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Resource Blessing or Curse in Eastern Africa: The Case of the Nile Waters

Youth Radicalization and Terrorism: Case of the Coast Region of Kenya

Changing Trends of Conflicts and Response Strategies in Eastern Africa

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International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC)

P.O Box 24232-00502

Karen, Kenya

Tel: 254 20 388 3157/58

Fax: 254 20 388 3159

Email: info@ipstc.org

Website: www.ipstc.org

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Edited by

Dr. Geoffrey Njeru

Design, Layout and Print by

Magfre Enterprises Ltd.

Tel: (020) 316691, 0770467342

Email: magfreenterpriseslimited@gmail.com

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Foreword

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is a research and training institution focusing on capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the framework of the African Peace and Security architecture (APSA) and has developed to be a regional Centre of Excellence for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. The IPSTC addresses the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated Peace Support Operations (PSOs) by analyzing the actors and multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research whose findings constitute the subject of this Issue Brief covers a broad spectrum of issues ranging from conflict prevention through management to post-conflict reconstruction. The Centre has made considerable contribution in training and research on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa through designing of training curricula, conducting field research and publication of Occasional Papers and Issue Briefs. The Occasional Papers are produced annually, while the Issues Briefs are quarterly. The issue briefs are an important contribution to the vision and mission of the IPSTC.

The First Quarter Issue Brief No. 2 (2015) has two articles on peace and conflict in Eastern Africa and the Great Lakes Region: "*Resource Blessing or Curse in Eastern Africa: The Case of the Nile Waters" and "Youth Radicalisation and Terrorism: The Case of the Coast Region of Kenya"*. The Issue Brief provides insights into pertinent peace and security issues in the region that are useful to policy makers and aims at contributing to the security debate and praxis in the region. The articles in this Issue Brief are also expected to inform the design of the training modules at the IPSTC. The research and publication of this Issue Brief has been made possible by the support of the Government of Japan through UNDP.

Brig. Robert Kabage

Director, IPSTC

Acronyms

AIAI	Al – Ittihaad Al- Islam
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
CAK	Communications Authority of Kenya
CFA	Cooperative Framework Agreement
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
GOK	Government of Kenya
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
IPK	Islamic Party of Kenya
ISCA	Islamic Supreme Council of America
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
MYC	Muslim Youth Center

NBCF	Nile Basin Cooperative Framework
NBI	Nile Basin Initiative
NBTF	Nile Basin Trust Fund
PJTC	Permanent Joint Technical Committee
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
R&D	Research and Development
SAP	Subsidiary Action Programmes
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
SVP	Shared Vision Project
TECCONILE	Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
VEOs	Violent Extremist Organizations

Introduction to Issue Briefs

The topics in this First Quarter Issue Brief address diverse issues of peace and security in the Eastern Africa and Great Lakes region. The first paper examines the potential of the Nile waters as a blessing or curse in Eastern Africa and the second looks at Youth Radicalisation and Terrorism in the coast region of Kenya.

The first paper, *Resource Blessing or Curse in Eastern Africa: The Case of the Nile Waters* assesses the potential of the Nile waters as an asset for peace and development and/or a source of conflict. The Nile river basin is a complex climatic and geographical zone with huge potential for conflict. It is also a climate security hot-spot, as rising temperatures and changing precipitation patterns exacerbate the already existing problems of desertification, water and food scarcity, posing a challenge to the stability of the entire region. One of the most important issues is the allocation of water resources among the riparian countries. Given the economic, environmental, developmental and political factors among the riparian countries, an analysis of the regional security implications suggests that conflicts may be inevitable if mitigation measures are not taken.

In the past, Egypt has stamped its hegemony over the Nile water resources. However, the old order imposed by the lower riparians, particularly Egypt, which monopolised the Nile Basin for centuries, is systematically being challenged by new realities and demands from assertive upper riparians. The half-century-old alliance between Egypt and Sudan established under the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement has engendered a new alliance of the upper riparians, born and reared under the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and institutionalised by the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). It remains to be seen how the assertiveness of the upper riparians of their rights to an equitable and reasonable share of the Nile waters will eventually unfold and whether the CFA will indeed enter into force and effect without the participation of Egypt and Sudan.

In the second paper, *Youth Radicalisation and Terrorism: The Case of the Coast Region of Kenya,* the author examines the drivers of youth radicalization and mechanisms

for countering it. The author explores the link between youth radicalization and terrorism especially the causes of violent behaviour among some of the groups. However, with the coming into existence of Al Qaida and its affiliates such as Al Shabaab, violent extremists have increasingly become more lethal and infiltrated societies causing mayhem and fatalities.

The study identifies several factors that may help explain youth radicalization in the Coastal region. These include technological advancements especially in the ICT sector, social and economic marginalization which is mostly historical, Islamic fundamentalism, Kenya's foreign policy, KDF incursions and counter-terrorism measures in Somalia as well as factors intrinsic to the youth. These have been classified as either existing pre-conditions, precipitant, strategic, and ideological factors. As such, violent extremist organizations find fertile ground which they readily utilize to their advantage to further recruit foot soldiers for their supposed cause.

The paper concludes with recommendations for a multi-sectoral approach to de-radicalization which aims at placing the responsibility for the process at the grassroots level especially among the youth, parents, and religious leaders among others. Empowering Muslim and other youth through improvement of the quality of their lives will go a long way in reducing social and economic marginalization of the Coastal people.

Resource Blessing or Curse in Eastern Africa: *The Case of the Nile Waters*

Carolyne Gatimu

Introduction

There are recurrent predictions that the next world war will be about water, not about oil or land. Water is metaphorically the blood of the organic whole that constitutes the world (Tadesse, 2008). In Africa, access to water is one of the most critical aspects of human survival. Today, about one third of the total population, constituting 300 million people, lacks access to water. As a result, many riparian countries sharing the Nile river basin have recently developed stakes in the water resources unexpressed in the past (Rahman, 2011).

The total amount of fresh water on the earth's surface is only 3%; the rest - 97% - is salty sea water. Of the 3% fresh water, only 0.3% is found in all rivers and lakes, while the rest is locked up in icecaps and glaciers. However, it is not so much the amount of fresh water on the surface of the earth that makes it scarce but its uneven distribution. Had water been evenly spread or distributed, it would have been ample for all conceivable human needs. It is a blessing that Africa contains most of the 0.3% fresh water in the world. It has a reticulation of 54 drainage basins, including rivers, which either traverse territorial boundaries or form part of such boundaries. These basins alone cover approximately half the total area of Africa. However, only about 2% of the total water in Africa is utilised, leaving the remaining 98% to replenish the ocean (Tadesse, 2008).

The Nile is regarded as the longest river in the world running a course of about 6,853 km with an enormous quantity of water in its watercourse. About 30% of its watershed comprises arid or desert lands. The longer of its two branches, the White Nile, extends from the mountains to the east of Lake Tanganyika through to Lake Victoria. The shorter branch, the Blue Nile, springs from the Ethiopian Highlands, joining the longer branch in central Sudan, and contributes the greater proportion of water entering Egypt. It enters the Mediterranean Sea through a series

of branches known as the Nile Delta. The Nile basin traverses the largest number of countries of any basin in Africa (see Figure 1). These countries, also known as the Ten Riparian States include Sudan, Ethiopia, Egypt, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, and Eritrea (wwf.panda.org).

The Nile river basin is a complex climatic and geographical zone with huge potential for conflict. It is also a climatic hot-spot mainly because rising temperatures and changing precipitation patterns exacerbate the already existing problems of desertification, water and food scarcity, thus posing a challenge to the stability of the entire region. One of the most important issues is the allocation of water resources among the riparian states. Given the economic, environmental, developmental and political factors among the riparian states, analysis of security implications points to possible regional conflicts if the status quo remains. In the past, Egypt has established its hegemony over the Nile waters and controls much of the water resources. However, this hegemony has recently been challenged by the upstream countries thus increasing tension between Egypt and some of its neighbours. The aim of this paper is therefore to assess the potential of the Nile waters as an asset for development and peace building and/or as a potential source of conflict in eastern Africa.

Organisation of the Paper

This paper is divided into eight sections. Following the introduction, section two highlights the objectives of the paper followed by a brief discussion of the current state of the Nile. The challenges facing the Nile region are covered in section three. A historical context of the Nile Basin is examined in section four while section five looks at the current positions of the riparian countries towards the exploitation of the Nile. Section six examines the Nile as an asset for peace or a source of conflict and section seven looks at the present cooperation efforts in the riparian countries. Section eight constitutes the conclusion and way forward.

Objectives

The paper is guided by the following objectives. These are to:

- Examine the current Nile Basin countries' positions towards exploitation of the Nile waters;
- Assess the potential of the Nile waters as an asset for peace and development and as a source of conflict; and
- Identify appropriate Nile water-related conflict prevention, management and mitigation measures in the region.

The State of the Nile River Basin

As mentioned in the preceding discussion, the Nile is the longest river in the world, traversing ten countries in Africa. The Nile as a natural resource and common property has benefited Eastern and Northern African countries' economic activities mainly through agriculture and tourism. For example, about 90% of Egypt's land mass is desert and therefore, many populations have congregated along the river banks due to the economic opportunities available especially the possibility of irrigated farming and livestock rearing. However, the almost complete dependence on water resources over the centuries has caused the Nile river basin's resources to deplete, leading to high rates of unemployment, diseases and hunger in the countries depending on the water resources.

Climate change especially global warming mainly due to greenhouse emission effect is one of the contributing factors to the declining water resource in the Nile river basin. High temperatures and underground water reduction in Egypt and Sudan are direct impacts of global warming. In addition, development along the Nile River has led to water pollution by many riparian countries. For example, the Ethiopian and Eritrean wars in the late 1990s polluted a substantial part of the river basin with military accoutrements. Such pollution has further been exacerbated by the huge populations concentrated in the river basin. The ten riparian countries have an estimated population of over 300 million, which accounts for about 40% of the entire African population with an average per capita income of $282. It is estimated

that by 2025 the number of people who depend on the Nile River will increase to 859 million (Rahman, 2011).

Industrialization and mechanization have also played a significant role in the pollution as a result of expansion of development projects along the Nile River. Farming along the river is one of the major sources of livelihood for communities living in the Nile basin but drought, famine, population growth and land degradation have impacted the water resources negatively. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in its 2010 report argued that land degradation and deforestation in the river basin due to excessive burning of vegetation for cultivation have virtually reduced water levels thus making it extremely difficult for cultivation and water conservation. Before the 1950s, there was less resentment on the sharing of the Nile water resources by riparian countries. However, with changing circumstances such as declining water resources, hunger, and disease, the riparian countries have found it inevitable to renegotiate earlier treaties in order to access the Nile (Rahman, 2011).

Figure 1: A map of the Nile river basin *(source: http://siteresources.worldbank.org)*

Challenges Facing the Nile Basin Countries

The Nile Basin capacity building network identifies five challenges that face the Nile Basin countries. These include the following:

Structural Lack of Research Capacity in Water Sector: Most of the basin countries are burdened by weak human and institutional capacity to manage water resources in an integrated manner. The situation applies not only to the management of trans-boundary waters, but also to the management of national waters. Water management within each country is still fragmented between sectors, and there is little integration among various sectors of water use, between quantity and quality, and between surface and ground water. Moreover, the diversity of institutional capacities in the countries is large. The availability of senior water professionals, for instance, varies from not more than 10 in one country (e.g. Rwanda) to a few hundred in another (e.g. Egypt). Moreover, six of the ten riparian states have undergone significant civil strife resulting in a vast backlog of water-related investments, inadequate infrastructure management, and a need for institutional and human resource development.

Lack of Trust and Partnerships: By its very nature, management of transboundary waters is a complex issue. In the case of the Nile, collective or joint development is made even more difficult by the fact that there is limited trade and exchange among the riparian countries. Political, economic, social and cultural (including language) differences among the countries pose a major challenge to such exchange. Within the water resources sector, there are few opportunities to exchange information and experience on a regional basis. The absence of such opportunities among the Basin countries has been a constraint to the building of a 'Nile water community' engaged in extensive professional interaction and joint problem-solving.

Little or No Research and Development (R&D) by Local Experts: Significant financial support has been offered by various donors for research (e.g. on water and climate change) in Africa. However, most of the countries in the Nile basin have a serious shortage of specialists in the water sector. As a consequence, either no R&D is

taking place or foreign experts do the main research work in those countries. They (foreign experts) are not only more expensive but also lack knowledge of the local situations and contexts.

