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*Conflict Early Warning and Response Systems in Eastern Africa: Do they Work?*



*The Role of IGAD in Security Stabilization in Somalia and South Sudan*

*Effective Strategies for Responding to Contemporary Conflicts in Eastern Africa*



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# Foreword

The International Peace Support training Centre (IPSTC) is a research and training institution focusing on capital for training at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the framework of the African Peace and Security architecture and has developed to be the regional Centre of Excellence for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. IPSTC addresses the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated Peace Support Operations by describing the actors and multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research conducted covers a broad spectrum ranging from conflict prevention through management to post-conflict reconstruction. The Centre has made considerable contribution in training and research on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa through design of training curriculum, field research and publication of Occasional Papers and Issue Briefs. The Occasional Papers are produced annually, while the Issues Briefs are produced quarterly. The issue briefs are an important contribution to the vision and mission of IPSTC.

The Fourth Quarter Issue Brief No. 7 (2014) has two titles on peace and conflict in Eastern Africa: *Conflict Early Warning and Response Systems in Eastern Africa: Do they Work and The Role of IGAD in Security Stabilization in Somalia and South Sudan*.

The Issue Brief provide insights into pertinent peace and security issues in the region that are useful to policy makers and aims to contribute to the security debate and praxis in the region. The articles in the Issue Brief are also expected to inform the design of the training modules at IPSTC. The research and publication of this Issue Brief has been made possible by the support of the Government of Japan through UNDP.

**Brig. Robert Kabage**

**Director, IPSTC**

# Acronyms

<b>AMM</b>	Africa Media Monitor
<b>APSA</b>	Africa Peace and Security Architecture
<b>ASF</b>	African Standby Force
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CAST</b>	Conflict Assessment Software Tool
<b>CEWARN</b>	Conflict Early Warning and Response Network
<b>CEWS</b>	Conflict Early Warning System
<b>CEWERU</b>	Conflict Early Warning Unit
<b>CPS</b>	Committee of Permanent Secretaries
<b>COMESA</b>	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
<b>COMWARN</b>	COMESA Early Warning and Response Network
<b>DPA</b>	Department of Public Affairs
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>EAC</b>	East African Community
<b>EACWARN</b>	East African Community Early Warning Network
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>EWER</b>	Early Warning and Response
<b>FFP</b>	Fund for Peace
<b>FSI</b>	Fragility States Index
<b>GBI</b>	Gender Based Indicators
<b>GIS</b>	Global Information System
<b>GPI</b>	Global Peace Index
<b>GPS</b>	Global Positioning System

<b>HDI</b>	Human Development Index
<b>ICISS</b>	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communication Technology
<b>IGAD</b>	Inter governmental Authority on Development
<b>NGO</b>	Non Governmental Organizations
<b>NSC</b>	National Steering Committee
<b>OAU</b>	Organization of African Unity
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>PCRD</b>	Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development
<b>POW</b>	Panel of the Wise
<b>PSC</b>	Peace and Security Council
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>RDC</b>	Rapid Deployment Capability
<b>REC</b>	Regional Economic Communities
<b>RRF</b>	Rapid Response Fund
<b>SADC</b>	Southern Africa Development Community
<b>SIPRI</b>	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNDHA</b>	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs



# Introduction to the Issue Briefs

The topics in this fourth quarter issue brief address diverse issues of peace and security in the Eastern Africa region. The first paper examines Conflict Early Warning and Response Systems in Eastern Africa. The second looks at the The Role of IGAD in Security Stabilization in Somalia and South Sudan.

This first paper, *Conflict Early Warning Systems in Eastern Africa: Do They Work?* assesses Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) in international conflict prevention platforms such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (REC), Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) and research institutions. The study specifically evaluates AU-CEWS, IGAD-CEWARN, EAC-EACWARN and COMESA-COMWARN.

The study notes that despite significant improvement in institutional and operational preparedness in the region, there has not been a significant reduction or mitigation of violent conflicts. There are still many questions about the design, efficiency and effectiveness of the current EWER mechanisms. Despite these challenges EWER mechanisms remain high potential investments for conflict prevention and management in the region. The study has identified areas that require intervention by national policy makers, regional and global actors.

In the second paper, *the Role of IGAD in Security Stabilization in Somalia and South Sudan*, the author identifies the role IGAD has played to stabilize current conflicts in South Sudan and Somalia. Regional organizations have been recognized as important bodies to maintain international peace and security by chapter VIII of the United Nations charter. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 in the same perspective and its overarching vision is to be the premier regional organization for achieving peace, prosperity and regional integration in the sub-region. IGAD has been a key stabilizing factor in the Somali and South Sudan conflicts despite significant challenges that still need to be addressed.



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# Conflict Early Warning and Response Systems in Eastern Africa: *Do they work?*

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*Joseph Kioi Mbugua*

## Introduction

Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) has assumed more prominence in international conflict prevention platforms such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (REC), Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) and research institutions. However conflicts in Africa continue to inflict severe damage on lives, livelihoods, properties and environment as if no EWER mechanisms are in place in countries such as; Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, South Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Nigeria and Kenya.

Conflict early warning and response is a field of conflict prevention. This is one tool among others that are employed to prevent, manage or mitigate the effects of violent conflict. Conflict prevention is emphasized in Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), CEWS, Inter governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Early warning concept was originally conceptualized by the military and governmental agencies in the 1950s in order to identify and offset national security threats. There are many cases where early warning systems were able to prevent loss of lives and destruction of property.

Equally there are many disasters where early warning systems were not in place or failed (Rwanda, Yugoslavia).<sup>1</sup> The end of the Cold War had a positive bearing on early warning since countries were more willing to develop conflict prevention

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1 Wulf and Diebel, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms: Tools for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Organizations? A Comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS, ASEAN/ARF and PIF; Working Paper No. 49, 2009

mechanisms under the framework of the UN.<sup>2</sup> However the changing trends of conflicts towards intrastate dimension also posed new challenges.

This paper assesses the capacity of AU Conflict Early Warning System (CEWS) and other regional mechanisms to identify gaps for effective EWER. The study is organized into four sections. Section one is the introduction where EWER is introduced and the purpose and scope of the study is established. The second section reviews the literature and theories on EWER from a global, African and Eastern African perspective. The conceptual framework for analyzing the study is also established. The third section places EWER within a global architecture and evaluates the tools and strategies in place and institutional effectiveness of EWER mechanisms practiced in the region. The fourth section explores the way forward for effective conflict EWER mechanisms in Eastern Africa, given current conflict dynamics. The study establishes the need for integrative conflict prevention mechanisms, where major primary conflict factors are incorporated in a systemic conflict prevention strategy.

## Statement of the Problem

Despite massive investments by governments and organizations in conflict prevention systems and tools; global, regional and national EWER systems are still fraught with major challenges such as; faulty analysis leading to inaccurate predictions, failure to foresee important events, late, inadequate linking of operational responses to warnings, uncoordinated and contradictory engagement and poor decision making.<sup>3</sup> Though significant capacity has been built in global, regional and country institutional capacity for early warning and response, there are still major obstacles to efficiency and effectiveness. There is yet no common strategic global conflict prevention framework that informs early warning and response therefore different actors respond in ad hoc manner.<sup>4</sup> The UN has not developed standards for universal conflict EWER systems.

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2 OECD-DAC (2008) Can Violence, War and State Collapse be Prevented?, The Future of Operational Conflict Early Warning and Response Systems, DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation (CPDC) and the DAC Fragile States Group (FSG) Joint Session, Paris, p.14

3 David Nyheim, Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response, OECD, 2009, p.16

4 International Peace Institute (IPI) (2012) Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and Response, Conference Report, New York

Different countries have different approaches and there is also no harmonious approach among organizations that focus on security and the ones on development.

There is inadequate allocation of funds to conflict prevention and EWER in particular. Use of technology (internet, data analysis programmes such as (Global Information System - GIS, Global Positioning System - GPS) bode well for EWER systems for data collection, communication, visualization and analysis. However there has not been a high uptake of this technology in the Eastern African region. There is no effective and coherent coordination between grass root, national and regional based EWER systems. Currently there are no national, regional and international standards of reporting for EWER.<sup>5</sup>

Sometimes the tools used for warning against impending conflicts oversimplify complex situations and due to the dynamic nature of conflict, they often become obsolete after a short time. The choice of the tool has been based on the preferences of the particular organization and focus area. Early warning information may be perceived as alarmist or offensive to other governments. However conflict early warning and response remains a key pillar of evidence based conflict prevention. Given the enormous costs inflicted by violence and wars on African populations and economies, investments in research and application of early warning and response systems is inevitable and appropriate. Early warning and response systems provide cost effective and pro-active response in crisis situations. They also enable improved planning and programming for governments and organizations and coherent inter agency responses based on country conflict analysis and assessments. There is a need for effective regional and international early warning and response mechanisms for monitoring, anticipating, and mitigating potential conflict situations in Eastern Africa in an efficient and timely manner.

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5 OECD, 2009.p.21

## **Research Questions**

- What is the nature of conflict EWER systems in the Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa?
- What is the role of EWER in conflict prevention?
- What determines an efficient and effective EWER model?
- What is the possible effective conflict EWER model for the region?

## **Objectives**

- To examine the nature of conflict EWER systems in Eastern Africa.
- To identify barriers of achieving effective conflict EWER systems in Eastern Africa.
- To assess the best possible EWER model in the region.

## **Hypothesis/Assumptions**

- A strong EWER model can prevent, manage and mitigate conflicts in the region more efficiently and effectively.

## **Variables**

- Context analysis, diversity, flexibility and sustainability of responses, planning and strategy, conflict sensitive, balance, speed, ownership, coordination and prudent management of technical and political problems.

## Literature Review

The formal study of Conflict Early Warning and Response began in the 1970s and its incorporation into public policy began after the end of the Cold War (1989).<sup>6</sup> Scholars such as (Singer and Wallace, 1979) used EWER to forecast war while (Charney and Charney, 1982) applied early warning to genocide prevention. The end of the cold war brought new dynamics with increased global powers cooperation in conflict management and prevention and more focus on intrastate conflicts in Eastern Europe and Africa. The need for such response was occasioned by the challenges posed by the ‘new types of wars’ that engulfed the Balkans, Rwandan genocide and Somalia conflict.

