

The Role Of Ideology in Youth Radicalization: Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale Counties

OCCASIONAL PAPER
SERIES 8, Nº2

2017

Compiled by
IPSTC Peace and Security Research Department

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Nairobi, Kenya.

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Published by
International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC)

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Website: www.ipstc.org

ISBN: 978-9966-025-79-1

Edited by: Prof Peter Kagwanja

Design, Layout and Printing:

Magfre Enterprises Limited

P.O Box 55944 - 00200 Nairobi

Cell: 0770 467342

Email: info@magfre.co.ke

Website: www.magfre.co.ke

Cover Photo Courtesy of: <https://www.salto-youth.net>

Foreword

The mission of the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is to be an independent research, training, and education centre in Eastern Africa that is responsive to peace operations, training, and education needs of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Research conducted at IPSTC covers a broad spectrum of issues relating to conflict prevention, management, post conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping operations. The aim is to promote peace, security and stability in the region which is essential for human and economic development in Africa.

The theme of research for 2017: ***“Enhancing Strategies and Mechanisms of Countering Violent Extremism and Protection of Civilians,”*** features issues on peace support operations, elections, protection of civilians, radicalization and de-radicalization, governance and border security. It aims at understanding the trends, dynamics, and strategic responses and mechanisms of addressing the threat of violent extremism. Some of the sub-themes addressed in the agenda include: youth radicalization and terrorism, countering violent extremism, maritime insecurity and gender perspectives on radicalization with specific reference to Kenya.

IPSTC produced 4 Occasional Papers in 2017. This publication titled, *The Role of Ideology in Youth Radicalization in Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale Counties*, provides insight into the role of ideology in youth radicalization in the coastal region Counties. These publications also provide significant contribution to research on radicalization, terrorism and violent extremism. This Occasional Paper is an important contribution to the vision and mission of IPSTC.

Brigadier Patrick M. Nderitu

Director, IPSTC

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Acknowledgements

I would like to sincerely thank all those who made this work possible, including the IPSTC Director, The Government of Japan through UNDP for their continued support in field research and publication. This research would not have been possible without the contributions of the all the young people who gave their precious time to be interviewed. Special thanks also go to the Programs Manager, Madam Eucabeth Katana for her assistance during the fieldwork. Last but not least, I would like to thank our research assistants from the Counties of Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi, and my colleagues in the Peace and Security Research Department (PSRD).

Abstract

The nexus between youth ideological radicalization, peace and security is complex. Youth ideological radicalisation in the Coastal counties of Mombasa, Kwale, and Kilifi has increased, resulting to violent extremism. The study sort to establish the existing ideologies among the youth, the process of acquiring these ideologies, analyze the relationship between ideologies and radicalization and examine measures put to address the ideologies. This was a descriptive cross-sectional study which was conducted using both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. The Pearson correlation coefficient was used to measure the linear association between the dependent and independent variable. Correlation coefficient was to be significant at the 0.05 level. A total of 384 youths were interviewed from 16 Sub Counties and 240 villages. Slightly less than half 160 (41.70%) of the youth were ideologically radicalized as compared to 224 (58.30%) who were not. The study established that ideology plays a role in youth radicalization. Each County had a predominant ideology. Very few measures were in place to address the ideologies. Top three variables that determined ideological radicalization included: measures put to address the ideologies, religious affiliations and ideology on youth education and employment. The study recommends enhancing age specific measures to deal with the ideologies for both in school and out of school youth.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
GOK	Government of Kenya
EA	East African
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
KII	Key Informant Interviews

Definition of Key Terms

1. **Ideology:** A system of ideas and ideals, normative beliefs and attitudes may be conscious or unconscious by an individual, group or society that forms the basis of: socio-cultural, economic political and government values that justify status quo or movements to change it.
2. **Radicalization:** Promoting an extreme belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious or social change. GOK (2014) states its a criminal offence and is liable on conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding thirty years.
3. **Counter Radicalization:** A process of relative change to reverse individual or group ideology, de-legitimising the use of violent methods to achieve religious, social or political goals and moving towards an acceptance changes within a pluralist context (Ashour 2009).
4. **Violent Extremism:** Advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives (USAID, 2011).
5. **Terrorism:** Any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorising people or threatening to harm them or imperilling their lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States, (UN, 2000).
6. **Counter-Terrorism:** The practice, military tactics, techniques, and strategy that government, military, law enforcement, business, and intelligence agencies use to combat or prevent terrorism.

Chapter One: Introduction and Background

1.1 Introduction

Ideologies play a significant role in defining a group distinctive identity and aims. It also provides a motive and framework for action. Youth radicalization is on the rise, causing major concerns for many governments and the international community. Globally, it is a threat to peace, security and stability. Ideologies have unique characteristics, and may include elements of political, religious, historical, semi-mythical, and supernatural beliefs. Communities and individual have always distinguished between professed ideologies and the actual beliefs. Some authors classify ideologies into the following categories: liberalism, conservatism, religion, anarchism, communism, dictatorship, and organised crime, (Cassin, Oyo and Dung's, 2016).

East Africa has one of the youngest population, with the youth between 18 and 35 years accounting for 80% of the total populace. The appeal of extremist ideologies to the youth has increased over the past decade. Youths are easily vulnerable to radicalization to extremist ideologies. For instance, in Kenya, a number of interrelated social, political and economic factors are fuelling the radicalization of the youth.

The process of radicalization involves communities and individuals moving from conventional beliefs to extreme beliefs. Ideological stand may not be necessary a precondition for radicalization to violent extremism. The two exist on a continuum where radicalization presents only the potentiality for recruitment to violent extremism.

In Kenya, the radicalization of the youth is an emerging threat to peace, security, and development. According to the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (2016), the youth are the main target of extremist groups. Due to their transitional stage, the youth are vulnerable and can be exposed to radicalization through different means and platforms being used by extremists. Radicalization of the youth is fuelled by interconnected socio economic, demographic and political factors. The Kenyan government with international partners have progressed in reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism, especially in the counties of Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi and Lamu at the Coast. The strategies of countering radicalization and violent extremism include addressing socio economic grievances, de-radicalization and the re-integration of returnees. The goals include helping radicalized individuals abandon violent extremist ideology.

According to the UN (2015), the nexus between youth radicalization, peace and security are complex. Radicalization among youth can be prevented by developing and using appropriate sustainable development approaches that meet the basic needs of the youth. Based on this background, this study explored the relationship between radicalization and ideologies among the youth in Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi Counties in Kenya.

1.2 Background of Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi Counties

According to research on drivers of ideological radicalization among youth in the coastal counties, radical groups exploit youth vulnerabilities. They observe of the challenges facing youth and tailor make radicalization process strategies. According to the research on drivers of extremism and radicalization among youth motivations have resulted from disconnect between youths and the leadership of some mosques, according to Odhiambo, Kennedy and Leshan (2015).

The Counties of Mombasa, Kwale, and Kilifi marine resources, contribute immensely towards the economic development of the three counties through tourism attraction, fisheries, shipping and port activities. Tourism and shipping sectors are the highest contributors to the economy, while small scale fishing contributes 95% of the total marine catch. The rich biodiversity in the counties play a significant role in defining global competitiveness in the tourism sector. Climate change, the impact has led to an increase in sea surface temperatures, caused the rise of sea levels and coastal erosion, and are likely to put additional pressure on coastal economies, communities and ecosystems, including islands, estuaries, beaches, coral reefs and marine biodiversity (GoK, 2016).

