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Contemporary International Terrorism and Its Implications on PSO: Case of AMISOM and MINUSMA

Distance Decay, Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Kenya

Effective Strategies for Responding to Contemporary Conflicts in Eastern Africa

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Foreword

The International Peace Support training Centre (IPSTC) is a research and training institution focusing on Peace Support Operations (PSO) capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The centre has evolved to become the regional Centre of Excellence for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa.

IPSTC addresses the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated PSO by describing the actors and multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research conducted covers a broad spectrum ranging from conflict prevention through management to post-conflict reconstruction. The Centre has made considerable contribution in training and research on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa through design of training curriculum, field research and publication of Occasional Papers and Issue Briefs. The Occasional Papers are published annually, while the Issues Briefs are produced quarterly. The issue briefs are an important contribution to the vision and mission of IPSTC. The First Quarter Issue Brief No. 1 (2016) focuses on two emerging areas which are becoming of increasing interest with respect to peace and conflict in Eastern Africa: *Contemporary International Terrorism and its Implications on PSO: the case of AMISOM and MINUSMA* and, secondly, *Distance Decay, Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Kenya.*

The Issue Brief provides insights into the dynamics of peace and security concerns in the region that are valuable to policy makers, and aims to contribute to the security debate and praxis in the region. The articles in the Issue Brief are envisaged to bolster the design of the training modules at IPSTC. The research and publication of this Issue Brief has been made possible by IPSTC.

Brigadier P. M Nderitu

Director, IPSTC

Acronyms

AAD	Ansal al Sadine
ACSS	Africa Centre for Strategic Studies
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQIM	Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
CBO	Community Based Organization
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
CT	Counter Terrorism
CTC	Counter Terrorism Committee
CVE	Counter Violence Extremism
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
HIPPO	High Level International Independent Panel on Peace Operations
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICPAT	IGAD Capacity building against Terrorism
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
INTERPOL	International Police
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali
MOJWA	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PSO	Peace Support Operations
RVE	Radicalisation and Violent Extremism
SNP	Somali National Police
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
UK	United Kingdom

UN	United Nations
UNDOC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNGCT	United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar

Introduction to the Issue Briefs

This first quarter issue brief addresses two aspects key to peace and security concerns in the Eastern Africa region. The first paper examines *Contemporary International Terrorism and its Implications on PSO: the case of AMISOM and MINUSMA,* and the second paper explores *Distance Decay, Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Kenya.*

In *Contemporary International Terrorism and its Implications on PSO: the case of AMISOM and MINUSMA,* the author examines the complexity and challenges of Counter Terrorism (CT) and Counter Violence Extremism (CVE) in PSO in terrorist infested countries of Mali and Somalia. He traces the UN's record of terrorists' challenges on its missions, evolution of robust PSO and the current mandate, doctrinal, principle and conceptual challenges of dealing effectively with CT and CVE. The study also highlights specific and contextual implications of terrorism on PSO in both countries. The research identifies key areas of concern such as, the threat of attack on UN/AU missions and humanitarian organizations, loss of credibility associated with support of given combatants and diversion of efforts from long term peacebuilding and development where the UN has comparative advantage. The study calls for review of the UN/AU conceptual and operational guidelines on dealing with CT/CVE in PSO.

The second paper examines distance decay as a possible motivator of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (RVE) in Kenya. It is premised on the argument that social habitat characterized by socio-economic and political deprivation and exclusion provides a climate of legitimacy and implicit support for RVE. Social movement approach and relative deprivation theory have been utilized to provide an in-depth understanding of the main variables. Conditions that constitute distance decay in Kenya include historical marginalisation; uneven development and economic opportunities; poor/lack of public services; ungoverned, or poorly governed areas; unemployment; frustrated expectations; political exclusion and denial of political rights; weakening of traditional family structures; injustice; impunity; and endemic corruption among others. These grievances are predominantly experienced by communities in the North Eastern and Coastal regions as well as residents of urban informal settlements. Many inhabitants of these areas have interpreted the grievances as abandonment, alienation, and collective victimization by the Kenyan government and mainstream society. This has brought feelings of hopelessness, frustration, and resentment towards the government and other communities which do not appear to be facing the same grievances. The paper concludes that there is need to address the socio-economic and political grievances faced by various communities in

Kenya in order to successfully curb RVE susceptibility. This should include deliberate efforts of enhancing growth and development in areas that have historically been marginalized. It should also encompass multi-sectoral response and cooperation with specific focus on practical, effective and long term strategies aimed at strengthening institutional underpinnings of human development, economic growth and security throughout the country.

Contemporary International Terrorism and Its Implications for PSO: the case of AMISOM and MINUSMA

Joseph Kioi Mbugua

Introduction

Though terrorism is an old tactic of warfare, it has assumed other dynamics occasioned by transnational organized armed groups taking advantage of global advancement in transport infrastructure, weapon and information technology. International terrorism in the modern age has also assumed a religious dimension.

The Sahel and the Horn of Africa complex conflict systems are located along the Saharan conflict/climatic/religious dividing belt. These regions have been providing new frontiers for global counter terrorism war with enhanced French and United States (US) cooperation (Reeve, R. & Polter, Z, 2014). The Sahel is a vast region, the size of USA, comprising twelve countries, with a population of about 200 million people. The region has a number of active armed groups. The root cause of the conflict is not yet well addressed. The United Nations (UN) has been caught up in partisan mission against a significant number of insurgent groups (Reeve, R. & Polter, Z, 2014). There are concerns that stabilization and peace enforcement missions may be breaking away from the core United Nations (UN) charter, mandate, doctrine, and principles. There are also fears that external military support may boost undemocratic regimes in Mali, Mauritania and Algeria.

In the Horn of Africa region, global concerns with Somalia resumed after the September 11 terrorists attack in New York. There were growing fears that terrorists would find opportunities to thrive in ungoverned spaces of fragile states. As a result, the US, the United Kingdom (UK), France, the European Union (EU) and other development partners initiated counter terrorism, security and state building programs. Though the power of terrorists has been significantly reduced and a government is operating in South-Central Somalia, the country is still far from stability.

Nations and international organizations have come up with ways and means of Counter Terrorism (CT) and Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) albeit with mixed levels of success. The UN has currently deployed in transnational terrorists affected areas. However, Peace Support Operations (PSO) such as African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and UN

Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) are operating in fragile states, which require rebuilding or strengthening of social and security institutions in order to protect civilians. This is because, military means alone, is inadequate to respond to the prevailing challenges. In missions such as the ones above, there is overlap among peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter terrorism and war; on the other hand, war on counter terrorism has changed the nature of PSO. In particular, PSO have assumed responsibility to protect (R2P) as a moral principle that calls for more robust operations in cases where there is ever increasing threat of genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Consequently, in 2006, the UNSCR 1674 for protection of civilians was adopted (Pearson, 2008).

Understanding the nature of transnational threats in Peace Support Operations (PSO) is crucial for the UN and African Union (AU) as they are called upon to assume state stabilization in complex emergencies. The assessment of the MINUSMA and AMISOM cases provides insights into the challenges and offer lessons for the UN, AU, and Troop Contributing Countries (TCC), Humanitarian organizations, PSO Training and research institutions.

This study focuses on the frontiers of CT in PSO knowledge and practice with specific reference to AMISOM and MINUSMA. The study provides analysis of UN and AU PSO, MINUSMA and AMISOM in a bid to showcase current status and dynamics and presents recommendations to improve counter terrorism in PSO praxis.

Research Objectives

a. To analyze the nature and dynamics of terrorism in peace support operations focusing on AMISOM and MINUSMA

b. To examine the implications of counter terrorism to PSO in Africa

c. To evaluate strategies of counter terrorism in PSO

Research Questions

a) What are the nature and dynamics of terrorism in peace support operations especially in AMISOM and MINUSMA?

b) What are the implications of counter terrorism to PSO in Africa?

c) How can counter terrorism strategies be more effective in PSO?

Statement of the problem

The complex and multifaceted nature of terrorism and its consequences for PSO threatens national, regional and global peace and security. Responding to terrorism in countries where there are UN or AU PSO missions is becoming a critical issue for the smooth operation and success of these missions. The UN and AU are neither primarily designed to deal with terrorists nor are PSO mandated to engage in such combats. There are vexing questions about the options for UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) given that they are assigned areas where terrorism is the modus operandi. A number of challenges can be noted:

The traditional UN doctrine may not be appropriate for such challenges? Use of parallel forces preceding, serving alongside or coming after UN forces such as the French operation Serval and Barkhane has not been formalized in PSO praxis? The question still remains as to whether, parallel operations/missions compromise UN impartiality.

Abrogation of peacekeeping principles may result in unintended consequences such as putting humanitarian staff at risk and reprisal attacks against missions as was the case in Mali and Somalia. Using force to support one side of the conflict makes the missions appear partisan and use of force to support the government may compromise sustainable peacebuilding whereby UN would be expected to mediate between the parties.

Current missions are state centred while terrorists operate across borders. Combating terrorists in one country may have significant spill-over effects on neighbouring countries as it has happened in Mali and Somalia.

Currently academics and practitioners have not developed a common position on the role of PSO in counter terrorism despite deployment of missions such as AMISOM and MINUSMA. This study will contribute to the broad understanding of the factors at play in the PSO and CT realms and shed light on implications for current and future missions.

Theoretical Framework

This study assumes a relationship between the following variables: terrorism, counter terrorism, parallel forces and their consequences on PSO.

The principle of 'Double effect'

This ethical/moral principle states that although actors are responsible for the harmful side effects that are caused by their actions; actions that produce undesired effects are

permissible as long as the following conditions prevail:

a) The primary goal of the action is legitimate
b) The side effects were not intended
c) The side effects are not a means to a desired goal
d) There was conscious efforts to address side effects
e) There was no foreseeable alternative to prevent or reduce side effects

The principle maintain that actors can engage in activities that lead to unintended/ undesirable or harmful outcomes even when the action/s are ethical, legitimate and meant to achieve positive results (Reichberg & Syse, 2004).

Double effect implies that actors are accountable even to the undesired outcomes of their actions. It means that actors can stop or change their actions if the undesirable outcome can be foreseen. If such actions are continued irrespective of their outcome, actors can be held responsible (Bomann and Larsen, 2004). This principle can be applied in the implementation and evaluation of PSO and Counter Terrorism. It can be used to inform policy and programmes before they are implemented or to analyse policies and programmes that have been implemented. This lens will be applied in understanding peace operations and counterterrorism in AMISOM (Somalia) and MINUSMA (Mali).

Hypotheses

- The UN/AU interpretation, policy, strategy and practice of counter terrorism will determine effectiveness of peace support operations
- UN/AU PSO engagement in counter terrorism against actors in conflict may have undesired effects
- UN/AU PSO association with parallel forces-states or regional, may also generate undesired outcomes

Conceptual Framework

Figure 1: Counter Terrorism in PSO



Source: *Author's impression of T/CT/PSO Relationships*

The role of PSO in counter terrorism and relationship with host government and international forces determines its successes or failure. PSO will bear consequences based on their perceived policies, affiliations and practice.

Literature Review

The CT and PSO literature reviewed offers different paradigms. Some of them support the hypotheses of this paper about the demerits in the use of CT in PSO while others cite effective cases of operations.

Some CT/PSO literature focus on evaluating mandate and appropriateness of the UN and Regional Economic Communities (REC) operations such as the AU to engage in CT (Cietto, 2012; Mauricio, 2014; Karin, 2014; ICG, 2014; Karlsrud, J, 2015a&b; Bruce, 2015). Though the mandate has evolved over time providing more leeway for robust operations, it is still not clear whether and how the UN can effectively engage in CT.

