bombing. The organized criminal gang members had intensive sense of perceived marginalisation and were motivated towards correcting the perceived inequality in society. The study also found an emerging nexus between organized criminal gangs and terror groups manifesting in the form of a shared dislike of the State and shared similar motives of application of violence and illegal activities. The study findings validate the Frustration – Aggression and Institutional Anomie Theories in that the study encountered angry young men, women, boys and girls with high propensity for criminality and terrorism due to poor psychosocial and economic conditions amidst ineffective social protection . The study held that organized criminal gangs in Mombasa posed a threat to peace and security. It thus recommended a paradigm shift in methodologies meant to stem organized criminal gangs and terror groups from hard to soft approaches. In terms of policy, the study recommendations advocated for an expanded social protection net with affirmative action particularly aimed at those vulnerable to criminality and terrorism.

Key Words: Organized criminal gangs, Terrorist groups, Radicalization, Terrorism, crime- terror nexus

Table of Contents

Preface	ii
Acknowledgement	iii
List of Abbreviations	iv
Abstract	vi
List of Tables.....	ix
List of Figures	x
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Background of the Study	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	2
1.3 Research Questions	3
1.4 Study Objectives.....	3
1.5 Justification of the Study.....	4
1.6 Focus and Scope	4
1.7 Definition and Operationalization of Key Terms.....	5
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	6
2.1 Introduction.....	6
2.2 Nexus between Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorist Groups	6
2.3 Social Characteristics and Gender Roles in Organized Criminal Gangs.....	12
2.4 Factors Contributing to Resilience of Organized Criminal Gangs	14
2.5 Levels of Organized Crime.....	15
2.6 Radicalization of Organized Criminal Gangs to Terrorist Activities	16
2.7 Linkage of Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorists Groups	18
2.8 Gaps in Literature Review	20
2.9 Theoretical Framework.....	20
2.10 Conceptual Framework.....	23
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	24
3.1 Introduction.....	24
3.2 Research Design.....	24
3.3 Study Site.....	24
3.4 Population of the Study.....	24
3.5 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure.....	25
3.6 Data Collection Method and Tools.....	28
3.7 Data Analysis.....	30
3.8 Validity and Reliability.....	32
3.9 Limitations of the Study.....	33
3.10 Ethical Considerations	34
CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION.....	35
4.1 Introduction.....	35
4.2 Social Characteristics and Gender Roles in the Organized Criminal Gangs.....	35
4.3 Factors contributing to Resilience of Organized Criminal Gangs	50
4.4 Level of Organized Crime Executed by Organized Criminal Gangs in Mombasa County	61
4.5 Radicalization of Organized Criminal Gangs to Terrorism.....	64
4.6 Linkage between Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorist Groups.....	68

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS..	77
5.1 Introduction.....	77
5.2 Summary of the Findings.....	77
5.3 Conclusions and Recommendations.....	79
5.4 Suggestion for Further Research.....	81
References	82
APPENDICES.....	89
Appendix 1: Gazetted Organized Criminal Gangs in Kenya as at 28th December 2016.....	89
Appendix 2: Official Government Record of Organized Criminal Gangs at the Coast Province of Kenya as at 29th May 2019	91
Appendix 3: Unofficial List of Criminal Gangs at Kisauni- Mombasa as at May 2019	93
Appendix 4: Unofficial List of Criminal Gangs at Likoni- Mombasa as at May 2019	93
Appendix 5: Unofficial List of Criminal Gangs at Mvita- Mombasa as at May 2019	95
Appendix 6: Unofficial List of Criminal Gangs at Nyali- Mombasa as at May 2019	95

List of Tables

Table 2.1	Relationship between Risk Assessment Tools for Radicalization...	17
Table 3. 1	Sample Size Distribution of Respondents by Count.....	27
Table 3. 2	Reliability Analysis.....	33
Table 4. 1:	Homicides committed with firearms.....	48
Table 4. 2:	Homicide Crimes attributed to Organized Criminal Gangs.....	50
Table 4. 3:	Organized Criminal Groups and Membership.....	53
Table 4. 4:	Inter Organized Criminal Gangs Cooperation.....	57
Table 4. 5:	Organized Criminal Gangs Involvement in Politics and Rivalry ...	61
Table 4.6:	Extent of Organized Crime.....	62
Table 4. 7:	Radicalisation to Terrorism.....	65
Table 4. 8:	Linkage through Modus Operandi and General Conduct.....	68
Table 4. 9:	Terror – Organized Criminal Gangs Cooperation.....	71
Table 4. 10:	Organization of Organized Criminal Gangs	73
Table 4. 11:	Measure of Association Between Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorists Groups	76

List of Figures

Figure 2. 1	Conceptual Framework.....	23
Figure 4. 1:	Organized Criminal Gang Membership by Age Cohorts.....	36
Figure 4. 2:	Membership by Age Cohorts of Majority Members of Terror Groups	37
Figure 4. 3:	Marital Status of Majority Members of Organized Criminal Gang..	38
Figure 4. 4:	Highest Level of Education amongst Majority Members of Organized Criminal Gang.....	39
Figure 4. 5:	Occupation of Majority Members of Organized Criminal Gang	41
Figure 4. 6:	Religion of Majority Members of Organized Criminal Gang.....	42
Figure 4. 7:	Ethnicity of Majority Members of Organized Criminal Gang.....	43
Figure 4. 8:	Gender Roles in Drug Trafficking in Organized Criminal Gangs	44
Figure 4. 9:	Gender Roles in Finance Related Crimes in Organized Criminal Gang	45
Figure 4. 10:	Gender Roles in Offences against Persons in Organized Criminal Gangs.....	46
Figure 4. 11:	Gender Roles in Offences related to IT in Organized Criminal Gang	47
Figure 4. 12:	Gender Roles in Offences related to Arms in Organized Criminal Gang	48
Figure 4. 13:	Gender Roles in Other Crimes in Organized Criminal Gang	49
Figure 4. 14:	Arrest and Conviction Records of Organized Criminal Gang Members.....	54
Figure 4. 15:	Organized Criminal Gangs Support Factors	55
Figure 4. 16:	Most Uniting Factor for Organized Criminal Gang.....	56
Figure 4. 17:	Consequences for Abandoning an Organized Criminal Gang.....	59
Figure 4. 18:	Organized Criminal Gangs' Vulnerability	60

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Terrorist groups all over the world seek to reduce capital outlays required to execute terror acts thus increasing their appeal to organized criminal gangs (International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence [ICSR], 2016). Al Qaeda and Islamic State [IS] for instance innovate locally available materials transforming them into military-type armed hardware for use against conventional security forces (Zimmerman, 2018). That notwithstanding, terrorist groups have also increasingly sought to engage in criminal activities to finance their operations (Shelley & Picarrelly, 2002).

ICSR (2016) reports that terror groups have also been targeting organized criminal gang members for recruitment by promoting narratives of restoration to piety. For instance, the IS aggressively pursues this doctrine by customizing the narrative of radicalization to personal circumstances and conditions that suit criminals. It further deliberately targets organized criminal gang members who have low self-esteem and are more vulnerable using a narrative of redemption.

In addition, a number of organized criminal gangs no longer fit into the profit driven narrative but are increasingly pursuing an ideological motive (Ballina, 2011). Furthermore, it has become complex to distinguish between organized criminal gangs and terrorists groups by relying on their behavioural and operational conduct, thus, suggesting that there is an opportunity for collaboration in their activities. (Shelley & Picarrelly, 2005). Organized criminal gangs are skilled in evading security investigation, have low violence thresholds and are highly resourceful thus providing an unsettling proposition in the eventuality that they consider having an engagement with terrorist groups (ICSR, 2016). The development of a mutual and consequential relationship between criminal gangs and terrorists such as apparent skills transfer of, for example, trafficking of small arms and forgery of documents like passports is harmful to social order.

The assertion on ramifications of a relation between crime and terror is further reinforced by Wilson (National Crimes Research Centre [NCRC], 2012) who argues that by their acts, criminals adversely influence social fabric. Therefore, there is a need for a dynamic understanding of the phenomenon of organized criminality and its distinction or convergence with terrorism (Ballina, 2011). This conceptual understanding is particularly important which without would be unhelpful on mitigation measures (Zimmerman, 2018).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Mombasa County has terrorists and organized criminal gangs (Bardurdeen & Goldsmith, 2018; SRIC, 2018). Fifty one point one percent (51.1%) of gazetted organized criminal gangs in Kenya operate in Mombasa (Republic of Kenya, 2016). Appendix 2 outlines the gazetted organized criminal gangs in Mombasa as at May, 2019. The organized criminal gangs have been transforming rapidly amidst evidenced radicalization (Security Research & Information Centre [SRIC], 2018). They mostly abuse Roypnol commonly used as a date rape drug amongst other opiates to give them bravery to commit heinous acts (Mkutu et al., 2017). Moreover, the increase in organized criminal gangs is bound to exacerbate due to thriving corruption in governance structures (NCRC, 2012, 2017).

According to ACLED (as cited in Mkutu et al., 2017) Mombasa county reported seventeen (17) terror related attacks and thirty one (31) fatalities between the year 2012 to 2016. Whereas, on matters radicalisation, Al Shabab has made significant inroads as a considerable number of youth have been recruited and trained to battle in Somali (Mkutu et al., 2017). In addition, Mombasa is resident to several unknown Al Shabab returnees (Mkutu et al., 2017). Consequently, the emergence of a number of organized criminal gangs is a result of former Al Shabab recruits (Mkutu et al., 2017).

Moreover, Mombasa continues to have essential conditions for a linkage of organized criminal gangs and terrorist groups as postulated by the USA Library Congress Report on '*Nations' friendly to organized crime and terrorism*' (Hubschle, 2011). The conditions identified in the report (Hubschle, 2011) that Mombasa identifies with are that; it has long maritime border that is not adequately secured (Gastrow, 2011; Mutoka, 2014), endemic corruption in governance structures and the criminal justice system (NCRC,

2012, 2017; KNCHR, 2014), it is a major attraction of international commerce (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics [KNBS], 2017), is a centre of illicit trade mainly conducted at the Port (Gastrow, 2011), has high poverty levels at thirty seven point six percent (37.6%) and has increased cases of illegal drugs trade and abuse (County Government of Mombasa, 2018). An open environment for crime and terror is further reinforced by high levels of youth unemployment (SRIC, 2018), perceived marginalisation by the national government (Mkutu et al., 2017) and a forty seven percent (47%) youth bulge which is vulnerable to crime (County Government of Mombasa, 2018).

Though various studies such as, Bardurdeen and Goldsmith (2018) and SRIC (2018) have indicated that Mombasa has a twin problem of crime and terrorism there is limited empirical evidence of the link between both problems. This study aimed to address this gap in knowledge. The friendly environment factors for crime-terror nexus could lead to their convergence. Consequently, organized criminal groups and terrorists may develop a synergy with dire ramification for security and development. Eiras and Kaufman et al (as cited in Dijk, 2007) support this assertion by postulating that respect for law and order is a prerequisite for economic development. Moreover, the escalation of violence and the crime-terror nexus is likely to lead to a poor quality life and alienation amongst Mombasa residents. The effect of all this could result in an erosion of confidence by the population in governance structures (Mkutu et al., 2017).

1.3 Research Questions

- i. Is there a link between organized crime and terrorism in Mombasa County?
- ii. What are the indicators of organized criminal gangs being radicalised into terrorism?
- iii. What factors contribute to the resilience of organized criminal gangs in Mombasa County?
- iv. To what extent are organized criminal gangs' activities perpetrated by women and girls in Mombasa County?
- v. What is the level of organized crime committed by criminal gangs in Mombasa County?

1.4 Study Objectives

The study was guided by the following objectives:

- i. To examine psychosocial characteristics and gender roles in the organized criminal gangs in Mombasa County.
- ii. To assess factors contributing to resilience of organized criminal gangs in Mombasa County.
- iii. To estimate the level of organized crime executed by criminal gangs in Mombasa County.
- iv. To evaluate radicalization of organized criminal gangs to terrorism in Mombasa County.
- v. To determine the link between organized criminal gangs and terrorist groups in Mombasa County.

1.5 Justification of the Study

Despite ramifications of the relationship between crime and terror, there is insufficient empirical literature on organized criminal gangs in Kenya (Mkutu et al., 2017; NCRC, 2012, 2017). A gap in knowledge therefore exists. This study therefore aimed to enlighten and build upon the current knowledge on organized criminality and terrorism in Kenya.

Further, Kenya has mostly responded to organized criminal gangs and terrorism through the establishment of specialized police units and enactment of strict laws (Mkutu et al., 2017). The centrality of these hard approaches to controlling organized criminal gangs and terror groups has proved ineffective in the experience of the USA (Zimmerman, 2018). A paradigm shift in tact is thus desirable (Mkutu et al., 2017). The study thus aimed to inform policy and practice in combating the twin problem of organized criminal gangs and terrorism.

1.6 Focus and Scope

The study limited itself to gazetted organized criminal gangs in Mombasa County. The study focused specifically on gazetted organized criminal gangs and terror groups operating in the four sub counties of Likoni, Kisauni, Mvita and Nyali. The study time frame was 40 days (from 13th May 2019 to 21st June 2019). Study findings relied on primary data.

1.7 Definition and Operationalization of Key Terms

Crime	Any offence contrary to tenets of Kenyan Law that is punishable by incarceration in Kenya Prison's facilities for a term of minimum period of six months.
Member of Organized Criminal Gang	An individual who openly admits to belong an organized criminal group as declared by the Kenya's Cabinet secretary for Interior and Coordination of National Government pursuant to Section 22 of The Prevention of Organized Crime Act 2010.
Organized Criminal Gang	A group made of three or more members which commit crimes for financial or material gain declared as organized criminal gang by the Kenya's Cabinet secretary for Interior and Coordination of National Government pursuant to Section 22 of The Prevention of Organized Crime Act 2010.
Radicalisation	A process of espousing and/or endorsing violence in pursuit of ideological and/or political gains as explained by the Kenya's Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 2012.
Returnee	A former member of a terrorist group who avows disassociation with terrorism activities and has willingly surrendered to the Government of Kenya authorities or has otherwise chosen to remain anonymous for fear of perceived reprisals.
Terrorism	Refers to acts which involve the application of violence meant to achieve ideological and/or political gains through; intimidation of the general public, upsetting religious order, undermining socio-economic institutions and threatening law and order in the manner as elucidated by the Kenya's Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 2012.
Terrorist Group	Organization that commits terrorism.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores existing literature on conceptual ideas associated with the main arguments and thematic areas of the study. It outlines the foundation of theories supporting the study. It also identifies empirical gaps and proposes a conceptual framework for the study.

2.2 Nexus between Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorist Groups

The passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution [UNSCR] 1373 and the subsequent ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism diminished terror groups by severing their sources of funding thereby creating options for funding such as engaging in criminal activities (Wang, 2010). Therefore the relationship between organized crime and terrorism seemingly varies over time depending on the operational environment (Ryabchiy, 2018).

2.2.1 Nexus between Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorist Groups at the Global Level

In 2001 there was a noticeable realization of an emergent threat that combined transnational organized crime and terrorism particularly by the United States of America [USA] (Shelley & Picarrelly, 2002). Makarenko (as cited in Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie, 2009) holds that the assimilation of organized criminal gangs into terrorism activities began in the 1990's. Since then, the linkages between organized crime and terror has continued to thrive in a multifaceted manner on the global arena (Shelley & Picarrelly, 2005).

Zimmerman (2018) underpins this linkage by identifying the various forms of transformation terror groups have undergone all over the world which underline; their resilience, the convergence of crime and terror and underscores the crime-terror continuum.

Zimmerman (2018) identified the following changes made by terror groups; disowning attacks, being averse to public expression of association with other groups, formation of novel groups with local and or regional focused objectives that do not publicly advocate terrorism, complete decentralization of operations to create stand-alone cells, and immersion into local situations and their associated struggles to integrate main agitators with a view of capturing local administrative structures. Al Qaeda and the IS are some of the terror groups that have been metamorphosing in tactics (Zimmerman 2018). The mutation of the terror groups is contingent on situations and means that they have been able to advance their agenda in a discreet manner thus consequently fortified their cause worldwide (Zimmerman, 2018).

The metamorphosis of the crime-terror continuum as postulated by Zimmerman (2018) is also illustrated by Wang and Wang (Wang, 2010) who affirm that the relationship between organized criminal gangs and terrorists is intricate in the global arena. This is exemplified in the following ways. First, Makarenko (Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie, 2009) holds that some terror groups such as Abu Sayyaf of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan no longer pursue political motives but instead commit crimes and try to mislead investigators from pursuing criminal investigation but to focus on their political grievances. Secondly, she argues that some criminal gangs use terror tactics to shape public discourse particularly against legislative policies by not favouring the policies and aiming at maximizing material benefits. Makaranko cites the Mafia, an organized criminal gang in Italy as having used a succession of car explosive strikes to dissuade the public from supporting parliamentary anti-terror legislation.. Lastly, Dishman and Sanderson (Wang, 2010) assert some groups are an amalgamation of characteristics of terrorism and organized crime thus leveraging the best of the organisation and group to maximize profits. For instance, Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie (2009) maintain that the terrorist attacks in Bombay (1993) and Madrid (2008) exemplify such synergy between criminal and terrorism characteristics as the two clearly manifested in the execution of the strikes.

The crime terror linkage has continued to upset peace and security by disrupting social, economic and political tranquillity (Shelley & Picarrel, 2002). Lormel (Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie, 2009) cites USA Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA] affirming that fifty percent (50%) of forty one (41) terror groups under their watch list engaged in trafficking of narcotics. For example, Hezbollah a terror group in Middle East actively engages in the trade of illegal cigarettes in Latin America to fund their activities (Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie, 2009). Hezbollah's reach also extend to the USA. One of its operatives Hassan Makki was indicted for smuggling illicit cigarettes worth between thirty six thousand and seventy two thousand dollars (\$ 36000 - \$ 72000) per month in the year 1997 to 1999 in North Carolina (Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie, 2009).

In Europe, terrorist groups have been collaborating with organized criminal gangs in illegal trafficking of humans across borders (Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie, 2009). Chepsiuk (Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie, 2009) demonstrates this alliance by claims that Al Qaeda use the Naples based Camorra Mafia to transport its agents to safe havens across Europe. Kaplan, Fang and Sangwan (Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie, 2009) argue that thousands of people including terrorists have been trafficked through Italy using the collaboration between terrorist groups and the Mafia at a cost of four thousand dollars (\$ 4,000) per head. Italy's political crimes unit (Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie, 2009) underpins this alliance by holding that there is an established nexus between Al Qaeda and the Mafia in Italy.

