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*Kenya's Contribution to
International Peace Support
Operations*



*Transnational Terrorism in
Eastern Africa: The Case of
Al-Shabaab in Somalia*

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Foreword

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is a research and training institution focusing on capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and has grown to be a regional Centre of Excellence for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. IPSTC addresses the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated Peace Support Operations (PSOs) by analysing the actors and multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research conducted covers a broad spectrum of issues ranging from conflict prevention through management to post-conflict reconstruction.

The Centre has made considerable contribution in training and research on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa through design of training curricula, field research and publication of Occasional Papers and Issue Briefs. The Occasional Papers are produced annually, while the Issues Briefs are produced quarterly. These publications are an important contribution to the vision and mission of IPSTC.

This First Quarter Issue Brief No. 1 (2015) has two titles on peace and conflict in Eastern Africa: *Kenya's Contribution to International Peace Support Operations: Insights from Somalia, and Transnational Terrorism in Eastern Africa: The Case of Al-Shabaab in Somalia.*

The Issue Brief provides insights into pertinent peace and security issues in the region that are useful to policy makers and aims to contribute to the security debate and praxis in the region. The articles in the Issue Brief are also expected to inform the design of the training modules at IPSTC. The research and publication of this Issue Brief has been made possible by the support of the Government of Japan through UNDP.

Brig. Robert Kabage

Director, IPSTC

Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| AIAI | Al Ittihad Al Islamia |
| AL-SHABAAB | Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen |
| AMIB | African Union Mission in Burundi |
| AMIS | African Union Mission in Sudan |
| AMISOM | African Union Mission in Somalia |
| AMU | Arab Maghreb Union |
| APRCT | Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter- Terrorism |
| AQIM | Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb |
| ARS-A | Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia- Asmara |
| ARS-D | Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia-Djibouti |
| ASF | Africa Standby Force |
| AU | African Union |
| CAR | Central Africa Republic |
| CJTF-HA | Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa |
| CMFZ | Zimbabwe Commonwealth Monitoring Force |
| COMESA | Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa |
| DDR | Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| DSC | Defence Staff College |
| EAC | East Africa Community |
| EASF | East African Standby Force |
| ECCAS | Economic Community of Central African States |
| ECOMOG | ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group |

| | |
|----------------|--|
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| EU | European UNION |
| EIJ | Egyptian Islamic Jihad |
| FIFA | International Federation of Football Associations |
| FOC | Full Operational Capability |
| GSPC | Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat, |
| ICGLR | International Conference on the Great Lakes Region |
| ICU/UIC | Islamic Courts Union/ Union of Islamic Courts |
| IGAD | Inter-Governmental Authority for Development |
| IGASOM | Inter-Governmental Authority for Development Forces for Somalia |
| IEDs | Improvised Explosive Devices |
| IPSTC | International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) |
| KDF | Kenya Defence Forces |
| KAIPTC | Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center |
| LAPPSET | Lamu Port and Southern Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor |
| LRA | Lord's Resistance Army |
| MINUSMA | Nations Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali |
| MONUSCO | United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo |
| MUJAO | Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NDC | National Defence Staff College |
| NMLA | National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |

| | |
|------------------|---|
| OAUF | Organization of African Unity Force |
| OCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OLF | Oromo Liberation Front |
| ONLF | Ogaden National Liberation Front |
| ONUMOZ | United Nations Operation in Mozambique |
| PAP | Pan-African Parliament |
| PCC | Police Contributing Country |
| PSC | Peace and Security Council |
| PSO | Peace Support Operations |
| PTA | Prevention of Terrorism Act |
| RECs | Regional Economic Communities |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SADC-RPTC | Southern Africa Development Community Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre |
| SALW | Small Arms and Light Weapons |
| SGBV | Sex and Gender Based Violence |
| SNPC | Somalia National Peace Conference |
| SRRC | Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| TCC | Troops Contributing Country |
| TFG | Transitional Federal Government of Somalia |
| TFIs | Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia |
| TNG | Transitional National Government of Somalia |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UN | United Nations |

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| UNAMID | African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur |
| UNAMIR | United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda |
| UNAMSIL | United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone |
| UNAVEM | United Nations Angola Verification Mission |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UN-HABITAT | United Nations Centre for Human Settlements |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children Fund |
| UNIKOM | United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observation Mission |
| UNIMOG | United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group |
| UNIOSIL | United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone |
| UNITAF | United Nations Unified Task Force |
| UNMEE | United Nations Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea |
| UNMIL | United Nations Mission in Liberia |
| UNMISS | United Nations Mission in South Sudan |
| UNOMIL | United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia |
| UNOSOM I/II | United Nations Operation in Somalia I and II |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNTAG | United Nations Transition Assistance Group |
| USA | United States of America |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |

Introduction to the Issue Briefs

The topics in this First Quarter Issue Brief address diverse issues of peace and security in the Eastern Africa region. The first paper examines Kenya's contribution to international peace support operations with a special focus on Somalia and the second looks at transnational terrorism, its nature, causes and effects with special reference to the Al-Shabaab terrorist group. The first paper presents an assessment of Kenya's participation in UN/AU peacekeeping missions with particular reference to Somalia and its implications for national and regional peace and security. The study examines the implications of troop contributions to Peace Support Operations (PSOs) for both African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) missions for peace and security in Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), the region and globally. Kenya's participation in the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is evaluated through a framework that reveals the implications for peace enforcement missions and what it means for the future of Kenya's participation in PSOs. The study reveals gaps in positioning PSOs as a strategic tool for promoting Kenya's internal security, defence and foreign policy strategies. The research further examines dynamics and challenges of the country's PSO participation and provides recommendations for a more effective strategy to boost the country's participation in and benefits from UN/AU PSOs.

In the second paper, issues surrounding transnational terrorism in Eastern Africa are examined. Before the transnational terrorist attack in 1998, the public could walk in and walk out of any shopping mall, restaurant or public building in the main cities without fear or apprehension, not so any more. There are some dates that are now painfully etched into the minds of East Africans. One of them is 11 July 2010. As the FIFA World Cup final was approaching its zenith, a bomb exploded at a clubhouse of the Kyadongo Rugby club in Kampala, Uganda. Seventy four people died and more than 60 others were injured. Al-Shabaab, the Somali terrorist group, claimed responsibility for the attack.

Three years after the Kampala attack, on 21 September 2013 to be precise, Al-Shabaab struck again causing 67 deaths and over 175 people were reportedly

wounded. This happened at Kenya's high-end Westgate shopping mall. As a result, Kenya suffered immense loss of human lives and economic destruction.

Besides Al-Shabaab, there are other terrorist organizations which are not based in Eastern Africa but derive a significant amount of financing through their activities in the region. This is particularly evident in narcotics trafficking, which is often funnelled to Europe via pre-existing routes in Eastern Africa and, at times, originating in South America.

Eastern Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti) is more vulnerable to transnational terrorism for a number of reasons. The sub-region suffers from political instability, ethnic and communal violence, pervasive corruption, widespread poverty, and high rates of unemployment and underemployment, especially among the young people. Terrorists and terrorist groups tend to exploit these negative conditions especially by recruiting the youth into their ranks as foot soldiers.

Furthermore, most of the borders in Eastern Africa, especially those of Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia are porous and there are many ungoverned spaces along the extensive boundary lines. Unfortunately, these countries lack the capacity to effectively monitor the borders which is a gap that can be exploited by terrorist groups to establish training bases for their members and/or to transport and distribute weapons, across the sub-region. Therefore, there is need to understand the ideological dynamics of conflicts that inform terrorism and its transnational nature. This is the subject of this paper. Country Reports on Terrorism 2013; United States Department of State Publication Published on April, 2014.

Kenya's Contribution to International Peace Support Operations: *Insights from Somalia*

Joseph Kioi Mbugua

Introduction

For a long time, Kenya maintained a policy of non-intervention in other states' affairs and commitment to regional integration, the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) peace and security initiatives. Kenya has been an active international actor since independence and hosts one of the four largest UN duty stations worldwide. Kenya's foreign policy expresses the country's commitment to world peace and security, national and regional security and development.¹ The country's commitment to UN activities including peacekeeping/peace support operations (PSOs) is demonstrated throughout history. Kenya has been a leading troop contributing country (TCC) to UN peacekeeping operations and UN-sanctioned AU Missions. As a former British colony and a member of the Commonwealth, Kenya enjoyed cordial relations and favoured status with the West (Europe and North America) during the Cold War. However Kenya remained nominally a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.²

The country became a member of the UN soon after independence in 1963.³ She became a UN transit zone as early as 1963 for the peacekeeping mission in Congo (ONUC) (1960); MONUC (2000); MONUSCO (2009); UNMIS (2005); Operation Lifeline Sudan (2005) and UNMISS (2011). The country became the global headquarters for the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1970 and UN Centre for Human Settlements (UN-HABITAT) in 1978.⁴ Currently, Kenya hosts 25 UN agencies and 75 semi-UN offices.⁵

1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFA), www.mfa.go.ke/

2 Kenya is currently ranked number 28 in the global list of TCCs but this figure does not include AMISOM. On Kenya's international relations see; Jon Rosen, Strategic Posture Review: Kenya, World Politics Review, January, 21, 2014

3 The United Nations in Kenya: 50 Years of Partnership, Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Kenya, United Nations Office in Nairobi, 2006, p.11

4 This is the only UN duty world station in the developing world

5 Opp.cit, p.33

Kenya's participation in PSOs spans three decades involving over 20 missions and more than 80,000 Kenyan troops.⁶ These missions have exposed Kenya's servicemen and women to politically charged international and inter-cultural situations. This has enriched their military and policing experiences and widened their worldview. These exposures have also provided opportunities to improve their professional skills.⁷ Currently, Kenya has peacekeepers in nine countries in Africa and Europe. In Africa, Kenyan peacekeepers have served in Namibia, Mozambique, Cote D'Ivoire, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan and Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, among others.

This study presents an assessment of Kenya's participation in UN/AU peacekeeping missions and its implications for national and regional peace and security. The research surveys the history and dynamics of the country's PSO participation and provides recommendations for a more effective strategy to boost the country's participation in and benefits from UN/AU PSOs.

Focus and Scope of the Study

This study explores Kenya's national military, police and civilian capacities to contribute to international peace support operations with special reference to Somalia.

Objectives of the Study

- To examine the contribution of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), Kenya Police and civilians to international peace support operations with special reference to Somalia;
- To assess the challenges of KDF, Kenya Police and Civilians effective contribution to international peace support operations; and
- To explore how KDF, Kenya Police and Civilians can contribute more effectively to international peace support operations especially in Somalia.

6 Authors aggregate number from different sources; UN, AU, Books review

7 Ibid.p.82, In 2001 Kenya was ranked the sixth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions and in 2013 Kenya is ranked number 28 with a contribution of 36,802 troop.

Research Questions

- How have the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), Kenya Police and Civilians contributed to regional and international peace support operations, especially through the current mission in Somalia?
- What hinders effective participation of KDF, Kenya Police and Civilians in regional and international peace support operations?
- What is the best model for participation in international peace support operations?

Statement of the Research Problem

The Kenya military and the Kenya Police have a long history in international peace support operations in Africa, Asia and Europe. However, there is little research output in the public domain that documents this contribution, challenges and lessons learned. Given the evolution of peace keeping/peace support operations, there is a lot that the country can offer to global advancement of theory and practice of peace support operations. Pre-deployment training, logistics and field operations can also gain from experience of previous Kenyan PSO missions in Africa and beyond.

The evolution of global and regional peace and security dynamics has seen a re-definition of sovereignty whereby the international community continues to take more responsibility in states that cannot guarantee domestic protection of human rights and the rule of law. While interstate conflicts have reduced since the end of the cold war, complex intrastate conflicts have increased. The Kenya security sector should learn from past PSO experience in order to raise their level of efficiency and effectiveness.

There are no clear linkages or indicators of Kenya's participation in international PSOs and their enhancement of national, regional and global security. Kenya does not have a blue print or 'White paper' on PSOs in terms of troop contribution (TC), police contribution (PC) or civilian contribution. There are no clear linkages between PSO policy/strategy and defence and foreign policies or vision 2030 that define national interests and development goals.

Lack of such foundational documents creates room for guesswork and ad hoc decision making. It also makes the country vulnerable to making PSO decisions that could be counter-productive or do not effectively serve the national interests.

The KDF's presence in Somalia has been subjected to different interpretations from various analysts. Starting as a Kenyan response to terrorist attacks from Somalia in 2011 and later becoming part of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the intervention continues to help Somalia to fight Al Shabaab terrorists. Given the evolving conflict dynamics in Somalia, South Sudan and Eastern DRC, Kenya needs to develop long term and coherent regional peace support operations or peace enforcement strategy. The achievements and challenges of KDF in Somalia from the strategic, operational to tactical levels need to be analyzed so that they can inform long term security policy and strategy.

Given the significance of peace and security in national development and the welfare of the state, effective PSO policy and strategy is long overdue. Kenya's troop contribution has been instrumental in stabilizing Somalia, attracting donor support and decimating the Al Shabaab. Kenya has not yet defined how PSOs advance national interests and regional peace and security. A well-defined PSO paradigm can be an effective instrument of advancing national defence and foreign policy.

Literature Review

The UN began sending peace keeping forces in 1948, three years after its establishment. Peace keeping missions have evolved into complex peace support operations since 1999. The Brahimi Report of 2000 and the September 11, 2001 event marked a turning point in the management of peace support operations (Johnson, 2005). Peace Support Operations have been analyzed in international relations theories. There have been a number of case studies on the effectiveness of international peacekeeping, linkages between peacekeeping and peace building, national and regional perspectives, peace operations capacity, doctrine and reform.

Peacekeeping operations have also been analysed through critical analysis of the wisdom of the current operations when viewed against democratic and transparent institutional frameworks (Pugh, 2004; Bellamy, 2004). Paris (2003) analyses peacekeeping from a world polity theory perspective. He argues that peace keeping tradition is influenced by formal and informal global culture. There are global norms that legitimize some practices and de-legitimize others.

Peacekeeping is shaped by the practice of ‘hasty democratization’ and ‘rapid liberalization’ as advocated by some global powers and international organizations. Others maintain that operations of the UN are shaped by the current global normative order (Johnstone, 2004; Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005). Different scholars have therefore written either to support or question the current peacekeeping order. A number of authors have also reviewed peacekeeping operations through a gender lens, (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts and Parpart, 2005; Mandelson, 2005; Whitworth, 2004), observing that PSOs are skewed in favour of men.

Keohane (2003) and Krasner (2004) have also analyzed the relationship between peacekeeping and peace building. They maintain that the international community has a role to ensure the sovereignty of fragile states in conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2004) hold that there has emerged a practice whereby global powers and organizations such as the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and UN, maintain trusteeship of fragile states. They send peacekeeping operations that are meant to bring the state authority back and leave as quickly as possible. They raise fundamental questions on the practices of peacekeeping operations such as; who

should lead the mission? Who funds the mission? How should they be coordinated? To whom will the interveners be accountable? And for how long should the mission stay?

There are a number of studies that have been done on peacekeeping in areas such as East Timor (Surkhe, 2001; Ryan, 2001), Kosovo (O'Neil, 2001; Simonsen, 2004); Sierra Leone (Hirsch, 2001; Adebayo, 2002); Afghanistan (Surkhe, Harpviken and Strand, 2002; Martin, 2003), Democratic Republic of Congo (Ginnifer, 2002); Rwanda (Jones, 2001), Dallaire, 2004); Namibia (Howard, 2002); Chad (May, 2002); Somalia (Murphy, 2003; Razak, 2004; Mersidias, 2005); Namibia and Angola (Dzinesa, 2004). Some of the publications examine comparative effectiveness of a number of peacekeeping operations (Cousens and Kumar, 2001; Malone, 2004). Other writers have reviewed peace implementation strategies and tasks; Stedman, S.J et al. (2002).

A number of recommendations have been provided on future PSOs including phasing of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reforms (SSR). The authors found that UN-led peacekeeping operations were successful in Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Eastern Slovenia and East Timor. The UN is seen as the most legitimate organ to send peacekeepers in fragile states due to impartiality. It has been recommended that priority should be given to security sector reforms and establishment of effective rule of law institutions. The relationship between the military and humanitarian actors should also be improved.

A study by O'Hanlan and Singer, (2004) found that there is a huge gap between demand and supply of peace keepers. They estimate that the world requires about 200,000 military and police peacekeepers. Some researchers have also looked at what determines troop contribution to the UN for individual states and regions e.g. US (Fleitz, 2002); South Africa (Kent and Malan, 2002); Japan (Ishizuka, 2005); Africa (Boulden, 2002); Europe (Smith, 2002) and French, UK and US, peacekeeping in Africa (Berman, 2003). Political considerations for troop contribution to PSOs may include enhancement of a country's national pride; may have been done through the intervention of global powers or influential partner's persuasion; desire to influence the mission; access to privileged information; accessibility to membership of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and payment in kind for past assistance. It has

also been observed that states may contribute troops in expectation of financial gain. States may also contribute troops if there is perceived positive implication to national interests.⁸

The overseas experience gained by the troops is also viewed as a positive outcome. Participation in PSOs may also enhance a country's global perception as a Good Samaritan, or as a nonaligned country that participates in global missions for the greater good of mankind. The domestic historical experience of Rwanda predisposes it to view PSO as an avenue to prevent genocide.⁹

Once nations create a culture of troop contribution and gain from the attendant experience, there is a positive implication for their internal military organization, planning, training and operations.¹⁰ This has been manifested in Ghana, Uruguay and Kenya.

The US and UK peace support operations doctrines have been examined by Cassidy (2004). The UK was found to be a respecter of consent before intervention while the US considered consent as a variable, meaning that the degree of consequences of intervention without consent would be considered. While the UK called for traditional peacekeeping, the US policy was informed by the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of using overwhelming force in PSOs. The conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia and Iraq in the 1990s informed the American peacekeeping operations policy.

