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Evaluating Disaster Management Frameworks In PSO, East Africa

Capabilities and Limitation in African Union Field Support: A Case of AMISOM

Creating and Enabling Environment for Peace and Security in Eastern Africa

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FOREWORD

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is a research and training institution focusing on capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the framework of the African Peace and Security architecture (APSA) and has developed to be a regional Centre of Excellence for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. The IPSTC addresses the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated Peace Support Operations (PSOs) by analyzing the actors and multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research, whose findings constitute the subject of this Issue Brief, traverses a broad spectrum of issues ranging from conflict prevention through management to post-conflict reconstruction. The Centre has made considerable contribution in training and research on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa through designing of training curricula, conducting field research and publication of Occasional Papers and Issue Briefs. The Occasional Papers are produced annually, while Issues Briefs are quarterly. The issue briefs are an important contribution to the vision and mission of the IPSTC.

The First Issue Brief, entitled ***Evaluating Disaster Management Frameworks in PSO in Eastern Africa,*** provides insights into the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) in East Africa. HFA was the key instrument for implementing disaster risk reduction (DRR). The second Issue Brief, ***Capabilities and Limitations in AU Field Support': Case of AMISOM,*** employs the case of AMISOM to expose some of the salient strengths and weaknesses of AU in the provision of field support. The research and publication of this Issue Brief has been made possible by IPSTC.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ARSDRR	Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction
AU	African Union
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EA	East Africa
EAC	East African Community
EU	European Union
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FGS	Force Generation Service
GFSS	Global Field Support Strategy
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals (Sustainable Development Goals-SDGs)
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NVG	Night Vision Goggles
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OP	Operation Peace
PET	Policy Evaluation and Training
PSO	Peace Support Operations
RECs	Regional Economic Commissions
SNSF	Somali National Security Forces
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations- African Union Mission in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNLB	United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNSCC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOA	United Nations Support in Somalia
UNSOS	United Nations Support Office in Somalia

DEFINITION OF TERMS

1. **Disaster:** serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. A disaster is a function of the risk process. It results from a combination of hazards, conditions of vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the potential negative consequences of risk**.**

2. **Risk:** the potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur to a particular community or society over some specified time in the future (death; injury; destruction of property and livelihoods; economic disruption or environmental damage) resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions. Conventionally, risk is expressed by the notation: Risk = Hazards x Vulnerability.

3. **Disaster risk reduction:** a conceptual framework of elements considered with the possibilities of minimizing vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a given community or society, to avoid or limit the adverse impacts of hazards, within the broader context of sustainable development.

4. **Resilience:** the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structural integrity. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection and improvement of risk reduction measures.

5. **Disaster management frameworks:** systematic process of using administrative directives, organizations and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster.

6. **Eastern Africa:** This study will focus on Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and South Sudan.

7. **Peace support operations:** designed range of civilian and military tasks, including the maintenance of public order, policing, mentoring of security forces, infrastructure reconstruction and national reconciliation. A peace support model operates on the basis of flexibility, allowing the mission to adapt its posture between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, depending on the compliance of the parties involved.

INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUE BRIEFS

The topics in this First Quarter Issue Brief address diverse issues of peace and security related to creating an enabling environment for peace and security in the Eastern Africa region. The first paper, ***Evaluating Disaster Management Frameworks in PSO in East Africa,*** examines the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) as the key instrument in implementing disaster risk reduction (DRR) based on generic indicators that were incorporated in the extended Programme of Action (2006 to 2015). The paper analyses the framework's implementation progress of by UN and AU member states in Eastern Africa. It also examines the framework's impact in disaster management in PSOs. In the second paper, ***Capabilities and Limitations in AU Field Support: Case of AMISOM,*** examines the capabilities and limitations of the AU in providing field support in peace support operations by analysing its performance in a complex operational space such as that of AMISOM in Somalia. The shortfalls and way forward are also discussed.

EVALUATING DISASTER MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS IN PSO IN EAST AFRICA

By Dr. Eunice Njambi

Abstract

The Hyogo Framework for Action's (HFA) DRR implementation period ended in 2015. East African nations (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and South Sudan) have made significant milestones in addressing DRR in accordance with the priorities set. However, South Sudan and Somalia are yet to have functional DRR frameworks. This paper has three objectives: analying the frameworks used by the UN and AU in disaster management in PSO; assessing implementation progress of the frameworks; and determining the impact of these frameworks on disaster managemet in EA. Secodary data was used to analsyze the progress and achievements based on the HFA's five strategic goals and priority areas. The HFA outlines five priorities (P1 – P5) of action for achieving disaster resilience by 2015. Each priority area had specific indicators developed to measure achievement. The five Ps included: P1: Ensuring DDR is a national and local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation. P2: Identifying, assessing and monitoring disaster risks and enhancing early warning. P3: Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels. P4: Reduce the underlying risk factors. P5: Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

Based on the findings, this paper concludes that, most EA states have adopted the Ending Drought Emergencies Strategy (resilience strategy) and developed/reviewed policies, strategies and plans and put in place institutions with dedicated staffs and resources for DRM, indicating increased awareness and commitment on the part of policy and decision makers. Most member states have systematically identified and documented information on major hazards and related disasters. Some higher learning institutions in some member states are offering undergraduate and post-graduate as well as short courses in DRR/DRM. In the EAC, DRM coordination is carried out through national platforms and the sub-regional DRR platform. DRR has considerably been integrated in emergency response management. Based on the above findings and considering the vulnerability and exposure to natural hazards, this paper recommends that EA needs to make improvements in DRR and there is need to support the integration/mainstreaming of DRR/DRM into peace support operations training, policies, plans and programmes at all levels of government.

Key Words

Disaster; Risk; Risk Reduction Frameworks; PSO.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Introduction

Every year, more than 200 million people are affected by drought, floods, cyclones, earthquakes, wild fires, and other hazards. Increased population densities, environmental degradation, poverty and global warming aggravate the impacts of natural hazards. Like the rest of the world, the Eastern Africa region is currently facing an unprecedented number of humanitarian crises, putting more strain on responders. The number of people targeted for assistance has more than doubled over the past decade, with global funding requirements increasing at a much faster rate. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) humanitarian risk analysis states that the region's humanitarian requirements have increased and currently exceed $5 billion (IGAD, 2015). Humanitarian appeals have traditionally been underfunded especially when the affected country enjoys middle-income status.

The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) was the key instrument for implementing disaster risk reduction (DRR) as adopted by UN member states. Its overarching goal was to build resilience of nations and communities to disasters by achieving substantive reduction of disaster losses by 2015. The HFA offered five areas of priority for action, guiding principles and practical means for achieving disaster resilience in the context of sustainable development. The priorities were: ensuring that DRR is a national and local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation; making disaster risk reduction a priority, knowing the risks and taking action; identifying, assessing, and monitoring disaster risks and enhancing early warning; and lastly, building understanding and awareness. Based on the collaboration and cooperation of states, the non-state organizations(regional, international, community-based) the scientific community, media and the private sector, the HFA was crucial to DRR.

In Africa, the AU Commission facilitates and coordinates the implementation of the Regional Strategy and Programme of Action in line with the HFA. At the sub-regional level, implementation and coordination were to be facilitated by RECs, focusing on providing strategic guidance to their member states, particularly in respect of inter-state initiatives.

National-level implementation and coordination were facilitated by AU member-states whose primary responsibility was to operationalize the Africa Regional Strategy and Programme of Action for DRR within the HFA.

Multi-stakeholder national platforms or national committees, including ministries dealing with DRR, were to contribute skills and knowledge to mainstream DRR into multi-sectoral development planning and implementation processes.

Generic indicators were incorporated in the Extended Programme of Action (2006 to 2015) of the HFA to be used for monitoring, measuring and reporting on DRR achievements.The HFA National Progress Query Tool is used for reviewing progress in implementing the HFA and assessing strategic priorities in the implementation of DRR in the five priority areas of action.

BACKGROUND TO DISASTER RISK REDUCTION STRATEGIES

Eastern Africa (EA) consists of the republics of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan and Somalia. The total population is about 133 million with an annual growth rate of 2.6 %. The region is prone to natural hazards, especially droughts and floods. Disasters have been known to retard and even reverse socio-economic development. Extreme weather phenomena occur with greater frequency and intensity in the region impacting on all development sectors such as water, agriculture and food security, infrastructure and transport, energy and health thereby threatening all the drivers of economic development. To address these impacts, the EAC secretariat developed a regional climate change policy and DRR framework to integrate and harmonize regional activities in response to disasters and climate change.

East African Community DRR Strategies

The EA region is prone to natural hazards such as floods, droughts, earthquakes, landslides, strong winds, and lightning together with their secondary impacts which include diseases and epidemics. Among these, drought, floods, landslides and epidemics are the most frequent disasters in the region. In order to address and effectively minimize the impacts of disasters in the region, legal and institutional frameworks are necessary along with other capacities required for this purpose. Furthermore, the East African Community (EAC) is part of the global community and hence needs to integrate DRR into its programmes and planning in line with the HFA and Africa's regional strategy.

The EAC DRR sub-regional platform was established in 2012 by EA member states. The five priority areas for the implementation of the EAC DRR framework were: development of an EAC DRRM strategy; resource mobilization for integration of DRRM into EAC plans and programmes; establishment of sub-regional DRR platforms; operationalization of a DRM Unit within the EAC secretariat; and DRR capacity development in the EAC.

The DRR strategies were based on the HFA which became the world's blue-print for DRR. The HFA's expected outcome was substantial reduction of disaster loss in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries.

The Africa Regional Strategy

The Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction was formulated through the initiatives of the AU, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), and consequently negotiated and approved by African countries in 2004. Subsequently, the Programme of Action for the implementation of the strategy was developed and adopted in 2005. Like the HFA, the strategic areas of intervention were identified as: 1) increased political commitment to DRR; 2) improved identification and assessment of disaster risks; 3) increased public awareness of disaster risk reduction; 4) improved governance of DRR; 5) integration of DRR in emergency response management; and 6) overall coordination and monitoring of the implementation of the strategy. DRR actions and plans by the AU and RECs in the above strategic areas have remarkable significance for Africa's DRR Strategy. The strategy argued that RECs and other stakeholders would have key roles to play in the implementation and monitoring of the strategy.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Despite making huge strides in their efforts in DRR by enacting national management legislation, EA countries especially are yet to have functional DRR mechanisms established. Disasters in EA are increasing in frequency, severity and impact. Weather, water and climate hazards dominate the disaster profile of EA, affecting on average around 12.5 million people per year. The region has experienced high levels of food insecurity, IDPs and refugee outflow from Burundi, Somalia and South Sudan due to upsurge in conflict. Continuing insecurity, multi-dimensional poverty levels, intensifying conflict, economic collapse and shrinking humanitarian space being experienced in areas such as the Greater Upper Nile in South Sudan and South-Central Somalia are major challenges to peace support operations (PSO).

In furtherance of their commitments to the HFA, the EA Governments were to take action to enhance DRR and adopt guidelines to reduce vulnerabilities to natural hazards. The HFA was to assist nations and communities to plan and make strategies to assist them become more resilient and cope better with the hazards that threaten to reverse development gains. Since the adoption of the HFA, EA nations have been implementing stategies aimed at reducing the damage and vulnerability caused by disasters and natural hazards through systematic efforts to analyze and reduce the impact of the factors behind such disasters. The strategies include reducing exposure to hazards, lessening vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, improving preparedness and institutionalization of early warning systems for adverse events.

Based on this background, this paper reviews the progress hitherto in implementing the HFA. The primary purpose of the tool is to assist countries and sub-regional organizations monitor and review their progress and challenges in the implementation of DRR and recovery actions undertaken at both levels in accordance with the priorities of the HFA or equivalent regional frameworks for disaster risk reduction.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What frameworks has the UN and AU used in disaster management in PSO?
2. What is the implementation progress of these frameworks in East Africa ?
3. What has been the impact of these frameworks on disaster management in PSO?