No Contextual on-the-job Training: Support usually addresses one link in the knowledge chain. When new people are trained, their level of research skills and experience is leveraged. But after the training they go home and in many cases the potential knowledge relationships within the group setting fall apart.

Need for Practical and Creative Solutions: solving the present problems in the Nile region requires a non-traditional approach. On the one hand, there is the need for stimulating socio-economic development of the region through solving practical problems. On the other hand, there is need for new or creative solutions. This requires that the world of knowledge generators (researchers and professionals) have to be linked with the world of implementers (decision makers and public and private sector agencies) and the users. The challenge is to move from innovative ideas through planning to actions on the ground. While this is already rather complicated to achieve in one organisation, sector or country, it is even more difficult when these issues have to be addressed in as complicated an environment as the Nile region. This requires the development of new approaches and new organisational mechanisms.

Historical Context

The hydro-politics of the Nile Basin generally have been dominated by Egypt (Tadesse, 2008; Martens, 2011; Rahman, 2011; Salman, 2012). For centuries, Egypt has ruled the Nile's waters almost unilaterally. The beginning of external influence in the Nile River affairs can be traced to the British conquest of Egypt and Sudan in the 19th and early 20th centuries. British colonialism in North and East Africa sought to secure interest in the Nile waters to ensure the production and export of cotton from Egypt and Sudan for textile industries at home. Consequently, a number of treaties on the Nile River were concluded during the last two centuries, most of which are the causes of the current disputes (Salman, 2012).

One treaty that is a source of a major dispute between Ethiopia on the one hand and Egypt and Sudan on the other is the treaty between Ethiopia and the United Kingdom, with respect to the frontiers between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea concluded in 1902. The treaty states in Article III that Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia "…engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct, or allow to be constructed, any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tsana, or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile, except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Sudan." The treaty has been the source of a long standing dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile. Ethiopia vehemently rejects this treaty, claiming that it was not ratified by any of the government organs and that the Amharic and English versions of the treaty are different with respect to the said article. Egypt on its part insists that the treaty is valid and binding on Ethiopia, and that according to its provisions Ethiopia cannot build any project prior to Egypt's agreement as a successor to the treaty.

Another treaty that is a major source of disputes is the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement concluded by Britain on behalf of its East African colonies of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, as well as Sudan and Egypt. It states that "Except with the prior consent of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation works shall be undertaken nor electric generators installed along the Nile and its branches nor on the lakes from

which they flow if these lakes are situated in Sudan or in countries under British administration which could jeopardize the interests of Egypt either by reducing the quantity of water flowing into Egypt or appreciably changing the date of its flow or causing its level to drop". However, upon attaining independence in the early 1960s, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika) argued that they are not bound by this agreement because they were not parties to it. Egypt on the other hand invoked the principle of state succession to support its claim that the 1929 agreement remains valid and binding. Egypt claims that, like the 1902 treaty with Ethiopia, the agreement gives Egypt veto power over any project on the Nile that would jeopardize its interests.

A third treaty, which is also a source of dispute between Egypt and Sudan on the one hand and the other Nile riparian states on the other, is the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. The agreement established the total annual flow of the Nile (measured at Aswan) at 84 billion cubic metres allocating 55.5 cubic metres to Egypt and 18.5 cubic metres to Sudan. The remaining 10 cubic metres represent the evaporation and seepage at the large reservoir created by (and extending below) the Aswan High Dam. Thus, Egypt and Sudan allocated the entire flow of the Nile as measured at Aswan to themselves. The agreement established the Permanent Joint Technical Committee (PJTC) with an equal number of members from the two countries as the institutional mechanism for the joint management of the Nile. While Egypt and Sudan recognised the claims of other riparian states to a share of the Nile waters if the other states so requested, they reserved to themselves the ultimate decision on whether these states would get a share, and if so, how much. They further entrusted the Permanent Joint Technical Committee (PJTC) with supervision of the use of any amount so granted to any riparian state (Salman, 2012). This agreement has been rejected by the other riparian states which argue that they are not parties to it and have never acquiesced to it. As riparians, they consider the claims of Egypt and Sudan to the entire flow of the Nile an infringement of their rights under international law to a reasonable and equitable share to the Nile waters, given that the Nile originates within their territories.

The Nile waters even became an issue of national security when Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt in 1979, confronted by Ethiopian plans on constructing dams, declared that the only matter that could take Egypt to war again was water. To date, no war has been fought over the Nile's water, and conflicts over trans-boundary Rivers in general have been solved peacefully. However, with the attainment of independence, and faced by the imperatives of development, all riparian countries have been compelled to challenge Egypt's control by re-negotiating earlier water treaties. Among the development challenges necessitating the renegotiation include high population growth hence need for more water, global warming, natural disasters, pollution, resource depletion, industrialization, urbanization, high capital costs of water drilling, and inability to pump underground water, among others. Egypt has been in near control of the Nile waters for a long time. The shortages of water and water resources in Ethiopia and Sudan have prompted those countries to take a second look at Egypt's hegemonic access to the Nile and its resources (Rahman, 2011).

Riparian States' Interests in Exploitation of the Nile

According to Tadesse (2008), all the riparian states have stated their need for greater access to the Nile waters as follows:

Egypt

- It uses the Nile River water more than any other country in the basin and has developed extensive areas of land through irrigation in the last 100 years. It claims to have developed a gross cultivable area of about 3.03 million ha
- It wants to maintain its 'prior appropriation' right and claim of 55.5 billion m3 of the Nile waters. It is reluctant to accept reallocation by upstream countries
- It wants to reclaim additional land to be irrigated by economising water
- It is negatively affected by siltation and deteriorating water quality
- Its agricultural production depends entirely on the Nile, therefore, it is the most affected by environmental degradation of the Nile basin
- It expects to gain a great deal from basin-wide cooperation and joint projects in flood and silt control, yearly regulated flows, hydro-electric power generation, etc.
- It has a relatively strong economy, better knowledge of the basin, and better capacity for water resource management
- It plays a crucial role in Nile Basin negotiations and has power over their success or failure
- Egypt now accepts the riparian rights of basin states but strongly suggests that regional cooperation has a higher priority than water allocation in the Nile basin. It emphasizes the need for basin-wide cooperation in hydrological data collection, exchange and analysis, arguing that no negotiations on international water rights are possible without an agreed data base which must be formulated on a maximum scale.

Sudan

- It makes the second heaviest use of the Nile River. It claims that it uses about 16.12 billion m3 of Nile River waters and irrigates 2.95 million acres of net cultivable agricultural land annually
- It wants to maintain its 'prior appropriation' rights to 18.5billion m3 of the Nile waters
- It has not fully utilised the share allocated to it by the 1959 bilateral agreement but wants to expand irrigation
- It faces political and environmental opposition to completion of the Jonglei I and II canals, but if completed, these would increase flows to the Aswan Dam
- It has interest in projects in upstream countries that would regulate and increase flow and decrease silt
- It benefits from basin-wide water management programmes
- It is reluctant to accept reallocation by upstream countries. However, its policy on water use by other riparian countries is generally more cautious and accommodating than Egypt's.

Ethiopia

- It is a major riparian state with its tributaries contributing 86% of the combined Nile water and has a strong claim for Nile water entitlement
- Ethiopia generally preferred to stay in the background in Nile related regional undertakings, but recent developments show its readiness to play a proactive role in the coming years.
- It does not advocate the principle of acquired rights, instead, it consistently promotes the concept of equitable entitlement as the best way to settle water allocation issues
- More than 95% of the silt in the main Nile comes from the Ethiopian highlands. It is interested in soil conservation and afforestation

- It wants to put about 2.4 million ha of land under irrigation and realize 103,680 GWh/year of hydroelectric power potential in the Nile basin
- Deforestation, rapid population growth and drought pose threats to its environment
- Much of the threat to the quantity and quality of Nile water comes from Ethiopia
- To retain the status quo would have a grave impact on conservation of the environment and development in general
- It is ready to cooperate once it ascertains its entitlement
- It would benefit from basin-wide cooperation programmes
- It strongly supports a new Nile water agreements regime

Eritrea

- It wants to use Mereb-Gash River for irrigation and hydropower
- It claims 'riparian rights' on the Atbara River, one of the tributaries of the Nile
- It would benefit from basin-wide cooperation
- Its deteriorating environment affects the water quality through siltation
- It expects to gain from a new Nile water agreements regime

Burundi

- It wants to use the Kagera River for its development
- Its consumption water demand is relatively low
- It does not expect water allocation from the Nile but claims 'riparian rights' on the Kagera River
- It is important in the sub-basin of Lake Victoria, benefits from regional cooperation, and wants to build its capacity
- It is concerned about the environment, but, being at the tip of the upstream, it is affected relatively less
- It is willing to change the status quo

Rwanda

- The Kagera River inflow is important to the water balance of Lake Victoria
- It has similar stakes/interests to Burundi's
- It is a key player in the sub-basin of Lake Victoria
- It expects to gain from regional cooperation
- It supports a new basin-wide agreement

Kenya

- It has an interest in developing its part of the Nile basin
- It expects its 'riparian rights' to be respected
- It has no significant claim to Nile water allocation
- It has an interest in protecting the environment
- It is not affected seriously by the status quo
- It expects to gain from basin-wide cooperation
- It supports a new Nile agreement

Tanzania

- It wants to exercise its 'riparian rights' on Lake Victoria
- It has interest in developing and conserving the resources of Lake Victoria sub-basin
- It has interest in developing tourism and agriculture
- It poses a relatively smaller threat to the quantity and quality of the Nile River
- It benefits from basin-wide cooperation

Uganda

- The White Nile carries about 31.0 billion m3 of water through Uganda to the Sudd wetlands (though only 14.0 billion m3 comes out as the White Nile)
- It is very important among the upstream White Nile riparian countries in terms of water contribution and the environment
- It has a lot of interest in ensuring its entitlement
- Owing to the abundance of rainfall and characteristics of the hydrology of the Sudd (in southern Sudan), its consumption demands are not a serious threat to downstream users
- It expects entitlement in future Nile water agreements
- It expects to benefit from basin-wide cooperation programmes

Democratic Republic of Congo

- It contributes significantly to the sub-basin of Lake Victoria
- It is less dependent on the White Nile for its development, but wants to ascertain its 'riparian rights'
- It has interest in conserving its part of the basin to promote tourism
- Its consumption demands in the basin are relatively low
- It has interest in cooperating in mutually beneficial basin management programmes
- It supports future basin-wide agreements.

An Asset for Peace or a Source of conflict: Theoretical Perspectives

The Nile can be a potential for peace and socio-economic development for the riparian states but can as well be a source of conflict depending on how the riparian states continue to engage each other. Kofi Anan (former UN Secretary-General) reiterated that "…unsustainable practices are woven deeply in the fabric of modern life. Land degradation threatens food security. Forest destruction threatens biodiversity. Water pollution threatens public health and fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflicts and wars in the future...." (Rahman, 2011). This statement is reinforced by the utterances of Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt in 1979, when reacting to Ethiopian plans to construct dams declared that the only matter that could take Egypt to war again was water.

Conflict Theory Perspectives

The horn of Africa has been bedevilled by conflicts, both interstate and civil wars for several years now. These conflicts are mainly concentrated in the north east and central Africa. While many of these conflicts have been disputes over land in mainly oil rich areas of the Congo, others have sprung from diversion of water resources. To understand these conflicts, one needs to visit any of the several applications and interpretations of earlier conflict theories propounded by scholars such as Karl Marx, Lenin and Weber. Collier – Hoeffer, also known as the C-H model is one of such interpretations of recent times. C-H model's analysis of conflict is based on the framework of many variables such as tribe, identity, economics, religion and social status in Africa. After analysis, the model concludes that economic factors, rather than ethnic or religious identities are the bane of conflicts in Africa. The Marxian perspective emphasizes the supremacy of the economic substructure over the socio-cultural, religious and political superstructure. It argues that social interactions are characterized by contradictions or conflicts whose resolution takes place through a synthesis that may be interpreted as peace.