In 2012 The European Parliament conducted a study to examine the link between organized crime groups and terrorists in the European Union [EU]. The main objective of the study was to determine the nature, threat, trends and impact of organized crime terror nexus on the European Union. The study used mixed methods of research to collect data from both primary and secondary sources. Data was mainly collected from actors in the security sector and the private sector with in depth knowledge of the research question. The findings pointed to a developing environment that encourages the development of crime terror nexus. It found a growing relationship between organized crime and terrorists. Turkey, the Balkans and Greece were also identified as more vulnerable to crime – terror convergence.

The findings also pointed to the perils of globalisation which include, heroin trafficking activities in West Africa by the Al Qaeda had an impact on crime and terrorism in Europe.

2.2.2 Nexus between Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorist Groups in Africa

The USA interagency law enforcement working group (Hubschle, 2011) describes Africa as a germane environment for terror and crime as a result of proliferation of drugs, the trafficking of arms and explosives and entrenched corruption in security apparatus. A USA Library of Congress report on crime in Africa of 2003 (Hubschle, 2011) argues that there are other factors that stimulate the link in Africa. These are low levels of income, general disregard for rule of law, ungoverned international borders, inadequate and poorly enforced anti-terror and anti-organized crime laws and feeble state structures. The combination of the afore-stated factors suggest a plausible crime-terror linkage.

Makarenko (Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie, 2009) validates this assertion by claiming that the African Continent is home to groups which initially fought on ideological and religious grounds but have since evolved into criminality and still use terror tactics. She gives examples of Somali and Angola as States harbouring such hybrid groups. Hubschle (2011) goes further to suggest that Somali is the cradle of terror groups. In terms of organized crime, Nigeria, Mozambique and Angola are the most afflicted countries in Africa by having huge presence of such (Dijk, 2007).

In West Africa, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime [UNODC] (Hubschle, 2011) found evidence of infiltration of Hezbollah in Shia communities resulting to engagement in criminality and financing terror. The UNODC (Hubschle, 2011) infer a possible engagement of Al Qaeda and Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] in drug trafficking in the region. The United Nations Security Council [UNSC] (Hubschle, 2011) in its May 2011 report further suggest a growing possible linkage between terrorism and crime especially in illegal drug trade in West Africa due to feeble state institutions. However, adequate empirical evidence suggesting a nexus between crime and terror in Africa is lacking (Hubschle, 2011).

In Eastern Africa region, terror attacks have largely been conceived and planned in Somali (Hubschle, 2011). Jane Terrorism and Security Monitor (Hubschle, 2011) suggests a possible cooperation in training and arms proliferation between Al Shabab, a terror group in Somali and pirates operating off the coast of Somalia . Other terrorist groups also operate in the region as illustrated by Wannenberg (Hubschle, 2011) who contends that Al Qaeda benefitted from the help of underground arms dealers to execute twin bombing attacks of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in 1997.

ENACT [Enhancing Africa's Response to Transnational Organized Crime] (2018) interrogated serious and organized crime in East Africa [EA]. The focus was on the following countries; Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. It found an increasing threat from terror groups particularly from the Al Shabab and JAHBA East Africa in the region. It noted the increasing trend of criminal gangs making specific mention of Mungiki, Wakali Wao and Wakali Kwanza in Kenya. The study pointed to a growing threat of organized crime in the form of; money laundering, drug trafficking, human trafficking, the proliferation of small arms, cybercrime and environment related crimes. It indicates a growing operational connection between criminal gangs and transnational organizations but nevertheless acknowledges limited research on the nexus.

2.2.3 Nexus between Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorist Groups in Kenya

Organized criminal gangs, and terror threats have continued to rise in Kenya (NCRC, 2017). This rise in organized criminal gangs is evidenced by an increase in their numbers in 15 counties out of 47 from ninety (90) in 2016 to one hundred and sixteen (116) in 2017 (National Cohesion and Integration Commission [NCIC], 2018). Appendix 1 outlines gazetted organized criminal gangs in Kenya as at December, 2016.

Some of these gangs have metamorphosed over time, changing their names and tact to underline their resilience amid Kenya Government efforts to ban them (NCIC, 2018; NCRC, 2017). For example, Mungiki, an organized criminal gang changed its name to Quails in Kiambu, Kwekwe in Murang'a and to Siafu and Gaza in Nairobi (NCIC,

2018). Generally, efforts to restrict the activities of the organized criminal gangs have failed (NCIC, 2018). These efforts include community led approaches to security such as the Nyumba Kumi innovation amongst others (NCRC, 2017). Unfortunately, some organized criminal gangs at times have enjoyed political support especially during election periods hence giving them latitude to commit extremist and unlawful acts with abandon (NCIC, 2018).

Gastrow (2011) argues transnational crime is prevalent in Kenya and that its nature is diverse. He explains that it includes; human trafficking, trade in counterfeits including other unlawful products, money laundering and smuggling of wildlife trophies. He argues that generally there has been a rise of transnational crimes with the culprits infiltrating the political circles. Gastrow (2011) posits that organized crime actors thus wield an influence on who gets elected in national politics by bankrolling campaigns. He notes that the infiltration into political circles by criminal actors coupled with a compromised criminal justice system through corruption provides a suitable ground for a growing criminal economy.

Kenya is a major transit route for drug trafficking (Gastrow, 2011; NCRC, 2017). Gastrow (2011) posits that drugs that are widely trafficked are cocaine and heroin. He argues that these drugs mainly emanate from Pakistan, Iran and Latin America. He further identifies West Africans working in concert with Kenyans as major traffickers of the illegal drugs.

Small arms trafficking which accounts for high crime rates experienced in some parts of Kenya is prevalent (Gastrow, 2011; KNCHR, 2014). The Dadaab refugee camp in North Eastern Kenya is at the centre of the intricacies involved in planning, storing and execution of the small arms smuggling (Gastrow, 2011). The net effect of trafficking small arms and trade has been the increase of kingpins of cattle rustling in the Rift Valley and well-armed gangs (KNCHR, 2014).

Terrorist attacks on the other hand continue to afflict Kenya. In 2016, one hundred and twenty two (122) fatalities were reported in 2017, eighty (80) deaths were reported in 2018, and on 15th January 2019, twenty one (21) people lost their lives (OSAC, 2018, 2019). Majority of these terror attacks are attributed to Al Shabab (KNCHR, 2014).

About seventeen (17) out of forty seven (47) counties in Kenya have registered the existence of this terror group however, their attacks are mainly targeted in northern parts of Kenya's Republic (NCRC, 2017). Al Shabab has exploited Kenya's inadequately secured borders and in some instances has bribed security and immigration officials to infiltrate and carry out attacks (KNCHR, 2014). This is perplexing since security actors have borne the most brunt of these terror attacks (Kenya National Commission on Human Right [KNCHR], 2014; Mkutu et al., 2017). The ease of entry and exit of terrorists is attributed to the twenty five (25%) of Kenyans found within the ranks of Al Shabab (Mkutu et al., 2017).

NCRC (2017) conducted a study to map out sentiments of the members of the public regarding crime prevalence and development in Kenya. The study was conducted using descriptive research design in all 47 Counties of Kenya. The study aimed at influencing policy through; identifying nature and rates of crime and their associated hot spots, isolation of vulnerability factors leading to crime and generally mitigation measures in place for both victims and perpetrators of crime. The study found the presence of 125 criminal gangs. Al Shabab was identified as having presence in 17 Counties. The findings also identified violent crimes as perpetrated by males whereas their female counterparts inclined towards nonviolent crimes. The study also observed the presence of a trend whereby crimes were mostly committed during weekends, at night and over festivities such as Christmas and Easter. The study identified push and pull factors towards crime as; low levels of education, alcohol and drug abuse, low incomes and lack of gainful employment.

2.3 Social Characteristics and Gender Roles in Organized Criminal Gangs

Most criminals in Kenya are illiterate (NCRC, 2017). Education is no doubt a critical pillar in assuring peace and security in countries and/or regions afflicted by conflict (De Silva, n.d.; Music, 2016). It increases the cognitive abilities of persons and thus enhances resistance to vile ideologies peddled by terrorists (Music, 2016). It also helps to open up access to economic opportunities and thus in so doing address social inequalities which is a key grievance fuelling recruitment to terrorism (De Siva, n.d.; Music, 2016).

This notwithstanding, Kruger and Maleckova (De Silva, n.d.) found empirical evidence of a positive association between higher education and affinity to terrorism amongst suicide bombers in Palestine. De Silva (n.d.) underscores this finding by citing various scholars that found secondary level education or higher accounted for greater number of Hezbollah recruits in Lebanon.

Poverty also has a great influence in motivating violence (De Silva, n.d.). This perhaps explains why majority of organized criminal gang members in Kenya who resort to violence are not gainfully employed and are poor (NCRC, 2017). Poverty thus escalate beliefs of marginalization and increases vulnerability to transformation and/or recruitment of organized criminal gang members to terrorism (Music, 2016).

Religion in addition, plays an important role in examining crime terror nexus and its mitigation. Music (2016) asserts that most terrorist organizations use the guise of religion to 'plant the seeds' for a justifiable cause while rationalizing violence. He posits that contemporary trends in combating terrorism especially in Europe have tended to link violent extremism to those who profess Islamic religion. While religion beliefs can stir violence, its actors straddle the entire society (De Silva, n.d.). Different groups within the society including criminal gangs have resorted to violent extremism to further their goals regardless of the religion they profess (Music, 2016).

NCRC (2017) describes majority of organized criminal gang members as youthful males. Accordingly, youth are the most susceptible to radicalisation (De Silva, n.d.). Age therefore is an important variable in determining susceptibility to crime and vulnerability to radicalisation to terrorism. Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) posit that those of between the ages of 15 and 17 most at times finds themselves in conflict with the law. They argue that age has a significant influence on the type of crimes committed as criminals change from infractions related to properties to offences against persons as they grow older. They further hold that as people age they tend to slowly desist from engaging in crime.

Gender also has a huge influence on the nature of criminality and engagement in crime (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983; Steffensmeier & Allan, 1996). NCRC (2017) reports that males tend to execute violent felonies while females engage in offences that have a low probability of violent acts.

However, responsibilities of females have evolved over time to include participation in more serious offences (Steffensmeier & Allan, 1996). Despite this evolution, Campbell (Steffensmeier & Allan, 1996) explain that females in criminal gangs still rely on their male counterparts in the execution of crime. Furthermore, the rates of transgressions of crime are usually higher amongst males than females except for commercial sex work (Steffensmeier & Allan, 1996).

The social environment in which most organized criminal gangs operate in is characterised by peer pressure, broken families and the prevalence of drug abuse (Mkutu et al., 2017; NCRC, 2017). Criminal gangs also have a tendency to have poor life skills and have a greater need for group identity (Mkutu et al., 2017; NCRC, 2017). These factors that border on negative socio-economic circumstances, poor mental health and undesirable personal circumstances are precursors to radicalisation to terrorism (Smith, 2018).

2.4 Factors Contributing to Resilience of Organized Criminal Gangs

Perri, Lichtenwald, and Mackenzie (2009) argue that organized criminal gangs thrive in situations where there is low law enforcement capability. They hold that this is reinforced in situations where organized crime groups consider that their interests are neither served by existing government nor are congruent to societal norms. They further posit that criminal gangs operating in metropolitan areas get buoyed by the desire to resist established rule of law and generally feel less restrained by reverence to political system.

According to Makarenko (Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie, 2009) organized criminal gangs and indeed terrorist groups learn each other's successes and failures and adopt accordingly. The adaption of lessons learnt reinforces the resilience of the organized criminal gangs. She further argues that mutual interdependence between terrorist groups and organized criminal gangs have been established in shared instances where the rule of law and established political order is against them. Such a symbiotic relationship results to synergy with an effect of enduring resilience for both the criminal groups and terror gangs.

Badurdeen and the International Crisis Group (Badurdeen & Goldsmith, 2018) hold the view that perceptions of marginalization of the Coast region of Kenya and the prevalent complaints linked to poverty has accentuated violence by Al Shabab. This argument implies that the organized criminal gangs thrive due to limited social economic opportunities that account for poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. (NCRC, 2017). Indeed terrorists exploit the get-rich motive of criminal gangs by cooperating with them in executing business transactions (Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie, 2009).

2.5 Levels of Organized Crime

Dijk (2007) argues that a publicly held view that a group is an organized criminal group is not definite. He goes on to state that countries all over the world have varying views of what constitutes organized crime and criminal groups. Kenney and Finckenaer and Levi (Dijk, 2007) suggest that the consensus amongst criminologists is that organized crime manifest in the following forms: the use of bribery to influence the criminal justice system and allied state officials, tremendous use of violence to gain material benefit, meddling in elections and infiltration of lawful economy.

Van Duyne and Van Baken (Savona, Dugato & Garofalo, 2012) argue that organized criminal groups must possess four features and two discretionary characteristics. They outline the obligatory characteristics as; it must have two or more people, should have been in operation for a considerable long period, alleged to have executed serious breaches of the law, and is driven by quest for financial and/or material gain. They further list non-compulsory features from which an organized criminal possess as; an indication of specialization amongst its members in terms of responsibilities, are meticulous in punitive and control measures for its members, have operations spanning across international borders, have a low threshold in employing violence in extortion, are highly organized with business-like organs, engage in sanitizing ill-gotten funds and have a span of influence cutting across major sectors of a state.

While this study used operational definition of organized criminal gangs as highlighted in Section 22 of Kenya's Prevention of Organized Crime Act 2010, it utilised the seven non-compulsory indicators as suggested by Van Duyne and Van Baken (Savona, Dugato & Garofalo, 2012) to measure organized crime. These indicators were considered important as they measure the span of organized criminality. Such determination is important in establishing control and prevention mechanisms by policy makers and practitioners (Savona, Dugato & Garofalo, 2012).

2.6 Radicalization of Organized Criminal Gangs to Terrorist Activities

ICSR (2017) posit that terrorists have a propensity to contaminate the perceptions, views, attitudes and beliefs of those amenable to them. They argue that terrorists espouse unorthodox ideologies to the detriment of peace and stability in societies. Therefore, in examining the nexus between crime and terror the centrality and importance of radicalisation to terrorism cannot be discounted. Radicalisation underpins the convergence of crime and terror and the transformation of organized crime gangs into terrorist groups.

Knudsen (2018) argues that countries all over the world have sought to develop tools to gauge radicalisation to terrorism in order to contain the vice. He however observes that model for radicalisation and terrorism are yet to be ascertained. The risk markers developed so far only measure the prospect of radicalisation (Smith, 2018). Knudsen (2018) avers that the United Kingdom [UK] has two tools viz Extremism Risk Guidance [ERG 22+] and Vulnerability Assessment Framework [VAF] which are widely in use to assess susceptibility to radicalisation to terrorism. He states that the ERG 22+ is applied on convicted terrorists while the VAF which is a derivative of the ERG 22+ is a tool used on suspects exposed to radicalisation to gauge if their vulnerability has been compromised. He notes that the VAF is used in prevention programmes in the UK.

Smith (2018) identifies other tools that have been developed to include the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment Consultative Version 2 [VERA 2] and the Historical Clinical Risk Management -20 Version 23 [HCR 20^{V3}]. Pressman and Flockton (Smith, 2018) hold that VERA 2 was developed to measure risk associated with violence emanating from political partisanship. Meanwhile Douglas et al. (Smith, 2018) aver that the HCR 20^{V3} is a clinical tool used to measure affinity to violence within correctional services facilities, hospitals and in criminal investigations amongst adults.

Smith (2018) holds the view that ERG 22+, VERA 2 and HCR 20^{V3} are considered as major tools for assessment of radicalisation. He argues that the three major tools have almost similar markers for gauging susceptibility save for minor differences. Table 2.1 highlights the similarities and differences between the three major tools.

Table 2.1 Relationship between Risk Assessment Tools for Radicalization

Indicator	ERG 22+	VERA 2	HCR 20 ^{V3}
Account for use of violence over time		X	X
Record of engagement in criminality over time	X		X
Acquaintance with extremists	X	X	
Radical ideology/immense complaints on injustices	X	X	
Determination to mete out violence		X	X
Capability and capacity to execute violence	X	X	
Psychological state	X		X
Socio-economic shortcomings (unemployment, low levels of education, difficulties in relationships etc.)			X

Source: National Institute of Justice [NIJ] of the USA (Smith, 2018)

The mark X in table 2.1 shows the inclusion of the subject indicator in the relevant assessment tool. While these tools were developed through credible research, experience with identified risk indicator(s) does not automatically lead to outright radicalisation (Smith, 2018). To determine radicalisation, this study utilised some indicators in the ERG 22+. The indicators borrowed mainly explored ethnic bias, magnified perception of alienation, support of courses pursued by terrorists, high affinity for violence and utter disregard for sanctity of human life.

2.7 Linkage of Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorists Groups

To measure the nexus between organized criminal gangs and terrorists groups, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute [UNICRI] and Thailand Institute of Justice [TIJ] (2016) provides a framework of examining the linkage (continuum) along four nexus points viz;

- i. *Operational linkage.* Measures the extent to which organised criminal groups and terror actors exhibit a symbiotic relationship in their operational behaviour such in securing funds, arms trafficking and control of turf. This nexus point is alluded to as transactional by UNICRI and TIJ (2016).
- ii. *Motivational linkage.* Assesses whether organized criminal gangs and terror groups have shared beliefs and value system manifested in common ideology and goals.
- iii. *State linkage.* Evaluates the degree to which the organized criminal group identifies with the State. Terror groups tend to distinguish themselves from the State.
- iv. *Use of violence goals.* Examines the motivation behind use of violence. The application of violence without the need for financial and/or material gain indicate crime terror nexus.

The ICSR (2016) however argues that organized criminal gangs and terrorist groups continue to be distinct but there has been a merger of their social network and operational environment. It argues that the merger of a community grid between the two groups has forced the two groups to recruit new followers from the same public net bringing about unplanned collaborations and connections between the two.

Makarenko (ICSR, 2016) on the other hand alludes to three nexus points viz; cooperation, convergence and transformation. The cooperation node averred by Makarenko (ICSR, 2016) is similar to the operational linkage characteristics suggested by UNICRI and TIJ (2016). Under the convergence node, she suggests that criminal gangs and terrorist groups use each other's methods. They deploy each other's tact depending on situation and driving force. At transformation node, she holds that organized criminal gangs and terror groups might completely metamorphose into the other side of the duality because of a radical shift in its driving force.