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

1. To analyse the frameworks used by the UN and AU in disaster management in PSO;
2. To assess implementation progress of these frameworks in East Africa; and
3. To determine the impact of the frameworks on disaster management in PSO.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

Over the past decade, the number of people affected by humanitarian crises has almost doubled and is expected to keep rising, with top-level emergencies and disasters being recorded in EA. Mega- disasters continue to occur more frequently and with more devastating effects in rich and poor countries alike.

Humanitarian crises continue to grow in scale and complexity, and humanitarian system and disaster management frameworks need to adapt to keep pace. This is critical for saving lives and for future avoidance or mitigation of disasters and hence the need to assess the impact of the UN and AU frameworks.

The UN developed OCHA's strategic plan which covered the period 2014-2017. The plan presented OCHA's vision, overarching goals and strategic objectives. Smaller-scale disasters, which are often cyclical and include droughts, floods and extreme temperatures, are also increasing. Small but recurrent disasters often cause more cumulative negative effects than larger disasters, but they receive less international attention and fewer resources.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The UN/AU Frameworks in Disaster Management in PSO

1.1.1 UN Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)

The HFA proposed five key priority areas for DRR implementation and identified actions to be used as benchmarks by governments. The priority areas are: 1) Governance and policy: ensuring that DRR was a national and local priority with a strong institutional implementation; 2) Risk identification and Early Warning: identifying, assessing and monitoring disaster risks and enhancing Early Warning (EW); 3) Use of knowledge, innovation and education: building a culture of safety and resilience at all levels; 4) Reducing underlying risk factors: focusing on environment, climate change, food security, gender, financial risk-sharing mechanisms and land-use planning; and 5) Strengthening disaster preparedness for effective response: provision of guidelines and indicators package. Since 2007, governments have been assessing their progress in the implementation of the HFA using the on-line HFA Monitor, over three biennial reporting cycles (2007-2009; 2009-2011 and 2011-2013). Governments have also benchmarked their performance in each priority area against 22 core priority indicators (PI) and have provided supporting documentation and means of verification. The accumulated collection of over 400 HFA Progress Reports since 2007 represents the largest public archive for understanding how countries address the HFA and the challenges, issues and opportunities that they face.

UNISDR examined HFA progress reports voluntarily submitted by countries in the 2009-11 and 2011-13 cycles. The first common challenge reported was insufficient levels of implementation for each monitored activity. A second common challenge highlighted by many countries was the need to strengthen local capacities to implement disaster risk management, including through establishing local-level mechanisms and risk assessments. A third challenge refers to how climate change issues are integrated into disaster risk management (DRM) (e.g. risk assessment, research, building codes, and land-use planning) given that climate change will lead to shifts in risk patterns. Fourth, DRM policymakers have difficulty in obtaining political and economic commitment due to other competing needs and priorities. Another common challenge refers to poor coordination between stakeholders, and lack of information sharing on risk assessment, monitoring and evaluation, early warning, disaster response and other DRM activities.

1.1.2 UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction

The Sendai Framework for DRR (2015-2030) was adopted by UN member states in 2015. It is the successor instrument to the HFA (2005-2015). The Framework is built on elements that ensure continuity with the work done by states and other stakeholders under the HFA and introduces a number of innovations. The most significant shift is a strong emphasis on disaster risk management as opposed to disaster management. In addition, the scope of DRR has been broadened significantly to focus on both natural and man-made hazards in environmental, technological, and biological domains. Health resilience is strongly promoted throughout.

There are five specific priorities which include: improved risk governance, better understanding of disaster risk, investing in resilience, and enhanced preparedness for effective response, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The Framework is the first major agreement of the post-2015 development agenda. Its impact over the next 15 years and beyond will depend on whether or not it hits seven global targets which include: substantially reducing disaster mortality, the number of people affected, economic losses and damage to critical infrastructure.

1.1.3 AU Disaster Management Frameworks

The Africa Regional Strategy for DRR was formulated through the initiatives of the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the UNISDR which was consequently negotiated and approved by the African countries in 2004. Subsequently, the Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Africa Strategy was developed and adopted in 2005. The Programme of Action was prepared with the overall goal of reducing social, economic and environmental impacts of disasters on African peoples and economies, thereby facilitating the achievement of the MDGs/ SDGs and other development aims in Africa. The strategic areas of intervention were identified as follows:

1. Increased political commitment to DRR.
2. Improved identification and assessment of disaster risks.
3. Increased public awareness of disaster risk reduction.
4. Improved governance of DRR.
5. Integration of DRR in emergency response management.
6. Overall coordination and monitoring of the implementation of the strategy.

At the regional level, Africa has made great strides. Several RECs have established DRR units. UNISDR has facilitated DRR expertise in the African Union Commission and has received and analyzed reports from 37 African countries since 2005. Across the region, there is a positive trend in the establishment or reform of institutional, legislative and policy frameworks for DRR, particularly for member countries of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC). In some cases, however, the lead institution for DRR is yet to bear sufficient influence upon all relevant sectors of government.

A number of RECs have made institutional advances in DRR. No less than five of these: the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), IGAD, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and EAC have developed DRR policies and/or defined strategies with UNISDR support based on the priorities for action of the HFA and the ARSDRR objectives.

1.1.4 EA Disaster Management Frameworks

The EAC Disaster Risk Reduction and management Strategy (DRRM) covered the period 2012-2016, addressing both natural hazards and human-induced disasters. The DRRM guiding principles focused on: addressing both natural hazards and human-induced disasters; coordinating and collaborating with other development sectors; mainstreaming the DRRM in development issues; formulating cross-border cooperation/collaboration mechanisms among partner states due to limitations of resources for coping with large-scale cross-border disasters; pursuing a collaborative approach by all relevant stakeholders including partner state governments, inter-governmental organizations, communities, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and development partners. Lastly, the stargegy focused on promoting research activities for indigenous knowledge within communities and low-cost measures in order to adopt and cope with disasters.

2.1.5 Existing EAC Instruments for Strengthening and Supporting the DRRM Strategy

Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC: the treaty provides for the strengthening and consolidation of co-operation in agreed fields that would lead to equitable economic development within the partner states and which would in turn raise the standard of living and improve the quality of life of their populations.

Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources: provides a proactive way of reducing risk and vulnerability and hence increasing the resilience of communities. Training communities to live in harmony with nature and natural ecosystems is currently being promoted as an ecosystem-based approach in disaster risk management. Articles 23 and 24 focus on combating desertification and mitigating the effects of drought and climate change. Article 35 on environmental disaster preparedness and management also stipulates the need for partner states to collaborate both in preparedness and response in order to effectively address environmental disaster emergencies.

Climate Change Policy, Strategy and Master Plan: the adverse impacts of climate change being aggravated by increasing average global temperatures are threats to almost all sectors of the economy in EA**.** To address these impacts, the EAC developed a Regional Climate Change Policy and Strategy Master Plan as a framework to integrate and harmonize regional activities in response to climate change in the EAC region. The main objective of these climate change tools was to institute and implement measures to improve the adaptive capacity and resilience of the EA region towards the negative impacts of climate change.

EAC Food Security Action Plan: EA largely depends on rain-fed agriculture thus making rural livelihoods and food security highly vulnerable to the consequences of climate variability and change. The EAC has developed a Food Security Action Plan to address food insecurity in the region in line with the provisions of the EAC Treaty as set out in Chapter 18, Articles 105 -110. One of the main objectives of the EAC as set out in the treaty is the achievement of food security and rational agricultural production. The Food Security Action Plan will guide coordination and implementation of joint programmes and projects emanating from this plan.

Strategy on Peace and Security: Article 124 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC recognizes the need for peace and security within the EA States. The same article spells out approaches for implementation in order to have a stable and secure environment within the region.

The EAC Development Strategy (2011-2016): the EAC's 4th Development Strategy defines the region's priorities and strategic areas of focus within the stipulated timeframe. The strategy has given priority to implementation of the HFA and the Africa regional DRR strategy and its plan of action. The establishment of this strategy is based on these two global and regional disaster management tools.

An assessment of its achievements and challenges indicates that EA has experienced institutionalization of regional mechanisms and programmes for early warning and disaster preparedness, conflict prevention and resolution, refugee management, and combating the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons. The performance indicators for coordination and strengthening of disaster management centres include: a DRR center established and equipped; a number of disaster assessments undertaken; adaptation and mitigation plans in place; disaster operational centres in place; harmonised disaster management legislation within EAC; and Centres of Excellence for training on disaster response and personnel put in place.

MEASURING UN DISASTER MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK GOALS AND INDICATORS

2.2.1 Hyogo Framework for Action Strategic Goals and Indicators

The UNISDR was mandated to serve as the focal point for the UN system in the coordination of DRR and to ensure synergies among disaster reduction activities, and assess strategic priorities in the implementation of DRR actions at country team levels. The UNISDR established five strategic goals and twenty two (22) indicators to assess the HFA.

This paper adopts the HFA Monitor which has been designed and enhanced for reporting cycles namely, 2007-2009, 2009 -2011, 2011- 2013 and 2013 - 2015. Secondary data was used to review the national process primarily continuous feedback mechanism for countries (Ref table 2). The data is the obtained from the national reported HFA progress and gaps in managing disaster risk for more resilient societies. It also helps capture key trends, areas of progress and challenges at all levels with regard to achieving the strategic goals of the HFA

In Table 1 below, each goal or priority area is represented by P1 for goal 1 to P5 for goal 5, while the core indicator in each priority area is represented by CI. Apart from priority area 4 (P4), which had 6 core indicators (CI – C6), the rest of the priority areas (P1, P2, P3, P5) had four core indicators each (C1 – C4). The assessment focuses on the extent to which the policies, programmes and initiatives have been implemented in achieving DRR's strategic objectives based on baseline indicators on levels of progress achieved in implementing the HFA's five priorities. The progress status for each indicator is measured on a Likert scale pointer of 1 to 5, where 1 is minor/no progress and 5 represents comprehensive achievement. Where data were not available for the reporting period, it is indicated as zero (0).

Table 1: Hyogo Framework for Action Strategic Goals and Indicators			
Goal	**Area of Focus**	**Code**	**Priority Indicators (PI)**
Strategic Goal 1	Making disaster risk reduction a policy priority, institutional strengthening	**P1-C1**	1. DRR included in development plans and strategies
	Ensure that DDR is a national and local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation.	**P1-C2**	2. Specific allocation of budget for DRR in the national budget
		P1-C3	3. Community participation and decentralization is ensured through the delegation of authority and resources to local level
		P1-C4	4. A national multi-sectoral platform for DDR is functioning
Strategic Goal 2	Risk assessment and early warning systems	**P2-C1**	5. National and local risk assessments based on hazard data and vulnerability information are available and include risk assessments for key sectors.
	Identify, assess, and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning	**P2-C2**	6. Systems are in place to monitor, archive and disseminate data on key hazards and vulnerabilities
		P2-C3	7. Early warning systems are in place for all major hazards, with outreach to communities
		P2-C4	8. National and local risk assessments take account of regional/ trans-boundary risks, with a view to encouraging regional cooperation on DRR
Strategic Goal 3	Education, information and public awareness	**P3-C1**	9. Relevant information on disasters is available and accessible at all levels to all stakeholders (through networks, development of information-sharing systems)
	Use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels	**P3-C2**	10. School curricula, education material and relevant trainings include DRR concepts and practices
		P3-C3	11. Research methods and tools for multi-risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses are developed and strengthened
		P3-C4	12. Country-wide public awareness strategy exists to stimulate a culture of disaster resilience, with outreach to urban and rural communities
Strategic Goal 4	Reducing underlying risk factors	**P4-C1**	13. DRR is an integral objective of environment-related policies and plans, including those for land use, natural resource management and adaptation to climate change
	Reduce the underlying risk factors	**P4-C2**	14. Social development policies and plans are being implemented to reduce the vulnerability of populations most at risk
		P4-C3	15. Economic and productive sectoral policies and plans have been implemented to reduce the vulnerability of economic activities
		P4-C4	16. Planning and management of human settlements incorporate disaster risk reduction elements, including enforcement of building codes
		P4-C5	17. DRR measures are integrated into post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes
		P4-C6	18. Procedures are in place to assess disaster risk impacts of major development projects, especially infrastructure
Strategic Goal 5	Preparedness for effective response	**P5-C1**	19. Strong policy, technical and institutional capacities and mechanisms for disaster risk management, with a disaster risk reduction perspective are in place.
	Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.	**P5-C2**	20. Disaster preparedness plans including contingency plans are in place at all administrative levels, and regular training drills and rehearsals are held to test and develop disaster response programmes
		P5-C3	21. Financial reserves and contingency mechanisms are in place to support effective response and recovery when required
		P5-C4	22. Procedures are in place to exchange relevant information during hazard events and disasters, and to undertake post-event reviews

(Source http://www.unisdr.org/2005/wcdr/intergover)

HFA GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OVERVIEW (2005 -2015)

This paper has used the UNISDR HFA online monitoring and review tool to asssess HFA implementation. This section covers the HFA implementaion progress strating with a global overview followed by the African region and lastly, the EA region. The first section is mainly for benchmarking and comparing the EA region with regional and global progress. The overview is based on individual country ratings regarding progress toward each of the HFA's strategic goals and the five Priorities for Action. As indicated above, the HFA was adopted by 168 countries with the aim of building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters. Based on UNISDR (2013), the section below gives a summary of the 168 countries that adopted the HFA. The progress is based on voluntary country-based self-reporting on full implementation reports.