Mombasa County has six administrative sub-counties namely Changamwe, Jomvu, Nyalí, Kisauni, Likoni, and Mvita. The total population is estimated at 1,175,152. The youth population stands at 609,663 (47.9%). This is a significant part of the total population with profound implication both for the County peace and security, Mombasa County Government (2013). The employment rate is approximately 37.6%, literacy level is 86.3% and absolute poverty level of 71.7%, (GOK 2016), making it a fertile ground for violent extremism.

Kilifi County has seven administrative sub-counties namely; Kilifi South, Kilifi North, Ganze, Malindi, Magarini, Kaloleni and Rabai. The population is estimated at 1,466,856, (KBS, 2009), with the youth accounting for 54%. The employment rate is approximately 30% of the total population. Boda boda transport business has eased the problem of unemployment among the youth in the county. Only 40.5% of the labour force is engaged in any form of employment. Also, the challenge of drug abuse is rampant in the county of Kilifi, (GOK, 2013).

The literacy level of the population aged 15 years and above remains low, with ability to read and write standing at 65.5%. The county remains one of the poorest counties in the country with an absolute poverty level of 71.7%, (GOK, 2013). Kilifi suffers from regular disasters including; drought, floods, insecurity, famine and other slow onset disasters such as HIV/ AIDs and resource-based conflicts. Potential Strategic policy thrusts, includes ensuring and intensify security surveillance.

Kwale County is divided into three administrative Sub-counties namely; Matuga, Kinango and Msambweni. The population is projected at 833,527, the vast majority as young people. A total of 51% have a primary level of education, 10% secondary, and 39% have no formal education. The support and commitment to the education of children has been minimal. Low literacy levels, transition and completion rates and inadequate technical skills are the main challenges facing Kwale's education system. Despite the availability of resource opportunities in the region, Kwale County still faces challenges such as collapsing of economic activities, declining agricultural production for food and industrial crops, inadequate and deteriorating infrastructure, and high and rising poverty levels (GOK, 2013).

1.3 Problem Statement

The threat of youth radicalization at the Coast has increased over the last two decades, resulting to violent extremism. The Government of Kenya and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in 2015 observed that most terror attacks carried out in Kenya are perpetrated by radicalized trained Kenyan youth. Such incidents include the bombing of the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, the massacres in Mpeketoni, bombings of churches and night clubs in Nairobi and counties in North Eastern and Coast regions. Scholars and security experts are increasingly studying the concept of radicalization within the local contexts (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010). The traditional methods of radicalising through teachings in mosques are complemented by other ways of radicalization (Cillufo, Cardash & Whitehead, 2007). It is imperative, therefore, for scholars and security practitioners to know the other methods of radicalization that terrorist have adapted to local context.

Studies on radicalization have focused more on external influences fueling radicalisation in Kenya, Odhiambo Kennedy and Leshan (2015) have sited; Navanti Group (2013), Crisis Group (2011), British Broadcasting Corporation (2011), Oruko (2012), Human Rights Watch (2012) Horgan, (2012), Ploch (2010), Netherlands Institute of International Relations (2009).

All these studies concluded that radicalization is influed by political, socioeconomic, religious, internet and flaws in anti-radicalization programmes by the government. There are limited studies focusing on ideological radicalization. According to Anneli Botha (2014), Hellsten (2016), Villa Vicencio, et. al, (2016) research on violent extremism in Kenya is fairly limited.

Lack of empirical evidence to support the claim that ideology is a key causal factor in the existence of radicalization calls further research. Based on the above background, the study will interrogate the ideologies promoting radicalization among the youths in the coastal region. The study will focus on the beliefs held by the youth within the social, culture, economic, and political context in the counties. It will provide a way forward in tackling ideologies influencing youth radicalization in Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi Counties.

1.4 Research Question and Objectives

1.4.1 Research Question: Does ideology play a role in youth radicalization in Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale Counties?

1.4.2 Broad objective: To analyze the role of ideology in youth radicalization in Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale Counties.

1.4.3 Specific Objectives:

1. To establish the types of ideologies existing among the youth
2. To analyze the process of acquiring the ideologies
3. To analyze the relationship between ideologies and youth radicalization
4. To examine measures of addressing the ideologies among the youth

1.5 Hypothesis

Ideological radicalization is not influenced by pre-ideological individual and communal grievances/ crisis or the process of encountering and acquiring ideology.

1.6 Justification and Scope

The African Union (2006) in the African Youth Charter states that the age cohort of 15 to 35 years is very vulnerable. In most cases, it contains impressionable adolescents, school drop outs, and unemployed persons. This is a significant part of the total population with profound implication for the peace, security and development of the coastal region. Radicalization as a process of ideological conditioning of individuals or groups can lead to violent extremism, National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC, 2016).

Leveraging youth energies, skills and attitudes can lead to positive, important and useful change. This can only happen when the concepts of ideology and radicalization are understood within the context established (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010). It is imperative, therefore, to establish the role of ideology in youth radicalization in the three Counties of study. Here, prevailing studies on ideology and radicalization focused on radicalized individuals are based on religious ideologies (Della Porta 2006; Horgan 2012; Harris- Hogan 2013; Ilardi 2013; Schuurman and Horgan 2016). Few studies have focused on ideologies held by the youth before radicalization.

Scope and limitations of the study

This study focused on youth aged 18 – 35 years in the Counties of Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi.


Chapter Two: Literature Review

2.0 Introduction

This section is a review of theoretical and empirical studies on ideological radicalization. The study explores empirical studies on beliefs, ideas and values on areas related to: economic, religion, politics, peace, security and women. The aim is to identify what has been done, methodologies used and identify gaps in knowledge. The first section discusses the three main grouping of ideology, based these concepts, an operational framework was developed to measure ideological radicalization among the youth.

Types of ideology

As Street (1993) argued, analysis of ideology is dynamic in nature. Ideology represent an ongoing process and not a state of being. Ideology is a cluster of ideas that consciously advocated for values and goals about life, religious, society, economics, politics and government. Ideologies posit action programmes for attaining these goals. According to James (2014) the study of ideologies in the last thirty ad hoc, cites (Raven, 1965, Freedden, 1996, Heywood 1998, Vincent, 1992) classical studies on ideology. Based on this studies, James argues the studies places in three major groups which includes liberalism, conservatism and socialism. The remaining ideological grouping are nationalism, environmentalism and feminism.

Ideological Spectrum		
		
Left(conservatism traditional)	Middle (socialisms)	Right (liberalism)
Rights – violating ideologies & systems (extreme force)	Rights violating Ideologies & Systems (Degree of force)	Right based respecting ideol-ogies & systems (no force)
Pure Communism, Socialism, Fascism, Anarchy , Theocracy	Modern Liberalisms individualism and collectivism, Progressiveness Conservatisms	Capitalism, Classical Liberal-ism, Constitutional Republi-canism
Source : The objective Standard Journal (2012)		

As shown in the summary table above, classifications of ideologies may either be left (conservatism), middle (socialisms) or right (liberalism). The concepts play a central role in the operationalization of ideology. The modern usage of the political terms left and right comes from the French Revolution of 1789 when supporters of the king stood to the president’s right, and supporters of the revolution to his left. The difference between left and right ideology is simply social equality and inequality or between liberalism and conservatism.

The Right Ideologies: Liberalism

Based on Geuss (2002) and Dunn (1993) liberalism is often viewed as a complex of doctrines. It involves zeal for freedom, toleration, individualism and reason, on the one hand, and a disapproval of power, authority and tradition, on the other. It involves 'the idea of limited government, the maintenance of the rule of law, the avoidance of arbitrary or discretionary power.

