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Promoting Peace Education through Peace Support Operations in Eastern Africa

Protection of Civilians in the Eastern Region of the Democratic Republic of Congo

Effective Strategies for Responding to Contemporary Conflicts in Eastern Africa

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Foreword

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is a research and training institution focusing on capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture and has developed to be the regional Centre of Excellence for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. IPSTC addresses the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated Peace Support Operations by describing the actors and multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research conducted covers a broad spectrum ranging from conflict prevention through management to post-conflict reconstruction. The Centre has made considerable contribution in training and research on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa through design of training curriculum, field research and publication of Occasional Papers and Issue Briefs. The Occasional Papers are produced annually, while the Issues Briefs are produced quarterly. The issue briefs are an important contribution to the vision and mission of IPSTC.

The First Quarter Issue Brief No. 1 (2014) has two titles on peace and conflict in Eastern Africa: *Promoting Peace Education through Peace Support Operations in Eastern Africa and Protection of Civilians in the Eastern Region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*. The Issue Brief provide insights into pertinent peace and security issues in the region that are useful to policy makers and aims to contribute to the security debate and praxis in the region. The articles in the Issue Brief are also expected to inform the design of the training modules at IPSTC. The research and publication of this Issue Brief has been made possible by the support of the Government of Japan through UNDP.

Brig. Robert Kabage

Director, IPSTC

Acronyms

AFDL   Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo

AMIB   African Union Mission in Burundi

AMISOM   African Union Mission in Somalia

APSA   Africa Peace and Security Architecture

ASF   Africa Standby Force

AU   African Union

CIED   Counter Improvised Electronic Devices

CIMIC   Civil Military Cooperation

CNDP   Congrès National pour la Défense du People

DDR   Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DFS   Department of Field Services

DPKO   Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo

EASF   Eastern Africa Standby Force

FARDC   Forces Armees de la Republique du Congo

FDLR   Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda

ICGLR   International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

ICRC   International Committee for the Red Cross

IGAD   Inter Governmental Authority on Development

IPSTC   International Peace Support Training Center

KAIPTC   Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center

M23   March 23 Movement

MLC   Mouvement de Liberation du Congo

MONUSCO   United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo

NGO   Non Governmental Organization

PoC   Protection of Civilians

PSC	Peace and Security Council of the African Union
PSCF	Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division of the AU
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
REC/RM	Regional Economic Community/Regional Mechanism
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAT	Systems Approach to Training
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SGTM	Standardized Generic Training Modules
SSAFE	Safe and Secure Approaches to Field Environment
SSR	Security Sector Reforms
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
UN	United Nations
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

Introduction to the Issue Briefs

The topics in this first quarter issue brief address diverse issues of peace and security in the Eastern Africa region. The first paper examines avenues for promoting Peace Education through Peace Support Operations and the second one looks at the state of Protection of Civilians in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo conflict.

The first paper, *Promoting Peace Education through Peace Support Operations in Eastern Africa* attempts to assess the current philosophy, strategic approach, methodology and practices of PSO education practices and identifies opportunities for improvement of PSO education in Eastern Africa. The paper has also identified a number of gaps including dependency on foreign funding, lack of harmonized long term training programs leading to certification and award of diplomas and degrees in PSO education. Peace education is being applied in various dimensions across the globe to provide suitable conditions for sustainable peace and is a specialized discipline within peace education/studies that provides knowledge and skills of conflict prevention, management and recovery in complex conflict situations. The paper calls for continuous research on PSO education to acquire innovative skills and knowledge of conducting peace support operations. It also calls for innovative approaches that unearth cultural, historical and political conditions that enhance or hinder peace support operations in Africa. The paper observes that the philosophy and principles underpinning PSO should also be grounded in African values and interests.

In the second paper, *The Protection of Civilians in Eastern Democratic of Congo (DRC)*, the author gives a snapshot of the devastating violent conflict attendant to the Eastern DRC. The snapshot includes a tracing of the background to the conflict, the actors and its negative impact on the populace, as well as an insight into the various strategies adopted to address the conflict. Towards this end, and in particular, the paper identifies the real impact of different strategies used by the International community as well as the Government of Congo to improve the Protection of Civilians caught up in the conflict. The paper concludes by proposing practical recommendations that can contribute towards the enhancement of the level of

Protection of Civilians and surmises that the fighting in Eastern DRC continues to threaten peace and security of both the Eastern DRC, the DRC in general and the entire Eastern Africa region.

Promoting Peace Education Through Peace Support Operations in Eastern Africa

Joseph Kioi Mbugua

Introduction

This paper is a product of a study whose main goal was to assess the contribution of Peace Support Operations (PSO) education in conflict prevention, management and peace building in Eastern Africa. The paper interrogates how peace education in Eastern Africa is being implemented by PSO organizations and missions to serve as a long-term tool of peace building in the region. The paper examines theoretical and conceptual basis, regulatory framework, policies, research, curriculum, training, practical activities and successful cases of implementation of PSO education in Eastern Africa. The specific objectives of the research from which this paper is derived were:

- To assess how peace education in PSO is being implemented in Eastern Africa.

- To examine long term potential of peace support operations education for conflict prevention, management and recovery in Eastern Africa.

This paper is organized into four sections namely; section one is the introduction, section two is theoretical and conceptual framework, section three is implementation of peace support operations education in Africa and Eastern Africa and an analysis of the state of PSO education and section four presents the conclusion and recommendations.

Global peace education in general is meant to make the world a better and more humane place. It is one strategy among many others in the general peace and security management framework. PSO education is a relatively new specialization within the wider peace education realm; having begun soon after the formation of the UN in

1945 whose first deployment took place in 1948 and 1949.[1] PSO education assumed more urgency after the end of the Cold war in 1989. Indeed, starting from 1948 until 1989, peacekeeping missions by the United Nations (UN) were of limited mandates and therefore training on diverse subjects such as human rights and protection of civilians, among others, were not included.[2]

The proliferation of internal conflicts after the end of cold war called for new approaches and techniques to peacekeeping. At first, most institutions were training local military and police to serve in peacekeeping and PSO missions in Africa and beyond. With the evolution of peace building, post conflict state reconstruction theory and practice; PSO also adapted new approaches and techniques. Today, Peace Support Operations has emerged as one of the global tools of maintaining peace and security over the last three decades and its education has also grown as a specialized, dynamic and organic discipline.

Peace Support Operations became a necessity due to challenges facing the UN peacekeeping missions and individual states to protect their citizens in complex emergency situations. Indeed, these challenges called for policy shifts in how PSOs were mandated. For one, this policy shift affected the interpretation of sovereignty and extended the grounds for human rights protection. The UN and other regional organizations saw the need to intervene in conflict areas in order to stop the fighting, bring warring parties to a negotiation table, protect civilians, create suitable environment for humanitarian relief and assist other states in nation building endeavours. The Brahimi Report of 2000 created new impetus for PSO by developing new principles and practices of UN PSO. It has been argued that, this in effect has affected the interpretation of sovereignty and rendered developing countries vulnerable to foreign interventions. The foreign interventions have also been informed by factors such as globalization[3], socio-economic and present-day political realities all of which have had an impact on the PSO. Africa has claimed the largest share of peace support operations in the world. Therefore, there is a

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1. United Peacekeeping: The Early Years, www.un.org/peacekeeping/operations/early.shtml
2. The first two missions were UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East (1948) and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), 1949, the UN began sending armed contingents in 1956 with UN Emergency Force (UNEF 1) to address the Suez Canal crisis between Israel and Egypt
3. Globalization refers to an uneven set of international processes that affect all areas of human activity, Jakobsen, 2002

higher demand for PSO education in Africa than in the rest of the world. PSO education that is meant to address the comprehensive needs of PSO missions is a fairly recent discipline in Africa, with the first training Centres beginning around 2000. PSO education brings together the military, police and civilians who work in complex emergency conflict systems. This paper presents options for effective implementation of PSO education in Eastern Africa.

Many of the skills required for peacekeeping are basic military training offered in most African Union (AU) and UN member countries. Some countries have courses specifically meant for preparing local military, police and civilian to PSO missions[4]. This paper maintains that PSO education in Africa should strive towards more innovative and politically, economically and culturally appropriate content design and delivery. The paper intimates that the current practices are too beholden to Western liberal democratic peace philosophy and too dependent on foreign funding. For this reason, the paper argues that PSO education should rely more on lessons drawn from the UN and AU missions in Africa such as the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) among others. Leading training institutions on the continent such as the IPSTC, KAIPTC and SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC-RPTC) can, indeed, offer lessons for improved PSO education through evaluation of the courses they offer. Furthermore, PSO education can be structured to respond to needs at different levels with corresponding certification leading to graduate programmes for PSO. At present courses are short term and offered to respond to practical needs in the field rather than for purposes of long-term competency in PSO.

Statement and Significance of the Problem

Most countries on the African continent are potentially at risk of both intra- and inter-state violent conflicts. The Conflicts emanate from challenges with undemocratic rule, abuse of human rights, sectarian conflicts, non-performing economies, organized armed groups, massive displacement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees and proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Drawing legitimacy from the UN Charter, the international community

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4.   UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Training Manual, Training Guidelines and Exercises, DPKO, 2009, p.13

responds to volatile post conflict situations through Peace Support Operations – peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peace keepers, made up of military, police and civilian components, need to be equipped with appropriate knowledge, skills and attitudes to be able to keep the peace. Over 100 countries currently provide peacekeepers in 15 UN peace support missions and hence a growing need for training military, police and civilians to serve in these missions. 78% of current UN peacekeepers serve in Africa and African peacekeepers make up about 50% of UN peacekeepers.[5] These figures indicate the significance of PSO education in Africa; meaning that if Africans dominate in PSO and most PSO are meant for Africa, it therefore follows that Africans must largely inform the content of PSO education.

The leadership and implementation of PSO mandates is crucial to successful turn-around of countries in conflict situations. The training offered to peacekeepers is crucial for the successful implementation of PSO mandates. PSO education is meant to be a tool of long-term peace building. However, the success of PSO education is dependent on proper interpretation of its concept and effective implementation of its programmes. It is important to compare and contrast the training programs of PSO education providers in Africa in a bid to learn from best practices and therefore, determine whether PSO education offered in Eastern Africa is well suited for peace and security stabilization, conflict transformation and sustainable peace building. It is noteworthy that, although many PSO education programmes are delivered in Africa, most of the courses are not based on sound theoretical foundation that can best inform policy and practice. There are very few studies that have been done to determine the philosophical and theoretical foundations that inform PSO training on the continent. Moreover, there are risks of duplicating training approaches that are informed by foreign ideologies and practices that may not add value to peace and security consolidation in the African context. Indeed, a challenge of PSO education in Africa is that they do not take into consideration the specific historical, socio-economic and political evolution in recipient countries and regions facing conflict. For PSO education programmes to be sustainable they must be based on social science theory that is validated by research and translated into practical procedures.[6] The effectiveness of PSO education depends on the relationship between theory,

5. Daniel Hampton, Creating Sustainable Peacekeeping in Africa, Africa Security Brief, ACSS, 2014, p.1
6. Theory identifies, clarifies and defines the phenomena of interest, their relationship with each other and guides and summarizes research (Johnson 2003, Merton, 1957)

research and practice. Therefore, there is a need to demonstrate how PSO education can lead to more efficient and effective transformation in the protection of civilians, delivery of humanitarian relief, and reform of the host countries peace and security institutions for long-term stability.

Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

The paper utilizes a number of theoretical and conceptual lenses to assess PSO education in Eastern Africa. Two of these theories are examined here in order to shed some light on different aspects of PSO that are relevant to this study.