Pearson (2008), asserts that a difference should be made between protection of civilians and counter insurgency operations, and argues that the UN use of force against spoilers or people out to threaten security of civilians is legitimate. The article maintains that the UN should engage in counter insurgency. However there is a thin line/grey area between CT and protection of civilians.

Other literature also address challenges of PSO in terrorists affiliated conflicts and alternative approaches to addressing CT in PSO environment (Mauricio, 2014; Karin, 2014; Ingerstad & Magdalena, 2015). They point to blowbacks associated with poor engagement with terrorists, such as vulnerability of civilian staff and humanitarian workers.

Other resources also address terrorism and CT/CVE in general examining trends, dynamics and implications for peace and security (Artinano Mauricio et al, 2014; Ferreiro, M, 2012). CT has been evolving especially since September 11, 2001, but there is still no universal standard practice.

Research has also focused on region or mission specific review such as that of Somalia/AMISOM and Mali/MINUSMA (ICG, 2014; Bruton & Williams, 2014; David, 2003). Literature also examines the global policy and institutional framework that informs CT (Rosand, Millar & Ipe, 2009; USDS, 2015; UNODC, 2016).

There are also reports on independent national focus on CT or coalition of the willing and their relationship with PSO (Hippel, 2004; Reeve & Polter, 2014; Ingerstad & Magdalena, 2015). Some authors cite success in a number of cases such as Sierra Leone, Mali, Somalia and Eastern DRC, while others refute credibility of such precedents.

Though these different prisms offer insight into the current state of affairs in PSO and CT, there is no adequate comparative study on the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. There are evolving dynamics of terrorism/CT/PSO practices that merit continuous evaluation of current missions such as MINUSMA and AMISOM in order to inform policy and practice in the field.

Defining Operational Concepts

Terrorism

Terrorism refers to any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing an act (UN, 2004). Terrorism is a weapon/tactic of warfare employed by relatively weaker parties to pursue political or ideological agenda. Terrorism target non-combatants and is aimed at achieving both social and political objectives. For maximum propaganda effect, terrorists target assets that can attract media attention. They also engage in kidnapping, robberies, assassinations and surprise attacks.

Terrorism was a successful weapon of war after the Second World War, in cases where insurgents sought to liberate countries from colonialism, for example, the National Liberation Front (FNL) in Algeria. It made the British withdraw from Palestine, Cyprus and Aden (Wilkinson, 2000). Due to a coalescing of a number of factors such as economic and military exhaustion of France and Britain and the political cost of maintaining colonies, terrorism became an effective weapon. This strategic win of terrorism has not been replicated in later incidents though it has become a more audacious form of political violence, partly due to effectiveness of the strategy in making use of limited resources with high impact and media publicity, releasing political prisoners and extortion of large sums of money (Wilkinson, 2000).

Terrorists from the 1990s and beyond assumed a radical religious dimension, the majority among who profess Islamic beliefs. This new phase has seen an increase in personal sacrifice (suicide) as a strategy of pursuing a holy mission. This tactic was also used by secular insurgents such as; Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey and Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. The religious terrorists such as al-Qaeda, Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are also driven by political goals such as the establishment of Islamic republics and control of territory (Wilkinson, 2000).

There has also been a juxtaposition between terrorism and drugs trade such as in West Africa, to finance operations. The emerging forms of terrorism are more lethal, amorphous, diffuse, complex and difficult to analyse and combat (Wilkinson, 2000). This metamorphosis poses challenges for PSO meant to keep peace where there is no peace to keep such as in Somalia and Mali.

International and Transnational Terrorism

This refers to the cross border illegal use of or the illegal threat of using force or violence against persons or assets with the intention to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in order to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives. International terrorism is considered a threat to international peace and security and is a crime in international law.

Counter Terrorism

Counter terrorism consists of military efforts to defeat particular actors who have been identified as terrorists/spoilers and/or their sponsors. It may also include law enforcement

approaches as well as aspects of tackling the root causes of the problem, often described as Counter Violence Extremism (CVE) (ICG, 2014). CVE is conventionally understood to be comprehensive, inclusive, demand driven (contextualized) and supposedly incorporates preventive and anticipatory measures. In its preventive domain, CVE is intended to address structural causes and aggravating factors (catalysts) that create grievances and thereby violent extremism.

Asymmetrical conflict/warfare

This refers to a conflict where one or more parties are not recognized as international legal persons (rebels, militias, guerrillas and insurgents); where there are no territorial boundaries between fighters, no distinction between civilians and combatants and where the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the Law of Armed Conflicts are not observed. In such conflicts, parties have unequal power and therefore employ unconventional tactics to engage their opponents (Cietto, 2012)

Peacekeeping

This was the traditional UN approach to conflict management where the UN provided a neutral third party service to parties in conflict and to monitor ceasefire. The main focus was to keep the status quo rather than helping parties to change. Peacekeeping occurs where there is a peace to keep. Its main objective was to create a conducive environment for peaceful resolution of the conflict by belligerents (Cietto, 2012). This meant deploying an inter-positional buffer force between the warring groups to reduce contact and escalation of conflict. Such forces were deployed when;

a) Consent of the host nations was provided
b) The UN was perceived as impartial
c) The UN troops were not expected to use force unless in self defense

Peace Support Operations (PSO)

PSO refers to the whole range of multi-dimensional and multifunctional complex peace operations authorized by the UN Security Council, comprising military police and civilian contingents. They are legally established under the UN conflict management chapters (VI, VII and VIII) of the UN Charter.

PSO enable fragile states that do not have capacity to maintain peace and security to benefit from international assistance. For PSO to employ effective counter terrorism

measures, they must have appropriate mandate, Rules of Engagement (ROE) and intelligence capability.

UN Peace Support Operations and Counter Terrorism

The UN has had a tumultuous path in peace enforcement. As early as 1948, during its' first peacekeeping mission, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine to keep peace between Israelis and Arabs after the creation of the state of Israel, Count Folke Bernardotte, a UN official in the mission was assassinated by a Jewish terrorist group. During the UN Iraq mission (2003), the head of mission, Sergio Vieira de Mello, was killed by vehicle borne explosives (Cietto, 2012).

The UN has carried out counter terrorism activities in missions such as International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 2001-2014, implemented by NATO in Afghanistan. The mission was directed at building capacity of the state, but also ended up confronting the Taliban. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1978-to date, initiated counter terrorism measures against Hezbollah (Bruce, 2015), and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights also faced terrorists' threats (Cietto, 2012). These were traditional peacekeeping missions deployed to prevent inter-state conflicts.

After UN failures in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia in the 1990s, a need for more robust missions was recognized. The UN Force Intervention Brigade deployed in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to fight M-23 in 2013 under the auspices of MONUSCO provided a new impetus for more robust PSO.

Through these missions, the UN using robust mandate in support of peace agreement employed measures to protect civilians against terrorists. In 2001, following the terrorists attack in New York, the UNSC approved Resolution 1373, which called upon all the member states to institute criminal, financial and administrative measures for counter terrorism (UNSC, 2001). Through this resolution, the UN established Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) to support implementation of the resolution. Subsequent resolution 1456 (2003) called upon states to respect human rights and other international laws in combating terrorism. The Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) was established in 2004 to assist in implementation. UNODC facilitates common legal framework for drugs, crimes and terrorism. Through such experiences, it has been observed that preventive measures should address real and perceived socio-economic and political grievances (Rosand, Millar, & Ipe, 2009).

The UN transition is informed by the need to protect civilians. The need for effective UN protection of civilians with an increased focus on stabilization saw the transformation of MONUC to MONUSCO in 2010. Providing mandates under Chapter VII has increased robustness of UN missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC and Cote D'Ivoire. There has been increased use of intelligence and Special Forces to support missions and use of complex equipment such as surveillance drones (Karlsrud, 2015).

This change may be informed by the experience of the West in Afghanistan and the influence of France in the UNSC and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The ongoing changes in peacekeeping operations pose challenge to the UN in maintaining its core principles as it embarks on more effective protection of civilians. The international community is yet to define how the two tools (PSO & CT) can be implemented in conflict situations where terrorism is a salient feature.

Parallel forces such as US, UK, France, NATO, EU (coalition of the willing) may be more appropriate given experiences in Mali, Sierra Leone and Somalia. Though CVE approach is an improvement from CT, it may marginalize, securitize and politicize the peacebuilding, local governance and development agenda (Karlsrud, 2015b).

CVE poses challenges to policy makers, and multilateral institutions ill equipped to respond to multifaceted obstacles. In the view of a UN evaluation panel, the UN should not offer technical solutions to political problems (UN, 2015).

UN Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), 2000 and UN High Level Panel on Peace Operations (2015)

The UN has made use of high level panels to review and adapt its PSO to changing dynamics. One of these was the Brahimi report, which provided a new road map for UN PSO. It laid down strategies to prevent conflict, called for clear and specific mandate, adequate rules of engagement, such as, parties should agree to the operation, adequate human resources, equipment, financial support and interim criminal code. The report recalled the primacy of principles as guiding framework for UN operations, but called for robust rules to enable troops to protect civilians (UN, 2000). The subsequent report charted new grounds in multidimensional operations involving CT/CVE and appropriate recommendations (UN, 2015).

UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (UNGCT) (2006)

This instrument provides framework for broad based and long term operations – it is based on respect for the rule of law and human rights and prevention of radicalization of local populations. The pillars of the strategy are; collective engagement, preventing and combating terrorism, strengthening state capacity and improved coordination of UN activities.

However, many actors are yet to develop a holistic and coherent implementation strategy, while some actors are not aware of its existence. The strategy provides a human security approach to counter terrorism (Rosand, Millar & Ipe, 2009). The UN Global Strategy clearly articulated that CT should address 'conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism', this include among others conflicts, lack of rule of law, human rights violations, discriminations and marginalization.

African Union and Counter Terrorism

The AU has a protocol on counter terrorism (1999) and a plan of action (2004). The organization harmonizes CT efforts of member states and RECs. The AU established the African Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT) in 2004 to build capacity of member countries (Ewi and Aning, 2011).

The AU also facilitates capacity building of member states in collaboration with UNODC, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UN CTC. A legal framework and a position on UNGCT Strategy are also under development.

Addressing counter terrorism in Eastern Africa is spearheaded by IGAD Capacity building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT). National efforts can be boosted by regional initiatives such as ICPAT. Civil Society Organizations (CSO) can create awareness, educate, research and provide oversight for implementation of the strategy and strengthen border security. Some limitations, however, still exist. For example, there is no regional/IGAD instrument for extradition and mutual legal assistance, and also the AU CT operations are still hampered by limited resources and capacity to monitor implementation (Rosand, Millar & Ipe, 2009).

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

Mali

West Africa and particularly the Sahel region face poor governance, state weakness, instability, weak border control, coups, electoral violence, rampant corruption and recurrent conflicts. The region is also characterized by low human development index (except Algeria) and extreme poverty (Ingerstad & Magdalena, 2015). The following neighbouring countries are affected by transnational terrorism in Mali: Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire, Guinea, Niger and Senegal.

Mali is a vast country with large swathes of desolate lands unreached by the state; terrorists find conducive environment to operate in such areas. There are multiple actors in the Mali conflict that make resolution of the conflict more challenging. Civilians/non-combatants are attacked without regard to international law and the Tuareg rebels use unconventional fighting methods.

In 2012, the Tuareg launched an armed rebellion in the north. Soon after, Army officers ousted the government in Bamako. As a result, in 2013, France intervened militarily and also, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was deployed. MINUSMA was launched in July 2013 with re-hatted AFISMA troops.

Due to the weakness of the Malian army, the rebels took two thirds of the territory and declared a new state of Azawad. The international community intervened to prevent an Islamic state from emerging. Due to Islamic based terrorists' connection of Malian rebels in the north, Mali has received considerable support from France and the US (Ingerstad, B. & Magdalena, T.M, 2015).