The September 2011 terrorists attack on the United States also created a new impetus for understanding conflicts in weak and failing states. Specific proposal for a global early warning system was made by a UN Special Rapporteur, Prince Aga Khan in 1981 (Rupesinghe, 1989). In 1987 the UN developed the *Office for the Research and Collection of Information (ORCI)* to develop an early warning system for monitoring global conflict trends. The UNHCR and UNDHA also spearheaded separate early warning systems that were relevant to their work. The first international Non Governmental Organization (NGO) to work on early warning system was International Alert in 1985.<sup>7</sup>

The UN Secretary General (Boutros Ghali) report of 1992, named, *An agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping*, captured the emerging trend by focusing more on comprehensive conflict prevention and peace building for sustainable conflict management (UN, 1992). The OAU also established a unit for conflict early warning; *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution* in 1992 (Cilliers, 2005). The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts (1997) Report also stressed the need for early warning, local solutions and quick international response, bearing in mind the lost opportunities in Rwanda and the Balkans (Carnegie, 1997).

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid. OECD, p.15

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. OECD, p.28

In 2000, the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace keeping Operations* (Brahimi Report); recognized the role of early warning in broader UN peace support operations. A unit within the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), named *Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat* (EISAS) was proposed but was not implemented (UN, 2000). The UN Secretary General's Report 2001: *Prevention of Armed Conflict*; stressed the need for the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), to develop capacity for conflict analysis for timely conflict prevention (UN, 2001).

The European Commission in its publication, *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*, also stressed the need for integrating early warning systems in its conflict prevention programmes to inform early response (European Commission, 2001).

The United Kingdom (UK) government responded positively to the Brahimi report and issued a White Paper in 2000 spelling out its commitment to conflict prevention and calling for the implementation of Brahimi report within 12 months. The UK subsequently established Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) as its new approach to international engagement framework (UK, 2000). In Eastern Africa, the Heads of States meeting in 2000 endorsed a recommendation to establish *Conflict Early Warning and Response Network* (CEWARN), (IGAD, 2000).

Many scholars have written on nature and effectiveness of early warning and response systems from a global, regional and national perspective; OECD, (2009), Rupesinghe, (1989). Some scholars have identified good practices in EWER. A number of criteria for gauging effective EWER systems have been identified: understanding the problem, diversity, flexibility and sustainability of responses, planning and strategy, conflict sensitive, balance, speed, ownership, coordination and differentiating technical problems from political issues; OECD, (2009), IPI, (2012). These reviews present ways and means of timely, cost effective and efficient governmental and institutional responses to conflict vulnerability. However the link between warning and response is still weak despite mushrooming of multiple EWER organizations, OECD, (2009). There has been a rising interests in conflict risks assessments among global private sector and this can boost EWER fortune. Documentation of practical experiences in countries and regions is providing valuable lessons for global EWER practitioners.



This analysis of the different EWER mechanisms reviewed in the study has been informed by the above findings.

## Theoretical Review

### Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention refers to approaches, methods and mechanisms used to prevent or contain potential violent conflicts; and to prevent violent conflict from re-emerging.<sup>8</sup> Prevention is critical for avoiding the devastation and immense human suffering associated with war. Financial and political costs of stopping violence once it has occurred are higher than prevention costs.<sup>9</sup> Systemic conflict prevention addresses causes of conflict across national borders (Annan, 2006). Conflict prevention entails conflict analysis, prevention analysis and preventive action.<sup>10</sup>

Conflict prevention is a central theme of the UN Charter, in Chapter VI and VII, 1945, authorising the UN Security Council, Secretary General and the General Assembly to settle disputes peacefully and to prevent the outbreaks of wars.<sup>11</sup> Chapter VI provides for a number of measures for conflict prevention such as: fact finding, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement and arbitration. In 1992, the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali advanced the concept of preventive diplomacy to refer to; *preventing conflicts from emerging and also escalating into violence through a number of measures; confidence building, fact finding missions, early warning networks, preventive deployment and demilitarized zones/peace zones.*<sup>12</sup> He emphasized the need for social and economic development to tackle the root causes of conflict. Prevention can be short term (operational prevention) or long term (structural prevention). Structural prevention aims at addressing the root cause of violence. Conflicts are addressed even before they emerge to ensure human security and social justice (Carnegie Commission, 1997).

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8 Wulf, H and Diebel, T. 2010, Systemic Disconnects: Why Regional Organizations Fail to use Early Warning and Response Mechanisms, *Global Governance*, Vol.16, no.4, pp.525-547

9 Human Security Report, 2005

10 Lund, 2002, Beyna et al.2001

11 UN, Charter, Chapter VI and VII, 1945

12 UN (1992) *An Agenda for Peace*, Report of the UN Secretary General

UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan also emphasized moving the culture of UN from reaction to conflict prevention.<sup>13</sup> Annan meant establishing multi-actors, multi-tools and multi-level approach to global conflict prevention. The establishment of International Criminal Court for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia are seen as deterrent measures to prevent crimes against humanity and genocide. Establishment of international regulations for arms transfers and control of proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons serve the same purpose of preventing conflicts. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), provided a case for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), arguing that the primary responsibility of protecting citizens lies with the national government but in case of inability or unwillingness, this responsibility can be taken by the international community.<sup>14</sup> This study is based on the wider conflict prevention paradigm in the analysis of regional EWER mechanisms.

## **Institutional Theory**

This theory examines how institutions are created or changed to maintain social order (Scott, 2004b). Institutional theory examines micro and macro/global institutional framework. The institutional environment is dynamic and therefore institutions become organic. Institutions are regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive. They are not always aligned and may conflict with one another (Sewell, 1992). The process of institution building is often informed by top down and bottom up approaches (Scott, 1995, 2001).

According to Zucker, 1988, *Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment*, the worth of institutions is not measured by persistence; like all systems, institutions are subject to entropy and therefore they must be rejuvenated to prevent decline and decay. Construction and deconstruction of institutions is a normal and healthy process. The introduction of open system model of institutional evaluation provides a much better lens (Scott, 2003b). This model recognizes the importance of the environment in which organizations operate. Institutional theory is important for understanding the relation between structure and behaviour, the relationship between ideas and interests and the tension between freedom and order.<sup>15</sup>

13 UN, Report of the UNSG, Kofi, Annan, Prevention of Armed Conflicts, 2001


14 (ICISS, 2001)

15 Scott, R.W (2004) Institutional Theory: Contributing to a Theoretical Research Program, Stanford University, p.30

Building institutions can boost the value of early warning through institutionalizing a systematic way of identifying, diagnosing, and defusing conflict drivers that might have a negative impact on the capacity and resilience of states. The presence of IGAD and its preventive arm, CEWARN has enabled Eastern African region to engage in conflict prevention, management, resolution and mitigation in a systematic way.

## Conceptual Framework

Effective and efficient EWER mechanisms are dependent on the following factors: Context analysis, diversity of data sources, flexibility and sustainability of responses, planning and strategy, conflict sensitivity, speed, ownership, coordination and prudent management of technical and political problems.



Effective EWER systems provide information that enables early action. They address the underlying causes of conflict. A wide conflict threat spectrum covers all the factors that determine the onset of violent conflict and other threats to societal stability.

## Conflict Early Warning Systems

Early warning refers to the systematic collection and analysis of information for the purpose of anticipating and identifying emerging, deteriorating or recurring humanitarian crises. Early warning allows the public and emergency responders to take pre-emptive protective action to avoid harm.<sup>16</sup>

Early warning system is defined as the mechanism for data collection, analysis and communication of information about a threat to the relevant authorities. Conflict early warning is an instrument of preventive diplomacy which aims at the early detection of events and actions that may result in eruption of violence. Early warning is a specific aspect of the wider concept of conflict prevention which refers to situations in which conflicting goals are controlled so as to avoid the development of hostilities.<sup>17</sup>

Early response refers to preventive action or early action. It involves consultation, policy making, planning and action to reduce or avoid armed conflict. The actions may include diplomatic, political, military, security, humanitarian, development or economic activity.<sup>18</sup> There are many early response actors such as national governments, regional organizations, UN, AU, NGOs, private sector and individuals. However the presence of these institutions has not prevented occurrence of conflicts. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) notes that effective conflict prevention depends on:

*Knowledge of fragility of the conflict situation and the risks associated with it (early warning), understanding of the policy measures available that are capable of making a difference (preventive tool box), and the willingness to apply those measures (political will).<sup>19</sup>*

There is no one universal theory that explains the causes of conflict. It is therefore quite challenging to predict the occurrence of conflicts. There are multiple factors

16 ISDR (2005), Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), 2005-15, Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, 2005, Hyogo, Japan, Chapter 126, p.34

17 Rupesinghe, 1994

18 Schmid A, Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms, Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, FEWER, 1998

19 ICISS, 2001, p.20

that cause conflict and they interact in different styles and context to create situations of conflict vulnerability. It is difficult to obtain accurate and reliable information, thus limiting the predictive value of modern EWER systems.<sup>20</sup> It has been expressed that there were adequate early warning in conflicts such as Rwanda genocide and former Yugoslavia but there was no corresponding action.<sup>21</sup> There are still a number of challenges on early warning such as who is doing the warning? For whom is the warning directed to? And what kind of warning is produced.<sup>22</sup>

Although a number of models have been proposed there is still no universal model practiced by global conflict prevention organizations.<sup>23</sup> The UN Centre for Early Warning proposed in the Brahimi report was not implemented due to member states misunderstanding and suspicion.<sup>24</sup>

Conflict early warning includes tools and systems that seek to prevent and predict mass violence, violent conflict, war, genocide, human rights abuses, political instability and state fragility. Early warning systems are those that involve regular and organized collection and analysis of open source information on violent conflict situations. They deliver a set of early warning products (based on quantitative or qualitative conflict analysis methods) that are linked to response mechanisms/instruments.<sup>25</sup>