2.3.1 Strategic Goal 1: Making DRR Policy Priority and Institutional Strengthening

Goal 1 had 4 indicators: **P1-C1** to ensure that DRR was a national and local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation. Consequently, DRR was to be included in national development plans and strategies; **P1-C2** - specific allocation of budget for DRR in the national budget; **P1-C3** - community participation and decentralization are ensured through delegation of authority and resources to the local level; and **P1-C4** to ensure that a national multi-sectoral platform for DRR is functional. Based on the five-point scale used to assess HFA implementation, the average score for Priority 1 was 3.4. Slightly less than half (49%) had substantial achievements albeit with limitations in capacity and resources. Few countries (2%) had action plans towards policy.

There has been significant progress in making disaster risk reduction both a national and local priority among the participating countries. Progress has been remarkable especially in establishing national policies and legal frameworks, having decentralized power and authority structures for resource allocation and increased public participation, and increased interest in establishing national platforms for DRR. However, a major challenge experienced was how to have effective action within the established legal and policy frameworks. The reason was that policy did not always translate into action. Furthermore, while several countries reported that they were aware of the need for investing in DRR, they were struggling to mobilize sufficient resources to do so. Figure 1, below, summarises global progress by 2016 in making DRR a policy priority.



Figure 1: Global Progress in making DRR a Policy Priority and Institutional Strengthening

2.3.2 Strategic Goal 2: Risk Assessment and Early Warning Systems: Identify, Assess and Monitor Disaster Risks and Enhance Early Warning

Goal 2 had 4 indicators **P2-C1** - national and local risk assessments based on hazard data and vulnerability information are available and include risk assessments for key sectors; **P2-C2-** systems are in place to monitor, archive and disseminate data on key hazards and vulnerabilities; **P2**-C3 -early warning systems are in place for all major hazards, with outreach to communities; **P2-C4** -national local risk assessments take into account regional/trans-boundary risks, with a view to achieving regional cooperation on DRR.

The average score for Priority 2 was 3.4. Just under half of the reporting countries rated their levels as "4", indicating substantial achievement. Despite having national plans on early warning systems as shown in Figure 2, only 2% of the countries had action towards plan or policy. One area of significant progress concerns regional and trans-boundary cooperation. New regional initiatives now offer additional opportunities for exchange that could help accomplish critical DRR goals while existing regional initiatives have attained significant advances. Another key achievement was implementation of risk assessment for critical infrastructures such as hospitals and schools.

One key challenge that is consistent throughout the country reports is lack of financial resources for accomplishing critical disaster risk reduction initiatives. The other reported challenges included lack of investments required to implement risk assessment capabilities fully across the country and not just in areas already known to be vulnerable. The second has been difficulty in applying the results of risk assessments to appropriate mitigation measures. Finally, countries need to coordinate their risk assessment and data collection efforts at both national and local levels as well as between sectors.



Figure 2: Global Progress in Identifying, Assessing and Monitoring Disaster Risks and Enhancing Early Warning

Strategic Goal 3: Education, Information and Public Awareness - Use of Knowledge, Innovation and Education to Build a Culture of Safety and Resilience at All Levels.

Goal 3 had 4 indicators: **P3-C1** - relevant information on disasters is available and accessible at all levels to all stakeholders (through networks, development of information-sharing systems); **P3-C2** -school curricula, educational materials and relevant trainings include DRR concepts and practices; **P3-C3** - research methods and tools for multi-risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses are developed and strengthened; **P3-C4** countrywide public awareness strategy exists to stimulate a culture of disaster resilience with outreach to urban and rural communities.

The average score for priority 3 has steadily risen to 3.2. Progress in using knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety has improved. The Key Accomplishment Country Report is a success in disseminating risk information to all stakeholders. Several countries reported success in compiling information and disseminating it to their stakeholders. They also recognized that better coordination of the flow of information and warnings related to disasters at national level could enhance effectiveness in building a culture of safety and resilience.

The key challenge, however, is finding an appropriate means of ensuring the right stakeholders receive accurate and timely information. Another challenge reported is that relevant existing risk information is not accessible to all stakeholders (see Figure 3).



Figure 3: Global Progress in Use of Knowledge and Education to Build a Culture of Safety and Resilience

Strategic Goal 4: Reducing Underlying Risk Factors

Goal 4 had 6 indicators: **P4-C1** – that DRR is an integral objective of environment-related policies and plans, including those for land use, natural resource management and adaptation to climate change; **P4-C2** - that social development policies and plans are implemented to reduce the vulnerability of populations most at risk**; P4-C3** – that economic and productive sectoral policies and plans have been implemented to reduce the vulnerability of economic activities; **P4-C4** – that planning and management of human settlements incorporate disaster risk reduction elements, including enforcement of building codes; **P4-C5** – that DRR measures are integrated into post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes; **P4-C6** – that procedures are in place to assess disaster risk impacts on major development projects, especially infrastructure.

The average score for priority 4 was 3.1. A key accomplishment reported by countries was modest success in integrating DRR into land use policies and plans. Although almost 70 % of the countries rated their levels at 3 or 4, thus indicating institutional commitment or substantial achievement, it is in this priority that the highest number of countries report minor progress. Lack of financial resources particularly among transitional countries is the major barrier to progress, especially at the local level. Figure 4 summarizes this information.



Figure 4: Global Progress in Reducing Underlying Risk Factors

Strategic Goal 5: Preparedness for Effective Response and Strengthened Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response at all Levels.

Goal 5 had 4 indicators**:** **P5-C1** - strong policy, technical and institutional capacities and mechanisms for disaster risk management within a disaster risk reduction perspective, are in place. **P5-C2** - disaster preparedness and contingency plans are in place at all administrative levels, and regular training drills and rehearsals are held to test and develop disaster response programmes; **P5-C3** - financial reserves and contingency mechanisms are in place to support effective response and recovery when required; and **P5-C4** procedures are in place to exchange relevant information during hazard events and disasters, and to undertake post-event reviews.

Most countries reported progress in Priority 5, with the average score over the three cycles being 3.4. Almost half the countries reporting in the 2011-2013 cycle rated their levels at 4, indicating institutional commitment. Many countries required local governments to establish disaster preparedness plans and regular training drills, although they did not provide adequate resources for doing so. The country reports show uneven results regarding local preparedness both nationally and regionally, with lack of financial resources often cited as a constraint.



Figure 5: Global Progress in strengthening Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response at all Levels

Based on the above analysis of HFA, global implementation of five of the most important drivers of progress has been put in perspective. Cutting across national borders, these drivers constitute a common framework for national progress.

They are: a multi-hazard, integrated approach to disaster risk reduction and development; adoption and institutionalization of gender perspectives on risk reduction and recovery; identification and strengthening of capacities for risk reduction and recovery; integration of human security and social equity approaches with disaster risk reduction and recovery activities; and engagement and partnerships with non-governmental actors, civil society and private sector at all levels.

AFRICAN REGIONAL OVERVIEW OF HFA IMPLEMENTATION

During the HFA's implementation period, Africa accounted for 67 droughts which affected 28 countries and over 120 million people between 2005 and 2014. More than 10 million people were affected by floods in West Africa in 2012 (7 million in Nigeria alone). Since 2000, over 14 million people have been affected by floods in southern Africa, with an average of 500,000 people affected every year by floods and cyclones between 2011 and 2014.

In particular, drought, floods and cyclones dominate the disaster profile of the Africa region, affecting on average around 12.5 million people each year. In the 10 years of the HFA, Africa has seen substantial flooding, such as in Nigeria in 2010 and 2012, Mozambique in 2007 and Namibia in 2009 and 2011, together with extreme temperatures across the Sahel. Drought is, perhaps, the dominant hazard. The 10 countries globally with the highest percentage of their population affected by drought are all African: Malawi, Niger, Swaziland, Somalia, Kenya, Eritrea, Djibouti, Zimbabwe, Mauritania and Lesotho. All of these have had more than 5% of their entire populations affected by drought annually.

Member states and the African Union Commission have demonstrated continuing commitment to disaster risk reduction by implementing the Extended Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (2006-2015). African Regional Economic Communities have made significant progress towards implementing the HFA. ECOWAS has been supporting its member states in coping with disasters in the sub-region and in building resilience in their populations and communities, including through substantial support to national platforms for disaster risk reduction and in coordinating partnerships.

ECCA adopted a disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation policy and associated strategies and programmes of action in line with the Africa Programme of Action and the HFA. SADC has developed a draft disaster management policy and an integrated plan of action in which its member states and partners are involved. IGAD is the first African regional organization to make the political shift from responsive drought management to a resilience approach. National disaster risk management policies and strategies are defined in nearly all IGAD countries.

The future is a complex one. Africa is home to seven of the world's ten fastest-growing economies and growth is likely to contribute to new risks through rapid urbanization and industrialization, intensive use of natural resources and degradation of eco-systems. Strengthening preparedness capacities to cope with crises and recover rapidly is therefore a critical element in building resilience, helping spearhead efforts to decrease vulnerability and reduce risk.

EA REGION HFA IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS (2005 -2015)

2.5.1 EA regional HFA implemenation per country

In EA, DRR plays a key role in several areas: environment and natural resources, peace and security, conflict, and economic development. The partnership between EAC and UNISDR (Regional Office for Africa) assists the EAC in strengthening and harmonizing DRR interventions within the region. This paper assesses HFA implementation based on 4 cycles (2007–2009, 2009–2011, 2011–2013, 2013-2015). The review is on the countries of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, South Sudan and Somalia. It is guided by three strategic goals: 1) Integrating disaster risk considerations with sustainable development policies, planning and programming at all levels, emphasizing disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness and vulnerability reduction; 2) Developing and strengthening institutional mechanisms and capacities, particularly in communities that contribute systematically towards improving resilience to hazards; and 3) Incorporating risk reduction approaches in designing and implementing programmes for emergency preparedness, response and recovery, including programmes for rebuilding the affected communities. As indicated in Figure 6, EA HFA (2005 -2015) average implementation level was 1.4, which was quite minimal or indicates no progress. The highest level of progress was reported in Tanzania at 3. The lowest level of progress was reported in Uganda at (1.1). Where data were not available for the reporting period, it is indicated by zero (0).