Middle Ideologies: Socialism

Socialism arose in the late 18th century as reaction to the economic and social change associated industrial revolution where the workers became increasingly impoverished. Socialism takes the sociability of the self to be fundamental as argued by James (2014). Socialism recognizes that we are not mere selves, but selves in a situation, in a society.

The Left Ideologies: Conservatism

The left favours transformation of structures/culture. Citizens in most developed democratic countries are willing and able to place themselves on the left-right dimension, Inglehart and Klingemann (1987); Colomer and Escatel (2003). The problem with conservative approaches to the left-right spectrum is that they fail to define the alternatives.

2.1. Ideologies and Youth Radicalization

2.1.1 Economic ideologies and radicalization

Economic ideology is expressed as a perspective on how an economy should run and to what end. The youth radicalization could be based on conservatism, socialisms or liberalism economic ideologies. Capitalism is an economic system and an ideology based on private ownership of the means of production and their operation for profit. Characteristics central to capitalism include private property, capital accumulation, wage labor, voluntary exchange, a price system, and competitive markets. Empirical studies on radicalization by Chiozza (2010), Swanson (2014) and Blake (2015) in Jordan, Kenya and Northern Ireland respectively established there was a link between economic ideologies and radicalization. When individuals are promised steady income in a community experiencing economic marginalization and poverty support. This disagrees with Shafiq and Sinno (2010) and Mousseau (2013).

Dantwala (2009) analysis of the India economic ideology associated with Nehru concluded that the ideology were associated with development of sectors like agriculture, industries and education. The ideologies transformed a political movement for independence into an economic movement advocating the retention and development of human individuality. His socialism was of a different kind from Marxist socialism and prohibited the use of violence.

Despite much controversy in the past his commitment to the cause of India's development remains unquestioned. His decisions were necessitated by the needs of the times to effectively harness India domestic means as well as strengthen its governmental control to lay the base for future privatization.

Three related studies into motivational and desisting factors for radicalisation by the Change Institute for the European Commission (2008) established that, the beliefs, ideologies and narratives of socio-economic factors contributed to violent radicalisation. Marxist ideologies challenged the primacy of capitalism and liberal democracy during the 20th century. Socialism – economic ideologies are based on some form of social ownership of the means of production and cooperative management of the allocation of resources. Socialist ideologies can be famed by the dominant coordination mechanism employed (economic planning or markets) and by the type of ownership employed (Public ownership or cooperatives). The state approves of the prices and products produced in the economy, subjecting the market system to direct external regulations. Alternatively, the state may produce the goods but then sell them in competitive markets.

Schleifer and Rober (1994) argue that the ideologies are pertinent for violent radical groups and who advocate violence in achieving its ends. Violent revolution is used to eradicate the hegemonic economic system and cultural superstructures. The radicalized groups are informed by socio-economic interests as well as the cultural identity they perceive that they are no longer served by the existing governance structures. The ideologies can be developed over time and include perceptions of economic, political and cultural discrimination against the group.

In many African countries, economic transformation needed to sustain pro-poor growth, to cope with population increases, and to become competitive in the global economy. However, the development outcomes in Africa depends on the political leaders framed beliefs and ideologies. The main driving factor of radicalization is driven by a political economic ideologies and the role it plays in radicalizing individuals.

2.1.3 Religious ideologies and radicalization

Religion plays a significant role to fulfil psychological and social needs. Religion usually describes the belief in a superhuman controlling power involving a God or gods; it entails a system of faith and worship as well as, like ideology, an underlying set of values, myths, ideas, attitudes, beliefs and doctrine that shape the behavioural approach. According to Global Research Centre (2016) of the religious ideologies at the macro level includes but not limited to; Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism. There are variations of these major ideologies and religions. Religious ideology has a both valuable purposes and dysfunctional basis. The latter can be detrimental both individually and socially with the (violent) consequences purpose.

Religious ideologies serve as a moral template for constructing ingroup/outgroup boundaries, legitimizing collective identity and show new members sincere concern for welfare and well-being. Religious, familial, and social deprivation may be the catalysts for early stages of religious ideological radicalization behaviors that are associated with a greater degree of religiosity.

According to Anne & Jason (2012), a study on the role of religious ideologies in the process of radicalization concludes that religion plays a lesser role in radicalization towards violent extremism than the policy response contends. This has implications for counter terrorism programs that aim to address the drivers of violent extremism. He further argues that the presence of other motivational factors such as a crisis of faith, trauma, or general dissatisfaction may or may not predispose individuals to radicalization.

An empirical study in Kenya by Anselm and Kunaal (2016), compared evidence from Christian and Muslim respondents with differing degrees of religious radicalization. The study concluded that there was no evidence that radicalization is predicted by macro-level political or economic grievances. Rather, radicalization was strongly associated with individual-level psychological trauma, historically troubled social relations, religious identification and exposure to radical networks. At the meso-level process, religious identification and exposure to individuals that migrate to Somalia were strong predictors of radicalization.

According to Anne Aly & Jason-Leigh Striegher (2012), religious Islamic ideologies are based on violent interpretations of Islamic texts combined with a strong belief in jihad between the Islamic and Western worlds; individual and group dedication to violent jihad as an obligation for all Muslims; and dedication to establishing a Pan-Islamic state through violent conflict. Anne and Jason analysis on Silber and Bhatt's Salafi-jihadi ideology model, concludes that its an extremist religious ideology which is not necessarily violent Islam but can lead to violent extremisms.

In Kenya, a study on religious radicalization by Anselm and Kunaal (2016), established that radicalization is an individual-level process that is largely unaffected by macro-level influences. They predicated the measures of radicalization at micro-level to include psychological explanations, historically troubled social relations and at the meso-level was religious identification and exposure to individuals that migrate to Somalia. Demographic variables such as individual's religion, gender, age, or marital status, Political, and economic grievances were not significant predictors of radicalization. Although violent extremists may articulate and justify their agendas using religious language, religion is not an inherent source of violence, but rather, a positive channel through which youth radicalization is often most effectively countered.

2.1.4 Political ideologies and radicalization

Youth is a period of maturation, young people experiment with their identity, group relationships, political ideologies and their place in the world. The stage may be used by politicians as a process that can lead to politically motivated radicalization. Political ideological radicalization may represent an attempt to assert citizenship rights and social inclusion when faced with marginalisation or discrimination.

Kamaldeep, Sokratis and Edgar (2012) states that at the other extreme it may also be the outcome of an existentialist strategy designed to overturn the existing political system by any means possible.

Political ideology also affects individual response to economic crisis, political realities especially in East African (EA) countries which were also cited as drivers of youth radicalization. Young people are motivated by a desire to combat injustice, impunity, and corruption. When youth observe any of these negative behaviours in public officials, especially corruption among security sector personnel, they become disillusioned with public institutions and look for solutions to problems outside of their countries' political processes, Christian B. (2015). The unequal or inconsistent application of the rule of law was also highlighted is cited as a major driver of youth frustration. Impunity among politically connected elites causes young people to lose confidence in their legal institutions, especially when youth receive harsh punishments for seemingly small offenses, such as operating an unregistered business or living in makeshift homes without formal titles.

A crisis of national identity was also cited as a potential cause of radicalization in EA. When young people are not firmly rooted in a sense of nation, they are more likely to be persuaded by foreign extremists who invoke transnational and radical ideals. Home grown radicalization is more likely to surface along ethnic, clan, or communal lines when a strong sense of nation is absent from the national consciousness.

