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*Assessing the Responses to Youth  
Radicalization in Eastern Africa*

*Emergency, Preparedness and  
Response to Drought in Eastern  
Africa*



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*Oxfam (2010-2011), Water distribution in the Horn of Africa during a severe drought.*

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## Foreword

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is a research and training institution focusing on capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the framework of the African Peace and Security architecture (APSA) and has developed to be a regional Centre of Excellence for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. The IPSTC addresses the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated Peace Support Operations (PSOs) by analyzing the actors and multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research whose findings constitute the subject of this Issue Brief covers a broad spectrum of issues ranging from conflict prevention through management to post-conflict reconstruction. The Centre has made considerable contribution in training and research on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa through designing of training curricula, conducting field research and publication of Occasional Papers and Issue Briefs. The Occasional Papers are produced annually, while the Issues Briefs are quarterly. The issue briefs are an important contribution to the vision and mission of the IPSTC.

The Third Quarter Issue Brief No 6 (2015) has two titles on peace and conflict in Eastern Africa, one article is entitled: *Assessing Responses to Youth Radicalization in Eastern Africa and the second; Emergency Preparedness and Response to Drought in Eastern Africa*. The Issue Brief provides insights into pertinent peace and security issues in the region that are useful to policy makers and aims at contributing to the security debate and praxis in the region. The articles in this Issue Brief are also expected to inform the design of training modules at the IPSTC. The research and publication of this Issue Brief has been made possible by the support of the Government of Japan through UNDP.

**Brigadier P. Nderitu**

**Director, IPSTC**

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>ACLED</b>	Armed Conflict Location and Events Data
<b>ACPP</b>	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
<b>ADB</b>	African Development Bank
<b>ALP</b>	Accelerated learning Programme
<b>AMIB</b>	African Union Mission in Burundi
<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission in Somalia
<b>APSA</b>	African Peace and Security Architecture
<b>ASAL</b>	Arid and Semi-Arid Land
<b>ASF</b>	Africa Standby Force
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CAF</b>	Conflict Analysis Framework
<b>CCAPS</b>	Climate Change and African Political Stability
<b>CEWARN</b>	Conflict Early Warning and Response Network
<b>CGCC</b>	Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation
<b>CTC</b>	Counter terrorism Committee
<b>CVE</b>	Counter Violent Extremism
<b>DPR</b>	Disaster preparedness and response
<b>DRM</b>	Disaster Risk Management
<b>EA</b>	Eastern Africa
<b>FR</b>	Formerly Recruited Children
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>HRW</b>	Human Rights Watch

<b>ICPAC</b>	IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Center
<b>ICU</b>	Islamic Courts Union
<b>IDDRSI</b>	Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative
<b>IGAD</b>	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
<b>IPCC</b>	International Panel on Climate Change
<b>IPSTC</b>	International Peace Support Training Centre
<b>ISIS</b>	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
<b>KDF</b>	Kenya Defence Forces
<b>KMYA</b>	Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance
<b>LRA</b>	Lord's Resistance Army
<b>NBDS</b>	New Business Development service
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>OCVP</b>	Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention
<b>PSO</b>	Peace Support Operations
<b>SSR</b>	Security Sector Reforms
<b>TJRC</b>	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNFCC</b>	United Nations Forum on Climate Change
<b>UNISDR</b>	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
<b>UNODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

## Definition of Terms

**Drought Preparedness:** A continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and taking corrective action in an effort to ensure effective coordination during incident response. This includes knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely or prevailing drought conditions.

**Drought Response:** The provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a drought in order to save lives, to reduce health impacts or to ensure public safety and to meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected.

**Drought Vulnerability:** The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of drought.

**Drought:** Deficiency of precipitation over an extended period of time, usually a season or more, which results in water shortage. There are four types of drought: meteorological (lack of precipitation), agricultural (lack of moisture in the soil where crops grow), hydrological (low levels of water in lakes and reservoirs), and socioeconomic (water shortages in drinking and running water) (UNISDR, (2009).

**Eastern Africa:** In this context, Eastern Africa, as indicated by the UN, consists of 11 out of 18 countries. The countries are: Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania (UN 2013).

**Emergency:** An immediate occurrence or threat that has caused loss or has a high probability of escalating to cause immediate danger to life, health, property, or environment. Emergencies are a disruption of the functioning of society, causing human, material or environmental damages and losses which do not exceed the ability of the affected society to cope using only its own resources.



**Radicalization:** A process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that (1) reject or undermine the status quo or (2) reject and/or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice (National Counter Terrorism Center USA).

**Terrorism:** Intentional infliction of suffering or loss of one party by another party, which has no authority or legitimacy. An alternative definition is the use of indiscriminate violence to intimidate the general majority of the people in a state to accept the changes advocated by the terrorists (Kenya National Counterterrorism Strategy, 2004: 1).

**Youth:** Persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years, (UN Commission for Social Development resolution E/2007/26 & E/CN.5/2007/8 of 2007).

## INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUE BRIEFS

The topics in this Third Quarter Issue Brief are geared towards creating greater understanding and appreciation of peace and security situation in the Eastern Africa Region. While one topic focuses on Youth Radicalisation in Eastern Africa the other focuses on Emergency Preparedness and Response to Drought in Eastern Africa.

The first paper, *Assessing Responses to Youth Radicalization in Eastern Africa*, argues that the youth are vulnerable and prone to recruitment into extremist groups. This is particularly the case in environments with extremely high levels of prolonged and severe intra and interstate conflicts. Such conflicts lead to instability, poverty, unemployment and political isolation that make the youth vulnerable to radicalization and may eventually join a terrorist group. In the absence of possibilities for employment and in an environment of pervasive cynicism, the youth are drawn into and can be recruited by extremist or terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab within Eastern Africa. This trend has been observed in Eastern Africa and in particular Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and parts of North Africa and the Middle East. Terrorist groups often provide social services in an attempt to recruit the youth who can subsequently be radicalized. This way, they also render whole communities vulnerable to exploitation by radical elements thereby eroding the capacity of such communities to defend themselves. Little attention has been paid to the unintended radicalization of the youth, children at risk, and vulnerable groups such as those living in areas easily targeted by extremist groups especially refugee camps and those of internally displaced and minority groups. This paper, therefore, examines radicalization, its determinants, consequences and some of the measures put in place by governments in the region to deal with it.

In the second paper, *Emergency Preparedness and Response to Drought in Eastern Africa*, examines the drivers of vulnerability which are dependent on several factors such as climate change, population dynamics and use of technology. The main

objective of the paper was to investigate and analyze emergency, preparedness and response to drought. In addition, the paper sought to identify and analyse the level of vulnerability to drought and existing drought emergency preparedness policies. Further, the paper interrogates the existing drought response mechanisms and associated challenges as well as opportunities for effective emergency preparedness and response in the region.

## **Assessing Responses to Youth Radicalization in Eastern Africa**

### ***Abstract***

The youth are vulnerable and prone to recruitment into extremist groups. This is particularly the case in environments with extremely high levels of prolonged and severe intra and interstate conflicts. Such conflicts lead to instability, poverty, unemployment and political isolation that make the youth vulnerable to radicalization and eventual joining of terrorist groups. In the absence of possibilities for employment and in an environment of pervasive cynicism, the youth are drawn into and can be recruited by extremist or terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab within Eastern Africa. This trend has been observed in Eastern Africa and in particular Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and parts of North Africa and the Middle East. Terrorist groups often provide social services in an attempt to recruit the youth who can subsequently be radicalized. This way, they also render whole communities vulnerable to exploitation by radical elements thereby eroding the capacity of such communities to defend themselves. Little attention has been paid to the unintended radicalization of the youth, children at risk, and vulnerable groups such as those living in areas easily targeted by extremist groups especially refugee camps and those of internally displaced and minority groups. This Paper, therefore, examines radicalization, its determinants, consequences and some of the measures put in place by regional governments to deal with it.

**Key Words:** Al-Shabaab; Youth; Radicalization; Terrorism; Extremism.

## 1.1 Background and Introduction

Eastern African Countries<sup>1</sup> have been subject to violent extremism and terrorist attacks perpetuated mainly by the Al-Shabaab, a Somali based Al-Qaida affiliate.<sup>2</sup> The attack targeting Christian students at Garissa University College in Kenya in which 148 Youth were killed is a case in point. The youth themselves have been fundamentally affected both as perpetrators and as victims. School-aged youth have participated in a variety of organizations that promote or carry out acts of violence. The youth have helped to fill the ranks of militaries, militias, gangs, and terrorist groups. Young persons' roles within these organizations have varied from providing logistical support (serving as "lookouts" or "moles") through raising funds and taking part in battles, to carrying out attacks. The processes by which youth become involved in these groups also vary. Some have been born into radical environments that promote violence. Others are "spotted" and directly recruited by groups. Some voluntarily join the groups, while others get forced into membership (Schmidt, 2013: 1). Today, the perpetrators of terrorism appear to be just out to kill, irrespective of the targets. The available experience from Kenya, Uganda and Somalia shows that the psychological mind of the perpetrators is devoid of any form of consciousness or humanity. They are simply killing machines. This is why preventive efforts to stop the youth before they are recruited and radicalized are crucial (Sodipo, 2013: 4).

The Eastern Africa region continues to grapple with an unprecedented rise in violence that targets the most vulnerable segments of society. The youth are being lured to abandon their promising futures as responsible citizens. They hold the key to future stable families, societies and nations. Radicalizing the youth towards the tragic path of violence and destruction based on ideological beliefs to achieve rapid

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1 *There are different definitions of the Greater Horn of Africa. In this policy research paper, the Greater Horn of Africa refers to the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.*

2 *For simplicity, this case study will use the term Al-Qaeda or Al-Qaeda affiliates to refer to this developing nexus of Islamist terrorist groups. This by no means seeks to belittle the significant differences between these groups in terms of stated ideologies, goals, tactics, and trainings. Groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, Al-Qaeda Central, Laskar-e-Toiba, al-Shabaab, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq are some examples of the groups comprising this nexus. The naming generalization is for simplicity only, and further group distinctions fall outside the purview of this case study.*

socio-political changes outside of the accepted norms needs to be addressed. Those luring the youth into extremism have exploited common grievances, hopelessness; perceived injustices and marginalization to radicalize them to their cause in the name of religion.

According to Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN, 2013), unemployment, poverty and political marginalisation have contributed to the radicalisation of youth in Eastern Africa. IRIN (2013) reports indicate that an estimated 75 percent of youth who have completed school have no jobs. This, coupled with rising political disenchantment, has led to serious challenges. Such issues breed radicalization as youth seek avenues through which to ventilate.

The role of the media as purveyors of information in this difficult environment and the adversarial politicking in the public domain offer nothing more than aggravated frustration for the youth.

The importance of this area of terrorist study has become particularly germane in light of the recent attack by Al-Shabaab on the Westgate shopping center in Nairobi, during which the terrorists used social media to give updates of their actions to the public. While social media has been used to support terrorist operations in the past (for instance the Mumbai attacks by Lashkar-e-Taiba in 2008) (Kilcullen, 2013) the Al-Shabaab Westgate incident is an example of real time, direct audience-targeted propaganda that social media facilitates.<sup>3</sup> Cast within this light is the question of how closely a terrorist website publisher is connected to a group's core operational personnel. This becomes particularly relevant as this knowledge could be used in the future to preempt incidents such as the Westgate attack.

With the rising IT literacy levels, more and more youth in Eastern Africa are becoming connected to the information super-highway on a daily basis (Graham, 2010). A tiny proportion of these Africans are terrorists. Sites such as Al-Shabaab's Twitter Feed have been highly graphic in their content and blatant in their

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<sup>3</sup> Kilcullen, David. (2013). *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla*. London: Hurst and Co. (Publishers) Ltd.

promotion of terrorism as a legitimate practice. It is notable how easily accessible they are for the common internet user especially the youth. Indeed, a Google search of the phrase “Al- Shabaab Twitter Feed” indicates how well-trodden or frequently visited the site has become.

While the presence of Al-Shabaab terrorist groups on the Internet is obvious, there are many unanswered questions that may need to be examined: are the terrorist website publishers within Eastern Africa actually resident in Africa? What is the preferred web-publishing technology for terrorist web publishers in Eastern Africa? What is the geographic distribution of terrorist groups publishing in Eastern Africa? Who are the target audiences for the terrorist publishers of Eastern Africa? These are all questions that remain unanswered regarding the presence of terrorists on the internet.<sup>4</sup>

Despite the often banal content of many terrorist websites (Holbrook et al, 2013), the very presence of a terrorist group on the Surface Web has consistently provoked strong reactions from the public and policy makers in Eastern Africa (Sheobat, 2013), suggesting heightened radicalization and recruitment of the youth by terrorist web-sites (Lappin, 2010; Awan, 2007; and Lauren Weiner, 2010). Many religious leaders and politicians have been critical of the internet service providers’ lethargy in response to terrorist use of social media to recruit the youth<sup>5</sup> (Kendzior, 2013).

Following in the wake of increased Al-Shabaab use of the internet, negative perceptions on terrorist access to the internet have grown to the extent that the issue has started to shape the form that web technology takes, with services such as YouTube labeling some content as inappropriate due to the presence of materials that promote terrorism (Kanalley, 2010).

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<sup>4</sup> *The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. Brigitte L. Nacos, Laura K. Donohue, (2003). Mass-mediated Terrorism:*

<sup>5</sup> *Social Media - characterized by highly malleable, user-created content. Web services such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube are all examples of social media websites.*

Although to date there have been no specific studies investigating Sub-Saharan African terrorist groups' use of the internet, Somalia's Al-Shabaab's use of the social media platform, Twitter, and face book has drawn large amounts of analysis from both media and policy circles (Pearlman, 2012). Academic studies such as Kahn et al (2004) have shown how common and easily accessible terrorist websites and content have become. However, despite the internet having become central to many people's lives globally, many past studies appear to have accorded terrorist use of the internet only tangential reference.

The Al-shabaab and Al-Qaeda terrorist use of different media contents, fully adjusted to children of different ages, and distributes them through the Internet and social networks, making them a powerful tool for conducting such goals.<sup>6</sup> The Al-Shabaab new media strategy and its efficiently developed self-recruitment models through the Internet have contributed to that significantly, enabling creation of virtual communities for education, mutual introductions, communication and the planning of mutual activities. Such new forms of online radicalization unfold new challenges for regional security services and call for a creation of new methods for the prevention of misuse of media for terrorist propaganda.<sup>7</sup>

However, there is a growing body of work that examines terrorist, dissident and criminal use of the internet. Studies such as Cheong et al (2011) examined how the micro blogging site, Twitter, could be used by security services in the event of a terrorist attack while other works address social media's role in civil unrest (Khondker, 2011; Ghonim, 2012). Within the field of criminology, a number of studies have explicitly segregated malicious activities within the Dark Web<sup>8</sup>

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6 *Mass-Mediated Terrorism; the Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism* Brigitte L. Nacos, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). New York: Columbia University Press.

7 'Media and the myth of radicalization', *Media, War and Conflict* 2: p. 107. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. Andrew Hoskins and Ben O'Loughlin, (2009).

8 Dark Web – is a layer of the internet that is deliberately hidden or is not accessible by any search engine. Accessing a Dark Web site requires specific technology and explicit knowledge regarding the location of the site the user wishes to visit. Dark Web content is typically illegal in nature.

(Christin, 2012) from Surface Web<sup>9</sup> activities (Décary-Hétu et al., 2011). To date, the bulk of research that has examined cyber-terrorism has exclusively examined Dark Web terrorist activity (The University of Arizona Dark Web Portal being the most prominent). What currently lacks in the literature is a more concerted examination of how various web technology platforms are being used by terrorists and how terrorist web content published to the Surface, Deep and Dark webs is related to user experience.

The available evidence suggests that youth roles within terrorist organizations have changed over time as well, with a growing number of instances of young persons carrying out (or attempting to carry out) terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings<sup>10</sup>. Both Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda continue to boost youth recruitment through the developed video networks.<sup>11</sup> The captured and recorded videos show Al-Qaeda members boasting about turning children into suicide bombers and young boys making statements promoting slaughter and declaring their allegiance to Al-Qaeda.<sup>12</sup> These tapes are believed to be training films used to encourage other youth to join the terrorist network. Captured along with these videos was a movie script outlining scenes where children would interrogate and execute victims, plant improvised explosive devises, and conduct sniper attacks against security forces.<sup>13</sup>

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9 Surface Web - defined as a layer of the Internet that is easily accessible via mainstream search engines such as Google. Sites on the Surface Web can be either HTML or social media based. However, all have the common feature that they have been designed to be easily found by an Internet user with basic skill levels.

10 "Mickey Mouse Knockoff on Hamas TV Used To Indoctrinate Children Into Culture Of Hate," Anti-Defamation League, (9 May 2007), [http://www.adl.org/PresRele/ASaw\\_14/5046\\_14.htm](http://www.adl.org/PresRele/ASaw_14/5046_14.htm).

11 P.W. Singer (2005). "The New Children of Terror," *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes*, Vol. 1, ed. James J.F. Frost. New York: Praeger, pp. 105-119.