Marx also reiterated the fact that social and human interactions are dialectical in the sense that when a dominant nation seeks to control dependent nations or peripheral countries, the product is a desire to rebel against the oppressor by the dependent states. This initially takes the form of agitation for equitable or fair share of resources. This is consistent with the C-H model which, after analysing empirical data on the causes of conflicts in Africa, concluded that economic factors are a significant predictor of conflict in many parts of the African continent. Economic factors or reasons may be varied and numerous due to the resources available in a given region and their mode of allocation. Any form of competition over resources will naturally generate either or both of these two outcomes: tension and potential conflict; and cooperation. In this case, Egypt's absolute control of water resources in the Nile is a potential for conflict. Citing the 1902, 1929 and 1959 agreements, Egypt has worked to sabotage many riparian countries through other diplomatic and international treaties. Ethiopia on the other hand has vowed to engage Egypt over the control of the water resources in the Nile valley basin. This is exemplified in the many water agreements initiated by Ethiopia and other riparian countries to abrogate all previous agreements hitherto entered by Egypt. Consequently, the looming tension between Egypt and the riparian countries led by Ethiopia is a recipe for conflict in north eastern Africa.

In addition, some unique features of the Nile water conflicts can be identified such as downstream countries' high dependence on the water, drastic disjuncture between contribution to and utilization of the Nile water among the chief riparian countries, and the dominance of Egypt in political and military power despite its geographical position at the end of downstream supply. Egypt contributes essentially nothing to the flow of the Nile, but it depends upon the Nile for 97% of its water supply and currently consumes more than 80% of all Nile water. Ethiopia, in the uplands, contributes 85-86% of the water flow in the Nile basin yet uses almost none of that water for irrigation. Dominant in political and military power, Egypt has so far been able to guard its access to a large share of the Nile water, but upstream countries' claims to the water resources in the Nile basin can no longer be ignored as populations in these countries continue to grow. Homer-Dixon (1994) observes that "conflict is most probable when a downstream riparian is highly dependent on river water and is strong in comparison to upstream riparians." On the basis of

such characterization, the Nile has been considered one of the few international river systems that have the potential for breeding armed conflict among its riparian nations (Wu and Whittington, 2006).

Realism is another applicable broad theory in international relations and politics which developed from the works of such thinkers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold among others. Classic realists consider the ability of states to mimic human behaviour in their innate desire to dominate others, a desire which leads them to go to war. In a realist system where sovereign states compete for power and advantage to one another's detriment, war is an inescapable fact, and foreign policy must be understood in terms of the pursuit of the national interest, notably power. States go to war in the pursuit of their own self-interests and based on their relative military and economic capabilities. As access to water is essential for the survival of the state, it follows, if one subscribes to a realist approach, that water may be a cause of conflict within the Nile Basin countries (Abawari, 2011).

The literature on water wars predicts that in the 21st century, scarcity of water and lack of institutions for the management of water will bring about water wars. For example, in his article, *The War over Water* (1984), Cooley argued that the main cause for the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, major aspects of the Palestinian question, and the struggle over the future of the West Bank was conflict over water. Since 1947, several cease-fire agreements between Israel and its neighbours have been concluded but this has failed to stop war because of the unsettled water question (Abawari, 2011).

Co-operation Theory

Although cooperation in international river basins has often been hindered by domestic politics, uncertainty, and high transaction costs, as demand for water resources continues to grow, the prospective gains from cooperation can no longer be overlooked (Wu and Whittington, 2006). In the Nile basin, for example, the Nile water is presently used virtually in its entirety by two downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan. Many upstream riparian countries have become increasingly assertive in claiming a share of the water. The population in these countries (e.g. Ethiopia and Uganda) is projected to double or triple in the next 50 years. Unilateral actions

in water resource development will set these countries on a collision course, and commentators have already warned that armed conflicts could arise. Although we are yet to see violent conflict over the Nile basin waters, unresolved water conflicts can severely hamper economic development

In contrast, the gains from cooperation could be substantial. For example, significant losses to evaporation can be prevented if water is stored upstream. Much of the Nile water is presently lost to evaporation and seepage as it flows north towards the Mediterranean, but such losses can be significantly reduced. The main Nile flows through severe desert, where net evaporation seepage losses are substantial in comparison to the southern reaches of the river. If the water were stored upstream (in Ethiopia) to counter such evaporation and seepage losses, a significant amount of additional water would become available for use. The White Nile flows through the Sudd wetlands, where half of its water is lost to evaporation. Much of that water could be conserved if a canal were built to bypass the Sudd.

In addition, there is also tremendous potential for hydropower development in upstream riparian countries which could benefit all countries in the basin. A large surplus of hydropower generated upstream (e.g. in Ethiopia and Uganda) could provide much needed energy for downstream countries to expand agricultural production and foreign exchange for upstream producers. Such electricity trading could increase flows of agricultural output from downstream to upstream states and thus reduce upstream countries' water requirements for domestic consumption.

Wu and Whittington (2006) argue that however attractive the economic gains from cooperation may seem from the perspective of the basin as whole, individual riparian countries will remain ambivalent to such prospects unless they can benefit by acting cooperatively. It is thus of paramount importance that the Nile riparians reach an agreement for equitable sharing of any gains from cooperation. In recent years, scholars have proposed various allocation schemes based on different notions of equity in anticipation of the need for guidance in negotiations that are sure to come. For example, some have proposed dual allocation guidelines: 50% of the water to areas where the flow is generated and the remaining 50% to areas of historical use such as 'prior appropriation' while others have suggest an 'equitable' allocation regime based primarily on population.

Although allocation schemes thus far have tended to focus on apportionment of the Nile water itself, greater benefits from cooperation could come from non-consumption uses of the water such as hydropower. Allocation of the economic benefits of cooperative water utilization thus deserves greater attention. According to Wung and Whittington (2006), cooperation is voluntary by nature and the glue for any sustained, voluntary cooperation among riparian countries would have to be the self-interest of each participating riparian. Accordingly, two conditions are necessary for any allocation scheme to be incentive-compatible. The first is individual rationality, which requires that benefits of cooperation allocated to any participating country must at least equal what that country would obtain by acting unilaterally. A critical distinction has however to be made between acting unilaterally and maintaining the status quo. The status quo is often used as a convenient reference point for comparative projections of the economic benefits of cooperative behaviour but such results can be misleading. The distribution pattern created by a status quo scenario heavily favours the existing primary beneficiaries of the Nile water (Egypt and Sudan) and it tends to disregard other riparian countries' increasing capability to pursue water resource development projects independently.

The second necessary condition for successful international cooperation is group rationality which requires that the aggregate benefits allocated to any subgroup or riparian country be at least the same as what that partial coalition could achieve on its own. Taking such partial coalitions into account may complicate analyses because individual riparian countries are then acknowledged to have many other options than either acting unilaterally or joining a grand coalition. However, that admission could actually simplify and facilitate the negotiation process. Owing to the symmetrical nature of the problem, group rationality for other countries may constrain the maximum share that a particular country can demand, essentially setting up an upper limit for negotiation.

Cooperative game theory has been applied to international river basins in a number of studies, following the pioneering work by Rogers (1969). Cooperative game theory offers an analytical framework in which economic gains from basin-wide cooperation, individual rationality, and group rationality can be considered jointly. By determining the "core" (an important concept in cooperative game theory)

one may arrive at a set of characteristic functions that specify minimum benefits under all potential coalitions (as well as non-cooperation). Incentive compatibility should therefore be given more prominence in the resolution of international water conflicts in general and the Nile Basin in particular, and that cooperative game theory can offer a useful framework for identifying solutions that are incentive-compatible (Xun Wu and Whittington, 2006).

Conflict and Cooperation Approach

This approach argues that interactions around transboundary water resources share both cooperative and conflictive behaviour. The argument made is that the examination of either conflict or cooperation refutes the reality of the vast majority of contexts where cooperation and conflict actually coexist, and perpetuates the paradigm that any conflict is "bad", and that all forms of cooperation are "good" (Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008; Abawari, 2011). The interactions between conflict (war) and cooperation are highly sophisticated and complex in nature as 'the absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict'. It is this characteristic complexity that has attracted attention from international water academics, practitioners and communities, to a joint reading of conflict and cooperation over transboundary water issues.

Conceptual Framework



Source: Author's own conceptualization

Hypothesis 1: Egypt's cooperation with other riparian states will lead to peace and socio-economic development for all

Hypothesis 2: Egypt's non-cooperation with other riparian states will lead to conflict and eventually water wars.

Present Cooperation Efforts: The Nile Basin Initiative

The Nile riparian countries have over the years tried to find ways of cooperating and/or working together. This process started with the meetings in the mid-1960s to discuss the rising levels of Lake Victoria that led to the Hydromet project. There were speculations that the rising levels might have been caused by the Sudd swamps and/or by the Aswan High Dam that was about to be completed at the time. Accordingly, Egypt and Sudan were invited, and they happily joined the Hydromet project. The process continued and proceeded through the Undugu Group (Swahili word for brotherhood) in the 1970s and 1980s; the TECCONILE (Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin); and the Nile 2002 conferences in the 1990s. However, these efforts did not go beyond attempts to improve communication between the participating states. Building on these efforts, the World Bank and UNDP, together with some other donors, started in 1997 to facilitate the establishment of a more formal setting for cooperation among the Nile riparians. This mechanism was called the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) (Salman, 2012; Tadesse, 2008).

The NBI is a partnership initiated and run by the riparian states of the Nile River through the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin states. All riparian states of the Nile Basin are included in the NBI except Eritrea which has observer status (Martens, 2011; Tadesse, 2008). The objectives of the NBI are to:

- Develop the Nile basin water resources in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure prosperity, security, and peace for all its peoples;
- Ensure efficient water management and the optimal use of the water resources;
- Ensure cooperation and joint action between the riparian countries, seeking win-win situations;
- Target poverty eradication and promote economic integration; and
- Ensure that the program results in a move from planning to action.

The NBI seeks to develop the river basin by implementing a broad approach, using different tools at different levels. At the international level, the NBI intends to promote a shared vision among all riparians. This Shared Vision Project (SVP) includes 'grants-based activities to foster trust and cooperation and build an enabling environment for investment'. At sub-basin level, the NBI promotes Subsidiary Action Programs (SAPs). These programs aim at 'identifying cooperative development opportunities to realise physical investments and tangible results (that is, action on the ground) through sub-basin activities in the Eastern Nile and the Nile Equatorial Lakes region' (Martens, 2011).

The World Bank, UNDP and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) are the donors most involved in the NBI process. The Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF), established in 2003, is managed by the World Bank and encompasses most of the international donor support. However, due to its over-reliance on multi-lateral donors, the NBI has been frequently portrayed by several critical voices as excessively donor-driven. Yet, without international technical, financial, and political support, it is unlikely that the NBI would have come this far.

Tadesse (2008) and Martens (2011) argue that considering that the hydro-political situation has been in a legal-political deadlock for decades, recent developments in the Nile Basin have shown that the downstream countries, Egypt in particular, are willing to put some effort into cooperation, through their support of selected upstream water development projects. This development can be interpreted as 'a partial shift in the behaviour of the states in the Eastern Nile Basin. They now at least to some degree accept one another's political concerns and national interests'.

However, the size and scope of this first set of projects does not threaten Egypt's hydro-political status quo. Nevertheless, it shows that the 'old school' of political thinking might be softening, especially with regard to the need for cooperation among riparian states.

The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework (NBCF)

The main objective of the NBI has been to conclude a cooperative framework agreement that would incorporate the principles, structures and institutions that would be inclusive of all the Nile riparians (Salman, 2012). Work on the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) started immediately after the NBI was formally established in 1999 and continued for more than 10 years. However, the process ran into some major difficulties as a result of the resurfacing and hardening of the respective positions of the riparians over the colonial treaties, as well as the Egyptian and Sudanese claims to what they see as their acquired uses and rights of the Nile waters. Those differences persisted and could not be resolved at the negotiation level and were eventually taken to ministerial meetings. However, those meetings in turn failed to resolve the differences and no agreement on the final draft CFA could be reached.

In 2010, four of the Nile riparians (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda) signed the CFA in Entebbe, Uganda, and were joined five days later by Kenya. Burundi also joined the five states. Although the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) indicated its support of the CFA, it has not yet signed it. The CFA lays some basic principles for the protection, use, conservation and development of the Nile Basin. It establishes the principle that each Nile Basin state has the right to use, within its territory, the waters of the Nile River Basin and lays down a number of factors for determining equitable and reasonable utilization. In addition to the factors enumerated in the United Nations Watercourses Convention, the CFA includes the contribution of each basin state to the waters of the Nile River System and the extent and proportion of the drainage area in the territory of each basin.

