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Enhancing Capacity for Regional Peace and Security through Peace Operations Training

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International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC)

P.O. Box 24232 – 00502

Karen, Kenya

Tel: 254 20 388 3157/58

Fax: 254 20 388 3159

Email: info@ipstc.org

www.ipstc.org

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Enid Burke

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Foreword

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is a research and training institution focusing on capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture and has developed to be the regional centre of excellence for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. It addresses the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated Peace Support Operations by describing the actors and multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research conducted covers a broad spectrum ranging from conflict prevention through management to post-conflict reconstruction. The Centre has made considerable contribution in training and research on peace support issues in Somalia through design of training curriculum, field research and publication of Occasional Papers and Issue Briefs. The Occasional Papers are produced annually, while the Issues Briefs are produced quarterly. The issue briefs are an important contribution to the vision and mission of IPSTC.

This First Quarter Brief on Somalia (2S, 2013) contains two titles on peace and conflict in Somalia: *Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa Sea board: The Role of Peace Support Operation (PSO) and Cooperation of Humanitarian Actors and Peace Support Operations: the Case of Somalia*. The Issue Brief provides insights into pertinent peace and security issues in Somalia that are useful to policymakers and aims to contribute to the security debate and praxis in Somalia. The articles in the Issue Brief are also expected to inform the design of training modules at IPSTC.

The research and publication of this Issue Brief has been made possible by the support of the Government of Japan through UNDP. The European Union also supports some of the researchers from the region whose papers appear in this publication.

Brig. Robert G Kabage
Director, IPSTC

Acronyms

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
EUROPOL	European Police Office
HQs	Headquarters
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMC	International Medical Corps
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organisation
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
LE	Law Enforcement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSOCs	On site Operation Centres
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations
RoE	Rules of Engagement
TFI	Transitional Federal Institutions

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance to Somalia
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Introduction to the Issue Briefs

The topics presented in this first quarter of the Issue Brief address diverse issues of peace and security in Somalia. The first topic in the Issue Brief examines the role of Peace Support Operations (PSO) in the maritime security of the Horn of Africa sea board, while the second topic looks at the state of cooperation of humanitarian actors and Peace Support Operations in Somalia.

In the first paper, *Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa Sea Board: The role of Peace Support Operations (PSO)*, the author presents a survey of maritime insecurity along the Somalia Federal Democratic Republic's sea board. The paper touches on Somalia's war and the link between the war and maritime insecurity. Further, the paper discusses maritime insecurity and in particular the drivers of maritime insecurity, effects of maritime insecurity and what strategies or policies have been developed relating to maritime security. Lastly, the paper looks into the role of PSO actors in regard to maritime security.

A detailed discussion is undertaken with regard to AMISOM's role in maritime security. The role of UNSOM is also highlighted as presented by the United Nations Security Council.

In the second paper, *Cooperation of Humanitarian Actors and Peace Support Operations: the case of Somalia*, the author identifies the complex realities of cooperation between military peace support missions and humanitarian actors in Somalia. It highlights the importance of cooperation between military and humanitarian actors in international crises, as it has been proven that crises cannot be solved by military

means alone. The paper analyses how humanitarians and the military have improved their cooperation to face contemporary crises and makes recommendations towards enhanced cooperation.

Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa Sea Board: The Role of Peace Support Operations (PSO)

Laura Muriithi

Introduction

Since the fall of the former Head of State, Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia has been without a functioning government. Maritime pirates and a host of other individual actors have taken advantage of the situation to exploit the Somalia sea board. The extent of maritime piracy has increased over the years to reach a level where maritime insecurity is a threat to the security of states in the Horn of Africa and in the maritime region. Maritime security along the Horn of Africa continues to be threatened by piracy, a dominant factor in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy activities in the region affect the political, economic and social security of states in the region. Maritime piracy is exacerbated by a host of factors including lawlessness in Somalia, a long coast line, lack of political organization on land, economic benefits (for pirates and other actors) and availability of weapons.

Somalia's volatile economic, social, and political conditions since the mid-1990s are said to be the breeding ground for maritime insecurity.

