

International Peace Support Training Centre Nairobi, Kenya

Assessment of Security Sector Reform (SSR) Processes in Post-conflict States in East Africa: Cases of Rwanda and Uganda



Lt Col Donatien NDUWIMANA

Changing Trends of Conflicts and Response Strategies in Eastern Africa

Assessment of Security Sector Reform (SSR) Processes in Post-conflict States in East Africa: Cases of Rwanda and Uganda

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Foreword

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is a research and training institution focusing on capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and has developed into a regional center of excellence for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. It addresses the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated Peace Support Operations (PSOs) by analyzing the actors and multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research conducted covers a broad spectrum of issues ranging from conflict prevention through management to post-conflict reconstruction. The Center has made considerable contributions in training and research on peace support issues in East Africa through design of training curriculum, field research and publication of Occasional Papers and Issue Briefs. The Occasional Papers are produced annually, while the Issue Briefs are produced quarterly. Issue Briefs are an important contribution to the vision and mission of IPSTC.

The Peace and Security Research Department (PSRD) of the IPSTC presents one of the occasional papers on Rwanda and Uganda titled: An Assessment of Security Sector Reform (SSR) Processes in Post-conflict States in East Africa: Cases of Rwanda and Uganda. The paper provides insights on the role of SSR in the efficient and effective provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance with a focus on Rwanda and Uganda. This study also assesses the implementation and effectiveness of SSR-DDR integrated approach in Eastern Africa with case studies of Rwanda and Uganda. This paper also aims at generating information that will be useful to policy makers and contribute to enhancement of human security in Rwanda and Uganda. It is also expected to inform the design of training modules at IPSTC. The research and publication of this Occasional Paper has been made possible by the support of the European Union.

Brig. P.M. Nderitu

Director IPSTC

Abbreviations

APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimanation Against Women
DCAF	Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demoblisation and Reintegration
DfID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRU	Defence Reform Unit
FDLR	Front Democratique de Liberation du Rwanda
IPSTC	International Peace Support Training Centre
LRA	Lord's Resistence Army
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintgration
NRA	National Resistence Army
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PSOs	Peace Support Operations
PSRD	Peace and Security Research Department
PTS	Police Training School
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UPF	Uganda Police Force
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNLA	Uganda National Libaration Army
UNSC	United Nations Security Council Resolution

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Abstract

Since the late 1990s, Security Sector Reform (SSR) has emerged as a key security and conflict focal point and has become widely accepted by security experts, development practitioners, and, to a lesser extent, democracy advocates. SSR is now broadly recognized as playing a vital role beyond improving the delivery of security and justice services to the population. The transformation of justice and security institutions to more accountable and effective entities is a critical element for post-conflict peacebuilding and development, contributing to both short-term and long-term stability.

Uganda and Rwanda have experienced violent conflicts since their independence. The most complex challenges confronting them is achieving effective human security, sustainabe socio-economic development and good governance. Like other African countries, security sector reforms implemented in Rwanda and Uganda have not fully meet all the security needs of the people. Rwanda started security sector reforms after the genocide in 1994 while Uganda initiated hers in 2000.

Despite the two governments' commitment to secure and stabilise their countries, they still experiencing challenges that undermine the success of security sector reforms initiated. Most countries in Eastern Africa are members of regional security arrangements, and, since many security challenges are often transnational, they cannot be effectively dealt with by national means or approaches alone. FDLR and LRA are serious threats to Rwanda and Uganda as well as to regional stability. This study, therefore, investigates security sector reform processes in these two countries and analyzes their implementation and effectiveness.

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1.0 Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed substantive widening and deepening of the concept of security. On the one hand, non-military security issues such as political, economic, societal and environmental aspects are broadly accepted as components of a meaningful security agenda. Furthermore, military threats and the way states respond to them have changed, as illustrated by the nature of conflicts after the second world war and the events of 9/11 and its aftermath. Asymmetrical threats and warfare, as well as the blurred line between different dimensions of traditional and new security issues have emerged as characteristic features (Heiner Hänggi, 2008). On the other hand, the primacy of national security has been supplanted by the logic of globalisation and the corresponding changes in the role of the state. With the proliferation of intra-state wars, the international community began to recognise that it is individuals and social groups that need to be protected rather than the state whose dysfunctionality is sometimes the primary cause of insecurity. The emergence of new security concepts such as societal security and human security led to the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and its importance specifically in post-conflict situations. Helping to create credible national services that provide security and putting in place comprehensive systems that provide and are seen to provide justice are fundamental ingredients for lasting and stability in post-conflict societies(Dmitry Titov, 2011)

1.1 Background

The concept of SSR originated from several sources. These included scholars of community development, who analyzed the functional relationship between security and economic development (Gallen, 2013). It was influenced by the broader human security agenda, which is based on two key ideas: protection of individuals, which is critical to both national and international security; and the security conditions required by people for their development. These security conditions are not limited to traditional matters such as national defence, law, and order, but rather incorporate the broader political, economic and social issues that ensure that people are free from any security risk (Hussein, 2004).

(SSR) continued to gain importance in Africa when many countries went through periods of intractable and complex internal conflicts especially where existing socio-economic

systems were completely destroyed. The emerging armies came from guerilla and militia backgrounds with deep political and ideological beliefs and behavior that had negative consequences on individual and societal security. Transforming the mindsets of former guerilla armies, reforming the new security forces, and integrating the diverse forces has proven to be practically challenging for many African countries. SSR was then an important tool to achieve this goal and steer a country's transition from conflict to peace. Accordingly, SSR is considered as a prerequisite for the re-establishment of the rule of law and a secure and peaceful society (Cawthra,1997).

In Rwanda, the civil war and the1994 genocide led to a total beakdown of institutions and infrastructures with serious consequences on law, order and security. The call for security SSR was issued by the UNSC Resolution 872, which established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in monitoring the security situation (UNSC/R, 1993). Following the genocide, the Security Council had to adjust UNAMIR's mandate to help achieve security and national reconciliation.

Much of Rwanda's post-genocide security reforms focused on the prosecution of individuals responsible for the genocide, and ensuring that the 'holocaust' will never be repeated. Specifically, the Government of Rwanda sought to enhance the capacity of its justice system to rebuild the country on the basis of the rule of law, meet the public demand for prosecution of the perpetrators, train and professionalize its new police force, and to demobilize thousands of soldiers and reintegrate them into the Rwandan society. Many of the reforms have improved the capacity of the Rwandan security sector. However, significant security concerns remain, such as trafficking of small arms and border skirmishes with FDLR rebels from Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Uganda, on the other hand, has also experienced considerable armed conflict since independence in 1962. Contributing factors to this conflict include: perceptions of political exclusion, social and economic marginalisation, poverty and underdevelopment, and regional and cross-border conflict dynamics. Though not exclusively, these conflicts have in the recent decades occurred primarily in the north of the country, including West Nile and Acholi regions. These regions appeared to be underdeveloped when compared with the rest of the country (Alava, 2002).