The CFA also includes provisions requiring the Nile Basin states to take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other basin states. It also indicates further that where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another Nile

Basin state, the state whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard to the provisions of the CFA on equitable and reasonable utilization, in consultation with the affected state, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, discuss the question of compensation. As a general rule, the lower riparians favour the no-harm rule, since it protects their existing uses against impacts resulting from activities undertaken by upstream states. Conversely, upper riparians favour the equitable utilization principle because it provides more scope for states to utilize their share of the watercourse for activities that may impact downstream states. However, it is widely believed that the Watercourses Convention has resolved this controversy by subordinating the obligation against causing significant harm to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization (Salman, 2012).

Conclusion and Way Forward

The discussion in this paper has shown that the Nile Basin is passing through critical and uncertain times. The old order imposed by the lower riparians, particularly Egypt, which monopolised the Nile Basin for centuries, is being systematically challenged by new realities and demands from assertive upper riparians. The half-century-old alliance of Egypt and Sudan, established under the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, has engendered a new alliance of the upper riparians, born and reared under the Nile Basin Initiative and institutionalised by the Cooperative Framework Agreement. It remains to be seen how the assertiveness of the upper riparians of their rights to an equitable and reasonable share of the Nile waters will eventually unfold, and whether the CFA will indeed enter into force and effect without the participation of Egypt and Sudan.

The CFA has ironically and inevitably resulted in the solidification of the major differences between the upper and lower riparians. Yet, the newly emerging power equilibrium within the Nile Basin could as well generate an opportunity for the two parties to compromise, and to realise that there is no alternative to cooperation. Such cooperation is desperately needed to pull the 300 million Africans who live in or depend on the Nile Basin from their poverty and misery. Egypt and Sudan are both recipients of the Nile water and, therefore, cannot have the last word on its utilisation. The imbalance between water contribution and water use, and the accompanying demographic, economic and developmental needs, will have to be addressed realistically.

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Youth Radicalization and Terrorism:
The Case of the Coast Region of Kenya

Joyce Gichuru

Introduction

Terrorism has become a global phenomenon affecting many countries including Kenya. Statistics for 2007 indicate that Africa recorded 6,177 casualties from 296 terrorist acts (Okumu and Botha, 2007). This makes the continent to have the second highest number of casualties after Asia. Several countries have been listed as having extreme risk to terrorism and terrorist activities. These include Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Libya. Other countries with considerable levels of risk include the growing economies of Nigeria, Philippines, Columbia and Kenya.

As countries continue to increase surveillance and counter-terrorism measures, so have terrorists changed tact to escalate, maintain and sustain extremist violence. Use of asymmetrical warfare and weapons such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has increased the lethal nature of terrorist activities. There has also been extensive recruitment of young people especially in the ages of 18-24. While previously this targeted young Muslim youth, it has expanded to include those from other religions through conversion.

Kenya has experienced terrorism at different levels since the first serious case in 1980 of the Norfolk Hotel bombings. In the recent past however, terrorist-related activities have increased by involving local citizens. The seemingly extensive youth radicalization activities in Kenya appear to benefit from the fact that terrorist cells no longer need to carry out the heinous acts but rather find ready and willing recruits in the country. Terrorist activities have also spread to hitherto ignored target areas and infrastructures to include common places such as markets, shopping malls and bus transport facilities. One of the regions greatly affected has been the Coast region. This has to a large extent had an impact on Kenya's national security as well increased the costs of doing business in the country. This paper therefore seeks to understand

the relationship between youth radicalization and terrorism and the main causes of youth radicalization in Kenya in order to suggest ways of addressing the problem.

Statement of the Problem

The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) deployed troops in Somalia in 2011 to pursue Al Shabaab which is an Al-Qaida-linked group after their repeated incursions into the Kenyan coast resulting in the abduction of tourists and citizens. Their intervention continues up to date after its affiliation into the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). The rationale advanced for this incursion was the security threat posed by terrorist activities emanating from the Somali al Qaida cell known as Al Shabaab (Aronson, 2013).

However, Kenya continues to experience terrorist attacks denoting that there exists a larger problem than initially thought. Scholars have argued that the terrorism problem in Kenya arises from the tact and form used by armed groups (Botha, 2013). In terms of tact, the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and asymmetrical warfare have become a hallmark of terrorist acts today. In terms of form, there has been the use of domestic sources especially human capacity in conducting the attacks. Individuals used to conduct the terrorist attacks in Kenya are mainly young people between 18-25 years and were initially thought to be Muslims of Somali origin. However, there has been a noticeable increase in terrorist attacks conducted by Muslims of Arabic descent considered to originate from the Coastal areas of Lamu, Mombasa and Kilifi among others. There are also pockets of individuals being recruited from other communities such as Luo and Kikuyu to undertake terrorist activities on behalf of Al Shabaab.

Consequently, there appear to be increasing numbers of militants and militant groups in Kenya. In the Coastal region of Kenya alone, this has become a common practice with groups such as Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) being involved in radicalization of the youth and recruiting them into militant outfits including terrorist groups. Their activities in the coastal region have been worrying with Muslim faithful feeling that radicalized youth pose a security threat to their day-to-day living (Kithuure and Bosire, 2014). Radical youth aged 20-30 years had indeed taken over three mosques since last year namely: Masjid Musa in 2013; Sakina

which was renamed Masjid Mujahideen in April 2014; and Swafaa in October 2014 (Mohamed, 2014). Sakina mosque itself was the scene of a violent takeover in which government security machinery was employed. Radicalized youth have displayed violent tendencies such as using mosques to propagate extremist views that may have been related to recent terrorist attacks in the coastal region.

The question that arises is: why has it become easy for militant groups to attract a considerable number of youth through radicalization that has resulted in their participation in terrorism activities? The study therefore sought to understand the causes of youth radicalization in the coastal region and its implications for terrorism and related activities in Kenya. This paper, which reports on some of the study findings, further analyzes the capacity of the security sector to deal with youth radicalization and the resultant terrorism.

Objectives

- To establish the factors behind youth radicalization and its links to terrorism in the Coastal region of Kenya;
- To examine the national capacity of the security sector to deal with youth radicalization and terrorism; and
- To propose strategies for national security organs to deal with youth radicalization and terrorism not only in coastal Kenya but the country at large.

Research Questions

- What are the factors responsible for youth radicalization and the resultant terrorism?
- What is the capacity of the national government and other stakeholders to address this problem?
- What are the opportunities for the prevention, management and resolution of youth radicalization and terrorism?

Justification

Radicalization in Kenya continues to increase among the youth in the coast region despite attempts to counter it through seminars, religious teachings and interactive sessions in which religious leaders' caution the youth against being misled by extremists. This has further exacerbated terrorist attacks and fuelled internal conflicts especially at the coast. The government and other institutions have undertaken a variety of initiatives to deal with this problem but there seems to be no end in sight. In 2014, at least 100 fatalities were experienced in Lamu County, where historical grievances were laced with extremist views.

In Mombasa, considered the main city of the Coastal region, at least three mosques have been reportedly taken over by radicalized groups during 2013-2104. The take-over was hostile indicating the extent to which the concerned youth were willing to execute the actions of their masters in ejecting the moderate *Imams* who saw it as the work of 'external forces' (Kithuure and Bosire, 2014).

It is therefore imperative to try to understand the factors behind the increased attraction of the youth to extremist and militant views and their resultant willingness to execute violent attacks in Kenya. With such an understanding, it is possible to propose an effective interventionist strategy as terrorism activities continue to challenge national security preparedness.

Definition of Terms

Youth

The United Nations defines the youth as persons between the age of 15 and 24 years without prejudice to other definitions by member states (UN, 1981). This means that this definition has not been applied universally in all countries or regions thus suggesting differences as to who a youth is especially when it comes to youth policy implementation. The African Union on its part defines the youth as those persons in age cohort 15-35 years (AU, 2006).

In Kenya there are two definitions for the term 'youth' although differences arise from a policy execution perspective. The Constitution (GOK, 2010) defines youth as those aged between 18 and 35 years. The sense of this definition is that it runs

from the earliest possible and acceptable school leaving age to the age at which most people will have completed third level education: the transition between education and the labour market. On the other hand, the National Youth Policy (GOK, 2006) defines a youth as a person resident in Kenya in the age bracket 18-30 years which in the context of this paper is more applicable.

According to the 2009 Kenya population and housing census, the total population stood at 38,610,097 (KNBS, 2010). Of these 19,192,458 were categorized as youth in the age bracket of 24 years which translates to about 30 percent of the population. The Coast region has a population of about 3,325,307 of which 55 percent are in the age bracket of 18-35 (KNBS, 2010). Further, at least 7 percent of the total population is considered to be of the Muslim faith inhabiting the coastal area (Vittori, Bremer, and Vittori, 2009). The prevalence of a large and dynamic youth population is shaping Kenya's coastal region's security landscape. Research on conflict and political violence indicates that young people are more prone to conflict than the older generation, and that the youth are more likely to join radical organizations than adults (Moshe, 2007).

The young generation is marked by a number of unique characteristics. To start with, the youth are increasingly interconnected to each other and the global market place of ideas via information and communication technologies (ICT). In this regard, even those wallowing in poverty will go to great lengths to ensure they own at least a mobile phone. This, coupled with efficient and cheap internet penetration and connectivity, has increased the number of young people accessing information. Through platforms such as Facebook, twitter, and my space, among others, the Kenyan youth continue to share ideas on a whole range of topics with each other and their peers around the world.

However, there are some variations in certain characteristics such as location preference and religion. A majority of the youth prefer living in urban areas but a good number maybe found residing in rural areas where they adopt a more traditional lifestyle and maybe far removed from the activities of the state. This latter group might be more difficult to deal with as they feel a sense of marginalization as is common in the Coast region. The youth in the country also profess different faiths, usually determined by their parents. The most dominant are Christianity and Islam.

However, there are instances where youth have converted to either religion once they become adults. The important point to note here is that religion and location preference have served as predisposing factors to radicalization.

Radicalization

Radicalization is a process by which an individual or group adopts increasingly extreme political, social or religious ideals and aspirations that: reject and/or undermine the status quo (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010); or reject and/or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice. For instance, radicalism can originate from a broad social consensus against what is considered progressive changes in society. Radicalization can be both violent and nonviolent although for the better part, the focus on radicalization leads to violent extremism (Borum, 2011).

There are multiple usually mutually reinforcing mechanisms and ways that constitute the process of radicalization (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). Radicalization that occurs across multiple pathways greatly increases a group's resilience and lethality and compromises its ability to blend with non-radical society and participate in the modern, globalized economy. Radicalization serves as a kind of sociological trap that gives individuals few or no alternatives to satisfy their material and spiritual needs (Berman, 2009).

Radicalization arising from religious ideals and aspirations has become the focus in the recent past especially after the 9/11 terrorists attacks on the US (Aronson, 2013). Religious radicalization in this context relates to Islam and its interpretation. It dates as far back as the 18th and 19th Centuries to the school of thought introduced by Muhamad ibn Abd-al Wahhab who called for the rejection of predominantly traditional Islamic norms and advocated for puritanical and extremist interpretation of the tenets (Botha, 2013).

The Wahhabi movement gained ground especially after 1920 by establishing an "accepted" new ideology of Islam (ISCA, n.d). This movement also received a lot of support from wealthy individuals especially in the 1970s and with the discovery of oil in the Middle East (ICG, 2005). However, as the movement grew, it mutated and splintered into many other groups including extremists pursing radicalized beliefs (ISCA, n.d). While over the years Wahhabism resulted in radicalised elements

within Muslim societies, it is not until the late 1990s that they were seen to take up increasingly confrontational standpoints. They have lately attempted to impose their ideology in many regions around the world.

ISCA (n.d) argues that Wahhabism is also built on the concept of political enforcement of religious beliefs and does not allow for inter-religious tolerance. Unfortunately, this narrow ideology has appeared and flourished in Islam in contravention of key Islamic tenets. For example, the Holy Quran does acknowledge that there should be no compulsion in religion and that all people are free to practice any religion they like. Wahhabism advocates otherwise.