Democratic Peace Thesis/Liberal Peace Theory

The democratic peace thesis/liberal peace theory is the most dominant theory in peace support operations education. In PSO education, the theory stems from the argument that democracies rarely go to war. This does not mean that democracies do not wage wars but that they mostly engage in war with undemocratic regimes. Therefore there is a need to promote democracy in the developing countries to prevent emergence of intra or interstate conflicts. Liberal democracies are also said to be less vulnerable to civil war. The legislature and judiciary provides the checks and balances on the executive power to declare war. Adherence to international treaties and norms also prevents democracies from engaging in war.[7] Democracies also view each other as legitimate states and they are also keen on promoting international trade.[8]

International relations theorist such as Robert Keohane (2002) and Stephen Krasner (2009), view PSO as a concept that questions conventional Westphalia view of sovereignty. Like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, it gives external parties a raison d'etre to intervene in the domestic affairs of a state in conflict. The authors argue for shared sovereignty where external powers have a say in the domestic affairs of a failed, failing or occupied state. However, for the developing world, these propositions can be viewed as re-incarnation of colonialism or neo colonialism and may harm the work of PSOs. Most PSO missions influence Security Sector Reforms (SSR), Disarmament Demobilization and Resettlement (DDR), Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) policy, constitutional review, electoral systems and development agenda of the host country. These are pertinent issues in any country. Their successful implementation addresses factors in a conflict that give rise to abuse of human rights. The concept of R2P stipulates that the

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7. John M, Owen How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace, 1994, p. 90
8. Hegre, Havard. "Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does It Take to Be a Trading State?" *Journal of Peace Research* 37.1 (2000), pp. 5-30

international community has a responsibility to intervene where the state is unable or unwilling to protect civilians against grave human rights abuse. Due to this perceived responsibility, it has been argued that PSOs are designed to enable states in conflict to return to peace and stability as advocated by the liberal democratic theorists.[9]

PSO education has also adapted the liberal peace theory, where empowerment of citizens through knowledge of peace and security can create conditions necessary for democracy and development. Thus, PSOs attempts to promote and defend the principles of liberal peace thesis. The PSOs promote liberal democratic values and ideals such as rule of law and human rights protection that are also supported by Western governments and NGOs (Richmond, 2006, p.1). Hence, this nexus means that the PSO education praxis is well informed by the liberal peace approach.

China and some other countries argue that PSO should be used to bring peace and security in conflict regions but they should not be used to promote particular ideologies (Wu Zengyu and Ian Taylor, 2001, p.137-154). They support a problem solving approach that does not change the fundamental structures within which conflict occurs but aims at exploring different options of conflict resolution. This position is informed by the perception that the operational strategies of liberal peace building perpetuate the needs and interests of capitalist societies in the Western world (Chandler, 2009). The perception draws credence from the fact that since most programs of PSO education in Africa are donor funded, the theoretical underpinnings of the liberal peace theory are hardly questioned.[10] It has also been advanced that PSO education in Africa is envisaged to promote legitimized global norms. For example, according to (Roland Paris, 2004), democratization and rapid liberalization are seen as the root to peace. Even the UN's peace education approach is shaped by this normative order.

One of the aims of the liberal peace strategies is to reconstruct societies and their governments in accordance with a Western liberal model of state-building and transform political cultures into modern self-disciplining and self-governing entities that transcend ethnic violence or fragmentation (Jabria, 2013). It is assumed that the

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9. Ian Johnson, Peace Operations Literature Review, Project on Transformations in Multilateral Security Institutions, Implications for the UN, Center on International Cooperation, Fletcher School of Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2005, p.3

10. Daniela Korppen, Space Beyond the Liberal Peace building Consensus – A Systemic Perspective, 2011, P.4

more developed and civilized a society is the less violence will be used to resolve conflicts. However, this state building model may not be enough in countries that have gone through protracted conflict like Somalia. Indigenous social structures emerged that perform the functions of the state and therefore cannot be ignored in the reconstruction stage. The liberal peace theory spectrum places Western states as developed and stable and therefore a model for the poor, chaotic, disorderly and violence prone developing countries. Hence, the normative underpinnings of PSO education programs are not only manifest in the content and goals of the concepts but also the methodologies used to implement them; methods are not neutral but have political implications. To say the least, the concepts and tools in PSO frameworks in Africa can be argued to be largely based on liberal assumptions (Roland Paris, 2004, Richmond, 2006, Jabria, 2013).

Critical Theory

Critical theory has been applied in peace support operations by a number of scholars (Bellamy and Williams 2004, Pugh 2003). Advocates of critical theory assert that theory is never politically neutral and instead someone develops it for particular reasons and purpose. The purpose of critical theory is human emancipation, that is, setting people free to do what they want as long as they respect the freedom of others (Booth, 2007). Therefore PSO activities informed by this theory respond to the following two questions:

- *"What theories, values, ideologies, interests, and identities shape the way people understand peace operations, and whose theories, values, ideologies, interests and identities are best served through the current practices of peace operations?"*

- *"What theories and practices of Peace Support Operations are most likely to advance human emancipation and how might such advances be achieved?"*

Responding to these questions, a number of scholars have asserted that PSOs are informed by the capitalist global political economy (Pugh, 2003, p.40). Due to Western dependence on international trade, PSOs are created to restore law and order and therefore open exploitation of raw materials and international trade. Therefore PSOs are created to maintain a neo-liberal economic order (Pugh, 2004, p.41). Critical theorists also emerge as defenders of the downtrodden in PSOs. They argue that PSOs must focus on the poor, disadvantaged, voiceless, unrepresented and the powerless. This view has gained currency with adaption of affirmative actions towards women, youth, minorities and people with disability within the UN, regional organizations, civil society and governments.

The content of PSO education informs what and how to study the subject and has an implication on the policy agenda. Critical thinking attempts to challenge the prevailing order by reflecting on the interests it serves, and ultimately to transform it.[11] A broader view is required for research in PSO so as to evaluate performance of modern PSO. Roland Paris (2003) asserts that PSO are controlled by liberal values that legitimizes and delegitimizes options. Therefore 'rapid liberalization' and 'hasty

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11. Robert, W. Cox (1981) Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10 (2): 126-155

democratization' are favoured as opposed to long-term trusteeship. Gender issues are also explored especially where security agents, and more recently belligerents for example the DRC, in PSO have been accused of sexual abuse (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts and Parpart (2005).

This paper adapts a macro and micro based approach to understanding peace support operations education in Africa where the general theories analysed above inform the study at the strategic level, alongside critical assessment of operational and tactical approaches to PSO education.

Peace Support Operations Education in Africa

Peace Support Operations in Africa did not emerge from purely home grown responses to security issues but it was informed by global trends in peace and security stabilization after the Second World War (WWII). However there is still a need to ensure that PSO education in Africa reflects the specific needs, goals and concerns of peace and security in the region.

Peace Support Operations (PSO) Education

The UN defines Peace Support Operations as, *'the evolving body of institutional guidance that provides support and direction to personnel preparing for, planning and implementing (UN) peace support missions.'* The International community may respond to crisis by deploying military, police and civilians that perform multiple functions. The multiplicity of functions has rendered complexity to the responses. These complex emergency response initiatives are known as Peace Support Operations (PSO) and may be coordinated under the auspices of the UN, AU or regional organizations such as ECOWAS and IGAD. At first the concept of PSOs meant short term related support such as election monitoring and international mediation. Today PSO encompasses a wider range of activities such as: comprehensive encouragement, re-enforcement of local capacities for conflict management and transformation.[12] PSO enables non-military actors to play a role in security matters, a space that was not available during and before World War Two (WWII). Other civilian tasks such as human rights protection and promotion of the rule of law, promoting good governance and democratization are also incorporated into PSOs.[13] However, PSOs cannot replace political negotiations and agreements but facilitates their implementation. For this reason, a clear political strategy and direction is crucial for mission success.[14]

Peace education can be defined as: '…*education that is directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It promotes understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups and furthers the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.*[15] Peace education envisions

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12. Berghoff Glossary on Conflict Transformation, Berghoff Foundation, 2012, p.88
13. Ibid. p.88
14. UN DPKO A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, NY, 2009, p.8
15 United Nations, www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/peace/frame2.htm, Accessed April 14th, 2014

a world that is free from severe violence, deprivation and exploitation. This is in conformity to the African *Ubuntu* conceptualization of peace that embraces human dignity, equality, tolerance, non-discrimination, social justice, mutual understanding, cooperative spirit and value of diversity among humanity.[16] Educating for peace focuses on the development of attitudes, behaviour, values, and skills for peace through exposure to constructive resolution of conflict. There is generally no global agreement on what constitutes peace education. Magnus Havelsrud (2008, p.60), argues that since peace and education are both abstract concepts, it is difficult to find widespread agreement on what peace education really means. Ian Harris and John Synott (2002, p.4), define peace education as, *'teaching encounters that draw out from people their desire for peace, non violent alternatives for managing conflicts and skills for critical analysis of the structural arrangements that produce and legitimate injustice and inequality'.* Johan Galtung argues that peace education ought to include discussion about both direct and structural violence (Johan Galtung, 1971).

PSO education aims at a critical analysis of war, armed conflict and political violence, to find an informed basis for resolving conflicts. Peace support operations education involves a dynamic relationship between theory and practice, peace research, peace studies and peace advocacy.[17] It aims to reduce violence, support the transformation of conflicts, and advance the peace capabilities of individuals, groups, societies and institutions. It may include policy and doctrine development, strategy articulation, and courses may range from *Human Rights Education, Rule of Law, Sex and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) analysis, Mine Action services and Counter - Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IEDs) to Disarmament Demobilization and Resettlement (DDR), Security Sector Reforms (SSR), Media and PSO, Disaster Management, Protection of Civilians, Conflict Analysis to PSO Logistics. Environmental security* education is also a core aspect of peace support education. PSO education also involves applied research on the conflicts in specific regions.

For these reasons, the paper posits that the process of designing peace education as well as developing contents, are vital elements. The paper endeavours to inform the design of relevant courses as well as policy advice to decision makers in peace and security.

16 Desmond, Tutu, God has a Dream: A Vision of Hope for our Time, NY: Doubleday Religion, 2004
17 Iain Atack, Peace studies and social change, The role of ethics and human agency, Development Education in Action, 2009

Global Peace Support Operations Education Framework

There is a top down cascading framework of global peace education that stems from the United Nations and cascades down to the African Union, Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and finally to the national structures.

The United Nations has spearheaded education for peace to prevent suffering and wastage of warfare in the modern era. Ideas of peace education emerged after the Second World War and were spearheaded by UNESCO as *'education for international understanding'*. Creating international understanding through learning about others was assumed to be an effective measure of conflict prevention.[18] PSO training took root during the cold war where the UN sent missions in Israel/Palestine, Korea, Lebanon, Congo, India, Pakistan, the Middle East and Cyprus. Peace Support Operations are not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter, however the legal basis for the UN PSOs is found in Chapter VI (Pacific settlement of disputes), VII (Action with respect to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression) and VIII (Involvement of regional arrangements) of the UN Charter. The UN has previously authorized PSO under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which states that: *'Nothing in the present charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security' and which encourages the 'pacific settlements of local disputes through regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring to the Security Council'*. It is important to underline that the United Nations has the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.

The *Charter of the UN* specifically outlines the purpose of the organization as preventing future war. Peace education is one crucial tool for achieving this stated purpose and thus, global peace education can be considered to begin at the United Nations.[19] The Preamble of UN Charter refer to some of its objectives as; *'re-affirming dignity and worth in the human person'* and *'establishing conditions'* under which justice and respect for international obligations can be maintained.

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18. Preamble to UNESCO Constitution, 1945
19. The United Nations is a global intergovernmental organization established by Charter on October, 24, 1945 with a general objective of maintaining international peace and security and promoting cooperation

Peace education plays a key role in the achievement of these core tasks.

Article 26, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that; *"Education shall be directed…to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship…and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace."*

International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is an integral *part of* the normative framework of UN peacekeeping operations. Therefore UN PSO seeks to advance human rights through the implementation of their mandates.[20] Training of PSO personnel in human rights protection and promotion is critical to mission success.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) also known as the 'law of war' or the 'law of armed conflict'; regulates the means and conduct of armed conflict. It is well founded in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two additional protocols of 1977. IHL also contains provisions for protection of cultural property, the environment and the victims during conflict.[21] Understanding and application of IHL in PSO is important for the protection of civilians and non-combatants in armed conflict.