Shelley et al. (2005) assert that lines that separate organized criminal gangs and terrorists groups continue to be blurred. They acknowledge that both organized criminal gangs and terrorists groups are learning organizations borrowing from each other lessons learnt and adopting accordingly. They also hold that to accurately determine a nexus both the driving force and techniques used by the two groups need to be examined. They thus suggest an approach based on Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield [IPB]. They call this technique 'Preparation of the Investigation Environment [PIE]'.

Shelley et al. (2005) hold that PIE just like the IPB endeavours to gauge a foe's most probable subsequent intended actions. They posit that PIE seeks to concentrate detectives' efforts on probable areas of interface between terror groups and criminal gangs. They argue that PIE compares conventional crime gangs with archetype terror groups and generates early warnings and reveal points of weaknesses.

To operationalize PIE, Shelley et al. (2005) categorise the possible areas of interface into two categories which are; structural and administrative watch points and modus operandi and general conduct watch points. The structural and administrative PIE base has five watch points (Shelley et al., 2005). These five watch points and associated indicators examine; how the groups are organized structurally, their objectives, shared values, identification with local support and ability to generate and enforce trust.

Shelley et al., 2005 aver that the modus operandi and general conduct PIE base scrutinize seven watch points viz: massive use of bribes, shared illegal activities like drug trafficking, fraud, hiding and sanitization of illegal acquired funds, selective application of violence not necessarily for financial gain, reliance on information technologies to execute scams and raise funds, use of modern communication gadgets to run operations and public participation in transactions conducted in mainstream economy for political mileage.

Shelley et al., (2005) assert that to determine a crime terror linkage numerous indicators must manifest positively under the two major categories of the PIE. Crime terror interaction was thus analysed using the Shelley et al. (2005) PIE watch points. This study further utilised the crime terror nexus nodes postulated by both UNICRI and TIJ (2016) and Makarenko (ICSR, 2016) to describe and measure the concept.

2.8 Gaps in Literature Review

A review of literature reveals little empirical evidence of determination of age of onset to crime in Kenya. There is little evidence of what has been done to determine age cohort composition of organized criminal gangs in a bid to estimate gang sizes and gender structure. This knowledge gap is important to be established as criminologists and scholars have realised the importance of age in explaining criminal tendencies (Hirschi & Gottfredsn, 1983). Further, there is sparse knowledge concerning women engagement in grave crimes (Steffensmeier & Allan, 1996). In Kenya, the participation of women in organized criminal gangs has not been well documented. In 2012, NCRC examined gender composition of organized criminal gangs in Kenya. This study examined gender roles and its impact in participation in organized criminal gangs.

On crime terror linkage, ENACT (2018) acknowledges a growing connection between criminal gangs and transnational crime actors in East Africa but admits that there is paucity of knowledge on the nexus. Globally, security actors have interrogated organized crime and terrorism seeking to establish their divergence and their convergence (Shelley & Picarrelly, 2002). This dynamic understanding is particularly important as a conceptual mirage could negatively impact on mitigation measures (Zimmerman, 2018). This study aimed at examining the scope of organized crime committed by the criminal gangs, their levels of radicalization and crime – terror convergence and divergence.

2.9 Theoretical Framework

Sacrae (n.d.) asserts that a number of theories have been postulated to explain criminality, terrorism and affinity to violence. He explains that these theories provide clarity and in depth understanding of diverse forms of crime. This study therefore used the theories of Frustration – Aggression and Institutional Anomie to explain the study concepts and their interaction.

2.9.1 Frustration- Aggression Theory

The Frustration – Aggression theory was postulated by Yale University’s psychologists namely; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears in 1939 (Eron, 1994). The main drive behind the theory is that people tend to resort to violence once their bid to attain personal goals are unfulfilled and thus frustrated (Eron, 1994). Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (Breuer & Elson, 2017) further explains that frustration can also result in other forms of reactions and not necessarily violence in all its forms. They hold that frustration should therefore be seen in terms of an occurrence which is a consequence of negative circumstances surrounding an individual and not necessarily an emotional state.

Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (Breuer & Elson, 2017) argue that the aggressive acts are normally aimed at the primary source of frustration. Geen (Breuer & Elson, 2017) however further expand the targets of aggression to include other people who are not directly responsible for the frustrations being felt. This mirrors terrorists' tactic of targeting innocent civilians (non-combatants) to pressurise them to support their aims against an established political order (Yamamoto, 2018).

Gossarth-Maticek, Eysenk and Vetter (Breuer & Elson, 2017) explain that the presence of frustration can also amplify negative perceptions. According to Morlan (Breuer & Elson, 2017) this can trigger a never ending chain reaction cycles of frustration and aggression. Poverty as circumstantial source of frustration easily explain crime (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983). Thus, it can be construed to mean that economic class deprivation is a trigger for violence tendencies which in turn invites State authorities' reaction and thereafter a never ending clash between the deprived and the State. This explains the resilience of terrorists and organized criminal gangs who mostly emerge from poor backgrounds (De Silva, n.d.).

To explain the nexus between organized criminal gangs and terrorist groups, Hanratty, O'Neil & Sulzer (Breuer & Elson, 2017) maintain that the frustration – aggression theory can be used to explain the copying of tactics and borrowing of lessons learnt amongst belligerents who share frustrations. Terrorists and organized criminal gangs mostly mimic the tactics of each other (Wang, 2010). Zimmerman (2018) alludes to such learning when he affirms that AL Qaeda in some instances no longer accept responsibility for attacks which is a tact that has been use by criminal organizations for long. Makarenko (Perri, Lichtenwald & Mackenzie, 2009) gives an example of terrorist tact of car bombing used by the Mafia (an organized criminal gang) to gain public support for it against Italy's Government.

2.9.2 Institutional Anomie Theory [IAT]

The IAT is associated with Messner and Rosenfeld who developed the theory in 1994 (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995). Messner (Savolainen, 2000) contends that the IAT is an extension of the strain theory. He argues that the IAT shift up the level of evaluation of crime tendencies from an individual to society. Savolainen (2000) contends that the strain theory which is part of the IAT focusses on how delinquency is spread over a society while the anomie examines differences in intensities of law breaking across social strata. He argues that the thesis underpinning the IAT is that law breaking levels in a society depends on shared values and stratifications within it.

Messner and Rosenfeld concur with the assertions of the strain theory that claims that economic inequalities amplify the occurrence of law breaking (Savolainen, 2000). Merton (Savolainen, 2000) holds that this is particularly applicable in societies pursuing capitalistic economy. Savolainen (2000) argues in such societies the drive towards criminal offending is high since get rich schemes supersedes ethical behaviours. He holds that unrestrained capitalism erodes shared values and instead glorify the culture of impunity in pursuit of wealth thus making the society greedy with no moral compass. The mounting violence using fire arms in the USA can be attributed to this anomie (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997).


Messner and Rosenfeld (Savolainen, 2000) further expanded the strain theory by adding other variables such as; unfortunate family backgrounds, poor education systems, weak social protection institutions and bad politics to explain delinquency and crime rates. Savolainen (2000) argues that broken down families and a poorly structured education system amongst other inadequacies remove restraints placed on individuals to conform to societal norms. He contends that disregard of institutions not associated with economic utility prospects coupled with divisive politics results to weak institutions and negative socialisation hence criminal culture.

The IAT prescribes a solution to this dilemma which involves a radical shift in politics and economic orientation of societies. Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) advocates for affirmative action revolving around general good of the society by addressing the inadequacies of the invisible hand of market forces used to allocate resources in capitalistic economies. They advocate for deliberate measures meant to address income inequalities. This is informed by findings of Messner (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997) who established a positive correlation between rates of murders and degree of inequalities associated with certain economic classes. Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) also encourages the political class to enshrine protection issues as rights concerns and that they are universal despite associated negative economic ramifications. They argue that when a balance is achieved within main organizations making a society for example through moderated capitalism, stable family units amongst others then a culture of upholding the law will supersede the obsession for wins without regard to legality of actions taken.

2.10 Conceptual Framework

The central argument of the study is that the presence of organized criminal gangs who are essentially poor, ill-educated and with low or no social protection lead to frustration which are reflected in aggression. Frustration amidst porous borders, drug trafficking and abuse, endemic corruption coupled with bad politics create a recipe for crime terror nexus. With their charismatic leaders, terror groups can seek to ally themselves with the organized criminal gangs to aid in fund raising and also to boost their operational capacity. In so doing a crime terror nexus unfolds. The study thus adopted a conceptual framework as shown in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2. 1 Conceptual Framework



Source: Author, 2019

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter rationalizes the study design chosen. It also justifies the context chosen to explore the study's concepts. Further it outlines how the study objectives were realized through data analysis.

3.2 Research Design

This study employed an exploratory research design. Exploratory research design is suitable for studying concepts and issues that little is known about (Maxfield & Babbie, 2012). This research design was chosen since there was inadequate literature on organized crime in Kenya to serve as pillars of the current study (Gastrow, 2011; NCRC, 2012).

3.3 Study Site

Mombasa County is cosmopolitan besides being a breeding and training ground of criminal elements (SRIC, 2018). The County also has active terrorist presence (Badurdeen & Goldsmith, 2018). Although Mombasa County has six sub counties, the study was limited in scope to Kisauni, Nyali, Mvita and Likoni which are hot spots and home to most organized criminal gangs (Mkutu et al., 2017). The gangs in the four sub counties chosen were considered sufficient to draw conclusion for the study as they also operate in the other Sub Counties of Mombasa (SRIC, 2018).

3.4 Population of the Study

The focus of the study was on organized criminal gangs in Likoni, Mvita, Nyali and Kisauni Sub Counties within Mombasa County. The primary study population thus consisted of: alleged, convicted and reformed organized criminal gang members. The list of organized criminal gangs operating in Mombasa was as provided in Appendix 2. Other population of interest included; returnees, religious leaders, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) with programs on criminal gangs and returnees, parents to alleged organized criminal gang members, National Police Service (NPS), Kenya Prison Service, peace committee members, youth leaders, organized criminal gangs' crime victims and National and County Government administrators in the four sub counties.

3.5 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

Pawelz (2018) argues that studies on criminal gangs usually encounter the challenge of determining the exact study population in terms of numbers. Fisher et al (as cited in Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003) holds that in such instance it is sound to assume that fifty percent (50%) of the population have the desired traits of study interest. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) go further and suggest a sample of three hundred and eighty four (384) at ninety five percent (95%) confidence level in such circumstances. This study therefore targeted to draw a sample size of three hundred and eighty four (384) respondents.

To determine who to sample from the study population a successive approach was used. Pawelz (2018) recommends this approach in criminal gangs' studies. She explains the approach as heavily reliant on snowballing and purposive sampling procedures coupled with application of best practices borrowed from scholars in difficult to access population studies. To actualize the successive approach, the study first identified periphery persons. Pawelz (2018) explains periphery persons as persons who reside and/or work in the study context and have an extensive knowledge of the study question(s) and/or population of interest.

The study thus purposively selected four individuals drawn from four different CSOs to act as the periphery persons and designated study's research assistants. The CSOs chosen were MUHURI, HURIA, HAKI Africa and Mtongwe Community Initiative. These CSOs had programs involving rehabilitation of criminal gangs and returnees. They were thus considered suitable since they had the trust of organized crime gang members (of study interest) and returnees. On identification, the researcher endeavoured to build a relationship with the periphery persons in order to establish trust as regards the intent and motives of the study. On attaining trust, the periphery persons were then trained on data collection and study ethics.

On completion of data collection training, the study embarked on step 2 of the successive approach as recommended by Pawelz (2018). This step involved mapping of the organized criminal gangs (as listed in appendix 2) to identify areas from which they operate from to allow for their easy engagement. Each periphery person was then assigned a sub county to carry out the research. The periphery persons thereafter purposively sampled the target population in their designated study areas in the first instance before resorting to snowballing. Purposive sampling refers to a deliberate method of choosing a research respondent because they possess desired study question traits or have extensive knowledge of it (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). Snowballing on the other hand refers to a method of obtaining subsequent respondents from an initial subject that had been purposively sampled (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).

3.5.1 Inclusion Criteria

The inclusion criteria for main respondents of the study were all reformed, alleged and convicted members of organized criminal gangs declared in the Kenya Gazette Notice 10690 of 2016 operating in Mombasa County.

3.5.2 Exclusion Criteria

The exclusion criteria for main respondents of the study were all criminal gang members belonging to other gangs other than those declared in the Kenya Gazette Notice 10690 of 2016. The exclusion did not include those who declared affiliation to the gazetted gangs in the past.

3.5.3 Sampling Size Distribution of Respondents

A total of two hundred and eighty two (282) individual respondents were interviewed with the main respondents accounting for two hundred and twenty nine (229) respondents (81.2%). For all respondents, the gender composition was as follows; two hundred and thirty eight (238) or (84.4%) were males while forty four (44) or (15.6%) were females. In terms of sub county distribution the breakdown of respondents was as follows; Likoni one hundred and twenty five (125) or (43.7%), Mvita thirty one (31) or (10.8%), Kisauni ninety one (91) or (31.8%) and Nyali thirty nine (13.6%).

Secondary respondents consisted of twenty five (25) returnees and twenty eight (28) Key Informants [KIs]. Payne and Payne (2011) describe KIs as experts in the matter under investigation by virtue of having in depth knowledge. The KIs were drawn from; religious leaders, CSOs, parents to alleged organized criminal gang members, NPS, Kenya Prison Service, peace committee members, youth leaders, organized criminal gang's crime victims and the local administration in both the National and County Government. For the KIs, appropriate sample size was pegged on the judgment of the lead researcher based on attainment of data saturation. Glaser and Strauss (Mason, 2010) define data saturation as an instance in which further investigation of a study matter does not bring forth anything novel. The sample size drawn is as shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3. 1 Sample Size Distribution of Respondents by Count

Respondent	Sub County				Gender		Total
	Likoni	Mvita	Kisauni	Nyali	Male	Female	
Criminal Gang Members	114	22	70	23	200	29	229
Returnees	2	0	16	7	15	10	25
Key Informants							
Religious Leader	1	1	0	1	3	0	3
Youth Leader	1	1	0	1	2	1	3
Civil Society	1	1	0	1	3	0	3
Organized Gang Crime Victim	1	0	1	1	3	0	3
Local Administration	1	0	1	1	3	0	3
Member Peace Committee	1	1	1	1	3	1	4
National Police Service	1	1	1	1	4	0	4
Parent of Organized Criminal Gang Member	1	1	0	1	0	3	3
Kenya Prison Officer	0	2	0	0	2	0	2
FGD ^b	1	1	1	1	-	-	4
Total	125	31	91	39	238^a	44^a	286

^a 4 respondents did not indicate their gender in the study questionnaire

^b FGD respondents not included in the total figure of respondents.

Source: Research Data, 2019

Four Focused Group Discussions [FGDs] were also conducted. Mugenda and Mugenda (2012) describe FGDs as a style of collecting data from a group of six to ten (6 – 10) persons from the same study context who have been impacted by the research question(s) in similar manner. This study however had FGDs of twelve (12) people each, of previously interviewed organized criminal gang members and KIs. This number of respondents was considered manageable. Three FGDs had exclusive representation from organized criminal gang members while one drew its membership from the KIs.

The organized criminal gang respondents were between the ages of fourteen and forty six (14 and 46 years) with an average age of twenty two point nine seven (22.97) years. The standard deviation [SD] of their ages stood at five point eight seven (5.87) meaning at 1SD, sixty eight percent (68 %) of the respondents were between the ages of seventeen point one to twenty eight point six six years (17.1 to 28.66 years). The sample size of the organized criminal gang members is categorised as good by Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) since a response rate of fifty nine point six three percent (59.63%) or approximately sixty percent (60%) was attained.

3.6 Data Collection Method and Tools

The study relied on primary data (both quantitative and qualitative) collected from members of the organized criminal gangs, returnees and Key Informants [KI] through methodological triangulation. The reliance on primary data was informed by the fact that the data sought was not readily available in public domain as criminal groups are secretive and thus difficult to extract data from (NCRC, 2012). Kraska and Neuman (as cited in Brent & Kraska, 2010) recommend methodological triangulation as it leverages on the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative approaches to research thus minimizing shortcomings in each.

A semi structured survey questionnaire made of both open and closed ended questions was thus used to elicit data from members of the organized criminal gangs and returnees. Maxfield & Babbie (2012) recommend semi structured questionnaires to effectively bring out the perceptions and beliefs of criminals. Five scale Likert type questions were also included in the semi structured questionnaire. The Likert type questions required responses ranging from totally agree to totally disagree.

For organized criminal gangs, the questionnaire covered the following thematic areas: demographics, gender roles in criminality, group resilience factors, span of organized crime, radicalization to terrorism and transformation watch points. Generally the semi structured questionnaire for the organized criminal gangs was greatly influenced by the works of various scholars. The indicators used to collect data on span of organized crime can be attributed to those suggested by Van Duyne and Van Baken (as cited in

Savona, Dugato & Garofalo, 2012). For radicalization to terrorism, data was collected based on customized ERG 22+ indicators as borrowed from Smith (2018). Meanwhile the transformation watch points were borrowed from the PIE framework of Shelley et al. (2005).

For returnees, the semi structured questionnaire sought information on; demographics, terror group involvement in crime, recruitment practices of terrorists and cooperation in organized crime between organized criminal gangs and terror groups. Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) using an interview schedule were also done to collect data from KIs. The KI interview schedule further sought data on; relationship between criminal gangs and terrorism, current crime mitigation practices and recommendations for measures to prevent crime terror nexus. An interview schedule was preferred since it allows for consistent and deliberate way of eliciting data (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).

For methodological triangulation, members of organized criminal gangs were also subjected to FGDs. To guide the discussions, an interview schedule was used. The interview schedule sought information on: organized criminal group's motivation and ultimate aims, factors explaining rise and resilience of criminal groups, opinion of the gang members on current crime mitigation practices and way forward. An FGD for KIs was also conducted. This FGD elicited data on: organized criminal gangs demographics, drivers, threat, prevalence, support, trends and activities. The study relied on the FGDs since they enable the intensive coverage of issues under investigation through guided free flow of thoughts from the participants (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2012).

Document review was also utilized as a tool to collect data from national government apparatus sources. The information collected from document review included information on; structure, size and characteristics of organized criminal gangs in Mombasa, crime history showing inter group relationship amongst the criminal gangs and modes of operation relating to the criminal gangs. The review also involved checking of; crime records as recorded in Police Occurrence Books [OB], prosecution records amongst other documents.

3.7 Data Analysis

The study yielded both quantitative and qualitative data which impacted on analysis methods used to actualize the study objectives. To examine social characteristics and gender roles in the organized criminal gangs, statistical methods and content analysis were utilized. Mean and standard deviation [SD] were used to interpret data on: ages of the respondents, age of joining criminal/terror group and age cohorts' composition of the criminal groups.