In modern societies, Wahhabism beliefs have provided the religious and ideological underpinnings that enable militant groups to take up arms against existing institutions in government or whenever they deem necessary. The strategy of Wahhabism extremist groups is to infiltrate mosques, Islamic teaching centers and charitable organizations from where they indoctrinate believers with their ideas and methods (ISCA, n.d). They are also accused of forcible imposition of their views on weak societies in the hope of conquering and establishing a base for further control (Okumu and Botha, 2007). Thus they justify their militant acts and illegal means of financing their cause by claiming to wage a '*jihad*' or holy war for the preservation of Islam. It is these acts of violence that have acquired the title terrorism and terrorism-related acts.

Terrorism

The definition of the term terrorism has proven problematic. However, the United Nations General Assembly since 1994 has condemned terrorist acts using the following description:

> *Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any way unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any nature that may be invoked to justify them (United Nations , 1994).*

Subsequent definitions have not yielded a universally acceptable version especially as regards the issue of self-determination and liberation movements. Hoffman (2006)

has identified three key aspects of all the definitions available, namely: acts of threat or violence; the communication of fear to an audience beyond the immediate victim; and political, economic or religious aims by the perpetrators.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 2012 defines a terrorist act as an act or threat of action which: involves the use of violence against a person; and endangers the life of a person other than the person committing the crime. Article 2 says the terrorist act should be one carried out with the aim of intimidating or causing fear amongst members of the public or a section of the public or intimidating or compelling the government or international organizations to do, or refrain from any act or destabilizing the religious, political, constitutional, economic or social institutions of a country or an international organization. In Kenya, terrorism has manifested itself in attacks by Somali-based militant group Al-Shabab, which is considered an Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group. It has also managed to recruit local citizens through radicalization of the youth in mosques to carry out attacks within the country.

Terrorism in Kenya: Change in Form and Mode

Kenya joined the ranks of countries susceptible to terror in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 owing to the fact that it had previously experienced attacks such as the 1980 Norfolk Hotel and 1998 United States Embassy bombings both in Nairobi. However, prior to the 2011 kidnappings of foreign tourists off her coast, Kenya considered herself a victim of what she defined as global terrorism pitying the West (alongside sympathizers) and Islamic militant groups in the Middle East (Botha, 2013).

As such, Kenya became a soft target due to a combination of geographic, regional, historical, political, economic and socio-cultural factors. These factors included the country's close ties with Israel and western countries, especially the US; the coast's geographic situation and strategic location relative to Europe, Asia, and neighbouring African countries; relatively long, porous and unmanned borders; unstable neighbouring countries, especially Somalia and Sudan; relatively open and multicultural society; and relatively good transport and communications infrastructure.

Terrorist activities were targeted at Westerners and their installations in Kenya. The 1980 Norfolk Hotel and 1998 US embassy bombings are clear examples as the former was attributed to the Palestine Liberation Movement (PLO) and the latter to Al-Qaeda. The response mechanisms therefore were targeted at surveillance and protection of these individuals and installations with increased assistance from Western countries. Unfortunately, the loss of lives and destruction of property was higher among the Kenyan population.

Beginning with the 2002 Kikambala bombings and subsequent attacks, an emerging pattern was noted. This pattern revolved around the form and mode of terrorist attacks where there was active involvement of Kenyan citizens both as attackers and as conduits for the attackers. For example, suspects of the Kikambala attack were Kenyans and included a Sudanese as the only foreigner. Moreover, the suspects lived and integrated with the communities of the coastal towns. As a result, some members of the local community easily identified with them to the extent of concealing their actions.

In 2007, a new pattern emerged this time in the form of the intended target being Kenyan installations. This brought to the fore a serious threat to security in the sense that the targets became ordinary citizens in their day-to-day activities sometimes assuming the face of religious intolerance. The Christian became the hunted and haunted by the Islamic jihadist. This pattern has continued up to date culminating in the most violent act in 2013 targeting the upmarket Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi and further followed by attacks on ordinary Kenyans in the very public and populated spaces this year. Towards the close of 2014, over 60 teachers and mine workers were killed in Mandera County in Northeastern Kenya by Al Shabaab in what appeared to be an act of religious cleansing.

Further to this is the changing face of the attacker. In previous incidents, the suspects have been Muslims of Somali and/or Arabic descent. However, the recent attacks have seen Kenyans from pre-dominantly non-Muslim communities in the urban and semi-urban areas conducting the attacks.

For example the attacks on Nairobi's Thika Road in May on commuter buses resulting in three fatalities and sixty four people injured, is reported to have been executed by Kenyan nationals (Maina, 2014). The perpetrators appeared to be new recruits into the Muslim faith following recruitment by radical Muslim preachers (Aronson, 2013).

The Muslim Youth Center (MYC) previously referred to as Al Hijra among other mosques has been accused of radicalizing Kenyan youth and subsequent recruitment into Al-Shabab. Currently, it is estimated that there are about 600 Kenyans in the Somali Al-Shabaab cell of which a good number belong to the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya among other communities (ICG, 2012). At the urging of Al Shabaab, an increasing number of terrorist attacks in Kenya has been carried out by locals many of whom are recent converts to Islam.

This group of militants is referred to as the "Kenyan Mujahideen" by the Al Shabaab core members. They constitute typically young and overzealous youth, with poverty making them easy targets for the outfit's recruitment activities. A study carried out by the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) argues that the changing form and mode of terrorism in Kenya indicates that Al-Shabaab is physically present and active in Kenya but in a more assiduous form thereby not easy to detect and at the same time likely to cause more harm (Botha, 2013).

In the case of Mombasa, while terrorism can be traced as far back as 2002 with the Kikambala hotel bombing, domestic actions have become more heightened in the past. Between March and July 2014, there has been either attacks directed at government facilities or what are considered immigrant communities. For instance, on 14 March 2014, two terrorists were arrested while driving a car carrying two improvised bombs. On 3 May 2014, there were twin terrorist attacks that killed three people. The most destructive acts were those carried out on 16 June 2014, where at least 48 people were killed when suspected Al Shabaab militants from Somalia stormed into government installations, hotels and businesses in Mpeketoni, a satellite settlement of Lamu city in the north coast.

There has been direct confrontation and altercation between government forces and Muslim youth following the assassinations of radical Muslim clerics and businessmen

as well as the closure of mosques deemed to be involved in youth radicalization and extremist activities. Sakina mosque in the Majengo area of Mombasa was the scene of violent altercations between police and radical youths who had taken over and even placed a flag bearing Al Shabaab signature (Kithure and Bosire, 2014). Moreover, there has been removal of moderate *Imams* (Islamic religious leaders) such as the *Imam* and caretaker committee of the Masjid Sakina who was violently evicted owing to what was termed as their moderate view and dalliance with the enemy namely the government and Christian population. The Imam was later assassinated owing to his open opposition to extremist views (Kithure and Bosire, 2014). It is also worth noting that at the time of his death, he held the position of Chairman of the Council of Imams and Preachers in Kenya and this resulted in tensions among the different Muslim sects (Mohamed, 2014).

This gives a pointer to the fact that youth radicalization and terrorism in the coastal town is alive with direct implications for national security. Some of the areas of the Coastal towns affected by radicalization and violent extremism include: Mombasa (Kisauni, Mvita, Likon); Kwale (Matuga); Kilifi (Kikambala); Malindi (Malindi town); and Lamu (Lamu Island, Faza and Kiunga) (Vittori, Bremer, and Vittori, 2009). This has created a national problem which requires a different set of responses that will address the root causes of radicalisation of youth in Kenya. These should be fed to the existing peacebuilding efforts in order to enhance the country's capacity for building sustainable peace and development.

Youth Radicalization in Kenya

History of Radicalization

Kenya is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multicultural society that is predominantly African. The Muslim community that accounts for roughly thirty percent of the population is drawn from the whole spectrum of Kenyan society but mainly constitutes communities of Somali and Arabic Descent found primarily in the North Eastern and Coastal areas respectively. The larger part of the Muslim population is young with sixty five percent of its members being between the ages of 18 and 35. The coastal youth also form 9 percent of the total youth population in Kenya (Njonjo, 2010).

The Islamic radicalization that is seen in many Muslim societies has its roots in the revivalists' movements that emerged in the 1950s (ICG, 2005). Kenyan Muslims are no exception as due to globalization and ease of communication they have become more observant and a portion has become radicalized. According to the 2009 census, the Kenyan Muslim community is about 3.3 million of the country's population of 38.6 million. Some sections of it have been exposed to various strains of radical Islamism in the last four decades, much of it based on an amalgam of Salafi theologies, the most popular being Wahhabism (Botha, 2013). Salafi radicalization was gradual and unfolded in three distinct phases, each complementing the one before.

The first wave occurred in the late 1970s and coincided with Saudi Arabia's emergence as an oil power keen to export its brand of Islam. It was essentially theological and driven by an unstated proselytising agenda. The aim was to subvert the traditional Shaf'i *mazhab* (sect) and related Sufi orders and convert their adherents to Wahhabism (ICG, 2012). The dissemination of Salafi ideas and values had a lasting impact on the community. Since the conservative Muslims resent the dominance of Western-style entertainment and consumerism, the Salafi quest for doctrinal purity and authenticity ended up fomenting discontent with modernity and the secular state (Botha, 2013). As such, the Muslim community grew more insular, puritanical and conservative. Sectarian animosities escalated and traditional support for moderation and coexistence waned (ICG, 2012).

The second wave started in earnest in the early 1980s. It was overtly political, rested on the Salafi creed and unfolded against the backdrop of Iran's Islamic revolution. Iran did strive to export its brand of radicalism to Kenya which has a tiny Asian Shia community that has traditionally stayed out of politics (ICG, 2012). The targets were communities in Nairobi and Mombasa. However, the community showed no signs of radicalization despite close links with Iran and thus these petered off although it triggered serious sectarian tensions with the Wahhabi groups. The Jamia Mosque in Nairobi was the battleground.

The political message of the new generation of Salafi radicalisms was simple but compelling: pure and authentic life was impossible under a secular state, not least because it did not allow Muslims to live in conformity with Islamic law – Sharia (ICG, 2012). Therefore according to the Salafists, Muslim minorities had no business seeking accommodation with the state, the only options were to emigrate- as the Prophet Muhammed did or struggle with separatism.

The third stage unfolded in the 1990s, entirely driven by a new generation of Salafi Jihadi militants and groups. This added a deeply militant layer on top of small but influential radicalised institutions based on a distinct puritanical theology and potent political narrative (ICG, 2012; Botha, 2013). The Jihadists neither invented a new language nor a new theology but simply built on the solid foundation established by their predecessors. The novelty of their world view and discourse lay in the elevation of jihad to a supreme act of faith and promotion of the cult of martyrdom as a justification for terrorism (ICG, 2012).

The Islamic community referred to as the *umma* in this case had failed because it had been co-opted by the unbelievers – *kaffir (*Moshe, 2007). They also argued that the community was fragmented and sought to achieve its aim through secular methods. Thus jihad was meant to emancipate the *umma* in preparation for the day of reckoning as their problems were common irrespective of where the Muslims were located around the world. This war had to be waged simultaneously globally and locally and as such there was need to recruit foot soldiers to undertake these activities (Moshe, 2007). The chief proponent of this violent millenarian message was al-Qaeda. By the early 1990s, this group had forged links with a number of groups in the Horn of Africa, principally the al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI), an armed

Islamist movement that waged a violent campaign in south-western Somalia until militarily defeated in the mid-1990s by Ethiopia (Sage, 2001; ICG, 2002). This group was both a product of the radicalisation process and a radicalising agent in its own right. However, military defeat did not mean the demise of its extremist ideology.

This group re-emerged with more virulence, first as the Union of Islamic Courts and later Al- Shabaab (ICG, 2005; Moshe, 2007). Members of the group were (and still are) scattered all over the Somali-speaking Horn of Africa, Kenya included, and beyond. They blended with the communities and even acquired political and business influence. This character points to the sophistication and resilience of the group aided by societal collusion. This by extension also provides an understanding of the assiduous nature of the group as well as the difficulty of totally eradicating the group with the use of military counter-terrorism measures alone.

It is also worth noting that AIAI was not a chance occurrence but rather a deliberate product of radicalization (ICG, 2012). It therefore maintained a formidable clandestine support network in North Eastern Province throughout the 1990s and beyond. It actively recruited jihadists, raised funds and kept a low-level presence along the border districts of Mandera, Wajir and Garissa. The group also infiltrated the influential Wahhabi clerical establishment that controlled most mosques in Kenya thereby resulting in radicalized teachings. They also gained control of charities and funnelled Islamic tax known as *zakat* to support its activities and start commercial ventures for its members. Through this, the group radicalised and recruited Kenyan Somalis mainly in North Eastern province and Eastleigh in Nairobi.