As already noted earlier, the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2000);* that came to be popularly known as *the Brahimi Report* has informed the current structure of multi-dimensional peace support operations practice and education. The report addressed past weaknesses that, for example, saw the UN fail to address the conflict in Rwanda (1994), Somalia (1993-5) and Bosnia (1992-5). This is a seminal publication that prepares the ground for improved global peace support operations education.

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has published a number of publications dubbed, *'A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for United Nations Peacekeeping'* since 2009. These publications are meant to improve on previous DPKO reform efforts in PSO through review of policy and strategy and consultation with stakeholders. In 2007 the DPKO listed the functions of PSO as; conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building. Further, three basic principles have continued to inform the

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20. UN: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), 2008Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Services (DFS)
21. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2008), Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, DPKO, p.10

operations of PSO: *Consent of the parties, Impartiality and Non use of force except in self-defense and defence of the mandate.*

Peace Support Operations are not only deployed by the UN but also by the African Union, African Economic Communities e.g. the West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) have engaged in various efforts aimed at strengthening and professionalizing the planning, management and conduct of UN peacekeeping operations. The Integrated Training Service (ITS) is an office within DPKO and DFS that supports training development and delivery needs of UN peacekeepers. The ITS unit works in collaboration with other training institutions to maintain high standards of PSO training.

A successful PSO mission is expected to achieve the following results:[22]

- Restore the state's ability to provide security and maintain public order;
- Strengthen the rule of law;
- Support the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes;
- Promote social and economic development and recovery including safe return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and refugees;
- Mine Action – Removal of unexploded ordinances and clearing land for settlement;
- DDR – Efforts to create a secure environment for safe return;
- Protection and promotion of human rights, national reconciliation and peace building;
- Security Sector Reform and rule of law;
- Electoral assistance – the holding of free and fair elections.

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22. Ibid. p.15

These wide-ranging tasks can only be successfully realized through properly constituted and comprehensive PSOs. The training undertaken by the various PSO training institutions is meant to support the UN, AU and other regional organizations mandated PSO missions. To ensure relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of PSOs, lessons should be drawn from the above thematic areas, among others, to inform training content, process and techniques.

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Mandates

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) provides the mandate for the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions. There is a number of existing UNSC resolutions that guide all UN PSO missions. Many of these UNSC resolutions have formed the basis for a number of training activities including Women Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325, 2000), Children in Armed Conflicts (UNSCR 1612, 2005), Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts (UNSCR 1674, 2006) among others. These resolutions have been part of the efforts by the UN to develop a concept of 'Integrated Missions' that encompass comprehensive measures to bring the conflict under control and rebuild the affected countries.

The Capstone Doctrine and UN Standard Generic Training Modules[23]

The UN Capstone Doctrine (2008) sets the basic principles necessary for guiding the planning and conduct of UN peacekeeping operations. The doctrine adapts the established peacekeeping principles, dubbed Pearson/Hammarskjold principles: consent, neutrality, non-use of force except in self defense and defense of the mandate. The doctrine also adds new principles such as: legitimacy and credibility, promotion of national and local ownership. In an effort to provide clear, authoritative guidance on the multitude of tasks it is required to perform, the UN has produced other numerous publications. The UN, as well, provides the basis and direction of PSO curriculum design manuals and training materials issued by the DPKO/DFS. Among others, some of the courses DPKO has been providing include: *UN Peace Keeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), Military Observer, Formed Police Units, Civil Affairs in PSO, Judicial Affairs Officers Course, Prison Incident Management,*

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23. UN DPKO (2013), www.un.org/peacekeeping/issues, March, 13, 2014

Defense Sector Reform Policy, Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): UN Framework, Senior Mission Leader Course (SML), Senior Mission Administrative Resource Training (SMART), Rule of Law, Electoral Assistance, Security Sector Reform (SSR), Mine Action, Gender and Peacekeeping, Field Support, Conduct and Discipline, Protection of Civilians, Environment and Sustainability, Children in Conflict, Human Rights, Curriculum for Civilian Peacekeepers, Code of Conduct, Prevention of Gender Based Exploitation and Abuse, Introduction to the United Nations, Cultural Awareness and Legal Framework for UN Peace Operations.

The African Union PSO Education Framework

The African Union (AU) is Africa's premier institution vested with the responsibility to maintain continental peace and security. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU under the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) provides overall strategic leadership in peace support operations. The African Standby Force (ASF) is one of PSO mechanisms set to spearhead rapid deployment in crisis situations. The Constitutive Act of the African Union provides the legal framework for Peace Support Operations. Article 4h, of the AU Charter states that; *'It is the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'.*[24]

The PSO operational guidelines for the AU are found in: *African Standby Force (ASF) 'Peace Support Operations Doctrine'.* It acts as a guide for the development and training of integrated ASF capability.[25] Initially this doctrine lacked comprehensive inclusion of civilians in PSO but the gap has ever-since been addressed.

The AU has increasingly assumed a bigger role in maintaining international peace and security in the post cold war era as the UN continues to share responsibility of maintaining global peace and security with other regional organizations.[26] The AU deployed its first PSO mission, African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003 comprising about 3000 personnel. The AU later deployed missions in Sudan, (AMIS, UNAMID) and Somalia, (AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)) and the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). The implementation of the ASF to deploy rapid peace support operations across Africa is well on course and it is set to be operational in 2015.[27] The AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) spearheads policy, standards, monitoring and evaluation of peace support training. The UN Capstone Doctrine and the AU guiding principles guide the PSOs conducted by the PSOD. The PSOD has designated specific training institutions as

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24. African Union, Report of 4th Ordinary meeting of specialized technical committee on defence, safety and security, 3-7 December 2010, p.5
25. Robert G.S, Gordon, (Maj. Gen. Rtd) A Comparative Study on Doctrines and Principles for Multidimensional Peace Support Operations: A Case for Harmonization and Enhanced Interoperability, International Forum for the Challenge of Peace Support Operations, 2011, p.7
26. African Standby Force (ASF) Peace Support Operations Doctrine, African Union (AU), Addis Ababa, 2006, p.3
27. African Union, Report of 4th Ordinary meeting of specialized technical committee on defence, safety and security, 3-7 December 2010, p.5

'Centres of Excellence' for delivering PSO education in Africa.

AU Policy Framework on Peace Support Operations Training

The AU considers training to be an important component for the preparedness of the African Standby Force set to be operational by 2015. Member states through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are responsible for the training.[28] The goal of the AU PSO education is to prepare military, police and civilians to conduct PSO within a multinational environment. The training is aimed at instilling the guiding principles, mind-set, knowledge and skills for conducting PSO to improve interoperability, increase cohesion, legal context of PSO, technical, tactical and specialized knowledge for successful operations in a PSO.[29] The AU PSO mission personnel are trained in the various Centres of Excellence in Africa. The missions offer various training and support services to complement the training by the national governments. Such training includes human rights education, political and security sector reforms among others. The AU harmonizes training among member countries according to UN standards. In addition, the AU provides training to the senior mission leaders; military, police and civilians through seminars, courses, workshops and conferences. The African Standby Force (ASF) doctrine mandates regional Centres of Excellence[30] to conduct training, evaluation and validation in peace support operations. The training has to confirm to AU training guidelines on PSO. Some of the recommended courses are: *Train the trainer, Public information and media operations, Joint Operational Planning for Staff, Crisis Management and Contingency Planning, Intelligence Analysis and Management, Negotiation, DDR, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Combating Sex and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), Gender awareness, Cultural awareness, Stress management, Senior Mission Leaders Course, Civilian and Police in PSO, Election Monitoring/Observers, HIV/AIDS, MILOBS, Land Mine Awareness and De-mining.*

The Centers of Excellence submit their courses and curricula through Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms (REC/M) to the African Union for

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28. African Union: African Standby Force (ASF): Training Policy, 2006, p.2
29. Ibid.p.3
30. These are selected PSO training institutions that have been certified as conforming to AU PSO education guidelines by the AU PSOD

incorporation into the AU Training Policy document.[31] The Centres also submit data of trained personnel to be included in the AU roster. Coordination and harmonization of African Standby Force (ASF) capacity building and training among the various regional Centres of Excellence is done through the following measures: [32]

- ASF Training Needs Analysis (TNA);

- Curriculum development for ASF training, and harmonization of curriculum among the various African training providers;

- Training Standards Evaluation, Accreditation and Recognition of training courses/institutions;

- Development and maintenance of an ASF Training Database of training courses, institutions and resource persons in various areas of specialization.

ASF Training Conference is held once a year in order to harmonize training across the continent in all components. The conference brings together Regional Economic Communities (REC), Centres of Excellence and the Africa Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) in order to assist AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) and Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms (REC/RMs) to identify the training needs of the ASF. It should be noted that not all institutions that are preparing staff for peace support operations are recognized by the AU and therefore, there are discrepancies in the training offered. The system of standardization from the PSOD has faced challenges due to regional priorities and context.

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31. African Standby Force: Evaluation, Validation and Centers of Excellence, 2006, p.15
32. Major General Ishaya Hassan, Head of ASF within PSOD, Proposal, 2006

PSO Education Implementation in Eastern Africa

PSO Training Centres in Eastern Africa follow the UN and AU policy and doctrinal guidelines on PSO education. The need for a unifying conceptual and guidance framework is important for interoperability and effective implementation on the ground.[33] Ideally, doctrine should drive training and thereby focus capability. Most PSO training institutions and Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) in Eastern Africa today adapt the AU framework in pre-deployment training of their staff. The pre-deployment training is meant to create awareness of the challenges encountered in field operations, raise motivation and commitment and enable acquisition of the necessary skills and knowledge for use in the field. Indeed, realistic pre-deployment training has a positive impact on peace support operations. In sum, the target audiences for PSO education are the military, police and civilians deployed in missions. It is important that these different components are trained together. Joint training creates the necessary cooperative learning that is required during implementation of mandate in the field.

Peace and Security Applied Research

A number of PSO Centres of Excellence in Africa such as the IPSTC and the KAIPTC undertake research to inform training. Publications such as Occasional papers and Issue/Policy briefs on topical peace and security issues are produced to inform the training and policy. In the case of the IPTSC, some of the research, which has been done, is based on specific thematic areas such as *security sector reforms*, *protection of civilians, conflict analysis* or on case studies such as *South Sudan*, *Kenya*, *Somalia* and the *Eastern DRC*. The IPSTC publications go through a rigorous research development exercise that involves conducting research agenda workshops, field research and symposium to validate research topics and findings respectively.

The IPSTC is consistently developing the necessary research/policy nexus. Meanwhile, the IPSTC relies on its established collaboration with governmental and academic institutions and civil society organizations, to ensure that its research

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33. Robert D.S Gordon (Maj.Gen. Rtd) (A Comparative Study on Doctrines and Principles for Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations: A Case for Harmonization and Enhanced Interoperability, p.2

agenda informs peace and security policies and strategies as well as its training interventions.

Designing Content for PSO Education

Many PSO training organizations adapt the DPKO generic training materials to their regional context such as the needs of the mission, participants and the different countries policies and priorities. The UN, AU, Governmental Organizations and International NGOs have developed generic materials for guiding curriculum development and training on specific areas such as SSR, DDR and SGBV. Pre-deployment training standards for the police, military have also been developed since 2009. However, there has been a shortage of materials targeting the civilian component of PSOs. All the available training materials are available to member states.

Some PSO Training Centres in Eastern Africa such as the IPSTC design their own PSO courses following an education Framework and approach that focuses on continuous improvement of training. This entails a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) as a first step in designing PSO courses. TNA involves field research to conduct interviews, focus group discussions and review of documents to determine what kind of training is required. Subject matter experts subsequently develop learning plans and facilitator guides for specific courses, and it is from these that the facilitators develop their lessons.