Patel (2009) holds that sixty eight percent (68%) respondents of an observed phenomena falls within one (1) SD of the mean, ninety five percent (95%) within two (2) SD and ninety nine percent (99%) within three (3) SD. The study thus utilised Patel's (2009) interpretation of the SD to derive further meaning of the descriptive statistics. Meanwhile, percentages and frequencies were used to interpret data on; occupation, religion, level of education, marital status and gender roles in criminality. Content analysis on the other hand was used to draw deductions on organized criminal gangs' dynamics focusing on threats, prevalence, demographics and gender roles in criminality. Neuman (2007) defines content analysis as a method of analysing verbal and nonverbal data gathered in the field to make deductions.

To assess factors contributing to resilience of organized criminal gangs, percentages and frequencies were used to analyse the closed ended questions. Meanwhile content analysis was used to analyse responses to the open ended questions on the subject administered in FGDs and KIIs. The analysis also involved triangulation of KIIs and FGDs data to check for consistencies and disregard data which was not collaborated.

To determine the extent of organized crime executed by criminal gangs, ordinal data was collected using a five (5) scale Likert type questionnaire based on indicators suggested by Van Duyne and Van Baken (as cited in Savona, Dugato & Garofalo, 2012). Jameison (2004) holds that ordinal data should be analysed using the median and mode as measures of central tendency while the Inter Quartile Range [IQR] be used to assess dispersion. To interpret the IQR the study held that a score equal or less than two (2.00) signify concurrence of opinion. An IQR score of greater than two (2) was considered to indicate divergence of views on a statement under examination.

To measure the level of concurrence amongst the respondents rating of all issues raised on the Likert type questionnaire on a specific subject, the Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance (W) was used. Kendall's W Coefficient scores range between zero (0) and one (1). Kraska –Miller (2013) holds that a score of zero (0) signifies a complete divergence of opinion whereas when the rating tends towards one (1) it signifies a very firm concurrence. Siegel (1956) advocates the use of Kendall's W coefficient in measuring convergence and/or divergence of opinions amongst respondents. The study thus analysed the scope of organized crime using the median, mode, IQR and Kendall's W coefficient. The overall median score for the various indicators was used to measure the level of organized crime.

To evaluate radicalization to terrorism amongst organized criminal gang members, ordinal data was elicited using a five (5) scale Likert questionnaire based on customized ERG 22+ indicators borrowed from Smith (2018). The median, mode, IQR and Kendall's W coefficient were used to analyse the data. To pass a judgement on the level of radicalisation amongst the organized criminal gangs, the overall median score encompassing all indicators was used.

Determination of the linkage between organized criminal gangs and terrorist groups was conducted on two levels of analysis. First, the five (5) scale Likert questions covering radicalization to terrorism for criminal gang members and one on terror group and criminal gang cooperation in organized crime activities were analysed using median and mode to identify crime terror nexus nodes. IQR and Kendall's W coefficient was also used to measure the level of agreement. This level of analysis aimed to establish linkages in the following forms; operational, motivational, shared identity in terms of State alienation and use of violence goals.

Secondly, ordinal regression was carried out using Statistical Package for the Social Science [SPSS] to measure association between organized criminal gangs and terror groups through their behavioural, operational and organizational conduct. The level of organized crime and radicalization to terrorism were designated as the independent variables (X) while the transformation watch points as postulated by Shelley et al. (2005) were designated as the dependent variable.

On regression; Cox and Snell, Nagelkerke and MacFadden coefficients were yielded which score between zero (0) to one (1). To interpret the ordinal regression coefficients, the study shared Kraska –Miller (2008) views. Kraska –Miller (2008) interpreted Cox and Snell, Nagelkerke and MacFadden measures of association in the following ways, zero-zero point one (0.0 – 0.1) very weak, zero point one to zero point three (0.1 –0.3) weak, zero point three to zero point five (0.3 – 0.5) average, zero point five to zero point seven) 0.5 – 0.7 strong and zero point seven to one) 0.7 – 1.0 very strong.

3.8 Validity and Reliability

Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) define validity as the extent to which study deductions are true. To assure validity of study findings, data collected from the main respondents were counter checked against existing Government of Kenya crime records and those from; returnees, KIs and FGDs. This method of data triangulation for validity assurance was advanced by Patton (Golafshan, 2003). Validity of the study was further enhanced by reporting verbatim the sentiments of the respondents. Noble and Smith (2017) hold that such reporting makes a study more believable.

On the other hand reliability is the extent to which a data collection tool can replicate study findings even after being administered several times (Mugenda & Mugenda 2003). Initially the data collection tools were pretested on four research assistants to address vagueness of the questionnaires and also invite suggestions for better framing of the questions. Mugenda and Mugenda (2013) advocates for such a method by holding that reliability can be enhanced through pretesting data collection tools on other persons who are not subject of the research.

Further, to ensure the consistency of the study's data collection tools, a reliability analysis was run using SPSS to check for internal consistencies. Cronbach's alpha score was thus computed and a score of 0.707 coefficient alpha attained by the study. George and Mallery (Gliem & Gliem, 2003) hold that a Cronbach's Alpha score that lies between 0.7 and 0.799 is acceptable. Table 3.2 gives the Cronbach's alpha score for the various categories of indicators in the study.

Table 3. 2 Reliability Analysis

Item	Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
Male roles in the organized criminal gangs	0.748	19
Female roles in the organized criminal gangs	0.683	19
Organized criminal gangs resilience factors	0.523	8
Terror groups activities in Mombasa	0.843	19
Scope of organized crime	0.567	7
Radicalization organized criminal gangs	0.748	14
Activities in which terror groups and organized criminal gangs cooperate	0.821	7
Transformation (behavioural and environmental) watch points	0.749	21
Transformation (organizational) watch points	0.677	11
Overall	0.707	

Source: Research Data, 2019

3.9 Limitations of the Study

The use of periphery persons who relied on their contacts to reach the organized criminal gang members had the potential of prejudicing study findings. Pawelz (2018) argues that since the periphery persons use snow balling and purposive sampling the first interviewee has huge implications on subsequent respondents as most likely he/she will likely recommend friends and not necessarily those that offer a varied perspective on the study question. The study sought to mitigate this limitation by impressing upon the periphery persons of the need to select first respondents who meet the inclusion criteria of study. This was important as poor selection of the first study respondent(s) deepen partiality of findings (Pawelz, 2018).

3.10 Ethical Considerations

Key to the study was the need to maintain confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents to assure their safety from possible retribution. The study methodology was thus designed to assure these important tenets through the use of periphery persons as research assistants. Informed consent was also obtained from the respondents prior to data collection. Further, authority was obtained from relevant institutions prior to subjecting their officers to the study interviews.

CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction


This chapter endeavours to answer the research questions. It outlines the study findings. Further, it provides an interpretation of those findings against existing literature.

4.2 Social Characteristics and Gender Roles in the Organized Criminal Gangs

The age of joining criminal gangs and engagement in criminality was averred by the respondents to be at the range between 7 to 34 years. The Mean and Standard Deviation [SD] stood at 17.41 and 4.37 years respectively. This means that at 1 SD, 68% of the criminal gang members joined these outfits between the ages of 13.04 to 21.78 years. This age range of onset (at 1 SD) signifies the period in which persons are most vulnerable to recruitment to organized gangs and/or engagement in criminal activities in Mombasa County.

The study's finding was consistent with Greenberg's (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983) assertion that during teenage years youth engage in criminality to finance their high need for socialisation activities with their friends due to lack of lawful of sources. He observed that the needs of teenagers have increased over generations amid rising cost of living. Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) aver that teenagers' capability to satisfy their social needs have diminished over the years and as such increased their propensity to engage in criminality. Figure 4.1 illustrates the age cohort composition of an average organized criminal gang in Mombasa.

Figure 4. 1: Organized Criminal Gang Membership by Age Cohorts



Source: Research Data, 2019


Figure 4.1 shows that based on aggregated and summated mean, a criminal gang had on average between 7 to 37 members. Majority of the criminal gang members were drawn from the under 18 and 18 – 34 years age cohorts. On examining these two age cohorts membership further, an inference was drawn that for every 4 male gang members there was one female. The study thus deduced that 20% of organized criminal gang members were female.

The findings also revealed that engagement in organized criminal gangs reduced with age. This was evidenced by the little representation of organized criminal membership by those of age cohort of 35 – 49 years and for the over 50 years. In fact no gang claimed to have a member aged over 50 years. The reduction in engagement in crime with age validated Greenberg’s (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983) assertion. He held that most a time parents, teachers and children courts amongst other agents of social control tend to let off teenagers when they offend. He observed that courts were normally persuaded by the jurisprudence of a child’s best interest and thus have lenient orientation. He explained that as criminals grew older, the society imposed upon them increased consequences for offending hence desistance. Further as teenagers grew older the possibilities of getting gainful employment, being married amongst others encouraged the propensity towards being law abiding.

The study findings drew some semblance of similarity on age of onset and age cohorts that made the bulk of the membership for both terror and organized crime groups. The age range of joining terror groups amongst the returnees was between 14 – 27 years. The average age of joining terror groups was found to be 20.58 years (SD 3.56 years). This meant that at 1 SD, 68% of them were recruited to terror groups between the ages of 17.02 to 24.14 years. The returnees (respondents) further claimed that 92% of terror groups were made up of youths between 18 – 34 years with 8 % of the terror groups’ strength drawn from the age cohort of 35 – 49 years.

The almost similar age range of vulnerability to joining organized criminal gangs and that of terror gangs has implications to policies and practices around prevention of criminality and terrorism. Bardurdeen and Goldsmith (2018) found that recruiters to terrorist activities no longer used religious edicts to enlist new members but instead customized their message to specific groups. The negation of use of religious edicts means therefore that criminal gangs were possible recruits for terrorists. The young impressionable teenagers joining criminal groups could easily be enticed into transiting to terror groups. Figure 4.2 illustrates the findings on age cohort composition of terror groups.


Figure 4. 2: Membership by Age Cohorts of Majority Members of Terror Groups



Source: Research Data, 2019

On marital status, the findings indicated that majority of organized criminal gang members were single. When asked about the marital status for majority of their group members, respondents averred 93.4 % of their colleagues were either single, divorced or separated. Only 6.6% were said to be married. The findings on marital status of members in the organized criminal gangs are as shown in Figure 4.3:

Figure 4. 3: Marital Status of Majority Members of Organized Criminal Gang




Source: Research Data, 2019

The high numbers of organized criminal gang members who were not married validated numerous studies which advanced the view that marriage was directly related to reduced criminality. Lyngstad and Skarohamar (2013) held that scholars were of the view that marriage reduced propensity to offend. Sampson and Laub (Lyngstad & Skarohamar, 2013) expounded on this view by asserting that marriage expanded the social net for a would be offender by adding the parents and families of the wife/husband thus affording him/her increased social support. They further posited that the marriage institution and its attendant social net increased the self-worth of an individual hence desistance. Warr (Lyngstad & Skarohamar, 2013) further held that a new wife/husband controlled the social activities of a spouse by reducing available time for activities outside the marriage institution such as criminal tendencies. He held that years spent on marriage helped reduce and eventually stopped criminal offending. This explained the low numbers of organized criminal gang members who were married.

The study findings on schooling revealed low levels and high number of drop outs amongst members of organized criminal gangs in Mombasa County. About 77.6 % and 16.2 % of the criminal gang members were of primary and secondary level of education respectively. No member of the organized criminal education claimed to have either vocational or tertiary level of education. Figure 4.4 illustrates the findings on education;

Figure 4. 4: Highest Level of Education amongst Majority Members of Organized Criminal Gang



Source: Research Data, 2019

The study further interrogated these low levels of education amongst the respondents. One respondent neatly summarized the general views of the KIs with the remarks:

Wazazi wengi wa hawa wakora hawajali wakati watoto wao hawaendi shule. Wanatulia tu ilhali watoto wao wanashinda maskan (Most parents of these organized criminal gang members don't care when their children do not attend school. They just keep quite whereas their children are idling in informal entertainment setting)' (Key Informant [KI], 14 June, 2019)

Respondents further explained that the Kenya's Ministry of Education through National Education Management Information System [NEMIS] had been compiling data on school drop outs on account of early pregnancies since the year 2018. They further averred that little effort had been made to tame the problem of school drop outs for those not affected by early pregnancy.

The impact of education on crime cannot be under estimated. Lochner and Hjalmarsson, (2012) observed that felonies such as pick pocketing, muggings, robbery amongst other street crimes were mostly executed by those with low levels of education. They further observed that policies designed to increase transition rates in schools and the quality of education greatly accounted for crime reduction. Lochner (Lochner & Hjalmarsson, 2012) defended this assertion by holding the view that education increased employability chances and in so doing opened up lawful fund sources thus discouraging crime.


On occupation, the main respondents to the study were asked to indicate the nature of work engagement of majority of their gang colleagues. About 57.2% of the respondents said that they were jobless while 6.2 % stated that they were continuing with their education at both primary and secondary level of schooling. 36.6 % of the respondents indicated that most of their gang colleagues were engaged in some form of income generating activity. Of these, 15.7 % claimed that majority of their fellow gang members were engaged in casual employment within the private sector while 15.3% were said to be engaged in small businesses.

The findings on occupation of gang members were collaborated by a KI with these remarks;

'Most of the organized criminal gang members lack employment. They mostly depend on their families hence when they don't get money from them they engage in crime so as to put food on the table' (KI, 15 June, 2019)

Figure 4.5 shows the findings drawn from the organized criminal gang members on occupation.

Figure 4. 5: Occupation of Majority Members of Organized Criminal Gang




Source: Research Data, 2019

Analysing the forms of occupation availed by the members of organized criminal gangs, it can be deduced that they are of low income class. These findings validate the IAT theory which holds that belonging to a low income class predisposes one to crime (Savolainen, 2000).

The respondents were also asked to identify the main religion professed by majority of the gang members. This was considered important as terrorist in most instances use faith as the main reason behind their war (Tarlow, 2018). The findings show that 79.5% of organized criminal gangs professed the Islamic faith. Christianity accounted for 12.7 % while traditionalist accounted for 0.4%. Some gangs claimed that they had equal representation from both Islamic and Christianity faith. These gangs accounted for 7.4 % of the total organized criminal gangs sampled. The responses to the question on religion is as shown in Figure 4.6.

Figure 4. 6: Religion of Majority Members of Organized Criminal Gang




Source: Research Data, 2019

The findings show that majority of the organized criminal gang members were Muslims. This has an implication on the desirable change agents. Bicer (2018) held that Muslim organized criminal gang members were most vulnerable to radicalization as terrorists have tended to contaminate the perceptions of those who profess Islamic religion. He averred that terrorists exploited the resentment of such Muslims against the State on issues such as economic inequalities amongst others and thus easily recruited them into terrorism. The vulnerability of muslims notwithstanding, Tarlow (2018) held that terrorists waged wars for both faith and non faith based reasons to advance their political ambitions Therefore the susceptibility of those who profess other faiths to radical terrorists' ideologies could not be discounted.

Organized criminal gang members were also asked to indicate the majority composition of their group in terms of ethnicity. Majority (at 59.8%) indicated that their groups were of mixed ethnicity while 40.2% indicated that they were of same ethnic group. Figure 4.7 outlines findings on ethnic composition of organized criminal gangs.

Figure 4. 7: Ethnicity of Majority Members of Organized Criminal Gang



Source: Research Data, 2019

Bodea and Elbadwi (Elu & Price, 2014) hold that negative ethnicity is directly related to politically motivated violence. The inference that can be drawn is that one's ethnicity could be used to incite violence against those from other tribes. The fact that 40.2% of the organized criminal gangs were of the same ethnic extraction provided an opportunity for terrorists to use as an entry point for fueling ethnic based violence to achieve their political objective. To overcome the perils of negative ethnicity, Li (Elu & Price, 2014) recommends equitable representation in state institutions by all ethnic groups.


On gender roles within the organized criminal gangs, the study found while the gazetted list of organized criminal gangs as outlined in Appendix 2 were male led with participation of females, there was an emerging trend of non-gazetted female led gangs. These female led gangs were exclusively composed of ladies. The three non-gazetted females' only criminal gangs identified were Wakware Babies and Watengwa File in Kisauni and Widen Girls in Likoni.

On participation in violent criminal activities, the three female only criminal gangs acknowledged participation in robberies with violence while armed with crude weapons. The study however found that generally ladies were more or less playing supportive roles in commission of violent crimes. To validate this finding, a gang member respondent remarked thus:

Wanawake kwenye group ni vyambo. Twawatumia kama mtego wa kuleta wanaume vichochoroni tunapote (We use our ladies as baits to lure men into a trap before robbing them of their valuables)' (Focused Group Discussant [FGD], 13 June, 2019)

In drug trafficking, the findings show that males and females were playing almost comparable roles. 90.4 % of the respondents felt that males played an active role in sale of drugs of abuse while 66.8% respondents felt that females also participated in the vice. On planting of bhang, 15.3% of the respondents held the view that males took an active role while 9.6 % averred that females' gang members also participated. On manufacturing drugs, the findings were 19.7 % for male participation and 12.7 % for females. Figure 4.8 outlines the findings on drug trafficking

Figure 4. 8: Gender Roles in Drug Trafficking in Organized Criminal Gangs




Source: Research Data, 2019

The high percentage of participation in drug trafficking findings validate assertions of the National Authority for the Campaign against Alcohol and Drug Abuse [NACADA] (2016). In its report, it alludes to a big market of drugs of abuse as was evidenced by 51% of Mombasa County residents using at least one drug of abuse.

The report posited that the most abused substances and therefore dealt in drugs/ substances in Mombasa were; Mugoka, Khat, Bhang, Heroin, Hashish, prescription pills amongst others. This study similarly found these drugs to be the most dealt in by the organized criminal gangs.

In finance related crimes, male and female organized criminal gang members had comparable findings in shylocking and extortion with a small difference in gambling activities. For shylocking, a paltry 5.7% of the respondents felt that male gang members participated in the activity with their female counterparts being attributed with same percentage. The low participation in shylocking could perhaps be explained by their low levels of income as result of lack of gainful employment as indicated in the findings on occupation. The low levels of income has an implication on the seed capital required to execute shylocking. On gambling, 71.2 % of male organized criminal members indicated that they gambled while only 48% of their female counterparts did so. In commission of extortion, 37.1% male and 18.8% female members of organized criminal gangs participated in the vice. Figure 4.9 highlights findings on finance related crimes.


