



The International Peace Support Training Centre  
Nairobi, Kenya

# AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?



OCCASIONAL PAPER  
SERIES 4, N<sup>o</sup>4

LT. COL. DONATIEN NDUWIMANA



# AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?

OCCASIONAL PAPER  
**SERIES 4, N°4**

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**IPSTC Peace and Security Research Department**

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## Foreword

The International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) has made considerable contribution in research and training on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. The centre is a training and research institution focusing on capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the African Peace and Security Architecture and has developed to be the regional center for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. It addresses the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated Peace Support Operations through exposing actors to the multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research conducted covers a broad spectrum ranging from conflict prevention, management, and post conflict reconstruction.

The Peace and Security Research Department (PSRD) of the IPSTC presents Occasional Paper Series 4 of (2013) on various themes on peace and conflict situation in Eastern Africa. IPSTC produced seven Occasional Papers in 2013. Five of them focused on Somalia while the others dealt with drivers of conflict and integration of child soldiers in eastern DRC. ***AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?*** has explored the contribution of AMISOM to peace and security stabilization in Somalia.

These papers provide insight into pertinent peace and security issues in the region that are useful to policy makers. These publications also provide significant contribution to the security debate and praxis in the region. The research products from IPSTC have been developed by researchers from Kenya, Burundi and Uganda and will inform the design of training modules at IPSTC.

This Occasional Paper is an important contribution to the vision and mission of IPSTC. The research and publication of this Occasional Paper has been made possible by the support of the Government of Japan through UNDP and the European Union.

**Brig. Robert Kabage**  
**Director, IPSTC**

## International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC)

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is an international center of excellence in peace support operations training and research focusing on capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the African Peace and Security Architecture. IPSTC is the regional training center for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. It addresses the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated Peace Support Operations through exposing actors to the multi-dimensional nature of these operations.

The Research Department of the IPSTC undertakes research for two main purposes: a) the design of training curricula to support peace operations, and b) to contribute to the debate towards the enhancement of regional peace and security.

The Peace and Security Research Department (PSRD) develops annual Occasional Papers and issue briefs covering diverse themes from the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. The 2013 Occasional Papers cover diverse topics in regional peace and security including the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia. PSRD's Research Agenda is traditionally comprehensive and addresses issues related to a variety of regional issues. The research conducted covers a broad spectrum of peace and security concerns ranging from conflict prevention, management, and post conflict reconstruction. IPSTC has made considerable contribution in research and training on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.

The Target audiences for our publications are the decision makers in key peace and security institutions in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. These include policy makers in national security sector such as internal security, defence, judiciary and parliament and regional institutions dealing with conflict prevention and management such as East African Community (EAC), Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), International Conference of the Great Lakes region (ICGLR), Regional Center for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), African Union, Embassies of key development partners with special interests in regional peace and security issues and the United Nations agencies in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.

Occasional Papers are an important contribution to the vision and mission of IPSTC. The research and publication of this Occasional Paper has been made possible by the support of the Government of Japan through UNDP and the European Union.

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## Abbreviations

|               |   |
|---------------|---|
| <b>AIAI</b>   | Ittihad al-Islamiya/Islamic Unity                           |
| <b>AMISOM</b> | African Union Mission in Somalia                            |
| <b>ARPCT</b>  | Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism |
| <b>DRC</b>    | Democratic Republic of Congo                                |
| <b>EU</b>     | European Union  |
| <b>ICRC</b>   | International Committee of the Red Cross                    |
| <b>IDP</b>    | Internally Displaced Person                                 |
| <b>IGAD</b>   | Intergovernmental Authority for Development                 |
| <b>IGO</b>    | International Governmental Organization                     |
| <b>NATO</b>   | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                          |
| <b>NGO</b>    | Non-governmental Organization                               |
| <b>PRIØ</b>   | Peace Research Institute in Oslo                            |
| <b>PSC</b>    | Protracted Social Conflict                                  |
| <b>SNM</b>    | Somali National Movement                                    |
| <b>SPM</b>    | Somali Patriotic Movement                                   |
| <b>SRSP</b>   | Somalia Revolutionary Socialist Party                       |
| <b>SSDF</b>   | Somali Salvation Democratic Front                           |
| <b>TFG</b>    | Transitional Federal Government (of Somalia)                |
| <b>TNG</b>    | Transitional National Government (of Somalia)               |
| <b>UCDP</b>   | Uppsala Conflict Data Program                               |
| <b>UIC</b>    | Union of Islamic Courts                                     |
| <b>UN</b>     | United Nations  |
| <b>UNDP</b>   | United Nations Development Program                          |
| <b>UNITAF</b> | Unified Task Force (for Somalia)                            |
| <b>UNSOM</b>  | United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia                |
| <b>USA</b>    | United States of America                                    |
| <b>USC</b>    | United Somali Congress                                      |
| <b>USSR</b>   | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics                         |

## Abstract

Since the civil strife in 1991, numerous peace initiatives have been made in attempts to stabilize Somalia. These initiatives faced various challenges and their success was limited. However, with the advent of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007, the security landscape has changed significantly and the foundations for restoring peace in the country have progressively improved. Indeed, AMISOM has lend credence to the notion, envisaged by the architects of the Africa Union (AU) in 2002, that ‘Africa should solve African Problems’. Despite this success, the fact remains that authorities in Somalia still have some way to go before they can secure and restore sustainable peace in the country.

**Keywords:** AMISOM, al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Background

After their independence beginning in the 1950s and in response to the various challenges contributing to insecurity in Africa, the newly independent African states formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963. Following the Sirte Declaration on 9 September 1999, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was transformed into the African Union (AU) in 2002. The AU's objectives were more comprehensive and markedly different from those of the OAU. Based on its vision at the time of formation, the OAU had served its mission well but was due for replacement by a structure that could respond more robustly to the emerging needs of the continent.<sup>1</sup>

At its formation, the AU instituted a comprehensive peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement mechanism designed to contribute towards effective conflict prevention, management and resolution. The mechanism is institutionalized within the framework of the AU Constitutive Act and its Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

Following the unsuccessful interventions by the UN in Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994), many Western countries exhibited fatigue and reduced their involvement in peace initiatives on the continent. Indeed, these countries were been accused of abandoning Africa to its own fate (Adebayo, 2008:131). The so-called “Africa fatigue” by the Western countries, both motivated and necessitated the continent's leaders to step-up and devise ‘African solutions to African problems’.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, it is in this context that the African Union (AU) has mandated a range of peacekeeping missions, among them, AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), to respond to the complex conflicts that have engulfed the continent.

Since 2007, AMISOM has been trying to stabilize Somalia against formidable odds – such as presence of transnational terrorists, lack of

<sup>1</sup> Otemuyiwa Bamidele, The history and development of the African Union, Panorama magazine, 2003

<sup>2</sup> Mark Malan, Whither Peacekeeping in Africa, Institute for Security Studies, 1999

adequate personnel and equipments. AMISOM is a peace-enforcement mission that by October 2013 had troops drawn from Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Sierra Leone and Djibouti. To date, AMISOM has had significant, albeit limited, achievements in addressing insecurity in Somalia. Thus far, AMISOM has effectively evicted the militant and insurgent Al-Shabaab, credited with most of the insecurity in Somalia, from most major urban centers in southern Somalia, including the capital city Mogadishu. The Somali National Army (SNA), with the support of AMISOM, captured Mogadishu on 9 December 2012. Other liberated areas include Baidoa situated in South-Central Somalia, and the port cities of Marka and Kismayo.