Malian army was defeated by rebels at Kidal. The Mali government relies on MINUSMA and French forces (Operation Serval, Barkhane) to stabilize the north. Mali rebel groups such as Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Murabitoun (AMB), Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), Ansar al dine (AAD) and others are operating in the north (USDS, 2015).

Terrorists in Mali pose a global security threat through perpetration of terrorism, trade in narcotics and kidnapping of Westerners such as the Algerian hostage crisis. According to UNODC, terrorists in West Africa make about US$900 million annually. MOJAO,

Ansar al Sharia, AAD and other northern armed groups profit in trans-Saharan trade in narcotics, human trafficking, arms, cigarettes, petrol, taking advantage of corrupt civil servants (UNODC, 2011).

The country has National Reconciliation Policy to draw the north to a peace table, but this had not been entirely successful. There has been a protracted peace process and a number of ceasefire agreements. On 20, June, 2015 – the Coordination – a coalition of rebel groups seeking autonomy for the north, signed an Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, facilitated by Algeria. However the pact has been violated by groups such as Groupe Autodefense Touareg Imghad (GATIA) (Ingerstad & Magdalena, 2015).

To help strengthen the security sector, the government introduced a penal code in 2013 to guide prosecution of terrorists, and the judiciary established specialized counterterrorism unit. Rule of law training and crime scene investigation course for police were also put in place. However the security sector lack accountability and respect for human rights and there is no national counterterrorism and CVE Strategy. Border law enforcement personnel lack capacity, training and assets for mobility (USDS, 2015).

Mali is a member of global counter terrorism forum, Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, the UN, AU and ECOWAS. A program for Accelerated Development in the Northern Regions was initiated with support from Global Community and Resilience Fund against radicalization (USDS, 2015).

MINUSMA

MINUSMA was established by the UNSCR 2100 (2013), under chapter VII – *'to use all necessary means to protect civilians'*. UNSCR, 2164 (2014) mandated MINUSMA to *support implementation of the peace agreement, support stabilization, protection of civilians, promotion of human rights and monitor ceasefire*. The mandate was also meant to respond to destabilization by transnational terrorists (UNSC, 2014). The mission is largely composed of troops from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). French forces are also mandated to conduct operations against terrorists groups. MINUSMA was the first UN multidimensional mission to be deployed in war zone/terrorists infested area where counterterrorism initiatives were ongoing.

AFISMA was introduced by the AU in 2012 before it was transformed into MINUSMA

by the UN in 2013. MINUSMA has been helping the government on Security Sector Reforms (SSR) since 2013. It's comprised of 10, 638 Troops, 1,055 Police and 1290 Civilians (USDS, 2015).

Terrorists demand for imposition of politico-religious governance systems is contrary to current international state system. Previously, the UN has dealt with insurgents bent on seceding, or demanding more power or autonomy within the state. This situation makes it difficult for the UN to be a mediator, having itself originated from the international state model. The objective of the Movement National de Liberation de l'Awazard (MNLA) of seeking autonomy from Mali and establishing a new state of Azawad is within the UN operational tradition of dealing with states while the AQIM and MOJWA do not fit in. However these two models have variations in that rebels shift in their demands and affiliations and could be amenable to negotiations (Mauricio et al. 2014).

The transnational nature and mode of operation of these insurgent groups makes it difficult for states and UN missions to address their challenges. This call for regional approach as exemplified by the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), although this also brings with it challenges of coordination and cooperation of multiple actors. The UN is experiencing new challenges and learning new lessons in this mission. UN Special Political Missions (SPM) in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria (OPCW-UN) and Somalia (UNSOM/UNASOM) have faced similar challenges and prevented transition into peace support operations missions (Mauricio et al (2014).

Strategic level implications of UN takeover of AFISMA and operational and tactical ability of the UN to handle combat operations are pertinent issues. Still, some questions remain – does it have the appropriate tools, capabilities? Is it the desire of member states for it to transform into combat, which implies increased risks to troops? (Karlsrud, 2015).

There have been attempts at political solution of the conflict through the Algerian led mediation and implementation of peace agreement, (Boutellis, 2014). There has been general progress in the implementation of the peace agreement (UNSC, 2015). MINUSMA helped the government to build capacity in the security sector for prosecution and determination of terrorism cases. It also promoted inter-communal dialogue in Mopti region. The northern part of Mali is still an extremely difficult working environment, troops have often come under attack using sophisticated means. Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) was established and inter and intra-communal dialogue is ongoing (UNSC, 2015). MINUSMA is among some of the missions that have

faced the highest asymmetric attacks in UN peacekeeping missions. The mission does not have a counter terrorism mandate and capabilities (DPKO, 2015).

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Somalia

The Horn of Africa sub-region is highly prone to terrorism. Almost all countries of the sub-region have been victims of terrorist attacks and have been responding unilaterally and collectively. Multinational organizations and donor countries have been engaged in various CT initiatives particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States of America as part of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) led by the US Government and its allies. Increasingly, global CT efforts have come to be perceived as ineffective and/or counterproductive for many reasons, including flawed policies and practices that prioritized militarized and law enforcement responses discounting local contexts and driving factors and catalysts to violent extremism.

Somalia has remained an unstable country for over two decades since the war against the government of Siad Barre began in the 1980s. A number of semi-autonomous regions have established a semblance of law and order such as Somaliland and Puntland. South-Central Somalia has witnessed a more violent period since the ouster of Barre in 1991.

Fearing the establishment of terrorist's haven in lawless Somalia, the international community began to support peace efforts for the country. The Djibouti peace conference (Somalia National Peace Conference) of 2000 marked a watershed in the beginning of establishing a national government whereby the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia was formed. The IGAD led Somali National Reconciliation Conference (Eldoret), 2002 and Mbagathi peace processes, 2003-5 produced the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and a Federal Transitional Charter. These efforts bore fruits and culminated into formation of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012. The FGS has continued to build capacity of the security sector and governance with the support of the international community.

Al Shabaab originated in 2005 out of the now defunct Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. Within a decade, its operational reach has expanded throughout the Horn of Africa. The group's first major international attack was a twin suicide bombing in July 2010 in Kampala, Uganda, that left 76 dead and 70 injured. The group stated publicly that the

attacks were in retaliation for Ugandan support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Since then, Al Shabaab has targeted regional troop-contributing countries to AMISOM and has carried out attacks in Djibouti, Kenya, and Tanzania. Attempted Al Shabaab attacks have also been thwarted in Ethiopia (Bruton & Williams, 2014).

Somalia has a low capacity for counter terrorism given the weakness of the government. There are no counterterrorism laws, and the country has limited investigative and enforcement capacity to prosecute terrorists, outdated penal code (1963), lack law drafting capacity and low judicial capacity. Terrorists are court martialled for lack of appropriate judicial process. Somalia cooperates with the international community in counter terrorism through the African Union (AU), IGAD, League of Arab States, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, and, is willing to share al-Shabaab intelligence with neighbours. There is a radio program for counterterrorism referred to as, Islamic Lecture Series (USDS, 2015).

The FGS is yet to develop capacity to establish a foothold even in areas liberated by AMISOM outside Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab continues to mount attacks against the government and people in Mogadishu and urban areas. The road map to federation with other autonomous region is still faced with challenges since the government is not yet in control of South Central region.

AMISOM

After the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in 2006 that ousted the brief reign of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), there was a need to fill the vacuum left, lest the Islamist rebels take hold of the country. The IGAD developed a concept for IGASOM force, which failed to take off due to capacity challenges.

AMISOM is a peacekeeping mission established by the AU to support security stabilization in Somalia under PSC/PR/Comm./LXIX), 2007. It is composed of troops from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. It is also mandated, and supported by the UN financially and with resources. It is currently operating under UNSCR 2232 (2015). It is mandated to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities and an immediate takeover by the UN. Its mandate is to, *'take all necessary measures to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups'* (UNSC, 2015). It is also charged with the responsibility to support

dialogue in Somalia, provide support to the FGS, support implementation of National Security Stabilization Programme, monitor security situation, facilitate humanitarian operations including IDPs and repatriation of refugees and protect AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment (UNSC, 2015).

This is the biggest and most complex AU operation with a total of 22, 126 troops. It has been engaged in counter insurgency and war rather peacekeeping. It has also suffered high casualties, but has maintained political will to continue fighting in Somalia (Bruton & Williams, 2014).

AMISOM managed to launch major offensive operations against al-Shabaab and drove them out of many towns such as Kismayu, Barawe and Bardhere. Al-Shabaab also lost control of large tracts of land in vital supply routes in such operations. Of late, al-Shabaab has been able to bounce back and stage significant attacks on AMISOM bases such as Elade, Ledo and Janelle, killing many troops and seizing weapons and equipment. Al-Shabaab continues to mount strikes in Mogadishu, Somalia in general and Kenya.

The mission has also faced logistical challenges such as inadequate capacity, low troops, medical supplies, coordination, poor relations with Somali government and fighting unconventional war. The Al-Shabaab enjoys local support, economic resources from local taxation and foreign support. Initially the TFG of Somalia did not enjoy significant local support and was seen as a puppet of foreigners.

The fate of AMISOM counter insurgency (COIN) strategy, operations and tactics has been mixed. The AMISOM military option has not been well supported by state and nation building strategies and there has been inadequate capacity building support from the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOA), (USDS, 2015). However AMISOM has increasingly reduced indiscriminate attacks and civilian casualties.

Given the recent major losses inflicted by the terrorists, there have been calls for change of mandate and rules of engagement. AMISOM like MINUSMA provides a clear picture of challenges posed by UN/AU PSO against terrorists. Both missions draw their troops from neighbouring countries with implications on inter-state relations. New adjustments are yet to take shape to inform global PSO policy and doctrine in terrorists based environments.

International Involvement in Africa Counter Terrorism

As already highlighted in this study, a number of countries outside Africa and regional organizations are making a contribution to CT in various capacity. The US, UK and France have tripartite arrangements for supporting PSO in Africa (Berman, 2002). Their contribution is significant, but comes with associated costs of blowback from terrorists.

United States

The US has continued its counter terrorism activities in Somalia, in part to fight al-Qaeda and also to assist AMISOM in defeating al-Shabaab. Strikes by the US forces eliminated Al-Shabaab leader Godane and other senior leaders (USDS, 2015). The US advocates for the parallel approach sequenced to allow UN to enter when the ability of negative forces has been significantly reduced. The US has also provided assistance for capacity building for the Somali National Police (SNP). National Security and Security Agency (NISA), Somalia, is the lead counter terrorism organization. In cooperation with AMISOM, FBI sent a team of investigators after the airport attack; however there is low financial transaction oversight capacity.

The US spearheads its counter terrorism strategy through AFRICOM's Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). The country has been fighting terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and has conducted aerial attacks and surveillance of al-Shabaab. The ACOTA provides capacity building in counter terrorism and PSO to African countries. The US interests are fighting global terrorism and securing maritime trade (USDS, 2015).

While the developed countries contribute less troops compared to developing countries in global PSO, they fund most of the missions. Developed countries prefer using parallel forces – single state; France in Mali and Cote De' Ivoire, UK in Sierra Leone or Coalition of the willing; US, UK, Germany in Iraq and ISAF, or through NATO and EU, AU, ECOWAS (Karin, 2004). The US has funded CT in Kenya, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia and regional organizations under the Security Governance Initiative (SGI) program and Crisis Response Fund. This project focuses on strengthening security sector governance to improve response capacity (US DoD, 2015).