Early warning performs a number of important functions in conflict prevention:

*‘A crisis prediction capacity that enables pro-active decision making, a stronger basis for evidence based decision making on countries affected by crisis, improved programming through systematic country reviews and expert analysis, a priority setting contribution through watch list type products, a starting point for developing a shared problem definition of crisis-affected countries that set the stage for more coherent responses, an ideas pool for responses and sometimes a forum to meet fellow responders and plan joint action.’<sup>26</sup>*

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20 International Commission, 2001

21 Carnegie Commission, 1997

22 Ackerman, A, p.4

23 Ted Gurr and Davies J.L (1998) Preventive Measures: Building Risks Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, Rowman and Littlefield

24 [www.un.org/en/peacekeepingoperations/Brahimireport/doc.aspx](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeepingoperations/Brahimireport/doc.aspx)

25 OECD, p.50

26 OECD, p.63

Effectiveness of an early warning system is determined by whether it is based on the ground or has strong field based monitors, uses multiple sources of information and both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis, makes use of appropriate Information and Communication Technology (ICT), provides regular updates to key national and international organizations and has a strong connection to responders or response mechanisms.<sup>27</sup>

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27 OECD, p.101

# Global Conflict Early Warning Systems

## United Nations

Early warning and response initiatives are expressed within the general UN conflict prevention framework. There are a number of historical documents that define UN's conflict prevention policy and approaches as presented earlier in conflict prevention theory. The UNSC in conjunction with Department of Political Affairs (DPA) conducts monthly 'Horizon scanning' sessions to discuss emerging and ongoing crises.<sup>28</sup> The UN has been developing conceptualization of early warning and early response and enhancing collaboration among its various organizations. The UN EWER framework aims at strengthening the national capacity for conflict prevention by building the skills of national actors including civil society and developing closer collaboration between them.<sup>29</sup>

The Department of Public Affairs (DPA) and UNDP work to build capacity for conflict prevention through a number of activities such as facilitating dialogue, training relevant actors on negotiation skills. This kind of intervention has been done in Kenya, Ghana and Burundi.

## African Union

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) established a Conflict Management Division in 1992. The operations were faced with a number of challenges owing to capacity limitations of the OAU. Article 4 of the *Constitutive Act of the African Union* (2000), articulates a commitment to conflict prevention and the responsibility to protect potential victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The *Protocol on Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU*; creates a number of conflict prevention instruments: Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, African Standby Force (ASF) and the African Common Defence Policy.<sup>30</sup>

Article 12 of the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU* provides for the establishment of the Panel of the Wise (POW) to assist the AU/PSC in conflict prevention, management and resolution.

28 International Peace Institute (IPI), Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and Response, 2012, p.3

29 UN SG Report, 2001

30 [www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf](http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf)

The panel is made up of five distinguished/ eminent African leaders with good reputation appointed by the AU Chairperson in consultation with other leaders. In 2008 the panel focused its energy on preventing electoral violence and it was instrumental in returning Kenya to a path of peace through the POW negotiated Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Accord (KNDR) in 2008. The POW has a lot of potential to prevent electoral violence through a number of strategic interventions; fact finding missions, good offices missions, supporting AU mediation initiatives, providing assistance to national reconciliation efforts aimed at restoration of national stability and offering advice to the AU chairperson on conflict crisis.<sup>31</sup>

The AU recognizes the need to institute measures to prevent electoral related violence through the 2002 Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa and the 2002 Guidelines for Election Observation and Monitoring Missions and the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Among the measures employed are; early warning and preventive diplomacy, election observation and monitoring, post-election mediation, technical and governance assistance and post conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD).<sup>32</sup>

### *Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)*

The Continental Early Warning System was created in 2002 under Article 1 of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol of the new Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The goal of CEWS is to; provide timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security and to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or resolve conflicts in Africa'.<sup>33</sup> CEWS has a monitoring and observation centre (Situation room) located at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and it is directly linked to early warning centres of Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

Article 12 (3) of the protocol also mandate CEWS to collaborate with UN and its agencies, international organizations, research centres, academic institutions and

31 International Peace Institute (IPI), Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence: Strengthening the Role of the African Union in Preventing, Managing and Resolving Conflicts, Report of the AU Panel of the Wise, 2010, p.67

32 Ibid. p.62

33 African Union (AU), Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: Towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System, Meeting of Governmental Efforts on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention, Concept paper, Kempton Park, South Africa, 2006, p.2



Non Governmental Organizations (NGO). CEWS is expected to develop a set of indicators to implement its activities. The information provided by CEWS is acted upon by the Chairperson of the AU Commission to advise the PSC on situations that require urgent attention. The Situation Room of CEWS collects data from AU field missions and open sources and provides regular reports. Its main purpose is to store and disseminate information. Efforts are being made to increase the number and capacity building of the personnel.<sup>34</sup>

The CEWS conducts a number of activities: Collection and analysis of conflict data based on indicators module, production of effective early warning – reports to facilitate engagement with decision makers, coordination and collaboration with relevant stakeholders such as RECs, UN (UNSC and Secretariat), Civil Society Organizations (CSO) and Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (the latter collects security information).<sup>35</sup>

CEWS analytical framework is comprised of: Collection and monitoring of information on potential conflicts – alerts, profiles and baselines for assessing vulnerability are produced that surveys actors and context. Gender Based Indicators (GBI) produced by CEWS and AU Women, Gender and Development Directorate, are used to reflect gender perspectives. Through analysis of structures, dynamics and actors, conflict trends trajectory is produced. Recommendations are provided through scenario building, development of response options and their validation and verification. There is a response framework that reflects the conditions identified through the AU conflict prevention infrastructure.<sup>36</sup>

CEWS relies on open sources and other institution based sources to gather its data such as Oxford Analytica, BBC monitoring, Africa Reporter, Africa Media Monitor (AMM) and Live-mon. AMM is a data gathering tool that facilitates collection and sharing of information in four languages across all African regions. Africa Reporter facilitates gathering of information from the AU field missions and liaison offices.<sup>37</sup> Live-Mon enables display of events occurring on the African map. There have been a number of efforts to strengthen collaboration and streamlining of activities

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34 Ibid.p.3

35 Ibid.p.4

36 Ibid.p.5

37 Ibid.p.6

between CEWS and RECs early warning mechanisms since 2008, such as use of similar soft ware, regular meetings and capacity building and production of a common newsletter.

Areas of improvements are: Enhanced capacity and uptake of ICT, enhanced partnership between situation room and RECs early warning units, training and capacity building of staff, stronger collaboration with other AU conflict prevention bodies, RECs, CSO and participation of civil society in CEWS is still limited.<sup>38</sup>

## **Global Early Warning Systems/Models**

Governments and organizations across the world have developed early warning systems. Most of them are based on software that collects data online. These systems have also developed their own independent indicators. Due to different strengths and weaknesses, these mechanisms can be merged in analysing specific conflict situations.

### ***Minorities at Risk (MAR) and Global News Monitor***

The purpose of this project was to establish the predictable conditions that lead ethnic groups within a state into conflict – rebellion and repression. The model assumed linkages between grievances, mobilization, rebellion and repression. Using statistical analysis to study historical cases, links were found between mobilization and rebellion. A number of structural indicators were derived from these linkages. This project added specific value to reliability of early warning through establishing dynamic factors in risk assessment that informs early warning.<sup>39</sup>

### ***Crisis Watch: International Crisis Group (ICG)***

This is a monthly report of the most significant crisis situations around the world. The index covers about 70 situations. The system also observes monthly trends in terms of escalation or de-escalation of conflicts, risks of conflicts and opportunities for conflict resolution. The report is also complemented by narrative monthly analysis of conflicts. The index is meant to inform the media, policy makers, business

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38 International Peace Institute (IPI), Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and Response, 2012, p.6

39 The Minorities at Risk project was established by Ted Gurr in Mary Land University, Gurr, 1994

community and the general public.<sup>40</sup> The Brussels based ICG has established centers in Africa, Asia and Europe and therefore it has developed significant capacity for global conflict analysis.

### *Fragile States Index (FSI)*

This is a states' annual survey based on their level of vulnerability to conflict. The index is based on a software system; Conflict Assessment Software Tool (CAST) developed by the Washington DC based Fund for Peace (FFP). The list examines political, economic and social indicators and also covers about 100 indicators based on other specific sub-themes.<sup>41</sup> The system can be used in conjunction with GPI among other indicators to achieve a clearer picture of a specific state's vulnerability.

### *Global Peace Index (GPI)*

This is a data system that ranks countries according to their level of peace. It has 22 qualitative and quantitative indicators and covers 162 countries (99.6) of world states. The index also examines global and specific country's trend through a seven year period and assesses the risk to conflict factors.<sup>42</sup> This is one of the most popular yardsticks for measuring states vulnerability to conflict and can be adapted to the local states context.

All these different approaches offer perspectives for adding value to EWER systems. As new indicators are identified, different systems can be adapted to produce better models. Therefore an effective model should be adjustable, flexible and robust.