Some PSO training institutions offer courses running across the conflict prevention, management and recovery spectrum. Conflict prevention refers to the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra state or inter-state conflicts from degenerating into violence. Conflict management involves measures to address conflict in progress such as bringing the warring parties to the negotiation table, observation, patrolling, supervision of ceasefires and support to verification mechanisms. In post conflict recovery, new democratic dispensation has to be put in place in the form of a new constitution, management of elections, reforms of the Judiciary and transitional justice mechanisms. Transformation of the security sector, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement of combatants, IDPs and Refugees is often a daunting task. For this reason, understanding PSO doctrine, concepts,

education and training, operational integration, assessment and monitoring, conflict analysis, setting clear objectives and goals and underlying assumptions and norms that informs PSO education programmes are important elements in PSO education. Training in these elements is important in order to build the regional capacity of national governments and the PSOs.

Training Delivery Methodology

The methodology used to deliver PSO education is extremely vital for effective transmission of knowledge and values. Facilitation has to be well planned, implemented and evaluated. PSO education provides experiences of collective sharing among the military, police and civilians. Problems are analysed from various perspectives and joint solutions to the issues are provided. Collaboration among people from different disciplines and cultures in PSO education creates the necessary attitude and behaviour in field operations. Most PSO education providers in Eastern Africa use a number of methods to deliver their training: presentations/lectures, debate, simulations, case studies and operational exercises. Use of audio-visual materials complements the training. Focus group analysis, seminars, workshops, symposiums, tutorials, mentoring sessions, personal reflections and presentations also create the necessary skills and attitudes required. Creating conducive atmosphere for learning where there is freedom of expression is necessary. Hence, PSO education also includes interactive, participatory, application of concepts to realities – situations and personal experiences, plenary and small groups' discussions (syndicates), group work, in house and external subject matter experts. Training methods must respect the learner as an autonomous being. For this reason, the personality of the facilitator as well as knowledge of the subject matter and understanding group dynamics, are essential elements. In addition, internationalization of knowledge and experience is necessary for effective delivery.[34]

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34. Ernst Von Glaserfeld, Peace Education – Methods, in p.83

Principles of PSO Education Design

There are a number of international provisions that guide PSO education designs in Eastern Africa; these include:

- Adhering to the UN peacekeeping doctrine and UN Standardized Training Modules (STM);

- Adhering to ASF Doctrine, AU guidelines, and other documents prepared by the AU and the UN;

- Incorporating peace and security priorities of the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms or the Regional Standby Force;

- Incorporating national policies and priorities;

- Integrative approach for military, police and civilians;

- Gender justice - Integrating gender in peace support operations in all the courses;

- Taking cognizance of environmental security;

- Targeting in-time training needs and adhering to mandate implementation;

- Cultural relativism;

- Values of Education

Comprehensive understanding of the factors that inform the principles of design of PSO education is critical. For example, in regards to the targeting in-time training needs and adhering to mandate implementation, it is important to realise that training the right people at the right time through focused selection achieves synergy in training standards and maximizes training resources. Indeed, the essential denominator for all training is that it is needs-driven.[35] As regards cultural relativism, it is important to note the need for cultural sensitizations for troops to enable them understand the cultures of the host country. Towards this end, there is a need to locate PSO education within an African cultural paradigm.

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35. Peter Albretch and Mark Malan KAIPTC, Training Needs Analysis Workshop, West African Civilian Professional Staff in PSO, 2005, P.32

This is because, the social-economic, institutional, moral and religious or spiritual worldviews should be understood for PSO to succeed in specific settings such as South Sudan (UNMISS) and Somalia (AMISOM). Moreover, cultural sensitivity in PSO is essential for the legitimacy of the mission in the host country. Another example is in regard to values of education. Values are the priorities that societies and individuals attach to certain beliefs, experiences and objects in deciding how they will live and what they will treasure. For this reason, core value instruction is necessary in PSO since the personnel cannot effectively execute missions that they do not morally believe in. Values such as commitment, integrity, honesty, service and excellence must be enshrined in PSO education. Respect for self and others, care, compassion, cooperation, tolerance and openness, trust, fairness, justice and social responsibility are some of the values that PSO educators must bear in mind. [36]

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36. A. Hills, The Inherent Limits of Military Forces in Policing Peace Operation, International Peacekeeping, 8, No. 3, pp.79-98, 2004

PSO Education Delivery Platforms

PSO education in Eastern Africa is delivered in several different settings: Pre-deployment, Scenario based Training and Exercises, In-Mission Education and Multi-lateral and Bilateral Training Initiatives.

Pre-deployment, Scenario Based Training and Exercises

Training ranges from classroom activities to field practice, strategic simulations to role-play and exercises. The National doctrine and strategy together with other environmental factors also come to play. States offer specific training to their mission contingents. The training may differ in each country despite following DPKO standards. The training may comprise of human rights, responsibility to protect civilians (Geneva Conventions) and civil-military operations and cooperation (CIMIC) in order to work with humanitarian agencies. The primary responsibility to train peace support operation personnel is placed on the member states before troops depart on mission. The extent to which this training is done depends on the policies and capacity of Troops Contributing Countries (TCC). As already pointed out, the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) of the UN provides guidance, materials for pre-deployment training and can offer training of trainers on request to national and regional training Centres in Eastern Africa.[37]

In-Mission Education

PSO training is also offered in the missions such as United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Most field missions have training wings for the military and police. The military and police and civilian are often trained separately. There are many context specific issues that might require training of PSO personnel in field missions such as cultural sensitivity and adaptation, SGBV, protection of civilians and security sector reforms. Some PSO courses are administered in missions to enhance integration and to orient the staff to practical equipment and operations. The UNMISS in collaboration with ACCORD has trained civil affairs officers to understand their roles, functions and tasks.

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37. UN DPKO, 2004

AMISOM has also conducted in mission courses such as Gender mainstreaming and protection of civilians in collaboration with ACCORD. Evaluation to assess the effectiveness of these trainings is regularly carried out.[38]

Multi-lateral and Bilateral Training Initiatives

There are several PSO training programs conducted in Eastern Africa with support from the United States and Europe. The instructors providing the training are normally sourced from Western countries or from Private Military Companies (PMCs). These instructors use standardized training programme.[39] These training assistance programmes are usually short lived and therefore do not provide sustainable capacity for African peacekeeping missions. Some of the courses offered include human rights, refugee protection, force protection, command and staff training. The United States offers support to PSO training in Africa through African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance (ACOTA), Africa Center for Strategic Studies and Africa Command.[40] The program offered runs for one month and trains military, police, civilians on various aspects of PSO and draws participants from AMISOM. The US strategy is to offer support to Africa PSO rather than providing its own soldiers to engage in peace support operations. Though the need to train the trainers has been expressed with regard to ACOTA, as a way of building capacity of African troops, there has not been any success in this direction. Training is still offered by American instructors. The problem may not only be lack of commitment by ACOTA but also, the fact that there is no guarantee that if trainers were to be trained, they would be available to continue delivering training. Indeed, disparities in deployment means, for example, that African countries may have a good number of PSO trained personnel, but the institutional capacity and operational readiness remains a challenge.

The British Peace Support Team in Eastern Africa (BPST-EA) also supports a number of courses covering different thematic areas such as media/public information and SGBV.

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38. Tjonneland, Elling and Chris Albertyn, Navigating Complexity: A Review of Training for Peace in Africa, 2010
39. Daniel Hampton, Creating Sustainable Peacekeeping in Africa, Africa Security Brief, ACSS, 2014, p.2
40. Chris Kwaja, Nigeria and Peace Support Operations in Era of Outsourcing, Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, Vol. 5 No.1, 2012, p.46

France provides PSO training to African countries through *Renforcement des Capacites Maintien de la Paix* (RECAMP). This program provides training to military and civilian staff to support capacity building of the African Standby Force (ASF).[41] The programme has both political and military support levels. Support is provided to regional mechanisms to promote peace and security and training on peace support operations is provided to African peacekeepers. In Eastern Africa, the French support is coordinated from the military base in Djibouti.[42]

Norway has been providing training for peace in collaboration with ACCORD and other PSO Training Centres in Africa since 1995. Since the establishment of the APSA, Norway has focused its support on the new AU structure.[43] Norway has also supported training of police in Eastern Africa. Japan has supported peace research and training at the IPSTC. Japan's focus has been on post conflict recovery programmes e.g. Security Sector Reforms and Protection of Civilians.

There has been a level of coordination of development partners' activities with RECs and AU. However there is still some room for improvement to create synergy between the AU and partners training activities. There has also been a need to share training publications between development partners, AU, RECs and Centers of Excellence but this has not always been forthcoming.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Some PSO training institutions have elaborate mechanisms for tracking implementation of training. Monitoring is done to enable assessment and evaluation of training. Training institutions send evaluation teams to the field of operations where their Alumni are working. Participants may provide oral or written evaluation. Training institutions may also commission external evaluations. Mobile evaluation teams are employed to access feedback from recipients and beneficiaries of the training offered and to gauge the impact of training. For example, the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) has sent evaluation teams to South Sudan

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41. Nicoletta, Pilozi, EU Support to African Security Architecture: Funding and Training Components, Occasional paper No. 76, 202009, p.28
42. Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji Bah and Fanny Calder (2005) The Implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations, Chatham House, p.15
43. Tjonneland, Elling and Chris Albertyn, Navigating Complexity: A Review of Training for Peace in Africa, 2010

and Somalia to gauge the relevance and impact of the training offered in 2013. The evaluation report identified training needs and areas for improvement of the current programmes such as the need for more practical lessons and the need for multi-lingual delivery of the training to cater for the French, Arabic and Amharic speaking troops. In addition, needs were expressed for training in new areas such as; report writing, team building, stress management, cultural awareness and respect for diversity, inter operability and multi-dimensionality in contemporary peace support operations. [44]

It is noted that, in most cases there are no policies of continuous training and deployment of peacekeepers. Since knowledge on PSO may not be retained for long if not practiced in the field, there are risks of losing knowledge among the trained personnel. Evaluation enables capturing of lessons learned and improvement of training. By doing this, PSO tactics, techniques and procedures are well incorporated into the PSO education strategy. If evaluation can be undertaken in all the current UN and AU PSO missions and Centres of Excellence in Africa, sufficient knowledge and experience would be collected to inform sustainable training and delivery of PSO education in Africa.

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44. IPSTC, Mobile Evaluation Training Visit in South Sudan and AMISOM Report (June – August 2013), 2014, p-1-51

PSO Education Institutions in Africa

A number of institutions have emerged over the past 15 years to offer PSO education in Africa.[45] The majority of the training Centres have emerged within the military. Some have developed to be international Centres of PSO education while others are national institutions for preparing the local military to serve in PSO missions. Indeed, most countries in Eastern Africa offer *Geneva Convention* and *Humanitarian space* concepts in their ordinary military training. Some countries have developed courses in protection of civilians, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) to selected officers. Military and police personnel may receive training on how to conduct patrol, secure key facilities, handle crowd control, assist disarmament programs, evacuate civilians and work with other sections of PSO. National training also equips PSO personnel with the ability to follow chain of command and rules of engagement (ROE).[46]

African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA)

APSTA was established in 2002 by leading African training and research institutions as the African Chapter of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). IAPTC facilitates sharing of information and advancing standards of PSO training in the world. APSTA is a framework for improving the capacity of peacekeeping training institutions through facilitating exchange of best practices and capacity development under the AU framework. APSTA seeks to deepen the debate on peacekeeping capacity development, on issues pertaining to peacekeeping in Africa including protection of civilians and the implementation of the responsibility to protect, through joint research.[47] APSTA collaborates with the Africa Union, especially the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) to enhance standards of PSO training in Africa. APSTA also endeavours to undertake research to improve PSO practices in Africa. APSTA, as a developing institution, has to continually revise its strategic approach in order to raise standards of PSO, avoid duplication and enhance synergy among member institutions.