After operating for 21 years without a central government and following the stabilizing of the security situation, Somalia saw the launch of a new interim Constitution, the inauguration of a new Federal Parliament, and the swearing in of Mr Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President of the Federal Republic of Somalia on September 10, 2012. These political and security developments are considered as milestones in the stabilization of the country and have created hope that they herald the beginning of a broader political process that will involve and embrace all the Somali population. Indeed, for the first time in a generation, a possible safe, secure and prosperous Somalia, at peace with itself and its neighbours, seems more like a reasonable aspiration than a distant dream.<sup>3</sup>

This study contains seven sections. Section one gives an overview of the layout of the study. Section two presents the conceptual framework and the literature review. Section three presents the nature of the conflict, the background and achievements of AMISOM. Section four presents the factors that inform the AMISOM ability to liberate areas occupied by the al-Shabaab. Section five identifies the contributions of different components of the AMISOM. Section six discusses the challenges and opportunities open to AMISOM in its efforts to deliver on its mandate. Finally, chapter seven gives the conclusions of the study and proffers recommendations on the way forward for AMISOM.

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3 Mahiga, A, In a 'year-end', Letter to the People of Somalia and the International Community, Mogadishu, 09 March, 2012

## 1.2 Definition of key words

### AMISOM

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is by definition, an active regional peacekeeping (in practice it is a peace enforcement) mission mandated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. The AMISOM is mandated to support governmental structures, implement a national security plan, support the Somali Security Forces, and assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.<sup>4</sup> As part of its duties, AMISOM also supports the Federal Government of Somalia's Forces in their battle against the al-Shabaab militants. The AMISOM was established by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 and on 21 February 2007 the United Nations Security Council approved the mission's mandate.<sup>5</sup>

### Al-Shabaab

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM) - Youth Movement or Movement of Striving Youth, more commonly known as al-Shabaab (The Youth or The Boys), is a Somalia-based militant Islamist group with ties to the al-Qaeda that gave it formal recognition in 2012. Al-Shabaab controls significant parts of the southern part of Somalia, where it imposes its own strict form of the Sharia law. As at May, 2011, the al-Shabaab's troop strength was estimated at 14, 426 militants. Al-Shabaab is designated a terrorist organization by several Western governments and security services.<sup>6</sup>

In February 2012, al-Shabaab leaders quarrelled with their mentor, Al-Qaeda over its *modus operandi*, a quarrel that saw a reduction of support by al-Qaeda, therefore Al-Shabaab quickly lost some of the ground it previously held. Al-Shabaab is an offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that splintered into several smaller factions after its defeat in 2006 by the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its Ethiopian military allies. Al-Shabaab considers itself as waging jihad against the enemies of Islam.

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4 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744 (2007), Adopted by the Security Council at its 5633rd meeting, on 20 February, 2007

5 Ibid

6 Dahir Alasaow. "Somalia: Report on Al-Shabaab military force", Sunatimes, January,14 ,2012

The al-Shabaab is engaged in combat against the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).

## **Al-Qaeda**

Al-Qaeda is a global militant Islamist organization founded by the late Osama bin Laden in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1988. Its origin is traced to the Soviet War in Afghanistan. The Al-Qaeda operates as a network consisting of a multinational, stateless army and a radical Sunni Muslim movement calling for global Jihad and a strict interpretation of the sharia law. The Al Qaeda is designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations Security Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and various other countries. Al-Qaeda has carried out numerous brutal attacks on non-Sunni Muslims, non-Muslims, and other targets in the world that it considers as **Kafir**.<sup>7</sup>

## **1.3 Statement of the Problem**

The continued threat of the al-Shabaab and its ability to mount deadly attacks, albeit sporadic, not only on the Somali population but also in neighbouring countries greatly undermines the commitment of the African Union to enhance peace and security on the continent. Despite the achievements clocked by AMISOM, a lot more still needs to be done in defeating and completely eradicating all threats to peace and security in Somalia.

## **Objectives of the study**

The objective of the research study are conceived as:

- a) Evaluate the success of AMISOM operations;
- b) Identify challenges that hinder AMISOM from achieving its mandate; and,
- c) Examine opportunities for AMISOM to enhance peace and security stabilization in Somalia

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<sup>7</sup> Blanchard, C M, Al Qaeda, Statements and Evolving Ideology, Congressional Research Service Report on July 9, 2007  
**Kafir:** is a denigrating Arabic term used in an Islamic doctrinal sense, usually translated as unbeliever, disbeliever, or infidel. The term refers to a person who rejects God in Islam or who hides, denies, or covers the "Islamic version of truth." The practise of declaring another Muslim as a kafir is takfir.



## 1.4 Scope and Methodology

Both primary and secondary data were used in this research. Official policy documents from the government of Somalia, United Nations reports and specialized organizations constituted secondary data. For the primary data, interviews were conducted in Somalia with AMISOM leaders and the police commissioner of Mogadishu. Other primary data was obtained from interviews with the different agencies working with AMISOM including: UNSOM, UNMAS as well as other international partners working in Somalia. Field research was limited to Mogadishu due to the prevailing security challenges. We couldn't get officials from the Government and the Special Representative of Africa Union.

## 2. Conceptual framework

Peacekeeping by the United Nations has evolved into a complex global undertaking. Peacekeeping operations are anchored on four main theories that can guide policy makers and practitioners in understanding the concept of peacekeeping. In their book “Understanding Peacekeeping, Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin clearly captures the distinction of the four theories of peacekeeping - liberal peace theory, global cultural theory, cosmopolitanism and critical theory.

### 2.1 Theories of Peacekeeping

#### 2.1.1 Liberal Theory

This theory argues that the best strategy to ensure security and to build durable peace is to support the advancement of democracy.<sup>8</sup> In the liberal theory, peace operations aim to build stable peace by enabling the creation of democratic societies and liberal free market economies. Although liberal theory is the dominant theory that underpins contemporary peace operations, its application remains controversial. China and many states in the global South, for example, argue that peace operations should be limited to assisting states and other actors to resolve their differences and should not be used to impose a particular ideology.<sup>9</sup>

#### 2.1.2 Global Culture and Peace Operations

Roland Paris (2003) argues that in the international normative environment, a ‘global culture’ comprises formal and informal social rules that guide international life and shapes the design of peace operations in fundamental ways. The design and conduct of peacekeeping missions reflect not only the interests of the key parties and the perceived lessons of previous operations, but also the prevailing norms of global culture, which legitimize certain kinds of peacekeeping policies and delegitimize others. Global culture helps determine the sorts of activities that are considered appropriate for peace

<sup>8</sup> ‘State of the Union Address’, US President Bill Clinton, New York Times, 26, January, 1994

<sup>9</sup> Xiao Yang, S: China in UN Security Council decision –making on Iraq, Conflicting Understandings, Competing preferences, Routledge 2 Park Square, New York, 2013

operations and rules out others, irrespective of whether or not they actually aid progression towards peace. Thus, despite its relatively good post-1945 track record, international trusteeship has been disqualified as a policy tool because of its putatively neo-colonial overtones.<sup>10</sup>

### **2.1.3 Cosmopolitanism**

An emerging cosmopolitan approach insists that the maintenance of truly stable international peace and security requires a particular way of understanding, organizing and conducting peace operations. Cosmopolitanism is regarded as a political alternative to nationalism, and cosmopolitan values are perceived to stand in opposition to identity politics and other exclusive ideologies. Within the international community, cosmopolitanism has gained interest as an alternative approach to deal with many of the security threats of the contemporary world that cannot be solved within national borders, such as international terrorism, transnational crime, and the proliferation of small arms, light weapons and weapons of mass destruction, human rights violations and violent conflicts.<sup>11</sup>

Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham have called for the development of cosmopolitan peace operations where the operations should be conducted by a standing UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) comprising specially trained military and civilian personnel capable of protecting civilians from harm and implementing the full range of the UN human security agenda.<sup>12</sup>

### **2.1.4 Critical Theory**

Critical theory starts from the presumption that theory is never politically neutral. Instead, it 'is always for someone and for some purpose'. All theories have a perspective (Cox 1981: 128). The purpose of critical theory is human emancipation, understood as the freeing of people 'from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others' (Booth 2007:112). Critical theorists seek to give voice to the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless' (Said 1994:84). They share with feminists