EA states have got in place some disaster management mechanisms and institutions at various levels of capacity but mostly focusing on disaster response rather than DRR. Many country and community disaster risk management has been based on emergency and crisis management or reactive (response) rather than proactive (preventive) actions. These have however been based on analysis of vulnerability, risk evaluations, and situational assessments with a view to mitigating disaster impacts.



Figure 6: EA HFA (2005 -2015) Overall Average Implementation Progress per Country

NB: Data were not available during that period for countries marked as 0.0.

Key

1: Minor progress with few signs of forward action in plans or policy

2: Some progress, but without systematic policy and/or institutional commitment

3: Institutional commitment attained, but achievements are neither comprehensive nor substantial

4: Substantial achievement attained but with limitations in capacities and resources

5: Comprehensive achievement with sustained commitment and capacities at all levels

LEGEND

BI	Burundi
KE	Kenya
RW	Rwanda
SO	Somalia
SS	South Sudan
SU	Sudan
TZ	Tanzania
UG	Uganda

EA HFA IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS PER GOAL (2005-2015)

2.6.1 Strategic Goal 1: Overview of Achievements

Making disaster risk reduction a policy priority and institutional strengthening

Goal 1 aimed at ensuring that DRR was made a national and local priority with strong institutional basis for implementation. Countries that developed policy, legislative and institutional frameworks for disaster risk reduction and are able to develop and track progress through specific and measurable indicators had a greater capacity to manage risks and achieve widespread consensus for engagement in and compliance with disaster risk reduction measures across all sectors of society. Based on the statistics in Figure 7, EA HFA (2005 -2015) overall implementation for Goal 1 was 1.4 which indicates minor progress with few signs of forward action in plans and/or policy. The highest level of progress was reported in 2013 -2015 (at 2.3). This suggests that some institutional commitment was attained but the achievements were neither comprehensive nor substantial. The lowest level of progress was reported in 2007-2009 (at 0.8). This indicted some progress but without systematic policy and/or institutional commitment.



Figure 7: HFA Goal 1 Implementation Progress in EA

Tanzania reported the highest (3.5) average implementation progress. All the other countries reported an average of below 3 with the lowest (0.2), being reported in South Sudan. Where data were not available for the reporting period, it is indicated as zero (0).



Figure 8: Goal I Implementation Progress per Country

2.6.2 Strategic Goal 2: Overview of Achievements

Risk Assessment and Early Warning Systems

Goal 2 aims at identifying, assessing and monitoring disaster risks and enhancing early warning. The starting point for reducing disaster risk and promoting a culture of disaster resilience lies in the knowledge of the hazards and the physical, social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities to disasters that most societies face, and of the ways in which hazards and vulnerabilities change in the short and long terms, followed by the actions taken on the basis of that knowledge. Going by the statistics in Figure 9, EA HFA overall implementation for Goal 2 was rated at 1.4. This implies minor progress with few signs of forward action in plans or policy. The highest rate of progress was reported in 2013-2015 (at 2.1). This suggests institutional commitment attained although achievements were neither comprehensive nor substantial. The lowest level of progress was reported in 2007-2009 (at 0.7).

This means minor or no progress and in turn little or no systematic policy and/or institutional commitment.



Figure 9: HFA Goal 2 Implementation Progress in EA

Tanzania reported the highest level (3.3) average implementation progress. Kenya, Burundi, and Rwanda reported some progress (2), but without systematic policy and/or institutional commitment. The lowest (0.8) was reported in South Sudan. Where data were not available for the reporting period, it is indicated as zero (0).



Figure 10: HFA Goal 2 Goal I Implementation Progress per Country

2.6.3 Strategic Goal 3: Overview of Achievements

Education, Information and Public Awareness

Goal 3 aimed at using knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels. Disasters can be substantially reduced if people are well informed and motivated towards a culture of disaster prevention and resilience, which in turn requires the collection, compilation and dissemination of relevant knowledge and information on hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities.

Figure 11 indicates that EA HFA (2005 -2015) overall implementation for Goal 3 was 2.1. This suggests there was minor progress with few signs of forward action in plans or policy. The highest level of progress was reported in 2013 –2015 (at 2.1). This means that there was some progress but without systematic policy and/or institutional commitment. The lowest level of progress was reported in 2007 -2009 (at 0.6). There was minor or no progress with few signs of forward action in plans or policy.



Figure 11: HFA Goal 3 Implementation Progress in EA

Tanzania and Kenya reported institutional commitment attained in education, information and public awareness on DRR, but achievements were neither comprehensive nor substantial (at 3.3 and 3 respectively). Burundi and Rwanda reported minor progress (1) with few signs of forward action in plans or policy. The lowest (0.8) was reported in South Sudan. Where data were not available for the reporting period, it is indicated as zero (0).



Figure 12: HFA Goal 2 Goal I Implementation Progress per Country

2.6.4 Strategic Goal 4 Overview of Achievements

Reducing Underlying Risk Factors

Goal 4 was aimed at reducing underlying risk factors. Disaster risks related to changing social, economic, and environmental and land use conditions as well as the impact of hazards associated with geological events, weather, water, climate variability and climate change are addressed in sector development plans and programmes and in post-disaster situations. Based on Figure 13, EA HFA (2005 -2015) overall implementation for Goal 4 was 1.5. This suggests that there was minor progress with few signs of forward action in plans or policy. The highest level of progress was reported in 2015 (at 2.2), indicating that there was some progress but without systematic policy and/or institutional commitment. The lowest level of progress was reported in 2009 (at 0.7), indicating minor progress with few signs of forward action in plans or policy.

Figure 13 HFA Goal 4 Implementation progress in EA

Goal 4 had slightly above-average implementation for Kenya and Tanzania as both reported some progress (at 2.9 and 2.6 respectively), but without systematic policy and/or institutional commitment. The rest of the countries reported below-average or minor progress with few signs of forward action in plans or policy. The lowest (0.8) was reported in South Sudan. Where data were not available for the reporting period, it is indicated as zero (0).



Figure 14: HFA Goal 4 Implementation Progress per Country

2.6.5 Strategic Goal 5: Overview and Achievements

Preparedness for Effective Response

Goal 5 aimed at strengthening disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. At times of disaster, impacts and losses can be substantially reduced if authorities, individuals and communities in hazard-prone areas are well prepared and ready to act and are equipped with the knowledge and capacities for effective disaster management. Going by the data in Figure 15, EA HFA (2005 -2015) overall implementation for Goal 5 was 1.4. This shows there was minor progress with few signs of forward action in plans or policy. The highest level of progress was reported in 2015 (at 2.2). This indicates some progress but without systematic policy and/or institutional commitment. The lowest level of progress was reported in 2009 (at 0.8) indicating minor progress with few signs of forward action in plans or policy.



Figure 15 : HFA Goal 5: Implementation Progress in EA

Goal 4 implementation for Kenya and Tanzania was slightly above average as they both reported some progress (2.8 and 2.5 respectively), but without systematic policy and/or institutional commitment. The rest of the countries reported below average meaning minor progress with few signs of forward action in plans or policy. The lowest (0.8) was reported in South Sudan. Where data were not available for the reporting period, it is indicated as zero (0).

Table 2: Summary of EA HFA Country Implementation Progress (2005 -2015) Per Strategic Goal																															
	2007 - 2009								2009 -2011								2011 -2013								2013 -2015							
	BI	KE	RW	SU	TZ	UG	SS	SO	BI	KE	RW	SU	TZ	UG	SS	SO	BI	KE	RW	SU	TZ	UG	SS	SO	BI	KE	RW	SU	TZ	UG	SS	SO
P1-C1	3	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	3	4	3	4	0	0	0	4	4	4	0	4	4	0	0
P 1 - C2	4	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	4	0	2	0	0	0	3	3	4	0	2	2	0	0
P 1 - C3	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	4	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	4	3	0	3	0	0	0	4	4	4	0	4	3	0	0
P 1 - C4	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	4	0	4	4	0	0
P 2 - C1	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	4	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	4	3	3	0	0	0	3	2	4	0	4	3	0	0
P 2 - C2	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	4	4	1	3	0	0	0	3	3	3	0	4	3	0	0
P 2 - C3	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	4	4	3	3	0	0	0	3	2	4	0	4	3	0	0
P 2 - C4	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	4	3	3	0	0	0	3	4	4	0	4	3	0	0
P 3 - C1	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	3	4	4	0	0	0	2	3	3	0	4	3	0	0
P 3 - C2	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	4	4	3	3	0	0	0	4	4	4	0	4	4	0	0
P 3 - C3	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	2	4	3	0	0	0	2	4	3	0	3	2	0	0
P 3 - C4	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	4	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	4	3	3	0	0	0	4	4	4	0	4	3	0	0
P 4 - C1	4	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	4	0	0	0	4	4	4	0	4	4	0	0
P 4 - C2	4	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	4	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	3	4	3	0	0	0	4	4	4	0	3	3	0	0
P 4 - C3	4	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	4	4	3	3	0	0	0	3	3	4	0	3	2	0	0
P 4 - C4	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	4	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	4	0	0	0	3	3	4	0	3	2	0	0
P 4 - C5	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	4	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	4	3	3	0	0	0	3	4	4	0	3	3	0	0
P 4 - C6	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	3	0	0	0	4	3	4	0	3	5	0	0
P 5 - C1	4	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	4	5	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	2	4	0	4	0	0	0	3	4	4	0	4	4	0	0
P 5 - C2	3	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	3	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	4	0	0	0	3	4	4	0	4	4	0	0
P 5 - C3	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	1	3	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	2	3	3	3	0	0	0	2	3	3	0	3	4	0	0
P 5 - C4	2	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	2	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	2	4	2	3	0	0	0	2	4	4	0	3	4	0	0

Key

0 : Data were not available during that period

1: Minor progress with few signs of forward action in plans or policy

2: Some progress, but without systematic policy and/or institutional commitment

3: Institutional commitment attained, but achievements are neither comprehensive nor substantial

4: Substantial achievement attained but with recognized limitations in capacities and resources

5: Comprehensive achievement with sustained commitment and capacities at all levels

IMPLICATIONS OF HFA (2005 -2015) IMPLEMENTATION ON PSO

In the 10 years of HFA implementation, Africa has experienced substantial disasters in climatic and hydrological hazards, in particular drought, floods and cyclones, which dominated the disaster profile of the EA region and affecting on average around 12.5 million people. Among the 10 countries globally with the highest percentage of their population affected by drought four are in EA and include Somalia, Kenya, Eritrea and Djibouti despite having implemented the HFA. Fragility and conflict have intersected with drought to complicate issues of risk and resilience (UNDP, 2015). From 2008 to 2011, Kenya and Ethiopia faced five severe droughts which affected over 17 million people. Uganda has experienced crises over an extended period of time through conflict and disaster, and this has weakened communities and institutions.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Based on the analysis done, this paper concludes that EA has achieved some progress in DRR in the five priority areas. In HFA P1, EAC developed its DRRM Strategy, a climate change strategy and master plan adopted by its policy organs. The EA Legislative Assembly is in the process of developing a DRRM Act. Most member states have developed/reviewed policies, strategies and plans and put in place institutions with dedicated staffs and resources for DRM, indicating increased awareness and commitment on the part of policy and decision makers. In 2011, EAC adopted the Ending Drought Emergencies Strategy (resilience strategy) leading to formulation of country and regional implementation programmes.

Most member states have systematically identified and documented information on major hazards and related disasters. Ethiopia has established a comprehensive risk assessment profile at the lowest administrative level. Most countries are in the process of establishing national disaster databases, especially on disaster losses. National early warning systems are in place in most member states (though not focusing on all prevailing hazards) with defined indicators, baselines, tools, systems and processes for regular monitoring. National

meteorological services, and the International Climate Prediction and Application Center (ICPAC) have been providing weather and climate-related information for DRR/DRM purposes. Risk transfer mechanisms connected to the national early warning systems are also being introduced in some countries although in most cases, they are still at micro-level and without clear policies and legal frameworks.