France

France has maintained close cooperation with African countries especially Francophone Africa in building capacity of African security sector and assisting in operations during

crisis. Renforcement des capacites Africaine de maintien de la paix (RECAMP) is the French policy approach to PSO and CT in Africa. France support to MINUSMA through operation Serval and Barkhane has had significant influence on CT in Mali and continues to support Zambakro Peacekeeping School in Cote d'Ivoire. The French military base in Camp Lemoniere, Djibouti, also provides assistance to PSO in Eastern Africa (Cietto, 2012).

United Kingdom

Under the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP), the UK utilizes security and development approach to support PSO and CT in Africa. It mainly focuses on capacity building of African countries. The UK has supported AMISOM TCC in capacity building of the security sector and has conducted capacity building for Somalia's military and police. This international support has addressed logistics weakness in regional PSO (Williams, 2013).

Challenges of UN/AU PSO Missions in Counter Terrorism

Implementing complex mandates in terrorists infiltrated operational theatres pose a number of operational challenges; asymmetric warfare, hostile and unconventional threats, links to transnational organized crimes such as drug trafficking and corruption (Mauricio, 2014). Due to asymmetrical nature of al-Shabaab fight in Somalia, it has been difficult to measure AMISOM progress. Though the terrorists may execute successful operations, it is not clear whether that indicates their resurgence or weakening force.

Transnational terrorism is a threat to UN field missions. The UN faced terrorists' attacks in Kabul, Baghdad, 2003, Algiers, 2007, Abuja, 2011, Mogadishu, 2013. Such attacks render the UN staff insecure, leading to 'bunkerization' and paralysis of service delivery to populations, subcontracting security services to third parties that might compromise UN impartiality, difficulties in staff recruitment and retention and difficulties in force generation from TCC (Mauricio, 2014). The UN finds it difficult to negotiate with terrorists due to the nature of terrorists' demands and objectives, decentralized structure, transnational scope, shifting allegiances.

In the meantime, some success models cannot be replicated. For example, the success of UN Force Intervention Brigade (UNFIB), in eastern DRC cannot be used as a model of UN peace enforcement having been a product of International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and only technically incorporated into MONUSCO (Cietto, 2014).

Another challenge is that the UN does not have intelligence capability, and is yet to spell out 'Post conflict stabilization strategy/doctrine'. Peacekeeping operations lack adequate equipment for surveillance and gathering of intelligence about terrorists in the mission area or the mandate and means to prosecute offenders. For example, the UN-endorsed mission in Libya (2011) to enforce UNSCR 1973 ended up in failure; NATO forces removed and killed Libyan president Col. Gadaffi even as the AU insisted on mediating the conflict - peace was not restored. The post Gadaffi Libya is yet to stabilize, casting negative aspersions on peace enforcement especially where the UN is used as a rubber stamp by parties with vested interests. Questions have been raised about the appropriateness and capability of the UN to engage in counter terrorism, with a perception that the UN is not principally and operationally ready to fight CT/CVE (Mauricio, 2014).

Other challenges also remain. The strategic value of such engagement is not yet clear; there are concerns about the UN impartiality as a partner of countries emerging from conflict. The UN use of force can have negative ramifications for PSO. The TCC whose troops will be more exposed to harm may decline to participate in PSO. The work of humanitarian organizations can be compromised by UN combat since they can be legitimate target of combatants. It is important for the UN to be perceived as independent from NATO or other partisan forces (Karlsrud, 2015).

A mismatch has been detected between the UN doctrine and current peace enforcement. Blowback against UN forces dent the image of UN as was the case in the attack of Chadian forces in MINUSMA. In Somalia, the al-Shabaab allowed Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to operate, but expelled UNPOS, UNDSS and UNDP from the territories under their control (Ferreiro, 2012, Sunil, 2016). There were also reports of aid being captured by rebel groups.

Too much focus on peace enforcement and fighting terrorism diverts energy and resources from state and nation building. UN Institutional weaknesses such as inadequate real time information and analysis capabilities to respond to terrorists' threats, inadequate good offices to deal with terrorism and inadequate preparedness to address region specific PSO challenges have been identified (Mauricio, 2014).

The issue of proximity of UN offices to the population of concern has also been raised. The UN assesses risks in volatile areas and locate offices in neighbouring countries such as the UN Political Office in Somalia that was based in Nairobi (UNPOS) or enhances

protection of staff and facilities UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNASOM), Mogadishu, but such measures keep the UN away from reaching populations and addressing their insecurity concerns

TCC have borne heavy price in AMISOM such as Al Shabaab attack in Uganda, 2010, attack of Kenya; 2013, 2014, 2016 and may affect their long term deployment. Both MINUSMA and AMISOM have troops from neighbouring countries that have a longer staying power due to negative effects of conflict to their countries. However such missions may not be viewed as impartial by the host country and hence could jeopardize the image of the UN.

In both Mali and Somalia, the UN has relied on parallel forces to stabilize the ground for UN interventions, such as operation Serval in Mali, while AMISOM and private contractors provides security of UN installations including the airport in Mogadishu. Local populations may not distinguish between UN and the parallel forces. The occasional violations of human rights by such forces paint a negative image of the UN and/or AU (Cietto, 2014). The UN is often viewed as advancing interests of powerful countries especially the US and Western Europe against Muslim countries. This perception, combined with earlier UN and US missions failure in Somalia, militate against transition of AMISOM to a fully- fledged UN mission.

Options for Effective UN/AU PSO Engagement in CT

The nature and dynamics of terrorism and counter terrorism in peace support operations is complex and multi-faceted. The features and challenges discussed, call for evolving strategies of counter terrorism in PSO.

Returning a war torn country to a path of peace is a long term endeavour and therefore external actors should support state building, nation building and peacebuilding. Actors and structures with national attachment, commitment and patience to bring about the change should be incorporated. Foreign interveners should evaluate their impact on the socio-economic and political trajectory of the country and determine whether it will bring the desired change (Saferworld, 2015).

The choice of local leaders or groups that foreign interveners support is crucial since support of illegitimate actors will advance corruption, illegitimacy and discontent among the population. In a conflict situation, credible leaders take time to emerge, while warlords are more dominant, visible and influential. Behaviour of foreign interveners is

crucial – they must be the paragon of justice, demonstrate respect for human rights and local cultures. Neighbouring countries or other international actors may support spoilers through ambivalent positions (Saferworld, 2015).

The Lessons of NATO intervention in Afghanistan provide that military intervention needs to be a subsidiary part of an overall political strategy in order to ensure that it contributes to long-term peacebuilding and development aims. Use of exclusive military strategy may drive populations to extremism due to civilian deaths and injuries and property damage (Saferworld, 2015).

Tradeoffs are required in rebuilding state capacity where the state agents may be viewed as illegitimate, as in the case of northern Mali. In such circumstances, the UN may be relevant in provision of services than extending authority of the state. Cooperation with other countries, RECs and other international organizations may be appropriate in stemming the drugs trade that perpetuate state fragility. However, efforts of UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and UNDOC sometimes are not brought to bear on UN missions (Cietto, 2014).

CT measures have impact on the security of neighbouring countries. This is the case in Somalia and Mali, therefore the UN should have contingency plans for spill over effects. The UN missions involving CT (to protect civilians) should be well equipped with appropriate tools to deal with such situations. It is possible for the UN to negotiate with terrorists where there is a likelihood of making advances towards resolution of the conflict. UN work should recognize the local context through cooperation with traditional structures and religious leaders (Cietto, 2014).

There is a need for preventive measures to inhibit terrorists' networks from destabilizing vulnerable states. This may include conflict management measures to strengthen political mechanisms to address grievances, population security, and strengthening of state capacity. Dynamic adaptation to evolving challenges has also been recommended in previous research (Cietto, 2014).

The UN may not be well designed and prepared to engage in offensive counter terrorism operations, but it is effective in security stabilization once the operations end. The UN Police (UNPOL), for example, was successful in securing liberated areas in Kosovo. The principle of subsidiarity can make a case for RECs to be responsible for peace enforcement while the UN maintains traditional peacekeeping (Karlsrud, 2015). According to the UN Secretary General, CVE should examine root causes, promote human rights, strengthen governance and increase political participation (Ban Ki Moon, 2015).

Conclusion

This study sought to understand the nature and dynamics of terrorism and counter terrorism in peace support operations focusing on AMISOM and MINUSMA. In this regards, the study has highlighted challenges in the interface between CT and PSO. The study has shown that there has been mixed results of the UN/AU engagement in PSO. It has also been argued that the two global peace and security tools of PSO and CT/CVE) may not work smoothly under UN/AU framework. Finally, the study has proposed strategies of appropriate CT/CVE in PSO.

Given the resurgence of global CT, UN/AU PSO missions should re-define their doctrines, concepts, guidelines and operation procedures in order to offer effective protection of civilians, maintain credibility as the global peacemaker of the last resort, while not being embroiled in perceived war between the Western-led global CT and Islamic based radical terrorism.

Mali and Somalia are offering experimental laboratories for appropriate interface between CT and PSO practices. The current status and evolution of terrorism and CT in those areas, do not bode well for the future of UN/AU missions.

Recommendations

To the UN/AU

- UN/AU PSO should build strong capacity to protect civilians while not engaging in complex combat operations against perceived terrorists where their credibility/impartiality may be questioned
- The UN should focus on socio-economic development where it has comparative advantage rather than engage in military/forceful interventions
- UN should develop local capacity of states to prevent threats – address internal political conflicts, reinforce border control mechanisms; support spread of government presence in remote areas and tailor intervention to local context (Cietto, 2014).
- UN should define stabilization more appropriately to enable strategic CT in PSO (HIPPO, 2015).
- CVE approach to CT needs to be fully integrated into UN/AU programming and activities

To States

- CVE approach to CT needs to be adopted by states in order to address root causes, de-militarize strategies and bring together a broad spectrum of stakeholders and actors
- States should genuinely address perceived insurgents political, economic and socio-cultural grievances such as marginalization while building capacity of professional and human rights respecting security sector
- States should engage in CT independently, through regional mechanism such as IGAD or ECOWAS, through coalition with France, UK or the US but not in cooperation with UN/AU PSO in order to maintain credibility of the latter

To Parallel Forces (States/Regional/Private armies)

- Conduct timely forceful interventions to deal with complex operations independent of UN/AU missions
- Develop doctrine defining rules of engagement including respect for human rights, entry and exit strategy with short term objectives to give room for other actors to engage in long term peacebuilding
- Disassociate operations with humanitarian organizations and PSO to protect their independence and impartiality

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Distance Decay, Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Kenya

Margaret Cheptile

1.1 Overview

There is no consensus among governments, policy makers, researchers and security practitioners on the definition of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (RVE). To this end, Hopkins and Hopkins (2009) argue that it is not then surprising that there are diverse opinions about the causes of RVE. Nevertheless, an attempt to define RVE is critical because it has profound implications on how we understand and address the phenomena. This paper adopts the definition provided by Wilner and Dubouloz (2010). They state that radicalisation is a process in which an individual or a group adopts increasingly extreme social, economic, political or religious beliefs, ideals and aspirations that reject and/or undermine the status quo. Therefore, radicalisation is rooted in a consensus towards reformist changes in the society where people divert from using ordinary and legal processes to using extreme and illegitimate means to attain a goal (Crossett and Spitaletta, 2010). Although radicalisation can either be violent or non-violent, the focus is often on the former as it easily leads to violent extremism (Borum, 2011). The study of radicalisation is wide-ranging; it examines what people think, how they think what they think, and how they progress or not from thinking to action (Botha, 2013).

On the other hand, violent extremism is defined as an active pursuit or support of use of fear, terror and violence to attain a stated change or goal in the society (Denoeux and Carter, 2009). According to Borum (2011), radicalisation and violent extremism are sometimes connected, but not always. For instance, just like radicalized people may not engage in violent extremism, some violent extremists are not ideologues or radicalised into extremist doctrines. Some extremists may only possess a cursory knowledge of the radical ideology. Nonetheless, violent extremism describes the whole spectrum that extremists use to recruit people to commit violence. This includes their underlying ideologies, funding, recruitment processes and execution of violent attacks (Somanader, 2015). However, radical and violent extremist groups have varied goals which may stem from social, religious, political, economic, environmental, or ideological factors in the society (Australian Government, 2015).