12 For simplicity, this case study will use the term Al-Qaeda or Al-Qaeda affiliates to refer to this developing nexus of Islamist terrorist groups. This by no means seeks to belittle the significant differences between these groups in terms of stated ideologies, goals, tactics, and trainings. Groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, Al-Qaeda Central, Laskar-e-Toiba, Al-Shabaab, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq are examples of the groups comprising this nexus. The naming generalization is for simplicity only and further group distinctions fall outside the purview of this case study.

13 Rear Adm. Gregory Smith and Major General Mohammed al-Askari, Press Conference, 5 February 2008, [www.mnf-iraq.com](http://www.mnf-iraq.com).



The demographics<sup>14</sup> of young persons becoming involved in terrorist groups also appear to be changing.<sup>15</sup> In many cases, the persons implicated are younger than those reported in the past. Today, more female youth are joining the ranks of terrorist organizations<sup>16</sup> and more young supporters are coming from Western countries.

This continues to fuel and encourage local youth to join terrorist groups that are further removed from actual conflict areas.<sup>17</sup> The appeal of extremist ideologies to the youth has increased today unlike in the past. Young foreign terrorist fighters are travelling in unprecedented numbers to join groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia,

Boko Haram in Nigeria or IS in Syria and Iraq.<sup>18</sup> A significant portion of such youth no longer contents itself with ideological sympathies, and decides to join radical and extremist groups.<sup>19</sup> Al-Qaeda and its affiliates Al-Shabaab have understood this reality and have been intensively targeting this demographic, taking advantage of several factors that are conducive to radicalization and violent extremism. This has been noticeable in numerous situations involving Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram and their affiliates throughout the world (Evans and Neumann, 2009; Kirby, 2007; Ferrero, 2005; Stern, 2003).

In Somalia, Al-Shabaab uses young fighters in its maritime piracy attacks, while Boko Haram in West Africa (Nigeria) depends on youth recruitment and has

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14 Videos have been found in which young persons in the United Kingdom filmed themselves reenacting beheadings. The youth were copying videos of beheadings that had been posted online by terrorist groups or their supporters (see Singer, "The New Children of Terror").

15 Department for Communities and Local Government (2011), *Citizenship Survey: April–December 2010, England*. London: Communities and Local Government Publications. p.26. For violent extremism in general, respondents were asked 'How right or wrong do you think it is for people to use violent extremism in Britain to protest against things they think are very unfair or unjust?'. For violent extremism in the name of religion, they were asked 'please tell me how right or wrong you think each of the following is: people in Britain using violent extremism in the name of religion, to protest or achieve a goal.' About 1% of all respondents said violent extremism in general was 'always' or 'often right'. A further 5% thought it was 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong'. Less than 0.5% said the use of violent extremism in the name of religion was 'always' or 'often right'. A further 1% thought it was 'sometimes right' or 'sometimes wrong'.

16 Department for Children, Schools, and Families, "Learning Together to be Safe: A Toolkit to help Schools Contribute to the Prevention of Violent Extremism," (London, U.K.: 2008), [www.dcsf.gov.uk/publications](http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/publications).

17 Jessica Stern, "Jihad a Global Fad", *The Boston Globe*, August 1, 2006, from: [www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/08/01/jihad\\_a\\_global\\_fad](http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/08/01/jihad_a_global_fad)

18 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas have recruited children as young as thirteen to be suicide bombers and others as young as eleven to smuggle explosives and weapons.

19 BBC News, "Militias 'recruit child bombers'," *BBC News* (25 April 2008) [http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pt/fr/-/2/hil/middle\\_east/7367920.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pt/fr/-/2/hil/middle_east/7367920.stm)

recently been using children as young as 8 years in its suicide attacks.<sup>20</sup> In the same context, while the involvement of youth could be part of the challenge related to violent extremism, the youths themselves can also be the solution. Urgent action is required at the national, sub-regional, regional and international levels in order to address this issue and place youth at the centre of the global agenda to counter violent extremism.<sup>21</sup>

Lastly, this paper examines the impact of counter-terrorism policies and best practices for or by the vulnerable communities and argues that, regional governments need to better understand the human security needs of the youth. It considers available research on effective strategies, including broad inclusion programmes, to protect and support the youth and school-going children who are at risk of radicalization.

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

The concept of youth radicalization has led to the perception of Muslim populations as ‘suspect communities’ perpetrating human and civil rights abuses and a damaging failure to understand the nature of the political conflicts in which regional governments are involved. The Eastern Africa region faces a range of challenges, including persistent threats posed by Al-Shabaab Islamist terrorists and other violent groups. These security challenges are exacerbated by an array of chronic problems ranging from underdevelopment and weak governance to massive unemployment, that make them potentially more vulnerable to empty promises of a better life and financial incentives offered by Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations. The region has also been heavily affected by destructive cross-border communal conflicts often triggered by resource scarcity due to rapid population growth and facilitated by porous borders.<sup>22</sup>

20 One of the most active generic social media platforms in Nigeria is the forum site *nairaland.com* and it was within this web site that researchers found a discussion on Boko Harams’ use of Facebook (<http://www.nairaland.com/1297912/boko-haram-leader-shekau-opens-facebook>). The Facebook site being discussed on *nairaland.com* is purported to be the work of Abubakar Ibn Muhammad Shekau, the current leader of Boko Haram.

21 Merle Kellerhals, “Using Children as Suicide Attackers Increases Sense of Barbarity,” *America.gov* (23 October 2007).

22 See Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Preventing Youth Radicalization in East Africa,” Program Report, Kigali, Rwanda, 22–27 January 2012, <http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Preventing-Youth-Radicalization-Program-Report-2012.pdf>. For instance, economic deprivation is seen as an important motivator for marginalized youth who join the separatist Mombasa Republican Council in the coastal areas in Kenya. Recruiters for Al-Shabaab also lure local youth by offering a sense of belonging, a compelling worldview, and a small stipend.

Overall, Eastern Africa youth experiences high levels of unemployment recently estimated at 40% (World Bank, 2012). Youth unemployment within the region stands at 70% of the total youth population. This high rate of unemployment is attributed to the fact that the minimal activities the youth carry out are not sufficient to afford them a decent life or provide for the utilization of their full potential.<sup>23</sup>

Regional governments have so far been unable to absorb their youth into decent employment in order to counteract the political and security challenges to a significant degree. The youth unemployment crisis continues to have a profound effect on young people and the societies in which they live. Young people experience increased levels of hunger, poverty, deprivation, fear, despair, absence of sense of belonging to the human family and social exclusion. The widening economic gap has led to growing frustration, desperation and exasperation among the population while governments and economists have been unable to absorb their youth hence many becoming available for radicalisation and terrorism.<sup>24</sup>

Terrorist groups operating in the Eastern Africa region have capitalized on economic weaknesses, governance deficits, violent conflicts, and the lack of effective service delivery by governments to recruit from politically and economically marginalized youth populations. Marginalized segments of the region's growing youth population are particularly vulnerable in this regard. These structural "push" factors, accompanied by "pull" factors such as charismatic recruiters, appealing ideologies, and material and social incentives have fueled radicalization and recruitment in the region.

Al-Shabaab have been in a position to recruit the youth who perceive of discrimination in any emerging job opportunities. Lack of opportunity as a result of discriminatory policies contributes to widely held grievances in Muslim

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23 Njonjo, K. S. (2010). *Kenya Youth Fact Book*. Nairobi: Institute of Economic Affairs and Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung.

24 For a more extensive discussion of the concept of countering violent extremism, see Will McCants and Clinton Watts, "U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment," Foreign Policy Research Institute *E-Notes*, December 2012, [http://www.fpri.org/docs/media/McCants\\_Watts\\_-\\_Countering\\_Violent\\_Extremism.pdf](http://www.fpri.org/docs/media/McCants_Watts_-_Countering_Violent_Extremism.pdf).

communities. The root cause of youth radicalization in Eastern Africa stems from the region's desperate economic, social, and political conditions. Ineffective decentralization of development plans and governance issues since independence form the backbone of this situation, which is taken advantage of by an infrastructure of social networks or religious and political groups that provide communities with what the government does not.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, economic development in the tourism industry, particularly in the Coast Province of Kenya has generally advanced without input from the local Muslim population and has also largely excluded them from its benefits. Fatima Azmiya Badurdeen (1st July, 2015) writes, "The government's attitude toward and plans for the coastal communities have led citizens in Coast to feel that their resources are being used for the benefit of others." Disparities in educational opportunities have also been a problem, and with less access to government-run schools, many Muslim families have turned to madrassas and to foreign education. Violent extremism also fuels inter-community tensions, inhibits socio-economic development and fosters regional and international insecurity.<sup>26</sup> It is therefore critical that regional governments and societies make it unacceptable for terrorist organizations to consider utilizing young persons to further their violent goals.<sup>27</sup>

### 1.3 Research Objectives

- To Assess the drivers/determinants and consequences of youth radicalization in Eastern Africa;
- To identify government interventions and other de-radicalization responses in Eastern Africa; and

25 Integrity Research and Consultancy, "Assessing Community Attitudes towards Violent Extremism and the Impact of International Prevention Programming," September 2012 (copy on file with authors) (hereinafter Integrity report) (elders and leaders focus group responses).

26 Director of religious youth organization, interview with Liat Shetret, Nairobi, October 2012; youth community organizer, interview with Liat Shetret, Mombasa, October 2012; civil society organizer, interview with Liat Shetret, Mombasa, October 2012.

27 Ibid. pp. 14-5. See also Brigitte L. Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). Nacos argues that 'publicity – far more than financial resources – is as essential for terrorists as the air they breathe. Terrorists perform their violent street theatre not, or not only, to harm their immediate victims but to obtain the attention of mass publics that they could not reach without the media communicating their deeds and carrying their messages' (*Ibid.*, p. 193)

- To assess the challenges and effectiveness of multi-dimensional responses to the problem of youth radicalization in Eastern Africa.

## 1.4 Research Questions

- What are the drivers/determinants and consequences of youth radicalization in Eastern Africa?
- What have been the respective governments' responses to youth radicalization in Eastern Africa?
- Which of the responses are most promising and how can they be up-scaled for sustainable peace and security in the region?

## 1.5 Justification of the Study

The rise of youth radicalization and violent extremism in Eastern Africa, especially among the youth, is one of today's most pressing threats to peace, stability and development. Not only does it threaten security and stability, but it also derails development efforts, foments community tensions and endangers future generations especially when radicalized youth abandon their education and employment to engage in terrorism. Today's generation of youth is the largest the world has ever known and it is the age group that is highly targeted by terrorist organizations.

Radicalization in Uganda, Kenya, Somalia and Burundi continues to increase among the youth despite attempts to counter it through workshops, seminars, religious teachings and interactive sessions in which religious leaders caution them against being misled by extremists. The region has witnessed terrorist attacks which have fueled internal and external conflicts. Regional governments and other institutions have undertaken a variety of initiatives but the problem persists.

Somalia continues to provide a safe haven, training camps and opportunities for extremists to fight the 'enemies of Islam'. Al-Shabaab have executed different attacks in the region by relying on local assistance and support. At the same time, Al-Shabaab continues to recruit Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian nationals to boost its ranks in Somalia.

On July 11, 2010 in Uganda, bombs exploded at the Ethiopian Village Restaurant and the Kyadondo Rugby Club where people had gathered to watch the final match of World Cup football. The attacks killed over 70 people and injured a similar number. Al-Shabaab publicly claimed responsibility calling the attacks a retaliation for Uganda's participation in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) authorized by the African Union and UN Security Council. In the crackdown that followed, Kenyan and Ugandan security forces cast a wide net, rounding up dozens of young people. Uganda responded to the attacks by working with the governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Somalia to hunt for suspects.<sup>28</sup>

Kenya, in particular, has seen a dramatic increase in the number of attacks against military, police and civilians since it sent military forces into Somalia to fight Al-Shabaab in October 2011. In 2014 alone, at least 100 fatalities were experienced in Lamu County, where historical grievances were laced with extremist views.<sup>29</sup>

In Mombasa, considered the main city of the Coastal region, mosques were reportedly taken over by radicalized groups during 2013-2014. The take-over was hostile indicating the extent to which the concerned youth were willing to execute the actions of their masters in ejecting the moderate *Imams* who saw it (take-over) as the work of 'external forces' (Kithuure and Bosire, 2014).

It is therefore important to try to understand the factors behind the increased attraction of the youth to extremist and militant views and their resultant willingness to execute violent attacks in eastern Africa. With such an understanding, it is possible to propose an effective interventionist strategy as terrorist activities continue to challenge regional security preparedness.

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28 Scott Baldauf, Mike Pflanz, and Max Delany, "Somalia's Al Shabaab claims responsibility for Uganda bombings" *Christian Science Monitor*, July 12, 2010, at [www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0712/Somalia-s-Al-Shabab-claims-responsibility-for-Uganda-bombings](http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0712/Somalia-s-Al-Shabab-claims-responsibility-for-Uganda-bombings).

29 It is not always clear who the perpetrators are, but in the past 18 months, Kenya has experienced a spike in grenade attacks, kidnappings, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kenya's northeastern region. The U.S. embassy in Kenya reported on July 5, 2012: "In the past year, there have been at least 17 attacks involving grenades or explosive devices in Kenya. At least 48 people died in these attacks, and around 200 people were injured... Nine of these attacks occurred in North Eastern Province, including locations in Dadaab, Wajir, and Garissa. Four attacks occurred in Nairobi, and four in Mombasa. Targets included police stations and police vehicles, nightclubs and bars, churches, a religious gathering, a downtown building of small shops, and a bus station. The most recent attack involved two simultaneous assaults on churches in Garissa on July 1, 2012. In this attack, 17 people were killed and about 50 people were injured." U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, *Travel Warning* (Kenya), July 5, 2012, at [travel.state.gov](http://travel.state.gov).



## 1.6 Radicalization: A Conceptual Framework

The concept of radicalization is not only central to this study but is also a subject that has gained significant currency among government officials, media practitioners, scholars and security officials in discourses on terrorism and violent extremism. Since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, attention to this phenomenon has continued to increase the world over. Yet, there is no single definition of the term that is generally agreed upon by its diverse users. As Schmidt noted, “the terms ‘radicalization’ and ‘de-radicalization’ are used widely, but the search for what exactly ‘radicalization’ is, what causes it and how to ‘de-radicalize’ those who are considered radicals, violent extremists or terrorists, is a frustrating experience” (Schmidt, 2013).

Ashour (2009), for instance, argues that radicalization is “a process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or behavioral transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly to the utilization of violence, or to an increase in the levels of violence, to achieve political goals” (Ashour, 2009: p; 11.2. For Sodipo, radicalization is “a process by which an individual or group adopts extreme political, social or religious ideals that reject the status quo, undermine contemporary ideas regarding freedom of choice and expression, and condone violence to achieve ideological ends, including undertaking terrorist acts” (Sodipo, 2013: p.8). It typically starts with changes in one’s self-identification. Grievances, frequently driven by personal or group concerns regarding local issues as well as international events, fuel this change.

A study on the causes of radicalization concludes that a complex interaction between factors at three levels i.e. individual, external and social is likely to be crucial for the intensity of or readiness for radicalization (Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008). External factors manifest themselves independent of the individual. They shape and constrain people’s environment although individuals have only minor influence on their environment. External factors can be subdivided into political, economic and cultural dimensions. Social factors refer to mechanisms



that position the individual in relation to others and hence can include people from in-groups as well as out-groups.


Wiktorowicz (2014) has identified four interrelated stages of the radicalization process as follows: **i)** Cognitive opening whereby individuals conditioned by both internal and external factors like economic and social circumstances become receptive to new ideas; **ii)** religious- search whereby individuals seek religious understanding of the issues; **iii)** frame alignment where the new ideas that are often radical in nature become meaningful to them, and **iv)** socialization during which individuals internalize radical ideas that enable them to join extremist groups (Wiktorowicz, (2014); Beutel, 2007). This process may not entirely explain the circumstances for all radicalized or Islamized groups but certainly illuminates how youths get radicalized in the West and other parts of the world. These factors may manifest themselves in different forms depending on the individual and context. However, agreement tends to revolve around a broad set of parameters that act as ingredients in the radicalization process: community grievance, ideology, mobilization, and tipping points. While community grievance is understood to be a sense of alienation or disenchantment that may provide a cognitive opening, ideology entails an extreme set of ideas that provide individuals with a new outlook and explanation for the world in which individuals may find themselves.

Mobilization captures the process by which the individual slowly integrates into a community or individuals who are like-minded and can create self-reinforcing community, and finally, tipping points are the specific events that push an individual or group from rhetoric to action (Beutel, 2007). External forces can also facilitate and reinforce these factors.

This study, therefore, defines radicalization as a process by which an individual or group transits from a state of passive reception of revolutionary ideals, views, ideas and beliefs to active and/or militant or extremist pursuit of such ideals, ideas and beliefs, especially through supporting, promoting or adopting violence as a means to achieving them.