Armed violence and insecurity were identified as primary contributors to structural poverty and inequality. The Ugandan Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) highlighted existing commitments to regional agreements on security promotion, including small arms control. The PEAP was purposively designed to increase awareness of the costs of armed violence, as well as of the positive dividends of military and police reforms in relation to enhanced safety of communities. In this regard, a defence review took place in Uganda in 2002. The review was conducted with the aim of creating a better security sector strategic framework and defence policy that was more transparent, efficient and accountable in sustaining the stability of the country.

Besides this holistic and integrated approach and link between SSR and development, the Rwanda and Uganda SSR resided in local ownership, principles of legality, accountability and transparency, and broader understanding of security as state security and individual security (Bendix and Stanley, 2008). In spite of the two governments' commitments towards security and stability in their respective countries, they still experience challenges that obstruct the success of the reforms initiated. Many security challenges are often transnational and cannot be dealt with by national means alone. However, despite most Eastern African countries being part of regional security arrangements, the FDLR and LRA continue to be a serious threat to these two countries as well as to regional stability.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In Rwanda and Uganda, conflicts have destroyed social cohesion and traditions, created and reinforced inequalities, destroyed human capacities and social capital, damaged infrastructures, and killed and displaced large numbers of people. A culture of violence between communities made difficult the establishment or resumption of normal social and economic activities in several parts of the two countries. The biggest challenge confronting them now is achieving effective human security, sustainable development and good governance after many years of conflict and political instability.

Like other African countries, the security SSR implemented in Rwanda and Uganda have not managed to fully meet their security needs. Rwanda started SSR in 1994 after the genocide while Uganda initiated hers from 2000. However, criminality remained prevalent and is attributed to the long-standing and widespread circulation of small arms and light weapons, and continued poverty. Furthermore, despite significant achievements on the socio-economic and political fronts in both countries, the military and police continue to influence political developments which has negative impact on stability.

Without a secure environment that ensures socio-economic progress and political stability, security SSR cannot produce the desired results. Peace, security and development can only take place in an environment where the local security sector is subjected to a rigorous democratization process, putting the security forces in the service of society's safety.

1.3 Objectives

- To establish the SSR that have been achieved so far in Rwanda and Uganda and their relationship with socio-economic development;
- To examine the relationship between SSR, DDR and state stabilization; and
- To identify the challenges faced during implementation of the reforms.

1.4 Literature Review

An emerging literature on SSR has been addressing improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of security sector actors and the need to situate their roles within a framework of democratic governance (Schnabel and Hans, 2011). SSR is a central concept as it links together several fundamental concerns of tadays's international political, economic and social development. It is closely associated with security, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, development, good governance, human rights, state building and democracy (Karim, Gnisci and Wanjiru, 2004). The concept of SSR is complex but is becoming more familiar, understandable and acceptable to political decision makers as well as the larger international political, academic and social circles.

However, security institutions in developing countries have not completly shifted their focus to broader and deeper security dimensions, and towards greater global security interdependence. All this feeds a perception of the ineffectiveness and growing irrelevance of military means for addressing security threats and challenges (Sköns, 2005). It was the

former colonial military forces, together with nationalist armies forged in the struggle for freedom, that were swept into political prominence by the tide of independence. But the immense political skill needed to keep the military under civilian control in these newly independent states was lacking. New civilian rulers often maintained colonial strategies of ethnic-based recruitment, divide and rule and internal deployment to counter domestic political opposition (Decalo, 1976). There is therefore a growing recognition of the need for global action to address these threats and challenges through security sector reforms.

In terms of which institutions are involved, the Human Development Report 2002, has defined the following organisations that are authorized to use force. These are civil management and oversight bodies, justice and law enforcement institutions; and nonstatutory forces. Each of these groups may consist of a number of institutions, actors, agencies and forces depending on indivdual national circumstances or specific historical developments of any given state.

Edmunds (2001) argued that SSR may be defined by its functional scope as a provision of security within the state in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control. This function refers to modern understandings of the concept of security which encompass classical concepts of state security and contemporary notions of social and human security. Considering experiences from different states, SSR may be described as a convenient genaral paradigm of a theoretical analysis of the democratisation process and as a rich instrument for political actions specifically in the following areas:

- Democratisation of the state: may be impossible without a transformation of the sector's institutions and methods of their oversight and control, so that they cannot act in a partisan way in domestic politics.
- Establishment of good governance practices: establishing the legitimacy and supremacy of elected representatives over all military and security institutions. These include representatives accountable to society and functioning in a transparent manner, and with the ability to balance off various vested interests of social and political groups. Such representatives should also be free from corruption and organised crime so as to create affordable security for all citizens.

- Economic development: the basis for which is a stable and politically predictable environment, operating on a transparent state budget and accountable for its implementation.
- Internal and regional conflict prevention: requires a security sector that facilitates effective management of internal tensions and conflicts, provides for security and justice equally to all citizens and social groups and, by being transparent in its doctrine, organisation and arms procurement may act as an institution of confidence building with neighbouring states.
- **Post-conflict recovery:** made possible through demobilisation of combatants and their re-integration into the society through unification of various armed formations into a national security structure; and by elimination of existing light weapons stockpiles and by prevention of privatisation of security services.
- **Professionalisation of armed and security forces:** by clarifying their roles and functions, accepting the rule of law and dominance of democratically elected authorities, and protecting the state and its individual citizens (Edmunds, 2001).

United Nations and African Union Frameworks on SSR

The UN approach to SSR is mentionned in the United Nations Secretary-General's Report entitled 'Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform' (UN, 2008). The report gives principles and standards which guide UN support for national actors in enhancing or re-establishing security and constituting a coherent approach to delivering SSR and assistance. This conceptualization of SSR is based on the need to address the deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional and other structural causes that underline the symptoms of conflict in the face of new and emerging threats.

The report also emphasizes the significance of a comprehensive approach and a coordinated strategy, especially in post-conflict contexts, and how activities undertaken early in a transition process, such as disarmament and demobilization, can have a significant impact

on longer-term peace and security and must therefore be linked to longer-term development processes (McCandless and Karbo, 2011). It acknowledges that a sufficient degree of security is needed to facilitate poverty reduction and economic growth. Basic principles of the UN approach to SSR include national ownership, commitment of involved states and societies, gender sensitivity, coordination of efforts of national and international partners, and monitoring and evaluation to track and maintain progress (Uzoechina, 2014).