While at the beginning the group did not seem to have an inclination towards radicalizing other Muslims, it did seek to cultivate ties with the Kenyan Coastal region (ICG, 2012). It therefore established links with an al-Qaeda active cell along the East African Coast that attacked the U.S embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-salaam in 1998. Thus by the time of the Kikambala bombings in 2002, signs of active local terrorist groups were quite evident along the coastal region. Owing to increased crackdown on mosques and madrassas in North Eastern province and Nairobi's Eastleigh's area, there was a shift to other areas as sources of new recruits. According to the United Nations Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea there

was a shift of focus to coastal regions of Kenya and Tanzania targeting Muslims (UNSC, 2011). The report noted that there was evidence to suggest that attacks in North Eastern province were joint operations between Kenyan Swahili and Somali jihadists. The Swahili jihadi members were able to evade security by posing as locals and relied on outdated profiling assumption by Kenyan security agencies that all Al-Shabaab members were Somali-looking (ICG, 2005). There was also evidence that some of the Swahili Al-Shabaab did indeed return to the Coast province and there could be a possibility that the recent terror attacks could be attributed to this group (ICG, 2012).

There has also been extensive use of the media and missionaries to disseminate political ideas alongside Islamic teachings (ICG, 2012). The most common are Radio Iqra and Rehema. Radio Iqra in particular has been accused of giving too much airtime to radical Tabligh preachers from Tanzania. The station is based in Nairobi and began a decade ago but steered clear of radical Islamic teachings as the owner then was a cabinet minister in the Kibaki administration. However, after his passing on, the station became distinctly sectarian giving the Salafi preachers exclusive coverage. The extreme views in such stations ignited tensions among Christians and Muslims in Kenya especially at the coast region. The use of electronic media has proven critical in the radicalization of youth in the region. Some mosques also took to inviting radical preachers. This practice however has been controversial. For example in 2010, riots erupted in Nairobi as radical young Muslims protested the deportation of a radical Jamaican cleric. This caused violence in the Central Business District and some Christian onlookers joined the police in repulsing the protesters. The riots led to the death of five people and injury of four police officers.

Thus the coastal region has experienced radicalization of some of its Muslim members over the years and the effects are now manifesting themselves in the form of terrorist-related conflicts. As such there is need to understand the reasons behind the allure of the youth to radicalization and membership into violent extremist organizations such as Al Shabaab in the Coastal regions of Kenya. Violent extremist groups have a way of utilizing existing grievances within a state to lure members into carrying out terrorist activities.

Drivers of Youth Radicalization in Kenya

Violent extremist organizations such as Al Shabaab cannot sustain themselves without young recruits. As such, the groups are keen observers of the challenges facing young people in Kenya. They then use these vulnerabilities to sell their "cause" for which the youth freely give in to, identify with and are ready to die for. In this case, recruiters ensure that the strategies are geared towards convincing the youth to feel they are doing the right thing rather than coercing them.

This implies the existence of factors that may be described as drivers of radicalization that make recruitment of the youth into these groups appealing and easier. Francis (2012), using categories identified by other authors categorizes drivers of youth radicalization as illustrated in table 1 below:

Table 1: Categories of Drivers of Youth Radicalization

Category	Sub-category		Examples
Situational	Pre-conditions	Enabling	Technological development within modernity e.g. internet
		Motivating	Racial and religious discrimination Economic and social exclusion
	Precipitant		Foreign policy e.g. the Iraq War
Strategic	Short Term		Defeat of Western/ modernity/ morality
	Long Term		Attention for aims, fear etc
Ideological			Non-negotiable beliefs about what is good for society
Individual			Personal dispositions and psychological conditions (although these have been disregarded over time)

In the context of the Coastal regions of Kenya these categories are relevant as drivers of youth radicalization and understanding each factor would provide the framework for determining effective strategies that can be employed in addressing the problem. The factors have not been discussed in any order of priority as the aim is to come up with a multifaceted approach towards the problem.

Pre-conditions

Enabling Factors

While affecting Kenya as a whole, modernization in the context of radicalisation and extremist violence should be given due consideration when it comes to transport and information, communication and technology (ICT) sectors. Infrastructure in this sector has improved over the years thereby reducing the cost of doing business. The most notable growth has been reported in the new ICT (internet, mobile phone, computers) compared with traditional (television, radio, newspapers) sector. This is evidenced in the low internet and phone calling rates per minute as well as increased penetration. As at December 2013, internet penetration in Kenya as a percentage of total population stood at 47.3 percent, way above Africa's average of 21.3 percent (CAK, 2014). Internet access is also fairly widespread in all cities and towns. The rates are also typically low at one shilling (0.06 dollar cents) per minute. The number of Facebook users, the most common social medium, is at 4.8 percent of the total population. Mobile phone penetration stood at 80 percent as at June 2014 (CAK, 2014). It is also worth noting that most of the phones are internet-enabled meaning that internet penetration can be assumed to be a high as the number of phone subscribers in Kenya.

In modern societies, this is a good sign as it means accessibility to information and contact among individuals has increased thereby easing the modalities of working. In tandem with this is the fact that the youth are more agile and adaptable in the use of ICT. As such, they are the main users of the new ICT mainly for the purpose of entertainment through games, movies, music downloads as well as knowledge-seeking and socializing (Njonjo, 2010). According to Njonjo, the use of internet for information access ranks 57%, followed by communication through email and social networks such as Facebook at 39%, and entertainment especially games and music downloads at 2%.

While this points to good progress, it aso portends a danger as there lurks cyber crime and terrorism targeting especially vulnerable groups such as children and young people. Internet connectivity is widespread and it is difficult to effectively police cyber-space thus leaving the young to have access to all kinds of information. For example, information on simple ways of making improvised explosive devices using

simple chemicals and their availability is provided on the internet. Security agents have for a long time dealt with traditional crimes which involve the apprehension of actual suspects but new forms of crime over cyberspace have proven a challenge. Thus cyber-terrorists and radical preachers have found space where they can further their extremist views with which the youth readily identify. Al Shabaab indeed does operate a website through which they transmit hate messages as well as announce their conquests. For example, following the bus attacks on Thika Road in Nairobi, there was extensive distribution of the scenes from the blast site on the whatsapp mobile phone platform. This had the effect of extending fear among the targeted groups as well as providing a platform for radicalzed youth to celebrate their actions.

In addition, Al-Shabaab has used the strategy of propaganda and alternative media in fueling radicalization as well as passing important messages across diverse groups of people. At its core, it has a sophisticated and diverse communication strategy aimed at influencing Muslims all over the world (Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher, and Sheehan, 2012). The group uses internet platforms such as twitter and digital video to project an image of itself as an effective and united force carrying out the will of God by implementing *Sharia* and fighting the enemies of Islam. This strategy was seen to be used extensively in Kenya during the Westgate Mall attack when Al-Shabaab took responsibility of the attack. Uniquely, the digital videos appearing in Youtube had militants who were well versed with the national language, Kiswahili, a pointer to how the group understands and preys on the intended recruitment targets.

Motivating Factors

Motivating factors relate to racial and religious discrimination as well economic and social exclusion of the coastal people and region. To understand the relevance of these factors it would be pertinent to understand the historical background of the coastal region especially from cultural and historical perspectives. These have had an influence on the political and socio-economic characteristics of the coastal regions and its peoples. The Arab settlers who arrived as early as the 15th century intermarried with the local Bantu at the time thus creating the concept of a Swahili person (Vittori, et. al, 2009). Over the years, Swahili became an identity as well as a language. The Portuguese and British colonists disregarded the Swahili population

which had grown substantially but neither fitted in the category of the local (Bantu) or European extractions (Prestholdt, 2011). Thus, during the colonial period, the group was excluded from political and social life as they were considered irrelevant. Prestholdt (2011) further argues that the Swahili who were mainly Muslims felt they occupied an awkward position as they were recognized neither as African nor non-native.

The result was that the community became more insulated from the larger Christian society and continued to face discrimination. However, the community also became cohesive and identified with the problems they were facing as a group. At independence, Kenya adopted the British system of government by which the country had been subdivided into provinces led by what were considered tribal kings/chiefs. However, this was not a smooth transition as two groups opposed the supposedly new civic order at independence (Ngunyi and Katumanga, 2012). These included the Mwambao Separatist Movement (MSM) which was contesting the allocation of the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip to Kenya by the colonial administration and the Somali secessionist movement called *Shifta*. Of interest is the fact that the Mwambao United Front, the military wing of MSM, acceded to the demands of a unitary state at independence and subsequently fizzled from the limelight and became inactive. However, its members continued to exist with their ideology and has re-emerged as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) with its clarion call of *Pwani si Kenya* which literally means 'the Coast is not part of Kenya'.

The alienation of Muslims continued long after independence and into the entry of multiparty politics. In 1992, the Muslims did attempt to form a party, the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) which was popular among young Muslims in the Coastal region. However, the party was accused by the regime at the time of promoting Islamic fundamentalism and was declared an illegal entity (Prestholdt, 2011). Of note is the fact that the activities of the IPK and Islam were considered a threat to Kenya's national security (Aronson, 2013). While the party fizzled out due to government crackdown, it created fertile ground for radicalization and extremism among the Muslim community. This also fostered cohesiveness of the group as the members continued to dialogue among themselves on the issues facing them due to discrimination and marginalization.

Marginalization happened mainly in terms of socio-economic development. Relative economic deprivation has long been the subject of local dissent, dissatisfaction and opposition to the national government (Mghanga, 2010). The average incidence of poverty in the Coastal region is estimated at 62% with the national average at 38% as at 2007 (KNBS, 2007). Further, poverty in some pockets of the cities at the Coast such as Mombasa average 70%. The level of economic disparity is perceived as being particularly acute among the regions with a large concentration of Muslims who feel increasingly marginalized by broken promises of government commitment to equitable development in the region (Mghanga, 2010).

Overall, Kenya experiences high levels of unemployment, 40% as at December 2012 (World Bank , 2012). Youth unemployment at the coastal region stands at 70% of the total youth population. This high rate of unemployment is attributed to the fact that the minimal activities the youth carry out are not sufficient to afford them a decent life or provide for the utilization of their full potential (Njonjo, 2010). Moreover, there has been animosity arising from the influx of migrant communities (*wabara)* who ventured into the coastal regions in the 1960s and 70s to capitalize on the economic opportunities available especially land resettlement schemes (Ngunyi and Katumanga, 2012). The result of this unequal development has been the existence of weak infrastructures, collapse of industries, deep mistrust between government/ policy and the communities and high levels of corruption.

Such grievances have led to formation of armed militia groups at the Coast such as *Mulungunipa* and its political wing the MRC, and the Kaya Bombo Raiders. These are the most prominent in the coastal region but there exist others such as the Coast Housing Land Network more known for its land rights lobbying activities than armed activity (Ngunyi and Katumanga, 2012). The most notable is MUHURI which is an acronym for Muslims for Human Rights.

The existence of such groups and grievances have a direct link to crime and insecurity in the sense that there exists a large young population at the Coast that is idle and socio-economically frustrated. Such individuals and groups have a greater propensity to engage in behavior that is likely to create insecurity. Njonjo (2010) argues that crime is strongly associated with young people as 53% of crime incidences in Kenya have been committed by persons between the ages of 16-24

years of which 89% are by males. Further, radical organizations have taken it upon themselves to understand and prey upon a combination of political realities, socio-economic factors and individual characteristics that render the youth vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremist organizations (Berman, 2009).

Al-Shabaab maintains strong relations with religious institutions and charitable organizations that pay those willing to be recruited into jihadsim. By extension, this has also led to an increase in international crimes such as piracy, drug trafficking and wildlife poaching to enable funding for youth radicalization and terrorism activities. Since the 1970s, extremist Islamic groups have been suspected of funding the communities at the Coast region through madrasas, health clinics, children's orphanages, and vocational training institutes. For instance, the youth would study for free from primary through to secondary and stand a chance of receiving university scholarship to study in Saudi or Pakistani Islamic universities (ICG, 2012). Many of the recipients of this education were from cash-strapped families who would have dropped out of the mainstream state-run schools. The brighter ones would be sent to Wahhabi institutions of higher learning such as the Kisauni Islamic Center in Mombasa. To such a group of the youth, this provided a route to gainful jobs and respectability, something which the state had ostensibly failed to do.