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40 [www.fundforpeace.org/en/publication-type/crisis.aspx](http://www.fundforpeace.org/en/publication-type/crisis.aspx)

41 [www.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestates/2014](http://www.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestates/2014)

42 [www.globalpeaceindex.org/globalpeaceindex/2014](http://www.globalpeaceindex.org/globalpeaceindex/2014)

## Common Indicators for Conflict Early Warning

Thematic area	Specific category	Intervening variables	Adaptation in Eastern Africa
<b>Justice and Human Rights</b>	Access to justice Protection of human rights Freedom of Civil society and media	Change of government General election	CEWS, CEWARN, COMWARN, EACWARN
<b>Economic Factors</b>	Inequality, economic growth, unemployment, inflation, price of basic commodities, dependence on few raw materials export, macro-economic instability	Structural industrial shift	CEWS, CEWARN, COMWARN, EACWARN,
<b>Socio-cultural factors</b>	Ethnic tension and division Politicization of identity/ethnicity Structural and historical factors	Globalization/ world order	CEWS, CEWARN, COMWARN, EACWARN,
<b>Demographic and historical factors</b>	Demographic/population pressure, non economic regional inequalities, criminalization of political dissent, violence, IDPs and Refugees, history of armed conflicts and structural instability, Lack of institutions and tradition of conflict resolution, unaccountable leadership	Migration	CEWS, CEWARN, COMWARN, EACWARN,
<b>Geopolitical location</b>	Regional and international factors, territorial disputes, external alliances	Country and region specific factors	CEWS, CEWARN, COMWARN, EACWARN
<b>Military and Illegal armed groups</b>	Small arms proliferation, non state organized armed groups, lack of democratic control of armed forces, high per capita military expenditure	Transnational arms trade/arms control	CEWS, CEWARN, EACWARN

<b>Environment and Resource Management</b>	Environmental disaster, scarcity of resources, resource management, conflict minerals, oil and gas, competition over scarce resources	Climate change and adaptation	CEWS, CEWARN, COMWARN, EACWARN
<b>Governance</b>	Regime legitimacy, rule of law, independent judiciary, separation of powers, constitutionalism, political parties, corruption	Globalization/ world order	CEWS, CEWARN, COMWARN, EACWARN

*Source: J.K Mbugua's Adaptation from SIPRI's 'Early Warning Indicators for Preventive Policy', Working Paper, 2003*

## **Conflict Early Warning and Response Systems in Eastern Africa**

### ***IGAD-CEWARN***

The Conflict Early Warning Network (CEWARN) is one of IGAD's department's targeted at preventing and mitigating violent conflicts. The Addis Ababa based organization was established in 2002. Its mandate is to provide credible, evidence based early warning information and analysis in a fashion that would inform timely action to prevent or mitigate violent conflict. CEWARN involves participation of civil society. The organization attempts to link local, national early warning networks with regional system. Initially CEWARN focused on pastoralists communities' conflicts but has since expanded its areas of coverage.

The principles of vertical coordination, subsidiarity and coherence enshrined in the APSA framework inform the relationship between CEWS and CEWARN. In its current strategic plan (2012-2019), CEWARN is planning to promote integration of warning and response, expand the range of topics covered to reflect a human security approach and to involve more stakeholders including the private sector.<sup>43</sup>

CEWARN was the first REC early warning mechanism in Africa. The Rapid Response Fund was set up in 2009. CEWARN is supported by a regional Technical

<sup>43</sup> [www.igad.org/cewarn](http://www.igad.org/cewarn)

Committee made of national heads of Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERU). The policy making organ for CEWARN is made up of Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS) from the relevant ministries.<sup>44</sup> The CEWARN is well integrated into communities through the District Peace Committees (DPC) that are linked to the National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) which also acts as the CEWERU, (Kenya).

CEWARN developed an 'Engendering manual' to reflect specific impact of early warning on different social groups, thereby designing appropriate response mechanisms for each target. The Rapid Response Fund (RRF) is meant to strengthen the response part of the CEWARN mechanism. Currently this basket fund is funded by the member countries and development partners. It has provided capacity for responding to conflicts at the national and cross border level. RRF has been implemented for the last 5 years and evaluation of the project has been done.<sup>45</sup> The RRF has also been designed not only to act as a fire fighting mechanism but also to support capacity for entire Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) spectrum.

Due to the traditional dependence on elders in peace making, there has been a tendency to include few women and the youth in Local Peace Committees (LCP), District Peace Committees (DPCs) and County Peace Forums (CPF). Though civil society is acknowledged as a partner, effective inclusion of civil society is lacking in some countries and regions. There are few regional coordinated disarmament projects. There is still a great need of building local capacity for conflict prevention at the grass root level.

### ***East African Community Early Warning Mechanism (EACWARN)***

The East African Community (EAC) is a regional economic union that brings five countries together; Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. Due to the significant influence of security matters on economic affairs, EAC has developed capacity for handling conflict, security and peace affairs.

The EAC early warning and response mechanism (EACWARN) is based on the

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Girma Kebede, Kassa, Final Evaluation Report of the Rapid Response Fund of CEWARN, November, 2011, pp.20-25

EAC mandate. A protocol seeking to address interstate security and defence, intrastate conflicts such as cattle rustling, smuggling and illegal trade, poverty and economic inequalities, human rights violations, cross border trade and resource sharing, has been put in place. This progress culminated into formulation of a Conflict Management Bill (2012) by the East African Legislative Assembly which recognized EACWARN among other measures.

The Protocol also establishes a regional centre for early warning. Early warning indicators were jointly developed among member states in 2011. The system is proposed to be harmonized with IGAD-CEWARN by working with national Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERU) in member countries.<sup>46</sup> EAC has a regional peace and security research institution known as Nyerere Centre for Peace Research.

### ***Common Market for East and Central Africa (COMESA)***

The COMESA Early Warning Network (COMWARN) is based on COMESA Peace and Prosperity Index (CPPI) which has seven variables of structural conflicts (*peace, health, wealth, food, trade, capital and education*). The system is well anchored on a legal foundation (Article 3 and 6 of the COMESA treaty. 54 indicators were developed from the seven indicators. The seven variables were later reduced to four: *peace, wealth, trade and health*. The resultant indicators were reduced from 54 to 10 based on policy relevance, data availability, multi-dimensionality and comparability.<sup>47</sup> This refined approach was expected to yield useful information for policy and decision making.

COMESA introduced conflict prevention after realizing that development in the region was heavily affected by conflicts. It focuses more on resource related conflicts. It is envisaged that civil society and the private sector will have an important role to play. The Comesa approach is more comprehensive since it covers a wide range of variables. A system was put in place to link Situation room at the headquarters with country early warning focal points through an information technology system.<sup>48</sup>

46 African Union (AU), Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: Towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System, Meeting of Governmental Efforts on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention, Concept paper, Kempton Park, South Africa, 2006, p.5

47 Makumi Mwangi, the COMESA Conflict Early Warning System (COMWARN), in Contemporary Security in Africa, Journal of the National Defence College, Kenya, 2014, P.95-104

48 Ibid. Makumi, Mwangi, 2014

## *East African Standby Force (EASF)*

The East African Standby Force (EASF) is the premier regional military and security institution and therefore an important forum for forging close relationship and minimising mistrust. Unlike other regional African Standby Force (ASF) divisions, EASF is not directly under IGAD but it is established under special regional agreements.<sup>49</sup> EASF is not only charged with the responsibility of preparing and deploying a Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC), preventive deployment and peace support operations but also does capacity building of the security sector (military, police and civilians), negotiation and mediation.

There are plans to start an early warning system in EASF to supplement the ones in IGAD and EAC. It will use the systems already in place in the region to enable information sharing and communication. The envisaged EASF early warning system is expected to focus more on areas of core competence and comparative advantage to avoid duplication of other regional mechanisms. Establishing clear lines of communication and coordination between EASF early warning and response activities and those of IGAD and EAC will be an added value.

## **Challenges of Early Warning and Response Networks**

There are a number of political, institutional and technical challenges that continue to derail effectiveness of EWER mechanisms. The CEWARN mechanism preferred to cover pastoralists' conflicts indicators. Even after the indicators were increased it is still not yet comprehensive to cover entire sources of state fragility. Domestic insecurity indicators are emotive issues in inter-state relations and therefore it is difficult for member countries to allow CEWARN to monitor political issues. At an institutional level, though CEWARN is among the most advanced mechanisms in Africa, there are still challenges of efficient monitoring and communication of findings. The response arm of the mechanism has also faced significant obstacles such as lack of resources and coordination.<sup>50</sup>

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49 Katja L Jacobsen and Yohannes R Nordby, DIIS Report, 2013

50 Alexander George and Jane Holl, *The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy*, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997, p.14



The real causes of conflict and how such factors interact to bring about conflict in a given context is usually not known. Most predictive models do not show what factors are critical to a given country. The real connection between specific factors and conflict is not given. The data available during conflict is hardly reliable. Some areas may not be accessible to researchers and therefore information is gathered through second hand sources. Somalia was not included in the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) up to 1997 due to difficulties in collecting information. There are many monumental changes in global peace and security that were not foreseen by experts such as; September 11, 2001 attack on the US or end of the Cold War in 1989.<sup>51</sup>

There is no clear linkage between early warning institutional framework and policy based conflict prevention. Information has been provided to agencies that have not responded to the warning and there seems to be no policy or administrative basis for compliance. The lack of relevant internal security and defence policies also deny EWER mechanisms a firm foundation on which to base their activities. Though there are a number of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that are engaged in early warning such as PEACENET in Kenya, CSOs are not major players in EWER. However in Kenya, they are incorporated in the National Steering Committee (NSC) mechanism. Though the private sector suffers immense losses from conflicts, they are hardly involved in EWER. The NSC in Kenya has built a forum for the private sector to engage in conflict prevention with remarkable outcomes.<sup>52</sup> There has not been adequate emphasis on social, economic and environmental vulnerability and communities are not effectively involved in vulnerability assessments. Climate change may continue to undermine efforts made in addressing resource conflicts and migration. There are also setbacks in accessing information. Data is mostly available at the national or county level. There are also missed opportunities occurring as a result of poor information receptivity, inadequate analysis, incomplete, inconsistent and contradictory response and warning-response gap.<sup>53</sup> EACWARN has lagged behind CEWARN partly due to focusing more on economic integration rather than peace and security. The different historical and political experience between Tanzania and the other member countries which have faced significant internal

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51 Ibid,p.15

52 [www.nscpeace.go.ke/nsc](http://www.nscpeace.go.ke/nsc)

53 Alexander George and Jane Holl, 1997, p.14

conflicts and membership in SADC informs Tanzania's lethargy on EAC security and political issues.<sup>54</sup> Since EASF early warning mechanism is not yet operational, it is yet to be seen how the system will work with already existing mechanisms in the region (CEWARN, EACWARN, COMWARN). There are still challenges of all the countries collecting comparable data at the same time within COMESA. It therefore becomes difficult to draw reliable deductions on regional conflict vulnerability.