The African Union Framework on SSR was finalized in 2012 after wide consultations with member states, civil societies and experts. It was formally adopted by the Assembly of AU Heads of State and Government in January 2013. It represents a major step in addressing the lack of African ownership of current SSR approaches, being an effort to bridge the continuing gap between existing approaches to largely externally-driven SSR and deficits in the delivery and governance of security in many AU member states (African Union Policy Framework, 2013). It is built on the international normative framework established by the United Nations and is also aligned with other AU instruments, including the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2000, the Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 2002 and the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy of 2006. This means that SSR is a long-term program that needs human expertise and financial resources. SSR is a never-ending process that has direct and immediate impact on political power relations. It can be executed only when there is political will to undertake democratic reforms in general (Dennis, 2013).

1.5 Theoretical Framework for SSR

There are many approaches to SSR. International organizations like the OECD carefully define SSR as a process of reforming and developing the entire security and justice sectors to ensure civilian oversight and a focus on human security. The current approach to SSR stands in contrast to the traditional security approach which focuses on expanding the capacity of state security forces for enemy-centric combat. The theory of change explains why and how certain actions produce the desired change in a given context.

In their simplest form, theories of change are expressed in the following form: If we do X (action), then we will produce Y (change/shift towards peace, justice, security) or We believe that by doing X (action) successfully, we will produce Y movement towards a desired goal (Woodrow, 2013).

Current SSR must be seen in the wider context of human security where the desired change is produced in an environment of peace and development. It is therefore difficult to establish a prescriptive set of reforms since they are likely to be wide ranging and affected by other areas of post-war recovery programmes (Gillespie, 2006). Thus, four broad dimensions of the SSR process that give the range of activities required are political, economic, social and institutional.



The Four Dimensions of SSR

1.5.1 Political Dimension

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) makes clear how important the political dimension is in SSR when it states that SSR inherently entails political processes since the objective is for security and justice to be delivered in line with human rights and democratic norms (Sedra, 2010).

The political dimension is crucial because it determines the character of the management of the security sector. However, it is potentially the most difficult especially in states where the military has been deeply involved in politics as it requires that the security sector accepts a loss of autonomy and power (Atsushi Yasutomi and Jan Carmans, 2005). It aims at establishing strong legislative structures over security institutions so that they do not act on their own interests. Policies are made by elected officials in an open and transparent manner. Nevertheless, there is a danger that these legislative changes can just be on paper. In order to be effective, it has to be combined with a political culture that respects the rule of law.

It is also in this dimension that SSR overlaps with wider reforms, particularly in the area of good governance. There is a need to recognise that Members of Parliament must be effective and accountable before they can provide effective oversight of the security sector. To achieve this oversight, the legislature needs to have access to budgets and a good understanding of the security sector (Bush and Givens, 2012).

For donors, the political element of SSR is crucial but also extremely difficult to navigate because it risks treading on sensitive areas of sovereignty. There is the inevitable result of creating winners and losers which cannot be avoided and must be planned for. In addition, it can be difficult for outsiders to fully understand and appreciate the complex networks of relationships that exist between ruling elites and institutions and without that understanding, external stakeholders are unable to fully influence decision-making.

A crucial element of realising the political agenda of SSR is having high level political commitment and understanding of the motivations of SSR supporters (Schreier, 2010). The UN is able to play a considerable role in the political element of SSR because it has sufficient presence and political legitimacy amongst all the actors. The UN has considerable leverage to influence political actors and assist them in conducting a successfull SSR process.

1.5.2 Economic Dimension

The economic dimension of SSR seeks to ensure that resources are used in an efficient manner and are appropriate for the number and size of security institutions relative to the economic capacity of the state. It concerns itself not just with what resources are allocated but also the rationale behind the allocation. There has to be a balance because if the security sector is over- funded, money may have been taken from other departments of the government and if it is underfunded there is the risk that the sector will be unable to provide security to the state and its citizens.

An underfunded security sector also increases the chance of corruption and dissatisfaction with the ruling regime which in turn impacts on human security (Hans and Schnabel, 2012). The UN can provide significant economic support to the security sector due to its ability to raise and mobilise funding. One area that provides more challenges for the UN and most international donors is the military because of the fear that it might be used in building a war instrument. The UN is willing to provide training on issues such as gender or human rights but will not provide funding for weapons.

1.5.3 Social Dimension

The social dimension of SSR links directly with the issue of human security and therefore addresses the need to ensure citizens' physical security. This includes their life, health and property. This goes beyond the role of the military in ensuring the safety of the state. It involves more actors and requires different skills and abilities. The social dimension requires the involvement of citizens and civil society. They must be consulted on their needs for security and they must themselves be vocal in engaging in the security discourse which reinforces local ownership (Alkire, 2003).

Often, there is lack of expertise, capacity and resources within government and society to effectively implement SSR, thus making foreign advisors essential but these advisors must have mentoring skills in order to improve local capacity for SSR. The UN, like any other actor, must tread a fine line between imposing SSR and assisting in it. It is therefore crucial that a comprehensive UN approach to SSR is in place.

1.5.4. Institutional Dimension

Institutional reforms aim at defining the composition of security structures and separation of powers between and among them. These reforms encompass all state institutions that have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens such as the armed forces, police, gendarmerie and paramilitary forces, intelligence and secret services, border and customs guards as well as judicial and penal institutions (Government of Slovakia, 2006). The institutional dimension involves increasing the capacities and professionalism of security actors and can include downsizing, upsizing or reorientation of tasks and objectives. A significant problem in tackling this dimension is that security institutions often have strong characteristics which may be entwined with the nature of society thus creating structural and behavioural barriers to the SSR process (Gordon, 2014).

Changing the behaviour of security institutions can be incredibly difficult. It is common for police forces to be feared by the population because they seek to control rather than protect them. Switching this and winning citizens' trust is a key part of the reform process. It is within this dimension that international donors can assist in making security institutions functionally effective. It is important to improve the effectiveness of security institutions, particularly the police. Effectiveness has to be strengthened in terms of resources, structures and size. The UN does have the capacity to provide assistance in this dimension due to the wide range of resources and institutional knowledge that it has built up, particularly in police reform. Given this potential, it is evident that the UN should have an understanding of SSR and an overarching policy in order to support it in post-conflict states (Greene, 2003).