Two main studies have examined Kenya's participation in AMISOM (ICG, 2012; Menkaus, 2012). These studies paint a grim picture of KDF intervention in Somalia, questioning its political and diplomatic preparedness. They assert that KDF was ill-prepared to fight an experienced guerrilla force (Al Shabaab) in unfamiliar territory. Ichani, (2014) examines the challenges Kenyan soldiers faced when fighting in a hostile environment (Somalia) including succumbing to battle stresses.

8 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, *Broadening the base of UN Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCC/PCC)*, IPI, 2012, p.8

9 Ibid. p.10

10 David, B. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer, *Maintaining System Stability: Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41, No. 6, 1997, p.731

Theoretical Framework

Global Cultural Theory

Global cultural theory is an offshoot of world polity theory (Finnemore, 1996; Paris, 2003). This theory asserts that there has emerged a 'global culture', an international normative environment that involves formal and informal structures that guide international behaviour and actions that also shape the design of PSOs. It describes what is to be included as legitimate and what is to be omitted irrespective of their impact on the success of PSOs. This approach has been criticized as a continuation of neo colonialism since cultural globalization is informed by Western values and traditions. Culturally specific allusions in PSOs are usually excluded. Local ownership is only used to legitimize implementation of donor funded programs but not to genuinely involve the local people. Diversity in programming, social justice and sustainable economic empowerment are not the main guiding principles in PSO education and practice.¹¹ The interaction of Western and African worldviews has created a third space for negotiation where unfortunately the Western paradigm reigns supreme. Promoting local ownership by recruiting local people is not enough; they should also use local strategies and tools in PSOs. It is therefore important to understand how ideas such as demand for elections during or after conflict, and economic liberalization have informed PSO despite their destabilizing potential, (Paris, 2004).

Critical Theory

Critical theory refers to a group of theories that seek to 'liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them'.¹² The theory explains what is wrong with the current social conditions, establishes norms for criticism and identifies practical pathways for social transformation. Critical theory provides the descriptive and normative bases for social inquiry aimed at decreasing domination and increasing freedom in all their forms. Critical theories have informed feminism, race, ethnicity and dependency theories.¹³

11 Cedric de Coning, *Civilian Capacity in United Nations Peace keeping and Peace Building Missions*, NUPI, Policy Brief, No. 4, 2010, p.5

12 Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory

13 Ibid.

The application of critical theory in peace support operations has already been examined (Bellamy and Williams, 2004; Pugh, 2003).

Advocates of critical theory assert that theory is never politically neutral and instead someone develops it for particular reasons and purpose. The purpose of critical theory is human emancipation, that is, setting people free to do what they want as long as they respect the freedom of others, (Booth, 2007). Therefore PSO activities informed by this theory respond to the following two questions:

- What theories, values, ideologies, interests, and identities shape the way people understand peace operations, and whose theories, values, ideologies, interests and identities are best served through the current practices of peace support operations?
- What theories and practices of Peace Support Operations are most likely to advance human emancipation and how can such advances be achieved?

Responding to these questions, a number of scholars have asserted that PSOs are informed by the capitalist global political economy (Pugh, 2003:40). Due to Western dependence on international trade, PSOs are created to restore law and order and therefore open exploitation of raw materials and international trade. PSOs are therefore created to maintain a neo-liberal economic order (Pugh, 2004: 41). Critical theorists also emerge as defenders of the down-trodden in PSOs. They argue that PSOs must focus on the poor, disadvantaged, voiceless, unrepresented and powerless (Edward and Said, 1994: 84). This view has gained currency with the adaption of affirmative actions towards women, youth, minorities and people with disability within the UN, regional organizations, civil society and governments.

The nature of PSO has an implication on the policy agenda. Critical thinking attempts to challenge the prevailing order by reflecting on the interests it serves ultimately seeking to transform it.¹⁴ A broader view is required when conducting research so as to evaluate the performance of modern PSO. Paris (2003) asserts that PSOs are controlled by liberal values that legitimize and delegitimize options.

¹⁴ Robert, W. Cox, *Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1981, 10 (2): 126-155

Therefore ‘rapid liberalization’ and ‘hasty democratization’ are favoured as opposed to long-term trusteeship. Gender issues are also explored especially where security agents, and more recently, belligerents, (e.g. in the DRC) in PSOs have been accused of sexual abuse (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts and Parpart, 2005).

This paper adapts macro and micro approaches to understanding peace support operations from a Kenyan perspective where the general theories analyzed above inform the study at the strategic level alongside critical assessment of operational and tactical approaches to PSOs.

Hypothesis/Proposition

The national capacity and quality of troop contributions to regional and global peace support operations has a bearing on national and regional peace and security.

Conceptual Framework

The nature of PSO doctrine and/or policy and the national capacity for preparing troops (training, deployment, operations, funding) to participate in PSOs is an important marker of state ability to maintain stability and promote global peace and security. There is a relationship between national military culture of peace acquired through participation in global PSO and national, regional and global peace and security.




Figure 1: National PSO Framework

This study attempts to understand how exposure of a country’s well trained security personnel in outside missions informs security dynamics back home and at the regional level.

Peacekeeping/Peace Support Operations

Peacekeeping

The UN defines peacekeeping as the use of military, police and civilian personnel to lay the foundation for sustainable peace.¹⁵ Peacekeeping has also been defined as field operations established by the UN, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under UN command and control, at the collective expense of the member states and with military and other equipment voluntarily provided by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent possible.¹⁶ This definition is limited since peacekeeping forces can also be established by the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

Initially, peacekeeping was mainly concerned with creating the conditions for the peaceful settlements of disputes between states. This approach was mainly guided by the traditional Westphalian respect for sovereignty of the state.¹⁷ Though the League of Nations established observer missions, they were not referred to as peacekeeping. The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).¹⁸

Peace Support Operations (PSOs)

There is no general agreement among peace and security actors on what Peace Support Operations exactly mean. Sometimes aggressive acts of war have been labelled peacekeeping to legitimize their activities.¹⁹ The UN has not clearly defined what the term PSO means. *The UN Handbook on Multinational Peacekeeping Operations* provides a list of military and civilian tasks that peacekeepers are supposed to fulfil.²⁰

15 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, 2003), p.2-3

16 Marrack Goulding, *The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping*, International Affairs, Vol.69, No.3, 1993, pp.455, former UN Under Secretary General

17 Westphalian refers to the treaty concluded at the end of Europe's 30 Years War (1618-48) between the Union of Protestant German princes and free cities and the League of their Catholic counterparts

18 www.un.org/en/peacekeepingmissions/untso

19 US Intervention in Granada, Russia's intervention in Chechnya, James, 1969: 9, Finnemore, 2003)

20 Opp. Cit, DPKO, 2003), p.2-3

The UN Secretary General's (Boutros Boutros Ghali) 1992 Report: *An Agenda for Peace*, appears to capture the more comprehensive meaning of PSO (referred to as peacekeeping):

The deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN/Police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is an activity that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.²¹

PSO assumed more prominence after the cold war where the nature and dominance of global conflicts changed from interstate to intrastate conflicts. They were more informed by the Western liberal democratic peace thesis where establishment of democratic values and institutions, respect for human rights and rule of law were seen as prerequisites for state stability.²²

Many African countries respected the non-interference in internal affairs of neighbouring countries principle. After the devastating conflicts in Eastern Europe, Rwanda and Somalia in the 1990s, there has been a shift towards interference in fragile states that are unwilling or unable to protect the fundamental human rights of the citizens.²³ This Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is seen as neo-colonialism among the developing countries. China also advocates for PSOs to intervene while observing a number of conditions; consent of the host nation, Security Council approval, peace agreement, UN as an impartial party and use of minimal force.²⁴

PSOs can serve a number of functions: separate adversaries, maintain ceasefires, facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief, enable refugees and displaced persons to return home, demobilize combatants, facilitate reconciliation and free elections and prevent small wars from escalating into big wars.²⁵

21 UNSG Report, *An Agenda for Peace*, 1992, p.20

22 Roland Paris, 'Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture', *European Journal of International Relations*, 9(3): 441-473, 1993

23 Tony Blair, 'Doctrine of the International Community', speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, Chicago, 22, April, 1999

24 Gill Bates and James Reilly, 'Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing,' *Survival*, Vol.42, No.3, 2000, p.44

25 Davis and Boyer, *Maintaining System Stability, Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1997, p.5

The PSOs in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire, Somalia, Libya, Sudan and South Sudan have had mixed success and experiences. The theory and practice of PSOs in Africa is still evolving and appears to be a hostage of the current Western liberal/ democratic peace theoretical paradigm.

Global Peace Support Operations Architecture

The United Nations

The UN Charter (1945) provides the UN with the mandate *‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’*, and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security.²⁶ The UN Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council establishes peacekeeping operations in a bid to fulfil this mission authorized under Chapters VI (*Pacific Settlement of Disputes*); VII (*Actions with Respect to the Peace, Breaches to the Peace and Acts of Aggression*) and VIII (*Involvement of Regional Organizations*) of the UN Charter.²⁷

The Capstone doctrine is an invaluable tool that provides orientation and guidance to UN peacekeeping missions, TCCs and PCCs, regional and other inter-governmental organizations, humanitarian and development actors involved in international crisis management and as well as local and national actors in PSO areas.

The UN peacekeeping operations are guided by three peacekeeping principles;

- a) Consent
- b) Impartiality
- c) Non use of force, except in self-defence and defence of mandate

Consent has however been limited by the emergence of Responsibility to Protect, where the international community can intervene in situations where the government is unable or unwilling to protect citizens against crimes against humanity and genocide. However, the Capstone doctrine maintains that success of PSOs is dependent on legitimacy, credibility and local ownership. The powers of the UN are derived from the UN Charter and UNSC Resolutions. Sometimes missions lose credibility where they do not meet expectations of the society or where they engage in Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV).

²⁶ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines - Capstone Doctrine, 2008

²⁷ Ibid. p.13

The core business of a UN PSO mission is to:²⁸

- a) Create a secure and stable environment while supporting a state's capacity to maintain the rule of law and protect human rights
- b) Promote dialogue and reconciliation and support legitimate and effective institutions of governance
- c) Promote a framework of coherence and coordination of UN activities and of other actors at the national level

PSOs play a catalytic role in peace building and development through cooperation and collaboration with other development partners. Kenya engages the UN in PSO through Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UNSC and Kenya's membership to the Special Committee on peacekeeping operations (C-34). Currently, Kenya co-chairs the Small Working Group on Military Capacities in C-34.²⁹

The African Union (AU)

The African Union (AU) collaborates with the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security as provided for under the UN Charter (VIII -Article 52). AU PSO missions are authorized in conformity with both the UN and AU Charters.

The AU was established in 2000 through the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The revitalized AU saw the need to improve its capacity for responding to conflict in Africa. The new outfit was meant to be more focused, proactive, responsive and comprehensive in preventing and managing conflicts in Africa. The AU constitutive act of 2000 established 17 key institutions. The act gives the AU the right to intervene and responsibility to protect in situations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

The AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the structural framework for managing peace and security on the continent. APSA establishes diplomatic, military, information and economic ways to address peace and security challenges.

The structure has several organs as defined in the Common African Defence and

28 Op. cit, Capstone, 2009, p.14

29 Kenya at the United Nations, Permanent Mission of Republic of Kenya at the United Nations, www.kenyaun.org

Security Policy (CADSP); the Peace and Security Council (PSC); Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); the African Standby Force (ASF) and Military Staff Committee (MSC); the Panel of the Wise (POW); and the African Peace Support Fund (APF).

In 2004, members of the AU agreed on CADSP. The Protocol and defence policy are the two major pillars of peace and security governance in Africa.³⁰ The AU PSC was established through a protocol that entered into force on 26 December, 2003.³¹ The PSC mandate is managing collective security and providing early warning and response capacity. The PSC works collaboratively with the AU Commission and the peace and security division. The PSC is also charged with the responsibility of implementing the CADSP.³² Fifteen countries are elected by the AU Executive Council to serve on the commission. The PSC is composed of 15 member countries, 10 of whom are elected on a 2-year term and 5 on a 3-year term. The mandate of the PSC is to:³³

- Promote peace, security and stability
- Anticipate and prevent conflicts
- Combat terrorism on the continent
- Develop a common defence policy for Africa
- Promote democratic policies, good governance and respect for human rights

The PSC collaborates with the UN Security Council in managing African conflicts. However, under Chapter VII, the PSC can deploy peace support missions on its own initiative. A number of other organs were established to assist the PSC in implementation of peace and security activities in the continent. The PSC has authorized a number of PSOs including the AU Mission to Burundi (AMIB) (2003); the AU Mission for Support to Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) (2006); AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (2004); and AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (2007).³⁴

30 Omar A. Touray *The Common African Defence and Security Policy*, African Affairs, 2005, Vol. 104, No. 417 p.10

31 Protocol relating to the establishment of the peace and security council of the African Union, Durban, July 2002

32 Alex Vines, A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture, *International Affairs*, 89: 1, 2013, p.9

33 Omar A. Touray, 2005, p.10

34 Kristiana Powell (2005) *African Union Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges of Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect*, Ottawa, North-South Institute, p.16

The African Standby Force (ASF)

The ASF is the African rapid reaction force capable of deployment anywhere on the continent. The force is divided into five regions – North, South, East, Central and West. This evolving force will have a military, police and civilian component. The regional forces will provide a brigade comprising 5,000 troops (military), 720 police and 60 civilians. The ASF will be supported by a Military Staff Committee (MSC) comprising senior military officers from PSC member countries.³⁵ The ASF is not a standing army but each region is expected to meet rapid deployment capability (RDC) where a specific number of forces can be raised within short notice.

Besides observation and monitoring, the ASF will undertake preventive deployment, peace keeping including multi-dimensional peace keeping, intervention in gross violations of human rights such as genocide and engaging in post conflict reconstruction activities such as DDR.³⁶ The ASF also has a mandate to protect civilians, especially vulnerable groups, namely women, children and the aged in armed conflict.

The East African Standby Force (EASF)

The EASF with a secretariat based in Nairobi is the eastern African peace support operations force under the AU peace and security architecture. The EASF Command provides administrative support to other policy organs such as the Council of Ministers, Planning Element (PLANELM), EASF Brigade Headquarters and LOGBASE in Addis Ababa. The force is composed of 3,000 troops who are based in member countries. The force brings together members of IGAD, East African Community (EAC) and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). The 11 member countries are; Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, Sudan, Comoros, Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Rwanda and Seychelles.

The mandate of EASF is to provide military advice to missions, participate in complex multi-dimensional peace keeping missions with deployment of military elements and be ready for deployment by the AU when the international community

³⁵ African Union, *Draft Framework for a Common African Defense and Security Policy* Adopted by the African Ministers of Defense and Security, Addis Ababa 20-23, January, 2004

³⁶ Op.cit, Kristiana, 2005

fails to act, for example over genocide.³⁷ The EASF also supports training on PSO, good governance, human rights and post-conflict resolution. The EASF is scheduled to reach Full Operational Capability (FOC) by the end of 2014.

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Like ECOWAS in West Africa, IGAD is a leading peace and security organ for Eastern Africa in the APSA framework. IGAD has been instrumental in shaping the peace and security trajectory in Sudan and Somalia. Members of IGAD can also deploy forces on their own initiative or through the UN or AU. Currently, members of the IGAD have deployed forces in South Sudan for the protection of civilians and vital installations and to prevent conflict escalation. EASF enjoys relative autonomy from IGAD and other mechanisms were put in place to provide space for countries that are not members of IGAD.³⁸

A pattern has been established where neighbouring countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia and Kenya and AU organizations such as (AMIB, AMID, AMISOM, ECOWAS) establish peace support operations and then the troops are redeployed to UN missions, as happened in Sierra Leone (1997), Liberia (2003), and Cote D'Ivoire (2003).³⁹

37 Ibid. Kristiana, (2005) p.26

38 Boulden, Jane, *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*; Palgrave MacMillan, NY, 2004

39 Funmi, Olonisakin, *Lessons Learned from an Assessment of Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations in West Africa*, KAIPTC, 2008

Framework for Kenya's Participation in Peace Support Operations

Kenya's participation in UN PSO can be expressed in the following framework:

- i. National interest and values (security, development, diplomatic and political)
- ii. Reigning global normative paradigm/ideological affinity and non-alignment
- iii. Respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states
- iv. Pragmatic foreign policy witnessed since the independence administration of Presidents; Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Arap Moi, Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta
- v. Commitment to regional security and development and world peace and security.⁴⁰

Policy

Kenya's foreign policy is based on strong advocacy for a rule-based international system, environmental sustainability, equitable development and a secure world. As a member of the UN, Kenya has been firmly committed to the organization's principles and objectives particularly achievement of global peace and security. Towards this end Kenya has been a leading TCC to the UN.⁴¹

Kenya does not have a written national defence policy in one document and therefore PSO strategic approach, doctrine, training and deployment are based on the UN (Capstone Doctrine) and AU (CADSP) guidelines, Kenya Defence Forces Act, KDF doctrine and the long established military traditions and procedures.⁴² Participation of the KDF and Kenya Police in international peace support operations is anchored

40 This is the author's framework of assessment based on Kenya's Foreign Policy and Political tradition/precedents and vision and mission of Kenya at the United Nations

41 See GoK, Kenya Defence Forces Act No. 25 of 2012, Part IV – Relationship with Other Countries and Employment outside Kenya, 36 (1 and 2 a) I and II, Pursuant to Article 240 (8) of the Constitution, the National Security Council may with the approval of Parliament – a) deploy national forces outside Kenya for: 1) Regional or international peace support operations b) other support operations and GoK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya's Foreign Policy, www.mfa.go.ke

42 Currently plans are going on to develop a national defence policy (P. Kagwanja, July, 2014)

in the UN Charter, AU Charter, Relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and the National Constitution (2010). The highest level of peace support operations training is offered at the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), Defence Staff College (DSC) and the National Defence College (NDC).⁴³

Doctrine

According to the Department of Defence (DoD), training in peace support operations should be provided after troops master basic military training such as: *communication, computer literacy, navigation and map reading, weapon handling, battle drills and tactics, patrolling by day and night, movement control and road blocks, physical training and international law of armed conflict.*⁴⁴ They must also be well versed in the history of the conflict and the environment. The training also encompasses Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Such training is provided to all the units at all levels. Kenya military officers receive peace support /conflict resolution training both locally and abroad (UK, USA, Pakistan and India). Kenya has contributed military, police and civilian contingents to many peace missions in Africa and the rest of the world since 1989.⁴⁵ In the AU framework, Kenya hosts the headquarters/secretariat of EASF. It is one of the countries that have been participating in preparing the capability of the regional brigade. Currently, Kenya has a battalion ready for deployment under the EASF Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) framework.⁴⁶

43 Training of Peace Operations as conducted in Kenya, African Capabilities for Training in Peace Support Operations, 1996

44 Ibid.

45 Opp.cit, 1996

46 www.easfcom.org

Peacekeeping Training Institutions

The need for training in international standards for operability created a necessity for establishment of PSO training centres to meet these needs. Below are the premier PSO training institutions in the country.