Somanader (2015) aptly states that, currently, it has become apparent that removing

violent radicals and extremists from the battlefield is insufficient to eradicate the global threat of RVE. Bjorgo (2005) further reiterates this argument by stating that: "if an area suffers from mosquitoes, draining the swamps where they breed is usually a more effective strategy than trying to kill all the individual mosquitoes." This implies that an effective effort against RVE must address the underlying conditions that influence or motivate its existence. According to Taspinar (2009), RVE results from extremely complex, multifaceted, extensive and often intertwined factors and hence an attempt to pinpoint a single cause is both difficult and misleading. Even where social, cultural, economic, political, and psychological factors merge, radical and violent extremist organizations have different objectives (Australian Government, 2015). Nonetheless, it is vastly reported that it is within a marginalised, excluded and desperate social, economic, and political setting that RVE emerge and blossom. According to Mehretu, Pigozzi and Sommers (2002), such setting is said to suffer from distance decay. They define distance decay as a situation where an individual, a group or community within a country feels marginalised and excluded from social, economic and political processes and development by the government and other members of the society. Bjorgo (2005) further states that, this feeling of marginalisation and exclusion is often accompanied by a sense of hopelessness, frustration, disillusionment and distrust towards the State and mainstream society.

While acknowledging the extensive list of possible causes of RVE, this paper examines distance decay as a likely motivator of RVE in Kenya. Methodologically, the paper is based on a descriptive approach relying on existing secondary data. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section covers the overview, background, problem statement and objectives that the paper seeks to address. Section two provides the conceptual framework and theories that guide the paper. Section three provides an examination of the proposed objectives while section four presents the conclusion.

1.2 Background

Kenya has experienced numerous terror attacks and violent extremism in different levels since the first case in 1980 of the Norfolk Hotel bombing (Botha, 2013). These attacks have not only affected security and development in the country, but also in the Eastern Africa region (Gichuru, 2015). What is significant is that radical and extremist groups in the region, especially the Al-Shabaab, plan and execute their atrocious activities with increasing assistance and support from local citizens. Gichuru (2015) states that the base

of Al-Shabaab attackers in Kenya has expanded to include not only Muslims of Somali and Arabian origins, but also non-Muslim communities such as Luo, Luhya, and Kikuyu among others. By 2012, it was estimated that there were about 600 Kenyans in the Somali Al-Shabaab cell with a high percentage belonging to non-Muslim communities (International Crisis Group-ICG, 2012). There is, however, a high likelihood that the number has increased over the last four years.

Botha (2014) argues that the Al-Shabaab have also recruited Kenyans to carry out violent extremist activities and terror attacks outside Kenya. For example, the attack of Ethiopian army base and Somalia's Ministry of Education in Mogadishu in April, 2007 and October, 2011, respectively, were reported to have been orchestrated and executed by Kenyan members of Al-Shabaab (Botha, 2014). This illustrates how RVE has become embedded within the Kenyan society. In addition, it could also suggest that there may be an element of failure by the Kenyan society and authorities that in turn, motivate Kenyans to join Al-Shabaab. To this extent, there is need to focus on the underlying domestic conditions, including social, cultural, economic and political factors, which radical and violent extremist organizations such as Al-Shabaab and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) exploit to recruit their followers.

BEGIN HERE There are two major and different perspectives that explain the emergence and expansion of RVE around the world. The 'security' perspective argues that the causes of RVE are unrelated to socio-economic and political marginalisation and deprivation (Taspinar, 2009). This perspective maintains that radicals and violent extremists are not from poor population as majority of them are often well educated and with average income. The proponents of this argument claim that in the 9-11 terrorist attacks in United States of America (USA), 15 out of the 19 terrorists were from Saudi Arabia, perceived as one of the wealthiest countries of the Middle East (Denoeux and Carter, 2009). Therefore, according to them, reducing poverty and improving socio-economic conditions in the society do not reduce RVE.

Contrarily, the 'development' perspective argues that there is a link between socio-economic and political marginalisation and RVE (Taspinar, 2009). Its proponents argue that 'security' view is erroneous and misleading for two reasons. First, it focusses more on the leaders and planners of RVE than on the foot soldiers. For example, Botha (2014) documents that transnational RVE organizations, such as Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and ISIS, prefer professional, educated and middle class leaders with sophisticated skills

to effectively conduct complex operations. They also choose charismatic leaders who can manipulate their followers, blend in with host societies, and exploit existing socio-economic and political grievances (Barsalou, 2002). However, Maleckova (2005) argues that the foot soldiers are often poor, uneducated, homeless or even refugees who are easily manipulated through their need to belong and promise of economic gains. For example, 3 of the terrorists in the 9-11 terror attacks in USA were 'Alghamdi', an Arabian name which indicates that they did not have a respectable tribal origin and were of low social status (Denoeux and Carter, 2009). To further support the 'development' perspective, Taspinar (2009) reports that the Islamic Combatant Group, a Moroccan-based RVE organization, mainly recruited unemployed and uneducated young men from Casablanca slums to execute terror attacks. In Lebanon, Borum (2011) states that Hezbollah and Fatah al Islam radical groups drew their main support from socio-economically deprived segments of society. In addition, Hudson (1999) highlights that wealthy youth from developed world engage in or support RVE activities out of a profound sense of guilt over the plight of the world's poor and marginalized population. However, little data exist to support or refute Hudson's argument.

Secondly, RVE organizations usually seek poor and failing or failed states such as Somalia, Yemen, Mali, Libya and Afghanistan among others to base their activities (Barsalou, 2002). They take advantage of porous borders, ungoverned spaces, weak or non-existent law enforcement and security services, and ineffective judicial institutions in such countries to recruit and launch their activities (Borum, 2013). Even in relatively wealthier countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia, and Lebanon, pockets of poverty and high-income disparities are fertile grounds for recruitment into RVE (Denoeux and Carter, 2009).

Lastly, contrary to the opinion that ideological fervour is a root cause of RVE, proponents of 'development' perspective argue that it is only used as a cover for underlying socio-economic and political grievances that foment RVE. For example, Somanader (2015) reports that RVE organisations such as Al Qaeda and Al-Shabaab use people who are already disaffected and alienated to propagate religious ideologies and violent acts. Similarly, Denoeux and Carter (2009) state that ideology or religion is used as a channel through which underlying socio-economic and political grievances are expressed and individuals mobilized. Therefore, the values that radicals and violent extremists embrace and common beliefs that portray violence as a logical form of retribution for the grievances faced evoke passion and deep feeling of loyalty that drives people into RVE

(Botha, 2013).

The discussions in this paper borrow largely from 'development' perspective. It is premised on the argument that social habitat characterized by socio-economic and political deprivation and exclusion provides a climate of legitimacy and implicit support for RVE. The assumption is that focusing on the collective grievances behind RVE is perhaps the most effective way of addressing the underlying motivations of RVE. In fact, according to Ahmed (2015) the topical discussion among security and development practitioners is how economic and human development can best be used to combat RVE.

1.3 Problem Statement

There is limited available information on the relationship between distance decay and RVE in Kenya. Yet, Al-Shabaab and other RVE organizations are reported to highly source for support from regions in Kenya that have historically been categorized as underdeveloped, excluded and marginalized (Botha, 2014). These regions include: North-Eastern (mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Isiolo counties); Coast (Mombasa - Kisauni, Mvita, Likon; Kwale -Matuga; Kilifi - Kikambala; Malindi - Malindi town; and Lamu - Faza, Lamu Island, and Kiunga); and Nairobi (informal settlements of Eastleigh and Majengo) (Borum 2014; Gichuru 2015). Eastleigh area, for instance, is reported to experience dire socio-economic conditions, identical to Somalia; with the exception of war (Hassan, 2012). However, the extent to which this argument is true is subject to debate. In the Coastal region, Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), a land secessionist movement, is supposedly involved in radicalisation and recruitment of unemployed, uneducated and poor youth into Al-Shabaab, ISIS and other extremist groups (Ahmed, 2015). To this end, there is need to investigate whether distance decay drives residents of these regions to RVE.

In addition, there is an increased number of Kenyans linked to radicalisation, planning and execution of violent extremism and terror attacks within and outside the country. Though not officially confirmed, local media channels have occasionally reported that a number of Kenyan youth are missing from various counties, and there have been high speculations that they might have joined Al-Shabaab and ISIS.[1] The increasing

1 For details see: http://intelligencebriefs.com/kenyas-security-agents-affirms-missing-youth-joined-somali-based-al-shabaab-militant-group/; http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/12/02/security-agents-say-missing-youth-have-joined-al-shabaab_c1248503; and http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Missing-Uasin-Gishu-youth-Shabaab/-/1107872/2914270/-/uicjxz/-/index.html

momentum and support of RVE activities in Kenya, especially in areas which seem to experience distance decay, warrants an investigation on the underlying motivating factors. Therefore, this paper attempts to enhance the understanding of the relationship between distance decay and RVE in Kenya. The paper also proposes various development and security measures that are vital in addressing RVE in Kenya.

1.4 Study Justification

Taspinar (2009) argues that an effective strategic campaign against RVE should seriously consider the socio-economic and political context that motivates violent behaviour. In fact, little can be done in short-term about deeply rooted cultural and psychological grievances, but a lot can be done in the social, economic and political spheres (Crossett and Spitaletta, 2010). Unfavourable and persistent socio-economic dynamics can degenerate into political violence and perpetuate a vicious cycle of radicalism, violent extremism, and civil war (Taspinar, 2009). It is in such environments that RVE finds social acceptance, and hence it should be altered by addressing the grievances that RVE organizations exploit. This is because without societal support, most RVE organizations are likely to fail (Ahmed, 2015). In Kenya, socio-economic and political disparities occur within identifiable ethnic, religious, political and regional lines (Borum, 2011). As such, these disparities reinforce a sense of distance decay and discrimination especially among those affected. By extension, this sense of distance decay and discrimination increases the possibility of such disparities becoming a political and security threat (Botha, 2014). To this end, examining and addressing unfavourable socio-economic and political conditions is one of the effective ways of curbing factors that motivate violent radicalism and extremism.

1.5 Specific Objectives

This paper is guided by the following specific objectives:

i. To examine the conditions that constitute distance decay in Kenya

ii. To examine ways in which distance decay promotes RVE in Kenya

iii. To recommend effective measures that can be used to address distance decay and RVE

2.0 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

This section presents the conceptual and theoretical framework on which this paper is based.

2.1 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework that guides this paper is captured in schematic Figure 1. It represents the author's own assumption and conceptualization of the relationship between distance decay and RVE in Kenya. The independent and dependent variables in this paper are distance decay and RVE, respectively. The arrows in the diagram show the flow through which the relationship between the variables is understood.