CEWS suffer from limited personnel and experts thus hindering production of effective reports. The system of intervention and coordination between the CEWS, PSC and Panel of the Wise is still not efficient and effective and there is as yet no uniform data collection mechanism between CEWS and REC.<sup>55</sup>

In most cases CEWS and the regional EWER mechanisms do not monitor electoral and governance indicators of impending violent conflict. Most EWER mechanisms did not predict the current conflict in South Sudan though there were clear indicators in the non inclusive preparation for the 2015 General election, schisms in the preparation of a new constitution, delayed reforms of the ruling Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), continued obfuscation of the party and the army (SPLA), discord among the ruling elites that culminated in the sacking of Vice President Riak Machar and other members of the Cabinet.

Most of the early warning mechanisms in Eastern Africa make use of only limited communication technology tools such as websites and emails. Satellite based Global Positioning System (GPS) and Global Information System (GIS) technology is hardly utilized. A number of global technology based early warning such as Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) stopped operations due to lack of funding and changing development partners priorities.<sup>56</sup>

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54 Paraphrasing Katja L Jacobsen and Yohannes R Nordby, Danish Interests in Regional Security in East Africa, DIIS Report, 2013:14, p.38

55 Ibid.p.63

56 OECD, 2009.p.21

## **Towards Effective Early Warning and Response Systems**

Though Eastern Africa region has institutions for EWER in place, going by the emergence of conflicts in the region, the effectiveness of these mechanisms can be questioned. There are a number of measures that can be put in place to improve effectiveness and efficiency of EWER in the region. EWER systems should be relevant to the context. This can be ensured through selection of appropriate indicators. Timing is also important to make sure parties are warned in time and the response measures are activated on time. This can be enhanced through use of technology such as mobile phones, emails and data processing software.

There is a need for clear linkage between early warning institutional framework and implementing institutions and policies. Developing regional and internal security and defence legislations, policies and strategies for EWER mechanisms can lay a firm foundation for operations of EWER mechanisms.

Data analysis can also be improved through use of efficient data analysis models taking note of structural factors, accelerating factors and triggers. Distinction should also be made between general and specific indicators so that the conflict warning can be contextualized to the given country. Consideration of intervening variables that can change the expected outcome is also necessary.<sup>57</sup> Results should also be displayed and posted in a user friendly manner and should be clear and unambiguous so that they can inform policy. Some index offer global conflict status through reports, numeric and graphic format. Specific countries can adapt the indices to their specific context.

There are ample opportunities in making use of modern communication technology for early warning. Strengthening ongoing systematic and consistent observation of conflict trends and likelihood of conflict emergence will go a long way in preventing conflicts in the region. Quality of data storage and retrieval system and dissemination can also be improved with adoption of technology. The countries and regional organizations need to allocate adequate resources for EWER mechanisms. More involvement of CSO and the private sector is necessary since these institutions bring value addition, knowledge and resources to EWER infrastructure.

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<sup>57</sup> SIPRI, 2003

## Conclusion

Despite significant improvement in institutional and operational preparedness in the region, there has not been a significant reduction or mitigation of violent conflicts. There are still many questions about the design, efficiency and effectiveness of the current EWER mechanisms. The study has identified areas that require intervention by national policy makers, regional and global actors. The UN, AU and the region could not effectively foresee the conflict in South Sudan, Central Africa and Mali. Opportunities for peace building have been missed in Somalia. Even where some conflicts are foreseen, there has been little or not sufficient response.

There are still many hurdles (political, institutional, technological and economic) along the way before effective regional early warning systems can be achieved. Despite these challenges EWER mechanisms remain high potential investments for conflict prevention and management in the region.

An effective model of EWER system in Eastern Africa should consolidate the following features: integrated into traditional community structures and has field based monitors, final analysis is based on different data collection systems utilizing both quantitative and qualitative methods, incorporates use of appropriate communication technology and is well linked to policy and decision makers who determine response to warnings.

## Recommendations

- The Eastern Africa region should harmonize methodology for EWER data collection for effective conflict analysis, prediction, prevention, mitigation and management.
- Develop user friendly early warning reports with guidelines for implementation.
- Develop guidelines for early response implementation, responsibilities and time frame.
- Investigate wider incorporation of technology in EWER.
- Include all the fundamental indicators including the political ones.
- Increase capacity and coordination of responding institutions.
- CSO and the private sector should hold governments and institutions accountable for implementation of EWER systems.
- Eastern Africa EWER systems should learn from global successful EWER mechanisms.

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# The Role of IGAD in Security Stabilization in Somalia and South Sudan

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*Lt-Col Donatien NDUWIMANA*

## Introduction

The role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international Peace and Security was recognized from the founding of United Nations (UN) and is articulated in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter<sup>58</sup>. The UN Secretary General Report entitled *An Agenda for Peace (1992)*, emphasized on the idea that Regional Organizations might be used to support UN Peace efforts across the spectrum of operations from preventive diplomacy to post conflict peace building.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was founded in 1986. Reads the Authority's Website. The new mandate was adopted in March 1996 at the Nairobi summit and the organization was renamed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The 1996 IGAD agreement included among its principles the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security, and the protection of human and peoples' rights. Headquartered in Djibouti, IGAD has seven member states namely; Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Eritrea had suspended itself from membership<sup>59</sup>.

Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Humanitarian Affairs is one of three priority program areas at IGAD and an aspect of the Authority's work in which significant progress has been registered. The overarching objective of the sector is to ensure security in the sub-region and to alleviate humanitarian suffering. The IGAD long term objectives are to ensure that peace and stability prevail in the

58 The Charter of the UN, 26 June 1945. Available at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

59 T, Staffer, IGAD: Horn's unserviceable stooge and Utensil, 2012

sub-region so that economic development can take place and to contribute towards alleviation and mitigation of humanitarian crisis through long term strategies and response to acute crises<sup>60</sup>.

This requires the development of conflict, prevention, management and resolution tools and the use of early warning and early response mechanism to prevent conflicts as well as capacity building in these areas. It also requires development of capacity to be better prepared to respond to humanitarian crises and mitigate human sufferings.

The following objectives have helped IGAD to create conditions for peace in its jurisdiction:

- To promote joint development strategies and gradually harmonize macro-economic policies and programs in the social, technological and scientific fields;
- To harmonize policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources, and promote free movement of goods, services, and people within the region.
- To create an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic trade and investment;
- To achieve regional food security and encourage and assist efforts of Member States to collectively combat drought and other natural and man-made disasters and their natural consequences;
- To initiate and promote programs and projects to achieve regional food security and sustainable development of natural resources and environment protection, and encourage and assist efforts of Member States to collectively combat drought and other natural and man-made disasters and their consequences;
- To develop and improve a coordinated and complementary infrastructure, in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy in the region;

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<sup>60</sup> Yifru Daniel and Kitevu Raymond, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – Peace and Security Architecture, <http://www.igad.org>

- To promote peace and stability in the region and create mechanisms within the region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-State and intra-State conflicts through dialogue;
- To mobilize resources for the implementation of emergency, short-term, medium-term and long-term programs within the framework of regional cooperation;
- To promote and realize the objectives of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the African Economic Community;
- To facilitate, promote and strengthen cooperation in research development and application in science and technology<sup>61</sup>.

Conflict in some IGAD countries specifically in Somalia and South Sudan are complex crisis which have resulted in significant internal displacement, and massive insecurity in the region. They have also triggered regional crisis with political, security development and humanitarian consequences.

## **Focus and Scope of the Study**

This paper examines the crucial role of IGAD in Somalia and South Sudan conflict resolution as well as the challenges it has encountered.

## **Objectives**

The specific objectives of this paper are to:

- Assess the contribution of IGAD in ongoing peace and security stabilization in Somalia and South Sudan.
- Identify obstacles for effective contribution of IGAD to peace and security in these countries.
- Investigate the opportunities for IGAD enhanced contribution to peace and security in South Sudan and Somalia.

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<sup>61</sup> Observatory on Regional Integration in Africa (ORIA), *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities*, a joint publication by the Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union, Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, 2006

## **Organization of the Study**

This study comprises of the introduction, statement of problem, significance and objectives of the study.. The second section examines the IGAD conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms. The third section describes the IGAD and conflict in Somalia. The fourth section provides a critical analysis of the role of IGAD in conflict resolution in the Sudan. The fifth section will analyze obstacles and opportunities for IGAD effective contribution to peace and security in Sudan and Somalia. Finally, this is will be followed by conclusion.

## **Statement and Significance of the Problem**

Since IGAD added peace and Security to its mandate, there has been no appreciable reduction in the level of conflict in the Horn of Africa or any significant signs of movement towards collective security arrangements<sup>62</sup>.The current conflicts in South Sudan and Somalia have negatively impacted the social, political and economic arena of the horn of Africa's countries. In Somalia out of nine million populations; over 3.2 million are in dire need of humanitarian assistance; over 1.2 million have been displaced, hundreds of the thousands have lost their lives when others are refugees in all parts of the world<sup>63</sup>. The particular conflict on terrorism in Somalia has also negative impact on political and economic systems of neighbouring countries. Piracy and terrorism have hindered international trade and prorogued the propagation of Small arms in the region. Similarly, the current outbreak of violence in south Sudan is commonly associated with ethnic divisions and governance which contributes to wider regional instability.

These conflicts have challenged the development of peace and security mechanisms on continental and regional levels. The creation of IGAD has brought a new diplomatic dimension to conflict management. However, protracted civil wars in Soudan and Somalia have continued to undermine the regional conflict resolution capacity. This paper, therefore, aims to underscore the role of IGAD in peace and security stabilization of Somalia and South Sudan.

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62 Sally Healy , *Seeking Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa: the Contribution of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development*,2011

63 2014 UNHCR country operations profile - Somalia

## Theoretical Analysis

The thrust of this paper is anchored in arguments propounded by two theories: neo-realist and liberal institutionalism theories.

### Neo-realist Theory

The neo-realist theory promoted by John Mearsheimer argues that institutions can do little to enhance stability in an anarchical international system that generates fear, uncertainty and relentless competition for power and security among states (Mearsheimer 1994/95)<sup>64</sup>. According to Mearsheimer, institutions are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, they have no independent effect on state behavior and they are therefore not an important cause of peace.