International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC)

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) has been training troops destined for peace support operations in the region, including AMISOM and UNMISS in collaboration with EASF. The IPSTC was established in 2001 to meet the growing needs of high calibre PSO training courses in Eastern Africa. The centre offers PSO courses at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. IPSTC has grown into a regional centre of excellence in PSO training. The centre is scheduled to scale new heights as research is well established as an independent core capability area to deepen training content and inform regional policies and practices of peace and security. High academic and professional standards are set to be achieved with development of the centre as a University campus offering graduate degrees (MA and PhD in PSO). The Center will continue to offer academic and practical value-based training to military, security sector, diplomats and civilians working in peace support operations.⁴⁷

So far, more than 7,000 troops have been trained in various aspects of safety, demining, human rights, rule of law, mission leadership and protection of civilians among other courses. The Centre also publishes *Issue Briefs* and *Occasional Papers, Learning Plans and Facilitator Guides* on various aspects of peace and security in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. IPSTC is also a member of the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA), an organization that promotes cooperation among peace support training institutions, professionalization and standardization of PSO training in Africa.

⁴⁷ www.ipstc.org/about-us.aspx

Defence Staff College (DSC)

The Kenya Defence Staff College (DSC) is one of KDF's leading institutions of higher learning. The college is meant to prepare military officers for command and staff. Established in 1984, it began training in 1988. Since then, new courses have been developed. There is a new curriculum on military and strategic studies. The college awards 'Passed Staff College' (PSC Kenya) and ordinary/post graduate diploma of the University of Nairobi to successful students.⁴⁸ Although the college is not specifically a peace support operations training institution, the training offered is an enabler to officers participating in such missions.

National Defence College (NDC)

The National Defence College (NDC) is one of Kenya's premier security, strategic and defence training institutions. The college maintains a pro-active analysis of security dynamics in the country, Eastern Africa and at the global level. The college runs 14 internally designed courses since 1997. Participants are drawn from Kenya, East Africa, Europe and Asia. More than 400 officers have graduated from the college since inception including about 300 Kenyan military and civilian officers and 118 officers from other countries. The college is accredited to the University of Nairobi to offer Diploma and Master Degree in international studies.⁴⁹ By undertaking research and training on key security concerns in the region, the college acts as a peace support operations enabler. Some of the senior leaders and former graduates of NDC have also been force commanders in international PSO missions.

The experience of Kenya's PSO training institutions has most likely inspired other countries to start peace centres e.g. Rwanda (Rwanda Peace Academy); Ethiopia (Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC)); and Uganda (Uganda Rapid Deployment Capability Centre). IPSTC has trained trainers who are serving in these institutions and it is also running a Mobile Training Team to serve in these centres, including at the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC-RPTC) in Zimbabwe and security sector in South Sudan.

⁴⁸ Defence Staff College, www.dsc.mod.go.ke

⁴⁹ National Defence College, www.ndc.go.ke/AboutNDC.php

Benefits of UN/AU Troop Contribution

Though there is no clear theoretical linkage between PSO and democracy, there is a likelihood of TCC gaining exposure to democratic ideals in post-conflict stabilization and peace building situations that might have an impact on democratic traditions and peacebuilding values and practices back home. International institutions such as the UN and AU are modelled on liberal principles and values. PSOs established by these institutions will also advance the same values on a global scale. Correspondingly, there has not been troop contribution from North Korea (perceived undemocratic), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (weak state) and Israel (with protracted conflict with Palestine) in the UN PSO history.⁵⁰ States that are weak, unstable or faced with conflict will most likely not be a steady contributor of troops.

UN Troop contributions after the cold war were drawn from developed middle powers such as Canada, Austria, Chile and Sweden and developing countries such as Pakistan, Egypt and Kenya. The main motive of the middle powers was to increase their international stature by projecting their neutrality. Developing countries were said to be partly motivated by the higher pay offered in UN PSOs, access to opportunities for training and some wanted to export troublesome personnel.⁵¹

The UN has had a tradition of drawing troops from non-aligned countries that have well trained and capable troops.⁵² It has also been observed that most TCCs are democracies or countries that are aspiring for democracy. Given the Liberal peace theory influence in PSOs, there has been a tendency of PSOs to advance liberal values such as free and fair elections, respect for human rights, and rule of law and protection of civilians.⁵³

Countries that make contributions to PSOs also happen to be those with considerable military and police capability. Strong countries are also more likely to pursue regional and global security interests that require UN support.⁵⁴ Sometimes if a UN mission is perceived as being controlled by powerful countries such as the US (NATO in

50 The DRC sent some troops recently to Central Africa Republic, despite its dire security situation in the east

51 Davis, Bobrow and Mark Boyer, Maintaining System Stability, Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1997

52 James, Lebovic, Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Support Operations after the Cold War, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.48, No.6, 2004, pp.910-936

53 Ibid. p. 26 (PDF)

54 Opp.cit, Lebovic, p.8

Libya and Afghanistan), countries will support or withhold their contributions based on their relations with these powers. Some countries will provide troops in conflicts that directly affect their national interests such as happened with Kenya and Ethiopia in Somalia and South Sudan.

Today there are more than 84 Troop Contributing Countries and most of them are from the developing world. Contributions from developing countries may have been more welcome due to perceived impartiality and non-ideological based participation. The total casualty rate in UN PSO has been 1% of the total peacekeeping forces.⁵⁵

Participation of Kenya in UN PSO enhances its international stature, bilateral and multi-lateral relations/diplomacy. PSO missions provide wide international exposure and recognition which in the long run enhance international reputation of the country. Participation in PSOs also enhances the country's credibility and acceptability as a committed peace and security international actor and therefore increases its clout to influence global peace and security debates and trends. Though foreign currency earnings from PSOs are insignificant to the overall economy, they can boost national foreign exchange reserves. They also augment the rank and file pay of the troops, a fact that enables them to cope with rising costs of living.⁵⁶

Kenya participated in UN multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations in Namibia that involved resettlement of refugees, election monitoring and DDR. Prior to KDF's incursion into Somalia, Kenya had not engaged in a peace enforcement mission. Kenyan forces were therefore largely perceived as neutral and impartial. Between 1992 and 2001, Kenya was ranked the 17th largest contributor to UN PSOs, contributing 4% of the troops.⁵⁷ TCC to the UN or AU in Africa performs better in Human Development Index (HDI) than countries that do not contribute troops (*see table below*).

55 Mohammad, Kabir, UN Peacekeeping and Bangladesh, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 52, No.1, 1999, pp.15-38

56 Katharina, Coleman, The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping: Incentivizing Effective Participation, Providing for Peacekeeping, No.7, 2014

57 Bellamy A.J and Paul D. Williams, Broadening the base of UN Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCC/PCC), IPI, 2012, p.13

Table 2: Africa HDI, Global Ranking and Troop Contribution, 2013

| Country | HDI Value | Ranking | Troop Contribution |
|----------|-----------|--------------|--------------------------|
| Kenya | 0.573 | 147 | 5,564 (including AMISOM) |
| Ghana | 0.535 | 138 | 2,928 |
| Ethiopia | 0.435 | 173 | 7,806 |
| DRC | 0.338 | 186 | 15 |
| Somalia | - | Not assessed | 0 |
| Eritrea | 0.381 | 182 | 0 |

Source: Adapted from UNDP, Human Development Index and DPKO, Global Troops Contributions, 2014

Contribution to UN peacekeeping can be advanced as a foreign policy tool. Kenyan personnel, both commissioned and non-commissioned officers, enjoy goodwill in UN-led PSOs. Kenyan soldiers have held high positions of authority in UN peace support missions. Overall, Kenya has provided more than 200 military observers and more than 10 Battalions to peace operations.⁵⁸

PSOs enable maintenance of national and regional peace and stability, facilitate free and democratic elections, enable cross-border trade and economic development and facilitate provision of humanitarian relief.⁵⁹ Kenya has built credibility and reputation in quality PSO participation. Lt. General Daniel Ishmael Opande (Rtd.), one of the leading Kenyan peacekeepers, was Force commander in UNMIL and UNAMSIL (2000-2003) and Chief Military Observer, UNOMIL.⁶⁰ Major General S.N. Karanja (Rtd.) served as Deputy Force Commander (AMISOM) and UNMIS, while Major Gen. F.K Nthenge is the current Deputy Force Commander, AMISOM, and currently Major General L.M Ngondi is Force Commander, UNMIL.

Kenya has made a number of token contributions in PSOs – fewer than 50 personnel. Token contributions have low risk and act as a stepping stone for larger participation. They provide an opportunity for troops to access privileged information, gain C-34 membership, gain domestic and UN prestige and obtain influential positions

⁵⁸ Training for Peace Operations as Conducted in Kenya, African Capabilities for Training in Peace Support Operations, 1996

⁵⁹ UN, Report of the UNSG, Boutros Ghali, 1995, p.19

⁶⁰ Lt. General Opande deposited his international awards and regalia (memorabilia) to the National Archives for safe keeping and access to the public in 2008

with financial gains.⁶¹ Kenya is among the most committed contributors of UN peacekeepers as indicated by a study of PSO between 2000 and 2010.⁶² KDF is already familiar with UN procedures and systems and therefore this makes it easier for the country to collaborate with UN for fast troop contribution.

61 Katharina Coleman, *The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping: Incentivizing Effective Participation*, *Providing for Peacekeeping*, No.7, May, 2014

62 Bellamy A.J and Paul D. Williams (2012) *Broadening the base of UN Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCC/PCC)*, IPI

Kenya's Intervention in Somalia and Incorporation into AMISOM

The Kenyan Defence Forces crossed into Somalia to prevent spill-over of conflict into Kenya on October, 16, 2011 through an operation code named; '*Operation Linda Inchi*' (Protect the Nation). In making this bold move, Kenya cited internal security concerns emanating from Al Shabaab terrorists from Somalia. The legal basis for intervention was based on the UN recognized right of self-defence.⁶³ The envisaged Lamu Port and Southern Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPPSET) infrastructural development project just 60 miles from the Somalia border cannot operate in an environment of insecurity. Kenya has borne retaliatory attacks from Al Shabaab in the North-eastern region, Nairobi, Lamu and Mombasa counties.⁶⁴

Due to its confidential nature, the US, Britain and France were not informed of the intervention before the debut. This was a demonstration of president Kibaki's belief in Kenya's determination to protect its sovereignty and ability to defend territorial integrity without recourse to second parties. This led to Western critics describing the project as having been launched with; '*inadequate political, diplomatic and military preparation*'.⁶⁵

Critics view Kenya's intervention as an attempt to create a buffer zone in Southern Somalia (Jubaland) that will protect the country against Al Shabaab incursion into Kenya's territory. Kenya maintains that the mission will stay until Al Shabaab is eliminated.⁶⁶ Al Shabaab has come to be associated with Al Qaeda, an international terrorist group that made several attacks on Kenya especially the 1998 bombing of the American embassy in Kenya killing more than 200 and injuring thousands and the attack on Paradise Hotel in Mombasa in 2002 where 18 people were killed and 80 injured.⁶⁷

63 Alfred Mutua, Government Spokesman, October, 2011

64 Col. Cyrus Oguna, KDF/AMISOM Spokesman, Assessing Operation Linda Inchi, Interview, Catherine Kihara, March, 2014

65 International Crisis Group (ICG), 'The Kenya Military Intervention in Somalia', Africa Report No.184, 15 February, 2012

66 Eric Ombok, 'Kenya Plans to Exit Somalia once Al Shabaab is Destroyed', Bloomberg Businessweek, October, 27, 2011, Quoting Alfred Mutua, Government Spokesperson

67 ICG, The Kenya Military in Somalia, 2012

Kenya bore negative spill over effects of the Somali conflict for more than 20 years. Illicit proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), influx of refugees (more than 500, 000 in the Dadaab camp alone), smuggled goods, poaching and cross-border attacks on police stations are some of the long term effects borne by the country. Though Kenya had observed the principle of non-interference in neighbouring countries for a long time, the problem at hand required a more drastic response. This was a new form of peace operation where Kenya was directly advancing its national security interests contrary to previous peace support operations.

Though KDF soldiers are not highly trained in guerrilla/asymmetric warfare, they quickly adapted to the tactics employed by Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is still posing major challenges to the Kenyan tourist sector by undermining transport and the economy of the former Coast province.

In 2012 KDF was incorporated into the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM was established by the AU in 2007. It was initially composed of troops from Uganda and Burundi. More countries such as Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone have also joined AMISOM. The UN Security Council under resolution 2093 (2013) extended the mission to 2014.⁶⁸

Kenya's intervention in Somalia was the first engagement in peace enforcement mission outside its borders. Perhaps this is a reflection of the global changing dynamics where sovereignty of fragile states in the face of genocide or crimes against humanity (Responsibility to Protect) has been increasingly questioned. The reasons for intervention were to stop attacks on tourists by the Al Shabaab from across the border and to protect territorial integrity.⁶⁹ The key Western partners, the US, UK and France later supported the Kenyan intervention and were only concerned about the planning and potential blowbacks. However, they offered technical support in the background to prevent anti-Christian/West sentiments among the Somali population that Al Shabaab would have been happy to ride on.⁷⁰

Kenya has predictably borne severe blows such as the 21 September 2013 attack on

68 Col. Cyrus Oguna, KDF/AMISOM Spokesman, Assessing Operation Linda Inchi, Interview, Catherine Kihara, March, 2014

69 Eric Ombok, 'Kenya Plans to Exit Somalia once Al Shabaab is Destroyed', Bloomberg Businessweek, October, 27, 2011, Quoting Alfred Mutua, Government Spokesperson

70 ICG, The Kenya Military in Somalia, 2012, p.15

Westgate Mall in Nairobi, killing more than 60 people and injuring more than 200. A total of 28 retaliatory attacks from Somalia have been recorded since KDF entry in 2011.⁷¹

Ethiopia later joined AMISOM and has been providing crucial support to Kenya's intervention. Ethiopia and Kenya share a Mutual Defence Pact signed in 1964 which has been renewed ever since primarily aimed at boosting their pacification efforts in Somalia.⁷²

71 Ibid.p.16

72 www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/Somalia, accessed October, 14, 2014

Challenges of Kenya's Participation in PSOs

Despite Kenya's outstanding performance in PSOs, there are concerns that too much dedication to them may detract the military from enhancing its war fighting capabilities. Kenya's intervention in Somalia lacked genuine consent from the host government. In the beginning, it seemed as though there was no explicit and clear political and military strategy for intervention in Somalia.⁷³

Civil society participation in PSOs is largely limited in most African countries due to lack of exposure and the technical knowledge associated with complex peacekeeping operations. Though civilians are trained in government and non-governmental organizations to participate in PSOs, the number is inadequate. Civilian participation in PSO missions is not facilitated by the government. Most civilians working for humanitarian and other missions have often used their personal initiatives and networks to join PSOs. This low participation of civilians can also be witnessed in EASF-supported training and missions.⁷⁴

The tripartite foundation of PSO encompassing military, police and civilians provides a stable framework within which Kenya can boost its performance in global PSOs. There has been a continuous demand for more civilian and police participation in UN-led PSOs. The Brahimi Report (2000) called for maintenance of a roster of trained civilian personnel for PSOs. The Zimbabwe-based AFDEM has been keeping this record for Eastern and Southern Africa but its capacity is limited.

The need for PSOs to incorporate DDR, SSR, electoral management, economic development, health, environment and crime, gives the participation of civilians a high priority.

Effective participation of women in PSO is still limited judging by the number of women in peace support missions.⁷⁵ Though training centres are building capacity of PSOs to understand protection of civilians, gender, Sex and Gender Based Violence

73 Opp. Cit, ICG, p.14

74 AU (PSOD) (Cedric de Coning and Yvonne Kasumba (ed.), *The Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force (ASF)*, 2010

75 Bellamy A.J and Paul D. Williams, *Broadening the base of UN Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCC/PCC)*, IPI, 2012

(SGBV) and participation of women in peace and security as outlined in UNSCR 1325, 1888, 1889, 1820 and 2122, the capacity is still low.

The Kenya police PSO contingent has not been as visible as the military contingent both in quantity and quality.⁷⁶ An improved police presence in the global PSO scene could have an impact on the discipline and performance of the local police.