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45. A list of peace support operations education providers has been appended to this document
46. Holt Berkman, Preparing for the Mission: Training, in Chapter Seven: The Impossible Mandate, 2007. P.4
47. www.apsta-africa.org/index.php/en, accessed February, 12, 2014

IPSTC Training and Education Framework

The goal of the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is to enhance operational capacity for peacekeeping through training, education and research for the benefit of military, police, and civilian staff. At the regional level, IPSTC offers integrated and multidimensional training and education towards capacitating of the UN, AU, and regional institutions engaged in Peace and Security.[48] All the three levels of training at the strategic, operational and tactical level are offered at IPSTC in Eastern Africa. The IPSTC was established in 2001as part of the Kenya Defence Staff College to train Kenyan personnel to serve in UN and AU peacekeeping missions. It has since grown into an international institution with a mission to conduct applied research, train and educate military, police and civilian personnel in all aspects of peace support operations. The IPSTC applies a *Systems Approach to Training (SAT)* to guide the development and delivery of education and training across the IPSTC system. This is a unified approach that incorporates research, curriculum design, monitoring and evaluation.[49]

The IPSTC conducts training needs assessment and thematic analysis of the various training and education requirements within the Eastern Africa region in order to develop a comprehensive framework that informs training design and delivery. The purpose of this framework is to provide a logical basis for developing new initiatives and future training and education events. The IPSTC addresses the issues from a "program" perspective where training needs are classified thematically. This enables the institution to generate capacity within particular swathes of knowledge and skills. This capacity is then used to determine what specific training and education content is required within that realm of knowledge and skills. Based on the results of the requirements analysis, the IPSTC training and education framework is divided into "core" and "reinforcing" programs.[50]

The core programs of the IPSTC reside within the respective Schools and the reinforcing programs reside within the Peace and Security Research Department. The core programs are based on training delivery while the reinforcement programs support the core area through provision of relevant applied research products. There

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48. www.ipstc.org
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.

are also "fundamental components" in the training and education framework. These components are cross cutting and apply to all programs, training and education events.[51] The purpose of detailing a training and education framework is to provide a logical basis for developing new initiatives and future training and education events.

In 2013, IPSTC launched the Mobile Training Team (MTT) that delivered its first training (Exercise Planning Process Course (EPPC) in collaboration with the AU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Thus, the MTT expanded the outreach capacity of IPSTC beyond its physical borders.[52] The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is the Training Centre of Excellence in the Eastern Africa region. Going forward, the IPSTC intends to establish postgraduate training in matters related to peace support operations. This will improve the capacity of the IPSTC to act as a top think tank on peace and security in the region.

Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)

The KAIPTC is a premier PSO institution in Africa based in Accra, Ghana. KAIPTC provides globally recognized capacity for international actors on African peace and security through training, education and research to foster peace and stability in Africa.[53] The institution offers multi-dimensional and integrated PSO courses at regional and international level. KAIPTC offers both short courses and a postgraduate program where trainees acquire a Masters degree in Conflict Peace and Security (MCPS), Masters Degree and Certificate in Gender, Peace and Security. The Research Unit produces knowledge that informs training and curricula development as well as to inform the ECOWAS, AU, UN and individual states on key peace and security issues in Africa. The training department offers multi-dimensional and integrated peace support operations training courses for the military, police and civilians at regional and continental level. KAIPTC employs the Collaborative Problem Based Learning (CPBL) approach. This is an experiential learning methodology where participants share/use their knowledge and experiences to solve emerging problems. This approach creates a suitable environment for adult

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51. www.ipstc.org/stratetic Plan 2012-2015, accessed March 10, 2014
52. Ibid.
53. www.kaiptc.org/about us.aspx, accessed March 12, 2014

learning where the intellectuals, professionals and practitioners can learn from each other. The facilitator acknowledges the wealth of knowledge among participants and provides guidance for advancing learning for all participants. Continental and regional focus and continuous review of training to reflect trends in knowledge and practices of conflict prevention and management enhance this methodology. Diversity of participants – nationality, culture, gender, education, profession and religion also adds new perspectives in conflict analysis and management. The KAIPTC has maintained its position as a centre of excellence in PSO training in West Africa and Africa at large due to the reach, content, depth and empirical utility of the training offered. Maintenance of high standards and liaison with international network has also contributed to KAIPTC achievements.[54]

There are other Centres of Excellence and Training Institutions carrying out PSO training in Africa for example, the SADC RPTC in the southern, the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) in the northern Africa regions among others.

In most PSO training institutions in Africa, majority of the training courses are still sponsored by development partners such as the BPST, ACCP (UK), GIZ (German) Canada, Norway, Finland, Denmark, US, European Union. This raises concerns about long-term sustainability of PSO training.

The Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) as the implementer of African Standby Force (ASF) agenda in Eastern Africa should provide the strategic direction and agenda for PSO training. There is a need for an Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)/East African Standby Force (EASF) PSO vision, concept and doctrine for Eastern Africa to guide research and training direction both at the IPSTC and other regional training Centres. This would echo the AU Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) framework in the region and add region specific features in PSO. Lack of this strategic direction can render PSO training in the region miss the core regional peace and security priorities. Equally important, as more Training Centres emerge in the Eastern Africa region, there may be a need to define areas of specialization based on institutional comparative advantages.

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54. Kwesi, Aning, Land Marks in Peacekeeping Training in West Africa and the Role of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, AISA, Policy Brief, No.32, 2010, p.1

Challenges of PSO Education Implementation in Africa

Peace Support Operations education in Africa is poised to play an even much bigger role as Africa takes charge of its peace and security agenda. Many new institutions are increasingly being founded to undertake PSO education across the continent. Since most of the training Centres in the Eastern Africa Region began as departments of the Ministry of Defence, they tend to train more military than police or civilians. Monitoring and evaluation of impact of trained personnel is still not well addressed. Though most training institutions are well funded by development partners, there are questions about sustainability due to dynamics of global aid flow and policy. For example, there has been a drastic fall in support from member countries of the European Union due to economic pressures at home. The African Peace Support Fund (APF) of the AU is yet to make an impact; so far it has only met 10% of PSO costs.[55]

There is inadequate cultural sensitive programming and multi-lingual skills. PSO personnel often work in very different cultural and linguistic zones. This poses problems of communication and relationship with host communities. The interface between research and public policy is still not yet well defined to inform national and regional security. There are as yet no adequate formal mechanisms for field PSO experience to inform PSO education in most of the training institutions. There is a weak feedback loop from PSO missions to inform program planning and design. There are no obligations for the missions to report to the training Centres on the performance of trained personnel. There is also lack of consensus in partnership between the UN and the AU in peace operations – sometimes the UNSC does not consider the views of AU or its organs when constituting a PSO. There is a regular clash of philosophies, priorities and practical approaches between the two bodies. For example, the hybrid operations in Darfur, Liberia, Somalia and Mali have registered lack of coordination.[56]

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55. Colonel (Dr.) Emmanuel Kotia, Contemporary Challenges to Peacekeeping, Operations in Africa, Kennesaw State University
56. Colonel (Dr.) Emmanuel Kotia, Contemporary Challenges to Peacekeeping, Operations in Africa, Kennesaw State University

There has emerged a trend of privatization of PSO in Africa where private military companies offer PSO services (Ghurkha Security Guards in Sierra Leone and Bancroft in Somalia). Such organizations erode state sovereignty and can be abused by their clients to pursue negative interests. They are also not transparent or accountable to national or international authorities.

Sometimes there is lack of common interpretation of concepts among PSO providers due to lack of joint training and absence of standard operating procedures. The AU PSOD lacks adequate capacity to manage the huge demand for peace support operations in Africa. The ASF also lacks a comprehensive concept of operations for supporting humanitarian assistance efforts in accordance with international practice and standards.[57] In addition, the ASF lacks a comprehensive framework for maritime protection. On their part, most troop contributing countries in Africa have limited capacity and resources to train troops. Information on national and regional PSO Training Centres that are relatively young is often difficult to find. This is coupled by the challenge of multi-duplicity of training programmes amongst the institutions, as they all tend to compete and undertake similar training rather than focus on areas of comparative advantages.

Most PSO training models in Africa are based on Western interventionist approaches to post conflict reconstruction. The implementation of these courses is funded and driven by western donors. Therefore most courses are short term and prescriptive, depend on donor priorities and are not harmonized into coherent long term training programmes. In addition, these programs often lack context specific approach and follow well-established nation building and stabilization straightjacket frameworks.[58] Finally, the ability of the current training programmes to have transformative potential is limited by lack of home grown input to PSO training in Africa. In any case, questions might also be raised about sustainability of the training offered since most of the PSO training institutions are donor funded.

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57. African Union, Report of 4th Ordinary meeting of specialized technical committee on defence, safety and security, 3-7 December 2010, P.56
58. Paraphrasing Fahamu and Africa Security Sector Network (ASSN), A Policy Dialogue: African Union Security Sector Reform Policy Framework and Gender Transformation, 2011, p.6

Effective PSO Education Implementation in Africa

Given the above status of peace support operations education in Africa, improvements can be made on a number of fronts. It is important to understand how Africa specific PSO experiences; cultural and historical background informs PSO education on the continent. The UN and AU guidelines are standard universal benchmarks for training, which enhance interoperability, but they must also be informed by the specific context of mission operations areas.

PSO Education is a comprehensive concept that may include concept of training and development. Training in this context refers to a systematic process to create knowledge and skills for improvement of specific activities and achieve organizational objectives while development is about providing opportunities for growth among the staff that is trained. The nature of PSO education and its scope depends on specific regional realities and therefore it ought to be reflected in different objectives, curricula and texts.[59] Inter group relations, nature of conflict, economic inequality and governance systems inform the nature of PSO curricula in Africa. Therefore, PSO education in Africa must be based on a sound theoretical framework that is based on unique African cultural, social-economic and political realities and borrows from international practice. Furthermore, training where civilians and the military are sensitized to the cultural, organizational, operational and normative differences, is important to enhance inter agency coordination and cooperation.

There is need to determine the reach of PSO education to determine what percentage of military, police or civilian working in conflict emergency situations in Eastern African have gone through PSO training and the impact, for example, of training on protection of civilians and victims in the current missions. This information is important to inform the nature of training – content, process and gaps. To appreciate the training offered in peacekeeping institutions, knowledge of international affairs/diplomacy/global security framework, power dynamics, interests and actors would be an added advantage for the trainees. Thus, there is need for further applied research informed curriculum to inform content, practice and policy.

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59. Ake, Djestert, Educating Towards a Culture of Peace, Malmo University, 2001

Given the dependency on foreign financial support among the Training Centres of Excellence, it is important to device new strategies of sustainability such as; selling and marketing materials (publications) and services (Training delivery, Evaluation, Training Needs Analysis, Curriculum design, Conflict Analysis, Linking Policy and Practice). The African Peace Fund and other regional mechanisms may in future, also be required to fund regional PSO education Centres to reduce dependence on foreign development partners.

Conclusion

This paper has explored the nature and scope of PSO education implementation in Africa. PSO education has significant potential to contribute to conflict prevention, management and recovery in Africa. The paper has confirmed that there is alignment of regional PSO training in the Eastern Africa region with UN and AU guidelines. The paper has identified gaps in harmonization of PSO theory and practice with African context specific requirements. The paper has pointed out the need for establishing PSO education standards that promote approval, excellence, recognition and accreditation of courses leading to long-term certification. Lessons can be learned from past and present PSO missions and Centres of excellence such as the IPSTC. The paper has noted that contemporary complex emergency situations such as Somalia, South Sudan and the DRC require continuous improvement in PSO education theory and practice. The space for the UN, AU, Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms and individual countries in promoting PSO education should be continuously negotiated and defined. Finally, the paper has pointed out that PSO education should be a dependable tool to stabilize countries in conflict through effective protection of civilians, protection of human rights and creation of legitimate constitutional based governance structures.