### Liberal Institutionalism Theory

In stark contrast to neo-realist theory, scholars of Liberal Institutionalism theory argue that states set up institutions that share the utilitarian and rationalist underpinnings in order to advance their interests and facilitate collectively beneficial cooperation (Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin 1995). In relation to security, institutions can provide states with information, reducing the uncertainty and risks associated with anarchy. While advancing a constructivist arguments Alexander Wendt (1995) observes that world politics is socially constructed. The fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material and shape the identities and interests of states as well as their behaviour. These social structures are defined by shared knowledge and understanding among groups of states, and vary between relationships of mistrust and conflict and relationships of trust and co-operation. Interdependence, collective identity formation and the institutions of sovereignty and the democratic peace have greatly reduced the dangers of anarchy.

In the same perspective, Article 52 of the UN Charter encourages pacific settlement of local disputes by regional arrangements or agencies. The end of the Cold War

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<sup>64</sup> Mearsheimer (1994/95: 8) defined an institution as a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should co-operate and compete with each other, prescribing acceptable forms of state behavior and proscribing unacceptable kinds of behavior. International organizations, including regional organizations, are formal and structured forms of institutions.

gave fresh impetus to this aspiration. The UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General have championed the peacemaking role of regional organizations (Boutros-Ghali 1992; UN General Assembly 1994; UN 2001, 2006, 2008; UN Security Council 2005). The UN's enthusiastic endorsement of these organizations rests largely on the promise that they can help to create a pacific regional environment because they serve as forums for conflict resolution, build trust through the frequency of interaction among states, encourage and facilitate a collective approach to cross-border security issues and encourage their members to adhere to international and regional norms on governance and conflict prevention<sup>65</sup>.

The establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002 also marked an important shift towards consolidating African peace and security activities at the regional level. The AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the key decision-making body in the new architecture. Its guiding principles include the traditional tenets of respect for sovereignty and non-interference alongside some more radical, interventionist principles incorporated in the AU's Constitutive Act. These include the right to intervene in a member state in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act) and the right of member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security (article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act).

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65 Laurie Nathan, *The Peacemaking Effectiveness of Regional Organizations*, Crisis States Research Centre, 2010

## Literature Review

Studies have shown that the characteristics of conflict in the Horn of Africa made the development of peace and security mechanisms more urgent and more difficult than in other regions of Africa. The region is a cultural crossroads where North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa meet and where race, ethnicity and religion have all been mobilized for political ends. Because of its strategic location, external powers have frequently intervened in the politics of the Horn and in some cases exacerbated local conflicts (Khadiagala, 2008).

It has been argued that the signing of the Sudan and Somali peace agreements in quick succession in late 2004 and early 2005 created an impression that IGAD was proving unusually adept at performing its new conflict resolution role. Two IGAD settlements within three months appeared a remarkable accomplishment, especially considering that both addressed long and complex conflicts that had defied previous attempts at settlement (Francis, 2006). However, a closer examination of the circumstances in which the agreements were achieved points to a more nuanced judgment about IGAD's institutional role.

According to the reports of The Expert Group and Monitoring Group on Somalia (Dec. 2010) despite the successful mediations in Sudan and Somalia, IGAD is still far from providing an institutional basis for regional security in the Horn of Africa. There remains a high propensity for regional actors to resort to the use of force. Indeed, during the Sudanese and Somalia peace processes IGAD's member states demonstrated their willingness to engage in war at the same time as organizing for peace. In the early years of IGAD's Sudan peace process, military action by Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda provided a level of pressure that persuaded the government of Sudan to negotiate seriously with the South. Similarly, reports to the UN Security Council's Sanctions Committee on the Somali arms embargo record military assistance from Ethiopia to its allies among the Somali factions throughout 2003-4.

Haacke and Williams(2009) have already noted that the contribution of regional bodies to conflict prevention and resolution varies greatly from one case to another. For instance, some have been highly successful; others have been largely or completely ineffectual, in relation to certain types of conflict. Any theoretical analysis of the role and impact of regional bodies in relation to peace and stability must endeavour to explain this variation. In effect a regional organization's peacemaking effectiveness is shaped by historical, geographic, political and economic circumstances<sup>66</sup>.

## **Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanisms of the IGAD**

The issue of peace and security has been the priority in the Horn of Africa region to harmonize and coordinate peacemaking and building activities. IGAD works in one of its priority area that is conflict prevention, management and resolution in the Horn of Africa. Nowadays, economic growth and poverty reduction programs are associated with the peace and security agenda<sup>67</sup>. Therefore to secure sustainable development, common security is the major prerequisite. The issue of peace and security in the Horn of Africa has been prioritized since the revitalization of IGAD with a broader development mandate. A peace and security strategy has been implanted for a collective Goal of member states since 2003. From that peace and security strategy, programs on conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are issued. The main focus of IGAD is on capacity building and awareness creation, and on the Early Warning of conflicts. The prominent mission in this regard is the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) around the intra- state conflicts in the Horn of Africa<sup>68</sup>.

### **IGAD Conflict Prevention Mechanism**

CEWARN is the regional coordinating office taking the lead in implementing the IGAD mandate in consultation with the various stakeholders. The establishment of CEWARN is a clear evidence of the regional leaders' long term commitment to ensuring peace and stability by defusing or pre-empting conflicts.

66 Haacke, J. and Williams, P. Regional Arrangements and Security Challenges: A Comparative Analysis', Crisis States Working Paper, Series 2, 52, London: CSRC, London School of Economics,2009

67 Saundry, Peter, Regional cooperation for peace and sustainable development in Africa, 2008

68 Kagwanja, Charles; Beyond Security, Assessing the role of IGAD, the Horn of Africa Bulletin



The decision making bodies of CEWARN are the Technical Committee on Early Warning and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries as the senior policy organs. The Technical Committee brings together the representatives of the member states, which are the CEWERU Heads as well as civil society representatives. They meet at least once a year to give recommendations to the Committee of Permanent Secretaries, which are senior government officials from the relevant ministries handling CEWARN's work, such as the foreign ministry. They discuss policy guidelines as well as lobby for and assist in implementation of CEWARN activities in the member states. Each CEWERU also has a National Steering Committee, which includes state and non-state actors like parliamentarians, police and military representatives as well as community leaders from civil society<sup>69</sup>.

## **IGAD Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanism**

Conflict management refers to measures that limit, mitigate and/or contain a conflict without necessarily solving it, while Conflict resolution refers to intensive efforts made at various levels to remedy the underlying incompatibilities in a conflict and mutual acceptance of each party's existence. Conflict management is usually conducted through the international community and requires mass financial capacity that regional organizations don't have. The United Nations has attempted interventions since the early 1990s, most notably through peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is strictly defined as UN troops physically separating two sides after an armed conflict and is not meant to be enforcement or collective security.

IGAD conflict management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts is premised on dialogue with the aim of promoting peace, security and stability as well as creating mechanisms to act collectively. Efforts within IGAD to solve security problems in the region have taken place in a particular context of a broad international consensus that regional organizations should play a greater part in maintaining international order and conflict resolution. As one of the sub regions that represent the Horn of Africa, IGAD has to play a forefront role in conflict management and Conflict resolution with the close coordination and support of United Nations and Africa Union in terms of military interventions.

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<sup>69</sup> Katja H. Christensen, conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism in the Horn of Africa: IGAD as a Pioneer in Regional Conflict Prevention in Africa,

IGAD has therefore a Peace and Security Division with a permanent mission to ensure that peace and stability prevail in the sub-region so that economic development can take place; and contribute towards alleviation and mitigation of humanitarian crisis through long term strategies and response to acute crises<sup>70</sup>.

## **IGAD Achievement Toward Peace and Security in the Region**

Since its creation, IGAD has made tremendous efforts to bring to an end the scourge of armed conflicts and political crises in the Region. In order to enhance its effectiveness in addressing conflict situations in the region IGAD has established specialized institutions such as Africa Standby Force, CEWARN, and ICPAT-Counter-Terrorism programmes.

### **Africa Standby Force**

IGAD has been instrumental in developing the Eastern African Brigade (EASBRIG) of the AU-led Africa Standby Force (ASF). EASBRIG is envisaged to include all seven member states of IGAD, as well as the non-IGAD Members Tanzania, Rwanda, Seychelles, Mauritius and Burundi. The mandate of ASF will be to maintain and enforce peace. IGAD, as interim coordinator, has helped to put in place institutional arrangements for EASBRIG. During the EASBRIG Summit in January 2007 the establishment of an independent secretariat was approved<sup>71</sup>.

### **Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)**

CEWARN is an initiative of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), designed to serve the Region as a mechanism that systematically anticipates and responds to violent conflicts in a timely and effective manner. CEWARN's mission is to establish itself as an effective and sustainable sub-regional mechanism that undertakes conflict Early Warning and Early Response and fosters cooperation among relevant stakeholders in order to respond to potential and actual violent conflicts in the region in a timely manner<sup>72</sup>.

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70 Cilliers Jakkie, Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa, *Occasional Paper 102, April 2005*

71 Alusala Nelson; African Standby Force East Africa moves on, *African Security Review*, 2004

72 IGAD: IGAD'S Regional Perspective in Disaster Risk Reduction

CEWARN is a major component of IGAD's peace and security agenda and was established to receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region. National early warning units, or CEWERUs, are now being set up. CEWARN seeks also to enable member states to prevent cross-border pastoral conflicts from developing into armed violent conflicts on a greater scale; enable local communities to play a part in preventing violent conflicts; and enable the IGAD Secretariat to pursue conflict prevention initiatives and to provide technical and financial support. CEWARN's focus on pastoral conflicts is unique among early warning systems in the different sub-regions of Africa<sup>73</sup>.

## Countering Terrorism

Signs of violent extremism and radicalization have been identified as a threat to peace and stability in IGAD countries. Porous borders, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, weak law enforcement and judicial institutions, corruption and in some cases state complicity in terrorist activities, lack of central authority, and grievances stemming from social, economic and political injustices were identified as the main factors for al-Shabaab, al-Qaida and other violent extremist groups' emergence and taking root in the region<sup>74</sup>.