There is increased public awareness of DRR, higher learning institutions in some member states (e.g. Bahrdar University in Ethiopia, Makerere University in Uganda, Masinde Muliro and University of Nairobi in Kenya, Ardhi and Dodoma Universities in Tanzania) are offering undergraduate and post-graduate as well as short courses in DRR/DRM thus contributing substantially towards the professionalization of the DRR/DRM workforce.

Platforms for coordination of DRR/DRM efforts exist in most member states. In EAC, coordination is carried out through national platforms. However, recently, EAC has established and operationalized a sub-regional DRR platform. Efforts have been made to harmonize DRR/DRM policies, strategies, plans, mechanisms and institutions.

Most member states have food, non-food and cash reserves for use in times of disaster, which help facilitate integration of DRR into emergency management. In most member states, Emergency Contingency Plans are in place and are being tested through simulation exercises. Ethiopia has established a multi-donor trust fund to implement a multi-sectoral climate-resilient green economy.

EAC has also received similar support from ECHO, JICA, and UNISDR for the implementation of HFA. A range of partners provided similar support to member states which enabled them further enhance their coordination and monitoring capabilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering that the scale of vulnerability and exposure to natural hazards is expected to continue to increase over the coming decades mainly due to climate change and rapid economic growth, Africa may potentially face unprecedented large-scale crises. Strengthening preparedness capacities to cope with crises and recover rapidly is therefore a critical element of building resilience, helping spearhead efforts to decrease vulnerability and reduce risk.

The main challenges that need to be overcome include limited incentives and political will; gaps in technical skills and knowledge on climate and disaster risk across sectors; inadequate financing mechanisms for DRR; and the complexity of implementing multi-sectorial and multi-stakeholder approaches to address climate, disaster, environmental and conflict risks that interface in this region in protracted crises.

There is urgent need for increasing and sustaining public awareness and political commitment for DRR/DRM with particular emphasis on addressing the underlying causes of disaster risks (relating to PA 1,2,3,4,5,6); and supporting the integration/ mainstreaming of DRR/DRM into PSO policies, plans and programmes at all levels of government.

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CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF AU FIELD SUPPORT: CASE OF AMISOM

By Major Norah Koech & Sharon Kogo

Introduction

After attaining independence in the 1950s and in response to the various challenges contributing to insecurity in Africa, the newly independent African states formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963. Following the Sirte Declaration of 9 September 1999, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the African Union (AU) in 2002. The AU's objectives were more comprehensive and markedly different from those of the OAU. According to its vision at the time of formation, it had served its mission well but was due for replacement by a structure that could respond more strongly and effectively to the emerging needs of the continent. When it was formed, the AU instituted a comprehensive peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mechanism designed to contribute towards effective conflict prevention, management and resolution. The mechanism is institutionalized within the framework of the AU Constitutive Act and its Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

Following the unsuccessful interventions by the UN in Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994), many Western countries exhibited fatigue and reduced their involvement in peace initiatives on the continent. Indeed, these countries were accused of abandoning Africa to its own fate (Adebayo, 2008:131). The so-called "Africa fatigue" by the Western countries both motivated and necessitated the continent's leaders to step-up and devise 'African solutions to African problems'. Indeed, it is in this context that the African Union (AU) has mandated a range of peacekeeping missions such as the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), to respond to the complex conflicts that have engulfed the continent. Since 2007, AMISOM has been trying to stabilize Somalia against formidable odds mainly the presence of transnational terrorists and lack of adequate personnel and equipment. AMISOM is a peace-enforcement mission that by October 2013 had troops drawn from Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Sierra Leone and Djibouti. To date, AMISOM has had significant, albeit limited, achievements in addressing insecurity in Somalia. It has effectively evicted the militant and insurgent Al-Shabaab, credited with most of the insecurity in Somalia, from most major urban centers in southern Somalia, including the capital city, Mogadishu.

The Somali National Army (SNA) with the support of AMISOM captured Mogadishu on 9 December 2012. Other liberated areas include Baidoa situated in South-Central Somalia, and the port cities of Marka and Kismayo. After operating for 21 years without a central government and following the stabilizing of the security situation, Somalia saw the launch of a new interim constitution, the inauguration of a new Federal Parliament, and the swearing in of Mr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President of the Federal Republic of Somalia on September 10, 2012; the repatriation of Somali refugees from Kenya back to their country and recently, the unveiling of a schedule for the first free and fair elections to be held in November. These political and security developments are considered milestones in the stabilization of the country and have created hope that they herald the beginning of a broader political process that will involve and embrace the entire Somali population. Indeed, for the first time in a generation, a possibly safe, secure and prosperous Somalia, at peace with itself and its neighbours, seems more like a reasonable aspiration than a distant dream.

Research Questions

i. What has been the technical capacity of past and current AU PSOs to implement their mandates?

ii. What are the key limitations of AU PSOs?

iii. How have AU PSOs managed capacity challenges?

Objectives of the Paper

The objectives of this paper are to:

- Assess the technical capacity of past and current AU PSO to implement their mandates.
- Identify key limitations facing AU PSO.
- Evaluate how AU PSOs have managed capacity challenges.

Statement and Significance of the Problem

The growing conflict in Somalia has attracted the attention of the international community where different states and institutions are participating in terms of humanitarian or military intervention with a view to stabilizing the country. Currently, the country is going through intervention by the AMISOM. Due to the fact that Somalia has been a failed state for a long period of time, the past two decades have seen different interventions at different times by different states or intergovernmental organizations.

According to the Wisdom Fund (2001), the country had experienced different interventions led by different states with different intentions and interests. In December 1992, the U.S sent 28,000 soldiers with the intention of helping the Somali people who were starving. The mission was carried out under the name of the United Nations and was called the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The Somali community including men, women and even children living in Mogadishu aggressively resisted the presence of foreign troops in Somalia. The mission went on for ten months and resulted in the death of many people.

As mentioned by Civins (2010), the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), entered Somalia in 2006 with political support from the US. The objective of the mission was to give support to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against the increasingly powerful Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The intervention ended in 2009 with no clear success and bad consequences. The other intervention, which is the focus of this paper, started in 2007 and is still ongoing. This intervention is being carried out by the African Union and has been named the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM is AU's third peacekeeping mission established with approval from the United Nations.

Theoretical Framework

Thomas Hobbes' 'social contract' and 'consent of the governed' theory is one of the theories of state formation that explains sovereignty and security from a bottom-up perspective. The Hobbesian perspective presents the basis of political authority as lying in mutual agreements among the citizenry. The search for security and other mutual societal gains is done by sacrificing the unlimited individual freedoms which at times endanger mutual peaceful co-existence of every member of the society. Thus, the issue of sovereignty is analysed from the perspective of consent as opposed to coercion while security is believed to be guaranteed as long as that authority is not absolute but voluntarily established (Brons, 2001: 40-44).

On the other hand, the top-down approach argues in exactly the opposite direction by emphasizing the importance of force. Force theory, as explained by David Hume and Ibn Khaldoun, contends that state formation and the subsequent sovereignty are outcomes of usurpation and conquest rather than consent. A brief overview is given of the nature of the process of post-colonial state formation in a number of African and Asian countries. Its main argument is that force is the source of the state's sovereign powers.

It presumes that the survival of the post-colonial state is always dependent on external sources than the consent of the ruled. In a ruler-ruled relationship, sovereignty (and hence, security) will always be at stake when such external support is reduced or terminated. This weakens or leads to the actual demise of the state (ibid: 45-47).

Literature Review

From its inception in 2007, AMISOM has come under scrutiny by different scholars and institutions. As expected, opinion on the performance of AMISOM has been varied. On the one hand, there are those who claim that the mission has made significant contributions in stabilizing the country. On the other, there are those who offer criticism of the mission. In June 2013, Cecilia Hull Wiklund, in a report titled 'The Role of the African Union Mission in Somalia: AMISOM – Peacekeeping Success or Peacekeeping in Regress?' argued that AMISOM, facing most of the challenges of other AU missions, lacks the military resources, capacity and funding, as well as the institutional capacity to manage its operations. She concludes that these factors had prevented AMISOM from fulfilling its mandate and, as a result, the mission had done little to contribute to the overall security situation in Somalia other than securing the Airport, the presidential palace and the road in between the two.

In January 2015, the AU Commission chairperson, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, expressed her deep appreciation of our peacekeepers, for their heroic contribution to peace and to service of their continent and its people. She went on to say that we should have a monument for our AU peacekeepers who have lost their lives in the duty of the peoples of the continent. This means that AMISOM's fallen peacekeepers deserve to be publicly recognized for their sacrifice. AMISOM's contributing countries should name their fallen peacekeepers and ensure that their families receive the compensation they are due, as written in the AU's agreements with its contributing countries.

The Global Field Support Strategy

The overall intention of the Global Field Support Strategy is to transform service delivery to field missions. It is designed as an integrated comprehensive programme that draws on the lessons learned from several decades of operational experience. The strategy is designed to achieve four core operationally-focused objectives that consider the impact of field missions' deployment. The core objectives are to:

(a) Expedite and improve support for peacekeeping including critical early peacebuilding;

(b) Expedite and improve support for peace-making, electoral assistance, mediation and conflict prevention.

(c) Strengthen resource stewardship and accountability while achieving greater efficiencies and economies of scale.

(d) Improve the safety and living conditions of staff.

The AMISOM mission objectives are to:

a) Fully utilize local and regional investment and capacity.

b) Reduce the in-country environmental impact of peacekeeping and field-based special political missions.

A piecemeal approach is not an option. The strategy brings for consideration of member states key proposed changes aimed at improving the full spectrum of service delivery. On the one hand, it provides fast, complete and flexible support to the civilian, police and military components deployed in the field. On the other, it ensures cost-effectiveness and transparency. This strategy proposes a new global service-delivery model. It foresees, in a departure from existing practice, a fundamental shift in the existing division of labour and a relocation of functions to improve responsiveness and better address the needs of field missions. The intention is guided by three assumptions:

i. That the Secretariat would continue to set strategic direction, exercise oversight and take policy decisions, and get out of the business of operational and transactional service delivery.

ii. That global and regional service centres would take over the majority of operational and transactional functions.

iii. That the mission support component of field operations would thereby be reduced, with only location-dependent activities performed in specific mission locations.

Department of Field Support

The Department of Field Support (DFS) in the UN provides dedicated support to peacekeeping field missions and political field missions. DFS provides support in the areas of finance, logistics, information and communication technology (ICT), human resources and general administration to help missions promote peace and security.

DFS has seven main offices:

a) Office of the Assistant Secretary-General;

b) Field Personnel Division;

c) Field Budget and Finance Division;

d) Logistics Support Division;

e) Information and Communications Technology Division; and

f) Policy Evaluation and Training (PET) Division

g) The United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi (UNLB).

Capacity of Past and Current AU PSO

The capacity of an organisation to undertake peace and security activities depends on the constitutional provisions of its mandate so as to become active and the institutional mechanisms through which it can function and exercise that mandate. The constitutive Act of the AU clearly states that one of the objectives of the AU is "to promote peace, security and stability in the continent". The AU, therefore, has a legal mandate to engage in peace and security. An assessment of its capacity therefore would not be complete without thorough scrutiny of its peace and security operations profile. During the third meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) held in Addis Ababa in 2003, a policy framework for the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) and Military Staff Committee (MSC) was adopted. This committed the AU to setting up an ASF to serve as a rapid reaction force comprising 10,000 persons by 2010 (8,000 military and 2,000 civilian). The intention was that Africa should possess the capability to act promptly upon request by a member state or when the AU decides that a situation is serious enough to warrant intervention to save lives and prevent a crisis from escalating.