Political ideologies pursue partisan ideological policies aiming to reduce the probability of a median-voter who determines the response to a crisis during elections. Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) argues that political manipulation leads young people to feel disillusioned with politicians and electoral politics leaving a semi-organized and politically charged youth cohort idle. Politicians who lose their elections may ideologically exploit the youth by inciting them to violent protests or armed resistance. Young people are not firmly rooted in a sense of a nation; they are more likely to be persuaded by foreign extremists who invoke transnational and radical ideologies. Home grown ideological radicalization is more likely to surface along ethnic, clan, or communal lines when a strong sense of nation is absent from the national consciousness.

Cultural ideologies sometimes challenge youth serving in positions of authority. This results to the youth infrequent interactions with state institutions, unregulated business activities, lack of registered property, and participation in unofficial security networks. Youth engage in informal economies and are subject to ideological criminality, since they may be physically distant from state institutions, such as youth living in remote areas where the state has little capacity.

2.2 Process of Ideological Radicalization

According to Silber and Bhatt's model, radicalization can be segmented along four phases: the pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and finally, radicalization to violent extremism. The pre-radicalization phase is the point of origin of the radicalization process and describes individuals prior to being exposed. The self-identification phase occurs when individuals are exposed to internal and external triggers which include but not limited to trauma, social alienation, economic marginalization, or discrimination. The triggers potentially cause the individual to make changes in their lives as they find new meaning to their lives.

The indoctrination phase, occurs when the individual increasingly intensify their belief system to the point that they whole heartedly adopt ideologies and will adopt a worldview in which conditions and circumstances exist whereby action is justified to support and further the cause. The radicalization to violent extremism conviction phase, occurs the individual is selected or appoint themselves as "warriors in a holy war" and thus see it as a religious duty to begin planning, preparing, and undertaking a terrorist attack

Ideological radicalization may be viewed at the three-level model of analysis (micro, meso and macro) described by Schmid (2013). Similar frameworks proposed by other authors attempt to address to some extent the shortcomings of other analytical approaches, which tend to over emphasise only one of the levels when searching for causes/factors. According to Veldhuis and Staun (2009) most factors could theoretically be listed at the macro level as well as at the micro level, and then in turn often at the social as well as individual level. Some macro-level factors have a social or individual element.

Micro-level involves individual's, identity problems, failed integration, feelings of alienation, marginalisation, discrimination, relative deprivation, humiliation (direct or by proxy), stigmatisation and rejection, often combined with moral outrage and feelings of revenge.

Meso-level is the wider radical setting, the supportive or even complicit social surround which serves as a rallying point and is the 'missing link' with the terrorists' broader constituency or reference group that is aggrieved and suffering injustices which, in turn, can radicalise parts of a youth cohort and lead to the formation of terrorist organisations.

Macro-level, It is the role of government and society at home and abroad, the radicalization of public opinion and party politics, tense majority-minority relationships, especially when it comes to foreign diasporas, and the role of lacking socio-economic opportunities for whole sectors of society which leads to mobilisation and radicalization of the discontented, some of which might take the form of terrorism. Radicalism is not violent or anti-democratic per se. It may be thought of as worrisome or undesirable, but it is not necessarily a threat. Extremists, by contrast, are never democrats. Their state of mind tolerates no diversity.

They are also positively in favour of the use of force to obtain and maintain political power. The latter factor in particular makes extremism considerably more worrisome than “mere” radicalism. Radicalism does not necessarily lead to extremism. Behaviors or expressions can (inadvertently) communicate the intention or capability to commit a terrorist attack. Such pre-attack “indicators” can be used to improve police services’ ability to detect and interdict terrorist plots before they materialize.

2.3 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

2.4.1 Theoretical Framework

This study is informed by the systemic stage model by Lewis Rambo (1998) and conversion theory as discussed by Neil (2015). The model highlights multifaceted conditions that result in ideological radicalization. In the transformational process of conversion, the individual goes from believing to adhering and practicing values/teachings. The model is based on 7 comprehensive process which incorporate micro, meso, macro and exo factors. The process includes: **Context**, historical, religious, social, cultural and personal factors; **Crisis**, personal/social (or both) disruption; **Quest** intentional engagement with crisis and its resolution; **Encounter**, recognition and contact with new movement; **Interaction** multi-layered extended exchange between convert and movement; **Commitment** construction of new identity and become a valid member of the movement; **Consequences** conversion as a result of new commitment and consolidation of experiences and, identities.


Based on the conversion theory, an operational framework for this study with three key process was derived. The first process is pre-radicalization process, the individuals identify the context of their perceived (ideological) crises, grievances which could be socio, religious, economic, political/governance and development. The second is receipting the ideology, individual quest for solutions of the crisis and through interaction and induction process in the new movement they have found. The last process, the individual is convicted and committed to take action despite the consequences.

Measuring ideological radicalization

Since ideology is coherent, repeated patterns, on-going system of ideas, relying upon basic assumptions about reality that may or may not have any factual basis. Studies by (Jost 2006; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008), proposed two core dimensions of ideologies (Liberal & Conservative) This study measured ideological radicalization on a spectrum along a left or right the 5 ideologies on a 3 pointer Likert scale

- 0= moderately liberal /traditional,
- 1=Strongly Liberal (open to new opinions & willing to discard negative traditional values)
- 2= Strongly Traditional (not open to new opinions & not willing to discard traditional values).

2.2 Operational Framework

Table 1: Operational framework on ideological radicalization process		
<div> <div>Pre Ideology</div> <div>Ideological Induction</div> <div>Ideological Conviction</div> </div>		
Identification of Grievances/crises	Encontering and acquiring ideology	Commitment to the ideology
1. Socio cultural 2. Religious 3. Economic 4. Political/governance 5. Development	1. Socio interaccations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Place of residence Relationship to the HHH Social Group belonging Religious affiliation Level of level Main source of income 2. Means of acquiring the ideology 3. Measures put to address the ideologies	<div> Ideological radicalized Strongly traditional on 4 ideology  Not ideologically Radicalized Strongly Liberal on 4 ideology </div>

Source: (Eunice, 2017)

2.2.1 Definition of Operational variables

Independent variables: Pre- ideology (individual and communal grievances / crisis), ideological induction (encountering and acquiring ideology).

Five variables were assessed: cultural view on women, religious freedom and its contribution to peace; security and development, leadership and management of local resources, youth education and employment. Ideological induction: Process of acquiring the ideologies. The variables assessed were based on the socio interactions and the means of acquiring the ideology.

Dependent variable: Commitment to the ideology radicalized ready or not radicalized for action. The outcome of ideological radicalization was measured using a three pointer Likert scale (strongly, moderate and slightly, those radicalized rated strongly traditional on all the five ideologies on (women/cultural, religious, economic, peace and security, political, youth education & employment).

Chapter Three: Methodology

3.0 Introduction

This chapter describes the research study design, study population, sampling method, sample size, and criteria for inclusion. It further, describes the ethical considerations, data collection process, research assistant’s selection and training, data quality control, entry and analysis.

3.1 Study Design

A descriptive cross-sectional study was conducted using both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods.

3.2 Study Area

The study was conducted in three Counties (Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi). A total of 16 Sub Counties and 232 villages were sampled.