There are many new challenges that the Kenya military, police and civilians have faced as they enter uncharted grounds. In Somalia, KDF faced a number of battle stressors. Though the soldiers were more familiar with conventional warfare, in Somalia they faced counter insurgency/asymmetrical warfare coupled with poor weather conditions, isolation and separation from loved ones.⁷⁷

As mentioned earlier, lack of a guiding national framework on PSOs creates a situation of missed opportunities for effective and efficient pursuit of national interests through this framework. Synergy is also lost through weak and ad hoc linkages between security, defence, foreign policy, other government agencies, civil society and private sector participation in PSO.

⁷⁶ www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/dpko/pcc

⁷⁷ Francis, Xavier, Ichani, Battle Stressors and Fatigue of Military Intervention in Somalia, *Journal of International Academic Research for Multidisciplinary*, 2014, Vol.2, Issue 3

Towards Effective National Participation in PSOs

The enormous social capital accumulated by the country's long service in PSOs should be harnessed as a flagship of international recognition alongside the country's prowess in international athletics, global attraction for international tourism and pace-setter in regional mediation for peace in Mozambique, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia. A globally respected security sector will also promote respect for human rights and rule of law domestically and at the regional level. These mutually reinforcing national attributes will create the necessary atmosphere for accelerated security and development. This can only be achieved through a comprehensive definition of the role of PSOs in national and regional security and development and establishment of an appropriate framework for its implementation.

For AMISOM to succeed, it must not only help the current administration in South Central Somalia but should also work with the autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland. The Somali problem is primarily political and only a political solution will provide lasting stability. The military strategy should follow and help the political strategy to succeed. Kenya should also research and understand the dynamics of Somalia's clan politics so that KDF does not unintentionally become the 'sixth clan'.

However, there are many ideas about the cause of the Somali conflict and as many ideas about its solution. Through international and regional engagement, Kenya should influence as much as possible viable political solutions. The Somalia peace enforcement mission provides KDF with an opportunity to test its operational capability, project its regional military prowess and safeguard national interests. Incorporation into AMISOM not only provides financial relief while offering legitimate international cover but also reduces national exposure to extremist groups.

So far KDF has respected Somali culture and religion while observing human rights and rule of law thus avoiding unnecessary cultural backlash.⁷⁸ The Kenya government should also strengthen its diplomatic and political mechanisms of addressing the Somalia conflict since the military can only succeed where it is supporting well

⁷⁸ Maj. Gen (Rtd) S.N Karanja, former Deputy Force Commander, AMISOM, Address at the AMANI Lecture series, IPSTC, 21, August, 2014

thought-out political policy and strategy. Under the IGAD framework, the AMISOM TCC should be more proactive in collaborating with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to define its political trajectory that is favourable to peace and security in the region. The current international efforts to build a strong Somali National Army/Somali Defence Forces must take cognizance of clan inclusivity within South-Central Somalia and its implications for the self-declared autonomous regions of Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug and Jubaland.

The IGAD-led peace process that enabled formation of the current FGS must not be side lined by the ‘international community’. It should re-energize itself once again to push Somalia into a realm of sustainable state and nation building. KDF success in Somalia at the strategic level is dependent on this outcome.

The exit strategy of AMISOM should be well defined and disseminated in order to have clarity on the vision and road map of the mission and to remove Somali perceptions of occupying forces (Kenya and Ethiopian contingents). The success or failure of Kenya’s/AMISOM intervention will define the future of peace enforcement praxis. It is necessary for the political and military leaders to espouse a grand transformative policy and strategy that will make Somalia a partner in the Horn of Africa’s security, socio-economic and political development rather than a major hindrance.

It is important for the Kenya mission to benefit from hindsight of UN and US interventions in the early 1990s and Ethiopia’s intervention in 2006. The respect for human rights, professionalism of armed forces and tolerance for religious and cultural diversity has endeared the forces among the clans of Southern Somalia. Initially, units of the KDF on the ground were commanded by Somali and Muslim officers who understood the local language and culture and were readily acceptable to the local people.⁷⁹

As the toll of KDF casualties hit hard on war-weary Kenyans and as the country’s divided politicians send mixed signals to Al Shabaab; the future of KDF’s presence in Somalia will be squarely intertwined and dependent on local political dynamics. This extra-territorial constituency may dim the fortunes of the KDF’s fight against Al Shabaab in particular and to the stabilization of Somalia at large.

⁷⁹ Residents were informed of impending attacks through media including twitter, Col. Cyrus Oguna, KDF/AMISOM Spokesman, Assessing Operation Linda Inchi, Interview, Catherine Kihara, March, 2014

Conclusion

The global position of Kenya as a leading TCC is well written on the global map. There are many factors favourable for a more effective and comprehensive participation in global PSOs, including goodwill from the international community (UN, AU, IGAD, EAC, World Bank and global powers). There is a clear relationship between TCC and national peace and security in Africa. The ground however does not seem to be clear and stable. There is no common policy and strategic framework that can join the loose ends of security, defence, foreign policy/diplomacy and development planning and implementation, upon which PSOs can be effectively pegged.

This study has established that police contribution and civilian participation are falling behind the good performance of the military. These are gaps that can immediately be addressed as an overall guiding policy is developed. Civil society and academia should enhance Kenya's participation in PSOs through assessment of missions (quantitative and qualitative) to help Kenyans understand the benefits of TCC/PCC and civilian participation in PSO missions.

Kenya's intervention in Somalia is a different kind of ball game. It does not fall within the traditional PSO profile. However, it has lessons to offer as the global dynamics of PSOs continue changing and shifting. The negative ramifications of that mission should not blur the good and long reputation of Kenya's participation in global UN/AU missions. Kenya's intervention in Somalia should be assessed under a different framework. However Kenya's experience in mediation and peace building in other countries in the region will come in handy once pacification of the renegade forces (Al Shabaab) is accomplished.

Due to territorial proximity and the past history of Kenya/Somalia conflict, the country can only run a relatively short term expedition to pacify extremists. Working jointly with the international community, Kenya and IGAD can support a pan-Somali clan and political elite constituency to advance the road to Somali national reconciliation, peace building and development. This means that there is a need for clear articulation and coherence of Kenya's long term internal security and defence interests, political expediency and military strategy in Somalia.

Recommendations

- Kenya should develop a strategic and long term blue-print that defines core national interest linkages to security, defence, Vision 2030, PSOs and development policies
- Top leaders and policy makers should have a clear understanding of the relationship between security, peace support operations and development
- There is a need to raise the bar of Kenya's TCC/PCC as part of a national and regional conflict prevention paradigm
- The costs and benefit of TCC/PCC should be analyzed and appropriate deployment strategies employed including assessing the value of strategic and token contributions
- There is need for developing a robust national infrastructure to respond to the needs of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. This infrastructure should be based on security and defence policies and the relevant institutions in place should have strategic linkages to achieve a common vision.
- The institutional framework should also be well aligned with (APSA), (EASF) and other regional security and development instruments
- The government should improve engagement of the Kenya Police Service and Civilians in international peacekeeping
- Proper assessment of the conflict, political, military and other related risks and dynamics should be made prior to sending the troops to conflict areas
- Kenya should not be relegated to the position of providing 'African boots' while the political decisions that determine the future of Somalia with implications for Kenya's national security, are determined by other 'interested parties'
- Further studies on the relationship between troop contribution to the UN/AU and the possibility of enhanced stability among troop contributing countries and regions should be undertaken

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ANNEX A

Kenya PSO Troop Contributions (1979-2014)

| Mission | Year | Troop/Police Contribution | Total | Global Ranking |
|---|-----------|---|-------|----------------|
| Zimbabwe Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMFZ) | 1979-1980 | Force Commander | | |
| Iran/Iraq United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG) | 1988-91 | Military observers | | |
| United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) Namibia | 1989-90 | Deputy Force Commander, Troop contingent and Military observers | | |
| United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) | 1991-2003 | Military observers | | |
| United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) | 1992-95 | Chairman Joint Verification Committee, Military observers | | |

| | | | | |
|--|-----------|--|----|--|
| Former Republic of Yugoslavia United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) | 1992-1993 | Military observers and Battalion operations, 4 rotations Sector Commander, FRY Senior Military Liaison Officer, Deputy Sector Commander, Chief of Staff, Garrison Commander | | |
| United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) | 1993-1997 | Force Commander 4 Troops 3 Military observers 26 Police | 33 | |
| United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) | 2003-2014 | 19 Troop 5 Military observers 5 Police | 29 | |
| United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) | 1993-1996 | Military observers | | |
| United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), | 1991-1995 | Military observers | | |

| | | | | |
|---|-----------|--|-----|--|
| African Union/ United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) | 2007 | 106 Troop 11 Military observers | 117 | |
| African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) | 2007 | Deputy Force Commander –Troops, Police | | |
| Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) New York | | Country Representatives | | |
| United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) | 2004 | 4 Troops 5 Observers | 9 | |
| African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) | 2004-2007 | 60 Troops 45 Military observers | | |
| United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) | 1999-2010 | 36 Military observers 4 Police | 66 | |
| United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) | 2010 | 21 Military 5 Police | 26 | |

| | | | | |
|---|-----------|---|---|----|
| United Nations Missions in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL) | 1998-2005 | Force Commander-Troops, 1 Sector HQ + 2 Infantry Battalions | 2000 | |
| United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) | 2006 | 1 Military observer 1 Police | 2 | |
| Ethiopia/Eritrea United Nations Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE) | 2000-2008 | 118 Troops 10 Military observers | 128 | |
| United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) | 2005 | 831 Troops 7 Military observers 20 Police | 858 | |
| United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) | 2011 | Police 28 Experts on Mission 6 Troops 696 | 730 | |
| United Nations Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) | 2013 | 1 Troop 2 Police | 3 | 24 |
| United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (1978) | | 1 Troop | 1 | |
| Total | | | Military 728 Police 176 Plus 4662, AMISOM | 28 |

Transnational Terrorism in Eastern Africa: *Case of Al- Shabaab in Somalia*

Martin Okwir

Overview of the Paper

Since the Al-Qaeda attack in the United States on September 11, 2001, there has been heightened global concern on the effects of Islamic-based international terrorists. Russia has also suffered massive effects from terrorists in Chechnya and other regions. In Eastern Africa before the terrorist attack of 1998, the public could walk in and out of any shopping mall, restaurant, and public building in the main cities without fear. This is not the case any more. There are some dates that are now painfully etched into the sub-conscious of East Africans. One of them is 11 July 2010. As the FIFA World Cup final was approaching its zenith, a bomb exploded at a club house of the Kyadongo rugby club in Kampala, Uganda. Seventy four people died and more than 60 others were injured. Al-Shabaab, the Somali terrorist group, claimed responsibility for the attack.

Three years after the Kampala attack, on 21 September 2013, Al-Shabaab struck again. They entered Kenya's high-end Westgate shopping mall, a model symbol of opulence in the out skirts of the Kenyan capital Nairobi, a place frequented by the high and mighty some of whom were diplomats and UN staff. Kenya suffered immense loss of human lives and economic destruction during the Westgate Mall siege. There is therefore need to understand the ideological dynamics of conflicts that inform terrorism and its transnational nature. This is the main objective of this paper.

Background

The world has been faced with the scourge of terrorism and terrorist threats for a while. Following a protracted period of conflict, social unrest, and political instability, the Eastern Africa region in particular has made considerable advances in democracy, economic growth, and development in the past decade,⁸⁰ notwithstanding these advances, there is concern about the increasing rise of terrorism and its adverse effects on peace, security, and development in the sub-region. The frequency and lethal nature of attacks in some Eastern African countries in recent years are an indication of the increasing sophistication of terrorist groups in the sub-region. Although not broken down by country, the United States 2011 Country Report on Terrorism indicated that, “Africa experienced 978 attacks in 2011, an 11.5% increase over 2010”. This is attributed largely to the more frequent attacks of the Somali-based terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, which conducted frequent attacks within the region, Kenya, and Uganda being the main recipients. It is documented that the Al-Shabaab conducted 364 of these terrorist attacks killing 132 people.

Compounding the situation is the rising radicalization and southward migration of terrorists and extremists, particularly members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), through the Sahel towards Somalia. Indeed, there are indications that AQIM has operational bases in some Eastern African countries and has forged tactical alliances with terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the Allied Democratic Front of Uganda, and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), all terrorist groups. These alliances have taken the form of AQIM’s provision of training and logistical support to terrorist operatives. In addition, there is suspicion that Al-Qaeda has developed ties with the Somali militant group, Al-Shabaab. More importantly, alliances and co-operation among Al-Qaeda affiliate groups with Eastern African terrorist groups, coupled with alleged support by certain ethnic communities and politicians in East Africa underpin the seriousness of the problem and the associated negative effects on the people and development of the sub-region.

80 The *East African*, October 18-24th, 2014. “East Africa region is dynamic and vibrant. We have worked tirelessly to maintain a stable macro-economic environment characterized by security of persons, property and our financial systems. We have defeated instability in East Africa and no one will be allowed to destabilize the region. Our region is now conducive for investments” President Museveni of Uganda on Security and Development.

In addition to the terrorist groups aforementioned, there are others that are not based in Eastern Africa but derive a significant amount of financing through their activities in the region, this is particularly evident in narcotics trafficking, which is often funneled to Europe via pre-existing routes in Eastern Africa and, at times, originating in South America. Eastern Africa, especially, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Djibouti is more vulnerable to terrorism and terrorist financing for a number of reasons. The sub-region suffers from political instability, ethnic and communal violence, pervasive corruption, widespread poverty, and high rates of unemployment and underemployment, especially among young people. (Nzes, 2012). Terrorists and terrorist groups tend to exploit these negative conditions especially with regard to young people (Allison, 2013: 1; Anzalone, 2012: 1).⁸¹ Furthermore, most of the borders in Eastern Africa especially Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia are porous and there are many ungoverned spaces along the vast boundary lines. These countries lack the capacity to effectively monitor the borders and boundary lines which is a vulnerability that can be exploited by terrorist groups to establish training bases for their members and to transport and distribute weapons across the sub region (Bruton, 2013: 5).

The devastating effects of terrorism, especially loss of life, destruction of property, insecurity, under-development, and reputational damage, have attracted the attention of the authorities or national governments of the East African Community on the need to act decisively to counter the threat. To address the terrorism challenge, (EAC) member States have attempted to enact (with various degrees of success) anti-terrorism and combating terrorist financing (CFT) laws, established institutional frameworks, strengthened investigative and prosecutorial capacities, and enhanced domestic inter-agency and international co-operation. In 2012, a regional Counter-Terrorism Action Plan was developed, with the support of many stakeholders, to strengthen regional efforts against terrorism (Zhao and Wang, 2008). In addition, the Summit of Heads of State and Government of Eastern Africa, held in Nairobi from 27-28 February 2013 adopted the East African Community (EAC) Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Implementation Plan, as well as the Political Declaration on a Common Position against Terrorism.

81 Kenya unemployment Rate from 1999-2014, Unemployment rate in Kenya increased to 40 percent in 2011 from 12.70 percent in 2006. The unemployment rate in Kenya averaged 22.43 percent from 1999 until 2011, reaching an all-time low of 12.70 percent in 2006, as reported by the Kenyan National Bureau of statistics.

The Strategy and Implementation Plan in particular provides a framework for the fight against terrorism in East Africa (Chan, 2001).

On the same note, after realizing the need to harmonize the law to combat terrorism, Eastern African governments notably Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Tanzania enacted some legislation to tackle terrorism and border security. For instance, in 2012, both the Kenya and Uganda governments enacted legislation on Law Enforcement and Border Security: these include among others; Prevention of Terrorism Act 2011; Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act; and 2010 Prevention of Organized Crime Act which provided a strong legal framework under which to prosecute acts of terrorism. Again, Kenya's National Assembly made new amendments to the landmark 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) with the aim of strengthening the criminalization of financing acts of terrorism. Unfortunately, the Kenyan judiciary stopped the application of these amendments after a petition by the Opposition Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD).

The Research Problem

Terrorism still remains a real challenge for law enforcement in Eastern African countries. Overtime, it has been mutating to the extent that enforcement agencies have to keep abreast of the emergence of terrorist networks (Aronson, 2010). Many works including Aronson (2010), Maina (2011) and (Gordon, 2011) have been written on terrorism in general. However, no specific work addresses Eastern Africa's responses to the transnational terrorist threat. Due to the sensitivity of counterterrorism, some aspects of the Eastern Africa strategy remain classified.

The limitations of current transnational counter-terrorism strategies in Eastern Africa are based on or argue for an entirely new approach to the problem. The military and law enforcement communities bring very different core competencies to the table. Neither community, by itself, has an adequate skill-set to implement transnational counter-terrorism strategies in the region effectively. Both communities working in tandem, however, offer capabilities that may prove effective in dealing with the complex Somali state problem setting. Transnational terrorism is one of the most substantial threats to peace and security within the Eastern African

region. Approaches towards this problem are however, diverse. As Member States implement different policies based on differing basic assumptions, a structured, univocal strategy towards transnational terrorism is absent, considering the continuing integration within the African Union, a union-level strategy with regards to terrorism is imperative. In order to support the formulation of such a strategy, this issue brief analyzes both the conceptual nature of the problems identified here and the possible measures flowing from these assumptions.

Overwhelming evidence suggests that most of the transnational conflicts and irregular threats in the Eastern Africa region include terrorism, poaching, piracy, trafficking in arms, drugs and humans; smuggling, document fraud, cyber fraud, money laundering, and cattle rustling. It should be recognized however, that transnational and irregular threats in the core Eastern Africa region originate mainly from outside this core. The growing threat of transnational and irregular threats in the Eastern Africa region is influenced partly by the situation in the Horn of Africa and partly by that in the Arabian Peninsula and its vicinity including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran. Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula are known to be key hideouts or head-quarters for terrorist cells and their proximity to the Indian Ocean gives the terrorists unlimited access to the porous Eastern African coastline.⁸²

Historical Reasons

So far, counter-terrorism measures applied by the respective member-governments of AMISOM and supported by the European Union (EU) and the US have not been satisfactory. While AMISOM has made major gains in stabilising Somalia, winning the hearts and minds of the country's youth is proving to be an impossible task, well exploited by clerics with fundamentalist ideas.