The AU has deployed troops in response to conflicts in various parts of Africa since its formation. However, this is no easy task, those involved in the set-up of these missions would share the frustration expressed by Major-General Frank van Kappen, the former military advisor to the UN Secretary-General who said:

> "…the planning of peacekeeping operations is the ultimate challenge because you never know where you have to operate; you never know what they want you to do; you don't have the mandate in advance; you don't have forces; you don't have transport; and you don't have money. We always have to start from zero. Each and every operation that we start, we start with nothing."

Apart from planning, the speed of deployment and sustenance of these troops on the ground is crucial in the achievement of a given mandate. An assessment of the capacity of the AU to plan, deploy and sustain forces therefore becomes important. By exploring the AU's previous missions, this paper investigates its successes and failures and interrogates the strategies used that could be used to draw the lessons learnt. This will help improve service delivery in current and future AU missions such as AMISOM.

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed in Sudan in July 2004 to monitor an AU-brokered N'djamena ceasefire agreement between the initial two rebel groups and the government of Sudan. Due to the continued violence, the mission turned into a full peacekeeping mission. The mission originally had the specific objective of prioritizing civilian protection by facilitating the save delivery of humanitarian aid and monitoring the N'djamena ceasefire agreement (ICG, 2005a, p.3; ICG, 2005b, p.4). As attacks on civilians continued unabated and the AMIS mandate changed to accommodate the changing realities, the strength of the force was increased. From force strength of 1,000 men, AMIS I troop level increased to 3,320 and reached 7,731 for AMIS II (Jooma, 2006: 6). Notwithstanding the transformation that AMIS underwent, the security situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate as parties to the conflict did not cease violating the provisions of numerous agreements that they had entered into (Saka, 2007 p.138). Worst still, AMIS lacked the capability to enforce those agreements. The apparent incapability of AMIS to carry out its mission mandate appeared to stem from the various problems confronting the AU and its peacekeeping missions.

The AU, however, was struggling with financial problems at that time and while a donor conference in Addis Ababa in 2005 helped raise funds to sustain the peacekeepers through that year and into 2006, in July 2006, the organization indicated it would pull out at the end of September when its mandate expired. Eric Reeves (2007), a critic of the AU peacekeepers and a research analyst in Sudan, observed that "these forces were largely ineffective due to lack of funds, personnel, and expertise." AMIS also suffered from problems of inadequate logistics and equipment essential for it to carry out its mandate. The peacekeepers were clearly under-armed. The under-funded and badly equipped AU mission was set to expire on 31 December 2006 but was extended to 30 June 2007 and merged with the UN in October 2007 to form the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The situation was ably captured by Makinda and Okumu (2008) in their description of the AU intervention in Darfur:

> "…the deployment of the AU mission in Sudan faced enormous problems...there were few countries with soldiers trained in peace operations of the Darfur nature, where there was also no peace agreement to implement, the AU lacked equipment and only had a few vehicles and tents and no aircraft…it took a while before the donors provided the promised equipment some of which was incompatible. When countries such as Rwanda and Nigeria offered troops, there was a logistical problem of transporting them to Darfur. Rwanda tried to send 300 soldiers...it was forced to postpone the deployment as preparations to house them had not been made".

The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)

The AU authorised the establishment of AMIB in April 2003 for an initial period of one year. Although it was the first fully-fledged AU peace operation, AMIB was essentially a merger of South African's SAPD troops with those from Ethiopia and Mozambique. Its mandate was to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, support the disarmament and demobilisation initiative, contribute to political and economic stability, and create conditions necessary for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission. The AU expected to fund AMIB's budget from pledges and donations from western donors. Overall, donor pledges of US$50 million fell short of the actual budget, which was estimated at $134million at the end of the fourteen months of AMIB. Besides, an international trust fund to assist AMIB received only US $19 million from donors. As Agoaye (2004) notes,

> …at both the strategic and operational levels, it is equally pertinent to note that the establishment and deployment of AMIB was affected by considerable challenges. The mission's logistical sustainment and funding was particularly problematic, owing to lack of substantive support from within Africa, as well as from the UN and the international community to provide requisite assistance.'

Due to the lukewarm international response to the financing of AMIB, South Africa ended up providing the bulk of the funding. Resource constraints hampered AMIB's ability to significantly contribute to the stabilization of Burundi through effective disarmament and demobilization. This resource shortfall was fundamentally addressed by the fact that the AMIB was a limited time-bound institution, awaiting deployment of a UN Security Council-mandated peacekeeping mission (Boulden, 2013). Had it proceeded to be a long protracted mission, the AU would not have sustained its field support operations due to poor funding. Having determined that the situation in Burundi constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region (and with the AU having intervened to restore the security situation), the UN Security Council (acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter - Resolution 1545) established the United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB) to support and help to implement the efforts of both the AU and Burundians in restoring lasting peace and bringing about national reconciliation under the Arusha Agreement. ONUB successfully completed its mandate in December 2006.

African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA)

The African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) was an Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) organized military mission sent to support the government of Mali from Islamist rebels. In June 2012, the ECOWAS Commission began discussions on the possibility of deploying a stabilization force to re-establish state authority in northern Mali. The UN and external donors provided support to ECOWAS's planning. The Malian army, ECOWAS, and the AU all requested that the UN Security Council authorize deployment of an ECOWAS stabilization force with a peace-enforcement mandate (under chapter VII of the UN Charter) to restore the country's territorial integrity and also secure its borders, while the Malian army would attempt to re-establish state authority. The concept behind the operations of the ECOWAS force was refined at two meetings involving senior Malian military officers, ECOWAS, Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, AU, UN, and other partners such as France, US and the EU, in Bamako in August and October-November 2012. From here there emerged a harmonized concept of joint operations, the "strategic operational framework", which sought to align the plans of the Malian army with those of a sub-regional force, the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).

The joint mission would back the poorly-equipped 5,000-member Malian army in three phases: build its capacity; recover occupied parts of the north of the country, and reduce the terrorist threat therein; and facilitate transition to stabilization activities in order to consolidate state authority in northern Mali. The plan also stressed the importance of longer-term security sector reforms of the Malian army, and intervention by international organizations and governments in the Mali crisis. Both ECOWAS and AU leaders endorsed the plan in November 2012 and asked the UN Security Council to authorize support for AFISMA's 3,300 troops with infantry units, air assets, and police units for an initial one-year period. The force was authorized in December 2012 in a resolution drafted by France (ECOWAS, 2012) with the UN Security Council urging AFISMA forces to take all necessary steps to rebuild Mali's army; help the government to extend its authority to the north; protect civilians; and help stabilize the country after military operations (UN, 2012). In order to ensure efficient deployment of AFISMA to Mali, the AU asked for a logistical support package to be provided to the mission through assessed UN contributions as had occurred with the AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur in 2007.

The plan was good on paper but would be difficult to implement in practice given the logistical and financial challenges of sub-regional armies, along with Nigeria's multiple commitments with respect to peacekeeping efforts. From the Congo crisis, Nigeria had contributed both military and police personnel to more than 40 peacekeeping operations in Africa and across the world. During the onset of the conflict in Mali, Nigeria had contingents of military, police, and civilian personnel in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Darfur. Additionally, AFISMA was mandated to train, equip, and provide logistical support to the Malian army but it could hardly equip or provide logistics to sustain itself in the field without substantial external assistance. Due to its rather severe limitations, the AFISMA mission was not well received by the UN as reflected in Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's reports to the UN Security Council, despite the fact that it was clearly time for last resort measures, as only military force would dislodge the hardened militants in Northern Mali. He continually warned that ill-conceived intervention by AFISMA could worsen the situation on the ground, while noting that the deployment of such a force could result in human rights abuses. He also persistently cautioned that AFISMA troops would have to be "held accountable" for their actions and called for UN human rights monitors to be deployed to effectively "police" AFISMA peacekeepers (The Namibian, 2012).

Instead of providing AFISMA with logistics and funding, the UN was more concerned with human rights observance.

By March 2013, the consolidated appeals process to secure funding for the AFISMA mission to support Mali had received only US$73.3 million, representing only 20 percent of its US$368 million target (UNSC, 2013: 5). While the UN Secretary-General was hesitant to provide the logistical support package that AFISMA requested, the provision of such support would have been in the interest of not just the West Africans but also the entire international community, including particularly powerful western states like France and the US (UNSC, 2013: 4). In further undermining AFISMA's viability, Ban Ki-Moon called for funding of its military operations to be done by bilateral or voluntary contributions, a clearly unsustainable approach for such a dangerous mission. Similarly, he authorized France to intervene only if the UN troops were under serious threat.

AMISOM-Somalia

Somalia is a classic example of a"failed state". A failed state is a country without a functional government or state apparatus and in which violence, insecurity, and human suffering characterize daily life. This has produced an on-going humanitarian crisis: basic problems of hunger, extreme poverty, large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and refugees. In addition, the rise of Islamic extremists and terrorism in the mid-2000s and fluidity of the transitional federal institutions have further exacerbated the situation. Following three years of civil war and decades of dictatorial rule under Siad Barre (1969-1995). Somalia has been without a central national government since 1991, which led to the creation of different local institutions to fill gaps of governance in essential areas during the past 20 years (Devlin-Foltz, 2010). Neither the UN missions (UNOSOM I -1992-1993 and UNOSOM II -1993–1995) nor the United States-led Unified Task Force (1992–1993) dubbed 'Operation Restore Hope' were able to resolve the disruption caused by the various feuding clans and disarm the warring factions (Murithi, 2012a).

Islamic militants have since then established control over large areas through the use of force but have been unable and/or unwilling to provide basic services to the population (Østebø, 2012). Nevertheless, communities in Somalia became "experts at the art of survival and adaptation" (Menkhaus, 2004: 163). Until 2006 and despite the absence of a central government,"Somalia had functioning local markets, a sustained economic boom, positive development in welfare indicators, relatively stable currency, informal financial services, considerable private investment and trans-border trade with neighbouring countries" (Kurtulus, 2012: 1287).

The social contract between the people and their local governance structures is crucial for survival of those at the bottom of the society (Leonard and Samantar, 2011). A 2005 AUPSC and UNSC-authorized IGAD-led peacekeeping mission was never deployed due to lack of political will and capacity to deploy peacekeepers, the fact that IGAD's Charter did not have a provision for the deployment of such a mission and the absence of consensus among the various Somali factions (Murithi, 2012a). This prompted Ethiopia to invade Somalia in 2006 to strengthen the Transitional Federal Institutions which were created in 2004, but actually further fuelled instability and encouraged the emergence of local armed militia to confront the perceived occupation (Murithi, 2009). In fact, Ethiopia's failure to concentrate on stabilizing Somalia and instead focusing on a military approach made it rather unpopular among the Somali public and generated not only more popular support for Islamist extremists but also pushed them closer towards Al-Qaeda (Devlin-Foltz, 2010; Leonard and Samantar, 2013). The persistence of violence and enduring state of insecurity in Somalia has produced unbelievable human suffering by preventing humanitarian intervention and relief work, breeding a fertile environment for clan-based armed militias and spilling over into neighbouring nations and regions with an influx of refugees into Ethiopia and Kenya, and fuelling piracy in the Indian Ocean (Murithi, 2012a).

To consolidate regional governments, international actors have occasionally supported regionally dominant warlords who only had an interest in fighting domestically and securing resources for their selfish agenda (Leonard and Samantar, 2013). Altogether, these problems have made it difficult for the Somali people to differentiate between well-intentioned actors and others (Bueger, Stockbruegger and Werthes, 2011). The Djibouti peace process started in early 2008 and led to the formal signing of the Djibouti Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, an Islamist coalition of opposition groups, in the presence of UN, AU, EU and US officials in the same year (Williams, 2009b). In the Agreement's 11 points, both sides agreed on ending the 18 years of fighting and withdrawal of Ethiopian troops along with the deployment of an international stabilization force that does not include troops from neighbouring countries. Furthermore, it paved the way for an expansion of parliament to include opposition and civil society representatives (Apuuli, 2011).