Distance decay consists of various social, economic and political grievances experienced continuously and persistently by certain individuals, groups, or communities in the society. The conditions of distance decay include: historical marginalisation; uneven development and economic opportunities; poor/lack of public services; ungoverned/poorly governed areas; unemployment; frustrated expectations; political exclusion and denial of political rights; weakening of traditional family structures; injustice; impunity; and endemic corruption among others. Left unaddressed, these conditions may be interpreted by the aggrieved individuals, groups or communities as abandonment, rejection, discrimination, alienation, or collective victimization by the government and mainstream society. These interpretations are likely to result in feelings of hopelessness, frustration, powerlessness, distrust and resentment towards the government and other members of the society who are perceived not to be facing similar grievances. It is such conditions and sentiments that are said to provide breeding grounds for radicalisation and violent extremism. For instance, these grievances and frustrations may be manipulated by RVE organizations to lure aggrieved parties into supporting, promoting or adopting their cause. They may also drive affected populations into believing that solutions to their problems are outside the normal legal or political structures. Nevertheless, the influence of distance decay on RVE is likely to be augmented by other factors. For example, enabling factors such as presence of internet and other forms of technology may make it easy for RVE to occur. Short and long term strategic aims including commitment to alter the status quo, create fear or motivate sympathizers may motivate aggrieved parties to adopt radical and violent actions. Lastly, religious or ethnic ideological fervour is likely to influence how individuals or communities respond to the underlying grievances and frustrations.

Figure 1: Conceptual Overview of Distance Decay, Radicalisation and Violent Extremism



Source: Author's Conceptualisation

2.2 Theoretical Framework

There are many theories that explain the various causes of and motivations for engaging or supporting RVE. Crossett and Spitaletta (2010) in their article: "Radicalisation: Relevant Psychological and Sociological Concepts", outline 16 theories on possible drivers of radicalism and violent extremism. However, the author utilizes the following two theories to explain the relationship between distance decay and RVE.

2.2.1 Relative Deprivation Theory

Some of the main proponents of this theory include F. Fanon (1965) and T. Gurr (1970). The theory posits that underdevelopment, economic disparities and marginalisation motivate radical and violent political behaviour. It argues that individual's or groups' sense of being, deprived of certain needs or freedoms by a governing body and mainstream society can result in feelings of frustration and rejection, which when they become persistent and unbearable a rebellion ensues. Failure to resolve these feelings through legal means allows them to accumulate and fester, eventually manifesting in radical ideas and violent acts.

This theory applies to the subject under discussion as it supports the claim that frustration stemming from social, economic and political grievances is a necessary condition for radicalism and extremism. This is because RVE groups, such as Al-Shabaab and ISIS, are likely to utilise existing grievances within a country to lure disillusioned citizens into their activities. Nonetheless, this theory has been criticized on the basis that grievances alone are insufficient explanation for violence. Beck (2008) argues that the theory fails

to explain why there are millions of frustrated people around the world, but only a few engage in RVE.

2.2.2 Social Movement Theory

Begin here Proponents of this theory, such as D. A. Foss and R. Larkin (1986) and M. N. Zald and J. D. McCarthy (1987), define social movement as a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social, economic and political structure and processes. They argue that social movement is a self-conscious group that coordinates its activities to challenge the prevailing status quo. The theory argues that social movements are informed by rational and strategic processes of collective behaviour occurring due to strained environmental conditions that produce mass sentiment of discontent. The theory also states that the primary task of any social organization is to maintain its own survival. This requires that members add and maintain supporters, and, manpower lost must be replenished through new recruits for the movement to grow and expand in capacity and influence. The theory further argues that recruiters of the organization operate as rational prospectors who must seek individuals who are likely to agree to act and effectively further the cause. The recruiters, therefore, must locate vulnerable targets and offer them social, economic or political benefits to persuade recruits into joining their cause.

Although this theory has been applied in social sciences for many years, its application to understanding RVE is more recent. D. D. Porta (1995) is one of the first scholars to connect the theory's concepts to RVE. In relation to the current discussion, Al-Shabaab, ISIS and other related factions cannot sustain themselves without new recruits especially to replenish battlefield losses. Like in other areas, recruits of RVE organizations in Kenya astutely observe the challenges facing the citizens and tailor their recruitment strategies to exploit the observed vulnerabilities. The recruitment approach includes offering social, economic and political rewards to victims of marginalisation and deprivation especially in North Eastern and Coastal regions as well as in urban informal settlements among other regions. The radical and extremist groups may also be viewed by aggrieved Kenyans as key mechanisms for expressing their grievances.

3.0 Methodological Approach and Analysis

This paper is based on critical review of selected secondary and primary sources, including: reports, government publications, books, theses and academic journals, to explore links between distance decay and RVE in Kenya. The literature review is further

complemented by personal experience. The arguments herein are therefore based on a combination of approaches. More specifically, qualitative analysis has been employed to provide an in-depth understanding of the topic under discussion.

3.1 Conditions that Constitute Distance Decay

Tahiri and Grossman (2013) state that how the society treats us makes us who we are. This implies that our context, including social, economic and political conditions, shapes our attitudes and behaviour towards others and society in general. Therefore, it can influence one to be good or bad citizen. Distance decay constitutes a number of social, economic and political grievances and frustrations that an individual, groups or communities face in the society (Mehretu *et al.,* 2002). According to Ahmed (2015) these grievances primarily stem from lack of equal opportunities relative to expectation (also known as relative deprivation) and a sense of alienation by a governing body or mainstream society. Taspinar (2009) argues that relative, rather than absolute, deprivation is critical in enhancing radical and violent behaviour because globalization of market and technology creates an acute awareness about opportunities available elsewhere. This leads to victimization, frustration and humiliation among aggrieved individuals or communities that are able to make comparisons across countries or regions (Maya *et al.,* 2002).

Crenshaw (1981) argues that no one is likely to engage in violent behaviour without the motivation to do so. Therefore, social, economic and political grievances are likely to push vulnerable victims into radicalism and violence. According to Masinjila (2015), distance decay is associated with changes in self or group identification that are informed by continuous and unaddressed grievances. This self or group transformation occurs because the grievances create a sense of disenchantment and powerlessness that provides a cognitive opening for radical ideas and violence. In this case, the transformed individual or group perceive the use of violence as the best approach to be heard and get the grievances and sentiments addressed (Botha, 2013).

The social conditions of distance decay constitute experiences or a sense of discrimination, social segregation, and marginalization based on gender, ethnic, racial, income or regional differences among others (Crenshaw, 1981). They also include normlessness, lack of order, and collapse of family, traditional structures and religious system (Botha, 2014). In addition, social distance decay also comprises high levels of illiteracy and State's inability to provide health care, education, and infrastructure among other social amenities (Ahmed, 2015). Hassan (2012) further argues that social distance decay may include continued

experiences of injustice and impunity by a group or individuals. For example, it includes physical violence, use of excessive force, killings, and indiscriminate and unlawful arrests by police or other security forces. These social conditions are likely to create a gap that other players, including RVE groups, are willing to fill hence making the aggrieved parties prone to manipulation, radicalism and violence. The relationship between social distance decay and violent behaviour is summarized below by Professor Gary Bouma of Monash University:

"…*violence is a response to frustration, to feelings of not being cared for, and thrives among those cut off from family, friends and the larger community...the combination of frustration, isolation and being introduced to highly charged motives for violence is the most potent combination of factors in the process leading some to acts of violence*…" (Australian Government, 2015)

In economic terms, distance decay is argued to extend beyond poverty. It includes real and perceived exclusion from national resources, inequality in sharing benefits of growth and development, relative deprivation and insufficient economic opportunities, substandard living conditions accompanied by feelings of frustration and alienation from the State and society in general (Botha 2013; Denoeux and Carter 2009). According to Somanader (2015) these economic grievances make people, especially youth, feel entirely trapped in impoverished communities with no path for advancement and ways to support their families and significant others. This results in frustrations and hopelessness which eventually provide conducive environment for recruitment into radical and violent behaviour (Higiro, 2015).

The political conditions of distance decay constitute presence of bad political governance, weak leadership and institutions, widespread corruption, and other forms of political injustice in public offices (Higiro, 2015). This form of distance decay also occurs when people are oppressed and human rights are denied by the government especially along sectarian or ethnic lines (Somanader, 2015). According to Taspinar (2009) political distance decay also includes the existence of ill-governed or ungoverned areas and systematic political exclusion of a group of individuals or communities. It is also documented that lack of fulfilment of promises made to youth by politicians during electoral campaigns forms part of political distance decay. This is because empty promises can create an opportunity for radical and violent forces to easily manipulate the aggrieved youth into engaging or supporting armed violence (Higiro, 2015). This is made possible when the

aggrieved youth believe that solutions to a better future are outside the normal political structure.

The discussions above highlight that unaddressed social, economic and political grievances converge to create breeding grounds for legitimacy and support of radical and violent behaviour. This is because violent groups prey on realities that render communities and groups vulnerable to radicalism as they offer to fulfil their needs (Taspinar 2009). There is no doubt that some parts of Kenya experience social, economic and political distance decay, although in different levels. Rasna Warah (2014) seems to agree with this statement as she describes Kenya as:

"…a fragile entity with unresolved group grievances and which those in power can conjure up at will, and make disappear just as quickly, making Kenya a shadow, a whiff, an odour in the air but no real form or substance for those outside elite circles" (Warah, 2014)

In this excerpt, Rasna Warah views Kenya as a possession of the ruling elite where those who are not part of the ruling class are alienated. In a study conducted among youth associated with MRC and Al-Shabaab, Botha (2014) found that 99% of the respondents said that the Kenyan government protects the interests of a few elites. In addition, about 96% stated that standing up against the government is justified. This finding demonstrates low legitimacy of the Kenyan government by those associated with Al-Shabaab and MRC.

Ethnic, regional and rural-urban divide polarise socio-economic and political contexts in Kenya (Botha, 2013). Specifically, North-Eastern region, Coastal region and urban informal settlements have historically been characterised by socio-economic and political deprivation and marginalisation (Botha 2013; Gichuru 2015). Government of Kenya-GOK (2011) documents that, compared to the national poverty rate of 47%, coastal counties such as Kilifi and Kwale record poverty rates of 71% and 75% respectively. Similarly, North Eastern counties including Wajir, Isiolo and Mandera also record high poverty rates of 84%, 73%, and 88% respectively (GOK, 2011). In addition, World Bank (2012) states that youth unemployment rates in North Eastern and Coastal regions are about 70% compared to a national rate of 40%. To this end, it may imply that individuals from these regions may not afford a decent life or utilize their full potential (Njonjo, 2010). This has prompted feelings of frustration and resentment among aggrieved individuals and communities especially towards Nairobi and other regions considered the centre of economic and political power (Botha, 2014). Further, these regions are not only marginalised and less developed than the rest of the country, but also predominantly

comprise of Muslims (Borum, 2011). Therefore, the perception that development is done along religious or ethnic lines politicizes the situation and makes it more volatile.

3.2 How Distance Decay Promote Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Kenya

As earlier argued, RVE organizations take advantage of the existing conditions of distance decay to solicit for support and acceptance from members of the society. Masinjila (2015) states that these organizations often attempt to fill the existing void by promising socio-economic and political benefits and rewards. For example, in his interview with ex-Al-Shabaab members in Eastleigh Nairobi, Hassan (2012) states that all the respondents said the terror group presented them with a 'package deal' to lure them into recruitment. Specifically, the following section outlines various ways in which distance decay promote RVE in Kenya.

a) Poor Provision of Public Services

Poor provision of public services in marginalized areas creates a capacity gap that is easily filled by RVE organizations. Taspinar (2009) reports that RVE organizations promise, and sometimes provide, health, education and housing facilities among other crucial services that local government fails to deliver. In addition, they recruit poor individuals with promises of income or support to their families (Ahmed, 2015). Therefore, the gap created by poor or lack of basic amenities provides a conducive environment within which RVE networks and groups can flourish. According to Denoeux and Carter (2009), often times, the frustrations and anger experienced by marginalised communities is not due to lack of services but the interpretation of this as a rejection and abandonment of responsibility by the State. Thus, deficiencies in service delivery create a broader crisis of State legitimacy, which drives people to engage in RVE. Violent radicalism and extremism is viewed by the aggrieved as reciprocal brutality to the degrading conditions they feel they have been forced to endure.