Figure 4. 9: Gender Roles in Finance Related Crimes in Organized Criminal Gang



Source: Research Data, 2019

On offences bordering on human trafficking, sale of human body parts and pimping, the general reflection of the findings point to a low involvement of organized criminal gang members in Mombasa for both genders. The findings show female gangsters were more likely to engage in pimping than their male counterparts. 21% of the females were said to participate in the vice with males accounting for 10.5%. The findings also show that the least likely crime to be committed by organized criminal gangs in Mombasa was sale of human body parts. About 3.1% females and 2.6% males acknowledged this crime. Human trafficking amongst organized criminal gangs in Mombasa was low. About 10.5% of female gangsters were said to be participating in human trafficking with their male colleagues accounting for 5.7%. Figure 4.10 outlines the findings on gender roles of organized criminal gangs' participation in human trafficking, sale of human body parts and pimping.

Figure 4. 10: Gender Roles in Offences against Persons in Organized Criminal Gangs




Source: Research Data, 2019

The findings on high participation in pimping amongst female gangsters confirm Steffensmeier & Allan (1996) view that this form of crime is mostly committed by ladies vis a vis males. It is however important to note pimping recorded low participation

for both genders in Mombasa. On offences related to Information Technology [IT] comparable findings for both genders were reflected. Mobile phone scams were likely to be executed by 24.9 % of the male gang members with females accounting for 16.6%. A gender parity was recorded in execution of internet based crimes at 8.7 %. However on forgery and fraud, 9.2 % of the males were said to be participants compared to 5.7% for females. The low participation in IT related crimes confirm the low levels of education amongst the organized criminal gang members. Figure 4.11 below outlines the findings on IT related crimes.

Figure 4. 11: Gender Roles in Offences related to IT in Organized Criminal Gang




Source: Research Data, 2019

On firearms, the findings pointed to a low level participation in the trafficking of firearms and explosives amongst organized criminal gangs in Mombasa. The findings reflected a great use of crude weapons in execution of crimes compared to firearms and explosives. Males’ participation in small arms trafficking was put at 3.5 % with females at 2.6 %.

On explosives trafficking, males accounted for 3.1 % participation while 6.1 % females were said to be engaged. Figure 4.12 shows gender roles in small arms and explosives trafficking in Mombasa.

Figure 4. 12: Gender Roles in Offences related to Arms in Organized Criminal Gang



Source: Research Data, 2019

The findings on small arms and explosives trafficking could perhaps explain the low number of homicides related to the use of firearms recorded in the four sub counties of interest between the years 2017 – 2019. Table 4.1 below show the number of murders by organized criminal gangs using firearms validating the findings on small arms and explosives trafficking;


Table 4. 1: Homicides committed with firearms

Description	Sub County	2017	2018	2019
Homicides committed with firearm	Kisauni	0	0	0
	Likoni	1	0	1
	Mvita	0	0	0
	Nyali	2	4	1

Source: Research Data, 2019

On other crimes, majority of the respondents showed a little inclination to vehicle theft. However they indicated that they mostly steal boda bodas (Motorcycles). For vehicle theft, 14 % of the males were said to be engaged in the vice with their females' counterparts accounting for 7.4%. On armed robbery, 69.4 % of the respondents averred that males participated while 25.3% thought females also participate. About 76 % of the males were likely to participate in house breaking with females accounting for 35.4%. About 54.1% of the respondents indicated male gangsters participate in election offences with female participation put at 39.7 %. Figure 4.13 below outlines the findings in gender roles involving other crimes.

Figure 4. 13: Gender Roles in Other Crimes in Organized Criminal Gang



Source: Research Data, 2019

The study findings indicate that females were gradually emerging into what was almost an exclusive male domain as far as perpetrating violent crimes was concerned. The findings validate Steffensmeier & Allan (1996) assertions that females roles in gangs are metamorphosing into execution of crimes of more gravity.

4.3 Factors contributing to Resilience of Organized Criminal Gangs

KIs generally pointed to a high prevalence of criminality associated with organized criminal gangs in the year 2017 and 2018. They however noted that the prevalence was moderate as at June 2019. These assertions were validated by a document review which reflected high actual and attempted murders attributed to organized criminal gangs. A total 130 homicides were reported from 2017 to June 2019, about 40.77% of them were committed in the year 2017 whereas the year 2018 accounted for 50.77% murders. This means that 8.46 % murders were executed in the year 2019 as at June. The rates of attempted homicides were also high in the year 2017 and 2018 compared to the year 2019. Of the 192 total reported attempted homicides as at June, 2019, about 45.83 % and 38.54% were executed in the year 2017 and 2018 respectively. The year 2019 as at June explained only 15.63% of the vice. Table 4.2 shows attempted and executed homicides as collected from document review.

Table 4. 2: Homicide Crimes attributed to Organized Criminal Gangs

Description	Sub County	2017	2018	2019
Homicides related to organized crime	Kisauni	5	12	4
	Likoni	8	10	5
	Mvita	0	0	0
	Nyali	40	44	2
	Kisauni	75	50	20
Attempted homicides related to organized crime	Likoni	6	15	8
	Mvita	0	0	0
	Nyali	7	9	2

Source: Research Data, 2019

To explain the reasons behind the mushrooming of criminal gangs, KIs advanced socio- economic, political and institutional factors. Most KIs indicated that organized criminal gangs were thriving due to the following psycho-social reasons; broken families, poor parenting, negative peer pressure, drug abuse, need for a group’s protection and the sense of belonging, negative social media content glorifying gangster lifestyle and terrorism, criminal justice system’s laxity, quest for fame, religious profiling by security apparatus and idleness as a result of dropping out of school.

The enduring psychosocial factors could perhaps explain the longevity and membership profiles of some of the organized criminal gangs as asserted by a KI thus;

'Gaza has existed for over 15 years. Majority of its members are in their late 20s to early 30s. Wajukuu wa Bibi is about 8 years old. Most of its members are below 18 years. In fact, majority of its members are primary school kids.' (KI, 16 June, 2019)

The political and economic factors advanced to explain the prevalence of organized criminal gangs were; poverty, political and drug dealers' influence, corrupt security agencies, the allure for easy money, unemployment and poverty. On drug barons' influence, a KI remarked thus;

'Drug barons greatly influence the youths and organized criminal gangs. They use them as private security guards. They have very strong networks. Police wakifanya oparesheni wanashika hawa wa chini tu (when police conduct an operation they mostly end up arresting those in lower echelons of drug dealing only)! The real guys are untouchable!' (KI, 18 June, 2019)

The institutional factors blamed for prevalence of organized criminal gangs were; lax and lenient criminal justice system, corrupt security agencies and ineffective correctional service system. The perception of a lenient criminal justice system was captured by a KI who said;

'Majority ya hawa vijana wahalifu ni under 18 years. Wakifanya uhalifu wakishikwa wanapelekwa korti ya watoto na kuhukumwa kifungo ikizidi sana miaka mitatu. Hwa wanapelekwa Likoni Remand home kisha wanaachilwa wakirudi ni legends kwa vijana wenzivao. Ukumbuke mtoto huyu aliwa! Hii inafanyisha maafisa wa lose morale (Majority are juvenile delinquents are below the age of 18. When they are taken to the Children's Court they are handed a maximum of three year jail term. They are later taken to Likoni Remand Home before they are released. When they go back to their homes they become legends amongst their peers. Remember these are murderers! When policemen see this they become demoralized)' (KI, 19 June, 2019).

The above findings on psychosocial, economic, political and institutional factors explaining the prevalence of organized criminal gangs and associated criminality validate the Institutional Anomie Theory [IAT]. Messner and Rosenfeld (Savolainen, 2000) alluded to poor psychosocial conditions as to having a considerable influence on criminality. Savolainen (2000) also posited that the lack of or weakness in institutions charged with social protection also contributed to criminality. The attribution of poverty, unemployment amongst others point to a need to increase the vibrancy of the Kenya's National Social Protection policy and programs. The social protection net seem inadequate.

The findings further indicated that the number of criminal gangs in Mombasa had grown substantially. The study encountered members of criminal gangs alleging to belong to 103 groups as outlined in Appendix 3 – 6. About 44.66% (46 in count) of these gangs were gazetted as outlined in Appendix 2. To explain the divergence between study findings and the gazetted list of organized criminal gangs a KI respondent remarked thus;

'This is as a result of the main groups fighting for supremacy. Consequently this leads to splinter groups. The splinter groups have spread to schools and currently most students are members of the gangs' (KI, 03 June, 2019)

The sub counties with the majority criminal gangs were Kisauni and Likoni with 25 and 65 respectively. Mvita and Nyali accounted for few gangs at 7 and 6 respectively. To explain the phenomenon of increased gangs in Kisauni, a KI remarked;

'Wengi ya hawa vijana wabalifu especially in Bakarani na Kisauni wanatoka Lamu (Majority of the youthful criminals operating in Bakarani and Kisauni are immigrants from Lamu County)' (KI, 19 June, 2019)

The study further sought to validate the claims of the organized criminal gang members and KIs on the numbers of active groups in Mombasa through document review. The Kenya NPS records document review generally gave conservative figures in terms of numbers of active criminal gangs within the four sub counties of Mombasa. It indicated that as of June 2019 Likoni had 8 active gangs as opposed to assertion of criminal gang members who alleged to belong to 65 different gangs. Kisauni as per the

document review had 2 active gangs as opposed to 25 as alleged by organized criminal gang members. The conservative reporting on numbers of active criminal gangs was also noted in Mvita and Nyali.

The document review also showed a gradual reduction in membership of the criminal gangs from the year 2017 to June 2019. The sub counties that were noted to have high numbers of organized criminal gang members were Kisauni and Likoni with 300 and 150 members respectively as at June 2019. No findings could be presented for Nyali as official records could not be accessed by the study as new police officers had been posted in. Table 4.3 outlines Organized Criminal Gangs in terms of numbers and membership from the document review.

Table 4. 3: Organized Criminal Groups and Membership


Description	Sub County	2017	2018	2019
Number of organized criminal groups	Kisauni	3	3	2
	Likoni	10	10	8
	Mvita	2	2	2
	Nyali	-	-	-
Suspected active members of organized criminal groups	Kisauni	800	600	300
	Likoni	200	180	150
	Mvita	15	15	15
	Nyali	-	-	-

Source: Research Data, 2019

Generally the perceptions of KIs coupled with those of organized criminal gang members’ respondents differed with those noted by the documentary review as regards active groups and membership. KIs and organized criminal gang members’ respondents shared the view that the numbers were high with the NPS maintaining the numbers were low. The difference in perception mirrors the assertion of Dijk (2007) who held the view that statistics gathered from police records most a times mirror their performance and not necessarily the degree of criminality. The study thus upheld the views of the KIs and organized criminal gang members.

The findings further point to a high likelihood of reoffending and therefore loyalty amongst organized criminal gang members. About 55.5% of the organized criminal gang members had been arrested and had a conviction record. The inference that can be drawn is that the period spent in incarceration did little to persuade the criminal gangs from reoffending. Figure 4.14 shows arrest and conviction records of the respondents amongst the organized criminal gang members;


Figure 4. 14: Arrest and Conviction Records of Organized Criminal Gang Members



Source: Research Data, 2019

The study further sought to establish what makes the organized criminal gangs thrive from their perspective. Five questions were put forth to the organized criminal gang members. The findings are as shown in figure 4.15.

Figure 4. 15: Organized Criminal Gangs Support Factors



Source: Research Data, 2019

The organized criminal gang members were asked if their families and/or dependants received support in form of money, employment, housing or any other form of help once they were imprisoned or killed or went missing. About 30.6% of the respondents alluded to their group giving some form of help to members who have been killed or imprisoned. About 61.6% averred that no help was to be expected. While 7.9% claimed that they did not know.

On whether they received support of politicians in their activities, 63.8 % of organized criminal gang members said yes. They alluded to getting cash in exchange for being private body guards or for intimidation of voters and/or political opponents amongst other duties. The claims of the organized criminal gang members were backed by a KI who remarked;

‘Criminal gangs are supported by our local politicians because once they are arrested, the political leaders call the OCS [Officer Commanding Police Station] to release them’ (KI, 19 May, 2019).


To outline the nature of duties the organized criminal gangs play for the politicians, an organized criminal gang member expressed frustrations thus;

'We feel wasted by our politicians after using us during the general election (2017) as pressure groups against their rivals. They have now completely abandoned us'
(Focused Group Discussant [FGD], 18 June, 2019)

Despite the acknowledgement of political support by some respondents, about 27.1 % of the organized criminal gang members' respondents denied receipt of any form of political support while 9.1 % of the respondents claimed they did not know.

To assess the organized criminal gang resilience further, the respondents from the gangs were asked on what they considered to be the most unifying factor. About 47.2% claimed the youth factor was what bonded them together the most. About 20.1 % of the respondents alluded to family relations as a unifying factor while 21.1% claimed it was their shared religion that kept them together. About 9.6 % of the respondents averred that a shared ethnicity is what united them. Figure 4.16 outlines the findings on what unites organized criminal gang members within their group.

Figure 4. 16: Most Uniting Factor for Organized Criminal Gang



Source: Research Data, 2019

The study further interrogated cases of inter gang cooperation in a document review. The prosecution record reflected that some gangs cooperate in the commission of crimes. As at June 2019, 30 cases had been recorded in Kisauni, 17 cases in Likoni whereas Nyali had 15 cases with Mvita reported to have few cases. The high cases of inter gang cooperation in Kisauni validate the KIs assertion when he held that no gang conducts an operation in the area without the authority of Wakali Wao.

On further interrogation of the prosecution records, the study was informed of a case of cooperation between Wakali Wao in Kisauni and Wajukuu wa Bibi in Likoni who often borrow each other expertise and strength to execute crimes in either's territory. Table 4.4 tabulates prosecution records in cases involving inter gang cooperation.

Table 4. 4: Inter Organized Criminal Gangs Cooperation

Description	Sub County	2017	2018	2019
Court cases involving different organized crime groups cooperating in the same crime	Kisauni	-	-	30
	Likoni	15	20	17
	Mvita	Few	Few	Few
	Nyali	50	48	15

Source: Research Data, 2019

Morselli, Gabor and Kiedrowski (2010) hold that inter organized criminal gang cooperation is a significant characteristic of organized crime. They hold that organized criminal gangs create linkages amongst themselves so as to increase their earnings from their activities. McGloin (Morselli, Gabor & Kiedrowski, 2010) explains that such networking affords the organized criminal groups agility in execution of their trade. This could also imply that inter group linkages afford organized criminal groups resilience as a result of acquired efficiencies from the cooperation.


The study further sought to gauge the willingness of the organized criminal gang members to reform and in so doing test the extent of their loyalty and assess potential ramifications. About 33.6% of the organized criminal gang members expressed fear that they would be killed for abandoning their groups. About 25.8% indicated that they would be marked and maybe punished and/or tortured. Approximately 6.6% claimed that they could not abandon their groups since in any case the society does not like them. The perception of being stigmatized and disliked were captured by a KI who remarked;

'Organized criminal gang members have branded some members of the community as informers. They feel insecure even when they want to change. They have no trust for the police since some reformed youths have been killed in the past' (KI, 17 June, 2019).

Approximately 21.9% of the organized criminal gang respondents were found to have a ready potential of being reformed. These were the respondents who claimed; that there would be no consequences (13.1%), won't earn a living (2.2%) and I don't know (6.6%).

Van Duyne (Morselli, Gabor & Kiedrowski, 2010) posits that the need to cultivate fidelity and belief in the honour of a fellow gang member is of significant value in organized criminal gangs. It is a consequence that the findings on repercussions of abandoning the criminal gang in Mombasa were found to be dire as was found in similar study in Europe by Von Lampe and Johansen in 2004 (Morselli, Gabor & Kiedrowski, 2010). In the study carried in Europe, they posited that the threat and actual execution of dire consequences made the price of betrayal to be too high to contemplate and thus group loyalty and resilience. Figure 4.17 shows the range of responses from organized criminal gang members on consequences of reforming/abandoning their groups.

Figure 4. 17: Consequences for Abandoning an Organized Criminal Gang



Source: Research Data, 2019


The organized criminal group members were also asked if there were any disagreements or power struggles or sub groups within their groups. Approximately 74.2% of the respondents alluded to intra group power struggles and the formation of splinter groups. About 21.8 % respondents denied that there were power struggles with 3.9% of the respondents claiming that they didn't know. The averment of power struggles validates assertions by the KIs explaining the increase in number of criminal groups as a consequence of splinter groups.

When asked if they were territorial fights, 87.3% of the respondents agreed while 9.6% denied. About 3 % claimed that they did not know. The findings of territorial fights were collaborated by a KI who averred;

'Between September to December 2018, Wakali Wao engaged Wakali Kwanza in a territorial fight. Wakali Kwanza were humiliated in the fight. Most of their members were seriously injured with some being killed. As a result Wakali Kwanza were wiped out. Some remnants of Wakali Kwanza pledged loyalty to Wakali Wao. Wakali Wao is now the dominant group in Kisauni. No criminal gang operation can be conducted in Kisauni without their authority)' (KI, 13 June, 2019)

The findings on organized criminal gangs’ participation in territorial fights and power struggles are as shown in Figure 4.18.

Figure 4. 18: Organized Criminal Gangs’ Vulnerability



Source: Research Data, 2019

The findings on territorial fights and political support were further backed by police records. The documentary review pointed to 21 inter organized criminal gangs homicide in Kisauni between the years 2017 to June 2019. About 80.96 % of the homicides were executed in 2017 and 2018. As at June, 2019 Kisauni had recorded 4 inter gang homicides. The police records also indicated some level of participation in political activities by the organized gangs. In the year 2017 and 2018, about 5 gangs were suspected to be involved in both Kisauni and Likoni. As at June 2019, about 2 gangs were suspected to be involved in Kisauni only. The relatively high levels involvement in political activities in the year 2017 and 2018 could be attributed to election period. Table 4.5 outlines the findings from document review with respect to political involvement and inter gang fights related homicides.