Table 2 : County and Sub County sampling table		
County	Sub County	% count
Mombasa 132(34.1%)	1. Changamwe	28(7.3%)
	2. Jomvu	20 (5.2%)
	3. Kisauni	17(4.4%)
	4. Likoni	27(7.0%)
	5. Mvita	14(3.6%)
	6. Nyalı	25 (6.5%)
Kwale 92(24.0%)	7. Kinango	25(6.5%)
	8. Lungalunga	12(3.1%)
	9. Matuga	30(7.8%)
	10. Msambweni	25(6.5%)
Kilifi 161(41.9%)	11. Kilifi North	71(18.5%)
	12. Kilifi South	31(8.1%)
	13. Ganze	15(3.9%)
	14. Kaloleni	12(3.1%)
	15. Magarini	13(3.4%)
	16. Malindi	19(4.9%)

3.3 Study populations

The youth aged 18-35 years were the primary study population. In addition, key informants and focus group discussants included were; National and County government administrators, religious and community leaders and youth representative.

3.4 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

Only youth aged 18 -35 years, who had lived in the selected study areas for the three months prior to the study were allowed to participate. Those who met the above criteria had to consent to participate in the study. Those who did not meet above criteria were excluded from the study.

3.5 Sample Size Determination

The Sample size was determined using Fischer et al, formula $n= z^2 * (p) * (1- p)/ c^2$ cited in Mugenda and Mugenda (2003).

Then	$n = \frac{z^2pd}{d^2}$
$q = 1-p$	i.e. $1 - 0.5 = 0.5$
$n =$	$\frac{(1.96) (1.96) (0.5) (0.5)}{(0.05)^2}$
$n =$	384

Where:

n = the desired sample size when the population is <10,000

Z =Standard deviate at 95% confidence interval (1.96)

p = The proportion target population estimated to have the particular characteristics of interest (ideological radicalized youth). This is assumed to be 50% since there are no statistical figures to that effect, expressed as decimal (.5) c = confidence interval, expressed as decimal (0.05).

3.6. Sampling Procedure

The study adopted cluster sampling and proportionate allocation in each County. A sampling list was developed using household list from the local administrator in the Sub County. Qualitative data sample size was purposively selected. A total of three focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted one in each County. 30 key informants dealing with counter violent extremism were interviewed, ten from each County.

3.7 Data Collection Tools

Quantitative data was collected using semi structured questionnaire. The main groups to be interviewed in this approach were the youth. Qualitative data was being collected through discussion guides in FGD and key informant interviews (KIIs). A total of 3 FGD and 10 KII were conducted one in each County.

Table 4 below gives a detailed sampling frame.

Table 3: Sampling frame					
County	Sub County	Population	KII County commissioner County Police Commander County DCIO Religious leader (3) Community Representative (2) Youth representative (2)	FGD	T o t a l S a m p l e Youth
Kilifi	Kilifi South	1,466,856	10	1	161
	Kilifi North				
	Ganze				
	Malindi				
	Magarini				
	Kaloleni				
	Rabai				
Kwale	Matuga	813,064	10	1	92
	Kinango				
	Msambweni				
Mombasa	Mvita	1,175,152	10	1	131
	Kisauni				
	Nyali				
	Likoni				
	Changamwe				
	Jomvu				
Total	16	3,455,072	30	3	384

3.8 Data analysis and presentation

Descriptive analysis was done to establish the distribution of the baseline survey variables. Mean, median and mode were used to describe the magnitude. The data is presented in tables, graphs, frequencies, pie-charts using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) and Microsoft Excel packages. The Pearson correlation coefficient was used to measure the linear association between the dependent variables (radicalization) and independent variable (ideology). Correlation coefficient was to be significant at the 0.05 level.

Hypothesis testing

The log linear analysis was used to determine statistical significant relationship between independent and dependent variables. None of the variables in the analysis were considered dependent variables, but rather all variables were considered variables of interest. Qualitative data was used to support the quantitative findings.

The data was analyzed using a three-step data analysis. Step one, involved documentation of all the issues as recorded during focus group discussion sessions. Step two, involved clustering of all the issues under their specific thematic areas. Step three, involved development of meanings and conclusions from the thematic areas in relation to the key study objectives. Issues emerging from the key informant interviews were clustered into thematic areas upon which meanings/conclusions were drawn.

3.9 Quality control and Ethical consideration

3.9.1 Quality control

The research assistants (RA) were selected based on predetermined criterion. RA had attained college level education with data collection experience. The RA was trained for two days. The training included; study purpose and objectives, tools familiarization, ethical issues in research and pre-testing of the tools. Ethical issues on creating a rapport, ensuring confidentiality and obtaining informed consent from the participants was emphasized and required during the study period. The lead researcher adjusted the research instruments after the piloting, in order to ensure that they captured all the study variables and meet the set-out objectives as well as enable the testing of the hypothesis. Field logistics discussed and clarified during the RA training. All logistics during the data collection was explained and agreed upon by the research team. The principal investigator put in place various measures to ensure quality of the study was achieved. At the end of each data collection day, the supervisors cleaned the data by examining filled questionnaires for completeness, consistency, error in entry and calculation and correctness of inclusion. The RA were supervised by principal investigator during data collection process.

3.9.2 Ethical considerations

Clearance to conduct the study was obtained from the IPSTC research department ethical committee, County administrators, National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation and the respondent was required to give informed consent prior to participation.

3.9.3 Consenting procedure

The respondents were recruited on voluntary basis and taken through the informed consent explanation form and the purpose of the study. The respondents willing to participate were required to sign the consent form with the RA.

3.9.4 Tool Validity test

Validity determines whether the research measures the intended outcome and how truthful the research results are. Content validity was done to ascertain connections between the independent and dependent variable. Subject matter was consulted during the technical proposal and tool development process.

3.10 Data Dissemination

The findings will be shared with relevant stakeholders in the IPSTC research symposium. The findings will be published in IPSTC *Amani Journal*.

Chapter 4 : Findings and Discussion

4.0 Introduction

This chapter describes findings based on the objectives and operational variables. Descriptive analysis illustrate the distribution of the study variables. The Inferential analysis was done to establish relationship between the independent variables (radicalization) and the dependent variable (ideologies). Chi square test established the relationship at the significance level at 0.05.

4.1 General Characteristic of the Respondent

A total of 384 youths were interviewed from 16 Sub Counties and 240 villages. The male accounted for 213 (55.5%), and female 171 (44.5%). The mean age was 26years , the median and mode was 30years. Slightly less than half were single, totaling to 189 (49.2%) and self employed at 168 (43.8%). On education level, 150 (39.1%) of the respondents had completed secondary education, while 79 (20.6%) had no any formal education. Slightly more than half, 216 (56.3%) of the respondents did not belong to any social group. On religious affiliation, a total of 167 (17.6%) were not affiliated to any religious group. Majority of the respondents were affiliated to the catholic religion totaling to 100 (26.2%), followed by the indigenous at 95 (24.9%), Muslims at 75 (19.7%), and lastly the protestants at 44 (11.5%).

Table 4 below, gives a summary of the respondents socio-demographic characteristics

Table 4: Summary of respondents' characteristics		N = 384	
Variable		Fre	%
Sex	Male	213	55.5
	Female	171	44.5
Age cohort	18 - 19yrs	30	7.8
	20 -24 yrs	111	28.9
	25 -29yrs	127	33.1
	30- 34 yrs	116	30.2
Marital status	Married (monogamy)	148	38.5
	Married polygamy	24	6.3
	Widow(er), divorced, separated	23	6.0
	Single	189	49.2
Relationship to HHH	Head of HH	152	39.6
	Spouse to HHH	66	17.2
	Child by Birth to HHH	166	43.2
Education Level	No any formal education	79	20.6
	Primary complete	77	20.1
	Secondary complete	150	39.1
	In tertiary school	78	20.3
Main source of income	No Source of income	100	26.0
	Farming	31	8.1
	Self-employment	168	43.8
	Salary	85	22.1
Religion affiliation	No religious affiliation	167	17.6
	Catholic	100	26.2
	Protestant	44	11.5
	Indigenous	95	24.9
	Muslim	75	19.7
Group Membership	Not in social group	216	56.3
	Women /men group	54	14.1
	Youth group	114	29.7
Position in the group	General member	121	31.5
	Executive committee member	47	12.2
	N/A (not in a group)	216	56.3

Based on FGDs with the youth, similar demographic patterns relating to age, level of education and source of income were observed. Three FGDs were conducted with a minimum of six discussants per group, the male discussants (16) were more than the female (8). All the discussants apart from one, had completed secondary education and a majority of the discussants were not employed.