Two months later, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1844 in which it threatened action against any activities that would endanger the Djibouti Agreement (UNSC, 2008).

On 6 September 2011, the involved parties agreed on a roadmap that led to the formal establishment of federal government institutions and the election of a president one year later (Schmidt, 2013 ; Williams, 2013a). In general,"the two-decade-long conflict in Somalia has been a crisis of governance, greed, and grievance, and the issueof oil exploration certainly has the potential to continue the trend" (Reitano and Shaw, 2013: 675).

Somalia has divided analysts into two camps: one emphasizing the predictability of crises and considering disaster as fate, and the second underscoring the preventability of crises and seeing them as tragedy (Menkhaus, 2007). Nevertheless, the example of Somalia shows that crises lead to a state of evolution that may offer the opportunity for a country or community to "emerge from the ruin of war into something worthy of the expression 'post-conflict"'(Menkhaus, 2004: 163). The case of Somalia is particularly unique in the sense that external actors attempt to create a state that has literally ceased to exist (Leonard and Samantar, 2011). The chaos is further magnified by the secessionist aspirations and overlapping border claims of Puntland and Somaliland, two regions in the North of Somalia (Walls, 2009). We next focus on the mission and mandate of AMISOM. However, it is important to underline that AMISOM is not only the sole AU-led peacekeeping operation launched between 2007 and 2012, but also the AU's biggest and most complex one that has emerged as a central focus on workable AU–EU–UN cooperation with regard to peacekeeping (Boutellis and Williams, 2013). In other words,"although all the AU's peace operations have faced difficult challenges, its mission in Somalia, AMISOM, has arguably been placed in the most perilous position of all" (Williams, 2009c: 107–108).

Key Limitations Facing AU PSO

The AU, unlike UN, does not have a logistics base and neither does it have a department dedicated to field support operations. It instead relies on troop-contributing countries' (TCCs) self-sufficiency and support from donors and the UN in its missions. Apart from lack of funding, reliance on outside partners, poor state of equipment, command problems and relationship issues with its partners, the AU struggles with management issues at the headquarters. The following sections discuss the key challenges and makes suggestions on sustainable solutions.

Funding

The search for a balance between the inability and unwillingness of AU member states to provide resources to AU peacekeeping and the overwhelming dependency on external, non-African support remains the biggest challenge for AU peacekeeping (Cottey, 2008; Williams, 2009c). An efficient field support system should be well-funded. Activities such as airlifts and logistical support are expensive. Personnel also need to be well-remunerated so as to keep their morale high and facilities such as hospitals need to be provided and stocked with the right equipment and medical supplies**.** In the agreement for deployment of AMISOM, the TCCs were to initially sustain themselves pending reimbursement from the AU. However, with the AU's meagre resources in its peacekeeping budget, the TCCs continued to shoulder the burden while some like Uganda and Burundi looked for direct partners such as US and France to fund their deployment, operations and training. Security Council Resolution 1863 (2009) called for a UN Trust Fund to be established to financially support the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and assist in the re-establishment, training and retention of Somali security forces in order to enable them fulfil the role foreseen of them in the Djibouti Agreement. Some of the money pledged by donors at the International Conference on Somalia Security Sector and Support to AMISOM was to be put into this Trust Fund. The Fund provides for improved coordination and transparency in applying voluntary contributions to the much-needed enhancement of the Somali security forces. Since the UN could not deploy as foreseen and requested by the AU, AMISOM benefits from a UN logistical support package, bilateral donations, and this Fund. The EU also provided the resources needed for payment of troop allowances and other related expenses within the framework of the African Peace Facility.

During the annual joint meeting of the Ministers of Finance and Economy of the African Union in Brussels in 2011, Commissioner Piebalgs confirmed the European Commission's support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by announcing an additional EUR 65.9 million to help keep the peacekeeping force in place and provide them with the means to do their job more easily, including medical care and transport. The EU however said it would reduce the budget to the mission from January 2016 by 20 per cent because of financial constraints. This means that the EU will give €20 million every month up to June while AMISOM requires about $300 million a month. AU officials met with AMISOM partners in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to discuss how to avoid "duplication and waste" of functions in Somalia.

Speaking at the heads of state conference for the TCCs, Kenya's President Kenyatta said that he was disappointed at the failure of the international community to live up to its obligations, having forgotten that AU was in Somalia on behalf of the United Nations. Reacting to EU's step to reduce support, the president said "whereas the continent is footing the bill of stabilizing Somalia by blood and flesh, it is disheartening that the international community is even contemplating to reduce support to AMISOM."

A meeting of the AU's subcommittee on audit matters held in Addis Ababa heard that the AU could not execute some of its planned programmes because of the late receipt of funds or lack of them from donors. The meeting concluded that "only programmes that have secured funds from partners should be included in the union's budget" and "the commission should ensure compliance with the signed contribution agreements entered with the partners". The AU's financial problems are further compounded by the fact that some member states fail to pay their dues. The organisation collected $84.6 million from member states last year (much less than the anticipated $138.5 million), a 67% rate of collection. Its international partners paid $67.1 million instead of the expected $287.7 million, a mere 23% of the pledges made. South Africa is one of the biggest contributors among the AU members, but more is expected. The AU summit in 2015 decided that six countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Egypt and Libya) should increase their contributions because they are considered to be wealthier than their other African counterparts. They are expected to cover 60% of the AU budget, starting from 2016. The AU's Budget Execution Report for January to December 2014 stated that, "despite high approved budgets, the funds released and the contracts/terms of engagement signed by the development partners were too insignificant. "This low commitment from the partners left the AU with a huge budget deficit."

The Report added that other ways of funding have to be established in order to increase the funds available to carry out the AU's activities because only 67% of member states' contributions were received, "which affects implementation of the activities financed by the member states. There are also outstanding balances amounting to $39.5 million brought forward from the previous year's assessed contribution". It proposed forming a committee to visit the member states that owe the AU money and convince them to pay their contributions and arrears. According to the Report, "…there is a need to revise the scale of assessment to ensure that the contribution to the AU budget is spread among more than five member states in order to reduce the burden of the current five member states that contribute 75% of the total AU assessed contribution."

Over-dependence on External Support

In terms of cooperation between the AU, EU and UN, structural imbalances derive from the fact that the AU is still a young organization with institutions under formation and less peacekeeping experience vis-à-vis the EU and the UN (Derblom, Frisell and Schmidt, 2008). The development of AU peacekeeping capabilities is a slow process that will require sustained long-term international assistance (Cottey, 2008; Cottey and Forster, 2004). Logistical support for AMISOM was primarily based on the model of operational self-sustenance by TCCs that was first practised in Burundi (AMIB). However, AU membership includes states with limited resources and the Burundi model has proven to be problematic. In reality, before getting UN logistical support, the TCCs to AMISOM were far from being self-sustaining and therefore in need of not only logistical support but also equipment, airlifts and training from partners. Uganda's deployment was supported by the US which provided airlifts, equipment, procurement of supplies and logistical sustenance in the mission area. The UK financially supported Burundi while France provided training. Such over-dependence on external support or assistance by both the AU and its TCCs to sustain its functions in PSOs has had a high impact on the attitude of the member states. Their financial contributions have remained at a minimum because they expect funding from other actors such as the UN and NATO.

Low Institutional Ability to Manage Operations

The number of staff employed by the AU is small compared to the organisation's ambitions which subsequently make the personnel carry multiple responsibilities. The Peace Support Operation Division (PSOD) which is responsible for planning, managing and deploying AU PSOs, as well as conflict mediation and post-conflict reconstruction, has only nine staff members. This is compared to the 630 personnel employed by the UN's Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO). Sustaining an effective field support requires a functional and well-resourced human capital at the headquarters. There is a general consensus that the Department of Peace and Security (DPS) is understaffed and many more personnel and operational tools are needed to handle the increasing volume, complexity of work and frequency of PSC meetings. More troubling is the fact that the department has been suffering from high turnover with many of its most competent officials continuously being poached by other international institutions such as the UN and the African Development Bank. The DPS in particular and AU in general have become a training ground for the UN.

The allure of bigger pay and less work has led some of the ardent pan-Africanists and senior professional staff to abandon the AU for the UN. There is therefore a need to strengthen the capacity of the headquarters in terms of human resource numbers and expertise but there are no funds directly dedicated for this. When outside partners have lent financial support to the AU, it has been aimed at direct operations leaving its institutional capacity underdeveloped. Critics of the AU also say that the organization lacks the capability to utilise funds.

Equipment

The Burundi model being used in the initial deployment of AMISOM meant that TCCs should be self-sufficient in terms of equipment. There being no standard set for the equipment needed in the field, the TCCs brought their diverse variety of equipment hence the troops from different countries had difficulties integrating under AU. African nations possess an array of armaments, from WW II vintage rifles to modern jet fighters. Countries of origin of these weapons are diverse and include the United States, Germany, North and South Korea, Iran, China and the former Soviet bloc. The continent has also several home-grown weapon-makers mostly manufacturing small arms but with some having the capability of more complex items such as missiles. South Africa had at one point even developed nuclear warheads, though these were purportedly dismantled nearly two decades ago. There are numerous reasons for such a diversity of weapons sources. Some countries deliberately followed a policy of purchasing from various countries in order to diversify their suppliers. Some turned to the former Soviet bloc when the West imposed arms embargoes for human rights abuses. Others shopped around for the best deal: tanks from this country, artillery pieces from that.

This wide array of equipment can create numerous problems for a joint force. Four main problems may be mentioned. First, a senior commander from one nation may be unfamiliar with the capabilities of the equipment from another, a problem amplified when that other nation's forces are put under his command. Not knowing ranges of artillery pieces, speeds of armoured cavalries, or lift capabilities of aircrafts could be disastrous during combat. Second, communication becomes difficult when various transmitters and receivers of different vintages from a variety of manufacturers are pressed into service. This can easily lead to orders not being properly communicated to troops, and battlefield assessments not being relayed to commanders. Third, sharing of ammunition as well as spare parts for broken armaments can present challenges.

At the small arms level, it is not so much of a problem as the AK-47 is rather ubiquitous on the continent, but for larger items such as tanks, which could have been manufactured in China, Russia, US or somewhere else, cannibalizing parts for repairs or obtaining rounds can be problematic. Fourth and finally, there is little or no cost savings from volume discounts for ammunition or parts because many African countries use different weapons. Had there been agreements to purchase the same type of item, say a mortar, then the purchasing countries could have used their buying power to leverage the supplier for a better price per unit.

TCCs are also largely under-equipped yet the nature of the peace operation in Somalia is highly unconventional and the area of coverage huge. As such, troops need highly sophisticated equipment such as tanks, armoured personnel carriers, AMVIS and NVGs and most importantly a superior air power using drones and the most stealthy and agile jets.

Posture of the AU Force

Competition with the AU for military manpower is another limiting factor. Other organizations such as the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) draw upon African nations for soldiers for their operations. ECOMOG, created by ECOWAS, is a multinational force comprising the militaries of several West African nations, notably Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia. Like the AU, ECOMOG has experienced problems such as poorly-equipped soldiers and, prior to 1999, military commanders answering to leaders back home instead of a central command. At times, there appears to be an endless number of African conflicts, some lasting a relatively short period of time and others that seemingly drag on year after year. Whether it is the AU, UN, or ECOMOG forces that are called in as peacekeepers, it is a nearly impossible task for the member countries to meet the force requirements of so many operations. Government fears of political fallouts are also the reason for inadequate and/or slow troop commitments. Ugandan peacekeeping troops were shelled during their welcoming ceremony in Somalia. Had there been any fatalities in their mission (which was already controversial among the Ugandan people), political pressure could have been brought to bear on the Ugandan government to bring the troops back home, effectively ending their mission as soon as it began. With a limited number of troops available to the AU and the huge areas they have to cover in some missions, the strength of the force is often too disbursed for any effective and sustainable field support.