Table 4. 5: Organized Criminal Gangs Involvement in Politics and Rivalry

Description	Sub County	2017	2018	2019
Organized criminal groups involved in political activities	Kisauni	3	3	2
	Likoni	2	2	0
	Mvita	0	0	0
	Nyali	-	-	-
Inter organized criminal groups homicides in the Sub County	Kisauni	05	12	4
	Likoni	-	-	-
	Mvita	0	0	0
	Nyali	-	-	-

Source: Research Data, 2019

4.4 Level of Organized Crime Executed by Organized Criminal Gangs in Mombasa County

The study also aimed to measure the level of organized crime and in so doing categorize in aggregate the organized criminal gangs in Mombasa. Seven questions modelled along the non-compulsory indicators of organized crime as posited by Van Duyne and Van Baken (as cited in Savona, Dugato & Garofalo, 2012) were used to determine the scope. The organized criminal gangs’ respondents (n = 229) were asked to state whether they; Totally Agree = 1, Somewhat Agree = 2, Not Sure = 3, Disagree Somewhat = 4 or Totally Disagree = 5 to the statements presented to them. The findings are as shown in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6: Extent of Organized Crime

Statement	Median	Mode	IQR	Kendall's W Test – Mean Rank
Separate role for each member	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.53
Use of discipline or control within the group	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.96
Internationally active	5.00	5.00	2.00	5.35
Use of violence	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.78
Use business like structures	4.00	5.00	3.00	4.67
Engagement in money laundering	4.00	5.00	2.00	5.09
Influence on politics, media, public administration, judicial authorities or the economy.	4.00	5.00	3.00	4.61
Overall	4.00	5.00		

Kendall's W = 0.385 $\chi^2 = 514.847$ df = 6 Sig = 0.000

Source: Research Data, 2019

On whether there was some sort of specialisation in the organized criminal gangs, the respondents totally agreed (Median = 1.00) with no divergence of views (Interquartile Range [IQR] = 1.00). Morselli, Gabor and Kiedrowski (2010) found similar results in a study of organized criminal gangs. Albanese (Morselli, Gabor & Kiedrowski, 2010) holds the separation of roles amongst members have a great influence on group cohesion and its operations as it reduces reliance on group leaders.

The respondents were also asked whether they employed disciplinary measures to assure effective control on its members. The findings indicate that on average the respondents totally agreed unanimously (Median = 1.00; IQR = 1.00). This finding validate the earlier findings on the consequences of reforming or abandoning the group where the threat of dire ramifications assured loyalty. This control was only with reference to exiting the group. However when considerations are made on the study findings about intra group power struggles and wars, a deduction can be made that the groups lack self-discipline. The respondents were also asked if they had presence or associates outside the international borders of Kenya.

The respondents totally disagreed with very little divergence of views (Median = 5.00; IQ = 2.00). The findings seem to suggest that the organized criminal gangs operation are mostly local and confined to Kenya. The respondents were further asked whether they easily resorted to violence or other means to cause fear and anxiety in the general public. The respondents were unanimous in totally agreeing to the use of indiscriminate violence (Median = 1.00; IQR = 1.00). Reuter and Desroches (Morselli, Gabor & Kiedrowski; 2010) posit that organized criminal gangs abhor use of indiscriminate violence as it results to undesired public visibility. Various scholars hold that organized criminal gangs only resort to violence to achieve material gains or to get rid of rivals (Morselli, Gabor & Kiedrowski; 2010).

The respondents were also asked if they had business like structures. The respondents somewhat disagreed however their opinions were divergent (Median = 4.00; IQR = 3.00). This finding mirrored the assertions of Morselli, Gabor and Kiedrowski (2010) who held that more often than not organized criminal groups operate in absence of bureaucracy. The respondents were further asked if they engaged in money laundering. The findings indicated that the respondents somewhat disagreed with very little divergence of opinion (Median = 4.00; IQR = 2.00). Morselli, Gabor and Kiedrowski (2010) aver that core organized crimes such as money laundering are mostly committed by more bureaucratic criminal entities. This validates earlier finding on the loose structured nature of organized criminal gangs in Mombasa.

The respondents were also asked if their influence pervaded most sectors in Kenya specifically in; politics, media, public administration, criminal justice system and the economy. The respondents somewhat disagreed however their opinions were divided (Median = 4.00; IQR = 3.00). The study found that organized criminal gangs were influenced by politicians. Scanty evidence was however found if gangs on their own motion influenced who got elected and agenda to be pursued. The only evidence that the study found as averred by the respondents was corruption amongst some low cadre police officers who solicit for protection money. A FGD participant buttressed this finding by remarking;

'Askari buja maskani tukawakatia kati ya Kshs 2000 – 3000 kwa wiki. Tunabusiano mzuri nao (Policemen normally visit our hide outs to receive weekly protection fee of between Kshs 2000 – 3000 per week)' (Focused Group Discussant [FGD], 13 June, 2019)

The overall assessment of all indicators measuring the scope of organized crime is somewhat disagree (Median = 4.00). However, participants had a weak to average agreement on the overall rating of the various indicators (Kendall's W = 0.385; $\chi^2=514.847$; df = 6; Sig = 0.000). Out of the seven indicators; 3 were totally agreed to (Median = 1.00), a further 3 indicators were somewhat disagreed to (Median = 4.00) and one indicator was totally disagreed to (Median = 5.00). The top three statements that the respondents had strong agreement in their rating were (from high to low agreement); separate role for each member (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 2.53), use of violence (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 2.78), and use of discipline or control within the group (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 2.96).

Overall, the study found that the organized criminal gangs in Mombasa had three out of the seven discretionary characteristics of an organized criminal gang. Van Duyne and Van Baken (Savona, Dugato & Garofalo, 2012) hold that for a group to be qualified as organized it must have at least two of the discretionary characteristics. Therefore the study confirmed that the gangs could be categorised as organized. Further, according to Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] of USA (Morselli, Gabor & Kiedrowski, 2010), an organized gang that executes indiscriminate violence and does not execute white collar crimes like money laundering is as categorised low level organised crime group. The study thus confirmed organized criminal gangs in Mombasa as low level organized groups.

4.5 Radicalization of Organized Criminal Gangs to Terrorism

The study endeavoured to measure the level of radicalisation to terrorism amongst the organized criminal gangs. Respondents were therefore asked 14 Likert type questions customised from ERG 22+ indicators as advanced by Smith (2018). The questions thematic underpinnings were based on examining; perceptions of marginalization, propensity towards indiscriminate violence, devaluing of human life, ethnic prejudice and identification with goals and motivation of terror groups. The respondents were required to state whether they; Totally Agree = 1, Somewhat Agree = 2, Not Sure = 3, Disagree Somewhat = 4 or Totally Disagree = 5 to the questions.

The main respondents to these questions were members of the organized criminal gangs (n = 229). Table 4.7 shows the findings with respect to radicalisation to terrorism amongst the organized criminal gangs.

Table 4. 7: Radicalisation to Terrorism

Statement	Median	Mode	IQR	Kendall's W Test – Mean Rank
I have my family support	4.00	5.00	3.00	10.02
Kenya has two groups of people; us and them	2.00	1.00	3.00	8.04
I would rather any harmful thing occurs to me than leave my comrades	1.5	1.00	2.00	6.35
Our religion is under threat	2.00	1.00	3.00	7.10
Our ethnic group is under threat	2.00	1.00	3.00	7.17
Religious leaders should play a big role in politics	2.00	1.00	2.00	7.39
Our ethnic leaders should play a big role in our politics	2.00	1.00	2.00	7.74
Stealing/harming someone who is not of my religious and ethnical persuasion is okay	2.00	1.00	3.00	6.99
Suicide bombing and indiscriminate attacks are justified	3.00	5.00	3.00	8.82
Marginalisation in employment and development	1.00	1.00	1.00	5.08
Political landscape is corrupt and needs an overhaul	1.5	1.00	1.00	5.33
Bad experience with the law enforcement agencies because of ethnicity and/or religion	2.00	2.00	2.00	6.84
The world would be a better place without USA	1.00	2.00	2.00	8.63
Al Shabab are freedom fighters	3.00	5.00	3.00	9.50
Overall	2.00	1.00		

Kendall's W = 0.154 $\chi^2 = 394.668$ df = 13 Sig = 0.000

Source: Research Data, 2019

Respondents were unanimous in totally agreeing that they faced marginalisation in that they could not secure employment nor access development opportunities (Median = 1.00; IQR = 1.00). They also somewhat agreed to the assertion that the world would be a better place without USA with little divergence of views (Median = 1.00; IQR = 2.00).

Most of the respondents were however split between totally agreeing or somewhat agreeing to the statements that they would rather be harmed than abandon and/or betray their comrades (Median = 1.50; IQR = 2.00) and that the political landscape was corrupt and needed an overhaul (Median = 1.50; IQR = 1.00).

Four statements relating to perception of marginalisation and non-sensitivity to persons of different ethnicity were somewhat agreed to but there was divergence of views (Median = 2.00; IQR = 3.00). These statements sought to gauge views of respondents on; stratification of Kenya into us against them, threat perceptions to their religion they profess and ethnic persuasion and whether it was okay to rob/injure someone from different religion and ethnicity from them. To underline the non-sensitivity to persons of different ethnicity a KI remarked;

Wote wanaodungwa kisu ni watu wa bara. Hawa vijana ni watu wametumwa. Ni watu madhaiju (All those who get assaulted in knife attacks are upcountry people. These young men are not acting on their own violation. Someone sends them. They are too weak to plan and execute these crimes without support)' Hata ukiangalia hapa Kisauni zile maduka zinaporwa si za watu wa hapa (A close scrutiny of the shops that get robbed here in Kisauni reveals that they belong to non-locals. (KI, 13 June, 2019).

The remarks validates the findings of Mkutu et al., 2017 who found that the exclusionist narrative that view upcountry people (wabara) as non-deserving of economic opportunities including jobs in Mombasa as being prevalent. De Silva (n.d.) citing various scholars alludes to such sensitivity as being side-lined in gainful employment opportunities as a precursor to terrorism recruitment.

The study further gauged the respondents' views on the need for a central role in politics for their religious and ethnic leaders. It also sought to gauge their perception of marginalisation by law enforcement agencies on account of their ethnicity and/or religion. Three statements were thus posed to the respondents who somewhat agreed to them with little divergence of opinion (Median = 2.00; IQR = 2.00). The study also sought to assess whether the respondents identified with terrorists' courses. They were asked to express their views on whether suicide bombing and indiscriminate attacks were justified and if Al Shabab were freedom fighters.

The most popular response to these statements was totally disagree (Mode = 5.00) however on average the respondents claimed I don't know (Median = 3.00). The views of the respondents were also divergent (IQR = 3.00).

The respondents were also asked if they had their family's support in their activities. The most popular response was totally disagree (Mode = 5.00) however on average they somewhat disagreed while holding divergent views (Median = 4.00; IQR = 3.00). It can be deduced the organized criminal gangs operate without the support of their close family members.

The findings show that overall the respondents somewhat agreed to the 14 statements measuring radicalisation to terrorism (Median = 2.00). However, they manifested a weak agreement (Kendall's W = 0.154; $\chi^2 = 394.668$; df = 13; Sig = 0.000) in overall rating of the statements. The four top most statements that had strong agreement in their rating amongst the respondents were (from high to low); there was marginalisation in accessing gainful work and development opportunities (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 5.08), the Political landscape was corrupt and required change (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 5.33), the loyalty to the gang came above everything else (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 6.35) and that they had a bad experience with the law enforcement agencies because of their ethnicity and/or religion (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 6.84).

After overall assessment of all the indicators, the study inferred that the organized criminal gangs in Mombasa were radicalised to violent extremism. However this radicalisation did not extend to identification with terror groups' methodologies and courses as evidenced by the indifferent responses (Median = 3.00) to justification of suicide bombing and whether Al Shabab were freedom fighters. The gangs were however primed for easy radicalisation to terrorism were they to encounter charismatic terrorists' leaders. Such leaders would exploit their vulnerabilities in form of heightened feeling of marginalisation and poor psychosocial conditions as alluded to by the findings on social characteristics of the organized criminal gangs. The study findings confirmed the assertion of Decker and Pyrooz (2011) who held that unorthodox ideologies are increasingly pervading criminal groups.

4.6 Linkage between Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorist Groups

The study aimed to determine the nexus between organized criminal gangs and terror gangs. The findings are as shown below.

4.6.1 Linkage through Modus Operandi and General Conduct

Statements based on PIE behavioural and environmental watch points as posited by Shelley et al. (2005) were used to compare ideal terror groups' behaviour against those averred organized criminal gangs. The respondents were required to state that they; Totally Agree = 1, Somewhat Agree = 2, Not Sure = 3, Disagree Somewhat = 4 or Totally Disagree = 5 to the 21 five scale Likert type questions. The findings are as shown in Table 4.8

Table 4. 8: Linkage through Modus Operandi and General Conduct

Statement	Median	Mode	IQR	Kendall's W Test – Mean Ranks
Public conduct of activities	1.00	1.00	1.00	6.83
Aim to address the grievances of our community	2.00	1.00	3.00	9.79
Aim for freedom for our community	2.00	2.00	2.75	10.25
Public acknowledgement of actions	2.00	1.00	3.00	10.39
Support to community activities like; education, sports, etc.	5.00	5.00	1.00	15.58
Running of legitimate businesses	4.00	5.00	3.00	13.37
International travel	4.00	5.00	2.00	14.17
Routinely deal with fraudulent documents	5.00	5.00	2.00	14.30
Small arms/explosives trade	5.00	5.00	1.00	16.29
We have financial experts	4.00	5.00	2.00	14.04
We trade in drugs of abuse	1.00	1.00	2.00	7.59
Use of IT in operations	2.00	5.00	4.00	10.23
Encryption/coding of communication	4.00	5.00	3.00	12.78
Conducting violence for publicity	1.00	1.00	1.00	7.78
Violence to create a climate of fear	1.00	1.00	1.00	6.30
Violence to interfere in elections and/or political process	2.00	1.00	2.00	8.00
Indiscriminate attacks on civilians	2.00	1.00	3.00	9.49
Pwani si Kenya	2.00	1.00	2.00	6.89
Bribery	2.00	1.00	2.00	8.09
Money laundering	4.00	5.00	2.00	13.55
Support to charities	5.00	5.00	1.75	15.27
Overall	2.00	1.00 ^a		

a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown
Kendall's W = 0.333 $\chi^2 = 1220.593$ df = 20 Sig = 0.000

Source: Research Data, 2019

The respondents were unanimous in totally agreeing to three statements that they; publicly conducted their activities, used violence to create a climate of fear and generally sought to attain publicity for their actions (Median = 1.00; IQR = 1.00). The respondents also totally agreed to the assertion that they traded in drugs of abuse albeit with some minor difference of opinion (Median = 1.00; IQR = 1.00).

The respondents also somewhat agreed with minor difference in opinion to three statements asserting that; they used violence to interfere in elections and/or political process, 'Pwani si Kenya' (The Coast Province is not part of the greater Republic of Kenya) and that they routinely used bribes to influence government and security actors (Median = 2.00; IQR = 2.00). They further somewhat agreed that the reason behind their being was to achieve freedom for their community albeit with divergent opinion amongst themselves (Median = 2.00; IQR = 2.75). The respondents were further asked if they; aimed to address the grievances of their community, publicly acknowledged their actions and if they carried out indiscriminate attacks on civilians. They somewhat agreed to those statements albeit with divergent views (Median = 2.00; IQR = 3.00). The respondents also somewhat agreed with highly divergent views as to whether they used IT in their operations (Median = 2.00; IQR = 4.00).

The respondents were probed further to ascertain their levels of transformation by posing questions relating to highly organized crime entities and terror groups. They were asked whether they; had financial experts, executed money laundering and if they travelled across international borders regularly. On these aspects, the respondents somewhat disagreed with little divergence of opinion (Median = 4.00; IQR = 2.00). When they were asked if they had legitimate businesses as fronts for sanitising their ill-gotten income and whether they encrypted/coded their communication, the respondents somewhat disagreed with highly differing views (Median = 4.00; IQR = 3.00).

The respondents further totally disagreed unanimously to the view that they give support to community activities like; education, sports amongst others and that they were involved in Small arms/explosives trafficking (Median = 5.00; IQR = 1.00). They also totally disagreed to the assertion that they lent support to charities in their communities with very minimal divergence of opinion (Median = 5.00; IQR = 1.75). The respondents also concurred that they did not routinely deal with fraudulent documents (Median = 5.00; IQR = 2.00).

Overall, the respondents somewhat agreed (Median = 2.00) to the 21 statements presented to them for rating however their level of agreement in rating all the indicators was ranging between weak and average (Kendall's $W = 0.333$; $\chi^2 = 1220.593$; $df = 20$; $Sig = 0.000$). The four top statements that received stronger agreement in their rating were (from strongest to weakest) that organized criminal gangs; used violence to create a climate of fear (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 6.30), publicly conducted their activities (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 6.83), believe that Pwani si Kenya (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 6.89) and that they traded in drugs of abuse (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 7.59).

Generally, 4 out of 21 indicators related to behavioural and environmental watch points as posited by Shelley et al. (2005) were totally agreed to (Median = 1.00). This was equivalent to 19.05 % of the total indicators under consideration. The four indicators were mainly on; use of violence to create a climate of fear and for publicity, public conduct of activities and drug trafficking. These 4 indicators that were totally agreed to relate to 2 of the seven key watch points that point to modus operandi and general conduct PIE base that Shelley et al. (2005) alluded to viz; shared illegal activities like drug trafficking and selective application of violence not necessarily for financial gain.

A further analysis of the 21 indicators related to behavioural and environmental watch points in Table 4.8 shows that 8 indicators were somewhat agreed to (Median = 2.00). This was about 38.10 % of the total indicators. Of these indicators, only one related to the seven key watch points averred by Shelley et al. (2005). This was with reference to use of bribery. When considered in totality, it was discerned that 57.14 % (12 items) of the 21 indicators under scrutiny were either totally agreed to or somewhat agreed to.

About 42.86 % (3 out of 7 key watch points) of the modus operandi and general conduct PIE base were satisfied. Utilising Shelley et al. (2005) argument, the study inferred that a nexus was yet to a manifest fully though it was slowly emerging since majority of the PIE base indicators were unsatisfied. Shelley et al., (2005) aver that a nexus manifest when majority of the indicators pointing to PIE base being examined are satisfied.

Analysing the crime terror nexus further utilising the crime terror nexus nodes postulated by both UNICRI and TIJ (2016) additional deductions were drawn. Just like terror groups, the organized criminal gangs in Mombasa feel totally alienated from the State. This assertion is manifested by their belief that the Coast Province is not part of Kenya. Another linkage in form of use of violence goals can also be deduced. The organized criminal gangs in Mombasa totally agreed to using violence for publicity and for creating a climate of fear and not necessarily for material or financial gain. That form of application of violence is synonymous with terror groups (Ryabchiy, 2018).

When the findings on shared illegal activities such as drug trafficking drawn from the organized criminal gangs’ members were interrogated and compared to those averred by returnees (n = 25), a symbiotic behaviour in execution of some crimes was inferred. Table 4.9 outlines the findings on the transactional linkage between terror and organized criminal gangs in Mombasa.