With the collapse of a central government and the consequent weakening of the country's naval forces, some Somali fishermen took it upon themselves to protect Somali waters and their economic interests, on the one hand, from over-fishing and on the other from illegal dumping by foreigners. These vigilante actions led to piracy as a means of supplementing livelihoods. Emboldened by the absence of an effective ruling authority, the piracy that stems from the coast of Somalia gradually transformed into a highly organized and lucrative criminal business for its leaders and enablers. It has proved to be an attractive, though risky, alternative for some impoverished youth who have few, if any, options to a legal livelihood. That said, pirates are criminals motivated by a desire for quick money, making Somalia less attractive as a place in which to invest and create employment.¹

This study examines maritime insecurity in relation to the Somali sea board. Maritime security will be discussed in depth as well as the drivers of maritime insecurity in Somali waters. The consequences and effects of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Aden are also discussed. Lastly, the role of PSOs, and in particular AMISOM, are articulated and any shortfalls or the way forward are discussed as well.

Statement of the Problem

Somalia is a country that has been in a state of unrest for more than two decades. The civil war broke out in 1991 following the removal of the dictator, Mohammed Siad Barre. The anarchy continued, following the ousting of the governing Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in January 2007 that was carried out by a United Nations-backed transitional government. This unrest brought about many consequences, one of

¹ Osman, A and Issaaka, K, (2007), *Somalia at the Crossroads*," London, Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd.

which was piracy in the Somali waters. From 2008, piracy along the Horn of Africa escalated rapidly, especially in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast.

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has now become a serious threat to international security and the global economy. It has endangered innocent mariners from countries around the world and jeopardized commercial shipping interests. The attacks by the pirates also pose an environmental hazard as ships may be damaged or purposely run aground by the pirates, thereby contaminating the seas, reefs, and coastal areas with dangerous pollutants. A cause of particular concern is the unhindered growth of this menace as the pirates have, in recent years, extended their attacks to the Gulf of Aden, between Yemen and Somalia's north coast. Subsequently, the pirates have been ranging farther out to sea, up to 600 miles, and now cover an area over one million square miles (2.59 million square kilometres) in the Gulf of Aden, the west portion of the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea.²

Research Questions

The study, from which this paper emanates, was based on the following three research questions:

- What are the driving factors of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Aden?
- What are the effects and consequences of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Aden?
- What is the contribution of AMISOM and other actors in enhancing maritime security in the region?

2 Murphy, M (2010), «*Smallboats weakstates dirtymoney*», London, Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd.

Objectives of the Study

- To examine the state of maritime security on the Somalia coast,
- To identify the main drivers of ongoing insecurity in the Gulf of Aden, and
- To analyse the strategies, policies and tactics that have been adopted by PSO.

Theoretical Framework

Realist theory

Realism emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of the international government. It is the dominant school of thought and is based on its three major underpinning principles which state that: States are the only major actors in the international system (state centric); States act as the rational individuals in pursuit of their national interest (unitary rational actor); and States act in the context that the international system lacks a central government (anarchical system).

Realism assumes that the sovereignty of nations makes a distinction between domestic politics and international politics. Historians trace it to luminaries like ancient Greek historian, Thucydides as far back as the fifth century BC. This was explained in his account of the long war between the Athenians and the Spartans, caused largely on hegemonic and commercial aspirations of both parties, in his work, *The History of the Peloponnesian Wars*. Much later, in the sixteenth century, the Italian statesman, Niccolo Machiavelli, in his publication, *The Prince*, echoed Thucydides sentiments. *The Prince* was meant to be a guide for the then rulers, and some of the principles are still as relevant as they were then.

Realism emphasizes the concept of the balance of power. This can be defined simply as the brake on the power of one state by the power of the other states. Balance of power hereby maintains the stability of the international system, but does not prevent war. But again, war in the realist view adjusts power relations, which is very controversial. It must be clarified that there is no single water tight definition of Realism. However, some working definitions are inevitable: Realism seeks to describe and explain the World of International Politics, 'as it is wherever it is'. It negates how we would like it to be. Realists give high priority to the centrality of nation states as the supreme political authority in the world. Realism seems to be a pessimistic theoretical tradition, that is, the international political system is characterized by conflict, suspicion, and competition, a logic which thwarts peaceful coexistence.³

Power, security and state interests (State centric) are fundamental to realism. Security is a function of power, defined as capability relative to other states. Nation states are engaged in a never-ending struggle to improve or preserve their relative power positions. The desired end justifies the means. This is a concept identified with the USA foreign policy of containment during the 'cold' and 'hot' war periods. Realist scholars such as Waltz and Morgenthau do not see power in isolation. They aver that power depends on how each state scores on its constituent variables, that is, size of population; size (and geographical location) of its territory; resource endowment – both human and natural; economic capability – Industrialization and food security; military strength – numbers, training and quantity and quality of armaments; political stability; and competence in governance.