For decades, Somali nationalists have nursed irredentist ambitions of a Greater Somalia, which encompasses parts of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. These were/are areas inhabited by ethnic Somali people which were 'lost' to its neighbours during the drawing of African borders by the European colonialists. To contain the aspirations of the Greater Somalians, Kenya and Ethiopia not only signed a defence pact in

⁸² The term "terrorist organization" will be used regularly throughout this study. In many cases this can also refer to small groups or cells. For the sake of consistency, this distinction will not be made each time the term "organization" is used.

1964 but have always taken a keen interest in the affairs of Somalia by supporting leaders who abhor irredentism, this has been a major bone of contention in the region which has, unfortunately, been exploited by Somali politicians with an axe to grind. As a result, in the last decade, all the 11 member-countries of the East African Community (EAC) and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have witnessed increased activism, some religious oriented. Thrown into this mix is a proliferation of rebel groups and militias with diverse self-serving political and economic motivations.

Rationale for the Study

Judging from the increasing manifestations and sophistication of transnational terrorist activity in Eastern Africa, more work has to be done to counter the problem. Terrorist groups have devised operational methods that have made it difficult for enforcement authorities to prevent attacks which have highlighted gaps in knowledge as it relates to understanding transnational terrorism in Eastern Africa. Therefore, Terrorism is not only leading to massive loss of life on the continent but is also impacting the economies negatively.

Economic Backlash

The damaging effects of transnational terrorism have seen Kenya's tourist city of Mombasa recording declining tourist arrivals. Facts and figures released by the cabinet secretary in charge of East African affairs commerce and tourism show that transnational terror attacks or perceptions of them, have undermined the country's image as a tourist destination. The effect on the country was that economy recorded a negligible 0.5% economic growth in 2012-2013.

Zanzibar too has not been spared the economic backlash of extremism. In 2012, tourism revenues were estimated at \$170.5m but this went down to \$155.6m in 2013. According to a 2012 integration study by the World Bank, the East African Community (EAC) region grew faster than all the other economic communities in the world except ASEAN, and each EAC member country more than doubled its GDP. But if transnational terrorist extremism in the region continues, the economic gains of the last few years may be lost.

To help fight transnational extremism in Eastern Africa, Western intelligence agencies have invested heavily in anti-terrorism efforts in Africa. Since 2002, the US has leased a permanent military base in Somalia's northern neighbour, Djibouti. Camp Lemonnier, whose average annual budget is \$238m, is home to the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HA) which is the US military's main anti-terrorism operational base in the Horn of Africa.

Intelligence Sharing

The UN Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee, in its report that was updated on April 2014, lists 96 individuals and 14 organisations in Africa, which it says, are affiliated to Al-Qaeda. Algeria, Chad, Comoros, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Uganda are the main African nations caught in the Al-Qaeda web. From Afghanistan to Yemen, to Al-Shabaab's Somalia, and going all the way to Mauritania in the west, the grip of Al-Qaeda is alive (Aronson, 2012).

It is only lately that regional approaches have gained a foothold and made use of the channels offered through the African Union and regional economic bodies. While governments have been late on intelligence sharing owing to intrigues of power, suspicions and vested interests, the transnational terrorism networks have taken full advantage of the bureaucracy bedeviling governments. A continent-wide intelligence-sharing initiative is still absent and the Africa Standby Force proposal has been slow to be realised. Among the Eastern African, Asian and Middle Eastern nations, it is clear that in as much as the UN lists them as being affected by transnational terrorism, there is little intelligence sharing between them. As such, most African countries tend to tackle their respective threats on their own or give their Western allies preference in intelligence sharing while ignoring their neighbours and other regions.

The third factor is less well known and least talked about, the transition from pastoralist culture to modernity. Every country in Africa that was based on pastoralist culture in the past is having a hard time transitioning to modernity. (African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS, Vol.7, November 2013).

These loopholes have worked in favour of the transnational terror networks just as

vices like corruption have been exploited to aid their missions. Westgate is a case in point of how corruption within Kenya's security architecture abetted terror.

Ethiopia is the odd one out as its counter-terrorism strategy appears to work and has kept Al-Shabaab away. Low funding of security agencies and wanton corruption are the vices that are yet to be tackled appropriately in the region (Aronson, 2012). In the 2013-14 Kenyan budget alone, the inspector general of police requested that Parliament allocate the police Ksh.150 bn (\$1.72bn), but parliament rejected the request and instead offered \$784 m to the police department. Due to the challenges posed by Al-Shabaab, Kenya expects to increase its combined defence budget to \$5.5bn by 2018, from the current \$4.3bn. (ISSUU - New African Review, June 2014 by IC Publications May 27, 2014). Further to this, the mobile phone operator Safaricom has been awarded a tender worth \$170.4m to develop a security communications, analytics, command and surveillance system to aid the war on terror. (African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS, Vol.7, November 2013).

Terrorist organizations depend on funds for their personal, operational, and organisational needs. Detecting and cutting off their source of funding are critical steps in denying them the ability to operate. Investigating, apprehending and prosecuting the financiers of terrorist groups and terrorist acts will serve as a deterrent to others. The freezing, confiscation, and seizure of terrorist assets will equally have a deterrent effect. More importantly, understanding and addressing the issue of terrorist financing is critical because of the destructive effects of terrorism on peace, security, and development within the Eastern Africa region.

Objectives

The Objectives of this paper are to:

- Examine the internationalization of Al-Shabaab and effects of their activities;
- Assess the strategies of governments, NGOs and international community in dealing with the challenge of international terrorism;
- Identify strategies and opportunities for effective prevention of terrorist infiltration in the region; and
- Explore the determinants of terrorism and assess its effects on the national life of the affected countries

Literature Review

Definitions

Transnational Terrorism: has been defined in various international counter-terrorism instruments. According to the UN Convention for the Suppression of Transnational Terrorism, the definition of terrorism in article 2 calls them “actions carried out by autonomous non state actors whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states” (Schmidt 1983; Cronin, 2002).

Terrorism is the “intentional infliction of suffering or loss of one party by another party, which has no authority or legitimacy. An alternative definition is the use of indiscriminate violence to intimidate the general majority of people in a state to accept the changes advocated by the terrorists (Schmid 1983; Chauovy 2004). The essence of terrorism is to kill or injure opponents in ways specifically designed to cause fear and thus, to disorganize the opposing society to a degree far out of proportion to the number of victims” (National Counterterrorism Strategy, 2011). The traditional inspiration for terrorism is Sharia Law.

Simply defined, **Sharia** refers to a body of Islamic law drawing on principles laid down in the Koran, supplemented by *Hadiths*, the sayings and teachings of the prophet as reported by reliable oral narrators who lived after him. Islam has always had lively debates on the hadiths and their interpretations down the centuries and these have generated different schools of law within the faith. However, the version of sharia spawned by salafism has never attracted mainstream following in Islam, hence the tenency to portray the many interpretations as one. For instance, Ibn Taymiyya argued that the correct traditions were those reported from the first three generations of Muslims, the ancestors or “salafs” and hence the modern word salafism. The problem, as Sadakat Kadri’s book, *Heaven on Earth: Journey through Sharia Law* shows, the salafist doctrine is by definition almost unquestionable: How is one to prove that a claim of the sacred is unsound without inviting blasphemy?

Salami’s doctrine is tried to wahhabism through Muhammad al-wahhab, a pious 18th century jurist, who claimed a right “to enforce one of God’s own rights”. He so impressed Muhammad Yusuf, a salafist cleric of the House of Saud that the two

soon partnered to form the first Saudi state, henceforth, the fortunes of the Saudis would be tied to wahhabism, ibn Wahhab's version of salafism. Salafism claims that its goal is to purify Islam, hence the rigid application of sharia wherever the doctrine is ascendant.

The salafist version is assumed and a march of the horrible is conjured up. The image then becomes one of Islamic fanaticism in which, to use Sadakat's words, all Muslims are presented as "fiery of eye" and bedraggled of beard. This ignorant rhetoric, so beloved of the American media, alienates most Muslims and blocks debate about what to do with extremist groups who are a danger to all and an even greater danger to Muslims.

Understanding Transnational Terrorism: Theoretical Framework

The levels-of-analysis framework stipulates that the origin of any war can be analyzed at the individual, nation-state or international levels. Despite the fact that this framework was conventionally applied to interstate relations, it can also be applied to a variety of non-state actors such as regional organizations. The main causes of transitional terrorism in Eastern Africa are more likely to come from internal rather than external variables. The realist hypothesis that external security is the leading issue is questionable in the context of the developing countries where resource shortages, inequality and social welfare may be the more urgent problems. Political leaders in Eastern Africa have however become more concerned about external security threats.

It is useful to consider theoretical frameworks that provide an understanding of how transnational terrorism manifests itself. These frameworks can be applied to the particular case of Eastern Africa. However, it is important to note that there is no broadly accepted model of transnational terrorism along the lines and ideologies that govern their existence. A number of studies have proposed a number of theories in explaining transitional terrorism.

The conceptual framework that guides this paper is captured in Figures 1 and 2. It represents the conceptualization of the author on transnational terrorism in the

eastern Africa region, it incorporates the person (meaning the active terrorist actors), the ideology underlying the respective type of terrorism (meaning the motivationally-relevant body of ideas underlying the crimes), and the respective social and cultural environment from which and within which terrorism occurs.

Figure 1. Terrorism Framework: The Gordon and Ford Conceptual Overview

| Components | LTTE (Example) | Description |
|--------------------|---|--|
| Perpetrator | Group/Individual | Virtual interactions can lead to anonymity. |
| Place | Worldwide | The event does not have to occur in a particular location. The use of cell phone and Internet has introduced globalization of the environment. |
| Action | Threats/Violence/ Recruitment/ Education/Strategies | Terrorist scenarios typically are violent or involve threats of violence. Violence in virtual environment includes psychological effects, possible behavior modification and physical trauma. |
| Tool | Kidnapping/ Harassment/ Propaganda/Education | Terrorists use the cellphone, computer and related tools. Facilitating identity theft, use of computer viruses, and hacking fall under this category. |
| Target | Government Officials/Corporations | Potential targets are corporations and government malls, buses, schools, government computer systems. |
| Affiliation | Actual/Claimed | Affiliation refers to recruitment in carrying out given instructions. Affiliation can result in strengthening of individual organizations as they can immediately acquire access to the information resources of their allies. |
| Motivation | Social/Political Change | Political, social and economic conditions are the motivations present in real-world terrorism. |

Source: LTTE = *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka)*.

The second illustration looks at the interplay among three factors: the individual person, ideology and the environment in which terrorism takes place.

Person, Ideology and Environment Conceptual Framework




Figure 2: Ideology of Terrorism

The second illustration as captured in Figure 2 attributes Transnational terrorism to a variety of factors: Economic, political, religious, ethnic and racial, social and cultural, environmental and revenge. These are contingent upon infrastructure, population and non-symbolic factors.

Political and Structural Theory

A political approach presupposes that the causes of terrorism can be found in environmental factors such as national or international arenas as well as sub-national spheres like universities (Hudson, 1999). This approach, which was mostly adhered to by left wing researchers in the sixties and seventies, including Ross (1996) and Ted Robert Gurr (1970; 2006) indicates poverty, oppression and inequality as major causes of terrorism. Central to Gurr’s research is the notion of relative deprivation, a term often used to describe feelings of economic, political, or social deprivation that are relative rather than absolute. He further suggests that the inability to obtain what is felt to be justified triggers feelings of frustration that ultimately facilitate the emergence of collective violence.

In addition to environmental factors, scholars have sought to identify preconditions that set the stage for terrorism in the long term, and precipitant mechanisms that activate the occurrence of terrorism. In a similar vein, preconditions are further subdivided into permissive factors which provide opportunities for terrorism to happen, and situations or reasons that directly inspire terrorist campaigns (Crenshaw, 1981). The use of preconditions implies a political approach as it seeks to distinguish what in the environment can contribute to an individual's involvement in terrorism.

Eastern African countries including the Horn of Africa are home to some of the world's poorest communities surviving on subsistence farming, pastoralist activities and petty trade. According to the International Labour Organization statistics, unemployment in sub-Saharan Africa lies at 7.8% compared to the global average of 6% as of 2013⁸³. The Somalia Human Development Report 2012 issued by the UN Development Programme, considers 82% of Somalis to be poor, with 73% living on less than \$2 a day.

Power Transition Theory

Conventional literature on the causes of conflict is dominated by the realist paradigm that incorporates several distinct theories. All these theories speculate that the key actors are nation states that act rationally to improve their security, power and wealth in an anarchic international system. One of such theories is the "*Power Transition Theory*". This theory can be used to explicate the causes of ethnic conflicts in Eastern Africa. Ethnic minorities feel protected under powerful centralized state or authoritarian political systems but when the centralized or authoritarian state collapses courtesy of democratic governance, this exposes ethnic minority communities to the "emerging anarchy". For fear of their security, the minority groups may create instability by providing security against perceived physical and economic dangers. Thus ethno-national groups in a condition of weakening centralized authority face an "ethnic security dilemma" that is comparable to the security dilemma facing states in the international system.

This realist explanation of ethnic conflict proposes that violence is likely to increase if ethnic groups overlap between state territorial borders. The legitimacy of states

83 Neumann, Peter, *Old and New Terrorism*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009.

is reduced as a result and this makes security more complicated, it may boost the possibility of secessionist wars and if ethnic minority groups are concentrated in a locality, they may decide to defend themselves thus creating instability, these are some of the realities in Eastern Africa, South Sudan, and Somalia that stimulate transitional conflicts. Therefore, the concept of power in political performance distinguishes the power transition tradition from the power concepts traditionally associated with realism. Relative power measures have also been applied to alliance systems. Kim (1989) introduces alliance conditions into power transition theory in estimating the optimal times for war between states, finding that alliances are partly associated with increased risk of conflict that may tend to increase a rise in extremism.

In analyzing transnational terrorism as a cause of conflict within the eastern African region: power transition focuses on differential growth rates and their effects on altering relative power between nations, resulting in new relationships among nations and the formation of new political and economic entities. One by-product of differential growth is high potential for conflict when a challenger and a preeminent or dominant nation reach the stage of relative equivalence of power, and specifically when the challenger is dissatisfied with the status quo.

Rational Choice Theory

The rational choice theory assumes that actors have preferences based on their estimation of outcomes, each of which yields different levels of well-being. The rational actor chooses a particular course of action because they believe it will ultimately yield the greatest amount of utility for themselves within existing environmental constraints (Bray, 2009). In this context, utility is defined as a set of preferences in which the higher the preference rank of a situation, the more utility it brings to the actor.

An actor's decisions rely on the value the actor places on the expected outcomes of the choices made and these valued outcomes can be material (objects) or non-material benefits (e.g. political, moral or psychological). Because an actor seeks to achieve the best possible outcome, rational choice theory concludes that individuals will act in a systematic, predictable way, consistent with their preferences (Bray, 2009).

In the area of peace and security, terrorists are conceived as strategic actors that deploy a rational political strategy (Crenshaw, 1998). The choice to use violence is a conscious one, made by an organization for strategic and political reasons. Al-Shabaab is one such actor who perceives some strategic rationale in their actions. If the assumption of Islamic ideological rationalization as the core basis of Al-Shabaab's operations is correct, then the whole of Al-Shabaab's strategy should have shown complete opposition towards the West and whole-hearted support to Al-Qaeda's global jihad network.⁸⁴

Rational choice models help us to understand the violent political behavior of groups. For example, Enders and Sandler (2006) have used rational choice theory to successfully model the reaction of terrorist groups to counter-terrorism efforts by governments. Thus, rational choice theory assists in exploring the motives of all individuals connected to violent political activities within a single conceptual framework, from tacit approval to explicit monetary support and non-violent protests in support of political extremists. Secondly, Rational choice theory is a positive theory rather than a normative one (Nicholson, 1989). This means that it does not pass value judgments on the reasonableness or appropriateness of individuals' political, religious, or moral beliefs. Rather, it takes those beliefs as given and examines the tradeoffs individuals make within that context (Enders and Sandler, 2006). Lastly, it explicitly incorporates constraints to deviant behavior. Constraints such as freedom of movement and availability of education or employment opportunities are some of the immediate and most movable targets for policy makers seeking to prevent transnational terrorism.

In support to the rational choice theory, terrorists "will naturally seek the weakest link i.e. the country with the least security," or the least secured sector within a country, to base their operations and arrange their subsequent attacks (Sander, Enders 2004: 16).

84 Horgan, John (2007), "Understanding Terrorist Motivation: A Socio-Psychological Perspective" in in M. Ranstorp, (ed.), *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction*. London: Routledge; Hudson, Rex A. *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why*. Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September 1999.

Also, with regard to terrorist attacks, terrorist leaders “maximize utility or expected utility derived from the basic commodities produced from terrorist and non-terrorist activities” just like rational choice actors make decisions to maximize utility or expected utility given specific constraints, more broadly (Sander and Enders 2004: 19).

Similarly, through its alliance with Al-Qaeda in Somalia and Afghanistan (under the Taliban regime) Al-Shabaab was able to operate freely and without fear of legal, military or judicial conflict. When the United States invaded Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda operatives rationally moved to ‘safer’ places in which to base their operations. They fled to nearby countries and many cells branched out. They are now operating in over 100 countries including many of the countries of the Eastern Africa and in Nigeria where it operates as Boko Haram.