Table 4. 9: Terror – Organized Criminal Gangs Cooperation

Statement	Median	Mode	IQR	Kendall’s W Test – Mean Rank
Drug trafficking	1.00	1.00	4.00	3.57
Small arms and explosives smuggling/hire	2.00	1.00	2.00	3.33
Human trafficking (smuggling of people)	3.00	1.00	4.00	4.14
Document fraud/forgery (ID cards, Passports, Exam Certificates, Insurance Certificates, Number plate forgery etc.)	4.00	3.00	4.00	4.36
Vehicle theft				
Armed Robberies/Burglary/Theft	2.00	1.00	4.00	4.29
Election support (Voter intimidation, bribery, ferrying etc.)	2.00	1.00	3.50	4.12
Overall	2.00	1.00		

Kendall’s W = 0.053 $\chi^2 = 6.703$ df = 6 Sig = 0.349

Source: Research Data, 2019

Generally, the findings on Table 4.9 show that terror groups have been executing a number of crimes in partnership with some organized criminal gangs. The top three organized crimes that the respondents (returnees) mostly agreed in their rating that are executed in partnership are, small arms/explosives trafficking (Median = 2.00; IQR = 2.00, Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 3.33), drug trafficking (Median = 1.00; IQR = 4.00, Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 3.57), and election related vices (Median = 2.00; IQR = 3.50, Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 4.12). Another key activity that was somewhat agreed that organized criminal gangs cooperate with terror groups was on armed robberies/burglary/theft (Median = 2.00; IQR = 4.00). While this activity was not amongst the top three, it was collaborated by a KI who remarked;

'On 21st April 2019 we gunned down four returnees in a fire fight at Kaloleni in Kilifi County. They were armed with 3 AK 47 assault rifles. These former AL Shabab members had returned to the country from Somalia and settled in quietly in Mombasa. They were law abiding citizens for about two years before they began robbery sprees in Kilifi. Perhaps Al Shabab could have been utilizing them to raise funds for their operations' (KI, 13 June, 2019).

The above remarks pointed to a possibility of terror groups' engagement in criminal activity and also to a possible collaboration with organized criminal gangs. However it is important to note that the general agreement on all the indicators alluding to a relationship between organized criminal gangs and terror groups as shown in Table 4.9 were very weak amongst the returnees respondents (Kendall's W = 0.053; $\chi^2 = 6.703$; $df = 6$; Sig = 0.349).

To draw study conclusion, both UNICRI and TIJ (2016) and Shelley et al., (2005) methods of analysing crime terror nexus were considered. It was thus inferred that a crime terror nexus was slowly unfolding due to; shared dislike of the state, similar motives of applying violence and shared illegal activities. The study holds that the use and acceptance of bribery may put state institutions at the risk of infiltration by both criminal groups and terror gangs.

4.6.2 Linkage through Structural and Administrative Similarities

To further determine criminal gangs and terror groups' nexus, the organizational behaviour of the former was interrogated. The organized criminal gangs' respondents (n = 229) were required to state that they; Totally Agree = 1, Somewhat Agree = 2, Not Sure = 3, Disagree Somewhat = 4 or Totally Disagree = 5 to the 11 five scale Likert type questions based on organizational watch points as posited by Shelley et al. (2005). The findings were as shown in Table 4.10

Table 4. 10: Organization of Organized Criminal Gangs

Statement	Median	Mode	IQR	Kendall's W Test – Mean Ranks
Operate as a decentralised loose knit network	2.00	1.00	3.00	5.88
Members have loose relatively short term affiliation	2.00	1.00	2.00	5.85
Constant effort to attract and recruit new members	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.41
Use of rituals and traditions to construct and maintain identity	2.00	1.00	3.00	5.96
Belong to the same religion	3.00	5.00	3.00	7.40
Enjoy political and labour movement support	3.00	1.00	3.00	6.99
Measures to assure members loyalty (e.g. rituals)	2.00	1.00	2.00	5.99
Intra group trust is based on goodwill and and/or friendships	2.00	1.00	1.00	4.89
Everyone in the group is equally competent	2.00	1.00	1.00	5.08
Members' understanding importance of completing tasks	2.00	1.00	2.00	5.34
Presence of IT specialists	4.00	5.00	2.00	8.23
Overall	2.00	1.00		

Kendall's W = 0.156 $\chi^2 = 308.270$ df = 10 Sig = 0.000

Source: Research Data, 2019

From table 4.10 it can be deduced that the respondents totally agreed unanimously that they made constant effort to recruit new members (Median = 1.00; IQR = 1.00). They also somewhat agreed unanimously that everyone in their gang was equally competent and that trust within the groups was based on goodwill and/or friendship (Median = 2.00; IQR = 1.00). They also somewhat agreed to the following albeit with small divergence of opinion (Median = 2.00; IQR = 2.00) that; their members have loose relatively short term affiliation, they employ measures such as rituals to assure members loyalty and that their members' have a thorough understanding importance of completing tasks. The study interrogated the findings on affiliation further and deduced that terror groups were recruiting members from the organized criminal groups. From the pool of returnees respondents (n = 25) about 80% were previously members of an organized criminal gang in Mombasa.

The study also sought to interrogate the nature of measures used to assure members loyalty. It was found that most organized criminal gang members have a huge trust on the powers of black magic to assure their loyalty and protection from the net of security agencies. A KI remarked;

'Tulipomua Captain J (leader of Wakali Wao) on 09 June 2019, wengi ya hawa magengi hawakuamini. In fact mama yake buyu kijana alituambia hatuwezi mpata kwa sababu ame muagua (When we gunned down Captain J on 09 June 2019, majority of the members of criminal gangs could not believe it. In fact his mum had told us that there was no way we were going to catch up with her son since she had invoked a protective black magic spell on him' (KI, 12 June, 2019).

The use of rites in organized criminal gangs is consistent Paoli's (Morselli, Gabor & Kiedrowski, 2010). He posits that the Mafia in Italy use certain rites to admit new members.

On professionalism of the organized criminal gangs and thus their fidelity towards completing assigned tasks, a KI remarked;

'Organized criminal gangs are quasi militia. They have a central command and abide by the doctrines of their group. Gangs can easily be mobilized for an agenda' (KI, 12 June, 2019).

A further assessment of the organizational watch points as outlined in table 4.10 showed that the respondents somewhat agreed albeit with divergent views (Median = 2.00; IQR = 3.00) that; they operate as decentralised loose knit network and that they used of rituals and traditions to construct and maintain identity. The respondents indicated they didn't know amidst divergent views (Median = 3.00; IQR = 3.00) that they belonged to the same religion and that they enjoyed political and labour movement support.

Generally the findings indicate a weak agreement (Kendall's W = 0.156; $\chi^2 = 308.270$; $df = 10$ Sig = 0.000) amongst the respondents in the rating of the 11 indicators related to organizational watch points as postulated by Shelley et al. (2005). The top 3 indicators with higher agreement as rated by the respondents from the highest to the lowest were that; constant efforts were being made to attract and recruit new members (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 4.41), trust within the gangs was based on goodwill and and/or friendships (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 4.89) and that all were equally competent (Kendall's W Test Mean Rank = 5.08).

Shelley et al. (2005) holds that the organizational watch points PIE has five key indicators viz; how the groups are organized structurally, their objectives, shared values, identification with local support and ability to generate and enforce trust. A further analysis based on these key indicators showed that the organized criminal gangs in Mombasa satisfied two of these key indicators. The satisfied indicators were on loose structures but with effective means of maintaining trust and loyalty to the group. The satisfied indicators related to 40% of the sum total. Drawing from Shelley et al. (2005) argument that majority of the indicators must be satisfied before a nexus inference is upheld, the study concluded that a clear cut linkage was yet to a manifest since majority (3) of the PIE base indicators were unsatisfied.

However the study inferred that while organized criminal gangs and terrorist groups continued to be distinct Mombasa, there was a slow merger of their social network and operational environment. This inference was validated by the apprehension expressed by a KI thus;

The organized criminal groups in Mombasa are wings of a mega group that we are yet to establish. They are meant to prod the ground and gauge reaction. How else do you explain their disappearance after security operations only to re—emerge with changed name and tact? (KI, 13 June, 2019).

The above apprehension point to a merged network between the two to an extent which was reflected in mimicked tactics and organizational structure albeit at a lower level.

4.6.3 Correlation Analysis: Nexus between Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorist Groups

Ordinal regression between organized criminal gangs and terror groups through their behavioural and operational conduct and organizational structure was carried out using SPSS. The results are as tabulated in 4.11;

Table 4. 11: Measure of Association Between Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorists Groups

Association	Pseudo R square Coefficient			P Value
	Cox and Snell	Nagelkerke	McFadden	
Through their behavioural and operational conduct	0.894	0.969	0.877	0.001
Through their organizational conduct	0.798	0.936	0.836	0.011

Source: Research Data, 2019

From table 4.11 it can be deduced that organized criminal gangs and terror groups are gradually sharing the nexus points as alluded by Shelley et al. (2005). The nexus through their behavioural and operational conduct using Cox and Snell was at 0.894 while through organizational conduct was 0.798. Applying Kraska –Miller (2008) interpretation of Cox and Snell coefficients, the study held that there was a very strong association. The findings validate the outcome of the individual analysis of the PIE base framework as well as those of both UNICRI and TIJ (2016) in the conclusions reached in sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter draws a conclusion from the study findings. It suggests findings for further discourse in theory, practice and policy. It also provides recommendations to various actors for the mitigation of crime terror nexus.

5.2 Summary of the Findings

The age of onset for 68% of the organized criminal gang members was found to be between the ages of 13.04 to 21.78 years. This age range of onset was within the age range in which returnees were recruited to terror groups which was between the ages of 17.02 to 24.14 years. The organized criminal gang members thus were found to be most vulnerable to recruitment to terror gangs. This deduction was further buttressed by the fact that 80% of the returnees were previous members of organized criminal gangs. The findings also revealed that engagement in organized criminal gangs reduced with age. Crime desistance began at between the ages of 35 – 49.

The study also found that women and girls were playing a significant role in organized criminal gangs and terror activities. There was an emerging trend of female-led gangs exclusively comprised of ladies. Three non-gazetted females' only criminal gangs were identified namely; Wakware Babies and Watengwa File in Kisauni and Widen Girls in Likoni. On participation in violent criminal activities, women and girls acknowledged participation in robberies with violence while armed with crude weapons. Generally, however, the findings indicated that women and girls more or less played supportive roles in commission of violent crimes. However it was found that for every four male gang members there was one woman or girl.

Organized criminal gangs resilience through to terrorism was credited to psycho-social reasons, political and economic factors and general institutional failures. Perception of unequal society were rife amongst organized criminal gangs. These gangs also drew their resilience from political support, cooperation amongst them in criminal activities and general fear of dire consequences for abandoning criminal activities emanating from fellow gang members.

The study found that the organized criminal gangs in Mombasa satisfied three out of the seven discretionary characteristics of an organized criminal gang as averred by Van Duyne and Van Baken (Savona, Dugato & Garofalo, 2012). Therefore the study confirmed that the gangs can be categorised as organized. Since the organized criminal gangs executed indiscriminate violence while not engaging in white collar crimes like money laundering, the study categorised the organized criminal gangs in Mombasa as low level.

The study found that organized criminal gangs in Mombasa were radicalized. The organized criminal gang only stopped short of accepting terrorists' methodologies such as suicide bombing and identification with their course as freedom fighters. They manifested vulnerabilities in form of heightened feeling of marginalisation amid poor psychosocial conditions which could be exploited into accepting terrorists' methodologies and courses. Further, exclusionist narratives that viewed upcountry people (wabara) as non-deserving of economic opportunities including jobs in Mombasa was prevalent amongst the organized criminal gangs.

It was further inferred that a crime terror nexus was slowly unfolding due to; shared dislike of the state, similar motives of applying violence and shared illegal activities. Organized criminal gangs were slowly transforming into terrorist groups through their operational conduct as they had loose structures but with effective means of maintaining trust and loyalty. Like terror groups, the organized criminal gangs in Mombasa felt totally alienated from the State. Some organized criminal gangs had the same goals of using violence as terrorist groups. They also applied violence for publicity and for creating a climate of fear and not necessarily for material or financial gain.

5.3 Conclusions and Recommendations

The study found that the nexus between organized criminal gangs and terror groups in Mombasa was gradually emerging. The perception of marginalisation, poor psychosocial conditions and poor social protection net was fuelling the nexus. The study further holds that the use and acceptance of bribery may put state institutions at the risk of infiltration by both criminal groups and terror gangs. Consequently, the study upheld the view that organized Criminal Gangs, terror groups and returnees constitute a direct threat to peace and security in Mombasa County. Returnees complicated matters further as they had the potential of putting their knowledge of the art of war at the disposal of the organized criminal gangs if so persuaded.

That notwithstanding, organized criminal gang members and returnees in Mombasa found it difficult to reform and reintegrate back into the community. This was occasioned by societal alienation and threats of retribution from their colleagues. However, it was also the study's view that the organized criminal gangs were vulnerable and could easily be stemmed. The intra group power struggles and inter group wars could be used as entry points in infiltrating the groups and take before the law the group leaders around whom the rest coalesce. Such a move if well planned could lead to disintegration of the organized criminal gangs. Further to the afore said, the study recommends that existing mitigation efforts used to stem organized criminal gangs and terror groups to be sustained. However, a multi-agency and sectorial approach is desirable to stem the nexus between organized criminal gangs and terror groups. In addition, the study recommends the following:

5.3.1 Policy Recommendations

- i. The Ministry of Interior to establish a policy that will afford amnesty and protection programs for organized criminal gangs willing to reform and have voluntarily surrendered to authorities. Such a policy should establish structures that will; provide counselling to active criminal gang members, rehabilitate and reintegrate them into the society.

- ii. The Judiciary should consider reviewing its sentencing policy guidelines on children in conflict with law particularly with respect to those who have committed capital offences. A balance need to be stricken between the child's best interest and public interest.
- iii. The Treasury should consider reviewing its budgetary policy and allocate more funds to National Youth Service [NYS] and National Industrial Training Authority [NITA] to allow for the affirmative action uptake of reformed criminal gang members into livelihood and skilled training.
- iv. The Attorney General should lobby, advocate and facilitate the legislation of an affirmative action in the matter of the requirement of a certificate of good conduct as a precondition for employment in both public and private sectors. This will allow previously convicted offenders to access gainful employment and mitigate against recidivism.
- v. The National Counter Terrorism Centre [NCTC] and the Ministry of Education should consider reviewing education policy to include Counter Violent Extremism training in teachers' education and in the curriculum offered to pupils in both primary and secondary level. This will amplify resistance to perceptions, views, attitudes and beliefs espoused by terrorists by promoting alternative conflict resolution mechanisms and enduring fidelity to peace.

5.3.2 Recommendations to Practitioners

- i. The Kenya National Police Service Commission [NPSC] should fully implement without prejudice the NPSC Transfer and Deployment Regulations, 2015. No officer should be allowed to stay at any particular duty station for a period exceeding three years. The transfers should be executed in a judicious manner without compromising security.
- ii. The Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government should;
 - a. Advocate and fully encourage a soft approach to crime and terror mitigation that is community led.
 - b. Strengthen the capacity and resources of CSOs (such as MUHURI, HURIA, MCI and HAKI Africa amongst others) and religious organizations engaged in addressing crime and terror.

- iii. UNODC and other like-minded donors should consider funding CSOs (particularly those that have programs for organized criminal gangs) so as they can sustain: community sensitization, the establishment of income generating activities for reformed criminal gang members, back to school programs, community recreation programs amongst others to mitigate against youth engagement in criminality.
- iv. The Ministry of Education should consider sharing data on School drop outs gathered on NEMIS with Ministry of Interior so as they can be accounted for and returned to school. Since drop outs are vulnerable to recruitment to crime and terrorism.

5.3.3 Recommendations to International Peace Support Training Centre

- i. Engage in Training Needs Assessment [TNA] and develop training programs for CSOs, religious leaders, teachers amongst other stakeholders in order to complement the Kenya's Government and NCTC efforts to prevent crime and violent extremism.
- ii. Engender all training within the ambit of peace and conflict studies and promote education of intervention measures encompassing human rights lens.

5.4 Suggestion for Further Research

It is proposed that the following research areas are needed for additional empirical knowledge on crime and terror in Kenya;

- i. Assessment of youth predisposition to violence as a means of expression.
- ii. Assessment of participation in programs and initiatives for Countering Violent Extremism [CVE] in Kenya.
- iii. Relationship of education and radicalization and violent extremism

References

- Goldsmith, P. (2018). Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya. *Journal for Deradicalization*, 16, 77 - 102
- Ballina, S. (2011). The Crime terror continuum revisited: a model for the study of hybrid criminal organizations. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 6(2), 121-136
- Bicer, R. (2018). Why Muslims become instruments of terror? *Kader*, 16 (2), 229 – 240
- Brent, J. J., & Kraska, P. B. (2010). Moving beyond our methodological default: A case for mixed methods. *Journal of Criminal Justice Education*, 21 (4), 412 - 430
- Breuer, J., & Elson, M. (2017). Frustration – Aggression Theory. The Wiley Handbook of Aggression. Berlin, Germany: John Wiley and Sons Ltd DOI:10.1002/9781119057574.
- Chamlin, M. B., & Cochran, J. K. (1995). Assessing Messner and Rosenfeld's Institutional Anomie Theory: A partial test. *Criminology*, 33, 411 – 429
- County of Government of Mombasa. (2018). Second County Integrated Development Plan (2018 – 2022). Mombasa: Author.
- De Silva, S. (n.d.). Role of Education in the Prevention of Violent Extremism. Washington, DC: World Bank Retrieved from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/448221510079762554/120997-WP-revised-PUBLIC-Role-of-Education-in-Prevention-of-Violence-Extremism-Final.pdf>
- Decker, S., & Pyrooz, D. (2011). Gangs, terrorism, and radicalization. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 4 (4), 151 - 166
- Dijk, J. V., (2007). Mafia markers: assessing organised crime and its impact upon societies. *Springer*, 10, 39 - 56
- Elu, J., & Price, G. (2014). The causes and consequences of terrorism in Africa. The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Volume 1: Context and Con

- ENACT. (2018). Overview of serious and organized crime in East Africa. Lyon, France: Author Retrieved from <https://enactafrica.org/research/analytical-reports/interpol-overview-of-serious-and-organised-crime-in-africa-2018>
- Eron, L.D. (1994). *Aggressive behaviour: Current perspectives*. New York: Plenum Press
- European Union. (2012). Europe's crime – terror nexus: links between terrorist and organized crime groups in the European Union. Brussels, Belgium: Author Retrieved from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201211/20121127ATT56707/20121127ATT56707EN.pdf>
- Gastrow, P. (2011). *Termites at work: Transnational organized crime and state erosion in Kenya*. New York: International Peace Institute.
- Gliem, J.A., & Gliem, R. R. (2003). Calculating, interpreting and reporting Cronbach's Alpha reliability coefficient for Likert Type. *Proceedings of the 2003 Midwest research to practice conference in adult, continuing and community education* (pp 82 – 88) Retrieved from <https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/344/Gliem%20%26%20Gliem.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- Golafshani, N. (2003). Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative research. *The Qualitative Report*, 8(4), 597 - 607
- Hirschi, T., & Gottfredson, M. (1983). Age and the explanation of crime. *AJS*, 89 (3), 552 -584 Retrieved from <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/227905>
- Hubschle, A. (2011). From theory to practice: Exploring the organized crime terror nexus in Sub Saharan Africa. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 5 (3-4), 81 - 95
- ICSR. (2016). Criminal pasts, terrorist futures: European jihadist and the new crime – terror nexus. London: Author.
- ICSR. (2017). *Countering violent extremism and radicalisation that led to terrorism: Ideas, recommendation and good practices from OSCE Region*. London: Author.
- Jameison, S. (2004). Likert scale: how to ab (use) them. *Medical Education*, 38, 1212 -1218
- KNBS. (2017). *Economic Survey, 2017*. Nairobi: Author.