1.6 Methodology

The primary sources of data for this study were interviews of key personnel from the security sector and civil society, and local authority leaders in Rwanda and Uganda. Interview guides were used to extract the desired information.

Secondary data were obtained from official policy documents from sources such as UN, AU and policy documents from the governments of Rwanda and Uganda as well as studies commissioned by specialized organizations. Desk-top research was conducted and the internet was used to access other publications relevant to the study.

Field visits provided access to raw data and observations of the SSR achievements on the ground. They also enabled the researcher to interact with key persons dealing with SSR in both countries and share their opinions and perceptions on whether and how peace and security had been improved. The respondents were selected on the basis of relevance of their institutions to the issues under investigation.

2.0 DDR and SSR Linkages

Diasrmemnet, Demoblisation and Reintegration (DDR) and SSR are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Working in tandem, they can enable countries emerging from conflict provide for their own security and uphold the rule of law. As such, politically, they rise or fall together.

In any post-conflict setting, proponents of DDR and SSR are required to sensitively balance the expectations and interests of different stakeholders. DDR is described as a process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods (Bryden, 2007). In the same perspective, SSR is motivated by the idea that an ineffective, inefficient and poorly governed security sector constitutes a decisive obstacle to security and development. DDR has a direct impact on the prospects of SSR since disarmament and demobilization (often conducted before SSR is addressed) set the tone for future reforms by establishing the nature and composition of the security sector (OECD, 2007).

Beyond their shared political objectives, DDR and SSR are programmatically linked, as failure of one risks failure of the other. Ex-combatants who are not properly reintegrated into civil society through DDR can complicate and potentially compromise SSR. Ex-combatants who do not successfully transition to civilian life may take up arms again or form criminal gangs, effectively challenging newly-created security institutions and forces that may lack sufficient capacity to control such challenges. As the population thus becomes vulnerable to violence, the state's inability to protect its citizens undermines its legitimacy. Inversely, if DDR succeeds and SSR falters, then people begin to rely on non-state actors such as ethnic or religion-based militias or village self-defense forces for their security (Sean McFate, 2010).

2.1 DDR and SSR in the context of Rwanda and Uganda

The DDR process in the Rwandan case aimed at the full integration of the ex- combatants into the new national army to ensure participation by all competing factions and a voluntary disarmament and demobilization of the others. For this purpose, a Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration agency established in 1997 was part of the Government of Rwanda's strategic response to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its commitments under the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The Government implemented its first stage from 1997 to 2001 with co-financing from various donors through a UNDPadministered Trust Fund and other UN agencies. The second stage was implemented in the period 2002-2008. The third stage was approved by the World Bank Board on August 27, 2009 and became effective in September 2009. Accordingly, a total of 76,686 combatants had so far been demobilized and totally reintegrated by December 2012(Waldorf, 2009)

For Uganda, disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration activities took place from 2000 and have been implemented by national agencies primarily the Amnesty Commission, with support from international agencies including the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), a multi-agency initiative financed by the World Bank and 13 other donors. Previously, the Government of Uganda had established a strategy for demobilization and reintegration through the Amnesty Act. Under this Act, ex-combatants would present themselves to the nearest Army or Police Unit, a Chief, a member of the Executive Committee of a local Government Unit, a magistrate or a religious leader within the locality and renounce involvement in war or armed rebellion. Ex-combatants would be provided with an Amnesty Certificate and entitling them to receive reinsertion and reintegration support. Under these two processes (MDRP and Amnesty Act), former combatants were reintegrated into civilian life.

3.0 Post-genocide Security Situation in Rwanda

The events of 1994 caused a 50% drop in GDP together with widespread loss of life and destruction of property (World Bank,1998). According to Colonel Musemakweli (personal interview on 24 April, 2015), after 1994, Rwanda faced important security challenges. These included continued security threats from former soldiers and militia housed in camps along the border with Zaire (currently the Democratic Republic of Congo); the need to ensure adequate legal process against the 130,000 prisoners suspected of genocide crimes held in Rwandan jails; the need to accommodate over 800,000 returning Rwandan citizens who had left the country between 1959 and 1994; and the final return and reintegration of 1.3 million people to Rwanda from Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Interview with Col. Musemakweli, RPA). In addition, the new government was faced with an economy in a shambles, a civil service that had lost three quarters of its qualified staff, and widespread destruction of social and economic infrastructure. The increased insurgency that followed the influx of returnees continued to pose serious security problems bringing a high level of mistrust between different sections of society.

Another important factor was the destruction of the Rwandan social fabric and social institutions due to mistrust caused by the genocide and changes in the composition of the Rwandese population. Socially and culturally, post-genocide Rwanda presented a totally different picture from the country before the war. The population movements gave rise to a myriad of different sensibilities: between those who stayed in the country between 1994 and 1996 and those who left; between returning exiles from different countries of origin; between French-speaking and English-speaking Rwandese; between those who lost part of their family to the genocide and those whose families were still intact; and between the families of prisoners and those of the rest of society (Fitzgerald and Roper, 2000). Whilst aspects of this diversity can be a source of richness by bringing together experiences from other countries, it posed a great challenge to building national unity. SSR had to adress all these issues through political, socio-economic and institutional reforms to enhance peace and security of the Rwandan people.

3.1 Political Reforms in Rwanda

SSR began in Rwanda with the signing of the Arusha Accord in 1993. The Peace Agreement was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, by the government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), thus ending the three year civil war. The Arusha Accord sought to establish a broad-based transitional government and negotiated points considered necessary for lasting peace including the rule of law, repatriation of refugees and merging of government and rebel armies. The call for reform was echoed in UNSC Resolution 872, which established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in monitoring the security situation (UN, 1993). Following the genocide, the Arusha Accord was still relevant but had to be ajusted to the post-genocide context. The Security Council adjusted UNAMIR's mandate to help achieve security and national reconciliation. The mandate of UNAMIR officially came to an end in 1996 and the Parliament enacted Organic Law No. 8/96 for the organization of prosecutions for offenses constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity (Tully, 2003).

Since 1996, far-reaching political and administrative reforms have been implemented. The reform of territorial administration has created a strong state presence from the central government through the provincial, district and sector administrations down to the cell or village level. The government uses commissions and community-based organisations. The administration to communicate with citizens and community-based organisations. The Rwandan political system has been defined as a "consociational democracy "or "power-sharing consensus democracy (the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) 2014 Rwanda Country Report). RPF leaders appear to justify avoidance of a competitive democratic system by citing the ethnic division of the society that led to the 1994 genocide, and the need to strive for national unity. Decentralization of administrative and political institutions set up grass-roots leadership structures and local governments through elections to empower local communities; launch and sustain unity and national reconciliation; and monitor human rights conditions. These are contained in the national program for strengthening good governance for poverty reduction in Rwanda).