A terrorist organization ensures its survival in a number of rational ways. Two prominent examples are the secret, underground nature of the organization itself, and the way in which individuals are recruited. The utilization of social networks to recruit and enlist members provides a natural vetting process and serves to strengthen bonds of trust among members. Furthermore, it is in the group’s best interest to recruit individuals whose decision to pursue terrorism stems from its own rational logic, as opposed to those who are simply mentally unhinged or seeking adventure. Given that survival is the group’s main goal, “not only do serious terrorists scorn the ineptitude of the more excitable, but they also find them a serious security risk.”⁸⁵

One strand of rational choice theory inspired by economics is that all individuals, and by extension organizations, are utility maximizers.⁸⁶ The particular utility one chooses is based on individual preferences and is not restricted to monetary gain. Consequently, “the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies posits that terrorists are rational actors. According to this view, terrorists are political utility maximizers; people use terrorism when the expected political gains minus the expected costs outweigh the net expected benefits of alternative forms of protest.”⁸⁷

85 Crenshaw, Martha. “The Causes of Terrorism.” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 1981): 392.

86 Starmer, Chris. “Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk.” *Journal of Economic Literature*. June 2000, pp. 332-382.

87 Abrahams, Max. “What do Terrorists Really Want?” *International Security*. Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008): 78.

Terrorists operate via propaganda of the deed; that is, the message they wish to send is often embodied in the attack itself.⁸⁸ If the social cohesion of the group were valued more highly than other factors, the act of planning, preparing for and finally carrying out an attack would serve a purpose beyond the political implications of the attack. The act itself is an external validation of the bonds formed between members. A Transnational terrorist attack can also serve the organization in a different way, as a reinforcing mechanism to solidify alliances between two groups if the target is of particular political or symbolic importance to one or both of the allied groups.

In sum, therefore, transnational terrorist organizations make rational decisions based on cost-benefit analyses and strive to maximize a given utility, which may not necessarily be political power. Furthermore, terrorist organizations inherently understand that survival is the central goal and take measures to ensure their self-perpetuation through the use of terrorist acts in order to propagandize, recruit, and build social cohesion within the group. Given this we can make several assertions regarding the behavior of terrorist organizations.

The transnational terrorism group's survival will be foremost amongst its goals and therefore considerations regarding survival will drive behavior. Secondly, transnational terrorist organizations will act on decisions only after conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the situation. Finally, these same organizations are driven by a desire to maximize a certain utility that can be political, social, or economic in nature. Using these three principles as a baseline, the following sections develop a framework for understanding why terrorist groups would be interested in forming alliances and how they might be expected to behave, once allied.

88 Garrison, Arthur H. "Defining Terrorism: Philosophy of the Bomb, Propaganda by Deed and Change through Fear and Violence." *Criminal Justice Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 2004, pp.259-279.

A Brief History of Al-Shabaab in Eastern Africa

Al-Shabaab rose from the ashes of the failed Somalia state. It grew out of Al Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI), a group led by Middle Eastern-educated Somali salafists that emerged after the collapse of the siad Barre regime in 1991. The group did not thrive immediately. AIAI's message did not find favour with many in Somalia, a country whose torrent of religious traditions and vibrant secular culture were inhospitable to conformism, a desired attribute of the salafists. By early 2000, unending violence had exhausted the country, immiserated the population on whom the burden of war fell most heavily. A split about goals and methods between the AIAI youth and its elders in 2003 forced the youth to decamp to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a relatively moderate group then trying to restore order in war-torn Somalia.

In 2006, the combined forces of Al -Shabaab and ICU overran the Capital, Mogadishu and promptly imposed their version of Sharia across the country. A panicked transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) invited Ethiopia to overthrow the ICU. In actual fact, Ethiopia did not need an invitation. It had its own Islamist bogeymen in the outlying regions of Ogaden, Issas and Afar and was afraid that the ICU success might inspire its own dissidents. The militant Al- shaabab became particularly incensed and impatient with ICU. It fought the Ethiopians, won some victories and then opened links with Al-Qaeda. Al-shabaab had come of age.

As Rob Wise Rob Wise. Senior Advisers, Arnaud de Borchgrave. War on Terrorism, 2001 notes Al -shabaab gained global standing through Al-Qaeda resources and training. Al-Qaeda gained influence over the group, a fact that was soon reflected in Al -Shabaab's ideology and tactics, for instance, suicide bombing and rhetorical posturing that now presents Somalia as a front in a "global war" against the West.

In Eastern Africa, Al-Shabaab continues to operate because of several factors: inequalities continue to exist; desperation and unemployment among the youth a weakening state feeding widespread corruption; militarization of some member states such as Uganda's anti-terror strategy; and finally, regional leadership cack-handed handling of Al-shabaab and the whole process of how the Somali community was being handled in Kenya.

East Africa is a highly unequal region. In northern Kenya, between 74% -97% per cent of the people live in absolute poverty amidst drought and famine. In Kenya alone, unemployment is high. For many years, these economic realities are always exacerbated by political inequalities. Of course, this does not translate into automatic support for Al-Shabaab but it does suggest lukewarm support or outright hostility to the governing elite which, of course, weakens the government's ability to fight Al-Shabaab in Somalia.⁸⁹

Economic stress has created an angry reservoir of desperate, poorly educated Muslim youths in the north and coast generally but in the northeast in particular. This then provides a large population from which Al-Shabaab is able to recruit. The cannibalistic corruption among the East African governments has weakened the state and its ability to confront Al-Shabaab's violence. The Kenya and Uganda governments' response to Al-Shabaab have been comprised of targeted assassinations and indiscriminate swoops and torture of suspected supporters. In Uganda, many youth were arrested without trial. Yet, brutality and impunity have not worked. On the contrary. Al-Shabaab has returned with greater force after each round of killings, carrying out ever more ruthless attacks and conducting even bigger massacres especially in Northern Kenya.

Incidences and Forms of Terrorism in Eastern Africa: Tracing Trans-national Terrorism

The long history of conflicts experienced by the region has weakened the capacity of individual states to address transnational and irregular threats. Regional and sub-regional bodies, inter alia, including the African Union (AU), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), The East African Community, (EAC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) have recognized that peace and security is a prerequisite to meaningful and effective collaboration in combating transnational threats such as terrorism. Enhancing peace by reducing insecurity in the Eastern Africa Region is, therefore, a high priority for all these organizations and other stakeholders in the region.

⁸⁹ Draft Sessional Paper on National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands: 2009 Government of Kenya, Office of the Prime Minister

Over the past years, Africa has played host to several high-profile terrorist events and movements that originated from other parts of the world (Botha, 2004). For example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was felt in Eastern Africa when in June 1976, a Palestinian terrorist hijacked a commercial Air France plane carrying 248 passengers and took it to Entebbe, Uganda. Before the twentieth century, terrorists attacked political and religious leaders to cause fear and compel behavior change. Old-school terrorism was direct in its targeting. Later, there was recognition of innocent victims and a distinction was made between legitimate and illegitimate targets (Kushner, 1998). The hostages, mostly Israelis, were rescued by Israel Defence Force Commandos in a dramatic, well-executed mission that showed much competence and served as a deterring mechanism to other terrorist groups. However, after 34 years, foreign terrorists again entered Uganda, this time due to Uganda's role in Somalia.

On July 11, 2010, Al-Shabaab carried out twin suicide attacks in Kampala, Uganda, against people watching a soccer match, leaving 78 people dead and 89 injured.⁹⁰ These were the first terrorist attacks by the group outside Somalia, qualifying Al-Shabaab as a transnational threat in the region. Since 2007, Uganda has been leading the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), with the assistance of Burundi. Both countries contribute a contingent force of about 9,000 troops based in Mogadishu. As a result, Al-Shabaab has embarked on a provocative strategy of deterring countries involved in the efforts to pacify Somalia by targeting their cities to compel them to withdraw from Somalia.

Kenya has been the scene of various attacks attributed to terrorist elements: the 1980 attack on the Norfolk Hotel in Kenya; the August 1998 simultaneous attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam; the November 2002 simultaneous attacks in Mombasa, Kenya- one on the Paradise Hotel and the other on an Israel-bound aircraft at take-off from the Mombasa International Airport, Kenya; the attack against a UN building in Algeria; and the atrocities of Boko Haram in Nigeria offer just a few examples of terrorist attacks carried out on African soil (Botha, 2004).

90 Major-General Kale Kayihura, "Annual Crime and Traffic/Road Safety Report-2010," *Uganda Police*, 11,

Dempsey, (2006) observed that Eastern Africa has its own peculiar domestic collection of ideologically-inspired violent non-state groups that are responsible for periodic bouts of mayhem. As such, effective counter-terrorism measures urgently need to be put in place.

Despite the efforts to combat terrorism, Africa, especially Eastern African countries have not only struggled against domestic terrorism, but have also been challenged by the emergence of transnational terrorist groups that have used Africa as a theatre to carry out attacks against both domestic and international targets. Bryant (2002), notes that Islamic militancy increases when social movements and political parties are formed to pursue religious and political goals. A good example is Hezbollah (party of God), an Islamist movement and political party founded in Lebanon shortly after that country's 1982 civil war.⁹¹

The Eastern Africa region has brought a new aspect of transnational terrorism known as Religious- Based Terrorism. To date, public survival is more likely to be threatened as militia groupings and criminals tend to target the youth for recruitment to fill their ranks.

⁹¹ See Garrison, Arthur H. (2004), "Defining Terrorism: Philosophy of the Bomb, Propaganda by Deed and Change through Fear and Violence." *Criminal Justice Studies* 17 (3): 259-279.

Al-Shabaab's Cooperation with Al-Qaeda

The Al-Shabaab's history initially had locally-focused operations in Mogadishu and Southern Somalia (Ploch, 2010), and were even willing to cooperate with Western humanitarian aid workers (Burton, 2010), presumably to gain local support and wealth.⁹²

In 2007-2008, one of Al-Shabaab's cell commanders stated in an interview that although Al-Shabaab deems Al-Qaeda as brothers in Islam, there were no links between the two (BBC, 2008). However, since July 2007, Al-Shabaab has been one of the 5 main affiliate groups of Al-Qaeda (Byman, 2012) and was named by McConnell (2012) as the strongest, most dangerous, and expansive terrorist group in Sub-Saharan Africa.

This paper analyzes the rational process that Al-Shabaab terrorist group went through before making the decision to openly declare allegiance to Al-Qaeda. The article begins by examining the critical period of change in Al-Shabaab, the methodology employed, and lastly, the factors that appear to influence Al-Shabaab's decision making from 2007 to date. The hypothesis of this paper is that Al-Shabaab pursued cooperation with Al-Qaeda after realizing that their nationalistic stance was no longer achievable.

Al-Shabaab's initial starting point as an organization is unclear. The group's founding could be dated back to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). However, Al-Shabaab became a discreet collective actor in 2006, when it became the military wing of ICU. During the period of 2006-2008, Al-Shabaab underwent changes that further integrated it into the global Jihad framework and, as a *de facto* Somali extension of Al-Qaeda. There is a clear progression in the organization from being the military wing of ICU, through being an independent militant organization with national ambitions to a (self-defined) 'Jihadist' organization with global ambitions.⁹³

92 Grenshaw, Martha. "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics* Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 1981) 392. Starmer, Chris. "Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk." *Journal of Economic Literature*. June 2000, pp. 332-382.

93 M.J. Gohel, (2003) quoted in Raufer, Xavier. "Al-Qaeda: A Different Diagnosis". *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26:391-398; 394.

The pinnacle of the changes was the declaration of the ‘New Praiseworthy Terrorism Campaign’ on April 5th 2008, where Al-Shabaab stated that their enemies were no longer confined to local warlords, apostate governments, or neighboring states, but had branched out to the United States and its alliance of ‘crusaders’ (Shabaab al Mujahideen Movement, 2008).

In 2008, The New York Times conducted an interview with AQM Emir, Abdelmalek Droukdal, whose statements regarding cooperation between the two groups are insightful. When answering the question “why did you join Al Qaeda?” Droukdal responded:

“Why shouldn’t we join Al Qaeda”? God ordered us to be united, to be allied, to cooperate and fight against the idolaters in straight lines. The same way they fight us in military allies and economic and political mass-groupings.... An ally is faced by another ally, and unity is faced by unity.... The joining was a legitimate necessity.... It was a mind full necessity imposed by the actual reality and the international system.

Later, when asked to identify any assistance provided by al-Qaeda, Droukdal answered:

“It’s normal that they [al-Qaeda] get stronger by us and we get stronger by them. They back us up and we back them up. They supply us and we supply them with any kind of support, loyalty, advice and available support.”⁹⁴

The striking issue is that in March 2008 when Al-Shabaab was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), they were still denying the existence of cooperation them and Al-Qaeda in more than one instance by Ali Mukhtar Roobow, the spokesperson of Al Shabaab, and other members (Harper, 2008).

This may have been contradictory to their goals at the time when their appeal for help from other FTOs could have benefited from an alliance with Al-Qaeda. It can be inferred that Al-Shabaab’s decision to cooperate with Al-Qaeda could not be sufficiently explained by the evolution of its character over time until 2008 when Al-Shabaab decided to fully embrace the Al-Qaeda mantra. Before then, Al-Shabaab publicly denied any cooperation but in August 2008, they publicly declared obedience to Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.⁹⁵

94 An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal”. *The New York Times*, 1 July 2008.

95 Jones, Seth G. and Martin C. Libicki, “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qaida.” 116.

Tracing Al-Shabaab's Strategic Preferences

In order to better understand this watershed period, it is necessary to first trace the strategic preferences of Al-Shabaab. In doing this, the author uses the framework of Rational Choice Theory. According to Anderton and Carter (2004) and Caplan (2006), the principle of rationality also exists in the mind of terrorists. Bray's explanation of individual rationality is applicable to group or organizational situations, including terrorist groups. With this approach, terrorism is indicative of collective rationality and radical political organizations become the key actors. Consistent with Bray, Crenshaw (1998) explains that organizations have a set of preferences or values and will choose to conduct terrorism when it is the best way to maximize preferences in comparison with alternative forms of action. It would follow, therefore, that Islamic militant organizations such as Al Shabaab have a set of preferences in the conditions they face, and that decisions about how to act are made to maximize their attainment of the organization's preferred outcomes.⁹⁶

Based on the Matrix outlined in Annex A, it can be ascertained that Al Shabaab had 3 main preferences: (1) Nationalistic, which relates to the internal struggles in Somalia, (2) Sharia, which correlates with the application of Sharia law, and (3) Transnational, which involved fighting foreign targets which were not directly related to winning the war in Somalia. This set of preferences will be further used to deduce how Al-Shabaab's decision to change its stance on Al Qaeda maximized its utility at the time, in line with the framework of Rational Choice Theory. In an ideal situation, Al Shabaab's actions should cater for its nationalistic preferences first and foremost, then its sharia preferences, and finally its transnational preferences.

Fulfillment of the secondary and tertiary preferences should not contradict achievement of the first-level preference.

In the case of Al Shabaab, these preferences can be derived from their historical statements and actions prior to August 2008 since, according to Bennett and Checkel (2012), the identification of an actor's preferences according to rational choice theory should be performed in the period before the outcome. Newer preferences

⁹⁶ Horgan, John (2007), "Understanding Terrorist Motivation: A Socio-Psychological Perspective" in M. Ranstorp (ed.) Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction. London: Routledge; Hudson, Rex A. The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why. Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September 1999.

are given a higher rank because they are closer to the point in time when Al Shabaab made its decision to publicly declare cooperation with Al-Qaeda rather than retreat to its original insular position. The outcome is a set of preferences shown in Figure 1 as an Annex.

The Losing Battle for Nationalistic Preferences

After the declaration of affiliation with Al Qaeda, the outcome should have helped Al-Shabaab maximize the outcomes for its primary, nationalistic preference to conquer Somalia and establish sharia law nationally. However, the declaration of allegiance to Al-Qaeda would appear to be counter-productive in relation to the aim of achieving control over Somalia. Achieving control over the country requires support from the public, yet there were strong anti-foreign sentiments in Somali society (Byman, 2012).⁹⁷ These anti foreign sentiments include antagonism towards Al-Qaeda, caused in part by the latter's trademark strategy of using suicide bombing which is considered a taboo in Somali society (USCIRF, 2009). Indeed, their declaration of unification with Al-Qaeda would only be consistent with their organizational preferences when viewed against the following facts:

1. Al-Shabaab had difficulties in achieving its nationalistic preference and would have achieved more utility by pursuing its transnational target;
2. These difficulties arose in the period of March-August 2008; and
3. Al-Shabaab perceived that affiliating with Al Qaeda would increase its capacity to strike foreign targets.

The hypothesis here is that Al-Shabaab pursued cooperation with Al-Qaeda after realizing that their nationalistic preference was no longer achievable in the near future. It can be strongly argued that Al-Shabaab was struggling to meet its nationalistic preferences due to the movement's legitimacy being increasingly questioned by the Somali public.

97 In this strategy, al-Qaeda hopes to spread out between 2000 and 2020 in seven phases including the "awakening" of the *umma* (Muslim nation); the overthrow of "apostate" regimes in the Muslim world; the reestablishment of Caliphates; and the worldwide victory over infidel regimes (See, Musharbash, 2005). To fulfill these objectives, it seeks to incorporate local radical Islamist groups into a global movement. (Rabasa et. al, 2006).

The support of the public is a necessity in Al Shabaab's quest to conquer Somalia. Being a small organization of only 3,000-6,000 members (McConnell, 2010), Al Shabaab would logically need to have public support to secure its hold on regions and the whole country.

During 2006-2007, Al-Shabaab initially had strong support from the public as it was perceived to be an organization that could bring stability to Southern Somalia, and more importantly, was the only belligerent organization left in Somalia after Ethiopia's invasion which incapacitated the ICU (Wise, 2011).