Realism emphasizes constraints on the international politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government. Considering all these problematic issues, it would be hard to see realism as realistic,

3 Arnold, G, (1995), *Wars In The Third World Since 1945*, London, Cassell.

since it leaves a number of issues inadequately addressed. However, realism is dominant because despite anomalies, its selection of aspects of events and identification of trends is more enlightening and fertile than those of its rivals. Amidst all the challenges, realism has been wise to revise its principles, and reinvent to even a newer body – neorealism. The principles revised are power, states, and conflict. Neorealism pays attention to the concept of economics, but with considerable reference to power. Also known as structural realism, it is more scientific. Neorealism, however, deals in a paradox that insists on the absolute centrality of the autonomous state in international politics, yet it denies the possibility of a theory of a state.⁴

Realism provides a lens to understand the resurgence of piracy at the level of nation states. Such a solution would focus on the international level. Realists believe that in an anarchic world, nation states need to protect their own interests. This is no difference on the high seas as there is no one in complete control outside of nations' coastal jurisdictions, thus creating a condition of true anarchy. Therefore, realists would advocate for nation states to act independently and set up their own maritime security operations to protect their interests in the Gulf of Aden. This could take the form of sending warships to escort their own merchant ships. It is important to note that these actions would most likely be taken by states with the greatest interest in shipping, such as importers and exporters of oil. What this behaviour also suggests is that states most concerned by issues of shipping would create an *ad hoc* coalition. The challenge for realism is justifying the use of single nations to deal with issues that are transnational in nature, such as piracy.

The Neoclassical Realism analysis assists in prediction and understanding of reactions by states in the region beyond what would be discovered

4 Dougherty, J and Rfaltzfraff, R, (1990), *Contending Theories of International Relations*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers.

with other prevailing theories. An understanding of possible reaction to changes in foreign policy and the variables that drive those reactions allow mitigation of misconceptions. In this way, Neoclassical Realism and the generalized intervening variable model developed in this paper show a usefulness beyond existing single- or multi-level theories for analysis of maritime security policy.

Marxist theory

Marxism is the political philosophy and practice derived from the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The main principles highlighted in this theory include: ‘Capitalism’ which is based on the exploitation of workers by the owners of capital; people’s consciousness of the conditions of their lives which reflects material conditions and relations; class which refers to differing relations of production, and as a particular position within such relations; material conditions and social relations which are historically malleable; class struggle structures which are featured in each historical period and are drivers of historical change.

Classical Marxism was influenced by a number of different thinkers. One of the main ideas highlighted was that of ‘exploitation’. Marx refers to the exploitation of an entire segment or class of society by another. He sees it as being an inherent feature and key element of capitalism and free markets. The profit gained by the capitalist is the difference between the value of the product made by the worker and the actual wage that the worker receives; in other words, capitalism functions on the basis of paying workers less than the full value of their labour, in order to enable the capitalist class to earn a profit. However, this profit is not moderated in terms of risk versus return.

The second idea highlighted is that of ‘alienation’. Marx refers to the alienation of people from aspects of their *human nature*. He believes that alienation is a systematic result of capitalism. Under capitalism,

the fruits of production belong to the employers, who expropriate the surplus created by others and in so doing generate alienated labour. Alienation describes objective features of a person's situation in capitalism. It is not necessary for them to believe or feel that they are alienated.

The third feature highlighted is that of 'class consciousness.' Class consciousness refers to the awareness, both of itself and of the social world around it, that a social class possesses, and its capacity to act in its own rational interests based on this awareness. Thus, class consciousness must be attained before the class may mount a successful revolution. Other methods of revolutionary action have been developed, however, such as vanguardism.

The fourth feature is that of 'historical materialism', which was first articulated by Marx, although he himself never used the term. Historical materialism looks for the causes of developments and changes in human societies in the way in which humans collectively make the means to life, thus giving an emphasis, through economic analysis, to everything that coexists with the economic base of society. For instance : social classes, political structures and ideologies. Political and historical events result from the conflict of social forces and are interpretable as a series of contradictions and their solutions. The conflict is believed to be caused by material needs.

The term, 'proletariat' is ascribed to those individuals who sell their labour power, and who, in the capitalist mode of production, do not own the means of production. According to Marx, the capitalist mode of production establishes the conditions that enable the bourgeoisie to exploit the proletariat due to the fact that the worker's labour power generates a surplus value greater than the worker's wages. The term 'bourgeoisie' applies to those who own the means of production and buy labour power from the proletariat, thus exploiting the proletariat. The

bourgeoisie may be further subdivided into the very wealthy bourgeoisie and the *petit* bourgeoisie.