This is the transition that underlies violent extremism or terrorism. In the light of the foregoing, the critical challenge is to uncover the reason why young people are inclined to being part of radical insurgent groups in Eastern Africa, particularly the Somali terrorist group, Al-Shabaab. Since youth radicalization within the context of Eastern Africa is best demonstrated by the activities of Al-Shabaab and its operations in the region, an overview of the origin, philosophy and activities of the Islamist group is appropriate here to prologue the discourse on the drivers of radicalization.

**Figure 2: Conceptual Framework on Determinants of Extremism**



*Source: Author's Conceptualization of Youth Radicalization in Eastern Africa*

**Hypothesis 1:** Individuals could be *pushed* into radicalisation by their perception of the failure of all nonviolent alternatives, including political participation, civil society action, peaceful protest or identification with victims of injustice, political repression, religious persecution, cultural discrimination, and economic deprivation.

**Hypothesis 2:** *Pull* factors include the rewards for joining a radical group in the form of material gains, sense of belonging to a “moral” or “religious” group, support and camaraderie from fellow radicals. Whether drawn by pull or push factors, individuals follow specific **pathways** towards radicalization.

# LITERATURE REVIEW

## 2.1 Recruitment, Radicalization and Utilization of Youth by Terrorist Groups

As its definitions indicate, radicalization is best viewed as a process of change, a personal and political transformation from one condition to another. Recent scholars argue that becoming radicalized is, for most people, a gradual process and one that requires a progression through distinct stages and happens neither quickly nor easily (Horgan, 2005; Sibley and Bhatt, 2007). A person does not become radical overnight, although the influence of an incident which may act as a ‘catalyst event’ (such as an experienced act of discrimination, perceived attack on Islam such as the 2003 war on Iraq, the AMISOM involvement in Somalia or a ‘moral crisis’ with the death of a loved one) may accelerate the process. For instance, Al-Lami (2009) notes that the majority of female suicide bombers in Iraq are thought to have had family members killed by either the multi-national or state forces in the country, triggering their own recourse to terrorism in an act of vengeance.

Radicalization in Eastern Africa has been explained from two theoretical perspectives: frustration by **relative deprivation** and contamination through **exposure**. The relative deprivation theory propounded by Ted Gurr is largely referred to as an efficient explanation of “why men rebel” (Gurr, 1970). Gurr argues that when material conditions change, values increase or decrease and attitudes or expectations of material conditions may not match. A personal perception of relative deprivation then leads the individual to a political attitude discontent from which violent action may emanate. However, as Charles Tilly et al (1978) argued, the key issue is not “*why men rebel*” but rather *why they do not rebel so often*”. His argument is not only about the scarcity of violence and logics of obedience, but about the fact that violence is linked to the political system and the State’s capacity and propensity for repression (Tilly, McAdam and Tarrow, 2001).

With respect to understanding terrorism in Eastern Africa, Didier Bigo and Daniel Hermant (1988) have followed Tilly's argument and have focused on the processional and relational understanding of violence rather than on the conditions causing the outbreak of violence (Wieviorka, 1988; Bigo, 2005; Bigo and Bonelli, 2008; Bonelli, 2011). This focuses on the specific but limited individual occurrences compliant with radicalization: pre-suicide videos, phone calls and letters to relatives, face-to-face interviews or vociferous speeches in court. These reinforce the individualistic and psychological orientations of radicalization. In addition, an analysis of the socio-political context and actions by different groups and interrelationships between social structures and political exposure in which violence is embedded are key to understanding the process of youth radicalization in Eastern Africa.

## 2.2 Terrorism and Radicalization in Eastern Africa

The principal terrorist threat in Eastern Africa currently stems from the activities of Al-Shabaab<sup>30</sup> in South-central Somalia.<sup>31</sup> Al-Shabaab, an umbrella group for a coalition of militias and insurgents, was initially associated with the Union of Islamic Courts, which briefly controlled most of south-central Somalia in 2006 until an invasion by Ethiopia in December of that year dislodged the group from power. Following its armed resistance to the Ethiopian occupation, which ended in January 2009, Al-Shabaab has continued as an alliance of disparate armed elements led by jihadists violently opposed to Somalia's Federal Government (SFG). Al-Shabaab is intent on establishing a fundamentalist Islamic state in the Horn of Africa. Its allies in Somalia include foreign fighters from Al-Qaeda, reportedly numbering in their hundreds. Through recent continued attacks against international targets such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Al-Shabaab has demonstrated its capacity to mount relatively sophisticated conventional attacks. It has continued to issue bellicose statements against countries in the region, most recently renewing its operations in some parts of Kenya and its threats against Uganda, Burundi and

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30 Meaning "the youth" in Arabic.

31 Arabic names are translated into Latin in a variety of ways. This report employs versions that are most common in the US media.

those supporting AMISOM operations in Somalia.<sup>32</sup>

Al-Shabaab, which seeks to implement *shari'a* law in areas it administers identifies itself as part of the global jihadist movement, which, for some time, has been more preoccupied with targets against the AMISOM and SFG and other local rivals than with projecting its power throughout the region. Al-Shabaab's and by extension Al-Qaeda's motives are to continue carrying out attacks in Eastern Africa. However, since many experts believe that Al-Shabaab is linked to Al-Qaeda, and Boko-Haram of Nigeria, this narrative could change if the former were to succeed in radicalizing the youth in order to establish substantial control of its territories and other large areas within Somalia. Eastern Africa and the Horn as a whole present numerous opportunities for regional (sub-state actors) to come up with measures for preventing youth from being radicalized. In addition, given Somalia's proximity to Yemen (another weak state with an Al-Qaeda presence), this study identifies the vulnerabilities of the youth posed by Al-Shabaab. It also suggests future threats and the need to take preventive measures to address them before they become realities.

On balance, there is a strong need to address youth radicalization and relative state fragility in order to bolster regional capacities to provide security, provide employment, encourage entrepreneurship, stem corruption, administer borders, and take other measures that together will help counter the recruitment of youth. This research focuses on the Eastern Africa region and singles out Al-Shabaab's operations in Somalia as the principal source of terrorist threats in the region. It also touches on other countries in region particularly Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and, to a lesser degree, Ethiopia. The first three countries together with Tanzania and Somalia are highly vulnerable to youth radicalization given their location along the Indian Ocean coast (except for Uganda and Burundi whose

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32 Uganda and Burundi have contributed over 5,000 peacekeepers to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the presence of which Al Shabaab vehemently opposes. In late October 2009, Al Shabaab threatened to attack Uganda and Burundi after AMISOM peacekeepers were accused of shelling a Mogadishu market and killing at least 30 people. The militant group's renewed threats against Kenya, a supporter of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, followed allegations that Kenya was recruiting and training young ethnic Somalis from northern Kenya to fight it. It (Al Shabaab) also threatened to send suicide bombers to Nairobi if Kenyan peacekeepers were deployed to Somalia with AMISOM. "Al-Shabaab Militants Threaten Kenya for Recruiting Allegations," VOA News, 12 October 2009, <http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-10-12-voa30.cfm?rss=topstories>; [http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=4567&Itemid=428](http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4567&Itemid=428); <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/24/world/africa/24somalia.html?ref=world>.

troops are part of AMISOM) and their expansive, porous borders, and long and largely un-policed coastlines.

## 2.3 Analysis of Radicalization

The terms ‘radicalization’ and ‘de-radicalization’ are used widely, but the search for what exactly ‘radicalization’ is, what causes it and how to ‘de radicalize’ those who are considered radicals, violent extremists or terrorists, is a frustrating experience (Horgan, 2005; Sibley and Bhatt, 2007). One literature survey found that ‘the causes of radicalization are as diverse as they are abundant’.<sup>33</sup> Rik Coolsaet, a Belgian expert who was part of an Expert Group on Violent Radicalization established by the European Commission to study the problem, recently described the notion of radicalization as ‘ill defined, complex and controversial’.<sup>34</sup> An Australian team of scholars concluded that ‘About the only thing that radicalization experts agree on is that it is a process. Beyond this there is considerable variation as to make existing research incomparable.’<sup>35</sup>

The popularity of the concept of ‘radicalization’ stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism. It was brought into the academic discussion after the bomb attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 respectively by European policymakers who coined the term ‘violent radicalization’. It has become a political ‘shibboleth’ despite its lack of precision.<sup>36</sup> Arun Kundnani comments: Since 2004, the term ‘radicalization’ has become central to terrorism studies and counter-terrorism policy-making.<sup>37</sup> As US and

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33 COT, *Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy*, (The Hague: COT, 17 November 2008), p. 11.

34 Rik Coolsaet (ed.), *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experience*, 2nd edition (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 240.

35 Minerva Nasser-Eddine, Bridget Garnham, Katerina Agostino and Gilbert Caluya, *Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review* (Canberra: Australian Government, Department of Defence March 2011), p. 13.

36 There are two versions of the term ‘violent radicalization’: (i) what is meant is not ‘radicalisation by violence’ but ‘radicalisation to violence’; (ii) and, in addition, the reference is not to ‘violence’ in general but to a specific type of political violence, namely terrorist violence against civilians and non-combatants. What is generally meant is ‘radicalisation as an individual or group process of growing commitment to engage in acts of political terrorism’.

37 Rosand et al., “Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in East Africa,” 15. *Ibid.*, 7; *Ibid.*, 28.

European governments have focused on stemming ‘home-grown’ Islamist political violence, the concept of radicalization has become the master signifier of the late ‘war on terror’ and provided a new lens through which to view Muslim minorities. The introduction of policies designed to ‘counter-radicalize’ has been accompanied by the emergence of a government-funded industry of advisers, analysts, scholars, entrepreneurs and self-appointed community representatives who claim that their knowledge of a theological or psychological radicalization process enables them to propose interventions in Muslim communities to prevent extremism.<sup>38</sup>

If the concept of radicalization itself is problematic, the same must by extension also be true for ‘de-radicalization’ and ‘counter-radicalization’, terms that are ‘poorly defined and mean different things to different people’ as the International Crisis Group noted in one of its reports.<sup>39</sup> If this is true, further progress in de-radicalization efforts and counter-radicalization initiatives is impeded by a fuzzy conceptualization of the core concept. Much of the present investigation is therefore devoted to address and clarify conceptual issues related to ‘radicalization’, ‘de-radicalization’ and ‘counter-radicalization’.

The literature on (de-) radicalization is young. The majority of publications are from the last decade, especially from the last eight years, triggered in part by a ‘blowback’ reaction to the US-led intervention to overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2003. Since this intervention was not authorized by the United Nations’ (UN) Security Council, it angered many Muslims in the Middle East and the West.<sup>40</sup> Most of the literature focuses on Islamist radicalization, especially in the West. The majority of studies describe radicalization and recruitment processes while studies on de-radicalization, disengagement and counter-radicalization are fewer and of more recent origin.

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38 Arun Kundnani, ‘Radicalization: The Journey of a Concept’. *Race and Class* Vol. 54, No. 2 (Oct.-Dec. 2012), p. 3.

39 International Crisis Group, ‘De-radicalisation and Indonesian Prisons’, Asia Report, No. 142 (19 November 2007), p. i. United Nations. Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes, (New York: UN/CTITF, September 2008), p. 5.

40 Defining Terrorism and its Root Causes. References to the definition of terrorism and the root causes as discussed in the United Nations General Assembly debate ‘Measures to eliminate international terrorism’, 1 – 5 October, 2001, United Nations, New York. Italics added by author.



What has been notably absent in most of the writings of those who now plough the field of counter-terrorism studies with regard to radicalization to political violence in general and terrorism in particular, is some soul-searching in individual histories. In none of the studies on radicalization and de-radicalization surveyed are discussions of apparently obvious questions found, like, ‘how did the radicalization that led to the American Revolution come about?’ or ‘how was the ‘de-Nazification’ (de-radicalization) of Germany achieved after the Second World War?’

## 2.4 The Gradual, Phased Process of Radicalization

It has sometimes been noted by intelligence agencies that radicalization can take place quite fast.<sup>41</sup> This is not necessarily the case of Eastern Africa because of the nature of Al-Shabaab’s operations. Here, only the last observed phase of reaction is fast especially after a dangerous person comes to the notice of intelligence agencies. The incubation period of youth radicalization often lasts months or even years, although there are exceptions to this rule.<sup>42</sup> There are many models depicting the process of radicalization. One of the first models was developed by Randy Borum in 2003. It lists four steps of radicalization to terrorism: (I) Recognition by the pre-radicalized individual or group that an event or condition is wrong (‘it’s not right’); (II) This is followed with framing of the event or condition as selectively unjust (‘it’s not fair’); (III) The third step occurs when others are held responsible for the perceived injustice (‘it’s your fault’); (IV) The final step involves the demonization of the ‘other’ (‘you’re evil’).<sup>43</sup>

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41 Communication by high-level national intelligence service official during an academic seminar at the University of St. Andrews (2007).


42 US Bipartisan Policy Center (2011), *op. cit.* (note 87), p. 3.

43 R. Borum (July 2003), ‘Understanding the terrorist mindset’, *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, 72 (7), pp. 7-10.

### 2.4.1 The Quintan Wiktorowicz Influential Model

Quintan Wiktorowicz introduced the notion of ‘cognitive opening’ in 2005. He examined the moment when an individual who has been trying to make sense of his or her existence suddenly sees the light, changing an old view of the world.<sup>44</sup> After studying a broad range of British Muslim extremists in the UK, Wiktorowicz found that it was not the most knowledgeable in Islamic theology that were vulnerable to radicalization but those who had only a superficial religious background.<sup>45</sup> This understanding is important to the success of countering violent extremism among the youth especially in terms of formulating a holistic and inclusive approach involving community leaders who are knowledgeable about Islamic theology, civil society actors, grassroots organizations, and other nonstate actors.

**Figure 3: Quintan Wiktorowicz Influential Model of Radicalization<sup>46</sup>**



Source: Wiktorowicz, 2005.

44 Q. Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*, (Lanham, Md.: Lowman & Littlefield), 2005.

45 Dina Temple-Raston, ‘New Terrorism Advisor Takes A “Broad Tent” Approach’, National Public Radio, 24 January 2011; at <http://www.npr.org/2011/01/24/133125267/new-terrorism-adviser-takes-a-broad-tent-approach>;

46 Alejandro J. Beutel, *Building Bridges to Strengthen America: Forging an Effective Counterterrorism Enterprise between Muslim Americans and Law Enforcement*, (Muslim Public Affairs Council: November 2009) p. 9. Available online at <http://buildingbridgeswny.org/articles/MPAC-Counter-Radicalization-Paper.pdf>

Another model developed by Joshua Sinai in 2012, divides the trajectory into three distinct phases: (i) Radicalization (ii) Mobilization (a form of active engagement) and (iii) Action (i.e. terrorism). For the radicalization phase, Sinai identifies six groups of factors: (a) personal factors, such as a cognitive opening which takes the form of seeking an empowering religious or political ideology that addresses the individual's concerns; (b) political and socioeconomic factors, such as a perception that one is being discriminated against; (c) ideological factors which are crucial but insufficient by themselves; (d) community factors such as presence of extremist sub-cultures within one's local community; (e) group factors, such as the presence of an extremist gateway organization in one's community; and (f) enabling factors that provide the means and opportunity to become an extremist.

The mobilization phase in Sinai's model is reached when certain catalysts in the form of 'triggers' drive the vulnerable youth or individual further along the path and he or she is not held back by inhibitors. For Sinai, the mobilization is an active phase consisting of three primary components: 1) opportunity (e.g. contacts with a terrorist group); 2) capability (e.g. training in the use of arms); and 3) readiness to act on behalf of a terrorist group. Finally, there is the Action phase of target selection and the actual terrorist attack.<sup>47</sup>

The staircase model was developed by Fathali M. Assaf Moghadam in 2009 for Islamic communities especially Somali communities in Eastern Africa, other developing countries and those living in Western and non-Western communities. He uses the metaphor of a narrowing staircase leading step-by-step to the top of a building, having a ground floor and five higher floors to represent each phase in the radicalization process. The top floor represents an act of terrorism. The ground floor, inhabited by more than one billion Muslims worldwide, stands for a cognitive analysis of the structural circumstances in which individual Muslims find themselves.

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<sup>47</sup> Joshua Sinai, 'Radicalization into Extremism and Terrorism: A Conceptual Model', *The Intelligencer*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 2012), pp. 22-3.

Here, the individual may ask himself or herself questions like ‘am I being treated fairly by the leaders or those in authority?’ The individual begins to interpret an ascribed causality for what they deem to be unjust. According to Moghaddam’s argument, most people especially the youth find themselves at this ‘foundational level’. Some individuals who are dissatisfied move up to the first floor in search of a change in their situation. On the first floor, one finds individuals who are actively seeking to remedy those circumstances they perceive to be unjust. Some of them might find that paths to individual upward social mobility are blocked, that their voices of protest are silenced and that there is no access to participation in decision-making. They move up to the second floor, where they are directed toward external targets for displacement of aggression. Here, they tend to place blame for injustice on out-groups (Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008).