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10 Bellamy A.J. and Williams P.: Understanding peacekeeping, Polity press, 65 Bridge Street, UK, 2010

11 Bjorkdahl A., Peace Operations and the Promotion of Cosmopolitanism, Lund university, Sweden, 2005

12 Woodhouse T & Ramsbotham O: Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2011

and anthropologists the view that it is important to seek out and illuminate the perspectives, concerns and experiences of those whose voices are often unheard such as, marginalized groups, ordinary citizens, women and children. Turning our attention to these groups helps shed light both on the things that make people vulnerable to local violence, domestic violence, rape, poverty, inadequate healthcare, and on under-explored avenues for human emancipation.<sup>13</sup>

It can be argued that cosmopolitanism is more inclusive in terms of tasks and capacity of peacekeeping missions in complex security situations like Somalia. Cosmopolitanism aligns with the contemporary complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions where effective peacekeeping requires competent, well-trained and well-equipped troops in sufficient numbers to maintain a secure environment in which peace-building efforts can move forward.<sup>14</sup>

## 2.2 Literature review

Since its inception in 2007, AMISOM has come under scrutiny by different scholars and institutions. As expected, the opinion on performance of AMISOM has been varied. On one hand, there are those who opine that the mission has made significant contributions in stabilizing the country; on the other hand, there are those who offer criticism of the mission.

In June 2013, Cecilia Hull Wiklund in a report titled ‘The Role of the African Union Mission in Somalia: AMISOM – Peacekeeping Success or Peacekeeping in Regress?’ argues that AMISOM, sharing most of the challenges of other AU missions, lack the military resources, capacity and funding, as well as the institutional capacity to manage its operations. She concludes that these factors had prevented AMISOM from fulfilling its mandate and, as a result, the mission had done little to contribute to the overall security situation in Somalia, other than securing the Airport, the presidential palace and the road in between the two.

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13 Bellamy A.J and Williams P : Op cit

14 Durch, W. J. Victoria K. Holt, C. Earle, R, Moira. S, K: The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations, Washington DC, 2003

In his 2012 writing titled, Somalia: ‘The light at the end of the tunnel?’, Christian Manahl, the former UN Secretary General’s Deputy Special Representative for Somalia and a political advisor to the European Union, argues that the entry of AMISOM and the end of the transition in Somalia ushered in a new political era, bringing hope for a lasting stabilization of the southern part of the country, which has been beset by a vicious circle of poverty, clan rivalries, and sectarian violence. He goes further to state that, the new Federal government would require substantial and sustained international assistance to tackle the challenges ahead and to succeed in its endeavour to bring peace, reconciliation, and effective administration back to the country. He concludes by proposing that the international community should review its institutional architecture in support of Somalia and quickly adapt it to the new and evolving realities on the ground.

More recently in June 2013, a report by the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the situation in Somalia stated that the overall security situation in Somalia continues to improve positively. The report points out that the Somali people and leaders must capitalize on the security gains made by AMISOM, the Somali security forces and their allies, to entrench the course of peace and prosperity. They must seize this opportune moment to bring to an end political wrangling, which can only complicate the process of stabilizing Somalia.

*‘I urge the Somali leaders to demonstrate the required maturity and goodwill as their country grapples with the challenges of this new page in their history. I welcome the FGS’s initiatives to engage regional authorities through outreach and dialogue, to foster national reconciliation and unity, as well as the efforts to rebuild the armed forces and integrate the militias.’<sup>15</sup>*

<sup>15</sup> Peace and Security Council 379th Meeting, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, 13 June 2013

### 3. Nature of the conflict, origins and mandate

Somalia has not had a central government since 1991 when civil strife broke after the late President, Said Barre was deposed. The subsequent insecurity in the country has been catastrophic with immeasurable negative impact on the Somali population. There have been many efforts, both internal and external aimed at stabilizing the country. For example, there have been a total of seventeen conferences held in different places at different times, but these, among other initiatives, did not have any substantive impact on resolving the conflict in the country. Fortunately, the landscape has progressively changed since AMISOM intervention in 2007. The following sections will address the nature of the conflict and the origins of AMISOM.

#### 3.1 Nature of the conflict

Compared to many other African countries, Somalia is a unique country in that it has a fairly homogeneous population. The Somalis population is mainly Muslim Sunni, and enjoy the same culture and language. Indeed, the population can be considered to belong to a single tribe with only differences in clans and sub-clans.

To a large extent, the violence in Somalia can be attributed to a proliferation of structured violence that entail complex and interrelated political, social, and economic drivers.<sup>16</sup> John Galtung first introduced the concept of structural violence in 1976. The concept explains effect of inequalities in a society as a result of divergences in social, political and economic factors. These factors create disparities between different groups of people in society and as a consequence, indirect or structural violence is manifested.

An important feature of the Somalia conflict has been the emergence of a variety of Islamist movements seeking to establish an Islamic state in Somalia and at the same time pursue a regional or global agenda<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> Reyhner L & Paffenholz, T: Peace building, a field guide, Lynne Rinner Publishers, Colorado, 2001

<sup>17</sup> Bradbury, M and Healy, S., Endless war: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict, International contact Group ,2010

## 3.2 Origins of AMISOM

The origin of AMISOM can be traced to the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia IGASOM, a mission that was designed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 2005. The IGASOM was unable to deploy successfully mainly due to lack of funding and challenges with the neutrality of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) given that most of the potential TCCs were Somalia's immediate neighbours. IGASOM was also seen as US backed western means to curb the growth of Islamic movement. These setbacks led the AU to embark on a new initiative and the result was the birth and deployment of AMISOM's on January 19, 2007.<sup>18</sup>

The first troops deployed by AMISOM were drawn from Uganda that was later joined by a contingent from Burundi. AMISOM has gradually increased its troop complement and by October 2013 the troop strength stood at approximately 18,000 with uniformed personnel drawn from Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Uganda.<sup>19</sup>

However, the mission continues to face challenges in defeating and eradicating al-Shabaab completely and restoring peace and security in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has used the presence of non-Somali troops in Somalia to create disaffection among Somali population and in effect gain support as well as recruit followers among sections of the population. This phenomenon including the fact that A-Shabaab has also been bolstered by a foreign jihadi contingent among its ranks and whose motivation might be different from that of the Somali population will continue to pose a serious challenge to the success of the AMISOM.<sup>20</sup>

## 3.3 The Mandate of AMISOM

A possible approach of analysing the success of AMISOM is an incisive interrogation of its Mandate; in other words the objectives for which the mission was established. Since its deployment in 2007, the mandate of

18 Shinn D,H: Somalia: Origin, Development and Future of AMISOM, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, October 13,2013

19 United Nations Security Letter dated 23 March 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

20 Tariku A. Kahssay, Keeping the Peace: Intervention and Security Challenges in Africa. The Case of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), The Hague, the Netherlands, Nov, 2009

AMISOM has changed with the current one being outlined in an African Union Peace and Security Council Communiqué and in a UN Security Council Resolution 2124. AMISOM is authorized to take all necessary measures as appropriate to carry out its mandate. Among others, the mandate of AMISOM include: supporting the Somali government and its institutions in their efforts to stabilize the country, advancing the process of dialogue and reconciliation, facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance, and creating conditions for long-term stability, reconstruction and development in Somalia.<sup>21</sup> In order to fulfil these objectives, AMISOM assumes the following overarching tasks:

- a) Supporting dialogue and reconciliation, working with key stakeholders;
- b) Providing, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions and their key infrastructure in order to enable them to carry out their functions;
- c) Assisting in the implementation of the National Security and stabilization Plan, particularly the re-establishment and training of Somali security forces;
- d) Providing, within their capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts;
- e) Monitoring, in areas of deployment, the security situation;
- f) Facilitating, as may be required and within their capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of internally displaced persons; and,
- g) Protecting its own personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defence.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> AMISOM Mandate, Resolution 2073 , Adopted by the Security Council at its 6854th Meeting, on 7 November 2012

<sup>22</sup> International Crisis Group, Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support, Africa Report No170, 21, February, 2011



## 4. Evaluation of AMISOM Performance

Undoubtedly, the security situation in Somalia has significantly changed since the inception of AMISOM. While the entire country has not been liberated yet and insecurity remains a great concern in many areas in Somalia; what had been achieved by AMISOM has begun to lay strong foundations for the restoration of peace and security. For example, the improved security situation has enabled the country to engage in democratic governance. A first step has been the move from a transitional government to an elected central government. This was the first election to be held inside the country after nearly 21 years. In addition, local administration structures in parts of the country, particularly in areas liberated from al - Shabaab, by the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF) with the support of AMISOM, have been established.