This support can be seen by how the communities of Jowhar and Beledweyne provided Al Shabaab with food and cooperated on security matters in mid-June 2006 (Dagne, 2011). Ali Mukhtar Roobow's public speeches on behalf of Al Shabaab in Dinsoor also received positive responses from the society (Reuters, 2007). However, it was reported that by the end of 2007, public support for Al Shabaab had decreased drastically in the regions it controlled (Le Sage, 2010). Local communities were distressed with Al Shabaab's style of governance, and started to form opposition towards the organization (Mulaj, 2010).

It can be further argued that the downfall in legitimacy was brought about by 4 main reasons: (1) Al Shabaab's basic nature as a Salafi organization, (2) The change of leadership from Aden Hashi Ayro to Godane on 1 May 2008, (3) Al Shabaab's inability to maintain stability in the region in the period of March-May 2008, and (4) the increasing number of Al Shabaab attacks targeted at civilians.

The second factor that contributed to this decision is the change of leadership in Al-Shabaab. After Aden Hashi Ayro was killed by a US airstrike on 1 May 2008, the position of leader was given to Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed Godane (Westcott, 2011). Compared to Ayro who balanced nationalistic and transnational preferences quite well, Godane was a figure who was very much in favour of transnational aims and cared less about the local conditions. Their difference in global jihad intentions could be seen by the public statements released during their eras. Under Ayro, Al Shabaab's statements emphasized nationalistic and anti-Ethiopian objectives. Ayro never mentioned Al Qaeda or bin Laden specifically in his speeches. However, under Godane, Al Shabaab was directly mentioned as an 'integral part of global

‘jihad’ (Kohlmann, 2009), and Godane personally declared allegiance to Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda operatives (Horadam, 2011), before finally declaring group allegiance to Bin Laden in August 2008.

The third factor, Al Shabaab’s inability to maintain stability in Somalia, also played a role. With the many conflicts that happened in 2008, e.g. conflicts between Al Shabaab and other organizations, and also conflicts between other actors in the society, Al -Shabaab’s legitimacy as the bringer of stability and order in Somalia was diminishing (Wise, 2011). Even though the reason behind Al-Shabaab’s failure to maintain stability was not clear, it is evident that 2008 was the year of the most intense conflict in Somalia during the last few decades, a condition that was contrary to the stability and order that was Al Shabaab’s trademark.

Benefits of Affiliation with Al-Qaeda

Public announcements of affiliation with Al-Qaeda could have been perceived to have significant benefits for Al-Shabaab in terms of achieving their Sharia and transnational goals. These benefits relate to (a) battle tactics training, (b) funding, and (c) branding and recruitment. According to Westcott (2011), there was a significant difference in the battle tactics of Al Shabaab. Previously, the majority of Al Shabaab tactics emphasized assassination (as part of an overall guerrilla strategy) when facing an enemy. However, after foreign influence, there were two new elements in Al Shabaab's tactics.⁹⁸

The first is the use of suicide bombings, which up till 2006 was not known in Somalia (USCIRF, 2009). The second element is the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and roadside bombs. Actors in Somalia had used IEDs before but this method of attack became prevalent in 2010-2011, when Al Shabaab conducted 137 IED attacks in Somalia. Previous data show that during October 2007-December 2008, there was a total of 18 attacks using explosives/ bombs/dynamites (Global Terrorism Database, 2013).

After affiliation with Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab's attacks became more coordinated, with targets of a higher profile than previously. Additionally, Al-Shabaab's sniper activity against AMISOM and the Transitional Federal Government also increased significantly (Westcott, 2011). It is logical to assume that Al- Shabaab expected to receive information on combat tactics especially suicide bombings and IEDs as these were the dominant tactics of Al Qaeda. Moreover, one of Al Shabaab's former leaders, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, was a senior leader of AIAI (Ali, 2010), who cooperated with Al Qaeda in the 1990s and would know of this benefit.

A second perceived benefit was an increase in Al Shabaab's funding. Compared to other Jihadist organizations, Al- Qaeda can be categorized as well-financed (Byman, 2012). Al Qaeda had access to Arab networks and had long been sponsoring the struggle of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) in Egypt, Algeria's Salafist Group

98 John Arquilla, "It Takes a Network: On Countering Terrorism While Reforming the Military," Testimony before the House Armed Service Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities on September 18, 2008, in *Lessons for Countering Al qa'ida and the Way Ahead* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010), 61, <https://www.hsdl.org>

for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat, or GSPC) in Iraq, and Chechen foreign fighters (Byman, 2012). Allying with Al-Qaeda meant potentially receiving a funding benefit.

A final perceived benefit of Al-Qaeda affiliation was that it would be easier for Al-Shabaab to recruit foreign fighters. Ali Mukhtar Roobow spoke about the need for more foreign fighters in the battle in Somalia and Al-Shabaab has all along aspired to unite the global Jihad with the Jihad in Somalia (Kohlmann, 2009). Al-Shabaab's growing prominence in Islamic radical forums, in an effort to be noticed and to reach out to the international Islamic militant community can also be seen as a reason, among others, for recruiting more foreign fighters.⁹⁹ The declaration of affiliation with Al-Qaeda made Al-Shabaab more attractive, as supporting Al-Shabaab would also be supporting the Global Jihad. Al-Qaeda also had a much wider network with the ability to reach out to various cultures and languages, which would increase the publicity of the group (Byman, 2012). This branding not only helped with recruiting, but also gave credibility to Al-Shabaab and enhanced its global reputation (Byman, 2012).

Al Shabaab could confidently believe affiliation with Al-Qaeda would enhance their recruitment capabilities based on their experience in February 2007. At that time, the As-Sahab Media Foundation of Al-Qaeda released a video entitled "To the Army of Distress in Somalia", in which Sheikh Abu Yahya al-Liby, acting as Al-Qaeda's representative, sent a message to the Somali society to not easily surrender and give up in fighting the infidels (Kohlmann, 2009). Even though this message did not specifically identify Al-Shabaab, Abu Az-Zubeyr Godane, who replaced Ayro as leader in May 2008, gave special thanks to Abu Yahya al-Liby for helping mobilize more than 1,000 mujahideen in the war in Somalia (Kohlmann, 2009). From this experience, it can be concluded that Al-Shabaab believed there would be positive benefits gained from Al-Qaeda affiliation and Al-Qaeda branding.

99 Kristopher K. Robison, Edward M. Crenshaw, and Craig J. Jenkins, "The Ideologies of Violence: The Social Origins of Islamist and Leftist Transnational Terrorism," *Social Forces* 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 2012–2014.

Meanwhile, recruiting more individuals for the war in Somalia became of utmost importance in Somalia in mid-2008. Since March, Al-Shabaab was experiencing attacks from the United States, firstly unsuccessfully targeting Hassan Turki (Harnisch, 2010), and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan (Ploch, 2010), both senior leaders of Al Shabaab. This turn of events led Roobow to conduct an interview with the Global Islamic Media Front, in which he complained that there was a lack of non-Somali ‘brothers’ in the war in Somalia, and Al-Shabaab aspired to unite the global Jihad with the Jihad in Somalia (Kohlmann, 2009).

In an arena of battle like Somalia, the number of troops is the most important factor, as military power indicated political significance of the organization (ICG, 2010). On the other hand, the global mujahideens who moved to Somalia were clear about their intentions to support global jihad, not Somali interests.

One Somali who moved back to the country stated: “*O’ my people, know that I am not doing this martyrdom operation only for the sake of Allah and his religion...not for nationalism, tribe, and money or fame*” (Kohlmann, 2009). Thus it can be seen that foreign recruitment would mostly benefit transnational causes of the Al Shabaab insurgency. However, as argued previously, at this point in time, it was a benefit that best maximized Al Shabaab’s utility as nationalistic preferences would be much harder to obtain. Since the nationalistic preference of Al Shabaab was in jeopardy, therefore, pursuing global credibility would have better maximized Al Shabaab’s utility. It is for this reason that Al Shabaab chose the path of affiliation with Al Qaeda to boost its organization’s existence and operations for the future.

Other Facilitators of Transnational and Irregular Threats in Eastern Africa

Proximity to the Arabian peninsula: Proximity to and close links with the Arabian Peninsula, a major source of radical Islamist ideology (Salaafism and Wahabism) has made it easy for the propagators of radicalization to enter and operate in the Eastern African region especially along the coastline.

Porous borders: Porous border zones continue to constitute threats to states and communities in the entire Eastern Africa region. The efficacy of the existing

information management systems and the challenges facing control and management of borders alongside other underlying social, economic and cultural factors continue to constrain the effective and efficient control and management of borders for sustained peace and security. There is both use of official and unofficial entry points depending on the category of travelers and the intention of entry or exit from a country.

Governments generally lack adequate equipment and training for officers to effectively curtail transnational and irregular threats. Most border control departments in the region have limited logistical support which increases loopholes in border control and management. This problem is partly responsible for reliance on other weaker systems for support. Since most of the border management and control posts are located in remote areas with no access to hydro electric power supply, the only available forms of power supply are solar and thermal energy which is also often too expensive to install.

Ungoverned or unpoliced spaces: These have helped to increase criminal groups using these spaces to plan, organise and execute criminal activities in the region. Examples are found in Somalia and Eastern DRC, some parts of the Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR)

Other enabling factors include:

- Weak legal and institutional frameworks;
- Weaknesses in good governance and the Rule of Law;
- Colonial legacies: - affecting legal systems, languages and cultures; and
- The rise of radical Islamist groups.

Collective security and securitization: Since the end of the Cold War, political analysts and policy makers alike have turned their attention to regional conflicts calling for collective security management. Collective security can be understood as a security arrangement in which all states cooperate collectively to provide security for all by the actions of all against any state or group which challenges the existing order by use of force. Collective security has been suggested by scholars as one of the most promising approaches for peace and as a valuable device for power management on

an international scale. Cardinal Richelieu proposed a scheme for collective security in 1629, which was partially reflected in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. In the Eighteenth Century, many proposals were made for collective security arrangements, especially in Europe (Buzan: 1993). Baha'u'llah (1817–1892), the founder of the Bahá'í Faith, prescribed collective security as a means to establish world peace in his writings during the 19th Century (Shoghi: 1983).

Securitization in international relations can be referred to as a concept connected with the Copenhagen School and is largely seen as a synthesis of idealism and classic political realism in its approach to international security. Securitization is an extreme version of politicization that enables the use of extraordinary means in the name of security. The ability to effectively securitize a given subject is, however, highly dependent on both the status of a given actor and on whether similar issues are generally perceived to be security threats.

Collective Security therefore is achievable by setting up an international cooperative organization under the auspices of international law and this gives rise to a form of international collective governance, albeit limited in scope and effectiveness. The collective security organization then becomes an arena for diplomacy, balance of power and exercise of soft power. It is therefore imperative that for the Eastern Africa region to effectively improve regional responses to combating transnational and irregular threats by fully embracing collective security mechanisms as a tool for achieving that objective.

Regional Efforts in Combating Transnational Terrorism

Both the Kenya and Uganda government's efforts to fight transnational terrorism alone cannot yield significant results without the cooperation of the countries in the region including Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Djibouti among others. The existence of long, porous borders that transnational terrorists can exploit has forced both Kenya and Uganda to forge a multilateral approach to the fight against terrorism.¹⁰⁰ To enable broad intelligence sharing in the fight against terrorism, for instance, Kenya hosted an Africa regional counter-terrorism conference in August 2004 to discuss regional cooperation in fighting the

100 Peter Chalk, *Case Study: The East Africa Corridor, in Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 157,

threat. This cooperation would, in the long run, help enforce border control and intelligence sharing.

Somalia's instability has also created problems for enforcing border controls. Somalia's lack of a central government for the last 14 years and its proximity to the Arabian Peninsula make it a potential location for international terrorists seeking transit or a launching pad from which to conduct operations elsewhere. Somalia also widely uses the *hawalla* system of money transfer. The lawlessness in that country is conducive to unhindered and unchecked movement of terrorists, material and cash through the long, unpatrolled coastline and porous borders. To address the problem, both Kenya and Uganda have been at the forefront in the region in bringing about national reconciliation to establish peace and stability in Somalia.¹⁰¹

The peace Somalia peace process conducted mainly in Kenya realized the signing of a peace accord between the warlords and the formation of a transitional federal government in Somalia. However, despite the sluggishness of the Kenya government to develop specific counter-terrorism legislation, it has sought to fight terrorism in several ways. However, considerable progress has been made in the establishment of specialized anti-terrorism units within the police and military forces; the establishment of a National Counter-Terrorism Centre under the auspices of the National Security and Intelligence Service to provide timely and factual intelligence to assist in the fight against terrorism; and strengthening of security measures at airports, government installations and foreign embassies in Kenya (Otieno, 2003).

The AU and Western European governments should seize this opportunity to support the new Somalia government to bring in peacekeepers to establish authority, disarm the militias, and pacify the country. Given the current goodwill within the Somali community and the involvement of all the warlords in the new government, the possibility that peace will be attained is a reality. With the establishment of a stable government in Somalia, Kenya and its allies would have an additional partner to fight terrorism in the region and to mitigate the use of the porous borders between Kenya and Somali by Al Qaeda elements.

101 Jamestown Foundation Briefs, "Al-Shabaab Expands Operational Zone with Kampala Bombing-But to What End?" *Terrorism Monitor* VIII, no. 28 (July 16, 2010): 2,

International Community Response

Transnational terrorism affects global peace and stability. As such, no country can single-handedly combat the threat. The enormous resources and global intelligence needed are beyond the reach of many developing countries particularly Eastern African countries. For several decades, security cooperation has been an important aspect of East African-US relations despite political disagreements between the US and Kenyan regimes over corruption and human rights abuses. Kenya-US relations during the Uhuru Kenyatta administration are warmer and promise deeper security cooperation. Already, the United States has spent over \$3.1 million on anti-terrorist assistance, including training Kenyan security personnel in the United States.

Security programs have been complemented by other initiatives such as the US donation of \$1 million for airport security equipment under the “Safe Skies Africa” program to improve aviation security. Terrorist interdiction programs using hardware and software packages are intended to significantly reduce terrorists’ freedom of movement among countries by the use of a state-of-the-art computer network that enables immigration and border control officials to quickly identify suspicious persons on terrorist watch lists who might be attempting to enter or leave the country (Royce 2004). There is also increased terrorist-related intelligence sharing, which has enabled the government to apprehend and disrupt the activities of terrorist suspects. The response of the international community, especially in providing resources and intelligence sharing will help Kenya fight transnational terrorism.

Current US policies are, as are those of other European countries, geared to meet the challenges of a soft target, as eastern Africa is perceived to be. However, Kenya is a source of terrorism as well as a soft target. The components of the US counter-terrorism program in east Africa are good but the focus is primarily short and medium term such as apprehending terrorists, providing training, and building a counterterrorism infrastructure to deny terrorists opportunities to exploit institutional weaknesses. What is missing is a long-term program to reduce poverty and the socioeconomic imbalance terrorists exploit.

Dealing with the source of terrorism entails institutional changes that go far beyond protection. These involve commitments of enormous resources to address the socioeconomic conditions that promote terrorism in Eastern Africa. Apart from security assistance, the United States should vigorously implement its National Security Strategy whose goal is to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, such as poverty, deprivation, social disenfranchisement, and unresolved political and regional disputes (Bush 2002: 17-19).

Making Counter-Terrorism Work

- In response to the growing security threat that transnational terrorism has posed in the Eastern Africa region, African governments and regional organizations have joined the U.S-led “war on terror.” Ideologically-charged counter-terrorism is becoming a sword that cuts both ways which means catalyzing and supporting peace processes while undermining democracy and stability in weaker states. Governments are utilizing terrorism to breathe new life into old security paradigms that prioritize regime survival and state security rather than human security.
- Coordination between national, regional and international counter-terrorist initiatives is needed to ensure that these initiatives do not undermine an already fragile security situation in Eastern Africa. Regional governments must re-commit themselves to counter-terrorism initiatives by strengthening the current counter-terrorism laws, police and intelligence, tightening border controls, coastline surveillance and anti-money laundering measures to detect, deter and diffuse transnational terrorist threats, while striking a healthy balance between these measures and the values of democracy and human rights. Regional governments should refrain from underhand manipulation of terrorism in ways that undermine peace processes.

- African institutions particularly the AU, IGAD and COMESA must unwaveringly pursue a counter-terrorism campaign within the broader framework of the emerging continental peace and security agenda. They should work with international partners to boost regional abilities to deal effectively with the security threats posed by transnational terrorism, always ensuring greater coordination between African efforts and those of international players like the US. Otherwise, the parameters of the war on terror will continue to be set by the imperatives of global insecurity with little attention to local security realities.
- Continued funding of existing initiatives is central to pushing back the frontiers of terrorism and regional insecurity in the Horn of Africa. However, nothing short of a holistic and well-coordinated counter-terrorism policy that ties together poverty eradication, conflict resolution and peace-building strategies can successfully drain the marshes in which extremism and terrorism thrives in the Horn of Africa.

External Assistance

- History has shown that the key to winning any successful counter-insurgency and irregular conflict depends on well-equipped and trained local forces, as opposed to international partners waiting to support the Eastern African states in major campaigns against insurgent Islamists. The regional bodies should rather train and equip effective local forces that can take on the burden of fighting their own wars.
- External partners should concentrate on the vital mission of training both the African forces and Somalia defence forces to enable them command the necessary resources and personnel to combat the emerging security challenges. Meticulous training and high-tech equipment will play a key role in combating transnational crime in the region.

- External partners mainly the US and Europe have in the past offered a variety of bilateral capacity-building and procurement programmes to many African forces. For instance, the US Department of Defence provides partner nations with access to its Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing which can be used to purchase other equipment. However, the problem of external bilateral support occurs at irregular intervals which create planning and coordination difficulties for the individual African / regional forces. Devising a comprehensive security cooperation arrangement that focuses on shared regional interests can assist to solve these problems.
- This paper further addresses the issue of security on common borders by calling for the setting up of management strategies. The AU Charter commits states to prevent any direct or indirect support or delivery of arms to armed radical Islamist youths operating in the region. These provisions outline a vision for border security infrastructure management for sustainable peace and development in the region and set the frameworks within which rules, norms and values that support the principles of non-aggression and mutual defence are to be built.