Young children, especially school age groups, are radicalized in mosques and other meeting places for Muslims and move to the third floor on the staircase towards extremism and terrorism. This phase involves a moral disengagement from society and a moral engagement within the nascent terrorist organization. Within this phase, values are constructed which rationalize the use of violence while simultaneously decrying the moral ineptitude of the incumbent regime. A smaller group moves up the narrowing staircase to the fourth floor, where the legitimacy of terrorist organizations is accepted more strongly. Here the attitude is: ‘you are either with us or against us’. They begin to be incorporated into the organizational and value structures of terrorist organizations. Some are recruited to take the last steps on the staircase and commit acts of terrorism when reaching the top or last floor.<sup>48</sup>

The Danish researcher, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen (2011), developed a model with socio-psychological and psychological approaches to the study of youth radicalization in Europe which are applicable in this study. By focusing on the personal or individual perspective, he identified six stages in radicalization: 1) Identifying a problem as not just a misfortune but an injustice; 2) Constructing a moral justification for

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48 F.M. Moghaddam, ‘De-radicalisation and the Staircase of Terrorism’, in David Canter (ed.), *The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspective* (New York: John Wiley, 2009), pp. 278-79.

violence (religious, ideological, political); 3) Blaming the victims ('it is their own fault'); 4) Dehumanizing the [targeted] victims through suggestive language and derogative symbols; 5) Displacing responsibility (God or other authorities ordered the individual to commit the act of violence), or diffusing responsibility (the group, not the individual, is responsible); and 6) Mis-constructing or minimizing the harmful effects (by using euphemisms or by contrasting with other acts that may be worse).<sup>49</sup> Common to several such models is the phenomenon of (perceived) relative deprivation, the search for identity, and sometimes also the assumed presence of certain personality traits in radicalized individuals.<sup>50</sup>

Phase or stage models generally have one important drawback: they were constructed on the basis of relatively few cases where young men (and more seldom women) actually ended up as (Islamist) terrorists, neglecting all those individuals in similar situations who did not go through all of the stages despite similar starting positions, for example those experiencing crises of identity.<sup>51</sup> Moghadam's staircase model, however, manages to accommodate that problem to some extent.

#### 2.4.2 A Synopsis

All of the models examined provided little specific information on how long the radicalization process took from inception to operational action. The studies indicate that radicalization takes place gradually over one to three years, similar to Silke's (2008) contention that for most, radicalization takes months or years. However, Reinares' (2006) sociological profile of arrested Jihadist terrorists in Spain estimated a longer process of radicalization, stretching up to ten years before their

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49 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, 'Violent Radicalisation in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 33 (2010), p. 799; Dalgaard-Nielsen, A., *Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe, Part II: The Potential Contribution of Socio-psychological and psychological Approaches* (Copenhagen: DIIS Working Paper, March 2008/3:10).

50 M. King and D. M. Taylor, 'The Radicalisation of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Social-psychological Evidence', *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol. 23, No. 4 (2011), pp. 602-22.

51 T. Veldhuis and J. Staun correctly noted: 'Just as it is impossible to explain the outbreak of revolutions by studying only revolutions [...] it is impossible to explain radicalisation only by cases of radicalisation. Phase models, however, do exactly this. They select observations of 'successful' radicalisation and start reasoning backwards to describe the radicalisation process which these radicals have presumably gone through. This selection procedure will produce biased results.' T. Veldhuis and J. Staun (2009), op. cit., p. 17.

arrest. The final stage of *Jihadisation* identified in this study (being the final stage which defines an actual attack) can occur quickly, with the authors citing periods as short as a couple of weeks if the members accept group decision to undertake an attack (NYPD, 2007: 45). This rapid escalation in radicalization is found in Demos, 2010) comprehensive study into the process of radicalization in the West titled *Edge of Violence*, although the authors failed to specify the number of radicals who had experienced this (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010).

Despite the identification of differing stages in the youth radicalization process, all studies agree that there is a stage of individual change (for example, increase in religiosity or search for identity) that is enhanced through external aspects (for instance discrimination or racism, or a perceived attack on Muslims such as the wars in Somalia, Nigeria, Libya, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such incidents increase levels of frustration leading to radicalization that usually takes place when the individual socializes with like-minded youth. These stages are not necessarily sequential and often overlap, meaning that a person may skip a stage in reaching militant action or may become disillusioned at any given point and abandon the process altogether.

### **2.4.3 Why the Youth Are at the Centre of the Problem**

The rise of radicalization and violent extremism, especially among youth, is one of today's most pressing threats to peace, stability and development. Not only does it threaten security and stability, but when radicalized youth abandon their education and employment and endanger future generations, they derail development efforts and foment community tensions. Today's generation of the youth is the largest the world has ever known and of the age group that is highly targeted by terrorist organizations. Radicalization among youth can and should be prevented, starting from an early age, by developing and using appropriate sustainable development strategies that meet their basic needs. Cooperation between all stakeholders is more vital now than ever before if our ambition is to stop more youth radicalization throughout the world in the years to come.

Although radicalization can happen at any age, young people who are in search of a sense of belonging, purpose and/or identity tend to be more vulnerable to violent extremism and radicalization than any other age group. The challenge of violent extremists drawing on ideas and grievances that resonate with various audiences in order to recruit and exploit disaffected youth and offer them a false sense of purpose, belonging and identity, is all too real.

## **2.5 Factors Contributing to Radicalization of the Youth**

A number of common denominators contribute to creating an environment that is conducive to terrorist recruitment and youth radicalization. To inform a solution, the international community should recognize the major factors that are conducive to youth radicalization. Push factors, which include socioeconomic and developmental drivers, as outlined in pillar 1 of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, can be combined with pull factors, like material or social incentives, as well as other related factors, to drive support for extremist groups and ideologies.<sup>52</sup>

### **2.5.1 Push Factors**

#### **2.5.1.1 Unemployment**

In Kenya, gross socio-economic disparities have impacted heavily on the youth. About 50% of Kenyans live below the poverty line which means that a majority of youth (over 60% of Kenyans are persons below 35 years) have inadequate access to basic needs and services namely, food, water, shelter and clothing as well as educational and health facilities.<sup>53</sup>

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52 Department for Innovations, Education, and Skills, “Promoting Good Campus Relations: Working with Staff and Students to Build Community Cohesion and Tackle Violent Extremism in the Name of Islam at Universities and Colleges,” (London, U.K.: 2006).

53 Nacos argues that ‘publicity – far more than financial resources is as essential for terrorists as the air they breathe. Terrorists perform their violent street theatre not, or not only, to harm their immediate victims but to obtain the attention of mass publics that they could not reach without the media communicating their deeds and carrying their messages’ (*Ibid.*, p. 193)

These conditions, particularly unemployment, are linked to an increase in social ills such as crime, prostitution, alcoholism, and hard drug trafficking and abuse among the young . Nairobi city, for instance, has been hit by a crime wave with gangs, composed mainly of youths, who are ruthless and trained in crime tactics. A majority of the young perpetrators of crime and violence in major towns in Kenya come from families that are poverty stricken.<sup>54</sup>

Marginalization happens mainly in terms of socio-economic development. Relative economic deprivation has long been the subject of local dissent, dissatisfaction and opposition to the national government (Mghanga, 2010). The average incidence of poverty in the Coastal region of Kenya is estimated at 62% with the national average at 38% as at 2007 (KNBS, 2007). Further, poverty in some pockets at the Coast such as Mombasa average 70%. The level of economic disparity is perceived as being particularly acute among the regions with a large concentration of Muslims who feel increasingly marginalized by broken promises of government commitment to equitable resource distribution and/or development in the region (Mghanga, 2010).

Overall, Kenya experiences high levels of unemployment estimated at 40% as at December 2012 (World Bank, 2012). Youth unemployment in the coastal region stands at 70% of the total youth population. This high rate of unemployment is attributed to the fact that the income-generating activities the youth carry out are not sufficient to afford them a decent life or provide for the utilization of their full potential (Njonjo, 2010). Moreover, there has been animosity arising from the influx of migrant communities (*wabara*) who ventured into the coastal regions since the 1960s and 1970s to capitalize on the economic opportunities available especially land resettlement schemes (Ngunyi and Katumanga, 2012). The result of this unequal development has been the existence of weak infrastructures, collapse of industries, deep mistrust of government by the communities and high levels of corruption. Such grievances have led to formation of armed militia groups at the Coast such as *Mulungunipa* and its political wing the MRC, and the Kaya Bombo

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54 Government of Kenya, 2009



Raiders. These are the most prominent in the coastal region but there exist others such as the Coast Housing Land Network more known for its land rights lobbying activities than armed activity (Ngunyi and Katumanga, 2012).

The most notable is MUHURI which is an acronym for Muslims for Human Rights. The existence of such groups and grievances has a direct link to crime and insecurity in the sense that there exists a large young population at the Coast that is idle and socio-economically frustrated. Such individuals and groups have a greater propensity to engage in behavior that is likely to create insecurity. Njonjo (2010) argues that crime is strongly associated with young people as 53% of crime incidences in Kenya have been committed by persons between the ages of 16 and 24 years of which 89% are by males. Further, radical organizations have taken it upon themselves to understand and prey upon a combination of political realities, socio-economic factors and individual characteristics that render the youth vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremist organizations (Berman, 2009).

The Ugandan labour force consists of persons aged between 14 and 64 who are either employed (in paid employment, self-employed and unpaid family workers) or unemployed (without work but available for work). Currently, the Uganda labour force is estimated to be 9.8 million persons aged 14-64 years, of which 53% are female. About 85% of the labour is in rural areas and 30% is illiterate. Close to 77% of the labour force have primary or no education. In addition, about 75% of the labour force is below 40 years.

The 2009/2010 Uganda National Household Survey revealed that the unemployment rate was at 4.2% in 2009/2010 compared to 1.9% in 2005/2006. The survey also showed that the general proportion of youth (international definition of 15-24 years) rose from 27% in 2005/2006 to 28% in 2009/2010. On the other hand, the proportion of the youth (national definition, 18-30 years) rose from 44% in 2005/2006 to 48% in 2009/2010. According to a 2008 World Bank Report, Uganda was among the countries with the youngest population and the highest youth unemployment rate of 83%. Some of the major reasons behind

the high youth unemployment rate were attributed to the fact that many youth lack employable skills and access to resources like land and capital while the overall existing policies continue to focus on creating job-seekers rather than job-creators.

Unemployment has social as well as economic consequences for young people. Unemployed young people are forced to find alternatives to generate income, including activities in the survival-type informal sector and, in extreme cases, criminal activity. Urban unemployment is further exacerbated by rural-urban migration. Rural migrants believe that more jobs and social opportunities are available in urban areas, but once in the cities, they find themselves without a job and with limited social networks. Trapped and discouraged by bleak job prospects, some turn to the sex, criminality and drug industries to survive. The youth now lack the capacity to access health services, lack leadership and management skills, and are prone to poverty because they are unable to engage in meaningful and gainful employment. Many of them have also resorted to corrupt tendencies in order to quickly go up the ladder of success.

**Burundi:** the level of poverty is rather high with 67% of the population living under the poverty line (one US dollar a day), and the country has much difficulties in improving the economy. This high level of poverty among parents, combined with strong population growth, hampers economic growth and the development of education. Burundi's Vision 2025 speaks of raising the general standards of education of the population to a level that can spur economic development in order to raise the GDP per capita, at \$ 720 in 2025. This requires substantial investments in schooling at the household and governmental levels. The high rate of poverty, however, remains a main challenge.<sup>55</sup>

One of the biggest problems in Burundi is lack of jobs as the youth who finish university studies cannot find decent jobs. According to some of the victim youth, "in order to be hired for any job" you must be corrupt or bribe the officials; the jobs are given according to who you know." For these youth, the current government

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55 REPUBLIQUE DU BURUNDI « *Vision Burundi 2025* », Bujumbura Avril 2010

attempt to violate the democratic process set by the constitution and the peace accord that ended a 12-year-long civil war is a blatant affront to their prospects of finding employment. The 2005 Arusha Accord has been the basis of the decade of peace that Burundi has enjoyed since the war. Many youth strongly believe in its critical role in maintaining peace but feel that the government's failure to find jobs for them only adds to their frustration thus creating conditions ripe for violent conduct including terrorism.<sup>56</sup>

**Tanzania:** increased levels of poverty and deteriorating livelihoods are the economic factors ideal for youth violence. This sometimes forces some parents to pull their children from school and encourage them to seek income-generating activities, which amounts to child labour. These include collecting scrap metal, roasting maize, selling maize, or working on farms. Lack of money and resources in a family tends to push youth and children away from home. According to 2012 national population and housing census, the Tanzanian Labour force (ages 15-64) is 23,466,616 which is equivalent to 52.2% of the total population; and the youth (ages 15-35) is 15,587,621 (equivalent to 66.4% of the labour force).<sup>57</sup> Unemployment is very high among the youth as compared to other age categories at 13.4% (males 12.3% and females 14.3%) with urban youth suffering the most at 26.7% and rural youth at 7.9%. Regional Commissioners' Youth Employment Forum (Nov. 2014)

### 2.5.1.2 Frustration and Unmet Expectations

In Somalia, the collapse of the state and international connectedness features prominently in youth radicalization. In other parts of the Eastern Africa region, economic disparity is perceived as being particularly acute among the regions with a large concentration of Muslims who in turn feel increasingly marginalized by broken promises of government's commitment to equitable development (Mghanga, 2010). Lost opportunities, identity and a sense of marginalization turn to be the major drivers of radicalization. These include lack of skills and

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56 <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2015/0507/In-Burundi-youth-find-their-voice-as-president-clings-to-power-video>

57 Regional Commissioners Youth Employment forum (19-20 November 2014)

access to productive sectors, weak social service institutions, inability to integrate fully to the society, breakdown of the family, and also problems associated with leadership of mosques. Often, the situation is marked by low education and disparate economic opportunities across segments of society. Unmet expectations and relative deprivation of the educated youth represents spells danger. Moreover, perceptions of social exclusion and marginalization as well as situation of youth population bulge are recipe for radicalization. These are warning signals that could increase the likelihood for young members of society being lured towards extremist causes. The root cause of this unequal development has been the existence of weak infrastructures, collapse of industries, deep mistrust of government policy and high levels of corruption.

Those who feel that their society as a whole has the least to offer or who feel that they cannot achieve the goals that they had expected to achieve are the most vulnerable to radicalization. Violent extremists take advantage of formal structures and informal networks and use all communication channels open to them to recruit the youth into their organizations. Recruitment into a violent extremist organization may be driven by identified needs of the individual and, in this sense, does not differ from recruitment into any other type of organization. The youth gravitate towards those organizations because of what violent extremism networks may offer in terms of materials and socio-psychological support such as money, protection and solidarity.

Poverty, unemployment and underemployment among the youth are socio-economic challenges that are evident in countries where violent extremist organizations operate.<sup>58</sup> In 2013, an estimated 73 million young people worldwide were unemployed, according to the International Labour Organization. In addition, the economic and social costs of unemployment, discouragement and widespread

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58 Department for Communities and Local Government (2011), *Citizenship Survey: April–December 2010, England*. London: Communities and Local Government Publications. P.26. the survey also divided respondents according to age, income and socio-economic group, among other factors. Between April 2009 and March 2010 (unpublished), 18% of all 16-19 year old respondents judged violent extremism was either 'always right', 'often right' or 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong' compared to 7% of 25-34 year-olds and 4% of 35-49 year-olds. While 3% of those in managerial/professional employment said violent extremism was 'always right', 'often right' or 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong', this rose to 6% in intermediate occupations, 7% among those in semi-routine/routine occupations and those who had never worked/ were long-term unemployed and 16% among full-time students. Furthermore, 11% of those earning under £5,000 per annum felt violent extremism was 'always right', 'often right' or 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong' compared to between 5 and 7% of those in higher income bands.

low-quality jobs for young people continue to rise and undermine economic growth potential. It is easier for violent extremist groups to recruit unemployed youth who see no future for themselves. A survey showed that respondents identified the high incidence of unemployment and poverty that prevail in the state as the second most important reason why youth engage in religious-based violence according to the department for Communities and Local Government (2011), Citizenship Survey: April–December (2010). The living conditions render highly vulnerable youth to manipulation by extremist ideologies.

## **2.5.2 Pull Factors**

### **2.5.2.1 Community Grievances**

A number of personal and social factors contribute to creating conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. Studies suggest that poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and weak family structures make or contribute to making young men and women vulnerable to radicalization, as extremist groups can position themselves to address some of these challenges.<sup>59</sup> At the same time, even where extremist group members may not themselves experience these conditions, their activities are presented as responding on behalf of those who do. Youth radicalization may often result from a combination of contextual and personal factors, such as a sense of alienation, exclusion, marginalization, deprivation, insecurity or victimization felt on behalf of an individual or community. The conflicts, violence, oppression, corruption, illegitimate and abusive exercise of power, perceived enmities or historical grievances that those individuals endure fuel their exasperation and provide them with a convenient justification to resort to violent extremism. Also, the lack of a culture of tolerance and peaceful coexistence may contribute to radicalization. Similarly, failure to integrate the youth into local societies may also lead to their becoming vulnerable to extremism.