As it has been discussed on the preceding sections, despite these successes, there still remain concerns among the government of Somali, its population and humanitarian agencies over the prevailing insecurity in the country. Top of this concern is the inadequate response to the humanitarian needs in the country. Lack of adequate response can in part be attributed to restrictions of access to certain parts of the country as well as gaps in the required funding levels.<sup>23</sup> In sum, although the recent security and political gains are noteworthy, much more remains to be done to ensure that the population is secure and that they can go about their business of rebuilding the country in peace.<sup>24</sup>

### 4.1 Specific Contributions by Components

The three components of AMISOM – military, police and the civilian, have achieved commendable progress in fulfilling their mandated tasks.

#### 4.1.1 The Military Component

Since 2009, the military component has supported the training conducted by the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM) of 4,500 soldiers

23 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia during Peace and Security Council 379th Meeting

24 Wiklund C,H: The Role of the African Union Mission in Somalia, Freedom For Information Report N : FOI-R-3687-SE, June, 2013

of the SNA in Uganda. The bulk of troops trained so far are mainly from the rank and file, thus leaving gaps in junior and middle leadership positions and resulting in a critical vacuum in terms of command and control of the SNA. In order to fill these gaps, AMISOM has begun working with the FGS and other partners to undertake the training of a new corps of junior officers to assume Platoon and Company command positions in the SNSF. Accordingly, following weeks of initial training, on 15 April 2013, 96 junior officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) completed a platoon Commander and Senior NCOs training course run by AMISOM at the newly refurbished Jazeera Training Camp in Mogadishu.<sup>25</sup>

However, with current force strength, and without critical multipliers and enablers such as a guard force and air assets, AMISOM will be constrained in its ability to expand its area of operations. It's good that the Security Council has extended the mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to 31 October 2014. The UN requested the African Union to increase the troop strength of that regional peacekeeping body from 17,731 to a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel as part of overall efforts to combat the increasingly asymmetrical tactics of al-Shabaab rebels in the country but the mission is still in need of assets to target al-shabaab strategic resources and provide air cover.

#### **4.1.2 The Police Component**

AMISOM police Component has the mandate to guarantee the rule of law in the city of Mogadishu and to improve the capacity building of the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible body that can provide security for the population.

For the moment, AMISOM police component continues to support the reform, restructuring, reorganization and professionalization of the SPF through various programs and activities. During the reporting period, AMISOM police, including the Formed Police Units (FPUs), worked closely with the SPF at various police establishments in Mogadishu to mentor, train and advise Somali police officers on a wide range of policing issues, including human rights and the management of crime.

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<sup>25</sup> Report of the chairperson of the commission on the situation in somalia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 june 2013.

In the coming period, the AMISOM police component will be extending its deployment to the other Sectors in order to provide support to the SPF. In this regard, AMISOM police has already undertaken a technical assessment mission to Sector 2 (Kismayo) and Sector 3 (Baidoa).

It has strength of 1,680 and currently has 362 deployed personnel consisting of two FPU's of 140 personnel each, 76 individual police officers and a senior leadership team of 6 officers. However, AMISOM still needs more staff and equipment for the FPU's to be able to provide more successful responses to public disorder and to effectively assist the Somali Police Force in increasing the number of operational police officers in the country.<sup>26</sup>

### **4.1.3 The Civilian Component**

The component has political, humanitarian and public information units. The political unit monitors, interprets and reports on political and other developments throughout Somalia, as well as providing advice on political processes. It is responsible for the implementation of political decisions on Somalia taken by the Africa Union Peace and Security Council and is helping build up the capacity of the nation's public service. The Civilian Component is committed to encouraging the launch of civil reconciliation initiatives with a view to seeking political inclusiveness and representation.<sup>27</sup>

The humanitarian unit works closely with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, the UN Children's Fund, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP) and other UN agencies as well as Somali and international NGOs to establish coordination mechanisms and the sharing of information. It also collaborates closely with the relevant Somali government agencies and ministries.

AMISOM's exit strategy is closely tied to the development of the institutional capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia. There is need to ensure that all the key state institutions, and especially those charged with providing security, are established and well functioning to ensure maintenance of rule of law, effective governance and provision of basic public services. In these, the AMISOM has and can play a critical role.

26 Report of the African Union Commission on the Strategic Review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Peace and Security Council 356th meeting 27 February 2013 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

27 Neus R. S, The Role of the African Union in Somalia: Where to go from here with the AMISOM Peace Operation? Institut Catala Internacional de Política Paper N08, April, 2013

## 5. Factors that Contributed to AMISOM Success

The primary prerequisite of securing Somalia remains the defeat and elimination of the threat of al-Shabaab. Thus far, and even though there are sporadic acts of terrorism, the militant group has been pushed out of the main towns of Somalia. The al-Shabaab is currently dispersed and present in the rural areas of the country. The following section will interrogate the factors that have contributed to the success of AMISOM in the implementation and realization of its mandated tasks.

### 5.1 Changing and Realistic Philosophies

#### 5.1.1 Thinking at the AU

Africa witnessed internal armed conflicts, since late 1980s and the 1990s that were unrivalled in scope and complexity. It is for this reason that in 1999, African leaders meeting in Sirte, Libya declared their determination to transform the OAU to enable them inter alia, “eliminate the scourge of conflicts, which constitutes a major impediment to the implementation of [our] development and integration agenda.”<sup>28</sup> In 2002, the African Union was born and adopted a comprehensive measure to address conflicts in its Constitutive Act for example:

*Article 4 (b) of the AU Constitutive Act...the AU has The Right to Intervene in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity – (Scenario 6) – pursuant to a decision of the Assembly.*<sup>29</sup>

Within the ambit of the AU Constitutive Act, several interventions by African countries in conflicts have taken place in the recent past. AMISOM is one of these interventions. Africa Union has moved from the philosophy of sovereignty of member states and non interference that was challenging the resolution of intrastate conflict.

<sup>28</sup> African Union, “Sirte Declaration”, Fourth Extraordinary Session of The Assembly of Heads of State And Government, paragraph 6, 8-9 September 1999

<sup>29</sup> Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union

### **5.1.2 Robust Mandates**

The unique nature of present-day conflicts and especially those afflicting the African continent has presented a serious dilemma for the UN in relation to its philosophy of peacekeeping. Given the UN was created to maintain international peace and security, in the context of African conflicts, there is usually no peace to keep in the first place. The UN Security Council has therefore struggled to deal with conflicts in African as the philosophy of peacekeeping holds little promise as opposed to that of peace enforcement which, essentially the UN does not readily accede to. Fortunately, the AU is more flexible and the continent has witnessed more robust mandates in conflict situations, key among them being AMISOM where peace enforcement has been clearly adopted as a precursor to peacekeeping. AMISOM is a chapter VII mission, authorized to take all necessary measures as appropriate to eliminate the threat of insurgency in Somalia.

### **5.1.3 Achievable Mandate**

The past and current mandates of AMISOM have been markedly different from that given to IGASOM. These mandates have taken into account what is achievable given the available capacities and actual realities on the ground.