Recommendations

- Continuous research on PSO education is necessary to acquire innovative skills and knowledge of conducting peace support operations. Research can unearth cultural, historical and political conditions that enhance or hinder peace support operations in Africa.

- The philosophy underpinning peace support operations should also be grounded on African values and interests. Continuous review of PSO methodology by academicians, practitioners and analysts is necessary to improve current practices including gender mainstreaming.

- Regional Centres of Excellence should concentrate on their areas of comparative advantage.

- There is a need to develop harmonized PSO education strategy and curricula *across multiple levels of learning leading to award of Certificate, Diploma, BA, MA, and Ph.D. certificates in* PSO education.

- A comprehensive PSO education framework can enhance capacity building of PSO personnel and increase the standards of PSO education in Africa.

- Forging partnership with other PSO training and support institutions in Africa and beyond, especially universities can add value through advanced research standards, training design and delivery.

- Development partners should build local capacity of trainers rather than delivering ad hoc training products that are not sustainable

- The IPSTC should endeavour to position itself as an institution of choice providing comprehensive PSO education framework suitable for conflict prevention, management and recovery in Africa through developing cutting edge research and training products.

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Protection of Civilians in the Eastern Region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Lt Col. Donatien Nduwimana

Introduction

The violence being witnessed in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo can largely be traced to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Spillover fighting from Rwanda led to the First Congo War in 1996 and the second one in 1998, which ended in 2003. However, Eastern Congo continues to be unstable[60]. The conflict in Eastern Congo has caused massive suffering of civilians, with millions dead, either directly or indirectly as a result of the fighting or from human rights abuses. Indeed, there have been many reports of killing of civilians, human rights abuse, sexual and gender based violence and destruction of property[61]. Today, most of the fighting is taking place in the Eastern part of the country (North and South Kivu) on the DRC/Rwanda and Uganda borders. The conflict is mainly caused by the presence of many rebel movements, militias and organized armed groups, governance, questionable political will to end the conflict and competition for control of mineral and natural resources[62]. Citizenship has also been a historical problem for the Banyamulenge and Barundi groups. This has not been addressed and continues to be a source of conflict. The major challenge for the DRC government in Kinshasa remains the instability in the Eastern part of the country, which continues to be fuelled by different militias, warlords and external forces.

Historical Background of the PoC Concept

The origins of the concept of the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in armed conflict can be traced to the history of the development of the norms of war that were

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60. Democratic Republic of the Congo, World without Genocide, http://worldwithoutgenocide.org/geno-cides-and-conflicts/congo, accessed May 12, 2014
61. Simon Robinson, Vivienne Walt: The Deadliest War in the World, 2006
62. Mining for mineral resources fuels Congo conflict, The Associated Press, Updated Sun. Nov. 2 2008 3:05 PM ET,CTV.ca

prescribed in early religious texts and developed over centuries. The need to protect the lives of civilians and other non-combatants (such as wounded or captured soldiers) in armed conflict has been gradually accepted in international humanitarian law, universalized and codified. The Fourth Geneva Convention coined the phrase Protection of Civilians and has become its firm international legal establishment.[63]

The massive killing of civilians in major armed conflicts in the last two decades in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Darfur and other places, has made PoC a central issue of international concern and which has been a key agenda for the UN since 1999 when the first report of the UN Secretary-General on the subject was issued. Since then, many UN peacekeeping operations have been mandated to provide robust protection of civilians. The UN System has therefore focused on increasing levels of attention on the protection of civilians not only in peacekeeping operations, but across the range of activities undertaken by the UN in conflict management, resolution and transformation efforts[64]. For example, the Protection of Civilian in the DRC Congo has been at the center of most PoC debates since the involvement of UN to stabilize the country in 1999.

Organization of the Paper

This paper is divided in seven sections. Section one presents the introduction where the historical background of PoC, the statement and significance of the problem and theoretical framework are presented. Section two provides an analysis on the Protection of Civilian in the context of eastern DRC conflict. Section three outlines the factors that fuel insecurity in the region. Section four identifies major perpetrators and their relationship with victims. Section five identifies the capacities of the DRC government and International community to provide effective protection to civilians. Section six analyses the factors that prevent effective Protection of Civilians in the DRC conflict. Section seven provides the conclusion and recommendations.

63. Vesselin Popovski: Siblings, but not twins, PoC and R2P, United Nations University, 2011
64. Vasselin Popovski: Siblings, but not twins: PoC and R2P, Institute for Sustainability, Article of 01/11/2011

Statement and Significance of the Problem

The Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo offers a case of study where the PoC has not been effectively implemented in spite of several initiatives by both national and international organizations. Despite the neutralization of M23 by the UN Force Implementation Brigade, people living in North and South Kivu are still facing daily threats, extortion and violence from armed groups and government forces. The government of the DRC estimates that there are about 40-armed groups in Eastern DRC, who continue to commit violence and human rights abuses.

Theoretical Analysis

Several international instruments support the Protection of Civilian (PoC) in Armed conflicts. The Geneva conventions, in their common Article 3 covered for the first time situations of non-international armed conflicts where civilians are usually targeted. The current United Nations Operational Concept on the protection of civilians is recorded in the UN Protection of Civilians Standards, which describes three tiers of protection activities (Protection through political process, Protection from physical violence, Establishing a protective environment) that should be deployed simultaneously. These tiers encompass full range of protection tasks outlined in Security Council mandates usually provided in actual UN Peace Support Operations. These tasks are organised in four phases (Assurance or prevention; Pre-emption, Response, and Consolidation), which should be understood as four organizing concepts that can be applied simultaneously depending on the range and nature of the threats. The Protection of Civilians activities distinguish three kind of protection: Protection through Political Process, Protection from physical violence and the establishment of a protective environment.

Protection Through Political Process

This type of protection intends to support the political processes of the host country (including peace negotiations and agreements, support to the development of governance institutions and the extension of state authority), which seek to establish a safe, secure environment where human rights are respected. This protection addresses conflict management and support to reconciliation (it can include local-level conflict resolution, as well as national or regional processes that

seek to address past conflict and restore confidence and stability).

Protection from Physical Violence

The protection from physical violence establishes deterrence through the presence of security agencies to protect vulnerable communities. This kind of protection acts to reduce the vulnerability of civilians through heightened human rights monitoring, political dialogue, conflict mediation and pressure and engagement with potential aggressors, as well as the establishment of physical defensive positions or cordons for example around targeted community or refugee sites. This type of protection includes response to violent attacks with all necessary means including the use of force, to protect civilians and stabilize the situation.

Establishing a Protective Environment

The establishment of a protective environment aims to create conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, to promote and protect humanitarian and human rights, to reduce forced displacements by creating suitable conditions for return, to initiate Security Sector Reforms, as well as Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DDRR). The four phases in which protection activities are undertaken are: Assurance or prevention; Pre-emption, Response, and Consolidation[65].

Assurance/Prevention

- On-going throughout the course of a UN peacekeeping deployment. Activities designed to demonstrate to the population that the mission is present, aware of the prevailing threats and circumstances, and prepared to take action to protect them.

- Patrols, including use of force if necessary to protect civilians during the course of routine patrols. Failure in this regard undermines the credibility and therefore effectiveness of deterrence.

- Human rights monitoring.

- Conflict prevention and mediation.

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65. The United Nations Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians

- Dialogue with armed actors, government forces and other potential parties in the conflict in order to affirm protection of civilians.

Pre-emption

- When the level of threat escalates or where preventive activities are no longer enough.

- Intensified political pressure and advocacy with parties to the conflict in order to diffuse tension and prevent violence.

- Increased strength and visibility of military or police presence.

- In some instances, limited punitive strikes/offensive operations (against negative forces with a known history of attacks against civilians, and that have given the mission reasonable belief that they are preparing to strike again), this both weakens the threat, and fortifies the credibility that is necessary to make deterrence effective.

Response

When a threat of physical violence becomes apparent and efforts to pre-empt that threat have failed or can be reasonably assumed to be insufficient, more active measures are needed. At this stage, the violent behaviour is already underway and steps must be taken to compel the aggressor to comply. This may require both physical protection and heightened political engagement at the local, national possibly international level *(Max Kelly with Alison Giffen (September 2011, p.12)*.[66]

Consolidation

- This is the stabilization of a post-crisis situation when the peacekeepers need to assist the local population and the host authorities to return to a state of normalcy.

- Involves liaison activities.

- Documenting and investigating human rights abuses etc.

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66. Max Kelly, Alison Giffen, Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 2011

- Facilitating humanitarian access and/or creating conditions conducive to the return of refugees and IDPs.

- Re-establishment of ties between the community and governance institutions (including security institutions) where necessary and possible[67].

These protection activities have been applied in Eastern DRC conflict but civilian protection has still not been enhanced. Sasha Lezhnev and Sarah Zingg (June 2012) argue that the failure of the UN to deal with the FDLR, as a major factor in regional instability, allows for the Eastern Congo crisis to fester[68].

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67. Max Kelly, Alison Giffen (2011), Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Stimson Center, Washington, DC

68. Sasha Lezhnev and Sarah Zingg Wimmer MONUSCO Protection of Civilians: Three recommended improvements

Protection of Civilians in the Context of Eastern DRC

A particular problem in trying to protect civilian populations is that of dealing with several armed non-state actors, not all of whom are connected to political structures to which political or diplomatic leverage can be used[69]. Since the collapse of the state in 1996, the government forces, militia and armed groups have been engaged in armed conflicts which has resulted in human rights abuses and have caused large displacements that aggravates the vulnerability of civilians. Forced labor, Extortion, Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) are some of the abuses committed by these groups[70]. The East and the North of the country are more affected and frequently marked by attacks on civilians. In a 2012 World Report on the DRC, nearly 1.7 million people were reported as internally displaced and a further 476,000 were reported to have moved to neighbouring countries as refugees[71].

Weak state authority, the illegal exploitation of mineral wealth and the easy access to weapons has fuelled cycles of violence. Armed militia has particularly targeted civilians, especially women and girls, in the eastern DRC. The prevalence of rape and other forms of sexual violence is considered the worst in the world with a woman being raped every minute in the DRC[72]. Aside from the severe physical and psychological trauma experienced by rape victims, sexual violence has contributed to the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, especially HIV/AIDS. Those who are not subject to violence must contend with poverty, famine, and disease. Hundreds of thousands of people have been impoverished by the violence. Infant and child mortality rates are extremely high as a result of famine and malnutrition. In its appeal for 2014-15, the UNHCR indicated that an estimated 3.4 million people have been displaced within the DRC and 2 million have become refugees in neighboring Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda[73].

This picture of the Eastern DRC conflict demonstrates that the Protection of Civilians in the context of eastern DRC conflict needs an integrated and holistic

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69. United Nations ; Special Report: Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict, April 2003
70. Stathis N. Kalyvas 2006 : The logic of Violence in Civil Wars , Cambridge University Press,University of Yale
71. World Report 2012: Democratic Republic of Congo
72. New York times, May 2011
73. UNHCR Global Appeal 2014-2015

approach with close collaboration with humanitarian, development, social, political and security actors.

Factors of Insecurity in Eastern Region of DRC

Among others, access to land, mineral resources and politics, are three major issues in the conflict in the eastern part of the DRC[74]. Ethnic affiliation is also a dominant and noticeable factor in the conflict with armed groups using it in their recruitment strategies for new members. Due to lack of stable and continuous governance, ethnicity has become an excuse to use violence to gain control of assets in the politically fragile environment[75]. The conflict in eastern Congo is also being fuelled and funded through illegal exploitation of mineral resources. Rebel militias and government forces are fighting each other for control of resources, which are in turn used to fund their armed activities and prolong the conflict. Indeed, many authors and analysts argue that the heart of conflict in Eastern DRC is the struggle for minerals. "In some ways (mineral exploitation) has become the means and the ends of the conflict. Rebel groups, governments and mining companies exploit mineral resources, fuelling civil and interstate conflict as players vie for control over riches"[76]. The effects of the 1994 Rwandan genocide have also complicated the stakes in the war. Politics of Eastern DRC revolves around identity; those deemed to be Rwandese (*Rwandophones*) against the original inhabitants. The "*Rwandophones*" are people who speak the "*Kinyarwanda*" language and are commonly referred to as the "*Banyamulenge*". Their citizenship has always posed problems because they are not fully recognized as Congolese citizen by the DRC government or the local population. Church leaders, community social groups and cooperatives have been major instigators in mobilizing communities against the *Banyamulenge*. The inability of DRC government to respond to the challenges of managing ethnic situation has led to the intensification of social divisions and tensions as well as slow national development. This has polarized the socio-political environment on the ground and given birth to several armed groups that thrive on ethnic affiliations and discontent.