3.2 Socio-economic Reforms

Socio-economic reforms in Rwanda took place in the context of good governance which has been a main objective of the Rwandan Governement. Good governance is not a matter of government only but a situation resulting from multiple relationships in which different actors in the public and private sectors at national and international levels play various roles, sometimes mutually reinforcing and complementary, sometimes conflicting, but always following the same principles and practices that are agreed as constituting good governance. These reforms included liberalization of economic activities via privatization of state enterprises.

So far, the country has achieved considerable economic growth. It has pursued sound fiscal and market policies. The government strengthened the territorial administration. It has also built the capital to support an international service center and to further improve roads and communications networks. The country is now exploiting its natural resources, including hydroelectric power, natural gas and scarce minerals. The modernization of agriculture began in 2007 with the country's Crop Intensification Program and the consolidation of land tenure.

The healthcare system is better organized and the spread of infectious diseases has been checked. The most important step forward has been the substantial reform in secondary and tertiary education and the almost 100% primary school attendance. This could be the basis for producing the high-level human resources needed for the planned modernization of the economy. Another important step is the reduction of population growth through improved reproductive healthcare and family planning education.

3.3 Institutional Reforms

This section assesses the reforms undertaken in various forces and institutions. The different forces can only be efficient and be held accountable if the various institutional tasks are clearly defined. An institutional overlap between domestic public security and external defence increases the danger of intervention by the military in domestic affairs.

3.3.1 Reform of the Rwandan National Police

The Rwanda government has established a system of accoutability in the police by implementing Community Partnership Programs and Community Partnership Committees. This system emphasises the social aspect as opposed to legal action by recognizing informal social control mechanisms in addition to modern policing as an essential component of restoring and maintaining order. At the neighborhood level, tens of thousands of local leaders keep watch over and manage and assist small units of the population. According to Emmanuel Butera (Director of Community Policing), this initiative has succeeded in making citizens participate actively in problem-solving to ensure their own security needs are met. A committee of seven and a local militia, is in charge of about 500-1000 households. Unacceptable behavior is recorded by these local leaders and passed up the hierarchy to the police. These partnerships help to ensure a strong state through social penetration, and also act to relieve the caseload of the police force.

3.3.2 The Professionalisation of the Police

The Police Training School (PTS) is mandated to professionalize the police service through provision of basic training. The PTS offers special training courses, including one in Advanced Internal Techniques. Furthermore, the National Police Agency immediately removes an officer from the force if any form of misconduct is detected on their part to ensure a high standard of professionalism. For example, in January 2010, the Agency dismissed 35 officers in order to maintain a high level of commitment and respect at home and abroad.

3.3.3 Reform of the Justice Sector

Rwanda has one of the highest ratio of prisoners per capita in the world follwing the prosecution of genocide perpetrators. Community service has been introduced as an alternative form of sentencing. Conditions have been improved in overcrowded prisons and prison staffs are increasingly being trained in human rights. Furthermore, the Ministry of the Interior has made progress with regard to improving prison services. Prisons are being moved from cities, and new facilities are being built. In order to improve access to justice for the poor and rural populations, popular courts based on traditional practices called

Abunzi have been established. This system takes care of cases that would have otherwise gone to courts of law. The *Abunzi* courts have jurisdiction over civil disputes of low value and minor criminal cases. They work with voluntary and elected local community mediators. The mediation committees are assisted by centers of justice established in every district to provide legal advice.

In 2002, the Government of Rwanda launched the *Gacaca* system as an alternative judicial model to prosecute genocide pepetrators. Over 250,000 Rwandans served as Gacaca judges at three levels nationwide, and roughly 1.5 million individuals had appeared before these traditional tribunals by the end of 2009. However, Gacaca's ambition is faced by many challenges including lack of legal representation for perpetrators to ensure fairness and credibility of evidence (Hansen, 2010).

3.3.4 Gender Sensitivity

The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) aims to eliminate gender discrimination, and is premised on guaranteeing fundamental human rights to men and women. The convention calls for the protection of women against all forms of violence, gender mainstreaming, and equal and full participation of women in all fields. The participation of women is recognized as a necessary component of complete development of a country, the welfare of the world, and the cause of peace. A highly participatory process is crucial if there is to be an accountable, equitable, effective and transparent security sector that responds to the particular security needs of women, girls, men and boys. The Rwanda National Police has set up dedicated police units, including Women's Desks, in order to ensure that female survivors of violence feel safe while registering complaints. Court statistics indicate a high Gender Desk effectiveness with 1,777 rape cases referred for prosecution by the Rwandan Police in 2006, resulting in 803 convictions.

Rwanda made an important step on gender equality in 2008, when 45 women were elected out of 80 members of parliament. At 56%, this was by far the highest percentage of women MPs in any government in the world. The constitution of Rwanda, adopted in 2003, states that at least 30 per cent of posts in "decision-making organs" must go to women and this can be seen across the country. In elections for district and sector council officials in 2011, women won 43.2 per cent of district and Kigali City advisory posts. Women hold a third of Rwanda's ministerial positions, including foreign affairs, agriculture and health and every police office in Rwanda has a gender desk to take reports on violence against women, as does the national Army (Amadi, 2015).

The representation of women in security institutions in Rwanda is also significant. Since its inception in 2000, the RNP force has embaerked on empowering women. The number of femele police officers has risen to 20% of the total police force of over 10000 police officers. The RNP targets a minimum of 30% of femele police officers as per the government requirement (Rwanda National Gender Statistics Report, 2013).

In peace support operations, Rwanda is currently the third highest contributor of female police officers and the second highest African contributor of female police officers (Kigali Principles on the the Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping).

4.0 Post-liberation Security Needs Assessment in Uganda

The National Resistance Army/ Movement (NRA/M) took over power militarily in 1986. The Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) remnants that were originally from the Northern part of Uganda fled to their home districts and Southern Sudan. They formed the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) which fought the NRA until they entered into a peace deal in 1988. The Holy Spirit Movement led by Alice Auma Lakwena led another fighting force that was defeated in 1999. Since then, the Lord's Resistance Army(LRA) led by Joseph Kony, has been fighting against the government of Yoweri Museveni. In mid-July 2006, the GoU and LRA entered into peace talks in Juba, South Sudan. The persistent hostilities by armed groups in Northern Uganda is mainly due to the failure of the state to properly address the root causes of the war (UK Parliamentary Group Report, 2007). According to this report, the police, army and other security forces still behave like colonial outfits that exhibit non-cooperation with the civilians, enforcing law and order, not in the service of the citizens, but for those in power.