Precipitant Factors

Counter-terrorism Measures

The effectiveness of counter-terrorism initiatives depends largely on the level of cooperation between government forces and local communities. When explaining the influence of counter-terrorism strategies on conditions that are conducive to terrorism, former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, stated that past cases show that governments that resorted to excessive use of force and indiscriminate repression when countering terrorism risk strengthening the support base for terrorists among the general population. He further noted that such measures further invited counter-violence, undermined the legitimacy of counter-terrorism measures and played into the hands of terrorists. Strategies such as mass arrests and racial profiling among others seemed to produce different results at different times. Military and police-led operations achieve different results depending on the situation. The animosity

displayed during the arrests made in a Mombasa mosque illustrated that dealing with difficult security situations could further fuel attacks and attract more youth into radicalization. These and related conditions have made it possible for terrorism to find a home in Kenya thereby exacerbating the security situation. Since it is the role of government to secure her people, the challenge therefore lies with the ability to strengthen the peacebuilding processes in place and ensuring that the necessary changes are undertaken to deal with the emerging threat of terrorism.

Foreign Policy

Kenya's foreign policy has mainly been anchored on the principle of non-alignment arising out of the cold war period (GOK, 2009). However, in practice Kenya has been considered more aligned to the West and its principles. In this case, Kenya is considered a satellite of Western capitalism and culture since it is predominantly Christian. As such, responses to global terrorism have been defined through the Western prism.

For instance, during the 1976 Entebbe raid, Kenya provided a refuelling and stopover base for Israeli jets to Uganda. This in turn attracted a backlash from the PLO in 1980 with the bombing of the Norfolk hotel. As such the radicalization process in the 1970s would greatly associate with the Palestinian cause where any country that acted contrary was considered an enemy. In 1999, Kenya was again seen to lean towards the West with the Abdulla Ocalan debacle. Ocalan had been termed a terrorist following the formation of the Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey in the 1990s. Greece, in support of the group, attempted to find a safe haven for Ocalan but he was captured in Nairobi under the auspices of the Greek embassy (Weiner, 1999). The Kurds in retaliation protested in Kenyan embassies around the world such as France and Bonn.

Kenya has also been seen to actively support Western efforts to identify, arrest and detain suspected terrorists especially after the fall of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia in 2006 (Ploch, 2010). For example, two Iranian terror suspects were arrested and detained in Kenya since September 2014 (Shimanyalla, 2014).

The decision in October 2011 to deploy thousands of troops in Somalia's Jubba valley to fight Al-Shabaab is also an act that has created tensions between the

two countries (Ghazzali, 2011). Since independence, Kenya adopted a policy of non-interference but the repeated incursions by Al-Shabaab militants challenged the principle. Springing from the premise of affront to her territorial integrity and sovereignty, Kenya launched an operation dubbed *'Linda Nchi'* (Protect the Country) (Botha, 2013). This policy initiative has provided ammunition for further radicalization and terrorism as evident with pronouncements by Al-Shabaab in the media following attacks in Kenya.

Such an approach is interpreted as opposition to Islam, and Muslim populations and countries around the world have used this to rally support and solidarity. Subsequently, radical groups have argued that such military operations are an affront to Islam and that all those who profess the faith wherever they are should show their support as well take any necessary action.

Strategic Factors

Strategic factors relate to the actions and activities a group takes to achieve its goals in the short and long term. For example, in 2003, over a million people are reported to have marched against the United Kingdom's involvement in the Iraq war, an entirely peaceful response to a situational precipitant factor (Francis, 2012). Francis further notes that the action was peaceful and represented the strategic aim of the anti-war movement. In the short term, it sought to make a clear statement of dissatisfaction against UK policy, whilst in the long term seeking to stop any further UK involvement in the war against Iraq.

It is worth noting that while radicalized groups and individuals have not always resorted to violence, current actions by violent extremist organizations (VOEs) such as Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been violent. For example in the short term, actions such as 9/11 may have motivated and emboldened sympathizers while also striking terror. In the long term the main aim was the removal of US military forces from Saudi Arabia (Kepel and Melelli, 2008). These aims were then projected through the media especially the alternative media to create the impression of "us against them".

In the short term, radicalized groups at the Coastal region appear to have sought sympathy as well as attention of the state. This is exemplified by pronouncements by radical preachers to the effect that terrorist activities in Kenya such as the Westgate

Mall case were deserved. There has also been the claim of a connection between the terrorist actions and the KDF intervention in Somalia. However, militant groups like MRC deny any connection with Al Shabaab thereby indicating that there could be a mesh of the aims pursued by different groups. Thus, while the current terrorist attacks are linked to regional dynamics and influence by global Islamic radical groups, there could exist a possibility that local dynamics may also be at play parallel to what is already known.

Ideological Factors

Radical Islamic ideology in Kenya originates from Somalia as noted in the history of radicalization. This is attributed to lack of border security as well as corruption as radical preachers found their way into Kenya (Aronson, 2013). However, there have also been Kenyan-born radical preachers but mainly trained in the Middle East and other Muslim countries (Shinn, 2004). The main message has been anti-Western and anti-Kenyan views.

In Kenya, there has been a distinct difference between those holding theologically conservative views and those willing to mobilize (Aronson, 2013). Over the years, such differences were less visible and most of the terrorist acts were directed by foreigners. This is exemplified by the case of the MYC in Mombasa which was not inherently a violent or militant organization but held theologically conservative views nonetheless. However, it evolved to become *al-Hijra* as the conservative Muslims were overshadowed by radicalized Kenyans with a desire to mobilize (Mogire and Agade, 2011). As such, Kenya can be said to have both radicalized terrorists and theologically conservative Muslims with the former made up mainly of foreign nationals and the latter consisting of Swahili Muslims.

The violent actions of the Swahili Muslims may be limited owing to the fact that IPK, originally an active party at the Coast, fizzled out due to government reactions as it was amenable to Islamic fundamentalism. Further, there exists over 200 mosques in the coastal region yet until now only about five can be said to have been administered by the radical or extremist groups (Rosenau, 2005). Thus, despite the fact that the Swahili Muslims may have considered themselves second class citizens and have an undeniable hatred for the political system and the West, they have actually rejected

the radicalizaton movement at the Coast (Vittori et al, 2009). As noted earlier, there has been assassination of Imams considered to be against radicalism and the fact that three mosques were taken over in a hostile manner by radicalised youth.

In this regard, there exists a section of extremist groups or individuals working parallel to the existing and recognized Islamic religious structures to further the Wahhabi ideologies. There have been several individuals and institutions accused of fuelling radicalization and terrorism at the Coast and working to undermine the existing religious structures (Kithure and Bosire, 2014).

Ideological factors lay in the Wahhabi influence out of which developed the Salafist doctrine that advocates for Muslim brotherhood. This was used primarily to rally young Muslims around the world to the belief that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were an affront to Islam. By using religious charitable organizations, the Salafist doctrine easily spread, exploiting socio-economic factors such as poverty and unemployment, corruption and perceived government subservience to US demands. It is worth noting that charitable organizations offer a range of services including health and education and are open to all irrespective of religious affiliation. This provides an entry point for the recruitment of Muslims and non-Muslims who incidentally have nothing to lose thereby being lethal foot soldiers.

Individual Factors

Individuals have their own internal or personal interpretations of their external environment. This is influenced by psychological considerations that affect one's political socialization. The socialization process may be affected by factors such as internet, prisons, mosques, churches, the role of family and friendship ties. The decision of whether or not to join a terrorist group will eventually depend on the individual and extent to which they can exercise rationality. By using persuasive means, extremist groups especially in mosques, are likely to influence one's decision. The fact that the family fabric has been eroded over time creates a situation where the youth have no one to look up to except vagabonds and the internet.

As such, radicalization becomes fundamentally an individual affair after exposure to various stimuli. It is also a long held belief that young people all over the world seek a sense of purpose and meaning in their lives. For men, there is a longing for

adventure, glory and heroic or iconic status, and each one seeks outlets that enable them break convention. When the existing and normal frameworks fail to provide for their fulfilment, then they are likely to fall prey to individuals and groups with ill intentions. In the context of terrorism, violent extremist groups are aware of young people's quest for meaning and therefore construct world views that satisfy youth desires for self-actualization and fulfillment. Jihadi messages like the provision of seven virgins if one dies fulfilling the word of the prophet thus resonates well with young recruits.

When it comes to individuals, it is necessary to understand the environment which provides initial contact for the youth. In their study, Ngunyi and Katumanga (2012), argue that the presence of a 'base' is the framework within which militant groups become embedded in the community. In this context, they argue that the base becomes the irreducible minimum for militancy, sustenance and reproduction. They define the base as the gathering of young people in a specific space, usually around an economic activity like a barber shop, a pub, pool table spot or a car wash joint. The study highlights several characteristics of the base to include: specific membership, a code of conduct and mentoring programmes; presence of underwriter/patron; and the incubator through which crime is birthed.

Ngunyi and Katumanga (2012), point out that the base is not always a place for negative innovations but collective social consciousness amongst the youth. This is expressed through peer-to-peer mentoring, imitation, admiration, grooming and sharing of experiences. The study identifies two base contexts: captured and freehold base. The former is mainly ethnic and homogeneous in its interests. The ethnic character is also replaced by criminal specialization. On the other hand, freehold base is mainly heterogeneous in interest and multi-ethnic in character. Of concern here is the captured base which has a stream of consciousness either informed by ethnicity, religion or history. It also uses active recruitment and any member who betrays the social code of the base is expelled and may even be killed.

With such a context, personal factors come into play as the youth become exposed to different groups and by the time they make a deliberate choice to belong to one, it might not be possible to backtrack as they would have greatly interacted with the process and could also have been benefiting from the process. Thus, as

noted earlier, Islamic radicalization was connected with certain mosques and Islamic institutions and could be equated with the captured base. However, since the onset of government crackdown and surveillance of institutions considered radical, some hostile activities have diminished. However, the recent take-over of Masjid Swafaa mosque revealed that there exists other bases in which the activities of militant groups continue to be propagated.

National Capacities and Opportunities to Address Youth Radicalization

National Capacity

The capacity to address youth radicalization in Kenya has been subsumed within the realm of terrorism and terrorism-related activities. In this context, response to terrorism has revolved around counter and anti-terrorism measures. As standard UN lexicon in combating terrorism, the two terms are different when considered from a functional point of view (Stepanova, 2003). Counter-terrorism measures refer to security approaches or tasks performed by the security component of a national or international authority. As such they are offensive or active measures. On the other hand, anti-terrorism measures refer to the use of political, legal, economic, civil society and other peace-building instruments for the purposes of both countering and preventing terrorism. They are thus referred to as defensive or passive strategies. This implies that a comprehensive response will be aimed at not only direct confrontation on terrorists but also creating mechanisms of preventing further terrorist attacks.

The changing form and mode of terrorism has in effect challenged the manner in which Kenya responds. As noted earlier, counter-terrorism activities were mainly Western-driven and the Kenyan government utilized diplomacy, military, information/intelligence, law enforcement, legislation and financial control mechanisms to deal with both the 1998 and 2002 bombings. However, from 2007, terrorist activities intensified and continued to threaten Kenya's security. This led to the Kenya Defence Forces incursion into Somalia in October 2011 thus marking a significant shift in Kenya's response to terrorism and terrorism-related activities. The objective was to safeguard Kenya's national strategic interest, a departure from previous adherence to the principle of non-intervention.

Kenya's Vision 2030 outlined an ambitious growth trajectory but insecurity arising from terrorism was seen as a hindrance under the Kibaki regime. Thus, it was only prudent to ensure that there was stability in areas bordering Kenya such as Somalia

that were sources of insecurity. Botha (2013) argues that the continued infiltration of Al-Shabaab resulting in youth radicalization would eventually create internal conflict if not addressed. Therefore, Kenya had no option but to respond the way it did. This should be viewed against the entry into the picture of the MRC although it was formed to address entirely different sets of problems by the Coastal peoples.

This incursion received support from the international community resulting in the inclusion of Kenya into the African Union Peacekeeping Force in Somalia (AMISOM). It also carried with it an element of national ownership as Kenya attempted to play an active role in resolving security issues in and around her. Besides military action, intense diplomacy, information, intelligence, law enforcement, legislation and financial control measures were undertaken. This resulted in plugging the holes which terrorists utilized to further finance, plan, recruit, and conduct their activities. Despite these offensive measures, the country continues to experience attacks that continue to threaten national security. The question therefore that arises is whether the government is using the right set of responses and has the necessary national capacities to undertake these responses. Kenya faces a myriad of challenges as regards response to terrorism. These include: lack of coordination on the ground; provision of rapid and preventive responses; ethnicization of the warning-response chain; lack of capacities at the national level; lack of political and institutional support; and poor performance measurement and coordination with other institutions.