Al-Shabaab's Operations in Eastern Africa: The Lessons Learnt

The first lesson is that extremist groups may not be defeated by military means alone. Ethiopia, Kenya and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) have tried without success to destroy Al-shabaab since 2006. Even when its leaders have been killed, as they have been with increasing regularity by American drone attacks, the group has merely been temporarily incapacitated, not destroyed. This probably means that violent methods may not work. Thus, for both Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, collective punishments against entire Muslim communities or even targeted assassinations may not be the panacea for terrorism.

The rounding up and internment of Somalis from Nairobi's Eastleigh district last year by the Kenyan government did not stop the attacks in Mpeketoni on the Kenyan North Coast and Mandera in northern Kenya.

The Al-shabaab has continued to flourish on the weakness of the Somalia state. In the long-term, only the resurrection of a legitimate and vibrant Somali state can erode the social and political base of Al- Shabaab. Negative publicity by foreign governments will not end the conflicts. For instance, the 2014 claims by the British ambassador to the United Nations that the Kenya Defense Forces were involved in a multimillion dollar contraband charcoal market in Somalia represents a negative portrayal by the West in the fight against terrorism. The emerging picture is that Kenya went to Somalia without a clear idea of what to do after intervention. Fortunately, the military intervention has proved effective in weakening Al Shabaab's economic and political foundations.

It is also clear that the places where extremist groups now flourish (Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia) are all post-intervention countries (in Libya by NATO; in Iraq and Afghanistan by the US and in Somalia by Ethiopia, Kenya and AMISOM. Such interventions may have slowed down Al -Shabaab but what will happen if the departure of KDF leaves behind a vacuum? The short of it is that military victory alone is not enough in Somalia. What matters is that there is no vacuum when KDF leaves. But even without a vacuum , there is the danger of future blowback. Blowback is the unintended harm that a country suffers from the fact of its involvement in another country. There is a large number of disenchanted youths from Kenya who have trained with Al-Shabaab for years may eventually come even if Al -shabaab is militarily defeated. This catchment group of youth may spearhead a blowback if proper planning is not carried out. Most Transnational terrorist attacks now happening in Eastern Africa, Middle East, North Africa, Somalia, Mali and even Northern Nigeria are true examples of blowback. They are led by religious extremists who have trained or fought in Afghanistan and the bad lands of Pakistan.

In order to uproot the roots of violent extremism, it is critical to understand why their fighters are so motivated, invariably more motivated than those sworn to eliminate them. The answer lies in the ideology of Salafism, sometimes called Wahabism by the western media. These extremist groups seek to impose a virulent form of sharia associated with Ahmad bin Taymiyya, an erudite 13th century jurist from Damascus.

It is important to remember that transnational terror groups are networked with Al-Qaeda and sometimes with the Islamic State (IS). This means that the global competition between Al-Qaeda and IS will influence how Al-Shabaab evolves in its operations. In January 2015, all media spotlights were on Al-Qaeda, thanks to the Charlie Hebdo murders in France, Islamic State's, barbaric beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya and incineration of Lt. Muath al-Kaseasbeh, the Jordanian Air Force pilot. These incidents show how the transnational terrorism networks are still operating.

Economic factors such as unemployment, low levels of education and inequality have not caused terrorism per se. However, as the case of Somalia shows, these conditions are fertile soil for the spread of radical propaganda within Eastern Africa because most of the terrorists are from US, UK, France and Pakistani nationalities who are educated and possess lots of money to lure young children into their ideological motives.

Eastern African nations' efforts towards eliminating poverty and unemployment and raising literacy levels will deter the radicalization. Governments must ensure free education to all Muslim and non-Muslim children and the curricula must be reviewed so that the children's mind-set is not negatively influenced.

Finally, the western countries, especially US and UK and their allies in the war against terror should pursue policies that help rather than undermine the efforts of those closest to the theatres of war. For instance, the US the Office of the Comptroller of Currency closed Hawala, the system that Somalis in the Diaspora use to send money home. The justification for this was that hawala transfers could find their way to the Al-Shabaab terrorist group.

As argued by George Monbiot of the UK Guardian, one may as well shut down "the phone networks to hamper terrorism." And while we are at it, "Why don't we ban agriculture in case fertiliser is used to make explosives? Why don't we stop all the clocks to prevent armed gangs from planning their next atrocity?"

Such measures are disproportionate and are likely only to alienate the communities with whom we need to work to fight terror. As Monbiot notes, remittances from the Somali diaspora are \$1.2 billion-\$1.6 billion a year, roughly 50 per cent of the

country's gross national income, and provides sustenance to 40 per cent of the population. In short, "cutting off remittances is likely to kill more people than terrorists will ever manage."

More terror funds have probably gone through regular banking than through Hawala, one of the least expensive methods of global funds transfer. The point here is That though it is true that informal remittance arrangements such as hawala in Somalia and the Middle East; hundi in India; and fei chien in China may lack both formal supervision and transparency, so too do formal institutions, brokerages, private banking and wire transfer companies, as the tax evasion scandal now confronting the Swiss arm of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, HSBC, clearly shows.

This means that even though it is essential to interdict the transfer of funds to terror groups to fight terrorism, generic knee-jerk orders are absurd and counterproductive. Improving transparency not just in hawala and other informal systems but also in formal banking is likelier to catch illicit transfers.

Challenges to Regional Responses to Transnational and Irregular Threats

The challenges to effective regional responses to transnational terrorism are numerous and include:

- Lack of a streamlined procedure for inter-agency coordination planned at the executive level is the main factor hampering effective control of transnational threats.
- Shared Ecosystems: Boundaries in the Eastern Africa region are characterized by shared ecosystems that make it difficult to manage transnational and irregular threats without collective action. For example, four main forest ecosystems: the Virunga Volcanic Ranges (VVR); The Semliki-Ruwenzori Stretch; Central Virunga and the Albert Rift cover states neighboring Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This stretch is a unique trans-frontier susceptible to threats due to a number of factors.

- The Existence of weak states including the existence of “ungoverned” spaces in the Horn of Africa (HOA), the Arabian Peninsula and the DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan.
- Limited counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism capacity.
- Lack of sufficient international attention and support, coupled with lack of resources (personnel and logistics).
- Inadequate observance and practice of good governance.
- Lack of harmonized and strict laws to combat transnational and irregular threats.
- Lack of harmonized extradition treaties among the states of the region.
- Lack of effective fora for various stakeholders to address transnational and irregular threats holistically.
- The existence of covert and overt alliances between some states and non-state actors.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

There has definitely been a lull in Al-Shabaab activity but that is not a cause for complacency. Terror groups work in cycles, lulls and peaks and the only way to anticipate attacks is to strengthen national resilience to minimize the disruption caused by attacks and to develop comprehensive strategies that are not exclusively military. Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram have shown how a relatively small group of committed and violent ideologues can easily spin out of control and eventually imperil a state. Ethiopia underlines the same point. Eastern Africa needs to put its security experts to work to craft a long-term strategy to limit the ability of groups like Al-Shabaab to undermine the state.

This Policy Brief is driven by the urge to answer the question: to what extent has international terrorism informed the conflict in Somalia and Eastern Africa in general? In an attempt to answer to that question, this paper has used Rational Choice Theory to analyze the factors that most contributed to change in the lives of the people within the region.

The costs of terrorism are varied: economic or social; direct or indirect; physical or psychological; and individual or community. In fact, it is from the cost that the consequences of crime may be derived. The cost of crime can be incurred as a result of actual experience in criminal activities, when there is physical injury, or when properties are stolen, damaged or destroyed. As a consequence of the prevalence of crime in society, the demographic composition may be altered through mass movement of people away from crime-prone areas.

Transnational has always had huge financial implications and burden to the affected countries. Apart from the economic or monetary costs associated with transnational terrorism, there are also social and psychological costs. Terrorism erodes inter-communal trust and destroys the reservoir of social capital that is so vital in building harmonious societies and pooling together community energies for national development. The attendant proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the militarization of society result in a vicious cycle of violence which hampers

national cohesion, stability and development. The long-term impact of such violence on cities and regions is best exemplified by the impoverishment that has affected northern Kenya and suffocation of the tourist industry especially along the coast of East Africa. For instance Mombasa used to be one of the most prosperous cities in East Africa with high numbers of tourists annually but the effects of terrorism have forced a drop in these as well as general social and economic development.

Somalia Al-shabaab terrorism and related acts such as armed robbery, assassination, kidnapping, which have created fear and a grave sense of insecurity in northern Kenya undermine the country's growth and development. Security agencies must be empowered, motivated and adequately mobilized to combat criminality and insecurity to the barest minimum. Also, effective legislation that will adequately punish offenders and deter potential criminals must be put in place.

Intelligence gathering by security agencies should be intensified, as this will nip many of the security problems confronting the nation in the bud. Also, border patrols should be enhanced with a proper and efficient regulation of the influx of immigrants or aliens in order to forestall their recruitment into criminal gangs.

Government should embark on veritable youth entrepreneurship and poverty alleviation programmes that will impact positively on the lives of the people. The physical, social and psychological quality of life of a society and its members both in domestic setting and within the larger regional and global system will give the citizens a deeper sense of patriotism. Accordingly, national security policy must provide the citizens with social, economic and political conditions conducive to happiness and relative prosperity. Thus, tranquility and well-being of a society are necessary components of national security.

The evil of youth unemployment should be seriously looked into by the government. Employment generation for the teeming population should be more aggressively pursued as a matter of priority by government at all levels. If more youths are employed, it automatically depletes the army of youths available for recruitment into various criminal activities. From all indications, the reduction of youth unemployment will translate into reduction in crime, and engender sustainable national development. The youths are an important part of the society, who should

be encouraged to channel their energies to national development by being positively engaged in the system and discouraged from activities that could be detrimental to the growth of the country. Therefore, every action taking towards youth employment is an action towards crime reduction as well as promotion of national development.

It is the contention of this paper that Al-Shabaab terrorism has given negative publicity to the Eastern African region. The consequences include shrinking markets; discouragement of investors and reduced Foreign Direct Investments; depletion of national funds available for development; and stunted development. However, if the Al-Shabaab insurgency is adequately checked and security of lives and property of individuals guaranteed in every part of the region especially along the borders, then, rapid development follow.

Recommendations

- Eastern African governments need to develop specific counter-terrorism legislation to deal with the vice from several fronts. The specialized anti-terrorism units within the police and military forces need to be empowered to deliver.
- The establishment of a national Counter-terrorism Centre under the auspices of the National Security Service is commendable but more needs to be done on integrating the command structures.
- Security measures need to be strengthened at airports, government installations and foreign embassies in Kenya.
- The Government of Kenya needs to come up with measures that combine legislative, security, social and diplomatic initiatives to deal with the terrorist threat. These measures should include anti-terrorism legislation; beefing-up security patrols by the military and police; social outreach; and peace talks.
- Other measures should include passage of anti-terrorism laws; cancellation of airport staff passes and re-issuing them after carefully screening the staff members; introduction of a new electronic pass system; and improving airport fences and enforcing security patrols inside and outside the fences.

New insights and practical ways for combating transnational crime and terrorism should be explored.

- Regional responses to transnational and irregular threats in the Eastern Africa region call for effective international, regional and sub-regional cooperation and support. This will include monitoring of transnational terrorist financing and installation of disaster early warning systems. This should work in tandem with community anti-terrorism vigilance systems.
- Technical assistance and capacity building should be directed at intelligence gathering and sharing and constant consultations and joint military and police exercises and operations.
- The East African Joint Counter-Terrorism Center (EAJCTC) based in Nairobi should be fully embraced and supported by all East African Community (EAC) member countries.
- Regional counter-terrorism initiatives and strategies supported by international partners in the global war on terror should be strengthened and operationalized.
- There is need to enhance regional collaboration and continuous capacity building amongst regional security and intelligence agencies to facilitate information sharing and the development of technical capabilities to detect and thwart potential terrorist threats, while also coordinating joint and rapid responses to terrorist attacks.
- Regional training platforms need to be developed by institutions such as the IPSTC to facilitate experience sharing among relevant authorities and to strengthen operational capacities.
- Sub-regional initiatives for capacity building need to be supported and regional and international co-operation increased, including arrangements for sharing of information on a continuous basis.
- There is need for fast-tracking the harmonization of legal frameworks and laws, including extradition treaties among the states of the region.

- There is need to undertake adequate training and sensitization of all the stakeholders on the value of effective regional combating of transnational and irregular threats.
- Serious research in all aspects of regional cooperation must be undertaken and promoted by all, the high cost of the same notwithstanding.
- Where international treaties or conventions addressing transnational and irregular threats exist, they should be urgently domesticated all signatory states in the Eastern African region.
- Ultimately, the creation of a political union covering the region may go a long way in improving regional responses to transnational and irregular threats. This, however, is a long term goal for the future of the Eastern Africa region. A political union for Eastern Africa is an ambitious target that has to remain on the mechanisms agenda for combatting terror in the region.

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ANNEX A:

Tracing Al-Shabaab’s Strategic Preferences from Early 2000s to 2010

| Preference | Type | Basis and characteristics |
|--|---------------|--|
| Conquering Somalia | Nationalistic | Roobow’s statement in August 2008, in which he stated that Al Shabaab would finish the war in Somalia <i>first</i> , then continue the struggle elsewhere (Harnisch, 2010). It is also the goal most frequently stated in 2006-2008. |
| Successful irredentism – regaining control over Muslim regions conquered by Ethiopia | Nationalistic | Objective stated in 2003 (Dagne, 2011). Part of the success of the 1 st preference. |
| Establishing an Islamic state with Sharia law | Sharia | Objective stated in 2003 (Dagne, 2011). Dependent upon gaining control over Somalia. |
| Establishing a ‘Greater Somalia’ | Nationalistic | Objective stated in 2003 (Dagne, 2011). Is dependent on the success of the 1st preference, as ‘Greater Somalia’ refers to the unification of all regions populated by Somalis, in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. |
| Attacking foreign targets in Somalia | Transnational | Objective stated in 2003 (Harnisch, 2010). Connected to the 6th and 7th preference. |

| | | |
|--|----------------------|--|
| <p>Fighting warlords supported by the USA in Somalia.</p> | <p>Transnational</p> | <p>Objective stated in 2005, yet explicitly stated to be less important than conquering Somalia in the New Praiseworthy Terrorism' Campaign of 2008. Connected to the 5th and 7th preferences.</p> |
| <p>Fighting third parties who assisted those who attacked Somalia.</p> | <p>Transnational</p> | <p>Objective also stated in the New Campaign in 2008 to be pursued after conquering Somalia. Connected to the 5th and 6th preferences.</p> |
| <p>Providing a safe haven for Al Qaeda in East Africa</p> | <p>Transnational</p> | <p>Objective stated in early 2000s, and was only the preference of Aweys and Ayro. Since the early 2000s, this preference was never reiterated, unlike all other preferences above.</p> |

Highlights of Key Messages in the Issue Briefs

Kenya's Contribution to International Peace Support Operations: Insights from Somalia

- The global position of Kenya as a leading TCC is well written on the global map. There are many factors favourable for a more effective and comprehensive participation in global PSOs. There is a clear relationship between TCC and national peace and security in Africa.
- There is no common policy and strategic framework that can join the loose ends of security, defence, foreign policy/diplomacy and development planning and implementation, upon which PSOs can be effectively pegged.
- Police contribution and civilian participation are falling behind the good performance of the military. These are gaps that can immediately be addressed as an overall guiding policy is developed.
- Kenya's intervention in Somalia does not fall within its traditional PSO profile. However, it has lessons to offer as the global dynamics of PSO continue changing and shifting. Kenya's experience in mediation and peace building in other countries in the region will come in handy once the pacification of Al Shabaab and other renegade forces is accomplished.
- Kenya and IGAD can support a pan-Somali clan and political elites' constituency to chart out a roadmap to Somali national reconciliation, peace building and development. This means that there is need for clear articulation and coherence of Kenya's long term internal security and defence interests, political expediency and military strategy in Somalia.

Transnational Terrorism in Eastern Africa: The Case of Al-Shabaab in Somalia

- Transnational Terrorism still remains a real challenge for law enforcement in the Eastern African countries. Overtime, it has been mutating to the extent that enforcement agencies have to keep abreast of development of terrorist networks.
- The limitations of current transnational counter-terrorism strategies in Eastern Africa are based on or argue for an entirely new approach to the problem. The military and law enforcement agencies bring very different core competencies to the table. No agency, by itself, has adequate skills to implement transnational counter-terrorism strategies among the region's member states effectively.
- The evidence suggests that transnational terrorism and irregular threats in the Eastern Africa region take various forms: wildlife poaching, piracy, trafficking in arms, drugs and humans; smuggling, document fraud, cyber fraud, money laundering, terrorism and cattle rustling.
- Transnational terrorism is one of the most substantial threats to peace and security within the Eastern African region. Approaches towards solving this problem are, however, diverge. Member States implement different policies based on differing assumptions. A structured, univocal strategy towards transnational terrorism is absent.
- In order to support the formulation of such a strategy, this Issue Brief has analysed both the conceptual nature of the problems identified here and the possible measures flowing from these assumptions.
- The growing threat of transnational terrorism and irregular threats in the Eastern Africa region is influenced by the situation in the Horn of Africa and partly that in the Arabian Peninsula and its vicinity including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran. Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula are known to be key hideouts for terrorist cells and headquarters, and their proximity to the Indian Ocean gives the terrorists unlimited access to the porous Eastern African coastline.

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