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<sup>59</sup> Community-based approaches to counter-terrorism Rachel Briggs, Catherine Fieschi, Hannah Lownsbrough, Demos, (2006).Bringing it Home: (p.68),

High levels of illiteracy may also be a contributor to youth radicalization and extremism. While it is evident that illiteracy does not manufacture the bombs that terrorist organizations use, arrest records indicate that the “real armies of suicide bombers and terrorists’ foot soldiers” are drawn from such “disadvantaged, stranded populations”; and that poverty, lack of education and indoctrination may prop up terrorism. Moreover, illiteracy renders young people more susceptible to the messaging and narratives of extremist groups as they lack the means to verify or challenge such ideas. Violent extremist groups have been strategic in exploiting these vulnerabilities through effective recruitment and use of social media and other online platforms in order to lull potential members into their hands. Such groups can manipulate information and exploit the political and ideological idealism of the youth through the effective use of propaganda. Considering that youth are the biggest consumers of social media, videos with soundtracks and messaging in their own language are utilized to engage them. However, such tools can also be used to contest the extremists in the same cyberspace.

## **2.6 INITIATIVES TO COUNTER YOUTH RECRUITMENT**

In Eastern Africa, governments have come up with different initiatives to counter violent radical groups. The approach being taken in each of the countries varies, with some like Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, Tanzania, Somalia and Rwanda focusing primarily on law enforcement and government initiatives aimed at preventing acts of terrorism and shutting down terrorist networks. Kenya and Uganda continue to use preventive as well as proactively disruptive interventions. The region has started implementing counter-radicalization initiatives aimed at understanding why people are susceptible to radicalization and then using that knowledge to minimize its occurrence. However, few of the counter radicalization initiatives appear to be aimed specifically at addressing or preventing radicalization and recruitment of school-aged children within their communities.

There are few initiatives or programs that directly address the youth or aimed at stemming recruitment attempts at venues frequented by youths. For example,

school-based programs have been suggested for the coastal region of Kenya that will seek to educate both students and teachers about radicalization and potential signs of extremism. The Kenyan government intends to come up with a school curriculum and syllabus to promote integration and multiculturalism, as well as teach skills that will be useful to young persons seeking employment. Other youth-based programs have been identified by the government and NGOs. These include: ensuring that job opportunities are available for young persons; tackling discrimination that could lead persons to become radicalized; and, developing rehabilitation programs for young persons who have been implicated in terrorist or extremist activity. With respect to countering internet-based recruitment within the region, it still appears that existing initiatives are not yet focused on the youth as a distinct group.

### **2.6.1 Responses by Governments to Terrorism**

Various measures have been undertaken to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. In Kenya, the Kenyan constitution adopted in 2010 has provisions aimed at promoting ethnic, national and religious tolerance, as well as respect for all religions, cultures and belief systems as a prerequisite towards peace, justice and human development. The Kenyan National Development Blueprint, the Vision 2030, also contains as national objectives measures to pursue and reinforce development and social inclusion agendas at every level. By these, the government seeks to develop means to tackle economic hardships and in particular, take measures that will engage the youth in gainful employment so as to reduce marginalization and sense of victimization that propels extremism and recruitment into terrorism. The processes however take time and to date, radicalization and youth recruitment continue to take place in various parts of the country. Countering radicalization and violent extremism is therefore critical to enhancing regional security.

In line with the UN Counter-terrorism pillar of taking measures to prevent and combat terrorism, the East African governments are currently closely monitoring radicalization initiatives with a view to identifying and arresting those who seek

to indoctrinate the youth and initiating programs to stop the youth most at risk of radicalization from becoming terrorists. The governments have initiated various initiatives putting the youth at the forefront of the fight against violent extremism. In this endeavor, the following measures have been adopted and are being implemented.<sup>60</sup>

- Education policies to ensure maximum education opportunities are available to all the youth at primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education in conflict areas and in other areas to be implemented as a bulwark against youth extremism. Some policy initiatives include specific education and outreach targeting the youth who are most vulnerable to violent extremism. Others are innovative programs aimed at nurturing the youth through development of talents and preaching peaceful co-existence among different cultures in various communities.
- Inauguration of a special fund (UWEZO) that seeks to expand access to finances and inculcate entrepreneurship into women, youth and persons with disabilities. This fund provides mentorship opportunities to enable the youth to take advantages of 30% government procurement preference through its capacity building program. It is recognized that this is an avenue for creating employment opportunities among the youth so as to prevent them from being targeted by extremist organizations.
- Government efforts in Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Somalia are now more focused on economic transformation priorities which have the greatest impact on youth economic empowerment. These include investments in information and communication technology, agricultural transformation and food security, investments in modern transport and logistics, investments in accessible healthcare, and strengthening of social safety nets to reduce household and community burdens.

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60 Dr. Attalah H. Bashir, Executive Secretary, IGAD, "Opening Speech by IGAD," Meeting of Ministers of Justice of IGAD Member States on Legal Cooperation against Terrorism, September 20, 2007.



- In the Eastern African region, the National Youth Council and National Youth Fund operational in Kenya, Youth Venture Capital Fund in Uganda, Youth Council Rwanda, and Burundi National Youth Fund are fully operational to oversee the programmatic aspects of the economic transformation agenda. For instance, in Uganda there is enhanced support to community development while in Kenya a system of devolved governance for equitable resource distribution to counties has been put in place. All these are meant to ensure that the youth have access to service delivery at the community level so as to avoid being radicalized by extremist groups.
- Through the National Youth Service, governments have initiated programs that seek to rehabilitate and mentor destitute children and youth who are vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment. These programs and services empower them with values that give them sense of identity, belonging and direction, in addition to promoting national values of tolerance, patriotism, loyalty and unity.
- The governments are also committed to creating partnerships with local communities, civil society, religious leaders and engaging other actors to keep the vulnerable youth engaged positively.
- Regional Cooperation especially inter-regional youth exchanges to develop and promote a common understanding on addressing youth-related issues with a view to enhancing resilience against extremism and other social services. Sharing of experiences and best practices will help the youth to empower themselves in order to confront radicalization and violent extremism.
- Enhancing the capacity of Kenyan Prisons authorities to identify specific cases of possible radicalization in the corrective facilities and initiate rehabilitation programs targeting specific cases.
- Governments in the region will continue to build institutional and community-level capacity especially at grassroots level targeting youth and women groups and to partner with the UN and other development partners in identifying new approaches or innovative ways to counter violent extremism and radicalization.

- Policy recommendations of the Muslim Reference Group will inform the Eastern African governments to maintain high levels of investment in measures to prevent radicalisation within their territories. The two key areas of youth and education and to some extent, inter-cultural/inter-faith relations will continue to illuminate areas for regional inter-governmental funding.
- Some governments (Kenya and Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda, South Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia) have already developed the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Taskforce. One of its first measures was to commission a report. This report, titled: Countering Violent Extremism Literature Review, released by the Regional Government Defense Department of the republic of Kenya, pointed out the number of issues around youth radicalization. Foremost among these were/are gaps between peace and security, research, University Centres of Research and Government departments that have been charged with forming and implementing policies on the threat of Islamic radicalism within the region.

It was as a follow up to the February 2015 by the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, Government of The Republic of Kenya organised a Regional Conference on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in Nairobi on 25 th-28 th June 2015. The aims were to build on the eight (8) broad outcomes of the White House Summit and to build capability, awareness and collaboration of Summit- level deliberations at the 70 th Session of the UN General Assembly that were held in September 2015.

- Most youth programmes involve a mentoring aspect, often matching youth from at-risk communities with successful role-models and also training them in useful social, economic and political skills. The rationale is that the capacity given to the youth is to enable them engage constructively with the political system while the media helps give especially Muslim youth a sense of purpose and hope that they can effect change within their communities. This sense of hope and purpose is expected to steer them away from extremism which is generally assumed to feed on frustration and a deep distrust of the system.

- Engagement of the media, NGOs and Civil Society and enhanced cooperation with countries in the region that face similar security challenges in countering the spread of extremist ideology.
- Development of a De-Radicalisation and Re-Integration programme to assimilate the youth returning from Somalia. This is done with the realization of the need to ensure fairness, observe the rule of law and avoid actions that may provide extremists with the basis they need to incite potential recruits to violence.

However, the fragile security environment in Somalia also continues to afford international terrorists a safe haven within which to operate. AMISOM, together with other nations, continues to engage in Somalia to prevent radical extremism from entrenching itself in the country. The Ugandan, Burundian and Kenyan Defense Forces are part of the AMISOM Mission, which, together with the Somalia National Army, is involved in operations to help bring peace and stability to Somalia and prevent the Country from reverting to a refuge and training ground for Al-Shabaab and other terrorist Organizations.

Counter-terrorism efforts especially in Kenya and Uganda have foiled several terrorism attempts but the terrorist appear undeterred by failure and continue to adapt to changing security environments. Cooperation against terrorism within Eastern Africa continues to improve at the regional level as exemplified by the African Union Peace and Security Council Summit on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa which was held in Nairobi on 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2014. The meeting, which came on the heels of a regional meeting of security chiefs, dealt extensively with the need for African leaders to work together to curtail Al-Qaeda's influences and curb the spread of violent extremism in the region. The meeting contributed further to the coordination efforts on the continent to strengthen the response to terrorism and its serious threat to international security.

Further, governments in the region have taken measures to implement the UN Counter-terrorism pillar of building the state's capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and strengthen the role of the United Nations system. In this regard,

and in keeping with the Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), Eastern Africa has continued to work with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to bolster its ability and that of other United Nations member states to prevent terrorist acts both within and across borders.<sup>61</sup> As part of regional efforts, Kenya and Uganda governments hosted and participated in a number of national and regional workshops organized in concert with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), bringing together stakeholders from law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, the judiciary and members of civil society to identify common challenges, opportunities and measures to counter extremism and enhance cooperation in combating terrorism. This has helped participants to better understand the threat and drivers of extremism in the region; identify ways to counter violent extremism; strengthen resilience of local communities; and build law enforcement and prosecution capacity to deal with the planners and perpetrators of terrorist acts.<sup>62</sup>

Eastern African governments will continue to support the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) in helping states to implement the global counter-terrorism strategy and the efforts of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee to strengthen the capacity of states to prevent and combat this scourge effectively. Governments have continued to support the effective implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) as well as international cooperation within the framework of the resolution. Terrorism is a challenge to all Eastern African regional states and to all humanity and cannot be justified on ideological, political, religious, or on any other ground. As such, it is essential to strengthen international cooperation since no single state can tackle terrorism alone. It is therefore only plausible that states work together in the elimination of terrorism.

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61 United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Home Grown Terrorist Threat Majority and Minority Staff Report 109th Cong.* (8 May 2008).

62 International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR) (2009). *Countering Online Radicalization: A Strategy for Action* (London: ICSR, 2009), p. 13. However, we should not forget the positive effects of the Internet, e.g. in the form of providing forums for public debate where all those with open minds can learn from each other and share a wealth of information that might also be used to counter radicalization to terrorism. This aspect is beyond the purview of this paper.

## 2.7 THE IMPACT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES ON VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES

Counter-terrorism measures are potentially counter-productive in the sense that strategies for countering violent extremism can negate human security objectives and erode democratic principles and social cohesion. For examples, measures which target a community on religious grounds can undermine government-community relations with implications for cooperation, and can undermine the safety of that community. They can generate tension, dissonance and fear which only accentuate the community's alienation and isolation.

Counter-terrorism measures can increase radicalization and incite conflict and violence rather than help prevent it. In some instances, violence is partly a reaction to counter-terrorism measures. Moreover, the manner in which they are applied can trigger violent reaction or serve to legitimize it. That can play into the hands of extremist groups by radicalizing moderates and facilitating the recruitment of new members. Typically, individual states may have failed to look carefully at how counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization measures may have greatly enhanced the vulnerability of some communities, immigrants, refugees, and other minority groups within Eastern Africa.

The resulting marginalization and sense of injustice can not only serve to justify and help rationalize extremist beliefs, but also render whole communities vulnerable to exploitation and intimidation by radical elements. Many factors render these communities more vulnerable to the pressure exercised by terrorist and criminal groups and less able to defend themselves. Among those factors, one finds the differential social and psychosocial impact of various counter- terrorism measures on the marginalized groups. Other neglected aspects of community dynamics are the fear and intimidation purposefully generated by extremist groups. Some communities are held hostage by criminal or radical groups living under a climate of constant anxiety and distress. Some counter-terrorism measures favored by the state rarely extend to offering effective protection to those communities against the radical elements hiding within them.

The public panic that usually follows acts of terrorism often compels governments to resort to policies and practices that restrict the rights of certain groups e.g. (minorities, refugees or foreigners). Some groups are identified as deserving suspicion, surveillance and other forms of control. In Kenya, Muslim and Somali communities have thus been targeted. This kind of community profiling has only exacerbated pre-existing feelings of exclusion and discrimination. This is compounded by the fact that many people tend to equate Islam with violence and/or terrorism.<sup>63</sup> Ignorance about the causes and nature of terrorism has had a negative impact on human security for minority groups.

Today, Xenophobia is present everywhere. Blaming foreigners and minorities becomes an easy way to explain what is wrong with the world. For this reason, consultation and engagement with CSOs in the community should be multi-tiered and not bent on viewing individuals as being synonymous with communities. All too often, in trying to implement community-wide policies, it is often easy to forget that no community is homogeneous.

In terms of education, there are minority language and religious schools offering additional language, religious and cultural classes to children of certain minority groups, while satisfying the requirements and curricula of the mainstream education system. Whilst these schools are specifically for children of minority groups, they are fully integrated into the overall school system and they do not exclude children from other groups. Children participate in inter- school events, take the same examinations as other schools, and enjoy the same holidays as other schools, together with their own cultural or religious events. Offering such flexible education options for minority groups is important in terms of respecting their religions, cultures and languages while at the same time treating them as part of the overall system. The education system of any country ought to strive to educate and integrate children. Schools ought to be places where the youth learn and broaden their minds as opposed to being indoctrinated by ideology.

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<sup>63</sup> Do not equate Islam with terrorism: They're on opposite ends of spectrum The Daily Nation; Tuesday, June 30, 2015. <http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Letters/Islam-Terrorism-Religion-Kenya/-/440806/2770750/-/14ffe2z/-/index.html>

For instance in Kenya, according to local media reports, the Ministry of Education and Sports has launched counter-radicalization programs in schools across the country because of reports that Al-Shabaab had infiltrated the school system in order to radicalize and recruit students.<sup>64</sup> These are fairly recent initiatives and the impact of such school-based counter-radicalization programs is yet to be properly assessed. For instance, the UK government, through the Ministry of Education, has introduced a wider range of measures to safeguard children from extremist views in schools with more rigorous checks on the establishment of free schools. Universities and colleges are encouraged to challenge extremist views in open debate whilst maintaining a commitment to freedom of speech. This follows from the view that radicalization tends to occur in places where extremist and violent ideologies and those that promote them, go uncontested and/or are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate. Attempts are being made to develop counter-narratives in schools as well as other contexts such as the internet where violent extremist messaging is prevalent.

### **2.7.1 Community-Based Initiatives**

Communities everywhere face challenges of all kinds: economic, environmental, political, and security related. Community resilience measures the community's ability and capacity to respond, regroup, renew itself, and recover from an adverse event or situation. There are four broad areas to address when it comes to increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism: engaging with local communities; building community capacity; developing and supporting positive leadership within the community; and promoting positive alternative activities.

Eastern African governments can borrow a leaf from the strategic objectives of the Birmingham experience. Need to have good understanding of local communities that may be developed to help inform and focus programme of action within the affected communities; this include; mapping denominational backgrounds

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<sup>64</sup> There has not been an energetic campaign to close madrasa schools but there is community anxiety of growing threats of jihadi terrorism due to increasing numbers of radicalised youth. Modest Islamic religious education is given in mainstream schools. Some fear this may be used as justification to end madrasa education or, less drastic, give the state the excuse to intervene. Crisis Group interviews, Muslim leaders, Nairobi, Garissa, Manderu and Wajir, September 2011.

and demographic and socio-economic factors as well as establishing community infrastructure as ways of accessing and influencing communities. This help local partners develop a richer understanding of the factors underpinning the challenge in different locality, and provide a basis on which to engage local communities.

The Preventive Extremism pathfinder Fund was set up to develop a community in which Muslims in Birmingham identified themselves as part of British society; the fund was initiated to help local community **challenge** the violent extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices; **Disrupting** those who promote violent extremism and supporting the local and community institutions where they may be active; **Supporting** individuals who are being targeted and recruited to the cause of violent extremism; **Increasing** the resilience of local communities to violent extremism; and **Addressing** the grievances that ideologues are exploiting among the communities.

Pathfinder fund were achieved through support and cooperate with the police and security services; and communities developed their own capacity to deal with problems that arose within the community and support divisionary activities for those at risk. These are some of the alternative measures that the governments in Eastern African could adopt in building support among the Muslim community in the targeted conflict areas.