The new AU mandate established the following mission for AMISOM:

- a) support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders,
- b) to provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to enable them to carry out their functions,
- c) to assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan of Somalia, particularly the effective reestablishment and training of all inclusive Somali security forces, bearing in mind the programs already being implemented by some of Somalia's bilateral and multilateral partners. to provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts,
- d) to monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation,
- e) to facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs,

- f) to protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defense.

This mandate was more carefully developed and written than that of IGASOM. The broad guidelines of IGASOM gave way to the more precise instructions of AMISOM.

These engagements are a clear demonstration of the commitment of AMISOM, as well the international community to partner with the Somali government and its people in order to bring peace and security in the country. Consequently, AMISOM has endeared itself to a big part of the Somali population and the resulting support has meant diminishing of the same to al-Shabaab who continue to lose moral and physical capital on the ground.

## **5.2 Specific Components of the Mandate of AMISOM**

This section looks at the specific factors that have contributed to the realization of set objectives under each of the specific mandates of AMISOM

In sum, the mandate of AMISOM includes:

- (i) to undertake counter offensive and deterrent measures to minimize the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia;
- (ii) pursue and consolidate a political settlement of the armed conflict in Somalia using political and diplomatic approaches;
- (iii) support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by assisting with the establishment of rule of law, provide VIP protection to government officials as well as facilitate free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia;
- (iv) provide protection to the Somali authorities and key infrastructure to help the former carry out their functions of government; and,
- (v) assist with the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, in particular the establishment of security sector

reforms as well as effective re-establishment and training of all-inclusive Somali National Security Forces (SNSF).<sup>30</sup>

### **5.2.1 Counter Offensive and Deterrent Measures to Minimize the Threat of Al-Shabaab**

A turning point for AMISOM was in August 2011 when African troops together with TFG forces pushed al-Shabab out of the capital Mogadishu. A number of reasons account for this turnaround, including more troop contributions from member states (Kenya and Dibouti), greater coordination between AMISOM and TFG forces, and reported training of Somali intelligence operatives by the Central Intelligence Agency.<sup>31</sup>

The first important success was when AMISOM together with the Somali forces pushed al-Shabaab out of the capital Mogadishu. Greater coordination among AMISOM forces and between AMISOM and Somali forces was observed. Since then, the coordination between AMISOM and Somalia Forces has continued to improve.

The involvement of the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF), which is well equipped and includes a large navy and air force, has greatly contributed to the achievements against Al-Shabaab. In addition, Ethiopia has redeployed troops into Somalia, capturing Beledwyne and has also moved into the central regions of Hiraaan and Galgaduud and further still into the Shabelle River Valley. The KDF has liberated Gedo, Juba, Kismayo, while AMISOM forces have pushed al-Shabaab from the capital, Mogadishu. Coordinated Efforts of Kenya, AMISOM, Ethiopia and Somalia have contributed greatly to ousting insurgents from most parts of Somalia.<sup>32</sup>

The Burundian and Ugandan armies have significant experience in insurgency warfare due to experience gained in the protracted civil wars they experienced in their countries. They have demonstrated more resilience to the asymmetric warfare. This proved invaluable in defeating and pushing

30 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2073, S/RES/2073 (2012), 7 November 2012. These responsibilities are reflected by the AMISOM as its mandated tasks in Somalia. For more on it, see AMISOM, African Union Mission in Somalia, available at <http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-mandate/> Retrieved on September 4, 2013

31 Meleagrou-Hitchens, A; Hussein, S: Factors Responsible for Al-Shabab's Losses in Somalia, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), King's College, London, 2012

32 Op. Cit., Meleagrou-Hitchens, A Hussein, S

the al-Shaabab out of Mogadishu. The Kenya Defense Forces peacekeeping experience has added to current success being experienced by AMISOM.

### **5.2.2 Pursuance of and Consolidation of Political and Diplomatic Settlement of Armed Conflict**

AMISOM political unit monitors, interprets and reports on political and other developments throughout Somalia, as well as providing advice on political processes. It is responsible for the implementation of political decisions on Somalia taken by the Africa Union Peace and Security Council and is helping build up the capacity of the nation's public service.

With the collaboration of AMISOM, the political situation in Somalia has continued to improve. The Federal Government continued its efforts to implement its Six-Pillar plan. The Six Pillar strategy is a comprehensive policy framework outlined by the President of Somalia for the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, around which the AU and the international community should align its support:

- Full Stability - Supremacy of the law and good governance, that incorporates rule of law and security
- Economic Recovery - Livelihoods and economic infrastructure;
- Peace building-Social reconciliation through building bridges of trust;
- Service Delivery - Health, education and environment
- International Relations - Building collaborative relations and polishing the national image;
- The Unity and Integrity of the country - Striving together for a better future.<sup>33</sup>

### **5.2.3 Supporting Dialogue and Reconciliation**

AMISOM has continued to support dialogue and reconciliation efforts at local, regional and national levels. At local and regional levels, in areas recovered from Al-shabaab, AMISOM has mobilised clan elders, religious and political leaders including members of parliament to resolve political and other differences.

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33 Report of the African Union Commission on the Strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)



At the national level, AMISOM has continued to support dialogue among various political actors in the country.

#### **5.2.4 Providing Protection to the Somali Authorities and Key Infrastructure**

The Military Component of the African Union Mission in Somalia is the biggest of the three components of the AU Mission in the country. The component provides protection to the country's Federal Institutions as they carry out their functions and helps secure Somalia's key infrastructure including its airports and seaports.

All the troops are deployed in four sectors covering south and central Somalia. The AMISOM military component has created a relatively secure environment which has allowed the Somali peace process to take root, allowed local population the opportunity to begin establishing accountable local governance institutions that can deliver services as well as rebuild the local economy and create linkages to the national economy and government.

#### **5.2.5 Facilitation of the Implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan**

Somali Security forces capacity to do joint operations with AMISOM and their training have been augmented. Somali transitional government has been ended with the election of new Federal Government.

Despite all these achievements, Al-Shabaab is still a threat in some of the recovered areas, and they still occupy some remaining pockets of Southern Somalia.

To address those challenges, the new Federal Government of Somalia in close collaboration with AMISOM has come up with a policy plan which is centered on reconciliation and stabilization of the country. AMISOM has continuously offered support in various mediations undertaken, to build internal cohesion among members and in capacity building for the public sector institutions to enhance security and participate in the government stabilization plan.

## 6. Challenges and Opportunities for AMISOM to Enhance Peace and Security

It has been noted in various sections of this report that even though AMISOM has thus far made considerable progress towards the achievement of its mandate and by extension contributed to the enhanced security and restoration of peace in Somalia, there are still outstanding challenges that require to be addressed. This section looks at some of these challenges and also goes further to point out the opportunities for overcoming them.

### 6.1 Challenges

This section will identify the challenges that face AMISOM in its quest to realize its mandate.

#### 6.1.1 Uncertain Political Situation in Somalia

The political power in Somalia can be characterized as local, fragmented, violent, heterogenic and based on hybrid structures of formal and informal institutions controlled by clans or militias, in which different socio-political orders interact.<sup>34</sup> This fluidity of structure, with access to resources and power being an important source of clan conflicts, has been an enduring challenge for peace negotiations and will continue doing so.

Looking beyond the clan issue, there are disagreements about the nature, or even desirability of the state. Much of Somali society has traditionally been nomadic and suspicious of the interference of a central authority in their affairs, a sentiment reinforced by experience with military dictatorship. The major clans favour a federal system of governance where distinct units of the country are largely autonomous but federated into a loose nation state, thus giving them control over their own territories.<sup>35</sup>

The success of AMISOM is therefore partially dependent on whether centralised structures of government can demonstrate legitimacy among

34 Hjalte T, *The Spaces of Civil War : From a Global Typology of Civil War to a Topography of Violence in South Africa*, 1976, 1986, 1996, University of Tromso, 2013

35 Owen F, *Somalia: Little Hope for Peace*, Zurich, September 2012

the Somali citizenry. One way of demonstrating legitimacy is ensuring the timely and efficient delivery of the much-needed public goods and services and providing stability and peace throughout the liberated areas. The challenge with the recognition of legitimacy is already manifest in the country with accusations that the local leaders who have replaced former al-Shabaab leaders do not, often, come from the majority clans in their areas but are puppets of the central authority. To date, the central government continues to struggle to gain the needed legitimacy.