Equally, civil servants primarily seek to serve the interests of the executive rather than the general good of the public. Ironically, they are not servants but masters of the citizens (Okoth-Ogendo, 1996). This authoritarian path inherited from the colonial era has been extended into the post-independence period. Uganda has experienced authoritarian rule of one form to the other. There was civilian authoritarianism under Obote's administration where political tolerance was rare and pluralism was shunned. Criticism of government was criminalized and civil society co-opted.

Another factor that influences political behaviour in Uganda is the structure of the society. Uganda is still largely a peasant society with the population widely dispersed. A predominantly literate populace mostly clustered in towns and other urban settings is generally more likely to be politically conscious than a highly illiterate and sparsely distributed population. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Uganda is a highly heterogeneous society in respect of linguistic, ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. Uganda society is composed of five linguistic groups that include the Bantu, Luo, Nilo-Hamitic, Sudanic and the Kalenjin. These linguistic groups are further sub-divided into sixty-five constitutionally recognized indigenous communities. This factor partly explains the highly ethnicized nature of Uganda's politics and the difficulty in entrenching a democratic and stable society (Lancaster, 2012). These various groups have contributed to the maintenance of identity politics in Uganda in the past and there is still latent identity politics along religious affiliation. This societal fragmentation has also contributed to corruption and nepotism that is increasingly being entrenched. There are other structural factors such as the big gap between the rich and poor, the urban and rural, and the educated and illiterate, which affect political behaviour and undermine democratic progress. Corruption, lack of democracy, poverty and insecurity are the major problems that successive governments have been dealing with since independence (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

4.1 Political Reforms in Uganda

The Uganda government brought together a range of representatives from different political parties and members of different ethnic and religious groups in an effort to overcome the historic divisions that served as the root cause of the endemic conflict. Many prominent Ugandan exiles were invited back to serve the country in advisory positions.

The Constitution was created through an extended process of consultation that lasted over two years, and was formally endorsed in 1995 by an elected National Assembly. Tendencies towards the re-emergence of patrimonial politics have been accompanied by growing demands for the restoration of multi-party democracy.

4.2 Socio-Economic Reforms

From 1986, Uganda made significant progress in addressing poverty and stemming the advance of HIV/AIDS through implementation of conducive socio-economic interventions and putting poverty reduction top on the development agenda. The challenge of short-falls in revenue collection has however led the Government and its development partners to focus attention on the levels of defense spending. An arbitrary ceiling of 2% of GDP was agreed. However, this figure was based neither on a real assessment of Uganda's security needs nor an analysis of the risks to development.

4.3 Institutional Reforms

Institutional SSR in Uganda aimed at the transformation of the traditional security actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that

is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.

4.3.1 SSR in Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF)

The Ugandan military and its external donors first discussed the possibility of a Defense Reform in 2001. At the time, the prevailing climate did not favor strong national ownership of a comprehensive, inclusive, and transparent process for various reasons. First, Uganda was confronting significant military threats, the most serious being in the north, where the Lord's Resistance Army was leading a major insurgency. Second, Uganda was maintaining a military presence inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where it had intervened several years before. Third and last, Uganda's defence reforms were conducted with the assistance of the United Kingdom just after the NRA came to power. At that time, the army, the police and other security agencies were affected by the political turmoil and violence which have highly undermined the safety and security of the Ugandan people as well as the country's overall stability and development.

The SSR started with the army which had the lead role in safeguarding stability. The NRA emerged victorious from the 'bush' war of 1981–86 and needed to be restructured to meet the requirements of an army in the service of a modern state. The aim of the security reforms in the army was to re-assess Uganda's central security interests and to consider how the roles, missions, and capabilities of the armed forces should be adjusted, and to make the UPDF and their supporting structures modern, professional, accountable and efficient. They also had to be affordable within a medium-term economic framework.

Therefore, between 1986 and 2002, important reforms were undertaken to transform the army into a modern, professional and non-partisan security actor. These reforms were undertaken in three important phases:

Phase 1: Development of Policy Framework

The first step entailed a wide-ranging Strategic Security Assessment, examining the various military and non-military security challenges that Uganda was likely to face in the future.

The first output was a Security Policy Framework (SPF) paper, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of different GoU agencies and departments in responding to these problems. The second output was a Defense Policy, identifying the role and mission of the UPDF and outlining a vision for its modernization.

Phase 2: Assessment of Defense Requirements

The second phase involved an analysis of the operational capabilities that the UPDF would require to meet these challenges and the supporting systems and structures needed to ensure effective utilization of these capabilities. The key output was four strategic options specifying the level of human resource, equipment, and training needed to develop them in a particular manner, and the financial implications. These strategic options would provide planners with various alternatives for developing the defense forces depending on the quantity of resources available.

Phase 3: Political Decision

Once the technical analysis was complete, the findings of the Defense Review were submitted to senior military and political leaders for consideration. Their task was to decide on the future structure and capabilities of the UPDF, and to determine the level of public expenditure that the Government of Uganda could devote to the defense sector. The findings of the Defense Review were published in the White Paper on Defense Transformation in June 2004.

Following completion of the Defense Review in June 2004, the Defence Reform Unit (DRU) produced a Defense Corporate Plan which provided a framework for turning Uganda's vision for defense transformation into a practical reform program. This action became an annual routine, reassessing requirements and priorities against resources in a coherent manner to support management decisions for defense.

The main actors in Uganda's Defense Reforms were the Uganda Defense Secretariat; the UK Department for International Development (DfID); the UK Security Sector Development Advisory Team; King's College, London, and Makerere University.

4.3.2 Reforms in Uganda Police

In line with SSR, the vision of the Ugandan Police is to provide an enlightened and motivated police force that is efficient and accountable to the public. Through the reforms underway, five core functions have been envisaged for the Uganda Police: crime management; public order and safety; traffic management; community assistance; and intelligence (www.jlos. go.ug accessed on14 April 2015).

However, the introduction of the multiparty system; the negative image and perception of the police by the general populace; the increasing levels of poverty and social exclusion; the rising population and its impact on crime prevention; and the challenges the police organ is confronted with in the enforcement of law and order; have made it difficult for achievement of the set reform objectives.