According to the key findings, on the Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: UK Background Report (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011) there were some strong areas that had the potential to make a real impact on building the resilience of the whole Muslim community; there was an urgent need for Imams to reconnect with youth people and get over language and cultural barriers which were obstacles to effective engagement; there was a need to empower women and allow them to play a larger decision-making role in the community; and there was a lack of capacity-building within the community to counter the often media-driven Islamophobia that linked violent extremism with Islam thus deeply upsetting the community.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Ferguson, C. and Hussey, D. (2010) 2008-09 Citizenship Survey: Race, Religion and Equalities Topic Report. London: Department for Communities and Local Government



One suggestion that came from the evaluators was to replace the words “preventing violent extremism” with more acceptable phraseology in order to attract more community involvement and confidence. Perhaps, the language that has revolved around counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization has become a source of grievances and injustice. Terms such as “Jihadist extremists”, “extremist Muslim”, Sikh Terrorist”, and radical Islamist’ might provoke feelings among Muslim and Sikh Communities of being unfairly labeled.

The European Countries recently established the Radicalization Awareness Network which is intended to consolidate expertise and best practices in the prevention of radicalization and assist its member states to address the associated challenges. These include front-line practitioners and the people who work directly with and in vulnerable communities e.g. law enforcers, civil society actors and researchers. One particular area of expertise is in the field of counter-narratives and developing online audio-visual tools featuring former terrorists and victims of terrorism to spread alternative messages that encourage and stimulate critical thinking that make viewers question some of the radical propaganda uploaded by radical groups.

### **2.7.2 Police-Community Interactions**

It is generally acknowledged that the terrorism prevention role of the police can be greatly enhanced if the latter forge and maintain quality relationships with the local population and with the various ethnic and cultural communities involved. Good relationships can lead to cooperation.<sup>66</sup> Various initiatives or methods can help the police service improve its relationship with ethnic minorities and other potentially vulnerable community groups. These methods, according to UNODC Handbook,, include: “recruiting members of under-represented minority groups into the police service and ensuring that they have equal opportunities for progression in their careers; training the police in cultural diversity and in policing a diverse society; establishing frameworks for dialogue and cooperation between the police and members of minority groups; and giving police access to interpreters and other

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<sup>66</sup> “Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy”, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, (2006).

individuals who can facilitate communication between the police and members of the minority groups”.

Good relationships between law enforcement agencies and the community can lead to effective communication and access to information. Sometimes, such information may help the police to sharpen their surveillance efforts. In cases where community leaders are aware of suspicious or difficult individuals, they can seek police assistance in trying to resolve the issues. Informal contacts with the police can provide a basis for dialogue and opportunities for intervention when needed. In many countries including Kenya, law enforcement agencies have recruited officers from the minority groups and deployed them to work in those same communities in an attempt to create greater understanding and trust between law enforcement and the community interest.

Once trust has been established with different groups, the police have a greater chance of engaging in dialogue with the community to discuss their grievances as well as their role in prevention of radicalization and/or terrorism. Some minority groups welcome the opportunity to share with the police some of their concerns about the negative impact of various counter-terrorism measures on them. It has been recorded that the relationship between the community and the Police Liaison work should become a precondition for promotion, and the police should develop indicators to judge the richness of an officer's community relationship, partly drawing on feedback from the communities.

To date, there are few studies conducted on how effective police outreach efforts have fared in mitigating the risk within minority groups or deterring radical elements in the community. In many instances, police officers have admitted that they have a long way to go in terms of delivering effective community responses to youth radicalization. At the local level, community policing is about serving the needs of the community and not just about policing the community.

Community policing, counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism, can be complementary themes at the level of front-line officers who work in the community

every day. This, admittedly, is a difficult and complex balance to achieve in practice and requires resources and a broad spectrum of social skills-based training for frontline managers. It is unrealistic to expect communities to self-police or confront radical elements on their own without assistance from law enforcement agents, especially if those concerned have access to weapons or use violence and other means of intimidation against members of the community. Communities can be empowered and supported by other means including social services, access to jobs and business opportunities, and additional activities and programs such as entrepreneurship skill development for youth and income-generating activities for those returning from abduction. After all, communities are best placed to act preemptively to diverting their young people from extremism.

The Eastern African Region can borrow a whole range of policies and programs from European nations especially the EU government in addressing home-grown violent extremism and in trying to prevent second-generation immigrants from becoming terrorists. Policies targeted at whole communities run the risk of stigmatizing that community whereas engaging with local religious organizations as well as individuals does not necessarily prove more fruitful in terms of results. Certainly, there are no simple answers and more empirical research is critical in finding everlasting solution to the problems affecting the Eastern African region. Evaluating preventive work requires measuring non-events. Nevertheless, measuring the effectiveness of counter-terrorism remains vital but difficult.

Within Eastern Africa, an effective preventive strategy involves creating awareness of extremism, terrorism and intolerance among children and youths and breaking down barriers with the help of the police. Recently, the Kenya government issued a 10-day amnesty to Al-Shabaab returnees, requiring them to surrender to security agencies. According to media reports, hundreds of youth who were trained in Somalia sneaked back into Kenya and are reportedly hiding in towns along the coast.

The reports indicated that a majority of the returnees came back after the U.S. drone strike that killed Al-Shabaab leader Adnan Garaar, believed to be the mastermind behind the September 21, 2013 Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Nairobi that killed 67 people. These measures are intended to win trust among the community and if managed well by the latter in collaboration with the police, they could be quite successful.

In recent years, Eastern Africa has seen an increase in the number of cases of home-grown extremism and radicalization amongst various communities especially along the coastal region of Kenya. More attention is being given to countering radicalization, particularly within the coastal youth in Mombasa. The Kenya and Uganda police have launched a regional counter-radicalization program for front-line officers in response to the issue of radicalized youth who are being recruited and lured abroad to Somalia or Yemen. The programme targets youth who have not yet crossed the line into violent extremism or terrorist acts.

The Kenya Police Service requires a lot of experience in community policing as it relates to youth crime prevention in areas such as gun violence, drug trafficking and poaching. Police officers who have been serving in similar units across Eastern Africa can apply the principles of community policing. These community experiences need to be applied to counter violent extremism that leads to terrorism. Policing must be part of a comprehensive solution that engages the community in different ways.

Today, radicalization of the youth within Eastern Africa poses many challenges for law enforcement agents, which necessitates working with the community and youth more closely and cooperatively than before. It requires a different policing model, one that establishes good relationships, close interactions, regular contact and communication, as well as feedback from the community on their relationship with the police.

## Summary of the Literature Review

The central focus of this study was to assess the responses to youth radicalization that leads to violent extremism. The diverse nature of these responses points to the fact that the driving forces for youth extremism and violence are numerous and largely context-specific. From the broad analysis undertaken by this study, the main contributing factors are economic, social, political, and religious in nature. The main findings of the study are summarized below, focusing essentially on cross-cutting factors within the Eastern Africa region.

Ignorance of the true religious teachings is a key driver of youth radicalization: in all the states within Eastern Africa, there is unanimity that ignorance of truthful religious teachings is the leading factor influencing the adoption of extreme religious views especially by the youth. Lack of deep knowledge of the true religious teachings may not be unconnected to three mutually related dangerous ubiquitous trends in the practice of religion in the recent times, namely, the proliferation of sects, both in Islam and Christianity; the proliferation of independent preachers in both religions; and the increasing reliance on preachers rather than on the text or scriptures (Holy Books). Lack of deep knowledge of the true religious teachings makes young people vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization by independent extremist groups and religious ideologues.

Unemployment and poverty contribute to youth radicalization and extremism: unemployment and poverty are socio-economic challenges that are not only intricately interconnected but glaringly manifest in Eastern Africa. In particular, the twin problem of unemployment and poverty are overstressing the moral and psychological strength of individuals to remain law-abiding citizens. As a result, most young people have taken to crime for survival or been easily recruited into violent criminal or terrorist groups.

In Mombasa, in the coastal region of Kenya, for example, many youth have identified the high incidence of unemployment and poverty that prevail in the region as the second most important reason why youths engage in religious-based

violence. They remain marginalized in terms of access to economic opportunities and highly vulnerable to behaviors inimical to peace and security in Kenya. Given their dire socio-economic situation, they seem not to have anything at stake with the government. The large number of jobless youth and street boys tell the gory story of this segment of the Coastal youth whose future appears bleak, thereby disposing them to cause and being used to cause social disruptions, religious conflicts and violent extremism.

This is not to argue that unemployment and poverty are direct contributory factors of youth radicalization, but it is safe to extrapolate that destitution, privation, hopelessness and other frustrating conditions of life render people, especially idle but energetic youth, highly vulnerable or susceptible to a certain degree of manipulation by extremist ideologues. As Komolafe. (2012), has argued before, unemployment and poverty indeed may not be the main factors in radicalization, but “the tendency to produce suicide bombers is greater in a community defined by mass misery and joblessness than the one in which basic needs of food, education, health, housing and sanitation are met for the majority of the people” in Sub-Saharan Africa, (Komolafe, 2012: 56). Hence, poor and unemployed youth who are in a terrible economic condition and whose future is characterized by uncertainty are vulnerable to religious extremism and radicalization.

Children with poor upbringing are more vulnerable to extremist views: the growing number of children without adequate parental guidance is one of the societal conditions that have contributed to the problem of youth radicalization and violent extremism in Eastern Africa. Too many Somali children suffer from neglect, poverty, hunger, illiteracy, squalor and child labour-related hardships. Across the region, especially in the Coastal and north-western parts of Kenya, millions of school-age children are not enrolled in school, thereby raising the level of illiteracy in the country and making them more vulnerable to manipulation by radical groups. These children are indoctrinated into clan systems. Obviously, the environment of widespread poverty in Northern Kenya has contributed to the growing population of these destitute children. Most of these children live in

extremely appalling conditions, roaming within their communities. In the Coastal region of Kenya, areas such as Mombasa have witnessed the worst cases of violent extremism. It has been reported that children from poor homes or those that were not brought up by their biological parents including children from broken homes, abandoned/orphaned children and children who are in the custody of relatives or other individuals into whose care they were entrusted are the most vulnerable group that may be used to perpetrate religious violence. It is not surprising that terrorist groups such as the Al-Shabaab are tapping into this situation to achieve their violent objectives.

The Nigerian government's documented report on children in June 2013, indicates that young suspects who were released by the Nigerian military claim they were paid N5, 000 each (about \$30 USD) by Boko Haram to set schools in Yobe and Borno states on fire and also spy on soldiers. According to one of them, *"We were taken to Damaturu. We watched out for the soldiers at their units and reported back to them. We were reporting when soldiers were at ease or enjoying themselves and when they were off-guard we were paid for doing that"* (Alechenu, 2013). The children, whose ages range between 9 and 15 years, have equally helped Boko Haram to carry stolen items, give information about people they want to attack and hide their guns after attacks. There are typical examples of how Al-Shabaab terrorist group in Eastern Africa radicalizes and uses children to achieve their ends. Therefore, there is urgent need for the governments of Eastern African states, civil society groups, development agencies, and religious bodies to partner with parents to transform the present precarious situation of Kenyan and Somali children.

Alleged excesses of security forces not a major driver of youth extremism: one prominent kinetic response to the Al-Shabaab extremist insurgency by the Kenyan government, for instance, in the coastal region of Mombasa, has been deployment of state security and military forces. Their deployment however has received criticism from a segment of enlarged local Muslim communities and the wider population including religious clerics, social commentators, opinion leaders, civil society organizations and media, for their harsh tactics and brutality that have injured

civilians and damaged property. Such allegations include unlawful killings, dragnet arrests, extortion and intimidation by security forces. Consequently, a section of the media, especially international media, have repeatedly mentioned that the excesses of the security forces are a critical factor in youth radicalization. Contrary to this claim, findings from this research show that the “alleged excesses of security forces” are in fact the least in terms of the driving forces of youth extremism and violence in Mombasa and Somalia.





## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 3.1 Conclusions

This study demonstrates cases of youth radicalization and religious extremism in Eastern Africa. With its consequences, radicalization can be devastating for the immediate community and, indeed, the larger society. Youth radicalization and extremism in the region have resulted in the destruction of private and public property, have caused or resulted in bodily injury and death, and displacement of thousands of people. The analysis in this study shows that economic (poverty and unemployment) as well as socio-cultural factors (poor parental upbringing or vulnerable children) underpin young people's vulnerability to engage in violent extremism or fall prey to violent ideologies propagated by extremist ideologues or radical groups.

Some measures have been taken by government to deal with the security challenges in Eastern Africa for example the Kenyan, Ugandan, Burundi, Somalia, Rwandan, and Ethiopian governments in dealing with the extremist groups such as the Al-Shabaab. As diverse as these measures are, the deployment of AMISOM in Somalia, and the involvement of the Kenyan security and military forces within the coastal region is one that has received the most attention from local and international media. The approach has received both a fair share of commendation and criticism by various commentators. Although use of coercion to deal with youth radicalization and extremism has recorded modest success, it has failed to defeat the scourge.

Therefore, any attempt to effectively and sustainably address youth radicalization and religious extremism in Eastern Africa, will require better understanding of its underlying drivers. This research is informed by this consideration, and is indeed only a modest attempt to uncover such drivers. The paper does not claim to have covered much ground. However, the utility of this study lies in the fact that it has made very important first step towards understanding the key drivers of youth radicalization and religious extremism in Eastern Africa. Findings of this research, hopefully, will aid in the on-going efforts to contain and roll back the spread of

violent radicalization within the region. It is believed that it should inform further action on the part of governments, the private sector, civil society, academics and international organizations. Regional and UN bodies have been in the quest to find the drivers of, and effective solutions to growing radicalization and extremism in Eastern Africa.

### **3.2 Recommendations**

In order to effectively respond to the problem of youth radicalization and extremism in Eastern Africa, the following measures are suggested. Eastern African governments can overcome violent extremism and help the youth to effectively resist the allure of radicalization and violent extremism and each regional government can help the youth to become champions and key actors in countering violent extremism within communities. To effectively address the conditions conducive to the spread of extremism and terrorism as outlined in the first pillar of the global counter-terrorism strategy, there is need to be inclusive. Involving the youth at every stage of the process can create societies devoid to violent extremists. There is need for re-examination of the various ways in which policy-makers deal with the threat in inter-governmental dialogue, national discourses and local conversations. Therefore, governments in the region need to look at the youth more as an opportunity to defeat violent extremism and radicalization. They (governments) need to empower youth with various tools required to confront violent extremists.

The youth need to be empowered through holistic education that promotes moderation and empathy; they should be given genuine opportunities for personal and economic advancement and be included in decision making at the local, national and international levels. All stakeholders (family, school, society, religious/spiritual leadership, government and others) have a role to play to ensure that the youth are fully engaged in peacemaking and countering violent extremism. The world needs to protect the youth from being radicalized and this can be done by addressing their developmental needs. It is imperative that innovative programs that give the youth better options to satisfy their developmental needs will have to be designed.

**Governments in the region to closely monitor and regulate religious preaching:**

this needs to be done in countries with a history of religious extremism, e.g. Uganda, where Joseph Kony of LRA radicalized and killed many children, all in the name of religious preaching. Therefore, religious preachers as well as places of worship should be closely monitored to avoid such avenues being used for propagating violent and extremist ideologies and/or distorting religious teachings.

**Creation of job opportunities for the Eastern African youth at risk:**

governments in the region must embark on effective poverty alleviation and human capital development programmes in order to empower the teeming youths who are most at risk of being easily recruited and radicalized by violent extremists and terrorists. To achieve this, the governments at all levels need to embark on the establishment of demonstration farms or workshops to provide the youth with vocational skills or knowledge that can make them self-employed in gainful youth enterprises.

This should be matched with the establishment of New Business Development Service (NBDS) Centres across all urban and rural areas where service delivery is critical. Such centres should be located in each of Kenya's 47 Counties or Local Government areas. These should be funded and staffed with skilled personnel some of who can render business development and career advice to the jobless youth, facilitate young entrepreneurs to access credit facilities or start-up funds, offer coaching services, and provide market data that will inform sound decision-making on career paths for those involved.

In this regard, a special youth empowerment fund or financial facility needs to be created. Such a facility should be robustly structured to enhance transparency and accountability in its management to avoid unnecessary bottlenecks and patronage networks that prevent the youths who genuinely need such interventions.

**Enhanced Provision of Education and Literacy Programme: Catch-up and**

**second-chance Education for Children:** due to high levels of illiteracy in areas where the youth are more vulnerable to recruitment, most young people have become easily susceptible to manipulation and recruitment into criminal and

extremist groups. Although the right to education is one of the basic rights of every child, access or entitlement to this right is hardly attained.

To reduce the number of people likely to fall prey to radical preaching and recruitment into violent groups, education should be made free and compulsory for every child in Eastern Africa. An initiative of providing second-chance education that primarily targets children who never had the chance for an education or who had dropped out of primary school should be encouraged especially in Kenya and Somalia. These include orphans and other vulnerable children such as the formerly recruited children (FRC); street children; child mothers; children living in areas prone to cattle rustling, etc. There should be deliberate encouragement of the Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP) that targets over-age youth, out-of-school children especially those who missed out on education due to captivity or encampment. This would enable them to re-enter the education system and complete primary and/or secondary levels of education.