### **6.1.2 The Mandate of AMISOM**

AMISOM mandate is renewed every year and is subject to political dynamics, financial and other factors out of control of the AU and the Somali government. There are a lot of negotiations that take place between African decision-makers, Somali government and their non-African partners. The outcome of these negotiations has complex motives and interests that have consequences on the autonomy of the mission. Also, when contingents are yearly rotated, there are implications for performance as personnel leave just after they have been trained and have gathered sufficient knowledge on the terrain and on al-shabaab operations and tactics.

### **6.1.3 Troop Strength**

A key challenge especially in regards to the Military component of AMISOM is the insufficient numbers of troops necessary to guarantee the stabilization of areas liberated from al-Shabaab and to continue with military offensive to root out all insurgency in the country. Indeed, the increase of troop levels from 12,000 to 17,731 through Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012) had significant impact on the military operations. However, this number is still too low to stabilize whole of Somalia given its size and the asymmetric nature of threats posed by al-Shabaab. In a letter to the president of the UN Security Council sent in October 2013, it is noted that there was need to increase the capability of AMISOM to enable it, operating alongside the Somali forces, to liberate and secure territory in Somalia and to effectively deny al-Shabaab the opportunity to mobilize resources and/or forcefully recruit and train insurgents to prosecute its asymmetric warfare.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Letter dated 14 October 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

### **6.1.4 The Police Component**

There is a shortage of skilled and specialized police Trainers in AMISOM. This challenge is further compounded by the fact that the few skilled and specialized police trainers like all other police officers, are deployed on a rotational basis and so, have to leave at the end of their mission cycle. This negatively affects both the internal and external training cells in AMISOM.

The training of AU Peace Support Operations remains a significant challenge because of low level of experience and language problems. Particularly since its latest expansion, AMISOM is hampered by a lack of Somali speakers, who could play a crucial role in the understanding of the local population and the National Security Force.<sup>37</sup>

### **6.1.5 The Civilian Component**

Similar to the Military and Police components, the Civilian component is understaffed and therefore faces difficulties in achieving its stated objectives. This makes it difficult to organise in-mission training as each unit needs specific training in addition to the generic peace support operations knowledge that is applicable to all the units in the component.

The most significant purpose of training in a peace support operation is to enhance the capabilities of mission staff to efficiently perform the mandated tasks needed for the effective execution of the mission mandate. Training must therefore be based on a function need and performance assessment basis. However, due to the absence of a structure for function and performance analysis, training has been individual-needs led rather than mission led.

Whilst the various types of training required by the civilian component for the performance of their functions is available on the continent and elsewhere, the skeletal nature of the component means that in some instances, sending an officer out for a two-week training would mean that there would be a vacuum for that period as there would be no one else to hold the fort.

In the initial stages of the mission, the international community prioritized strengthening the Federal Government and mitigating the threat posed by

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<sup>37</sup> Report on Training Needs Analysis (TNA) for the African Standby Force, Nairobi/Accra, July 30, 2013

the al-Shabaab. This in effect resulted in the neglect of recruitment and training of a capable civil component.<sup>38</sup>

### **6.1.6 Emerging threats**

Increasingly, AMISOM is being called upon to deal with emerging security challenges for example, those pertaining to maritime security including piracy, dumping of toxic wastes, over-fishing among others along the coast of Somalia.

The slow pace in liberating areas occupied by al-Shabaab and the sporadic attacks in the liberated areas can lead to anxiety among the Somali population. Indeed, the Somali government, which is receiving support from AMISOM, could face credibility deficit whereby legitimacy of government is questioned and the resulting vacuum could easily be retaken by al-Shabaab.<sup>39</sup>

### **6.1.7 Management of Disengaged Fighters**

AMISOM in collaboration with other partners has been developing strategies, policies and plans for the management of both the Captured and Voluntary Disengaged Fighters (CVDF). These instruments have been presented to the FGS for adoption but, without corresponding provision of adequate financial resources, efforts to offer alternative livelihoods to former fighters are bound to fail. The result will be that their disengagement from the fighting might only be temporary with disgruntled individuals reverting back to fighting and/or engaging in banditry and other forms of criminality.<sup>40</sup>

There are two categories of disengaged fighters: those who have been arrested or captured in combat and those who have voluntarily surrendered themselves to AMISOM or the Somalia National Forces. On its part, AMISOM continues to receive disengaged al-Shabaab fighters, but the mission has limited resources to cater for them. The role of AMISOM is to receive and manage defectors at designated reception centers for 48 hours and then hand them over to the FGS for further management.<sup>41</sup> As

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38 Peace and Security Council Report, January 2013

39 Peace and Security Council Report, 2013

40 Williams P. D., *Dealing with Disengaged Fighters: The Case of al-Shabaab*, International Peace Institute, 2013

41 Report of The Chairperson of The Commission on The Situation In Somalia, 13 June 2013

of mid-January 2013, the federal government was holding approximately 1,500 disengaged fighters.<sup>42</sup> Like AMISOM, the FGS does not have the necessary capacity to help facilitate the transition of such a large number of disengaged combatants.

### **6.1.8 Large Numbers of IDPs and Refugees**

UN agencies estimated that more than 1.2 million persons had fled their homes in Mogadishu and its surroundings as a result of targeted attacks by al-Shabaab and continued conflicts between National Forces and anti-government groups. The Somalia office of the UNHCR, estimated that there were 1.46 million IDPs in the country as a result of internal conflict. Most IDPs continue to live in dire conditions in protracted displacement, and prospects for durable solutions remain distant for many of them. Refugees were estimated to be 684 475 in 2011.<sup>43</sup>

Since its establishment in August 2012, the new National Federal Government of Somalia has sought to promote peace, good governance and improve relations with parts of the country which have been seeking degrees of autonomy. However, the federal structure remains weak and potential for further instability remains. The Islamic militia Al-Shabaab, despite being ousted from some areas it controlled for years, remains a major threat to peace and security.

### **6.1.9 Clan Rivalry**

The Somali people are among the most homogenous in Africa, both ethnically and religiously. However they are deeply divided by an ancient family or clan system which stands at the foundation of political and social life.

Somalia has five main clans and numerous sub-clans in the population structure of Somalia. The Hawiye clan is most closely associated with the Islamic extremists and represents some 25% of the population. Traditionally, it is located in the areas north of Mogadishu and stops below Punt land.

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42 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia (AU doc. PSC/PR/2(CCCL- para.31), January 14, 2013

43 The Guardian, Dadaab refugee camps: 20 years of living in crisis, 24 March 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/mar/24/dadaab-refugee-camps-living-in-crisis> Date accessed 27 April 2011.

Northwest Somaliland and eastern Ethiopia is the territory of the Isaaq clan, a tribe representing 22% of Somalia's people. The Darod clan is the most widely distributed tribal network and accounts for some 20% of the Somali population. It covers Puntland and a little further south, as well as the area bordering Kenya.<sup>44</sup>

### **6.1.10 Dependence on Donor Funds**

The lack of sustainable funding poses a serious challenge for AMISOM in terms of continuity of its operations, the provision of the required capabilities and logistical support. While there are several co-existing support models including the UN Trust Fund, the EU African Peace Facility, direct donor support and United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), AMISOM is a heavy burden for the AU. To its credit, UNSOA and the support from the EU has made a big difference, but is still far from meeting most of the needs of the mission. For example, the necessary additional deployment of troops to area where they are most needed has been hampered by the lack of resources to airlift and sustain the troops in the mission.