The Uganda Police Force (UPF) reform process originated from the realization of the critical issues relevant in transforming the Force into a professional, accountable and credible institution whose values are based on the philosophy and practice of community policing and observance of human rights which would provide a firm foundation in the process of consolidating a peaceful Uganda. The Reform process started in December 2006 and aimed at reinforcing the centrality of UPF in achieving national development and consolidation of democracy based on Article 211 of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda and intended to make the force relevant, professional and democratically accountable. The following specific reforms have been introduced: community policing, which involves different communities in security and crime prevention; mechanisms to evaluate performance and discipline; introduction of a legal department which includes a human rights complaints desk, and management units at the Directorate, department, region, district and station levels.

4.3.3 SSR in Uganda Justice System

According to Steven Kavuma (Uganda Chief Justice), "the Uganda judiciary used to have fewer judges and other judicial officers, fewer facilities and financial resources. The system was substantially slow. Civil and criminal cases used to remain in the court system for many years and the system was highly unpredictable". In the interview, he assured that the Uganda judiciary was currently much more vibrant and forward-looking. Judges were now engaging in discussions on reforms, modernization, rebranding and ideologically positioned to take on responsibilities of contributing to economic, social and political transformation of the society based on the rule of law. The courts are increasingly working toward ensuring the safety of the persons and their property, protecting the rights of all to engage in gainful activities for the overall good of humanity. Statistics show important milestones in judicial service delivery. The number of cases managed to completion by the various courts is at 130,000 cases a year against 45, five years ago (Kavuma, Steven, Uganda Chief Justice, personal interview on 28 April 2015).

More specialized courts have been introduced e.g. anti-corruption court whose establishment has significantly contributed to the fight against corruption in the country by collaborating with other agencies to automate processes in courts to weed out corrupt staffs.

Since 2012, the Ugandan Judiciary has been introducing significant reforms to address judicial problems and better serve the people. These reforms are organized around five main issue-areas:

- Organized filing systems to maximize efficiency and accuracy: about 84% of respondents interviewed in Jinja argued that finding and retrieving files from the archives used to take days but now it takes just a few minutes.
- Electronic case management: cases can move more quickly through the courts. Today, 100% of all new case files are being entered into a digital system in both project courts and people can get help faster.
- Stenographic recorders to create accurate, objective and complete records: replacing hand-written notes helps ensure files are clear and understandable for all parties.
- Workflow improvements for administrative staff to reduce errors and opportunities for corruption: Yorokamu Bamwine, the principal judge of Uganda's High Court, said, "these improvements are strengthening the image of the courts and the trust of the people" (Alividza, 2009).

4.3.4 Women's Participation in Justice and Security Sectors

In general, Uganda has gender disparities in several areas. According to government statistics, 55% of women are illiterate compared to 36 % of men. Although women contribute more than 80% of food production, only 7% percent own land. Official data from the Ugandan government suggest that women contribute about 50% of the country's GDP, yet women and men are not equally distributed across the productive sectors. About 57% of the working population (employed, self-employed and unpaid family workers) is female, but only 2% of the female working population is in administrative, managerial and professional occupations. Only 0.05% of the senior positions in the civil service are held by women (MGCD).

In the Judiciary, the data available shows that the top leadership is male- dominated while women make up the bulk of the lower cadres. The Chief Justice of Uganda is a man while his deputy is a woman. The principal Judge is male and the chief registrar is a woman. Uganda has 6 Judges of the Supreme Court of whom 2(33%) are women; six (6) judges of the Court of Appeal of whom 2 (33%) are women; and 29Judges of the high court, where 9 (24%) are women.

The Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) has a total of 1,566 female soldiers. Data on the corresponding number of male soldiers was withheld with the explanation that disclosure of information on the actual size of the defence force would compromise national security. However, for a few selected ranks, numbers of male and female soldiers were provided for comparison.

According to statistics, Uganda has only 1 woman at the rank of a Colonel compared to 99 men; and two women are at Lieutenant Colonel against 98 men at the same rank. There are three women at the rank of Major versus 97 men; six women Captains compared to 94 men; 2 women and 98 men for Lieutenant rank and 11 women at Second Lieutenant compared to 89 men (Report of the Centre for Women in Governance).

In the police, statistics from the Uganda Police Department show that the police force is composed of 38,001 officers of whom 5,252 (14%) are women. The highest career rank in the Uganda Police Department is that of the Assistant Inspector General of Police. Above that rank are two positions of Inspector General and Deputy Inspector General of Police

which are political appointments. Currently, these two positions are occupied by men. There are twelve officers at the level of Assistant Inspector General of Police two (16%) of whom are female (Uganda Police Headquarters).

5.0 Effectiveness of SSR in Rwanda and Uganda

SSR in Rwanda and Uganda have produced a safer and more secure environment compared to the situation that prevailed before. More positive trends are observed in Rwanda and include: low level of coruption; development of the judiciary from zero to a professional and efficient power within the state accompanied by efforts made to create a relatively fair justice system. A strong political will for women's participation in decision-making processes and increased attention to gender-based violence, including sexual violence, has also cultivated an enabling environment in Rwanda.

In Uganda, the general standards for law enforcement and human rights observation are in place. The constitution states that it shall be the duty of the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces and any other armed force established in Uganda including the Uganda Police Force and the Uganda Prison Services, all intelligence services and the national Security Council, to observe and respect human rights and freedoms in the performance of their functions'. However, both countries have important challenges that need to be addressed for successful security sector reforms.

5.1 Challenges to Rwanda SSR

The challenges to Rwanda's SSR may be grouped under four broad categories. These are small arms trafficking, the volatile situation in the DRC, anti-democratic tendencies such as authoritarianism and lack of leadership alternation in the form of extension of presidential term limits, and socio-economic inequalities. These are discussed below.

Small arms trafficking: political instability in neighboring countries, in addition to porous borders and unregulated trade, mean that there are a lot of unregulated weapons circulating in Rwanda. These weapons have enabled armed robberies as well as a series of grenade attacks.

The situation in the DRC: the presence of Hutu militias and former genocide perpetrators in the eastern DRC require a strong military presence from Rwanda, putting a strain on the country's military. Allegations of RDF involvement in the conflict in the DRC have also created problems for the Government of Rwanda.

Anti-democratic tendencies: the government of Rwanda has been widely criticized for engaging in authoritarian practices. According to civil society activists, the military and police officials are often involved in threatening or imprisoning journalists who criticize the government or who publish proof of government mismanagement or corruption. Such problems threaten the legitimacy of the security sector.

Related to anti-democratic tendencies is lack of democratic alternation. Despite its persistent 8% economic growth, Rwanda's level of democracy is ranked 132 out of 167 countries in the 2012 Economic Intelligence Unit Democracy Index Report. Extending term limits in elective positions engenders corruption, the main cause of public distrust in democratic institutions, and a significant obstacle to economic development in the country. With term limits, transitions take place as a natural course of events in a democratic system and politics ceases to be viewed as a zero-sum game which constitutes a major source of instability and insecurity.