Provision of education is a step in the right direction. However, there is need to overhaul the curricula to inculcate the right training and skills that will make such children self-reliant and relevant in the modern, competitive, and knowledge-driven economy and not one driven by religious education. Compulsory primary and secondary education should be implemented in all areas as a basic entitlement to the children. Thus, what is critically needed is for the local communities and governments to muster the right political will in order to deliver quality and accessible education to more children through enhanced allocation and judicious utilization of funds in the educational sector.

**Promotion of peace education:** governments, peace and security institutions, religious institutions, private sector and civil society groups should invest more resources in promoting peace education in areas affected by conflicts. Peace education initiatives will help to redress the culture of violence and aggression and also inculcate the value of peaceful co-existence and non-violent orientation on every citizen. Peace education will help the youth better appreciate the value of peace,

thereby making it difficult for people to use them to cause violence. Peace education should be integrated into the educational curricula of all countries in the region right from primary through secondary and tertiary to university level. In addition, the problem of youth radicalization and extremism could partly be curbed through proper sensitization and enlightenment programmes using specially designed FM Radio and Television programmes and group discussions. Such programmes should be aimed at discouraging youth extremism and promoting the virtue of peaceful co-existence. For this reason, a robust countering of violent extremism (CVE) programme should be part and parcel of peace education in Kenya.

**Design and delivery of robust programmes for vulnerable children in areas prone to religious extremism or conflicts:** governments should fund national councils for the welfare of vulnerable children to enable them formulate and implement robust rehabilitation programmes for extremely vulnerable children within the region. Government representatives at all levels should partner with credible civil society organizations to design and implement effective programmes for such children. This is an area where individuals, civil society groups and governments can better put to use the skills of university graduates who studied social work, administration, counseling, and psychology. Such youth rescue programs, and rehabilitation and reintegration interventions are important given the finding that children who are not brought up by their parents are more exposed to using violence in propagating their religious views. Several media reports point to the fact that radical extremist sects such as the Al-Shabaab recruit and manipulate such children to perpetrate violence. Given their socio-economic and religious condition, such children are extremely vulnerable to religious extremism and financial influences.

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# Emergency Preparedness and Response to Drought in Eastern Africa

Dr Eunice Njambi

## Abstract

*Drought is the most common hazard both globally and in the Eastern Africa (EA) region. In 2011 and 2012, drought in EA was the worst in 60 years. The livelihoods of people living in the region especially the pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and farmers were severely impacted, and the economies of the affected countries suffered. A post-disaster needs assessment by the World Bank in Kenya estimated that drought-related losses amounted to 4% of the GDP. This paper focuses on 11 out of 18 countries in EA i.e. Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania which together have a total estimated population of 248,200,000 (Global Water Partnership Eastern Africa, 2015). The paper analyzes emergency preparedness and response to drought. In addition, the paper identifies the levels of vulnerability to drought, and existing drought emergency preparedness policies. Furthermore, the paper interrogates the existing drought response mechanisms and associated challenges as well as opportunities for effective emergency preparedness and response in the region. Eastern Africa's vulnerability to drought is complex and depends on its drivers which determine the capacity to cope. The drivers of vulnerability are dependent on several factors such as climate change, population dynamics and low use of technology. Agriculture, which is mainly rain-fed, contributes 40% of the GDP and accounts for 90% of the region's food for 70% livelihoods. Drought is endemic to EA occurring about once every three years and sometimes, simultaneously in several countries affecting large populations. Drought has a major impact on peace and security especially because of the interconnectedness of the challenges it precipitates. Vulnerable communities face cycles of violence, drought and poverty. This paper recommends drought cycle management (DCM) as a response strategy. It acknowledges that droughts are a normal and inevitable part of the climate particularly in the dryland areas and, usually, the question is not if, but when it will occur. DCM uses the periods between droughts to prepare for the next one so as to minimize its impact when it occurs. There is need to utilize the existing national implementing and coordination structures for drought management and the availability of political will and commitment to drought risk reduction by governments in the IGAD region.*

# INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Introduction

Drought is major cause of concern for many countries across the globe. Over the past quarter century, the world has become more prone to drought. Projections show that the frequency, severity, and duration of drought are expected to even further intensify in the coming decades because of climate change and associated risks. Drought impacts on livelihoods causing significant socio-economic and ecological damage. This increases household vulnerability to food insecurity, disrupts local power relationships and damages the social safety networks built around lending and borrowing. Drought increases competition for scarce natural resources resulting in inter-communal conflicts and insecurity.

Droughts continue to have significant impacts in both developed and developing countries. The latter still suffer from droughts the most. In Europe, drought conditions are intense over the majority of the continent especially around the Mediterranean. In Asia, drought is present from western, through central and eastern Russia and in the Southeast and the Indian sub-continent. In Africa, drought remains entrenched across the equatorial region and through much of the South. South Africa has declared drought a disaster in Free State and Northwest Provinces. About 60% of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is said to be vulnerable to drought with 30% estimated as being highly vulnerable. Drought is a fact of life in many parts of EA. large parts of the region are arid or semi-arid, with increasingly high degrees of rainfall unreliability from year to year (EAC 2012). In the last 30 years, there has been at least one major drought in each decade. Serious droughts were witnessed in 1973/74, 1984/85, 1987, 1992-1994 and in 1999/2000 (IGAD 2013).

Drought is a major cause of concern in EA and threatens the livelihoods of over 13 million people. The long-term impacts of prolonged drought on ecosystems are profound with accelerated land and environmental degradation and desertification.

The negative impacts of drought erode the available institutional capacities and exacerbate civil strife and poverty levels (IFRC, 2011). Droughts are hard to avert, but their effects can be mitigated, the price of preparedness is minimal compared to the cost of disaster relief. Drought prevention should be a collective response of national governments, local authorities and communities. The focus of this paper is to investigate and analyze emergency preparedness and response to drought in the EA region.

## **1.2 Eastern Africa: Background Information**

### **1.2.1 Geography**

The EA region, as defined by the UN, is made up of 18 countries: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Réunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The countries are heterogeneous in size, geographic characteristics, history, economic and political structures (UN, 2014, 2013). This paper focuses on 11 countries i.e. Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The region is characterized by high climate variability in both rainfall and temperatures, which has significant impacts on water resources, food security, natural resource management, health, settlements and infrastructure. Climate change in the region has resulted in droughts, erratic floods and erratic rainfall patterns. Increasing desertification and ecological degradation are contributing to recurrent, prolonged and widespread drought (IPCC, 2014).

### **1.2.2 Demography**

The total population of EA is estimated at 248,200,000 with children and youth accounting for 80% of the population (IGAD, (2013). It is projected that by the year 2050, the region will have a population of over 496 million which will have major implications for economic development in the region (SID, 2012).

### **1.2.3 Socio economic Characteristics**

The economy of EA has been developing positively albeit with great disparities in levels between and within countries. Infrastructure development, a growing services sector, discoveries of oil, gas and mineral resources if adequately managed could become key drivers for economic growth and development inspite of several potential risks particularly to peace and security (ADB, 2014). Seychelles is the richest economy in EA driven by the financial sector, tourism and fisheries. Kenya is the second largest economy and one of the most diversified, it serves as a hub for EA. The Ethiopian economy continues to experience robust growth with GDP growth projections of 8-8.5% mainly from direct foreign investment. Economies of Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda are estimated to grow steadily. Comoros has experienced modest growth rate, driven by agriculture and investment in the transport sector. Djibouti's growth is largely based on port revenues, financial and banking sectors. Sudan's economy is driven by agriculture, extractive industries and domestic services that provide low-productivity jobs. Inflation rates in the region are relatively high, for example, in Sudan it stands at an average of 36.9%, the highest in Africa, occasioned by exchange-rate devaluations, unsterilized gold purchases and supply disruptions due to civil conflicts (World Bank, 2015).

### **1.2.4 Socio-cultural Dimension**

The EA region is home to close to two hundred ethnic groups and occasionally. Ethnicity is an important defining factor of African political, economic, social and cultural life. Urbanization, intermarriages and globalization are profoundly challenging ethnic identities/alignments especially among the youth in urban areas. Majority of people in EA are farmers and depend on their livestock and farm produce for livelihoods. Pastoralists move from place to place with their livestock for usable pasture land and water. During drought, their movement increases. There is a history of pastoral communities fighting for scarce resources in Southern parts of Ethiopia, Northern Kenya, parts of Somalia and the Sudan. Conflicts are exacerbated and more difficult to resolve when drought occurs.

### 1.2.5 Drought in Eastern Africa

Eastern Africa is prone to extreme climatic conditions where drought is recurrent particularly in the dryland areas. The impact of drought has been devastating. The 2010-2011 drought was possibly the worst in 60 years, resulting in widespread famine and a humanitarian crisis (IFRC, 2011). In the last 20 years, ten drought events have affected millions of people with more than 40 million living under exceptional drought conditions. Climate change will lead to increased temperatures, rise of sea level, and changes in annual rainfall, agricultural production, health status, and water availability, among others. EA is one of the world's most food-insecure regions with nearly 44% of the population living in areas prone to extreme food shortages. Between 1970 and 2000, countries in EA were threatened by famine at least once every decade. In future, the impacts of climate change as well as growing populations and declining per capita agricultural capacity are expected to further threaten food security. As one of the least developed areas in Africa, EA has limited capacity to respond to drought or food crises (Global Water Partnership Eastern Africa, 2015).

## 1.3 Problem Statement

The Eastern part of Africa is recognised as one of the regions that have suffered severe droughts for many years. Countries acknowledged to be prone to drought conditions include Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. The worst hit areas include those on the border between Ethiopia and Djibouti, northern-Kenya, central and south Somalia and parts of Eritrea. In 2011, these areas experienced the worst drought since 1951. In 2012, drought affected over 13 million people, including 3.75 million Kenyans and 3.7 million in Somalia (half the population). The Eastern Africa region accounts for 41% of natural disasters that have occurred in Africa for the past 30 years (IGADa). Drought is one of the causes of loss of human lives, livestock and declining economic activities. Drought can fuel violent conflict and migration with negative impacts on peace and security. The concept of emergency preparedness and response particularly relates to drought readiness, resilience



enhancement, sustainable food security, and livelihood diversification. Promoting resilience is a new focus for many development practitioners especially in the Horn of Africa. This stems largely from increased recognition of the need for drought-related policies and plans that emphasize risk reduction (prevention, mitigation and preparedness) rather than reliance on drought relief.

There is need for early actions from both governments and donors to make local long-term investments that build the capacity of people and communities to respond proactively to extreme weather. It is vital to have emergency plans in place so that the effects of drought on people can be mitigated and for a coordinated response to be effectively and efficiently launched at the onset of drought and other crises. This study seeks to examine challenges and opportunities for disaster management strategies, particularly preparedness and response to drought in Eastern Africa. Despite the existence of various mitigation strategies, drought remains one of the most common disasters that undermine livelihoods and well-being (Mogotsi et al, 2012). Drought is a creeping phenomenon whose effects accumulate over time before they are felt but linger on long after its occurrence.

## 1.4 Research Questions

The study seeks to answer the following research questions:

- What is the level of vulnerability to drought in EA?
- What are the existing drought emergency preparedness and response policies in EA?
- What are the drought response mechanisms and associated challenges in EA?
- What opportunities exist for effective emergency preparedness and response to drought in EA?

## 1.5 Objectives

The main objective of the paper was to investigate and analyze emergency preparedness and response to drought in Eastern Africa. More specifically, the paper aimed at:

- Identifying the level of vulnerability to drought;
- Analysing existing drought emergency preparedness policies;
- Describing drought response mechanisms and associated challenges; and
- Exploring opportunities for effective emergency preparedness and response to drought.

## **1.6 Justification**

Drought is a major limiting factor for agriculture in the EA region which relies largely on rainfall. Despite having drought management policies and strategies, drought continues to impact negatively on the livelihoods of the populace. Although the EA governments have significantly invested in disaster drought recovery measures, there is need to continuously interrogate the different factors associated with the recurrence of drought and to propose relevant mitigating interventions.

## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Levels of vulnerability to drought in Eastern Africa

#### 2.1.1 Eastern Africa Vulnerability to Drought

Drought is the most common hazard in EA whose increased frequency, intensity and severe weather continue to impact negatively on developmental activities as resources for development are diverted to finance disaster emergencies. Vulnerability to drought is exacerbated by increased frequency and intensity of extreme climate and severe weather events. Drought has negative impacts on security and livelihoods. Table 1 shows the frequency of drought occurrence and its impact.

Vulnerability is defined in many ways and it has different meanings when used in different disciplines and contexts (Füssel, 2000). Drought vulnerability is used to highlight the socio-economic and bio-physical characteristics of the region that make it susceptible to the adverse effects of drought. Vulnerability to drought is complex because it depends on its drivers which determine the capacity to cope (Naumann et al, 2013). EA vulnerability to drought depends on several factors such as climate change, population dynamics, low use of technology (60% of agriculture is rain-fed but it accounts for 40% of the GDP, 90% of the region's food and 70% of livelihoods). This is compounded by poor policy implementation, unsustainable water and land use patterns, loss of economic diversity, retrogressive cultural practices and slow economic development (Hellmuth et al, 2007; Naumann et al, 2013). As Hellmuth argues, prevalence of drought and decline in food availability should not necessarily lead to famine and loss of livelihoods. Due to heavy dependence on rain-fed agriculture, EA is vulnerable to frequent and severe droughts (Esikuri, 2005).

<b>Country</b>	<b>Drought Frequency</b>	<b>Impact of Drought</b>
<b>Burundi</b>	1998/1999; worsened in 2000, 2004/2005	Affected NE Burundi, national disaster declared; refugees move to Rwanda & Tanzania due to starvation
<b>Djibouti</b>	Several droughts (1980, 1996, 2001, 2005, 2008)	50% of agriculture and rural livelihoods affected.
<b>Eritrea</b>	1983-1986; worst drought in 2000	Fall in agricultural production
<b>Ethiopia</b>	At least five major national droughts since 1980	11% of population exposed to drought, mainly pastoralists
<b>Kenya</b>	Major drought every 10 years, minor every 3-4 years. Droughts in ASALs (1983, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2005 and 2010/2011)	Significant loss of agricultural production; 2 million people affected; 4 million worst affected in 37 years: 13.3million affected by worst drought in 60 years
<b>Rwanda</b>	1998 and 2000; annually from 2002 to 2005	Serious deterioration in food security; reduced hydropower supply; electricity crisis
<b>Somalia</b>	Devastating droughts 1963-64; 1974-75 and 2010-2012	More than 258,000 people died; half of the victims were children younger than 5 years
<b>Tanzania</b>	1980-2008; Severe drought 1999/2000 extended to 2008-2012	livestock deaths, acute food shortage, loss of life, crop failure, electricity shortages
<b>Uganda</b>	1983-1985; 7 droughts between 1991 and 2000; 2008; 2010-2011 and 2013	Depletion of pasture and severe lack of water for livestock; conflicts; human and livestock deaths
<b>South Sudan</b>	Worst drought 1980-1984 and 2011	Widespread displacement and localized famine in some parts of the country
<b>Sudan</b>	Most serious drought incidents were in 1970, 1983 – 1985, 1991 – 1992 and 2010 – 2011.	The 1983–1985 and 2010-2011 droughts resulted in mass deaths of humans and livestock.

### 2.1.2 Types of Drought

**Meteorological drought:** According to UNISDR (2009), a meteorological drought is usually defined by a precipitation deficiency over a pre-determined period of time. A general working definition of meteorological drought is ‘a reduction in rainfall supply compared with a specified average condition over some specified period (Hulme, 1993). Therefore, meteorological drought is a deficiency of precipitation (intensity) from expected or normal that extends over a season or a longer period of time (duration) and is insufficient to meet the demands of human activities and the environment. This is the most important type of drought which drives the other types of drought discussed below.

**Agricultural drought:** Agricultural drought links various characteristics of meteorological (or hydrological) drought to agricultural impacts, focusing on precipitation shortages, soil and water deficits, and reduced ground water or reservoir levels needed for irrigation, among others.

**Hydrological drought:** Hydrological drought usually refers to a period of below-normal stream flow and depleted reservoir storage during which stream flow is inadequate to supply established uses under a given system. It results from periods of extended precipitation shortfalls that impact on water supply, potentially resulting in significant societal impacts.

**Socio-economic drought:** Socio-economic drought occurs when the demand for socio-economic goods exceeds supply as a result of a weather-related shortfall in water supply (combination of meteorological and hydrological drought impacts) or human-induced factors (from increased population and poor production from lack of or poor technology).

### 2.1.3 Impact of Drought on Peace and Security in EA

Peace, security and drought are interconnected challenges in EA where vulnerable communities face cycles of violence, drought and poverty. The frequent conflicts in the border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda are mostly drought-related and have negative impacts on livelihoods (Mercy Corps, 2010). While conflict among pastoralists exacerbates their vulnerability, it has also traditionally served as a strategy that people adopt to cope with livelihood pressures, for example, through engaging in cattle raiding and banditry (Nyariki et al, 2005). In recent years, the nature of violence in pastoralist areas in EA has changed due to factors such as weapons proliferation, lack of sustainable economic opportunities, and weakening local governance structures.