IGAD has already taken steps to implement Capacity building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT), set up in 2006 to strengthen and build capacities of IGAD Secretariat and its member states in combating terrorism. ICPAT's focus includes establishing a regional approach to counter terrorism with a broader international strategy; acting against financing of terrorism; developing operational capacity to counter illegal cross border movements; expanding the capacity to record and share information; ensuring that human rights are protected in counterterrorism operations and promoting educational program to enlist as well as enhance public support<sup>75</sup>.

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73 Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States. Done at Khartoum on 9th January 2002.

74 Horn of Africa Region Capacity-Building Working Group Workshop on Countering Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa 11 February 2014 Ankara

75 Matthew Schwartz; *Fighting Terror Through Justice: Implementing The IGAD Framework for Legal Cooperation Against Terrorism*, Global Center on Cooperative Security, New York ,2012

## **Peace and Security Framework Strategy**

With funds from the European Union, The Secretariat is coordinating the development of an Eastern and Southern African Regional Framework to address CPMR issues. The framework applies to IGAD, COMESA, EAC and IOC as a common regional CPMR framework. This is in addition to an IGAD-specific CPMR strategy that is currently under development.

## **Regional Disarmament Program**

IGAD works closely with the Regional centre for Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), inaugurated in June 2006. Since all IGAD member states have signed up to the UN's Nairobi Declaration of Small Arms, IGAD agreed to work in partnership with RECSA as opposed to establishing a separate program<sup>76</sup>. IGAD has also made progress in Disaster Risk Management by the development of a sub-regional drought and disaster preparedness strategy to reduce risks caused by natural disasters under development.

## **IGAD's Contribution to the Conflict Resolution in Somalia**

IGAD has deployed various efforts to address the Somali crisis. From 1991, IGAD gave a mandate to member states to deal with the issue of Somalia. The issue of Somalia was mainly handled by Djibouti and Ethiopia between 1991 and 2002. This shows that, at the outset, the members of IGAD were relatively on common terms to reach a consensus on the Somalia peace initiative taken by one of them<sup>77</sup>.

## **The ARTA Conference of 2002**

The Somalia Reconciliation conference held in Arta, Djibouti in 2000 was as a result of unprecedented determination by IGAD to resolve the unfolding crisis. The meeting attended by about 400 delegates, lasted several months of intense deliberation. This conference was also attended by CSO representatives and some Somalia clan leaders. The Arta conference refrained from dealing with diverse powerful faction leaders. In the same period, a Transitional National Government

<sup>76</sup> Williams Andrew: Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa, Golbal International Cooperative,2013

<sup>77</sup> Hyde,J .Henry. Somalia:Expanding Crisis in the Horn of Africa,Illinois,June 2006

(ING) was established in the conference headed by Dr Abdiqasim Salad Hassan. The initiative was in line with the bottom-up approach authorised by IGAD in 1998 to solve the conflict in Somalia.

## **The Eldoret Peace Process**

In January 2002, in Khartoum summit, the IGAD member states agreed to have a new peace process under the support or backing of IGAD. They assigned the IGAD technical-committee that had the responsibility of undertaking the peace process which was composed of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and front line states. Kenya provided the chairman-designate and venue for subsequent meetings, Eldoret<sup>78</sup>.

This peace process had three phases. In the first phase, there were about 300 political, military, traditional, and civil society leaders attending the conference. This created a sense of ownership among the Somali stakeholder.

The second phase focused on the substantive issues at the hub of the peace process. In this stage, six reconciliation committees working on the federal charter constitution, disarmament and reintegration, land and property, local conflicts, economic recovery, regional and international issues were formed. The reconciliation committee had seventy five delegates selected by the plenary. The reports of the committee were similarly submitted to the plenary for adoption and discussion.

In the third phase, the plenary discussed and approved the report of the committee and proposed an all inclusive power sharing arrangement with the objective of forming a broad-based and functioning central government. Power sharing and representation at various levels of government was given serious consideration during the deliberations. Power sharing and representation at various levels of government was given serious consideration during the deliberations. Clearly, IGAD's peace-making activities in Somalia helped to secure legitimacy for the organization and build wider international acceptance as the sole appropriate forum for combating conflicts in the Horn of Africa<sup>79</sup>.

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78 Kidist Mulugeta. The Role of Regional and International organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD. Addis Ababa. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2009)

79 Institute for Security Studies. Somalia: the Sudan-IGAD peace process - signposts for the way forward,2005

## **The IGAD Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia**

In view of the deteriorating security situation, the heads of states and governments of IGAD issued in 2005, their plan to deploy a Peace Support Mission to Somalia. The Mission had a mandate to provide security support to the Transitional Federal Government and guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace process and assist with the reestablishment of peace and security including training of the police and the army<sup>80</sup>. The decision of IGAD summit was endorsed by the Fourth Ordinary Session of the African Union and authorized by the 24th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU. With the view of implementing the decisions, the AU/IGAD sent a Fact-Finding and Reconnaissance Mission on February 14, 2005 to determine the mandate, force, size, structure, and tasks of the peace support mission. The proposed IGAD Forces for Somalia (IGASOM) deployment plan was presented by the Military Experts to the IGAD Member states, refined by the chiefs of defense, and finally approved by the Ministers of Defense at the March 14, 2005 meeting in Entebbe, Uganda<sup>81</sup>. Nevertheless, the IGASOM deployment did not take place in light of extant difficulties which were mainly due to the UN Security Council's inability to lift the arms embargo on Somalia. Hence a request was made for a Joint AU/IGAD Planning Team and the Somali National Security and Stabilization Plan for the deployment of forces to Somalia. It was finally by the PSC, at its Meeting held in Addis Ababa on 19th January 2007 the AU Commission was mandated to establish a Peace Support Mission in Somalia. The decision was therefore taken to deploy an AU Force that incorporated elements from IGAD to be called African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which has made significant achievements in the security stabilization of Somalia.

## **IGAD's contribution to the Conflict Resolution in Sudan**

IGAD's engagement in the Sudan peace process began on 7 September 1993 when it established a Standing Committee on Peace to assist negotiations and end Sudan's civil war. A Declaration of Principles (DoP) was proposed and quickly accepted by

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80 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Outcomes of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia and the IGAD Military Planning Meetings, Peace and Security Council 29th Meeting 12 May 2005 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

81 Tariku Abreha Kahsay; Keeping the Peace: Intervention and Security Challenges in Africa :The Case of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),International Institute for Social Studies, The Hague,2009

the SPLM/A as a basis for negotiations, but was not endorsed by the Government of Sudan (GoS) until 1998. By this time the peace process was floundering and in an effort to re-activate it the mandate was renewed by the IGAD Sub-Ministerial Committee on the Conflict in Sudan (IGAD, Nairobi, 23 July 1999). This Committee established a Secretariat for the IGAD Peace Process on the Sudan based in Nairobi with the mandate to carry out continuous and sustained mediation efforts with a view to arriving at a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

On 20 July 2002 the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed the Machakos Protocol as a framework for the conduct of the negotiations and after two and one half years of negotiations endorsed the CPA. A Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities was signed on 15 October 2002. An addendum to this MoU established the Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), a mechanism to check violations that were poisoning the negotiations. Several breakthrough agreements were made in 2003 between Dr Ali Osman Taha, First Vice President of Sudan and Dr John Garang de Mabior, Chairman of the SPLM/A, culminating in their commitment to a comprehensive Peace Agreement. IGAD was the lead agency in the Sudan peace process because it was a conflict that required regional ownership of the problem.

Further agreements were negotiated on security arrangements, power-sharing and wealth-sharing over the next two years, culminating in the signing on 9 January 2005 of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

IGAD's institutional role proved crucial, first in framing the problem as a North-South issue and second in maintaining a semblance of continuity for the Sudan peace process as a whole. This long-term engagement enabled those involved to capitalize on opportunities to come to a settlement. Without IGAD's sustained involvement these would most likely have been lost<sup>82</sup>. However, despite the key role of IGAD, Somalia has always been on the priority agenda of many NGOs and IO since the beginning of the Somali crisis. Different contributions from various actors; Africa Union, UNSC, humanitarian agencies; have been made in coordination with IGAD towards stability of Somalia.

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82 Bizusew Mersha. *Sub-Regional Approach to Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Case of IGAD's Mediation Role in the Sudan*. Addis Ababa University, 2004.



## **Challenges of IGAD in conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution**

Despite its successes in the peace and security domain, IGAD faces a number of major challenges that threaten its future effectiveness. The complexity of conflicts, rivalries between member states, poor governance within countries and lack of funds are the major obstacles to IGAD success.

### **The Complexity of the Somali Conflict**

Somalia, a case of state failure in modern times, has moved from one crisis to another thereby impeding realization of long lasting peace and stability. More importantly, the total disintegration of the state has continued to undermine efforts geared towards implementation of agreed arrangements for fair representation, power, and resource sharing and reconciliation in Somalia. Furthermore, sustainable peace primarily requires committed internal actors. In this regard, IGAD lacks genuine partners of peace from within. Clan loyalty has been a major obstacle for all the peace processes launched after 1991. Zero-sum clan contest coupled with protracted conflict and deepened divisions makes reconciliation and power-sharing a difficult task in Somalia. The peace efforts are invariably also interrupted by opportunist warlords and other groups and individuals who continue to benefit from the chaos. These groups lack national interest and they breach and disown several agreements they have even signed. Violent Islamist extremists who aim to establish a Taliban-like regime in the Horn of Africa by uniting all Somalis living in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti are clear obstacles to peace in Somalia, further complicating an already complex Somali conflict environment<sup>83</sup>.

### **Rivalry Among Member States**

The strength of any organization depends on the relationship between its member states. However, the history of IGAD member states has always been full of rivalry<sup>84</sup>. Politically, almost all of them have underlying and unresolved disputes among and between themselves.

<sup>83</sup> The Centre for Research & Dialogue, Conflict Analysis South-Central Somalia, World Bank, May 2004

<sup>84</sup> Medhane Tadesse. Turning Conflicts to Cooperation: Towards An Energy-Led Integration the Horn of Africa. Addis Ababa. Friedrich- Ebert- Stiftung, 2003.