74. Vlassenroot, Koen: "The Formation of New Political Complexes: Dynamics of conflict in Ituri", Occasional Paper, Center of African Studies (2003), p. 3

75. Mads Fleckner ; Reasons and Motivations for Violence by Internal and External Actors in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Dynamics of Conflict, 2005

76. Investigating the Causes of Conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo, <http://www.ukessays.com/essays/international-studies/investigating-the-causes-of-conflict-in-democratic-republic-of-congo.php>, Accessed on 04 April 2014 at 2 pm.

Perpetrators of Violence in Eastern DRC

In spite of the success of the UN FIB in neutralizing M23, the government of the DRC still reports that there are more than 40-armed groups operating in Eastern DRC. This section of the report aims to present the profile of some major armed groups accused of grave human rights violations in Eastern DRC. These particular armed groups have significant military capacities and political influence, and represent direct threat to the government.

M23

The M23 rebel group came into existence in April 2012 when hundreds of mainly ethnic Tutsi soldiers in the FARDC (the Congolese army), led by Gen Bosco Ntaganda, mutinied over poor living conditions and pay. Most of the mutineers were previously members of the pro-Tutsi Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). In 2009 CNDP signed a deal with the government, which the mutineers felt Kinshasa did not fully implement. M23 takes its name from the 23 March 2009 CNDP-DRC government peace treaty. Fighting between M23 and FARDC has displaced hundreds of thousands in North Kivu and forced tens of thousands to flee across the border to Rwanda and Uganda. Both sides have been accused of gross human rights abuses against each other and civilians, some of which amount to war crimes, according to human rights groups. In December 2012, M23 briefly occupied the North Kivu provincial capital of Goma. Officially, M23 wanted better governance, security, democratization and development of the country. Lately, they publicly demanded amnesty and military as well as political reintegration. They were neutralized by the UN Force Intervention Brigade and do not present a significant threat any more.

Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)

The FDLR was formed by Rwandan Hutu linked to the 1994 genocide and includes former members of President Juvénal Habyarimana's Army and Interahamwe Militia. After they were routed by the new Rwandan troops following the genocide, they regrouped in the DRC to plot a return to power in Kigali, forming an armed group that became the FDLR. During the two Congo wars former DRC President Laurent-Désiré Kabila formed an alliance with the FDLR to battle Kigali's influence

in eastern Congo after 1998 with some elements from the FDLR joining the DRC Army. Relationship between the two countries remained tense until 2009 when the new DRC president Joseph Kabila allowed Rwandan troops to enter Congo in 2009 and hunt down the FDLR. The group has an armed wing, FOCA (Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi), which is active in South Kivu. FDLR has alliances with other groups, such as the Mayi –Mayi armed group, which is strongly opposed to the Tutsis[77]. According to the 2013 Midterm Report by the UN Group of Experts (GoE), FDLR grew weaker in the first half of 2013, with the decrease in numbers (3,000 from 6,000) attributed to a high surrender rate. The group continues to be implicated in human rights violations and illicit exploitation of natural resources. FDLR remains active in parts of Masisi, Walikale, Southern Lubero and Rutshuru territories.

Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU)

ADF/NALU is a Ugandan Muslim rebel group founded in the early 1990s. It operates inside and outside Uganda. Under pressure from the Ugandan Army, the militia crossed into the DRC and has remained in the area of North Kivu. Peace negotiations between ADF/NALU, Uganda and the DRC began in 2009 with UN facilitation[78]. The Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (Forces démocratiques alliées-Armée nationale de libération de l'Ouganda, ADF-NALU) is one of the oldest but least known armed groups in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the only one in the area to be considered an Islamist terrorist organisation. Although it does not represent the same destabilising threat as the 23 March Movement (M23), it has managed to stand its ground against the Congolese army since 2010[79].

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77. Steve Hege, Understanding the FDLR in the DR Congo: Key facts on the Disarmament, Repatriation of Rwandan Rebels, 2009
78. Country Report on Terrorism 2012
79. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/b093-eastern-congo-the-adf-nalus-lost-rebellion.aspx, Accessed on 23, April, 2014

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

Joseph Kony founded the "Holy Spirit Mobile Force" in northern Uganda in 1987 after a rebel group by the same name was defeated while opposing President Yoweri Museveni's government. In 1989, Kony renamed the militia the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), claiming that his objective was the establishment of a Christian-inspired theocracy in Uganda. The LRA first moved into Southern Sudan in the mid-1990s but following the 2005 Sudanese peace agreement and the indictment of Kony by the International Criminal Court (ICC), the group was forced to cross into DRC's Garamba National Park. In December 2008, Ugandan, Southern Sudanese and Congolese armies launched a joint offensive in Garamba, but failed to wipe out the LRA leadership. The group, which is divided into small groups, move on foot across the Uélés districts of North-Eastern Congo, the east of the Central African Republic (CAR) and parts of Southern Sudan. Between December 2007 and April 2010, the group is believed to have killed around 2,000 civilians and abducted around 2,500 in Congo. The group is accused of brutality against civilian population, forced recruitment of child soldiers and turning girls into sex slaves.

Raia Mutomboki

Raia Mutomboki collaborated a lot with the M23. It is believed to be the largest armed group in South Kivu. Raia Mutomboki, established in 2005 in South Kivu's Shabunda territory by Congolese Army Defector Pastor Jean Musumbu in response to FDLR massacres, comprises various groups headed by local leaders and FARDC deserters. It evolved from a parochial Militia into a violent group deployed across large parts of North and South Kivu. Its main purpose is to react to threats from the former Interahamwe FDLR group, which has a large presence in Eastern DRC. It operates on the basis of localized self-defence militias that are meant to counter the FDLR threat with maximum violence, including serious human rights violations such as arbitrary killings, attacks against unarmed dependants, or executions.

Mai-Mai Sheka (Nduma Defense of Congo-NDC)

Formed in 2009 by minerals businessman Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka in North Kivu's Walikale Territory, Maï Maï Sheka has 150-180 men, mainly army deserters and youths. General Sheka has in the past allied himself with ex-CNDP (subsequently

M23 leader) Gen Bosco Ntaganda, who is currently indicted by the ICC. MONUSCO has variously condemned attacks by Maï Maï Sheka (sometimes in collaboration with Raia Mutomboki) in parts of North Kivu's Masisi Territory in which several civilians were killed and injured, including women and children. In 2011 the UN accused Sheka for human rights and war crimes.

Mai-Mai Kifuafua

Its fighters are drawn mainly from the Batembo, Bahunde and Bayanga communities and it is active in southern Masisi Territory (North Kivu). The group claims to be protecting "*indigenous*" interests from "*foreign Rwandophone groups*". During the 1998-2003 civil war it fought the Rwandan-backed Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie rebellion, and its successor the CNDP, and has fought against RCD-Goma (which ruled North Kivu as a proxy of the Rwandan government from 1998-2003) and the CNDP in the past, according to a report attributed to the Small Arms Survey[80].

Linkages Between Various Actors

It can be seen that some of the armed groups, especially the Mai-Mai, have had relationship with the government forces, when they consider themselves defending their country against external interference. FDLR and some Mai-Mai militia were supporting the government forces to fight the CNDP/ M23 and were perceived to have backing from the Rwandan army. Some groups also draw considerable support from the local communities from which they are recruited. Politicians and Businessmen have also been known to be influencing/controlling some of the armed groups and provide organizational, financial and logistical support. It should be noted that the armed groups may not be purely military organizations as such, but, by and large, are also part of the society. They are often in civilian social networks and receive crucial inputs from elites and communities, which is necessary for their survival. Apart from civilian networks, another crucial factor in understanding the kaleidoscope of armed groups in the eastern DRC is the national army, the FARDC. Many officers in FARDC maintain close ties with the armed groups for political or commercial reasons. This undermines the army's perceived neutrality; as do the on-

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80. Letter dated 22 January 2014 from the Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

going power struggles within the FARDC that often play out along ethnic lines. This lack of neutrality, together with strong ethnic animosities and FARDC's conduct, makes communities turn to armed groups for protection.

The National Government and International Community

Since PoC is a collective and shared responsibility of the state, civil society groups and the international community,[81] the DRC leaders at all levels should consider that peacekeeping operations cannot be regarded as a substitute for state authority. The protection of civilians depends on the stability and legitimacy of the state institutions. This lacking, the international community is therefore, highly involved in rebuilding state authority in Eastern region of DRC. This section will analyse how the International community and the DRC government are implementing PoC in the Eastern region of the country.

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81. Joseph Yav Katshung, *When Reality contradicts Rhetoric: Civilians Protection in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*

National Dynamics to the Protection of Civilians in Eastern DRC

Government Strategies to Protect Civilians in Eastern DRC

The protection of civilians is primarily the responsibility of the Congolese government and its security forces. The government has attempted to take some measures to tackle abuses by its troops, including the establishment of a special military tribunal and the adoption in July 2009 of a policy of "zero tolerance" for abuses committed by government soldiers[82]. This establishment of zero –tolerance for human rights violations was a major attempt by the government of DRC to protect civilians. Regular military tribunals have therefore tried some cases of serious human rights violations but the reality on the ground indicates that not much has changed. The real impact of the zero-tolerance policy can only be measured by its implementation. Despite a handful of more high-profile trials, the vast majority of crimes on civilians have neither been investigated nor prosecuted. So far, Human Rights Watch has not indicated any decrease in human rights violations by the Congolese army soldiers since the policy was announced. This demonstrates that the government has thus far been largely unsuccessful at protecting the majority of its citizens. The failure has been attributed to corruption, lack of political will and lack of resources[83].

The Congolese Civil Society Organizations (CSO) Dynamics

The protection of civilians in the DRC has elicited active engagement of the International Community as well as the Congolese civil society actors. The civil society includes religious structures, professionals, pro-democracy social movements, minority right groups, labor unions, women's organizations, peasant leagues, NGOs, human rights organizations, traditional leadership group elders, community-based organizations and political parties. One of the important achievements from the civil

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82. Security Council Report : Cross-Cutting Report No. 2: Protection of Civilians
83. Human Right Watch 2010: Congo Civilians, who will protect them?

society campaign in Eastern DRC has been mobilization, education and sensitization of the society on issues affecting their wellbeing. Communities have been sensitized to know their problems and needs, and to confront conflict problems together[84]. Many collective community protection practices have been established in the Kivus like going to fields in groups to minimize risk; using whistles to alert each other to danger and reorganizing agriculture in order to cultivate in safer proximity to their village. There are also larger structures extending beyond single communities. Inter-ethnic traditional structures such as *Baraza la Wazee* (community elders) try to bring together moderate leaders of multiple ethnic groups to try to confront inter-ethnic conflict and promote unity. The problem is sometimes the politicization of such inter-ethnic structures, which brings the risk of bias or exclusion. *Baraza La Wazee* has demonstrated that ethnic collaboration can influence people's thinking and that multi-ethnic leadership delegations can potentially negotiate with authorities or armed groups and express the people's needs. Another vital mobilizing structure among the population is the Catholic Church, which has networks throughout the country. The Catholic Church has a Justice and Peace network with a commitment to confronting human rights issues[85]. There are several other small organizations that also engage in peace activities and which have also contributed to stabilization efforts in Eastern DRC. In spite of the good work undertaken by CSOs, they continue to be exposed to serious risks/threats. Several members of the CSOs have been killed or threatened in the last several years, to the extent that MONUSCO's human rights division established a special Protection Unit for Human Rights Defenders, Journalists and Witnesses.