For example, the Darfur mission had so many challenges for the AU. First was monitoring and sustaining an effective field support for an area roughly the size of France. The area covered by AMISOM in Somalia is equally big for the number of personnel available.

The strength of AMISOM's uniformed personnel currently stands at 22,126. This includes both troops and police. Along with the current Force Headquarters staff of 81, the military component has 5,432 troops from Burundi, 1,000 from Djibouti, 3,664 from Kenya, 850 from Sierra Leone, 4,395 from Ethiopia and 6,223 from Uganda. However, the area of coverage remains so vast for this relatively small number of troops and given the reluctance of some countries such as Ethiopia to occupy some of the areas which fall under their sector, the distance between the camps is so huge it has become difficult for the troops to provide operational or even logistical backup for each other. There are also mobility challenges brought about by constant attacks, ambushes and IEDs planted on the roads which make troop resupply and evacuation in times of distress such as medical evacuation difficult. The area is also too vast for the limited air support available to cover effectively. President Kenyatta stressed the urgent need for the mission to deploy troops in all the designated areas which deployment could be effected through a reorganisation of the current posture or a troop surge to enable the establishment of an effective presence that guarantees sustainability of AMISOM current success on the ground and further liberation of areas under the terrorists."

Command Problems

Command problems are experienced mainly at the level of senior officers, between clan leaders, warlords and the official military commanders. War is divided into different levels in the military doctrine and for good reasons and the speed and scope of future conflicts appear to justify more authority in the hands of unit-level commanders, not less. Unnecessary review of target lists and interference in tactical decisions must be eliminated. In situations in which political concerns are significant, higher levels of command must provide clear guidance to subordinate commanders and trust them to act with good judgment. Commanders must resist the temptation to allow loyalty to their parent service or community to influence the development of the best plan or force structure. Likewise, political leaders must resist the temptation to let everyone play and unnecessarily widen the field of actors.

The largest AU-led operation appears to be a collection of national contingents reporting to their capitals instead of the force commander or the AU special representative.

The implementation of this provision is thus quite challenging. Past experiences show the unwillingness of Kenyan or Ethiopian forces on the ground to submit to AU command. This situation makes it difficult for the mission leadership to ensure effective management and utilisation of troops and resources available in the different contingents. There is need therefore, to enhance command and control capabilities, especially the ability to co-ordinate ethnically and culturally diverse forces.

Complex Relations between the AU and Partners

Today, complex conflicts involving extremism, transnational crime, and asymmetrical tactics require the AU, sub-regional bodies and the UN, together with partners such as the EU, to field robust, agile and decisive operations based on an integrated system of response among multiple actors. They should also invest greater effort in prevention as the best means of effective conflict management for conflicts not to break out. Indeed, Africa and its international partners need to ask themselves how they allowed the CAR, which displayed sufficient signs of fragility, to once again slide into chaos. Deploying troops may sometimes be important to avert a crisis, but their effectiveness in the field will depend so much on how much support they get. Thus, before any deployment, questions of sustainable field support should be answered to avert massive loss of lives like that which has visited Ugandan, Rwandan and Kenyan forces in Somalia. In its tenth anniversary, the AU has become more assertive and wants to be the principle voice for Africa, but it has to balance this with its limitations and recognise that there are other important and equally strongly-willed, actors. The AU wants to be treated as an equal partner by the UN Security Council, but for a number of reasons, the five permanent council members want greater oversight and will not sacrifice their soldiers in African wars.

The Africanization of peacekeeping in Africa, therefore, has gradually increased since 2000 and has taken an innovative turn with UNAMID, the first hybrid (joint) AU-UN mission in Darfur and now AMISOM. The problems with the joint model have been widely acknowledged, even by the AU mainly because of lack of balance in the division of labour. Nevertheless, the UNSC, as well as the Department for Peacekeeping Operations, must realise that international peace and security are squarely within its responsibility and when regional actors such as the AU step up this cause, it should receive maximum support both financially and logistically.

When all actors understand that this is not a contest of might and capability, then, working together will become much easier. Since no particular architecture has provided meaningful solutions to world peace and security crises on its own, alternative thinking is required.

Addressing AU Capacity Challenges in PSO

For many years, UN peacekeeping missions have been performed by peacekeepers from underequipped, ill-prepared developing countries whereas the nations with the best equipped and skilled armies have been reluctant to put their soldiers at risk, provide equipment and other resources, or cover the cost of operations. Although some analysts applaud the support given by the western countries to the AU and its member states to help overcome the significant challenges and gaps facing the organisation, others view the support differently (Peter, 2003). For instance, some observers argue that western states have merely encouraged the AU to take on the struggle of peacekeeping in places where western forces are not willing to deploy and take on tasks beyond the AU's capabilities.

If African states have the political will to undertake PSOs in Africa with whatever troops available, then, this is clearly the best way of addressing African conflicts. However, the basis of division of labour, where Africans undertake missions supported by outside states is that partners assist African states in supplying the same kind of equipment and develop the same kind of standards needed to ensure the same kind of safety as they would to their own troops (Holt, 2007). The idea is that bilateral partners place the same requirements on African troops as they would place on their own, but that they would also provide them with similar resources and proficiency as their normal armies. This should be the case not just in terms of logistics but also in areas such as human rights training and gender issues. Thus, the argument that Western states merely sit back while Africans take all the risks is unfair. If the same standards can be achieved, then, there is no reason for western states to intervene. In addition, if Western powers insisted on getting involved, it would constitute another impingement of Africa.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The African Union is yet to command or deploy enough trained troops, money and political will to effectively intervene in all of Africa's conflicts. The probability that all these factors will change in the immediate future is quite low. Even when a force can be assembled, additional problems limit their functioning as a unified entity with effective command and control. Language, religion and other factors frequently divide them and sustaining effective field support under such circumstances is difficult. Geopolitics also dictates which nations may contribute soldiers to which missions. Mandates that impede rather than facilitate peacekeeping minimize the forces' impact. Yet, despite all of these obstacles, the AU is expected to make and/or keep the peace on the continent. Many of the soldiers who have served in these operations have done so bravely and with honour. Some have paid with their lives. The African Union Mission in Somalia would benefit from predictable levels of funding, required mission enablers such as air and maritime assets, as well as enhanced capabilities for analysis, planning, and management. This calls for a review of AMISOM's mandate to match Al-Shabaab's mode of warfare.

The AU should also work with international bodies such as the UN in order to improve logistical capabilities, especially transport and communications, secure and train with modern equipment, enhance troop training emphasizing joint force operations, and include an effective component on respecting human rights and pursuance of clear mandates that facilitate rather than impede the flow funds and access to and use of modern equipment. This should go juxtaposed with efforts towards providing AMISOM with facilities derived from improved intelligence capabilities such as sophisticated maps. Finally, the AU should learn from past peace operations, both successful and not, and apply these lessons to future operations. These are not easy changes to make. They will entail much debate, and perhaps even loss of some AU members who are unwilling to accept certain provisions. However, they are the minimum requirements for the creation of an AU force that can effectively intervene in conflicts. Without such an entity, foreign powers, even previous colonial powers, might enter the void with funds and/or forces to once again dictate the policies and futures of African nations instead of having the latter develop and implement their own solutions to their own problems.

Recommendations

Partner engagement with AMISOM should not be viewed only from the financial standpoint. For instance, AU should note other forms of support to Somalia, such as the EUTM, OP, support to coastal communities and other forms of support to development in the country. Moreover, in addition to the multi-lateral support for the mission, there is significant support available bi-laterally P/TCC, Mission HQ and AU PSOD, particularly to facilitate the transition from offensive to stability operations.

Funds should be made available for peace support in Africa. The AU needs to develop a source of dedicated funding, such as through taxes, tariffs, and/or fees, to support military training and operations of AU forces. On that, it has proposed possible levies to increase the organisation's finances.

There is need for division of labour among partners within the mission. A recommendation was made to nominate lead nations for sectoral engagement in Somalia. Moreover, there is need to delineate the responsibilities of FGS, UN and AU in implementing the FGS security reform. The AU is the future of security in Africa and a more united continent will be a more secure one. After fifteen-plus years of varied bilateral and multilateral initiatives focused on strengthening Africa's capacity to manage its own crises, there should be a review of what has been achieved and what can be made to work better. UN-AU relations have improved, at least in peacekeeping, although the UNSC's failure to reform its membership structure and tensions over the ICC militates against this. Nonetheless, the UN's decision to bolster its office to the AU (UNOAU) with an Under-Secretary General at its head is a significant step. The pressing need is not for African solutions as such. It is for improving cooperation by defining a clearer division of labour based on an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of all relevant actors: national, sub-regional, continental and international.

Prior to sending an AU peacekeeping force for an operation, the AU should realistically determine its capability to succeed as well as its ability to protect itself. Given that the demand for missions in Africa is high, the forces available should also be deployed properly so as to have a concentration of force and effective use of the limited logistics capabilities for each nation and this will ensure that the contingents provide both tactical and logistical backup for each other. The AU should ensure that AMISOM fully deploys troops in their respective areas of jurisdiction, especially in the Gedo region, and review sector allocation.

The AU should also solicit for support from UN and international partners in providing the necessary force multipliers to AMISOM for better field support capabilities.

There is need for an effective AMISOM command and control in order to achieve synergy of the Mission's efforts against Al Shabaab. Therefore, AMISOM contingents need to fully support the force commanders for effective and accountable command of all military units and equipment assigned to the Mission under the overall leadership of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and AMISOM Head of Mission. Finally, there is need for better co-ordination of operations and logistics through the establishment of enhanced mechanisms and structures, as appropriate, between AMISOM and UNSOS.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF KEY MESSAGES IN THE ISSUE BRIEFS

Evaluating Disaster Management Frameworks in PSO in Eastern Africa

- For the UN and AU, disaster management frameworks in PSOs are based on the UNISDR. Governments have benchmarked their performance in each priority area against 22 core priority indicators (PI) and have provided supporting documentation and means of verification.
- HFA progress reports by countries in the 2009-11 and 2011-13 cycles reported 5 common challenges namely: insufficient levels of implementation for each monitored activity; the need to strengthen local capacities to implement DRM; integrating climate change issues into DRM; difficulties in obtaining political and economic commitment due to other competing needs and priorities.
- In East Africa, implementation of HFA was based on the Programme of Action prepared with the overall goal of reducing social, economic and environmental impacts of disasters on African peoples and economics, thereby facilitating the achievement of the MDGs/SDGs and other development aims in Africa.
- Across the EA, there is a positive trend in the establishment or reform of institutional, legislative and policy frameworks for DRR, particularly for member countries of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC).
- The impact of the frameworks on disaster management in PSO by the AU.
- The EAC DRRM) covered the period 2012-2016 addressing both natural hazards and human-induced disasters. This includes the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC; Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources; Climate Change Policy, Strategy and Master Plan; EAC Food Security Action Plan; and Strategy on Peace and Security.

Capabilities and Limitations in AU Field Support: Case of AMISOM

- The AU is an organization formed to replace its predecessor, the OAU. On many fronts, the AU has outshone its predecessor. However, the union is struggling with many challenges that include lack of funding, lack of equipment, lack of institutional capacity to handle funds and a myriad of command and Complex Relations between the AU and Partners.

- If the call for African solutions to African problems by the AU is to see the light of day, the AU states must renew their commitment in terms of funding the affairs of the organization. They cannot expect western countries not to interfere in African problems yet they are the ones funding, just as the saying goes, "he who pays the piper calls the tune". Due to the many challenges that the AU faces, it does not have the capacity to effectively conduct field support in AMISOM and other missions. Instead, it relies on a model where individual troop-contributing countries are supposed to be self-reliant in the field (Commonly known as the Burundi Model).

- With the availability of funding, the AU could pursue a model similar to that of the UN with a complete logistics base and money to hire equipment not only from African states but also outside.

  As a matter of urgency, the AU should reconsider the state of AMISOM field support because the heavy loss of life in Somalia is mainly due to lack of effective field support.

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