## **6.2 Opportunities**

### **6.2.1 Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)**

The current Federal Government and Parliament are no longer transitional. The government has a degree of authority and legitimacy domestically and has been recognized by the international community, including the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and many other organizations and countries. The President has set out a vision and priorities for the country including security and justice, economic recovery, governance and combating corruption.<sup>45</sup> The work of AMISOM can be enhanced where governance institutions are in place.

For external support to have a significant impact, it must be leveraged on viable institutions that advance the quest of the state in nation building. Here,

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44 Ulf Dahre J : Post-Conflict Peace-Building in the Horn of Africa, A Report of the 6 Annual Conference on the Horn of Africa, Lund University, August 24-26, 2007

45 African Development Bank Group Somalia Country Brief, 2013-2015

local governance is intended to be a key instrument for reconciliation and peace building, as well as serving as the basic political structural framework that enable the Somali population, through decentralized service delivery, to benefit from better social services and livelihood opportunities.<sup>46</sup>

### **6.2.2 The Capture of Kismayo**

Since the KDF was incorporated into AMISOM and the eventual capture and control of the port of Kismayo; AMISOM has gained critical leverage not least because this has denied al-Shabaab access to the main seaport that had been a major source of income. The intervention by the Kenyan military was both successful and important to the AMISOM and the Somali Government not only because they were able to gain ground and extend their area of control but also to demonstrate to the Somali community that al-Shabaab could be vanquished. Indeed, without the intervention by the KDF and the subsequent control of the port of Kismayo and the surrounding areas, al-Shabaab could have gained the necessary financial resources and continue to command the needed moral authority to mount and sustain a military campaign against Mogadishu.

### **6.2.3 Popular Support by the Populace**

In recognition of the risks of fighting among an urban population, AMISOM reviewed its engagement strategy and re-prioritized its interventions paying more attention to Somali cultural ties to attract the support of the population. Regular meetings with community leaders, outpatient clinics for treating civilians, and the provision of clean drinking water have been purposefully used by AMISOM to build and maintain the support of the population and political leaders during the most intensive periods of the military campaign.

The success of this strategy was demonstrated by the fact that despite its sophisticated propaganda capacity and sustained efforts to discredit AMISOM, al-Shabaab has failed to create substantial opposition to the mission among the majority of the Somali population. Indeed, AMISOM has been able to fully exploit the withdrawal of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and the waning support for the militants particularly following their unpopular response to the famine and aid efforts of 2010–11.<sup>47</sup>

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46 Ramsbotham, A and Zartman W, *Paix sans frontières*, Building Peace Across Borders, 2011

47 Matt Freear and Cedric de Coning, *Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali*, 2013



## 6.2.4 Continued Support by External Partners

Since its deployment, AMISOM has been supported by various partners who have provided the necessary resources to sustain the mission. To date, AMISOM, in concert with the Somali government, has provided and is seen as the central pillar of stability in Somalia. The Somali government forces have greatly complemented AMISOM operations through the provision of vital human intelligence and facilitating the mobilization of the populace to support the mission. In addition, Militia forces, including the Ahlu Sunna WalJama'a and Ras Kamboni, have been vital allies to AMISOM and have assisted in operations outside Mogadishu, particularly in the capture of the port of Kismayo and its environs.<sup>48</sup>

The continued support by the EU in the training of the forces that began in 2010, complemented by additional training by US forces and other partners; has been instrumental, for example, in the fight against al-Shabaab. This commitment to train both the African Union led force and the Somali forces are expected to continue and even gain more momentum in the wake of international commitments made at the 2013 Somalia Conference in London.<sup>49</sup> This engagement offers a perfect opportunity to develop the necessary capacity and required security infrastructure in Somalia.

## 6.2.5 Improved Geo-political Climate

The end of the Cold War brought a rapid growth in quantity of UN activities in Africa. Soon after unsuccessful withdrawal from Somalia and failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda led to the retrenchment and reassessment of UN operations in Africa.<sup>50</sup> Major Powers in the UNSC retreated from their initial post-Cold War enthusiasm for engagement in African conflicts. Simultaneously, a debate about possible increased cooperation with regional organizations emerged.<sup>51</sup>

Interventions by African countries in conflicts outside the UN or AU frameworks have been observed. More importantly, such interventions by individual states have occurred side by side with internationally mandated missions in two central theatres of armed conflict: Somalia and the

48 Nur M. Abdi, *International Community and Stability of Somalia: Case of AMISOM*, 2012

49 Matt Freear and Cedric de Coning, *Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali*, 2013

50 ONUC - <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuc.htm>

51 Vladimír Kváča : *UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa*, Jan Masaryk Centre of International Studies, University of Economics, Prague

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Both are the centerpiece of a regional conflict formation with non state armed groups, but also state forces operating across borders on a regular basis.<sup>52</sup>

In Somalia, the establishment of the African Union Mission (AMISOM) was meant to replace Ethiopian military involvement, but the neighbor's forces have repeatedly intervened after an official withdrawal in 2009. Furthermore, Kenya directly intervened in Somalia after October 2011 and got approval from the AU later, followed by the plan to incorporate Kenyan forces into AMISOM. Similarly, the Eastern DRC has time and again seen military interventions by neighboring Rwanda based on an agreement between the Congolese and the Rwandan Presidents after November 2008. The international community finds it convenient to argue for the regionalization of peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Africa and the principle of "African solutions for African problems."<sup>53</sup> This was also the consequence of the death of American soldiers which not only influenced American public opinion towards UN peacekeeping but also acted as a major warning against putting Western boots on the ground in African war zones.

### **6.2.6 Rehabilitated and New Infrastructure**

Prospects for infrastructure rehabilitation and development during the re-construction period will greatly depend on maintaining a peaceful political environment, law and order, sound economic and social policies, and the proper functioning of the facilities and services later. Rehabilitation of infrastructure also provides opportunities for enhancing the dialogue and cooperation between communities, around improving common infrastructure assets, as part of peace building efforts. The actual state of infrastructure in Somalia presents many challenges, including logistical means and insecurity especially in large parts of South Central Somalia. All kind of infrastructure has suffered from lack of maintenance and rehabilitation, war damage and vandalism, and years of neglect.<sup>54</sup>

52 The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich: International Peace Keeping in Africa: Actors and Missions;23/24 November 2012

53 Vorrath, J: When the Neighbors Keep a Foot in the Door: Regional Interventions and Peacekeeping in the DR Congo and Somalia, Center for Security Studies,Zurich, 2010

54 Bassiouni D, S § McKay, L: Somali Joint Needs Assessment, Infrastructure Cluster Report, September, 2006

### **6.2.7 The Somali Diaspora**

The Somali Diaspora makes a major contribution to the Somali economy and livelihoods through remittances, humanitarian assistance and participation in recovery and reconstruction efforts. Without this support, the economy of the country would have collapsed long ago. The Somali Diaspora is the major investor in the country and provided 80% of the start-up capital for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Private sector investments contribute to economic recovery and improving livelihoods. Returnees establish businesses individually or as a group and pool resources or manage business at the executive level. Investment is spread over various sub-sectors such as small scale industries, telecommunication, remittances and trade.<sup>55</sup>

Since 2000, the Diaspora has been highly visible in the state institutions of Somalia, including Somaliland and Puntland, occupying top leadership positions of the state, political parties, cabinet, parliament and civil service. Finally, Diaspora members contribute to development through their work for international development agencies. Returnees contribute their skills and technical know-how, where they teach in the local universities and provide technical support to government departments. The UNDP Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support (QUESTS) project has helped to promote this activity in areas of stability. Overall, the activities of the Diaspora in the political and economic spheres tend to be mutually supportive of each other and are resulting in an ever-strengthening Diaspora network that plays an increasingly significant part in the life of the country.