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84. Deetz, S. A., & Stevenson, S. L. (1986). *Managing Interpersonal Communication*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers

85. Liam Mahoney, 2013, Advancing field protection and human rights: Non-military strategies for civilian protection in DRC

The Contribution of International Actors to Protection of Civilians in Eastern DRC

The International Community has responded to the violence in the eastern DRC by taking diplomatic, political and military measures to confront the operations of armed groups, which have threatened the safety and security in the DRC. The Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Framework Agreement for Peace, Security and Cooperation in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region has taken measures to improve the capacity of civilian protection and hence end the prevailing culture of impunity in the country.[86] Strategies to improve protection of civilians in conflict situations have also been developed by the International Community.

United Nations Organization Mission for Stabilization of the Congo (MONUSCO)

One of the most prominent examples for the implementation of strategies to protect civilians in Eastern DRC is MONUSCO, which has already developed and continues to implement a number of innovative and practical approaches. Recent efforts have focused on further enhancing the situational awareness of MONUSCO troops and improving communication between the mission and the local population. Such measures have been boosted by the ability to respond when necessary; although capability shortages have limited action in this regard. MONUSCO gathers information about risks facing civilians from a range of sources (its own staff, especially Civil Affairs and Human Rights and their respective networks of Congolese sources, its Joint Protection Teams and Community Alert Networks, the humanitarian community, and others). This information becomes part of a database that feeds into a tool called the Must-Should-Could Protect Matrix. This matrix is a prioritization tool for ranking the severity of risk to different communities. MONUSCO in principle commits to urgently respond to the highest-risk must-protect communities, including the deployment of military peacekeepers to the neighborhood.

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86. A Framework of Hope: The Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, 24 February 2013

International Criminal Court

Impunity is also a cause of continuous human rights violations in the country. The DRC does not have an adequate justice system to deal with all kinds of crimes committed against civilians. This is where the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) comes in. Five individuals suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity have faced international justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, former leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), a Congolese militia group that was active in Ituri; Germain Katanga, former leader of the Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri (FRPI) militia group; Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, former leader of the National Integration Front (FNI) militia group; Callixte Mbarushimana, Executive Secretary of the FDLR, who was arrested in France on 11 October 2010; and more recently, Gen Bosco Ntaganda (M23), all have been committed to face trials[87].

The UN Intervention Brigade

The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2098 on March 28, 2013, authorizing the establishment of an Intervention Brigade (UNSC 2013) within the existing UN Stabilization mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), was met with scepticism by humanitarian organizations working in eastern DRC. A number of them expressed concerns over the targeted offensive operations to neutralize armed groups, which could pose new risks for Congolese civilians, and questioned the chances of success for such use of military force, if it was not part of a comprehensive approach to addressing violence in eastern DRC. However, this scepticism was toned down with the success of UN Intervention Brigade in defeating the M23 rebel group. The Intervention Brigade next aim is to neutralize the FDLR and their allies and help to re-establish state authority in Eastern DRC in accordance with their responsibilities to protect civilians. It should be noted that the history and recent working relationship between FDLR and FARDC to fight M23 could undermine the FIB efforts to neutralize FDLR. Currently, the Brigade is also responsible for the protection of civilians alongside the rest of the MONUSCO UN peacekeepers present in the DRC[88].

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87. Democratic Republic Of The Congo 2013 Human Rights Report
88. J. Arthur Boutellis: From Crisis to Reform: Peacekeeping Strategies for the Protection of Civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Presence of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

The ICRC has a large presence in the eastern DRC, engaging in its standard assistance activities and direct communication with armed actors. This contact is confidential, and many armed actors have participated in ICRC trainings on International Humanitarian Law. The ICRC strengthened contacts with weapon bearers, conducting extensive briefings to increase respect for IHL/International Human Rights Law, as envisaged in the framework of military reform. In parallel, ICRC also worked with government representatives to advance national IHL implementation. Alongside the National Society, the ICRC also worked with the media to raise awareness of Humanitarian Principles and the Movement's neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action countrywide, particularly ahead of elections.

Factors that Prevent Effective Protection of Civilians in the Eastern DRC

Insecurity and Inaccessibility

Insecurity has caused multiple displacements further aggravating the vulnerability of the population. A trend of self-defense (vigilante) groups set up to protect the population against state and non-state perpetrators have since emerged. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) are known to be circulating amongst the civilian population, thus complicating the security situation. Inter-ethnic tensions, land and resource conflicts remain stumbling blocks to durable peace efforts. Ethnic tensions are mainly fuelled by the stateless status of the Banyamulenge group, which still has an unclear citizenship. Difficulties in accessing Relevant Authorities due to logistical challenges and security restrictions, as well as a shrinking humanitarian space due to military operations and attacks on humanitarian actors further limit the reach of service providers. Also many areas are hardly accessible because of the lack of good communication and infrastructure in the vast DRC country.

Impunity

Impunity contributes to undermine the basic security in the country. Legal uncertainty and the lack of access to justice are obstacles to the stabilization of the region and the restoration of lasting peace. Despite the Government's zero-tolerance policy, human rights violations continue to go unpunished. Weakness in state/judicial structures, corruption and the lack of political continue to jeopardize efforts in bringing perpetrators, especially those who have committed serious/grave human rights violations, to justice. The population has little confidence in the justice system while fearing reprisals from the perpetrators. The climate of impunity perpetuates the cycle of violence, forces the population to arm and defend itself and further weakens efforts to resolve conflict through legal and mediatory measures. An environment conducive to human development can only be achieved through an increased respect for human rights and rule of law.

Security Sector Reform

The Congolese security forces are not in a position to guarantee the safety of the civilian population. Disorganized, factionalized and unpaid military resort to extortion and victimization of the local population. Fighting continues amongst the ranks on various issues. The FARDC is also faced with logistical limitations, vis-à-vis deployments and this affects their ability to combat rebel forces. True reform, including the training of all security forces in civilian protection and human rights principles, the implementation of that training in field operations, effective application of military justice and measures to remove known human rights abusers from the Army and the implementation of a judicial system based on the rule of law, is crucial to improving the humanitarian situation in the DRC and moving the country to a position of stability, economic development, and robust democracy[89]. This is currently lacking.

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89. Colin Thomas-Jensen and Tara R. Gingerich : No will, no way: US-funded security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2010

Conclusion

Despite on-going military offensives and the defeat of the M23, the threat posed by armed groups and national forces to civilians remains high. FARDC and the UN Intervention Brigade have moved against armed groups but FDLR still poses a threat. After 20 years of being in the Eastern DRC, the defeat of FDLR may not be an easy task. Speaking the same language as villagers, inter-married with them, forming part of the local economy and having historic operational relationship with FARDC, FDLR fighters have woven themselves into the fabric of life in eastern DRC and use the population as its human shield[90]. Another serious threat to the Protection of Civilians in Eastern DRC is the national army and the police. FARDC troops have routinely committed crimes against populations they have been deployed to protect. The fact that the FARDC is a patchwork of fighters with various backgrounds like the former President Mobutu's military personnel, militiamen from various armed groups with inadequate and insufficient training, exacerbates divisions in the army and potentially puts civilians at risk. This situation can also undermine efforts by MONUSCO to protect civilians and compromises its credibility; especially when civilians are attacked by those meant to protect them (government security institutions/forces). The lack of effective Protection of civilians by the host nation has negative effect on the peacekeeping mission.

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90. Peter Jones, 2014, Decades after genocide, Congo struggles to dislodge Rwanda rebels, Reuters

Recommendations to Improve the Protection of Civilians in Eastern DRC

Despite significant efforts by the DRC government and the International Community, the protection of civilians in Eastern DRC has not yet been achieved. Several violent armed groups as well as the government forces are still accused of committing grave human rights violations. The following recommendations, if applied would enhance the security of civilians in Eastern Democratic of Congo.

The DRC Government

The Government of DRC should ensure that state authorities (especially those dealing with security) are held accountable for their actions. This should be done with a view to improving effectiveness of protection of civilians. The Government should reinforce and extend state presence to remote and rural areas, and include wide community participation and consultation. Dialogue with Armed Groups should continue (i.e. seek non-military solutions and community-level peace building and reconciliation initiatives). The Government of the DRC should deliver full citizenship to all Banyamulenge and many other ethnic groups in Eastern Congo that have settled in the region before independence in 1960. The government should also recognize minority rights and make sure that such rights are enshrined in the constitution of the country. The Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) should not permit individuals who have previously committed atrocities to join its rank and file and should be trained in the protection of civilians, respect for Individual/Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law. All the perpetrators of serious crimes in the DRC, including members of the FARDC, need to be held accountable.

The International Community (AU, UN, SADC)

The international community should support the DRC government through maintaining commitments to regional stability laid out in the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF), provide encouragement and technical support to the DRC in fulfilling its own commitments under the PSCF, and ensure high-level engagement on the situation with various stakeholders and actors in eastern DRC.

The international community have an important role to play in supporting other Governments in the region to realize commitments under the PSCF and to maintain inclusive and transparent political dialogue at local, national and regional levels. The international community can also pressure the regional leaders to implement regional agreements. The UN, AU, ICGLR and SADC must continue to ensure that signatories to the Framework Agreement for Peace, Security and Cooperation in the DRC fulfil their commitments. Signatories must use the momentum from the defeat of M23 to help eliminate other armed groups, particularly the FDLR and Mayi-Mayi militias, and continue with diplomatic efforts aimed at greater regional cooperation to prevent recurring cycles of violence. The broad endorsement observed in the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the region have to be supported by a permanent and specific body to follow up, evaluate and report the implementation of this Framework by all the countries concerned.

United Nations Organization Mission for Stabilization of the Congo (MONUSCO)

MONUSCO's role in the protection of civilians remains a critical part of its mandate. The deployment of standalone UN civilian human rights monitors in large part of Eastern Congo can help to better monitor the situation. This will encourage locals to interact with immediate and neutral human rights bodies, which will enhance coordination and coherence in protection of civilians before, during and after military operations. Members from the civil society, MONUSCO, the DRC government and local communities should complement these teams. To emphasize this, MONUSCO should increase the patrols, both in numbers and coverage (i.e. the Patrols should be frequent in communities where attacks are likely to occur). MONUSCO should also support the Democratic Republic of Congo government in facilitating local peacebuilding initiatives within communities.

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Highlights of Key Messages in the Issue Briefs

Promoting Peace Education Through PSO in Eastern Africa

- PSO education has significant potential to contribute to conflict prevention, management and recovery in Africa.

- There is a need to develop a harmonized PSO education strategy and curricula across multiple levels of learning leading to award of Certificate, Diploma, BA, MA and PhD in PSO education.

- PSO education should be a dependable tool to stabilize countries in conflict through effective protection of civilians, protection of human rights and creation of legitimate constitutional based governance structures.

- The philosophy and principles underpinning peace support operations should also be grounded on African values and interests. Continuous review of PSO methodology by academic, practitioners and analysts is necessary to improve current practices including gender mainstreaming.

- Regional Centres of excellence should concentrate on their areas of comparative advantage.

- Continuous research on PSO education is necessary to acquire innovative skills and knowledge of conducting peace support operations.

Protection of Civilians in the Eastern Region of the DRC

- The government of the DRC should continue building and professionalize the security institutions and forces to enhance protection of civilians.

- The Government should do all that is practical to eliminate impunity or reduce its level for effective protection of civilians

- The government of the DRC, together with the International and Regional Communities should use the necessary mechanisms and tools to neutralize/

defeat FDLR and other armed groups. This will enhance the credibility of the government to protect civilians and will also demonstrate the impartiality of International and Regional Communities.

- To enhance the protection of civilians in eastern DRC, MONUSCO should improve patrols to go out into communities considered most vulnerable (i.e. where attacks are likely to occur).

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