The historical rivalry among IGAD member states show that the region is in serious crisis and this has led to endless competition in framing and initiating peace processes in Somalia. It has also become difficult to have a common position on Somalia as well as in the South Sudan current conflict. Ethiopia and Eritrea have taken their proxy war to Somalia by supporting and arming various Somali factions further aggravating the conflict since 1998. The formation of the TNG was not well received by Ethiopia, while Eritrea supported it. Ethiopia and Djibouti also demonstrated contradictory views on the Somali peace processes. The internal dynamics, therefore, made it very difficult for IGAD to function properly and deal with regional security issues. This has led many close observers to conclude that IGAD is in a coma (IGAD Secretariat 2004). While this is the dominant opinion, there is also a contrasting view that the effect of the regional division is exaggerated. Despite their differences, the member states work for their common interest. For instance, more than 70 percent of IGAD's Council of Ministers meetings revolved around Somalia, showing that when it comes to their interest, they are ready to engage in dialogue<sup>85</sup>.

## **Regional Political Instability**

Almost all states members are in fragile democratic transition. The regimes are characterized by bad governance, poor human rights records, and weak democratic institutions and culture. Furthermore the regional states have a long history of engaging in each other's internal affairs by supporting rebel groups.

As a result, it is hardly possible to think of a common security policy and structure, since an air of mistrust and non-cooperation rather than of peaceful coexistence predominates. IGAD is therefore, unable to develop a common position to effectively deal with conflict in the region<sup>86</sup>.

## **Uncertain and Insufficient Financial Support**

Member states contributions to support IGAD's operations have increased over time. However, such funding remains unpredictable, making substantive recruitment

85 2010: concept note, Draft Elements for developing a regional action plan, final report. Djibouti Code of Conduct

86 <http://www.igad.org>, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – Peace and Security Architecture

and longer-term planning difficult. As a result, IGAD is highly dependent on donor funding. IGAD periodically convenes a Donor's Forum, intended to ensure coherent and sufficient levels of funding. However, as 2007 evaluation of IGAD by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had found, the Forum lacks coordination and a commonality of purpose, with the result that IGAD has received piecemeal, project-focused, short-term support over time. Highlighting the support for peace and stability processes in the region as a notable exception, the evaluation report goes on to state: 'Donors, who have a key role in ensuring that IGAD has the right mix of resources to promote regional development, have fallen spectacularly short of assuming a coordinated, effective approach in this regard by encouraging IGAD's focus on stand-alone projects rather than performance-based, integrated programming'<sup>87</sup>.

IGAD has not so far been able to develop a strategic approach that attracts core funding, with the result that major donors including USAID and the EU are either disinvesting or putting the bulk of their funds elsewhere. This is undermining IGAD's effectiveness<sup>88</sup>.

## Competition for Resources

Competition for resources is already acute, especially in the semi-arid periphery of the countries of the region. It can be expected to increase as population grows and an already fragile environment is degraded, including through climate change. Competition for scarce water resources, especially the Nile Waters, seems set to intensify. Environmental shocks from rain failure or floods are regular features of the economic landscape. Maintaining food security is a constant challenge for governments. Famine is unlikely to be a direct cause of conflict the reverse is more likely but the fragility of the environment means that resource struggles are often battles for survival and are conducted with greater intensity<sup>89</sup>.

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87 Yifru Daniel and Kitevu Raymond, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development(IGAD) – Peace and Security Architecture,Djibouti,2011

88 Aiding Peace, A Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflicts Prevention and Peace Building Activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010, Final Report, December 2010

89 Sally Healy, Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel, Royal Institute of International Affairs, uk, 2008

# Opportunities for Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa

## Positive Geo-political Change

The deliberate targeting of civilians in modern conflict has influenced the re-conceptualization of sovereignty, which holds that a key tenet of a state's sovereign right is its responsibility to its citizens. Against this normative background, it is widely accepted that one of the central tasks of contemporary peace operations is PoC. Increasingly, this has meant providing UN missions with robust mandates, including the use of force, in order to protect civilians. This opportunity is therefore offered to regional organizations such as IGAD in consultation with Africa Union and United Nations<sup>90</sup>.

## Regionalization of Conflict

The Horn of Africa constitutes a Regional Security Complex in which the security problems of one country impacts negatively on the security of many other states of the region. The different conflicts interlock with and feed into each other, determining concerted conflict resolution approaches. It is imperative to note that the conflict in Somalia serve as a case study on how conflict systems and the linkages among different levels of conflict can regionalize or internationalize the struggle. Washington's global war on terrorism and Addis Ababa's regional and domestic insecurities have shaped how outside forces intervened and, in turn, produced new conflict dynamics within Somalia. By the same token, regionalization of conflict creates novel opportunities to promote conflict resolution mechanisms as the ripple effects of the catastrophic nature of the conflict in Somalia alter expectations and calculations across the Horn of Africa. Similarly, the war against terrorism has opened up unique options for regional solution where countries must collaborate in order to realize long lasting peace and stability.

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90 Sharon Wiharta, Neil Melvin and Xenia Avezov , *The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations, Mapping the Emerging Landscape*.

## **Region's Importance**

The regional importance takes into account, the region's resources that could benefit the people in the region as well as the interests of the international community. These include but not limited to the 115 million people living in the region, the vast agricultural, water and mineral resources, the hydro-power potential that could meet the region's energy needs as well as those of the adjacent nations, the geo-political importance as a major conduit of international commerce in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and the contribution to international collaboration as the seat of the African Union Headquarters, the Economic commission for Africa, and the Inter-Governmental Agency for Development.

## Conclusion

IGAD has been a key stabilizing factor in the Somalia and South Sudan conflicts. In Somalia, the main achievement has been the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. In 2012, after over 20 years and 14 attempts, Somalia finally had an elected central government in the form of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The FGS consists of the parliament elected by the clan elders in August 2012, the executive headed by the prime minister, and a president elected by the parliament. This provided the legitimacy for the international community to rally around. Establishing a government has been IGAD's main achievement and provided the right entry point for wider international involvement<sup>91</sup>. For the moment IGAD, AU and the international community need to work in a synchronized fashion in order to achieve more results. What has been embarked upon in Somalia can only be sustained by the efforts of the entire African continent and the international community working together.

In Sudan, IGAD played an important role to end the conflict between North and South Sudan. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was a great milestone for IGAD's work in the region despite many outstanding issues between South and North Sudan. However the current situation in South Sudan seem to be different and much more complicated. It is extremely difficult to predict whether or not IGAD will be successful in returning peace to the country as some of the member states are implicated in the protracted conflict. North Sudan and Uganda, for instance, are perceived to have vested interests and therefore their neutrality is questionable, ultimately impacting negatively on the IGADs role as a peace facilitator in the conflict.

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91 Safeworld Report , Regional engagement in Somalia, August 2012

## Recommendations

- The strength of any organization depends on the relationship between its member states. Politically, almost all of IGAD member states have underlying and unresolved disputes among and between themselves. Therefore IGAD should initiate a comprehensive strategy to encourage member states to initiate dialogue on unresolved disputes among and between them.
- Strengthening democracy and good governance by ensuring peaceful democratic transitions in IGAD member states. This will help to have strong democratic institutions able to stabilize their countries and reduce regional instability.
- IGAD and its member states, as well as other regional organizations, should constantly bear in mind that peace processes do not come to an end with the signing of a peace agreement, however comprehensive. The appropriate role for IGAD is to ensure that the subsequent phases of peace building, reconciliation and reconstruction are conducted within a regional framework where necessary, appropriate and practical.
- IGAD must continue to cultivate the support and goodwill of the international community to access political and financial support for its efforts and, encourage the financial support of its member states and the international community, expand its capacity to monitor and engage in regional confidence building activities.

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## **Highlights of Key Messages in the Issue Briefs**

### **Conflict Early Warning and Response Systems in Eastern Africa: *Do they Work***

- Developing regional and internal security and defence legislations, policies and strategies for EWER mechanisms can lay a firm foundation for operations of EWER mechanisms.
- There is a need for clear linkage between early warning institutional framework and implementing institutions and policies.
- Going by the emergence of conflicts in the region, the effectiveness of EWER in Eastern Africa mechanisms can be questioned.
- EWER systems should be relevant to the context. This can be ensured through selection of appropriate indicators. Timing is also important to make sure parties are warned in time and the response measures are activated on time. This can be enhanced through use of technology such as mobile phones, emails and data processing software.
- EWER mechanisms should use different data collection systems utilizing both quantitative and qualitative methods and incorporates use of appropriate communication technology

### **The Role of IGAD in Security Stabilization in Somalia and South Sudan**

- IGAD member states have a long history of engaging in each other's internal affairs by supporting rebel groups. As a result, it is hardly possible to think of a common security policy and structure, since an air of mistrust and non-cooperation rather than of peaceful coexistence predominates. IGAD is therefore, unable to develop a common position to effectively deal with conflict in the region

- IGAD must give attention to constructing durable security architecture for the region including provision for the eventual conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty/arrangement among its member states that would compel countries to actively disavow support to groupings engaged in armed subversion into neighboring states.
- The contribution of regional bodies to conflict prevention and resolution varies greatly from one case to another. Any theory of the role and impact of regional bodies in relation to peace and stability must endeavor to explain this variation. A regional organization's peacemaking effectiveness is shaped by historical, geographic, political and economic circumstances.
- Peace and security are the prerequisites for the countries and citizens of the IGAD region to achieve their potential. A comprehensive regional peace and security strategy is called for with IGAD at its heart. To succeed, such a strategy needs to be simultaneously very ambitious and soberly realistic. It needs to embrace the breadth of human security as well as to address security challenge of preventing and resolving armed conflict.

# About the Authors



**Mr. Joseph Kioi Mbugua** is a researcher at IPSTC where he has published a number of occasional papers and issue briefs. Mr. Mbugua has over twenty years experience in peace and security research, training and facilitating in peace building and as a writer and editor in media and publishing industry.

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