Socio-economic inequalities: according to civil society respondents, evidence shows that inequalities especially in land distribution have grown rapidly since 1994. After the genocide, new groups entered the struggle for land in Rwanda. The pressure on land increased while the pre-existing inequalities in land access played an important factor during the genocide. The current agricultural policies are considered to be beneficial to some groups in society than others, which is not healthy in a fragmented society and may lead to tensions.

5.2. Challenges to Uganda's SSR

According to respondents from the civi society, the challenges to SSR in Uganda are persistent and endemic corruption, lack of collaboration with the civil society, and lack of debate and dialogue between the government and the opposition and other non-state security agencies involved in the management of security.

Endemic corruption: Uganda has a multi-agency approach to combatting corruption in government institutions. However, the different forms of corruption in Uganda include bribery, extortion, illegal use of public assets for private gain, over-invoicing and under-invoicing, payment of salaries to non-existent (ghost) workers, fraud and embezzlement

of national funds, nepotism and political patronge. Again according to interviewees, the Defence People's Forces Act does not prohibit any form of corruption within the Defence Forces like in all other Ugandan ministries. Internal conflicts and bad politics have also undermined provision of services to rural areas. Areas that have endured conflict, mainly in northern Uganda and parts of the east, have received less development attention because the government has been preoccupied with ending the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency for many years (International Defence and Security Programme, Uganda 2013).

Lack of collaboration with civil society: in Uganda, the civil society perceives the security sector as secretive and a representation of the government while in turn the civil society is regarded as representing interests outside those of the country. The relationship between government and civil society is characterized by mutual distrust, misunderstanding and suspicion which undermine the ownership of SSR.

Lack of political debate and dialogue: according to respondents from the civil society, the government of Uganda appeared to demonstrate commitment to promote a vibrant multiparty system especially after completing its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2008. However, the government did not show this commitment when it came to discussing issues regarding the legal framework for the Electoral Commision with the Opposition. Furthermore, the dynamics of diversity and pluralism also remain a challenge to Uganda's political system.

Politicization of the army and police: Uganda has a history of military-led coups and several post-independence presidents have had to depend on creating a strong support base in the defence forces in order to survive in office. Despite a return to multiparty politics in 2005, military and police forces continue to exert influence on political developments. For example, the Army Council continues to choose 10 military officers to represent the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) in Parliament, the justification being that the army should be involved in the country's political process to assure stability.

Multiple para-military agencies: Uganda has many paramilitary groups some of which are suspected to belong to individual politicians and key public figures. Whereas the constitution mandates the UPDF and UPF to be the only security groups, and the laws establishing the two institutions give them power to initiate other paramilitary groups, similar paramilitary

outfits exist outside the mandate of the law and constitute a challenge to security sector reform. Such groups pay allegiance to personalities within UPDF, UPF and other private individuals. While the formal security institutions concentrate on fighting crime, some paramilitary groups gravely violate the rights of the people. According to a respondent, this greatly undermines the independence of the UPF and its ability to deal with public safety and security.

Conclusion

SSR is increasingly put forward as a solution by a broad spectrum of African states facing security challenges. SSR in Rwanda and Uganda have created a secure and safe environment.

The civil war and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda have led to a total beakdown of institutions and infrasturctures, with serious consequences for law, order and security. The SSR implemented so far have improved the capacity of the Rwandan security institutions. However, significant security challenges remain such as small arms trafficking, and border skirmishes with FDLR rebels from Eastern DRC.

In Uganda, conflicts have in recent decades occurred primarily in the north of the country, including the West Nile and Acholi regions. These regions appear to be underdeveloped, compared with the rest of the country. Armed violence and insecurity were identified as primary contributors to structural poverty and inequality. Despite the persistent high level of corruption and political challenges, SSR was conducted with the aim of creating a better security sector strategic framework and defence policy that is more transparent, efficient and accountable to sustain development and stability of the country. Despite the progress achieved on several fronts, the Uganda police force remains wanting especially in relation to the way it deals with divergent opinions from the opposition.

For Rwanda and Uganda, as well as many other African countries, the lack of democratic alternation erodes the balance of power and weakens the authority of autonomous legislatures, independent judiciaries, neutral electoral authorities, and competitive political parties. Forays into a third term and beyond distract leaders from implementing important policies, thus consolidating authoritarianism and contributing to political polarization.

Recommendations

Rwanda Should:

- Continue to mitigate conflict and promote reconciliation by increasing access to justice, encouraging young people from different ethnic groups to participate in development of their communities, and improving livelihoods as a tool to reduce the potential for conflict and promote peaceful resolutions.
- Enhance civilian control. Civilian control is critical to the democratic control and governance of the security sector. This will bestow accountability upon the security forces. Civilian and democratic control cannot be effective without political alternation in political leadership. Term limits are needed to provide an important check on the concentration of power, strengthen democracy, and ensure long-term peace, security and stability.
- Increase socio-economic equality. Socio-economic equality has enormous importance for the future of Rwanda. The country would benefit greatly if social inequalities and absolute poverty were eradicated.

Uganda needs to:

- Enhance public confidence in security forces. Public confidence in the Ugandan security forces, especially the police, has been eroded due to corruption and impunity, excessive use of force or brutality, and disregard for and abuse of human rights.
- Increase salaries, training and equipments for Uganda Police. Some of the UPF interviewed stated that they continued to be constrained by limited resources, including low pay and lack of equipment and training. They argued that this situation exposed them to corrupt behavior. The police are considered as the most corrupt government unit whose officers are paid low wages and salaries, thus encouraging corruption in the outfit. Even with a recent increase of basic pay for the lowest police rank to 70 US dollars a month, it is hardly adequate for the necessities of an average family.
- Increase the participation of women in Uganda's security forces. Women are poorly represented in key departments of the different security organs which also affects the quality of security work.

International Partners need to:

- Increase commitment in support of SSR based on local demand. This implies a willingness to provide support to needs identified by local stakeholders at the individual, sub- national and national levels. This also implies a willingness to help develop a reform-friendly environment by engaging in dialogue with national authorities, and by helping civil society in its various manifestations to articulate needs and propose constructive approaches.
- (UN and international donors) have a comprehensive plan for more technical and financial support to SSR activities in East Africa to enhance effectiveness and accountability of security institutions. New security dynamics in East Africa have challenged the validity of conventional approaches to security and reinforced the relevance of security sector Reform.

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