The indirect impact of drought on peace and security includes: restriction on migration by pastoralist groups, economic activities, and diminished ability to peacefully negotiate access to water, pasture, and markets. Drought-related conflict

restricts movement to and from towns, denies communities access to schools, health facilities and other essential public services. Access to such essential services has been shown to affect pastoralist households' capacity to manage risks and respond to shocks, thus inevitably influencing their resilience (Alinovi et al, 2010).

## 2.2 Theories of Preparedness and Response to Drought

This paper is informed by two complementary theories: disaster pressure and release (PAR) and disaster access. From these theories, the relationships between disaster risk, vulnerability, hazard and coping capacity, can be analyzed. These have led to evolution of the drought cycle management model which is a translation of the theories into a practical working tool. The PAR model by Blaikie et al (1994) explains disaster risks from a macro perspective. The PAR model argues that disasters occur at the tangent between two opposing forces, those of natural hazards and the processes that generate vulnerability. Disaster happens when these two forces coincide.

The model identifies a progression of vulnerability in which the root causes are shaped by a series of dynamic pressures which can give rise to unsafe conditions. These forces are defined as follows: Root causes are a set of well-established, widespread economic, demographic and political processes within a society and the world economy that give rise to vulnerability and reproduce vulnerability over time. This affects the allocation and distribution of resources between different groups of people. The second force is dynamic pressures which include the processes and activities that transform the effects of the root causes into vulnerability and channel the root causes into particular forms of insecurity related to hazards, for example, population growth, rapid urbanization, deforestation and a decline in soil productivity. Dynamic pressures include lack of training, appropriate skills and local conditions of markets and policies; unsafe conditions are the third force and these are specific forms of vulnerability which manifest themselves in time and space in conjunction with hazards. This may occur through such processes as fragile local economic conditions, lack of disaster planning and preparedness and a fragile environment.

The Access model (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon and Davis, 2003) explains how unsafe conditions at a household level emerge as a result of processes that allocate resources. A household's level of access to resources strongly influences its capacity to respond to the impact of hazards. Resources can be economic (income, loans, employment), related to health or infrastructure (including communications) or information-based. The access model considers how the relationship between household access to various resources and the choices made within a set of structural constraints impacts on their ability to withstand shocks. Access to resources is the key to how households improve their livelihoods, making them sustainable, increasing their resilience against shocks and having the capacity to restore their livelihoods after a disaster occurs.


While the PAR and ACCESS models consider vulnerability at various levels, they do not address the issue of coping capacities which can be classified under three broad headings that include reducing vulnerability and strengthening resilience, survival and recovery. This calls for application of the Drought cycle management (DCM) approach which is based on DRR principles and has been developed to tackle the negative effects of drought in the Greater Horn of Africa (CORDAID, 2004).

### **2.2.1 Drought Management Cycle**

Drought cycle management (DCM) realizes that droughts are a normal, inevitable part of the climate of the drylands. It recognizes that a drought will occur sooner or later the question not being 'if' but 'when'. Drought cycle management uses the periods between droughts to prepare for the next one in order to minimize impact when it hits. DCM strategies focus on trying to strengthen livelihoods through measures such as improving water conservation, improving livestock management and creating insurance systems at the community level. They also seek to ensure that food stocks are in place when droughts are expected (during the alert state) to provide emergency aid when a drought hits and support the reconstruction of livelihoods after drought periods.

Effective drought cycle management calls for appropriate actions to prepare for and manage its impacts and help the affected households recover. Ideally, as shown in Fig 1 below, the system should include the following: strong institutional management and coordination structures at all levels; effective early warning and information systems; drought contingency planning at all levels; easily accessible drought contingency funds at local community and national levels; and capacity to implement timely drought response measures and to provide support to drought recovery interventions (FAO, 2014).

Figure 1: Disaster Mitigation, Preparedness, Relief and Reconstruction



Source: Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008



## 2.3 Drought Emergency Preparedness

Preparedness refers to pre-drought activities designed to improve institutional and community operational capabilities for responding to a drought event. It corresponds to the planning of activities in advance of a drought event (Bazza, 2002). Its main requirements include the incorporation of drought risk in water management as well as other sectoral policies, particularly those sectors that are most vulnerable to drought events (e.g. agriculture, energy production). Preparedness also includes early monitoring to identify drought events and assess their severity as well as develop management plans to cope with drought and minimize its impacts.

Prediction and Early Warning are essential components of drought preparedness plans and policies which aim to improve the efficiency of drought planning by providing reliable information to support drought risk assessment and selection and implementation of mitigation actions. Early warning systems combine meteorological (e.g. temperature, precipitation) and water system-related information (e.g. water availability, water demand and supply) in order to assess the probability of occurrence, as well as severity of a drought event. This stresses the need for coordinated action in terms of collecting and analyzing data (IGAD 2013b). Monitoring Committees are responsible for setting the thresholds that describe different drought severity levels.

## 2.4 Drought Response Mechanisms

Response mechanisms are either reactive or proactive in nature. In EA, response mechanisms are usually reactive approaches based on the implementation of measures and actions after a drought event has started. This approach is taken in emergency situations and often results in inefficient technical and economic solutions since actions are taken with little time to evaluate optimal actions and stakeholder participation is limited, if any.

A proactive or preventive approach includes measures designed in advance with appropriate planning tools and stakeholder participation. The approach is based

both on short and long term measures and includes monitoring systems for a timely warning of drought conditions. It can be considered an approach to manage risk. It consists of planning the necessary measures to prevent or minimize drought impacts in advance. The approach includes preparedness with planning tools that enable the consequences of a possible water emergency to be avoided, reduced, or implemented when drought occurs. Despite the fact that proactive approaches are more efficient than the traditional approach, they allow drought mitigation measures (both long and short term). The approach is complex and EA countries continue to suffer devastating losses due to drought. Consequently, EA countries need to continue advancing and improving the quality of interventions related to drought response.

#### **2.4.1 Measuring Emergency Preparedness and Response to Drought**

To measure EA emergency preparedness and response to drought, this paper focuses on three areas: assessing existing national policies, strategies, and plans related to drought; prioritizing areas of focus and sharpening national institutional capacities for drought preparedness and response. This is summarized in Table 1.

**Existing national policies:** all the 11 countries have current national policies, strategies, plans related to drought. **Area of focus:** majority of the national strategies focus on ensuring improved agricultural production Early warning systems data collection and predictions drought occurrence.

**National institutional capacities:** Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management; Ministry of Environment; and National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), are the core institutions that deal with drought response. Despite the countries having outlined strategies and policies related to drought response, the capacity to respond is still weak and not articulated properly. The need for effective co-ordination of drought response, transparent responses, and provision of funding corresponding to activities by the government, are still wanting.

**Table 1: National Drought Policies, Priority Areas and Institutional Structures**

Country	National Policies, Strategies, Plans related to DRM	Major Priority Areas Identified	National Institutional Capacities for DRM
Burundi	Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Strategic Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Improving agricultural production</li> <li>▪ Assessing &amp; improving food security</li> </ul>	Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
Djibouti	National Plan Climate Change Adaptation Public Investment Plan (PIP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ National Programme for Food Security</li> <li>▪ Mitigation and response activities, including adaptation to climate change</li> </ul>	Ministry of Agriculture, Water, Livestock and Fisheries (Focal point for IDRSI)
Eritrea	Ministry of Agriculture (2014-2018) strategic & development plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Drought mitigation adaptation; land use</li> <li>▪ Monsoon rain analysis</li> <li>▪ Early warning systems data collection and predictions</li> </ul>	Ministry of Agriculture
Ethiopia	National Disaster Risk Management Policy; Pastoral Development Policy and Strategy Framework Early Warning & Emergency Coordination Center; Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy and Framework (2011)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provision of suitable social services</li> <li>▪ Expansion of infrastructure</li> <li>▪ Emergency response and Coordination</li> <li>▪ Early warning systems</li> <li>▪ Climate resilience building</li> </ul>	Ministry of Agriculture: Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Section
Kenya	Disaster management policy and Strategy, Vision 2030 has mainstreamed DRM in all its key pillars, Second Medium Term Plan (2013-17), Climate Change Response Strategy (2010) and Action Plan (2013)	Disaster risk management Climate change adaptation	National Drought Management Authority (NDMA)
Rwanda	Coordination of all disaster-related activities with focus on relief	Early warning systems for Drought monitoring (not yet in place)	Ministries of: Agriculture & Animal Resource; Disaster Management & Refugee Affairs
Tanzania	National Disaster Management Policy (under development) Five-year Strategic Plan (2013-2018) on Disaster Management	Monitors drought condition Issue early warning	Tanzania Meteorological Agency (TMA) Disaster Management Department
Uganda	The Constitution; Climate Change Policy, 2013; Disaster Management and Preparedness Policy, 2010; Range land Management Policy, 2001 National Water Policy, 1999	Disaster risk management; Climate change adaptation; Coordinates and responds to drought-related community-based programs and emergencies	The Department for Disaster Preparedness and Management including supporting District Disaster Management Committees (DDMC)
South Sudan	National Disaster Management Policy (under development) Five Years Strategic Plan (2013-2018) on Disaster Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Water supply initiatives for production</li> <li>▪ Early warning systems</li> <li>▪ Conflict management</li> <li>▪ Livestock development</li> </ul>	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management; Ministry of Environment

## 2.5 Challenges and opportunities for effective drought response

### 2.5.1 Challenges Associated with Responding to Drought

- Limitations in the human resource and institutional capacities that are required to coordinate and implement drought risk management and resilience building initiatives.
- Inadequate policy and legislative frameworks for disaster risk management in general and drought risk management in particular.
- Lack of information on water and other natural resources in the ASALs of the countries.
- Weak markets, communication and transport infrastructure conditions in the drought vulnerable areas.
- Weak early warning systems to inform vulnerable communities on weather trends and disasters and to alert them for effective preparedness and response.
- Low level of education and strong adherence to traditional ways of keeping large herds of livestock by pastoralist communities. At times this is exacerbated by issues related to land tenure arrangements.
- Limitation of resources to finance the various initiatives on drought risk management and resilience building.
- Inadequate participatory platforms in drought management programs.
- Adoption of reactive crisis management approaches in drought management, including over- reliance on relief aid.

### 2.5.2 Opportunities for Effective Response to Drought

- Existence of IGAD to establish regional and international mechanisms for cooperation to address cross-border drought issues.

- Existence of the IDDRSI framework at regional and national level, including the adopted Country Programming Papers (CPPs) for drought resilience and sustainable development.
- Availability of political will and commitment to drought risk reduction by governments in the IGAD region.
- Existing national implementing and coordination structures for drought management.
- Availability of relevant national policies and strategies which provide a fertile ground for drought resilience and sustainable development activities in the ASALs. In some countries, the identified policy gaps for integrated drought management and identified capacity gaps for implementation provide additional opportunities.
- Availability of institutions with long experience and well-developed frameworks in implementing related programs and projects in some countries thereby providing good practices.
- Interest of development partners, IGAD member countries and the private sector to support national and regional initiatives to enhance drought resilience. An association known as the Global Alliance for Drought Resilience and Growth has recently been formed by development partners to provide an informal forum through which ideas and intervention plans on certain key climate change aspects e.g. drought resilience can be exchanged (UNAIDS and IGAD, 2012).

# CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## 4.1 CONCLUSION

Drought is endemic to EA and fluctuations of rainfall have been noted for as long as records have existed. Drought is recurrent and can be expected to return to the region in much the same way that it periodically returns. Rain-fed agriculture, which is the dominant form of agriculture in the EAC sub-region, is seriously affected by droughts. The agriculture sector provides the main occupation for over 80% of East Africans.

Episodes of droughts are the most common and significant disasters in the EA region and are associated with climate change. They are on the rise in terms of frequency, magnitude and intensity. Severe drought is experienced in every twenty five to thirty years and a less severe drought every ten to fifteen years. Another moderate drought is normally followed by good rains every five to seven years. The total occurrence of droughts is one third that of epidemics and floods, but the total victims of droughts is remarkably higher than other disasters

Drought affects key sectors such as manufacturing, education, national security, tourism, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, agriculture and livestock, environment and forestry, and energy, among others. Therefore, economic losses and damages caused by droughts are prevalent in all these sectors. The main components of drought preparedness include drought characterization, risk and impact assessment, prediction and early warning and the development of drought management planning and interventions which touch on many water management-related policies.

## 4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to enhance the development of drought-resilient national institutions, there is need to work with local communities. The national institutions dealing with DRM need to invest more in strengthening local community capacity (ability

in terms of skills and knowledge, authority, resources and the responsibility) in drought management. Among the priorities in capacity building are:

- Specific allocation of responsibilities to all stakeholders;
- Community-based education on drought vulnerability management;
- Build community capacity early warning and drought planning; and
- Enhance community-based early warning systems

Risk communication is critical to ensure that selected risk mitigation options are acceptable by the public. Local knowledge is useful in defining region-specific or water use-specific mitigation options. In this regard, the development of community-based mechanisms is needed to increase community participation in drought preparedness and planning for response.

Droughts can occur simultaneously in several countries affecting many people. Indeed, drought- precipitated disaster is one of the similar cross-border issues in the region. Therefore, sharing disaster information between regional member states is crucial.

## Highlights of Key Messages in the Issue Briefs

- **Poverty and unemployment** contribute to youth radicalization and extremism. In the Eastern Africa region, unemployment and poverty are socio-economic challenges or twin-problems overstressing the moral and psychological strength of individuals to remain law-abiding citizens.
- **The Social Media** have been viewed as supporting terrorist operations in real time e.g. the Al-Shabaab Westgate incident is cited as an example of the real time, direct-to-target-audience propaganda that social media facilitates.
- **Al-Shabaab's use of Social Media such as Facebook, Twitter Feeds and U-tube** have been highly graphic in their content and blatant in their promotion of terrorism as a legitimate practice, and notable in how easily accessible they are for the common internet user especially the youth.
- **High levels of illiteracy** may also be a contributor to youth radicalization and extremism. Illiteracy renders young people more susceptible to the messaging and narratives of extremist groups, as they lack the means to verify or challenge the ideas themselves.
- **Developing de-radicalization and re-integration programmes are needed to assimilate the youth returning from Somalia.**
- **Initiate programmes involving mentoring and matching youth from at-risk communities with successful role-models** and training them in useful social, economic and political skills.
- **Regional Cooperation especially inter-regional youth exchanges** are necessary to develop and promote a common understanding on addressing youth-related issues with a view to enhancing resilience against extremism and other social vices. Sharing of experiences and best practices will help the youth to empower themselves in order to confront radicalization and violent extremism.



## Emergency Preparedness and Response to Drought

- **Drought vulnerability** is used to highlight the socio-economic and bio-physical characteristics of the region that make it susceptible to the adverse effects of drought. Due to heavy dependence on rain-fed agriculture, EA is vulnerable to frequent and severe droughts
- **Drought response mechanisms** in EA are usually reactive approaches based on the implementation of measures and actions after a drought event has started. This approach is taken in emergency situations and often results in inefficient technical and economic solutions.
- **Drought response mechanisms and associated challenges such as** limitations in the human resource and institutional capacities that are required to coordinate and implement drought risk management and resilience building initiatives
- **Opportunities for responding effectively to drought is based on** availability of relevant national policies and strategies and addressing the identified capacity gaps for implementation.

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
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# APPENDICES

## APPENDIX 1: MAP OF EASTERN AFRICA



## Author Profiles



**Martin Okwir** is a Policy Analyst and Researcher at IPSTC. He has over 10 years of working experience in key areas: Stakeholder Engagement; Capacity Development, Programme Management and Implementation, Climate Change Adaptation, Integrated HIV/AIDS, and Malaria. He has worked with AMREF Uganda and UNICEF in the Nutrition and Food Security project in Eastern Uganda through Strengthening Decentralization for Sustainability (SDS) project, which supports local governments to improve Social Service Delivery. Mr Okwir holds a Masters Degree in Public Policy and Management (MPP) from KDI School of Public Policy and Management, South Korea; He hold a Certificate in Law and Policy from the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel; Mr. Okwir hold a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Social Sciences from Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda; and a Diploma from the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He has published on Positioning Uganda for Economic Development in the New Vision Newspaper of Uganda. Mr Okwir also conducted independent research on Saemaul Undong's contributions to Korea's development and the lessons for Uganda.



**Dr. Eunice Njambi** has PhD and a Master's degree in community health and development from Great Lakes University, with further training in health systems management from Galilee International Management Institute, Israel. She is community development specialist, with expertise in research consultancy. She has been a principle investigator in national and regional research with USAID, KIPPRA, Concern World Wide South Sudan, AMREF/ MOH, UNCHR/ UNICEF/Action Against Hunger, DONONE Baby Nutrition. To date she has supervised Master's degree research for over 50 Students who have graduated. She facilitates development of community based partnerships, strategic plan development and policy development and analysis. Currently working with IPSTC as a curriculum designer and has public one occasional papers and Issue Briefs on in peace and security.



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