On issues relating to ideological radicalization, the study showed that more males were involved.

The male gender were seen as the drivers and actors of ideological radical movements. Based on the fact that the male respondents were less than half 160 (41.7%) of the respondent were ideologically radicalized as compared to 224(58.3%) who were not. Ideological radicalized youth were highest in Kilifi 78 (20.3%) as compared to Kilifi at 44 (11.5%) and Mombasa at 38 (9.9%) .

4.2 Existing Ideologies among the Youth

The respondent was asked to state ideologies existing among the youth based on 5 main areas these included: women’s roles and position in the society, religious freedom and its contribution to peace, security and development, leadership and management of local resources (e.g. land, minerals, sea port, and beaches), peace security and development for the county, youth education and employment. A total of 1,005 suggestions of existing ideologies were made. The ideologies were grouped in 4 main emerging ideological themes. The top three ideologies were based on youth education and employment, peace, security and development and natural resource management as shown on fig 1. Below gives a summary of the ideologies among the youth:

Figure 1: Ideologies among the youth



Ideology on Women’s Roles and Position in the Society

During the FGD and the KII the study established both positive and negative ideologies regarding women role in leadership. The youth who participated in the FGD, were more negative as compared to the youth who participated in the household interviews. The ideologies stated that, women are created to be helpers at home, and that they are weak and untrustworthy, thus cant be good leaders.

All FGD discussants had common belief that women cannot lead. They were perceived to need more protection than men, especially while vying for a political seat. The discussants stated that women who are divorced, unmarried and childless are considered to be a curse and can’t hold a leadership position.

Another emerging issue raised during the FGD, was that when women hold a political leadership position, they tend to neglect their duties, since they are more focused on taking care of their families at home.

Based on this, the discussant alluded that women should not be given any chance in public leadership. Most of the discussants expressed that the place for women was not in strategic leadership (governor, senator, members of parliament), but on lower positions in the society like those of Members of County Assembly (MCA), or home workers.

A discussant statement that was representative comments of many FGDs participants.

(Traditionally, women are inferior and cannot lead. They cannot compete with men during campaigns. Women in political leadership are mostly single or divorced and cannot be taken seriously as good leaders. When women take up leadership role, watakalia wanaume (Quote from FGDs).

Unlike the FGDs, the KII both male and female had different beliefs concerning women's roles and position in the society. One of the KII reported that Mombasa being an urban setting, the youths advocated for women empowerment. Also, the Youth, tend to work together in group activities. However, some activities such as garbage collection is done by youths of male gender. Recently, youths of female gender are seen to be engaging in activities that were previously reserved for men such as, driving tuktuks (resemble a motorbike but with a covered body).

In Kwale and Kilifi, which are rural Counties, one KII observed that women are controlled by men, and are not trained on how to lead. Among the Muslim, a woman is expected to be submissive to the man, even if she is employed. Among the Christian there is a tradition in church that men are to take lead. Yet, women and girls play active role in church activities, more than the boys and men.

Ideology on Natural Resources Management

The main ideology regarding natural resource management was that elders are irresponsible in natural resources and they don't involve the youth and the community in the management of the same. This ideology was supported by the discussants of the FGDs. The participants felt the local communities specially the youth were not involved in natural resource management. The participants identified the key natural resources in the Counties, which included; the Port of Mombasa, beaches, Fort Jesus and minerals. The ideologies were based on the belief that the Port was not helping the locals because it was perceived to be managed by non- locals. Yet during the FGDs it was perceived that the key positions in the port and casual jobs are held by the local coastal community.

Even among the locals, the FGD discussants expressed that tribalism, nepotism and ghost tenders is strife in the County government.

The discussants felt that the job opportunities at the County government are for specific local communities. When an opportunity arises the chance is given to the relatives of those in key positions. The youth also stated that the accessing job opportunities at the national level had the same trend. The youth perceived that international companies were far much better than local companies (in terms of employment benefits). The International Companies managing the natural resources within the counties are seen to be better than local companies, because they use the cooperative social funds to support the youths in the community.

Discussant statements below representative comments of many the participants.

Locals are not given opportunity to work in the Port while the key management staff from the Coast, have no teeth to bite. Port inawenyewe, Port ni kujuaana, and there are specific people controlling it. The Port is not helping the locals. Youths and generally the locals are not involved in the leadership and management of resources.

For example, the key machines, were taken from the cashew nut factory to Thika by former senior employees and politicians. In the security jobs such as the Kenya defence forces (KDF), police, prison etc., the youths who qualify during the recruitment process are normally not taken. Instead wanaulizwa “unajua nani hapa”. A parent has to pay not less than KSh100, 000 for their children to join the security sector (Quote from FGDs).

The KII participants had different views regarding the youth and natural resources management. They felt that a majority of the youth have no knowledge on the resources available and their distribution. On the other hand, the youth perceived that the natural resources belonged to them, yet they did not have ownership. Despite these perceptions, the county government employed 70% locals. A majority of the youth lacked skills needed to effectively perform their duties. This notwithstanding, the local youth perceive the ocean is a place for relaxation, fishing and tourism. They prefer to go to the beach to look for spouses/partners. Based on this, most of the youth do not appreciate the natural resources available in the region apart from the Port of Mombasa.

The KII stated that there was a narrative that the natural resources had been taken by non-locals. This has resulted to the youths becoming less interested and involved in fishing, farming and small-scale business. It was established that most fishermen were elderly people, who use old equipment to fish. Also, killing of elders, has become a norm especially in Kilifi County. The youths execute this act so that they can inherit the ancestral lands and in turn sell it at a low price to buy motorbike for business. Due to low formal education and poor entrepreneurship skills and are not linked to any faith, the youths are not able to sustain the boda boda businesses.

According to the KII most youths do not appreciate the resources and opportunities available, apart from the Port. Despite the availability of training through the UWEZO and the Youth Enterprise Funds, that aims to enable the women, youth and persons with disability to access finances to enhance their economic growth and promote businesses and enterprises at the constituency, the uptake of the funds by the youth is very low due to fears of having their business being auctioned.

Ideology, Religious Freedom and its Contribution to Peace, Security and Development

During the youth FGDs discussions, participants had mixed belief concerning religious freedom. Some discussants believed that the freedom in religion has brought hatred within different religious affiliations and that one religious belief can promote peace. The discussants who had this belief, believed that there was no relationship between security and religion and that people only hide behind religion when they are involved in illegal things. Other participants felt that in all the Counties where there was religious freedom, development was realised. The discussants noted the development contributions by the Anglican Church of Kenya especially in Kilifi.

Despite this freedom some discussants noted that there was inter and intra conflict within different religious affiliations. Some religious groups sort to promote peace despite feeling superior than others. Some FGD discussants felt that the non-locals, who have migrated from other counties with their preferred religious beliefs, tend to impose these beliefs to the locals, whom majority are Muslims. The discussants felt that these people perceived their religion to be superior to others. This type of perception could result to community conflict when a family member is converted from one religion to another, despite the fact that there is religious freedom.