In Kenya, Botha (2014) highlights a marginalized, forgotten and poor village of Siyu on Pate Island in Coastal region that welcomed Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, the leader of al-Qaeda's East African cell. Fazul was regarded by the village as a generous provider of money who brought some relief to their dire socio-economic conditions. This perception and social acceptance enabled him, and others like him, to further embed himself within the local community, and to plan and execute their goals. United States Agency

for International Development (USAID) also explored the same linkage in Morocco. It established that Moroccans who engaged in terror attacks hailed from the country's worst shantytowns. Their participation was attributed to abject and sordid environment characterised by lack of social amenities such as water, housing, electricity, and sewers; appalling sanitary conditions; rampant crime, drug trafficking, and a pervasive sense of rejection, abandonment and hopelessness (Taspinar, 2009). This appalling environment is similar to the one inhabited by residents of Eastleigh, Majengo and other urban informal settlements in Kenya (Hassan, 2012).

b) Weak or Lack of State Presence

Denoeux and Carter (2009) state that ungoverned or poorly governed areas such as peri-urban slums; border regions; places mired in violent conflict and/or criminality; and remote, isolated, or desert regions with low population density provide ample space for RVE groups to operate. In Kenya, these areas include the border, conflict-prone and arid lands of Northern region; isolated sections of the coastal region; and poor and crime-prone informal slums of Nairobi and other major towns. Generally, the capacity of the State to monitor vast border and desert regions as well as to control illicit activities in these areas has proved challenging (Borum, 2011). Al-Shabaab and other RVEs groups cannot only operate easily but are also likely to draw passive and active support from the communities which, on the main, feel ignored by the State.

c) Unemployment

Al-Shabaab, ISIS and other RVE groups take advantage of unemployment crisis in Kenya to radicalise and lure people into violent extremism (Gichuru, 2015). Research indicates that young people are more prone to conflict and RVE organizations than older people (Africa Center for Strategic Studies - ACSS, 2012). The Kenyan population is dominated by young people and it is projected to grow younger over the coming decades (Masinjila, 2015). With a high unemployment rate, the Kenyan youth are left with so much free time that makes them prey to RVE networks. Denoeux and Carter (2009) state that idle and unemployed youth are easily drawn to radical preachers and media and may also be receptive to income and material benefits offered by RVE organisations. In his interview with ex-Al-Shabaab members in Eastleigh, Nairobi, Hassan (2012) states that the respondents said the terror group offered them employment from which they could provide for their families. They earned about 50-150 US dollars per month for jobs such as patrolling the streets which, according to them, required little effort. Prior

to this, the respondents claimed they were unemployed, hopeless and relied on relatives for sustenance. They thus took advantage of the opportunity provided to them by Al-Shaabab to avoid languishing in unending poverty and misery.

Furthermore, Borum (2011) argues that the increased rural-to-urban migration in Kenya accompanied by lack of formal employment and high cost of living in urban areas has pushed many people into the informal sector, where they interact infrequently or at cross purposes with State institutions. The struggles they endure in finding their place in society and in meeting basic needs combined with frustrations and lack of support from the government, make them vulnerable to recruiters of RVE who offer them a strong sense of purpose, community, and even financial compensation.

d) Frustrated Expectations

The gap between socio-economic and political expectations and realities on the ground create what is referred to as frustrated achievers. Taspinar (2009) highlights that rising and frustrated aspirations are frequent motivators of radicalism and extremism. In Kenya, the growth of unemployment and underemployment among educated persons as well as provision of jobs without outlets for political and social participation create a blend of frustration that foments radical ideas and violent extremism (Borum, 2011). The unemployment gap is likely to worsen as majority of Kenyans access and complete secondary and university education due to subsidized schooling and increased proliferation of colleges and universities. Denoeux and Carter (2009) reports that the frustration and push towards radicalism and extremism arises not so much from the system's inability to deliver services and adequate standards of living, but its inability to keep up with the expectations of the educated, upward-mobile and achievement-oriented elites. Higiro (2015) argues that the youth are likely to be affected by frustrated expectations because they are more aware of global trends. In addition, youth who complete secondary school and college with grim economic prospects and those from poor economic backgrounds are likely to experience a significant scale of frustrated expectations. Therefore, the profound anger and frustration created by a sense of having been misled and betrayed by the government and society can easily be fertile grounds for RVE.

e) Political Exclusion and Denial of Political Rights

The manner in which the State interacts with the population shapes how citizens view political involvement and their trust in or disillusionment with political leaders (ACSS,

2012). Denoeux and Carter (2009) define political exclusion as lack of legal avenues for expressing political demands and grievances, and for participating in political processes. It is a situation in which individuals are deprived the ability to influence policy decisions, including through free and fair elections, develop and express views freely, and to have personal autonomy from the State. The systematic denial of opportunities to influence decision making or to remove regimes perceived to be corrupt and unjust can be a significant driver of RVE (ACSS, 2012). According to Maleckova (2005), at the same level of income, countries that lack civil liberties and disrespect political rights are more likely to produce radicals and violent extremists. This is because denial of political rights stimulates anger that may make people believe that radicalism and violence are the only viable options for political communication or influence.

The opinion poll released by IPSOS Synovate in December, 2015 indicated that the majority of Kenyans (78% of 2,058 respondents) believed that the country was headed in the wrong direction. The respondents expressed their discontent with how State institutions were addressing issues of corruption, impunity, social injustice and human rights among others.[2] It is such frustrations that if not addressed adequately and in a timely manner, are likely to increase vulnerability to RVE. In addition, political exclusion of the Muslim community by the State in Kenya has been documented. Botha (2013) outlines that, in 1992, the State declined to register political parties such as Islamic Party of Kenya and the Democratic Movement due to their religious affiliation. This was interpreted as an attempt to exclude Muslims from political processes in the Country. Ahmed (2015) further reports that Kenyan Muslims also feel discriminated when applying for national identity cards and passports. This is because, unlike other Kenyans, they are required to produce additional documentation as evidence of citizenship, including their grandparent's birth certificate. On the contrary, Christian applicants are only required to present their birth certificate and that of their parent. It is because of such treatment that many Muslims in Kenya feel they are not fully part of Kenya (Ahmed, 2015).

f) Emotional and Social Benefits

Denoeux and Carter (2009) argues that RVE organizations offer not only material rewards, but also social status, self-esteem, respect from peers, glory and fame, a feeling

2 For details see: http://www.mediamaxnetwork.co.ke/k24-tv/183889/majority-of-kenyans-believe-the-country-is-headed-in-the-wrong-direction-according-to-opinion-poll-conducted-by-ipsos-synovate/

of brotherhood and personal empowerment. These are emotional and spiritual benefits that individuals who feel victimized and marginalized may long for. Hassan (2012), documents that Al-Shabaab terror group uses social benefits to attract youth from Kenya into its agenda. He argues that an Al-Shabaab recruiter often identifies a group of idle youth and approaches one of them with a promise of making him an 'amir' or leader of his own men, if he could get more of his friends to also join the group. Promise of a leadership position elevates one's self worth and status. For example, one of ex-Al-Shabaab members that Hassan (2012) interviewed highlighted that patrolling the streets as an armed member of Al-Shabaab commanded fear and respect from peers and community members. In addition, those who join the terror group are seen as heroes for 'defending their religion and community'. Therefore, for hopeless and poor young people, the reputation that accompanies Al-Shabaab membership among their peers is attractive as it propels a person from irrelevance to prominence.

g) Weakening/Disintegration of Traditional Family Structures

Path to distance decay may also reflect through weakening and disintegration of traditional family and community structures in Kenya. Denoeux and Carter (2009) argues that family and traditional mechanisms that used to inculcate social norms, rules and culture have been weakened thereby creating space for unchecked deviant behaviour. This is attributed to massive urbanization that has shattered traditional systems of social regulation. A field assessment by USAID in 2008 in Garissa, Kenya, indicated that youth susceptibility to the lures of radical organizations increases where family, clan and ethnic based structures that used to constrain anti-social or violent behaviour have frayed or disappeared. This is worsened when the State structures fail to create alternative and effective mechanisms of social regulation to replace the former avenues of socialisation and behaviour regulation. Therefore, increased urbanization accompanied by disintegration of traditional systems of behaviour checks in Kenya may trigger a search for identity, meaning and purpose from elsewhere, including in RVE organizations.

h) Sense of Injustice and Collective Punishment

Ahmed (2015) argues that strong feelings of injustice trump economic factors in motivating individuals or communities to supporting or joining RVE organisations. He further explains this argument by giving a short excerpt of a 23-year old ex-Taliban militant who says:

*"I did not join the Taliban because I was poor...I joined because I was angry...I was angry because the Islamic school where I used to study was destroyed in the U.S-led surge to clear the area of militants five years ago. It was where the young people studied. It was where we all came together. It was the centre of my village…" (*Ahmed, 2015)

According to the ex-Taliban, a sense of being wronged and having no source of meaning in his life pushed him to join the Taliban terror group. In Kenya, there have been reports of direct confrontation between the government forces and Muslims in Mombasa. Notable cases were reported after the supposed assassinations of alleged radical Muslim clerics including, Sheikh Aboud Rogo (2012), Sheikh Ibrahim Omar (2013) and Sheikh Abubakar Shariff (2014), as well as after the closure of mosques deemed to be involved in RVE (Kithuure and Bosire, 2014). These acts were termed as forms of injustice by some Muslims in Kenya.

Botha (2013) also argues that Muslim youth in Kenya have joined extremist groups as a counter-reaction to what they perceive as government-imposed collective punishment. The collective punishment is said to be driven by the perception that all Muslims and Somalis are terrorist or potential terrorists and hence responsible for the growing insecurity in the country. Botha (2013) reports that non-Muslim Kenyans in Eastleigh, Nairobi, turned against and attacked Somali-Muslims following a grenade attack in November 2012. He further documents that a high proportion of Somali-Muslims in Kenya claimed that they were threatened and told to 'go home' following the several grenade attacks in Nairobi.

Acts that are regarded as injustice or seen to constitute collective punishment can easily promote feelings of marginalisation and hence likely drive the aggrieved parties into RVE as an attempt to defend themselves and their communities. In his interview with individuals associated with MRC and Al-Shabaab, Botha (2014) outlines that over 85% of the respondents rated their level of frustration when joining the groups to be between 5 and 10 (1 and 10 being the lowest and highest levels of frustration, respectively).

i) Widespread Corruption and Impunity

ACSS (2012) argue that corruption, impunity, cronyism, favouritism and nepotism especially in public institutions may make citizens resentful, disillusioned and push them to lose confidence in the legitimacy of the public sector. This situation is aggravated when corruption and impunity among political elites is tolerated while ordinary citizens

receive harsh punishment for seemingly small offenses (Bjorgo, 2005). Such situation may elicit moral outrage and anger that provide a powerful motivation for supporting RVE as people look for solutions outside the legal political process (Denoeux and Carter, 2009). RVE organizations take advantage of this anger and outrage during their recruitment processes. They often emphasize consistently that they are against such ills as corruption and impunity and present themselves as embodiments of integrity, principles and moral rectitude (Borum, 2011). Ahmed (2015) argues that it is based on this promise that aggrieved and disenchanted Kenyan youths are drawn to support Al-Shabaab, MRC and other radical organizations. Al-Shabaab for instance, perceives itself as upright, principled and ready to defend ideals of Muslims.

j) Historical Marginalisation and Unequal Development

Perceptions of repeated marginalisation and underdevelopment propel communities to support RVE as retribution for abandonment and as a fight for survival (Denoeux and Carter, 2009). Notably, Tahiri and Grossman (2013) explain that it is not the individual, but collective sense of marginalisation that drives people to radicalism and violent extremism. This feeling proves difficult to address when it becomes chronic as any incident, however trivial, can trigger victim's support for RVEs.