- KNHCR. (2014). *A country under siege: The state of security in Kenya an occasional report (2010 – 2014)* .Nairobi: Author.
- Knudsen, R.A. (2018). Measuring radicalization risk assessment conceptualization and practice in England and Wales. *Behavioural Science of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 1-18. doi:10.1080/19434472.2018.1509105
- Kraska - Miller, M. (2008). *Non Parametric Statistics for Social and Behavioural Science* [ebrary Reader version]. Retrieved from ebrary database.
- Kraska - Miller, M. (2013). *Non Parametric Statistics for Social and Behavioural Science* [ebrary Reader version]. Retrieved from ebrary database.
- Krejcie, R., & Morgan, D. (1970). *Determining sample size for research activities*. New York, United States: Free Press
- Lyngstad, T. H., & Skarohamar, T. (2013). Understanding the marriage effect: changes in criminal offending around the time of marriage. *FMSH – W – 2013 -49* Retrieved from <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00870455/document>
- Mason, M. (2010). Sample Size and Saturation in PhD Studies using Qualitative Interviews. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 11(3)
- Maxfield, M.G., & Babbie, E. R. (2012). *Basic Research Methods for Criminal Justice and Criminology*. Belmont, U.S.A: Wadworth
- Messner, S. F., & Rosenfeld, R. (1997). Political Restraint of the market and levels of criminal homicide: A cross national application of institutional- anomie theory. *Social Forces*, 75 (4), 1393 - 1416
- Mkutu, K., Otieno, E., Gioto, V., Wandera, G., Kajumbi, O., & Palmreuther, S. (2017). *Mombasa and Isiolo Counties crime violence and prevention survey*. Nairobi: World Bank
- Morselli, C., Gabor, T., & Kiedrowski, J. (2010). *The factors that shape organized crime*. Ottawa, Canada: Research and National Coordination Organized Crime Division Law Enforcement and Policy Branch Public Safety Canada. Retrieved from http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-89-2010-eng.pdf

- Mugenda, O. M., & Mugenda, A. G. (2003). *Research methods: Quantitative and qualitative approaches*. Nairobi, Kenya: Act press.
- Mugenda, O. M., & Mugenda, A. G. (2012). *Research methods: Dictionary*. Nairobi, Kenya: Applied Research & Training Services.
- Music, S. (2016). The role of education in preventing violent extremism and radicalisation. *Proceedings of the first international conference on education titled changing reality through education* Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324942495_The_Role_of_Education_in_Preventing_Violent_Extremism_and_Radicalism
- Mutoka, R. (2014). Assessing Current Trends & Efforts to Combat Piracy: A Case Study on Kenya. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 46(1), 125 -142
- NACADA. (2016). *Status of alcohol and drug abuse in the Coast Region of Kenya: Baseline survey report*. Nairobi: Author. Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/saidi.mwachinalo/Desktop/Coast%20Baseline%20Survey%20Final%20Report_2016_17.pdf
- National Cohesion and Integration Commission. (2018). *The Impact of Organized Gangs on Social Cohesion in Kenya: Policy Options*. Nairobi: Author. Retrieved from <http://www.cohesion.or.ke/images/docs/downloads/Policy-Brief-on-Impact-of-Gangs-on-Cohesion.pdf>
- National Crimes Research Centre. (2012). *A Study of Organized Criminal Gangs in Kenya*. Nairobi: Author. Retrieved from <https://crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Organized-Criminal-Gangs-in-Kenya.pdf>
- National Crimes Research Centre. (2017). *National crime mapping study: Public perceptions of crime patterns and trends in Kenya*. Nairobi: Author.
- Neuman, W.L. (2007). *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. London: Pearson Education Inc.
- Noble, H., & Smith, J. (2017). Issues of validity and reliability in qualitative research. *Evidence Based Nursing*. Retrieved from <http://ebn.bmj.com/content/18/2/34>

- OSAC. (2018). Kenya 2018 Crime and Safety Report. Retrieved from <https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=23745>
- OSAC. (2019). Kenya 2019 Crime and Safety Report. Retrieved from <https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=25693>
- Patel, P. (2009). Introduction to quantitative methods. *Empirical Law Seminar*. (pp 1 -14). Massachusetts, USA: Harvard University Retrieved from https://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2011/12/quantitative_methods.pdf
- Pawelz, J. (2018). Researching Gangs: How to Reach Hard to Reach Populations and Negotiate Tricky Issues in the Field. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 19 (1) Retrieved from <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/2878/4157>
- Payne, G., & Payne, J. (2011). *Key Informants*. London: Sage Publication
- Perri, F. S., Lichtenwald, T. G., & Mackenzie, P. M. (2009). Evil Twins: Crime Terror Nexus. *The Forensic Examiner*, 16 - 29
- Republic of Kenya. (2010). Prevention of Organized Crime Act No 6 of 2010. Nairobi, Kenya: Author. Retrieved June 01, 2019 from <http://kenyalaw.org/lex/rest/db/kenyalex/Kenya/Legislation/English/Acts%20and%20Regulations/P/Prevention%20of%20Organised%20Crimes%20Act%20Cap.%2059%20-%20No.%206%20of%202010/docs/PreventionofOrganisedCrimesAct6of2010.pdf>
- Republic of Kenya. (2012). Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 2012. Nairobi, Kenya: Author. Retrieved June 01, 2019 from <http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=No.%2030%20of%202012>
- Republic of Kenya. (2016). Kenya Gazette Notice Vol. CXVIII – No 165. Nairobi, Kenya: Author. Retrieved June 01, 2019 from http://kenyalaw.org/kenya_gazette/gazette/volume/MTQyNA--/Vol.CXVIII-No.165
- Ryabchiy, K. (2018). Rethinking the crime – terror continuum in the 21st century: post 9/11 to the present. Unpublished Masters of Security Studies Mini - Dissertation, University of Pretoria.

- Sacrae, M. (n.d.). The structure and relevance of theory in criminology. Retrieved from <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d765/2f8847d82ec38b1c86430c6d7424c0d058d9.pdf>
- Savolainen, J. (2000). Inequality, Welfare State, and homicide: Further support for the institutional anomie theory. *Criminology*, 38 (4), 1021 – 1042
- Savona, E. U., Dugato, M., & Garofalo, L. (2012). *A framework for the quantification of organized crime and assessment of availability and quality of relevant data in three selected countries of Latin America and the Caribbean*. Milan, Italy: Transcrime Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime
- Security Research & Information Centre. (2018). The Status of Peace and Economic Impacts of Conflict in Kenya. Nairobi: Author. Retrieved from http://www.srickenya.org/publications/The_Status_of_Peace_and_Economic_Impacts_of_Conflict_in_Kenya_A_Case_on_Nairobi,_Mombasa_and_Kisumu_Counties.2018.pdf
- Shelley, L.I., & Picarelli, J.T. (2002). Methods not Motives: Implications of the convergence of international organized crime and terrorism. *Policy Practice and Research*, 3 (4), 305- 315.
- Shelley, L.I., & Picarelli, J.T. (2005). Methods and Motives: Exploring Links Between Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism. *Trends in Organized Crime*, 9 (2), 52- 67.
- Shelley, L.I., Picarelli, J.T., Irby, A., Hart, D. M., Craig-Hart, P. A., Williams, P., Simon, S., Abdullaev, N., Stanislawski, B., & Covill, L. (2005). Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism). Retrieved from <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211207.pdf>
- Siegel, S. (1956). *Nonparametric statistics for the behavioural sciences*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc.
- Smith, A. G. (2018). *Risk factors and indicators associated with radicalization to terrorism in the United States: What research sponsored by National Institute of Justice tells us*. Washington DC, United States: National Institute of Justice

- Standard Digital (2019, February 21). Dusit Attack Highlights New Generation of Al Shabab Recruits. *Standard Digital* Retrieved from <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001313822/dusit-attack-the-new-generation-of-al-shabaab-recruits>
- Steffensmeier, D., & Allan, E. (1996). Gender and Crime: Towards a gendered theory of female offending. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 22, 459 - 487
- Sullivan, G.M. & Artino Jr, A. R. (2003). Analysing and Interpreting Data from Likert Type Scale. *Journal of Graduate Medical Education*, Vol. 5(4), 541 – 542. Retrieved from <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3886444/>
- Tarlow, P. (2018). The interaction of religion and terrorism. *International Journal on Safety and Security in Tourism/Hospitality*, 1-23 Retrieved from https://www.palermo.edu/Archivos_content/2017/Economicas/journal-tourism/edicion16/PAPER-2.pdf
- UNICRI & TIJ. (2016). Breaking the Organised Crime and Counter Terrorism Nexus: Identifying Programmatic Approaches. Bangkok, Thailand: Authors Retrieved from http://www.unicri.it/in_focus/on/Crime_Terrorism
- Wang, P. (2010). The Crime – Terror Nexus: Transformation, Alliance, Convergence. *Asian Social Science*, 6(6), 11 -20
- Yamamoto, M. M. (2018). *Terrorism against democracy*. Maryland, USA: Center For International & Security Studies at Maryland.
- Zimmerman, K., (2018). Terrorism, Tactics, and Transformation: The West Vs The Salafi – Jihadi Movement. American Enterprise Institute.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Gazetted Organized Criminal Gangs in Kenya as at 28th December 2016

1. 42 brothers
2. Acrobatic
3. Akapulo
4. Akili za Usiku
5. American marines
6. Bad men
7. Baragoi Boys
8. Beasts
9. Black Latino
10. Bongo Rongo
11. Boston Boys
12. Bulanda Boys
13. Chapa Ilale
14. Chifu Kali
15. Chimoi Highway Gang
16. China Squad
17. Chini ya Mnazi
18. Chunga Chunga
19. Colombo
20. Confirm Group
21. Cool Base
22. Corner Stars
23. Culture Boys
24. Egypt Boys
25. Eleven Crazy (Mji Mkubwa)
26. Elite
27. Eminants of Mungiki
28. Five Fingers
29. G15
30. Gaza
31. Gaza Boys

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 32. Gaza strip | 51. Mawaiyo |
| 33. Islamic State | 52. Mayakuza |
| 34. Jikoni Boys | 53. Memory/Mbele yao Gang |
| 35. Jimba Lords | 54. Mkuki |
| 36. Kabaridi | 55. Mossad |
| 37. Kadu Asili Networks | 56. Ngundu River Boys |
| 38. Kaganalau | 57. Nzoia Railway Gang |
| 39. Karanja road | 58. Quick Response Group |
| 40. Usalama Youth Group | 59. Rambo Kanambo |
| 41. Kasumburu Cool Base | 60. Rangers FC |
| 42. Kawangware Boys | 61. Rounder Seniors |
| 43. KendaKenda | 62. Sanfit |
| 44. Kisoda Crew | 63. Sarogeza |
| 45. Lipa Kwanza | 64. Seven Lions |
| 46. Mafuguli Gogo Team | 65. Sikujui |
| 47. Marachi Republican Council | 66. Sixty Four |
| 48. Masaa soo | 67. Smart |
| 49. Masenari | 68. Smarter |
| 50. Matakwei | 69. Spanish Boys |

70. Super power

71. SWAT

72. Taliban Boys

73. Tek Mateko

74. Temeke

75. Tiacha Group

76. Timboni Mateja

77. Vietnam

78. Vijana wa Labour

79. Vijiweni Boys

80. Wajukuu wa Bibi

81. Wakali Kwanza

82. Wakali Pili

83. Wakali Wao

84. Wasasi

85. Watalia

86. Watoto wa Kambete

87. Ya Moto

88. Young Killers

89. Young Mulas

90. Young Turks

Source: Kenya Gazette Notice, 2016

**Appendix 2:
Official Government
Record of Organized
Criminal Gangs at the
Coast Province of Kenya as
at 29th May 2019**

1. Acrobatic

2. Akapulo

3. Akili za Usiku

4. Al Shabab

5. Bad Men

6. Black Latino

7. Bongo Rongo

8. Chapa Ilale

9. Chifu Kali

10. Chunga Chunga

11. Colombo

- | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 12. Cool Base | 31. SWAT |
| 13. Eleven Crazy (Mji Mkubwa) | 32. Temeke |
| 14. Gaza | 33. Timboni Mateja |
| 15. Islamic State | 34. Vietnam |
| 16. Jikoni Boys | 35. Vijiweni Boys |
| 17. Jimba Lords | 36. Wajukuu wa Bibi |
| 18. Kadu Asili Networks | 37. Wakali Kwanza |
| 19. Kaganalau | 38. Wakali Pili |
| 20. Kasumburu Cool Base | 39. Wakali Wao |
| 21. Kisoda Crew | 40. Wasasi |
| 22. Lipa Kwanza | 41. Watalia |
| 23. Mafuguli Gogo Team | 42. Watoto wa Kambete |
| 24. Masenari | 43. Ya Moto |
| 25. Mawaiyo | 44. Young Killers |
| 26. Memory/Mbele yao Gang | 45. Young Mulas |
| 27. Rangers FC | 46. Young Turks |
| 28. Sarogeza | |
| 29. Sixty Four | |
| 30. Spanish Boys | |

**Source: Mombasa County
Commissioner's Office, 2019**

Appendix 3: Unofficial List of Criminal Gangs at Kisauni- Mombasa as at May 2019

1. 542 team
2. Chafu Kali
3. Chafu Mtaa
4. False Hope
5. Gangna
6. Haribu Chafu
7. Ile Mbaya
8. Kajiwani Nyowa
9. Kali Wao
10. Magodoroni Team
11. Mayatima
12. Mboga Saba
13. Pentagon
14. Rigotwe
15. Team Washanga
16. Tembeza

17. Twan 26 team
18. Wakali Kwanza
19. Wakali Sana
20. Wakali Sasa
21. Wakali Wao
22. Wakware Babies (Ladies gang)
23. Wasafi Sana
24. Watengwa File (Ladies gang)
25. Watengwa Group

Source: Research Data, 2019

Appendix 4: Unofficial List of Criminal Gangs at Likoni- Mombasa as at May 2019

1. 001
2. American Soweto
3. Amsha Popo
4. Bad Squad
5. Benjo
6. Binde Squad

- | | |
|----------------------|------------------------|
| 7. Black Latino | 26. Grand Pa |
| 8. Black Wadada | 27. Green Storm |
| 9. Boko Haram | 28. Hatucheki na Watu |
| 10. Chafu cha Docks. | 29. Hot Base |
| 11. Chafu Sita | 30. Hot Boys |
| 12. Chafu za Bilal | 31. Istanbul |
| 13. Chafu za Bota | 32. Kapenguria Six |
| 14. Chafu za Down | 33. Kifaranga Kitukutu |
| 15. Chafu za Motoni | 34. Kula Wao |
| 16. Chaka to Chaka | 35. Loliondo |
| 17. Coz Chafu | 36. Machizi Flani |
| 18. Crazy Boys | 37. Mashababi |
| 19. Dirty Kenya | 38. Mbwa Kachoka |
| 20. East Mob | 39. Mbwa Koko |
| 21. Floropa | 40. Military/Pentagon |
| 22. Ganja Farmers | 41. Nzaiko |
| 23. Gaza | 42. Roraropa |
| 24. Ghetto Family | 43. Sinyenge |
| 25. Gotta Go | 44. Street boys |

45. Team Shiranga
46. Temeke
47. Thug Life
48. Vampire
49. Vituko
50. Vituko 003
51. Wafuasi wa Israel
52. Wahusika
53. Waja Kali
54. Wajukuu wa Bibi
55. Wakali Kwanza
56. Wana Gangsters
57. Watalia
58. Watanashati
59. Watoto wa Nyuki
60. Watulivu
61. Widen Boys
62. Widen Girls(Ladies gang)
63. Wrong Time

64. Young Mulla
65. Young Thugs

Source: Research Data, 2019

Appendix 5: Unofficial List of Criminal Gangs at Mvita- Mombasa as at May 2019

1. Crazy Boys
2. Fire Boys
3. Ropa Boys
4. Sana'a Wee
5. Temeke
6. Tip Top
7. Tomba Ropa

Appendix 6: Unofficial List of Criminal Gangs at Nyali- Mombasa as at May 2019

1. Gaza
2. Ghetto Boys
3. Mayakuza
4. Wakali Kwanza
5. Watalia
6. Watengwa

ABOUT THE AUTHOR



Maj Mwachinalo is currently an Applied Researcher at IPSTC. He holds a Master's Degree in Strategic Management and a Bachelor's Degree in Education from the University of Nairobi. He previously worked at Kenya Military Academy and 77 Artillery Battalion as an Assistant Lecturer and Education Officer respectively. He served in United Nations' Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) between the years 2011 and 2012.

Publication

Maalu, J., & Mwachinalo, S. D. (2016). Knowledge Management Strategy and Organizational Change in Commercial Banks in Kenya. *Review of Social Sciences*, 1(7), 32 – 43. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.18533/rss.v1i7.44>

Conference Paper

Maalu, J., & Mwachinalo, S. D. (2016). Knowledge Management Strategy and Organizational Change in Commercial Banks in Kenya. Paper presented at the 7th Africa International Business Management (AIBUMA) Conference on 28 July 2016 held at the University of Nairobi.



International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC)

P.O Box 24232-00502 Karen, Kenya

Tel: +254 791574336 / 786585167

Email: info@ipstc.org

Website: www.ipstc.org

This publication has been edited and printed courtesy of UNDP



ISBN 978-9966-104-06-9



9 789966 104069