### **6.2.8 Local Capacities for Peace**

In conflict situations, it is important to identify local peace actors/factors that can reduce tensions and draw the people together. In Somalia, clan leaders have for the past fourteen years largely taken over the roles of the state in security and law. They have consolidated their traditional role as dispute mediators and enforcers of customary laws, including the *xeer*, that regulate most aspects of social life within and between clans. As such, traditional leaders in Somalia have not only been the prime force for stability and continuity in terms of regulating access to pasture, water and in conflict resolution between clans, but have also been instrumental in establishing relatively stable structures of governance especially in the Northern parts of Somalia.

<sup>55</sup> A report for UNDP by Hassan Sheikh and Sally Healy on the Role of the Diaspora in Somali Development: Somalia's Missing Million: The Somali Diaspora and Its Role In Development, March, 2009

Apart from maintaining a primary role in local conflict resolution and upholding of customary laws, the traditional leaders have generally been perceived as the most legitimate leaders by their clan members.

Given the central and legitimate position of the traditional structures in Somali society especially after the collapse of the state in 1991, it is extremely important that they be involved in the actual peace processes in the re-emerging Somalia state.

### **6.2.9 Entrepreneurial Society**

Given the vibrancy and innovativeness of the Somali business community, they must be involved in post conflict reconstruction in the country. The business sector not only thrived in spite of chaos but has also been innovative as seen in the creation of a local entrepreneurial cadre in telecommunication industry, banking and money transfer services unrivalled even in stable countries. The business sector if empowered can absorb the youth and engage the population in gainful employment which will reduce the militancy of al-shabaab.

The close relationship between traditional elders, business community and the new political leaders can lead to identify an inclusive recovery strategy to accelerate the rate of economic recovery of the country. The private sector has contributed to peace building in Somalia by paying for the disarmament, rehabilitation and employment of thousands of former gunmen. In Mogadishu, many telephone repairmen, petty traders, drivers and company or business guards are former gunmen.<sup>56</sup>

### **6.2.10 Natural Resources**

Somalia is rich in natural wealth and if properly and sustainably harnessed can play a critical role in alleviating poverty and rebuilding the required infrastructure. Therefore the FGS has to promote sustainable development and management of natural resources by developing legal and regulatory frameworks and building capacity in Natural Resources Management. Somalia natural resource is the backbone of the economy but also could be a driver of conflict and increase vulnerability both economically and politically, at local and regional levels. To ensure sustainable environmental and natural resource management the FGS should develop technical options for natural resources revenue-sharing and build the capacity of key natural resource management institutions.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Mohamed A J, Business as usual: Bakaaro market in war, International Contact Group, 2010

<sup>57</sup> The Federal Republic of Somalia : A new beginning for a sovereign, se cure, democratic, united and federal Somalia at peace with itself and the world, and for the benefit of its people

## 7. Conclusion

This section of the report endeavours to summarize the achievements of the AMISOM and the challenges that it has faced in its drive, together with partners, to secure Somalia. The section also proffers a number of recommendations that can aid the AMISON in this quest.

The findings of this study have clearly established that since its debut in Somalia in 2007, AMISOM has made important and substantial contributions towards the improvement of security in Somalia. Key to this success was the defeat and subsequent ejection of the militant al-Shabaab group from the capital city in Mogadishu in 2011 followed by that of the port of Kismayo in October 2012. The liberation of these key areas have been instrumental and today after over 20-years of civil strife, Somalia has a functioning central government and its populace are slowly re-building their shattered lives. AMISOM, working together with the Government of Somalia, continue to liberate and hold more ground previously held by the al-Shabaab.

The study has pointed out that the achievements of AMISOM, the FGS and their partners, was made possible by several factors. These range from the implementation of more robust mandates, conducive political climate and goodwill within and outside Somalia, and provision of most needed resources by the international community, among other factors. In addition there has been a genuine desire by the Somali population to see the end of the strife and commitment to see the re-birth of their country. Indeed, this has contributed to shift in public opinion that has increasingly seen al-Shabaab losing ground at all levels. On its part, AMISOM steadily continues to “win the battles and not lose the war”.

This study has likewise identified various challenges that face AMISOM, and its partners, in their quest to enhance security and enhance peace in Somalia. The challenges are diverse and range from the latent threat of the al-Shabaab manifested in sporadic acts of violence within and out Somalia, the question of legitimacy of the central authority/government, large number of internally displace persons and refugees, emerging new security threat and frontiers of conflict, lack of and uncertainty of guaranteed provision of resources among many other challenges.

Fortunately, the study has also identified a myriad of potential opportunities available to AMISOM, and its partners, in its endeavour to realize its mandate. This includes, revamped and more realistic mandates, political goodwill, an educated and enlightened populace especially those in the Diaspora, untapped wealth from the country's natural resources, and entrepreneurial society, existing strong local structures of governance amongst other factors.

AMISOM initiative has demonstrated that as a continent Africa has come of age and the adage of 'Africans finding the solutions to African problems', is not a myth but a reality and opportunity for the continent to grab and embrace.

## **7.1 Recommendations**

### **7.1.1 Revamping the AMISOM**

It is critical that AMISOM initiatives should be sustained if it is to effectively deliver on its mandate. The troop numbers should be increased and better resourced. More robust sources of funding e.g. the AU Peace Fund should be identified to meet the needs of the mission as well as guarantee its sustainability.

### **7.1.2 Liberation and Effective Control of Occupied Areas**

Together with the Somali National Security Forces, AMISOM should not relent in its drive to liberate areas still occupied by al-Shabaab. Once liberated these areas should be effectively controlled to prevent the potential incursion of the vanquished militants. Better and sustained training of the national security forces as well as their upkeep and welfare are paramount as the exit strategy of AMISOM will effectively depend on the capacity of these forces to take over and maintain the security in the country.

### **7.1.3 Building the Capacity of the Police**

In line with its Strategic Concept, the Police component of AMISOM should continue to build on its Formed Police Units (FPUs) in order to be more effective in public order management. In addition, AMISOM should enhance its support to the Somali Police Force and facilitate its transformation into a credible law enforcement component.

### **7.1.4 Legitimacy of the Federal Government**

The Civilian component of AMISOM has a critical role in enhancing the legitimacy of the Government of Somalia and in particular in the liberated areas. AMISOM, in collaboration with the central government, should continue to engage with the existing local structures and dynamics in promoting national reconciliation processes. In this sense, enhanced coordination and clear demarcation of responsibilities amongst all the practitioners is important in order to minimize friction among them and for purposes of efficient and effective use of resources.

### **7.1.5 Winning Hearts and Minds**

AMISOM drive of “winning hearts and mind” is a key confidence-building tool. The provision of services such as medical care and water among others to the civilian population is critical in demonstrating the goal of the mission. Building, gaining and maintaining public confidence is critical in the fight against al-Shabaab. This is because the militia group is adopting and waging an asymmetric warfare that can only be won with the support of the Somali population. AMISOM can complement its confidence building programs with the following measures:

- a) Creating and implementing a conduct and discipline policy in line with established humanitarian standards;
- b) Effective investigation of allegations of serious misconduct by AMISOM personnel, and adopting disciplinary measures where necessary;
- c) Adopting practical and preventive measures in relation to the protection of civilians, including through training and awareness-raising programs.

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## AMISOM in Somalia: *A Ray of Hope?*

The African Union (AU) peacekeeping force in Somalia, AMISOM, has since 2007 been trying to help bring peace in the Somalia. Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Sierra Leone and Djibouti are the only troop contributors for the mission. After six years of fighting with limited resources, which has led to a significant number of casualties among soldiers, AMISOM's achievements are important though limited.

Despite the negative criticism that have been made on the role of AMISOM in the security advancements of Somalia, the findings of this research indicate that the presence of AMISOM has produced a situation that would never have been achieved by any of the different forces that have been previously deployed. The African Union Mission's advance across Somalia transformed al-Shabab from a powerful militant group to a weakened band of insurgents. AMISOM is clearly one important piece of the Somalia puzzle, although several other factors constitute important pieces. In its role as a peacekeeping mission, AMISOM has significantly contributed in bringing Somalia to where it is today and it will continue to be of importance to the future of Somalia.

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