Another conflict within a religious group tend to resonate from the prism of leadership and control. It emerged during the FGDs that the Muslim youth would want to take control of the mosques which currently are under the leadership and control of the elders. The Muslim youths can only lead prayers when allowed by the elders. Some of the FGD discussants expressed a feeling that the youths would like to change this scenario and take over the leadership. However, politicians on the other hand, support the elders who are usually reluctant to accept any change. It emerged also, that the youth felt despised by politician who felt they are not holy and hence cannot lead the mosques. Both the KII and the FGD discussants stated there was need for the National and County government to involve the religious leaders and the youth in issues regarding religion and development. This they stated would bring development and peace in the County and nation at large.

Discussant statements below representative comment of many the participants.

Uhuru wa kuabudu ni muhimu sana na umechangia pakubwa sana katika kuleta amani na maendeleo katika Kaunti. Uhuru wa kuabudu hauwezi kusababisha ukosefu wa amani kwa kuwa sheria na taratibu nyingi za kidini zinaunga mkono amani. (Freedom of worship is good, has contributed at large in bringing peace and development in the County. Freedom of worship doesn't contribute to lack of peace because there are laws governing religion, all denominations support peace).

Uhuru wa kuabudu umeleta vita na chuki katika baadhi ya mataifa mengi, duniani hivyo kuchangia ukosefu wa amani na usalama. Msimamo wangu kuhusu masuala ya dini, ningelipendekeza kama kungelikuwa na dini moja watu wote wangelikuwa wakiongozwa na mfumo mmoja basi kungekuwa na amani. Muslims believe that non-muslims are kafiri (non-believers) and this can cause conflict. (Freedom of worship has brought conflict and hatred among many nations. Religion therefore, contributes to lack of peace and security. My stand regarding issues of religious is that if there was one religion, all the people would be led by one system, hence there would be peace.

(Quote from FGDs)

Ideology on Peace Security and Development for the County

The youth were aware that peace promotes development. During the FGDs and the household interviews, they stated that there was a decline with investors in the coastal region especially in the tourism industry due to insecurity related incidents.

The main ideology among the youth regarding peace and security was the police are enemies of the youth and the community is not involved in peace & security issues. Youths believe that peace, security and development is the responsibility of the government. According to the discussants this was more evident in Kwale and Kilifi unlike Mombasa which was termed to be relatively calm and residents were able to go on with their business.

Both the KII and the FGDs participants concurred that collaboration between community stakeholders and the security agencies in peace and security matters would improve peace and security. When probed further during the FGDs the discussants felt the collaborations was lacking. This is because the youths fear the security agents, whom they felt harasses them even when they have not committed any crime. The youths stated that they would rather run away from the police even when they are not on the wrong. When probed further they stated that the community fear reporting potential threats of peace and security due to victimization or being killed. In some instances, the police make wrong statements and even impose illegal exhibits to have the youths arrested and jailed.

It was revealed during the FGDs that the youth are usually incited by politicians especially during the electioneering periods as a result of such incidents, the investors shy away. In Kilifi the main ideology on peace and security was related to the killings of the elderly who are alleged to be practicing witchcraft.

Belief in *chai* is a threat to peace, security and development. The ideology leads to misuse of the land leading to deaths, and also lack of title deeds when the grey-haired elders are dead. In retaliating, relatives of the elders who have been killed tend to avenge their deaths, hence resulting to a perpetual state of insecurity in the counties. The discussants stated that this was a peace and security issue.

Discussant statements below representative comments of many the participants.

Naamini kukiwa na amani na usalama basi maendeleo yatapatikana hapa. Amani na usalama utachangia pakubwa maendeleo ya eneo hili. Naunga mkono amani na usalama kwa sababu huchangia maendeleo ya jamii. Naamini kwamba usalama na amani miongoni mwetu ndio silaha kubwa ya kuleta maendeleo baina yetu. (I believe when we have peace and security then there will be development in this area. Peace and security contributes a lot to development. I support the presence of peace and security, because it contributes to community development. I believe peace and security among us is the weapon of bringing development among us).

Everyone should be involved in matters of peace and security. However, most youths always think negatively about security issues. They don't see the importance of having peace and development due to high unemployment rate. This results to some getting involved in illegal activities. Similarly, the police also extort the members of the community whom they perceive as their source of income. In Diana, relationship between the police and the youths jicama petrol na moto. The Kenya police are using their uniforms to mislead the community, (Quate from FGDs).

Ideology on Youth Education and Employment

The ideology regarding youth education and employment has had some negative effects on education, based on the FGDs discussions. The youth believe that securing employment depended on luck and not education. When probed further, the youth had a mind-set that access to education and formal jobs, was for specific people. This is despite having free primary education, availability of bursary and cost sharing in secondary schools. The discussants stated that high cost of secondary and tertiary education hindered the youths from reaching the said levels of education. The findings showed that most parents were not able to pay school fees for their children. Hence the youths opted to look for informal employment in Arab countries which did not require any form of education.

Unlike in the FGD the KII had a different stand regarding youth education and employment. The KII stated that the youths complain of being unemployed because they believe in white colour job. The youth also don't want to use self-employment as a means of creating employment, yet high percentage of these youths do not have formal education. Poor parenting also played a role in the disempowerment of the youths.

Discussant statements: Below represents comments from the participants.


Education is nothing today. This is because even if you acquire education, one still needs a person to influence their employment. Youths are educated but there are no jobs. Some have jobs, but they are illiterate. Kaži Ni zaḡ winey despite going through the interview process. On the other hand, there are those who are not educated, but are successful, and informal jobs in Arab countries do not require education. Only age matters. (Quite from FGDs).

This society does not value education. Our mothers prefer to buy Lesos and kangas (a dressing for women). The youth like to have fun and enjoy themselves. They don't have time for education. Most of the youth also don't have technical skilled education. I believe many youths will get employment if our leaders will stop being corrupt. (Quote from KIIs).

4.2.1 Rating of Ideologies

The respondent was asked to rate the five ideologies on a 3 pointer Likert scale (0=moderately liberal or Traditional , 1=Strongly Liberal (open to new opinions and willing to discard negative traditional values), 2= Strongly Traditional (not open to new opinions and not willing to discard traditional values). Fig 2. gives a summary of ideology rating .

Figure 2: Respondent ideologies rating



Based on fig 2 above nearly half of the respondent (46%) were strongly traditional on total rating.

Half (54%) of the respondent were open to new opinions and willing to discard negative traditional values regarding leadership and management of natural resources.

Slightly more than half (61%) rated ideology on women roles as strongly traditional, meaning the respondents were not ready to discard the traditional values.