Opportunities to Address Youth Radicalization

For Kenya to come up with effective counter radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies, there is need to better understand the concept of radicalization. In addition, it is necessary to appreciate the fact that the concepts of radicalization and terrorism do not necessary refer to the same thing but rather the fact the one may lead to the other. As such, since the current measures aim at dealing with countering terrorism, they may result in further exacerbating radicalization. This in turn implies that there exists a latent threat as radicalised groups still possess the capacity to regroup and resume their militant activities whenever an opportunity presents itself.

For Kenya to effectively deal with radicalization, it will require an understanding of the factors that fuel it. As explained earlier, radicalization finds a place in Kenya owing

to several internal factors namely: situational, strategic, ideological and individual factors. These factors have taken root over a period of time and thus cannot just be wished away. This implies therefore that the process of countering radicalization or de-radicalization is a long term one that requires tact and patience. This is due to the fact that radicalization is hinged upon the future of Islam and Muslim societies and thus is not something that can be disregarded.

It also touches upon the relationship between Muslims and people of other faiths in society and as such needs to be given due consideration. This relates to the creation of some sort of ownership as it will ensure that there will be wider support for counter radicalization measures. The measures undertaken by the government should be driven from the grassroots level where especially there is extensive involvement of the moderate Islamic faithful. Support from other institutions such as international organizations should be more discreet and at the periphery so as to reduce the tensions arising especially between the Islamic extremists and the West.

There exist a number of opportunities to remedy the effects of radicalization in Kenya. First is the madrasas. Kenya's madrasas have been dominated by the well resourced Wahhabi charities and foundations since the 1970s and are located in virtually every urban center. For example, Eastleigh is known to have the most madrasas per square kilometre. However, most of the madrasas are currently cash-strapped and scholarships have diminished over the years (ICG, 2012). This is attributed to the extensive anti-terrorism measures that have plugged the holes to financing schemes by militant groups such as illegal trade.

This has further been compounded by the fact that Kenya has attempted to provide free primary and secondary education thereby increasing the number of student enrolment especially in marginalized areas of the Coast and North Eastern provinces. However, Muslim students end up attending both the madrasas and the secular public schooling system. The problem does not stem from attending both sets of institutions but rather from the conflicting doctrines as the madrasas still apply the Salafi doctrine. To this extent therefore, there is need to identify how the existing madrasa system can be harmonised with the existing public school system to foster teachings that may reduce radicalization in the long term.

The second opportunity is madrasa reforms owing to the fact that a majority of the moderate Muslims feel the time is ripe for these (ICG, 2012). The problem that arises however is lack of any draft strategy as the issue is deeply divisive. Conservative Muslims view the idea as largely driven by the West. The US has in recent years attempted to support the reforms in the Coast region and this has further galvanised the resolve of the hardliners towards resistance (ICG, 2012). The idea of reform is rather tricky for the government owing to the sectarian divisions and the continued counter-terrorism policies that largely focus on security. Moreover, since the current madrasas rely on the Salafi doctrine, it would be tantamount to suggesting that there are flaws with what the Muslims have believed in for so many years.

While this is a difficult path, lessons can be drawn from the modestly encouraging steps towards reform as applied in a few countries such as South East Asia. These include bringing the madrasas under the ambit of the education ministry, requiring registration and enrolment information, setting academic standards that can be monitored and evaluated, and instituting a module of non-religious courses that would justify supervisory visits. In essence, the idea is to bring about modernisation and mainstreaming of the traditional madrasa pedagogy with the secular schooling to which many other faith communities in Kenya have subscribed.

The third opportunity lies with leadership of the Muslim community (ICG, 2012). The Muslim community suffers from sectarian and regional divisions, inability to confront major challenges like radicalization, and mounting tensions with other major faith groups. These inadequacies are largely blamed on the lack of legitimate leadership though not necessarily due to their lack of physical presence (ICG, 2012; Botha, 2013). The leadership is seen as elitist and self-serving and their integrity tied to links with the political/government regimes or foreign interests.

This has been extensively exploited by radical groups to the extent of attempting to overthrow the Muslim leadership. At the center of this backlash has been the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) whose status as the pre-eminent Kenyan Muslim body is increasingly contested. This has especially been exploited during the government's counter-terrorism strategies where SUPKEM has not provided sufficient direction owing to its close ties with Kenyan political parties and politics. For that reason, there has been room for manoeuvre by other groups and

one can only speculate that some leadership would emerge one day although it is unknown what interests that leadership would serve. In the context of this paper, such a leadership is one that would work towards reduced radicalization.

Fourthly is the Office of the Chief Kadhi which has existed since the colonial days as an official arm of the judiciary. The opportunity here is that through extensive lobbying and goodwill from political leaders, the institution was entrenched in the Constitution (GoK, 2010). This in itself was a great achievement for Muslims although it was vehemently rejected by the Christian community who are more than 80% of the Kenyan population. This means there was extensive goodwill by the government and other stakeholders to allow for the existence of Muslim institutions without subsuming them into the overall secular state institutions. This is an opportunity for the government to set aside funding for the moderates through such institutions to enable them to carry out de-radicalization programmes.

Such an opportunity provides the Muslim community with the latitude to demand for more concessions within the mainstream society rather than opt for secession as was fronted by the MRC. It also provides the government with an opportunity to demand for the reformation of existing and formation of new effective Islamic institutions. The International Crisis Group (2012) notes that the Kenyan Muslim leadership lacks the institution of a Grand Mufti, the supreme Muslim spiritual leader who provides spiritual guidance and when necessary, issues binding pronouncements *(fatwa)* on vexatious issues. The formation of a Muslim Advisory Council of respected leaders through selection or election by the community would also be necessary to ensure that the issues of the community are effectively addressed.

Another opportunity lies with civil society organizations (CSOs). These institutions operate at the grassroots level and provide channels through which the community can interact with the decision makers and leaders as observed by Lederach (1997). Being at the grassroots, CSOs are in a position to detect radicalization tendencies at early stages and undertake intervening action before they metamorphose into violent extremist acts. CSOs can also be in a position to engage the parents, teachers, coaches, mentors, religious leaders and young people in creating a multi-sectoral approach to counter-radicalization efforts. In order to offset radical worldviews, the youth must be exposed to a plethora of counter-narratives and positive life visions,

and some of the most effective interlocutors for communicating counter-narratives are religious leaders, mentors, teachers and youth peer educators.

The government on the other hand is crucial in providing and creating the space necessary for transacting the myriad interactions that occur among the different groups. The end goal is to create a single counter-radicalization strategy but rather a network that would engage young people in various ways necessary to prevent violent extremist ideas from taking root.

Conclusion

The paper addresses the problem of youth radicalization in Kenya and its link to terrorism and terrorism-related activities. Islamic radicalization, while not new, has been seen to have a profound effect in Kenya after the 9/11 terror attack in 2001 in the US. It has mainly been associated with Somali radicals from neighbouring Somalia. However, the current attacks especially in the Coastal region have been linked to local radicalized groups and networks. This implies that terrorism and terrorist-related attacks have undergone changes in terms of tact and form thereby presenting a challenge to security agencies in addressing the problem.

To deal with terrorism, the country has relied on counter-terrorism measures but the more robust anti-terrorism measures have only been applied partially. As such, there has been disregard for measures aimed at addressing the concerns arising from the ever increasing number of radicalised local youth in the Coastal region. The paper identifies several factors that result into youth radicalization namely: ICT, historical, economic and religious marginalization, strategic aims of the VOEs, ideological and personal factors.

However, there are opportunities which can be utilized to address the problem such as reformation and appropriate utilization of the madrasas, funding to and assistance of moderates as well as a multi-sectoral approach involving the youth themselves and stakeholders as agents of change.

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Highlights of Key Messages

Resource Blessing or Curse in Eastern Africa: *The Case of the Nile Waters*

- There are increasingly frequent predictions that the next world war will be about water, not about oil or land. Water can be seen metaphorically as the very blood of the organic whole that constitutes the world. In Africa, access to water is one of the most critical aspects of human survival. Today, about one third of the total population (roughly 300 million people) lack access to water.
- The Nile River basin is a complex climatic and geographical zone with potential for conflict. It is also a climate security hot-spot, as rising temperatures and changing precipitation patterns exacerbate already existing problems of desertification, water and food scarcity thus posing a challenge for the stability of the entire region. One of the most important issues is the allocation of water resources among the riparian countries. Given the economic, environmental, developmental and political factors among the riparian countries it is possible to do an analysis of regional security implications and conflicts that may arise if the current status quo remains.
- In the past, Egypt has established its hegemony over the Nile water resources. However, the old order imposed by the lower riparians, particularly Egypt which monopolised the Nile Basin for centuries, is now being systematically challenged by new realities and demands from assertive upper riparians. The half-century-old alliance of Egypt and Sudan established under the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement is facing a new alliance of the upper riparians born by the Nile Basin Initiative and institutionalised by the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). It remains to be seen how the assertiveness of the upper riparians of their rights to an equitable and reasonable share of the Nile waters will eventually unfold, and whether the CFA will indeed enter into force and effect without Egypt and Sudan.

Youth Radicalisation and Terrorism: *The Case of the Coast Region of Kenya*

- Youth radicalization has been a gradual process since the 1970s but it is not until the mid- 2000s that the Coastal regions displayed deliberate and active recruitment of the youth into VOEs. While the MRC has been in existence since independence as the Mwambao United Front, it continues to display ability to metamorphose and align to any change that ensures its relevance thereby meshing historical grievances with radical ideologies. As such, there exists an environment that provides fertile ground for radical groups to flourish and recruit young people mainly in the ages of 15-24 years. The drivers of youth radicalization are classified as either existing preconditions, precipitant, strategic, ideological and personal/individual factors which predispose individuals to violent extremism.
- Existing preconditions include the socio-economic situation of the Coastal peoples which has a direct link to historical factors. Others include religious and economic marginalization which erodes identity for any group of individuals. The improved/new ICT sector to which the youth readily adopt has also played a key role in transmitting radical information. Moreover, the old ICT (radio and newspapers) has also been used extensively to transmit radical messages.
- Kenya's foreign policy especially its relationship with the West has contributed to fomenting radicalism. Coupled with strategic location, porous borders and corruption, radical groups have gained access to the country. The incursion by KDF has come to be used as an excuse by radical groups to justify their 'cause'. However, the counter-terrorism measures used should balance between dealing with and preventing the threat but at the same time diminishing the attraction of local youth to VEOs.

- A comprehensive strategy that includes the government, religious leaders, CSOs, youth among other stakeholders should be adopted. This ensures ownership of the de-radicalization process. Reforming and mainstreaming the existing madrasas framework may provide a monitoring and evaluation mechanism. Moderate Islamic groups need to be assisted technically and financially to expand Islamic knowledge and its dissemination to counter the already existing radical narratives.

About the Authors

Carolyne Gatimu is a Social Science/ Development researcher. She holds a Master of Arts degree in Development Studies and a Bachelor's degree in Sociology from the University of Nairobi, Kenya. She has been involved in various research projects and is well versed with matters of research, particularly qualitative research techniques. She has previously worked at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, where she has researched on industrialization in Kenya. She has also consulted for Oxfam International and Institute for Development Studies at the University of Sussex, U.K on food security issues in the country and is currently working as a researcher at the Peace and Security Department, IPSTC.

Joyce Gichuru is an Applied Researcher at the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC). She holds a Master of Arts degree in International Relations from United States International University and a Bachelor's degree in Agricultural Education and Extension from Egerton University. She has extensive experience in government having worked for many years. She has worked as a policy analyst with the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) and authored works in the area of foreign policy and international trade. She lectures at USIU focusing on foreign policy and international political economy and is a training consultant for the Foreign Service Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Currently, she is working as a researcher in the area of peace and security operations in the Eastern Africa region.

International Peace Support Training Centre
Westwood Park
P.O. Box 24232 - 00502, Karen, Kenya.
Tel: 00254(0) 20 20 388 3157/8
Fax: +254 20 388 3159
Email: info@ipstc.org
Website: www.ipstc.org

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