In 2012, a World Bank report indicated that uneven development in Kenya was at 8.2 (where fully uneven development = 10 and fully even development = 1). Specifically, it reported a higher underdevelopment in North Eastern and Coastal regions as compared to other parts of Kenya. This augments Mhanga (2010), who argues that communities in the two regions feel continuously marginalised by successive governments. Ngunyi and Katumanga (2012), further highlight that coastal region communities lament that 'outsiders' have occupied their land, controlled their resources and subjugated them. This situation has created a sense of exclusion and frustration among the aggrieved communities, which also happen to be predominantly Muslims. As Mghanga (2010) aptly puts it, a sense of exclusion and underdevelopment is more volatile when perceived to take ethnic or religious context. The fact that underdeveloped areas are inhabited by Muslims while developed areas are inhabited by Christians alters the debate from development to religious and political context.

Ngunyi and Katumanga (2012) argue that socio-economic and political marginalisation of North Eastern and Coastal regions of Kenya began in the colonial period. It continued after independence resulting in Shifta war (1963-67) and MRC's quest for secessionism

in 2008. The pursuit of independence and self-determination in the two cases partially illustrates that continued exclusion and marginalisation drove the aggrieved communities to feel that they were not part of Kenya. This feeling is likely to provide fertile ground for RVE among the North Eastern and coastal populations. In fact, Al-Shabaab claims that they are fighting against exclusion of Muslim communities in North Eastern, Coast and Nairobi regions (Botha, 2014). In addition, Al-Shabaab is reported to recruit frustrated MRC sympathizers to support their cause (Hassan, 2012).

3.3 Addressing Distance Decay, Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Kenya

The factors outlined in section 3.2 illustrate that decay in social, economic and political contexts in Kenya has critical influence on victim's support of RVE. This reinforces the importance of addressing the conditions that constitute distance decay in Kenya so as to reduce RVE from blossoming. This should be done straightway given that the future of RVE organizations depends on their ability to recruit new members, and as such, they are likely to continue recruiting followers from Kenya and beyond. To curb citizen's susceptibility to promises of radicalism and extremism, all stakeholders need to offer something better in terms of development and equal opportunities (Ahmed, 2015). This argument is aptly supported by Professor Gary Bouma of Monash University who says:

"…*Acts of violence occur at the end of a process that often starts quite some time before. It is during this 'time before' that preventive measures can be taken. At the very early stages these measures simply involve caring for vulnerable individuals. Such acts are motivated less by preventing violence than simply wanting to support and assist persons in distress.*" (Australian Government, 2015)

Cross-sectoral responses and cooperation is required to successfully address radicalism and violent extremism in Kenya. This should include involvement of security, humanitarian, development, academic and religious organizations in public, private and civil society sectors. In particular, youth groups, religious centres, Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and schools are in constant interaction with young people and communities vulnerable to RVE. Therefore, they should be involved in counter-RVE initiatives given that they are better positioned to assist in disengaging them from RVE. The efforts of these groups should complement existing peace building efforts to avoid duplication as well as to enhance the capacity and

sustainability of the ongoing peace and development strategies.

Overall, stakeholders should focus on practical, effective and long term strategies aimed at strengthening institutional underpinnings of development and security. This includes focusing on human development that is known to fight against relative deprivation and marginalisation by prioritizing not only the quantity of growth, but also the quality of life (Sen, 1999). To this end, there is need to enhance social and political progress towards making freedom and democracy in Kenya integral part of development.

Socio-economic opportunities should be increased to meet the needs of growing population of young people in Kenya (Ahmed, 2015). The public, private and civil society sectors should make adequate investments including expansion of entrepreneurship, education, vocational training, and youth programs. These programs have been proven as best strategies for countering radicalism and violence (Taspinar, 2009). However, there is need to ensure that enhancement in access to and completion of schooling matches with job market requirements to deter the phenomenon of frustrated expectations.

Socio-economic and political ills such as corruption, injustice, favouritism, and impunity should seriously be addressed. Public institutions including the judiciary, executive and legislature and the security sector all need to uphold rule of law by respecting human rights without discrimination, as outlined in the constitution. National resources should be broadly shared throughout Kenya, with deliberate efforts at enhancing growth and development in areas that have historically been marginalized. In addition, the government in partnership with NGOs and private sector should ensure that people in marginalized areas are provided with adequate basic services. These acts of good governance are likely to improve confidence and legitimacy of the State and, by extension, reducing support for RVE.

It is the primary responsibility of the State and citizens to ensure sound governance and equal development throughout the country (Somanader, 2015). However, the contribution of foreign governments and international organizations is required to efficiently and effectively address the vast conditions of distance decay. Contributions in terms of financial resources should be well managed to ensure that they are directed to critical areas that influence vulnerability to RVE. These areas include microcredit programs, education, vocational training, and labour productivity among others (Borum, 2013). Nevertheless, given the reported widespread corruption in Kenya, foreign assistance should be accompanied with stricter and feasible conditionalities for institutional reforms

such as better governance, political participation, and human development.

It is argued that communities are able to identify and address, at an early stage, vulnerability to RVE (Angus, 2016). For this reason, community level campaigns and peace building initiatives should continuously be supported by the government and other partners. Communities and the mandated government institutions should hold regular dialogues on the threat, vulnerability, and consequences of RVE. The government, NGOs and private sector should make an attempt to support community initiatives that sensitize and educate people on the dangers of RVE and rebut radicalism and extremist propaganda. Such initiatives include empowering local communities to identify, respond and resist emerging radicalisation and extremism. It also includes building national cohesion to address alienation and disenchantment experienced by certain communities. Masinjila (2015) rightly states that citizens need to feel useful and appreciated if they are to be shielded from the temptations of RVE.

4.0 Conclusion

The preceding review examined the relationship between distance decay and RVE in Kenya. The paper concludes that although there is a confluence of factors that motivate radicalism and violent extremism, influence of distance decay cannot be ignored. The reality is that radicals and violent extremists manifests around issues that are of concern to the community. Social, economic and political grievances and frustrations that exist in the society are manipulated by RVE organizations with the ultimate goal of converting aggrieved citizens to their interpretation of the situation as well as to solicit their support.

In Kenya, conditions that constitute distance decay include historical marginalisation; uneven development and economic opportunities; poor, or lack of public services; ungoverned orpoorly governed areas; unemployment; frustrated expectations; political exclusion and denial of political rights; weakening of traditional family structures; injustice; impunity; and endemic corruption among others. These grievances are predominantly experienced by communities in the North Eastern and Coastal region as well as residents of urban informal settlements. Many inhabitants of these areas have interpreted the grievances as abandonment, alienation, and collective victimization by the Kenyan government and mainstream society. This has brought feelings of hopelessness, frustration, and resentment towards the government and other communities which seem not to be facing the same grievances. Scholars, such as Botha (2013); Borum (2011); Ahmed (2015); and Hassan (2012), agree that these underlying conditions and sentiments have provided breeding grounds for RVE in Kenya.

To successfully curb susceptibility to RVE, the paper concludes that there is need to address the socio-economic and political grievances faced by various communities in Kenya. This should include deliberate efforts of enhancing growth and development in areas that have historically been marginalized. It should also encompass multi-sectoral response and cooperation with specific focus on practical, effective and long term strategies aimed at strengthening institutional underpinnings of human development, economic growth and security throughout the country. Continuous partnership between vulnerable communities and the government is also encouraged given that communities are better positioned to identify and address RVE at an early stage.

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Highlight of Key Messages in the Issue Briefs

This factsheet is a quick reference guide regarding issues discussed in the two papers.

The key messages in the first article, **Contemporary International Terrorism and its Implications on PSO: Case of AMISOM and MINUSMA include:**

- The Sahel and the Horn of Africa complex conflict systems, faced by poor governance, state weakness, instability and recurrent conflicts, are providing new frontiers for global counter terrorism war with enhanced international cooperation
- The nature and dynamics of terrorism in peace support operations is complex and multi-faceted, therefore there is a need for evolving strategies of counter terrorism.
- Responding to terrorism in countries where there are UN or AU PSO missions is becoming a critical issue for the smooth operation and success of these missions.
- Implementing complex mandates in terrorists infiltrated operational theatres pose a number of operational challenges; asymmetric warfare, hostile threats, links to transnational organized crimes such as drug trafficking and corruption
- Global CT regime especially in PSO context is under review due to flawed policies and practices that prioritized militarized and law enforcement responses discounting local contexts and driving factors and catalysts to violent extremism
- Too much focus on peace enforcement and fighting terrorism diverts energy and resources from state and nation building. UN is institutionally not well prepared to address region specific PSO challenges. Blowback against UN forces will dent the image of UN
- The UN is yet to spell out 'Post conflict stabilization strategy/doctrine'. UN may not be well designed and prepared to engage in offensive counter terrorism operations but it is effective in security stabilization once the operations end
- The ongoing changes in peacekeeping operations pose challenge to the UN in maintaining its core principles as it embarks on more effective protection of civilians
- The UN and AU are neither primarily designed to deal with terrorists nor do they have capacity as demonstrated in UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM.

- In missions such as above there is overlap between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter terrorism and war on the other hand war on counter terrorism has changed the nature of PSO.
- Abrogation of peacekeeping principles may result in unintended consequences such as putting humanitarian staff at risk and reprisal attacks against missions as it has happened in Mali and Somalia.

The key messages in the second article, **Distance Decay, Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Kenya** are as follows:

- Although there is a confluence of factors that motivate RVE, influence of distance decay cannot be ignored.
- The reality is that social, economic and political grievances and frustrations that exist in Kenya are manipulated by RVE organizations with a goal of soliciting support from aggrieved citizens.
- Conditions that constitute distance decay in Kenya include historical marginalisation; uneven development and economic opportunities; poor/lack of public services; ungoverned/poorly governed areas; unemployment; frustrated expectations; political exclusion and denial of political rights; weakening of traditional family structures; injustice; impunity; and endemic corruption among others.
- These conditions are predominantly experienced by communities in the North-eastern and Coastal regions of Kenya as well as residents of urban informal settlements. Many inhabitants of these areas have interpreted the grievances as abandonment, alienation, and collective victimization by the Kenyan government and mainstream society. Among many, this has brought feelings of hopelessness, frustration, and resentment towards the government and other communities which seem not to be facing the same grievances.
- There is need to address the socio-economic and political grievances faced by various communities in Kenya in order to successfully curb RVE susceptibility. This should include deliberate efforts of enhancing growth and development in areas that have historically been marginalized. It should also encompass multi-sectoral response and cooperation with specific focus on practical and long term strategies aimed at strengthening institutional underpinnings of human development, economic growth and security throughout the country.

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Mr. Joseph Kioi Mbugua is a researcher at IPSTC. He has published a number of articles in the IPSTC occasional papers and issue briefs. Mr. Mbugua has over twenty years' experience in peace and security research, training and facilitating in peace building and as a writer and editor in media and publishing industry. Mr. Mbugua has done consultancy work for a number of organizations including UNDP, UN Women, National Council for Gender and Development, Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC), Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management, GIZ, PACT-Kenya, COPA, Kenya Institute of Governance (KIG), NPI-Africa, and Practical Action, among others. He has facilitated peacebuilding training for District Peace Committees (now County Peace Committees) in Moyale, Marsabit, Isiolo, Samburu, Meru North, Trans Nzoia, Kajiado, Nairobi, Bungoma, Uasin Ngishu and Turkana. Mr. Mbugua is a graduate of the University of Nairobi and holds an M.A degree in peace and justice from the University of San Diego in California, and is also a recipient of the prestigious Fulbright and Rotary Ambassadorial Scholarships from the United States.

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APPENDIX

MAP OF SOMALIA AND MALI

Source: *BBC*

Source: *UN Department of Field Services*

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