4.3 Process of Aquiring of Ideologies and Measures put to address Ideologies

The respondents were asked to state the process of acquiring ideologies among the youth. The process was measured using the following areas: Pre-radicalization, ideological induction and ideological conviction. The pre-radicalization process identified individual and communal grievances, ideological induction, evaluated the ways youth encountering and acquire ideologies. The outcome of the process was ideological conviction which was ideological radicalization. Based on table 6 below; the main 144 (37.5%) grievance was based on national government policies on local resources management, followed by personal crises related to weak spiritual foundation 89 (23.2%) More than half 235 (61.2%) of the youth acquired the ideologies from peers followed by political and religious leaders

Table 5 : Pre ideological grievances by receipting process				
Pre ideological grievances/ crisis	Family member	Leaders (political traditional & religious)	Peers(observation, experience & social media	Total
1. Government policies on local resources	20(5.2%)	22(5.7%)	102(26.6%)	144(37.5%)
2. Marginalization special groups needs	3(.80%)	48(12.5%)	27(7%)	78(20.3%)
3. Corruption in leadership	0.00%	2(.50%)	71(18.5%)	73(19%)
4. Weak spiritual foundation	26(6.8%)	28(7.3%)	35(9.1%)	89(23.2%)
Total	49(12.8%)	100(26%)	235(61.20%)	384(100 %)

During the FGDs and the KII it was confirmed that the youth acquired the ideologies from their peers. Most of the youth it was established are not talked to at home on various issues. The discussant stated that parents do not have time for their children. Some parents protect their children even when they have committed criminal offences. When probed further, the discussants stated that these leaders mislead the youths through wrong teachings. It was established that the youth have specific meeting places. When probed further it was established that the Maskani ya Vijana (youth hideouts) exist with the knowledge and approval of the Mzee WA kijiji (village/community elder).

Discussant statements:

The youth between ages 12 – 15 go to Mascagni/Vijiweni and are involved in illegal/gangs activities. Those in the university and colleges especially students from rural areas, are misused by drug barons to sell drugs, with some becoming “young rich billionaires” from this vice. (Quote from FGDs).

4.3.3 Impact of the ideologies on the community

The respondent were asked to describe the impact of ideologies on the community. A total of 2426 ways were given. They were further grouped into four thematic areas which included Family issues which focused on; interaction, parenting issues, marriage, dependency, and population trends. Human rights, focused on issues of freedom of association, movements, crime, community policing, peace and security. Human security, focused on issues related to; education, income, health, employment, and food security.

Access to information, focused on acquisition of knowledge related to culture, religion, and governance. Based on table 7 below, the impact on the family was highest at 848 (35%) and the least was access to information at 473 (19.5%)


Table 6: Impact of the ideology	N	%
1. Family	848	35.00%
2. Human rights	573	23.60%
3. Human security	532	21.90%
4. Access to information	473	19.50%
Total	2426	100.00%

4.4.3 Measures addressing the Ideologies

The respondents were asked if there were any measures in their County or community that address the ideologies. A majority of the respondent 302 (78.6%) reported there were no measures put in place, as compared to 82 (21.4%) who stated that measures were in place. The respondents was asked to suggest measures that can be put to address the ideologies among the youth. A total of 1152 suggestions were given.

They were based on three areas which included; education for religious and local leader at 139 (36%), youth education and capacity building at 134 (35%) and community education at 111 (29%) as shown in fig. 3 below.

Figure 4: Suggested Measures to address the ideologies



4.4 Determinants of Youth Ideological Radicalization

Log linear analysis was used for both hypothesis testing and model building. This was to determine the relationship between dependent variable (ideological radicalized) and independent variables (ideologies on: women's roles, religious freedom, peace, security and development, management of local resources, youth education and employment)

Pearson's correlation coefficient (r) was used to measure the strength of the association between the independent variables (personal and communal grievances/crises, ways of acquiring ideology) and the dependent variable (ideological radicalization). The value of (r) data ranges from -1 to +1: Positive (r) indicates that both variables increase and decrease together, whereas negative (r) indicates that as one variable increases, so the other decreases, and vice versa.

The main objective of the study was to establish the role of ideology in youth radicalization in the three Counties. In addition, the study sort to analyze and establish existing ideological grievances, the process of acquiring the ideologies, the relationship between ideologies and youth radicalization and lastly examine measures put in place to addressing the ideologies.

Pre-ideological grievances/ crisis

In objective one, individual/communal ideological grievances were assessed based on: socio, religious, economic, governance and development. Three out of the five variables had a statistically relationship with ideological radicalization. These included ideologies on; peace, security and development ($r^2 = .113$, $p = .027$), leadership and management of local resources ($r^2 = -.126$, $p = .014$), youth education and employment ($r^2 = .129$, $p = .012$).

Ideological induction the process Encountering and acquiring ideology

The second objective assessed the process in which the youth acquire the ideologies. The variables assessed were based on the socio interactions, means of acquiring the ideology and the measures put in place to address the ideologies. Five out of ten socio interactions variables assessed, had a statistical relationship with ideological radicalization. These included; Sub County ($r^2 = -.165$, $p = .001$), County ($r^2 = -.167$, $p = .001$), religious affiliations ($r^2 = .151$, $p = .003$), presence of measures to address ideologies ($r^2 = .101$, $p = .048$), measures of addressing the ideologies. ($r^2 = .215$, $p = .001$).

Based on table 6 below, out of 15 independent study variables, only 8 variables influenced youth ideological radicalization. The top three variables included the presence of measures put in place to address the ideologies ($r^2 = .215$), religious affliction ($r^2 = .151$) and ideologies on peace, security and development ($r^2 = .113$).

Table 7: Determinants of youth ideological radicalization		
Study variables	Pearson Correlation (r ²)	P value
Pre ideological grievances/ crisis		
1. Ideology on peace, security and development	.113*	.027
2. Ideology on Leadership and management of local resources	-.126*	.014
3. Ideology on Youth education and employment	.129*	.012
4. Ideology on religious freedom contribution to peace, security & development	.075	.145
5. Ideology on women roles culture	.014	.790
The process of acquiring the ideologies		
6. Sub County of residence	-.165**	.001
7. County of residence	-.167**	.001
8. Religious affiliations	.151**	.003
9. Presence of measures to address the ideologies	.101*	.048
10. Measures of addressing the ideologies.	.215**	.001
11. Relationship to HHH	.004	.940
12. Education level	-.027	.591
13. Main source of income	-.069	.179
14. Group membership	.029	.574
15. Position in the group	-.023	.653

Chapter 5: conclusion and recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

The study main objective was to establish the role ideology plays in youth radicalization in Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale Counties. Five main ideologies were established in the three counties. The ideology that women are weak and cannot lead was predominant in all the three Counties. The predominant ideology in Mombasa was on freedom of worship that brought hatred. The belief was that, one religion can promote peace /development. In Kwale, the main ideology was based on the police being the enemies of the youth. This is because the police don't involve the youth and the community in peace and security issues. In Kilifi the predominant ideology was based on the fact that elders were misused the available natural resources, and they didn't involve the youth and community in the management. The main process of youth acquiring the ideologies was through their peer. In all the three counties there were very few measures put in place for addressing the ideologies among the youth.

5.2 Recommendations

Based on the findings, the study recommends;

Partnership and programs

1. The County governments department of youth and education needs to enhance the age specific measures to deal with the ideologies for both in school and out of school youth.
 - For the youth in school, the study recommends the establishment and enhancement of peace clubs in both primary and secondary schools.
 - For the out of school youth the study recommends the collaboration between the religious, community and youth, group leaders to establish and enhance the socio economic support groups which can be used to promote peace champions.
2. The Kwale County police headquarters needs to enhance the partnership between the police, youth, religious and the community elders.
3. The Kilifi County department of youth, in partnership with traditional elders, religious leaders and the youth needs to establish and enhance traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in the community to equip the youth with dialogue , negotiation and mediation skills.

Further research

Since this study did not focus in details regarding the role of religious and community based organization in dealing with ideologies, there is need for further research in;

1. Establishing and documenting best practices in dealing with ideologies.
2. Conduct a TNA in schools to establish the capacity of teachers and religious leaders in dealing with ideological radicalization.

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Annex: Map Showing Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi Counties



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