The '*petit* bourgeoisie' are those who employ labour, but may also work themselves. These may be small proprietors, landholding peasants, or trade workers. Marx predicted that the *petit* bourgeoisie would eventually be destroyed by the constant reinvention of the means of production and the result of this would be the forced movement of the vast majority of the *petit* bourgeoisie to the proletariat sector. Marx also identified various other classes such as the '*lumpen proletariat*' who include criminals, vagabonds, and beggars. These people have no stake in the economic system and will sell themselves to the highest bidder. Landlords are another class of people who were historically important, some of whom still retain notable wealth and power. The peasantry and farmers were regarded as disorganized and incapable of carrying out change. He also believed that this class would disappear, with most becoming proletariats but some becoming landowners.⁵

The Marxist theory of war is quasi-economic in that it states that all modern wars are caused by competition for resources and markets between great (imperialist) powers, claiming these wars are a natural result of the free market and class system. Part of the theory is that war will only disappear once a world revolution, over-throwing free markets and class systems, has occurred. Thus there are actors who enjoy the disorder in Somalia since they enjoy economic benefit from the lack of a stable government.

Insecurity in Somalia has brought about certain negative features, among them, maritime insecurity and piracy. Conversely, the stability of the country will lead some actors to endure economic losses. The unequal distribution of wealth through globalization and global

5 Worsley, P, (2002), *Marx and Marxism*, London, Routledge.

markets within and between states remains a flaw within the global system and a source of conflict. The ideology of Marxism, based on the unequal distribution of economic wealth and political power as the product of capitalism, has created a backlash against global markets and the power of the Western liberal market democracies.

Maritime Security

Somalia's sea board

Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa covering 3,300 kilometres. This factor alone magnifies maritime operations in the region. The coast also allows pirates the flexibility to move bases up and down to evade counter piracy. These two main factors combine to give Somalia's piracy the special status that sets it apart from those of other regions. Not only can all operations be supported from numerous bases with impunity, but hijacked prizes are also positioned to lie close offshore in convenient capture. The dirty business of exacting ransoms for seized ships, cargoes and crews, is carried on without let or hindrance. The longer Somali piracy continues, the harder it becomes to eradicate. In parallel is the newly established Somali government that has to run the huge task of building an economy and industry able to turn minds from crime to honest work.

The maritime insecurity issue takes up much time, energy and resources of the Federal Government of Somalia, which needs to focus on long-standing issues: acrimonious clan politics, rampant corruption, maritime piracy, a stubborn Islamist insurgency and 2.5 million people still in crisis from the 2011 famine.⁶

Drivers of maritime insecurity

There are political, economic, social, legal and security reasons for the recent spurt in maritime insecurity which include: political instability resulting in lack of governance of the littorals; the absence of security threats and challenges to maritime supply chains; political will on the part

6 Little R. (2013): << Maritime security off Somalia and in the Indian Ocean>> *The Phoenix Think Tank*, <http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/2013/01/maritime-security-off-somalia-and-in-the-indian-ocean/> accessed 22 June 2013.

of states to fight piracy; poor socio-economic conditions pressurizing local populations to commit piracy for survival; inadequate military capability to respond; and the absence of a robust legal system to prosecute, despite laws against piracy (pirates have long been *hostis humani generis* — enemies of mankind — under public international law, and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides significant powers to states to prosecute pirates).⁷

Maritime strategies and policies

Maritime security is not a new issue for NATO and the European Union. Both organisations have already developed a number of policies and tools to tackle maritime threats. However, they are currently reviewing their contributions and considering greater roles in the future.⁸ Some of the policies adopted by actors in maritime security include the EU's adoption of a more robust mandate on 23 March 2012 that escalated the Rules of Engagement (RoE) for naval forces to attack Somali targets on land from the sea or the air. Such action upon the 'coastal territory and internal waters' of Somalia would deny pirate attack groups the impunity hitherto enjoyed, by disrupting their efforts to get to sea to attack world shipping. Secondly, international Law Enforcement (LE) agencies are now harnessed to pursue the money, money-laundering and the financiers behind piracy. INTERPOL and EUROPOL are devoting considerable efforts and resources to track financial flows and communications to identify forensically the controlling minds and networks. They recommend that LE personnel should be embedded in warships to improve evidence-gathering for prosecutions.⁹

7 Sakhujia V. (2010) "Security threats and challenges to maritime supply chains," *Disarmament Forum*, pp 3-12.

8 Nato Counter-piracy operations http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm accessed on 22 June 2013.

9 Little R. (2013): << Maritime security off Somalia and in the Indian Ocean>> *The Phoenix Think Tank*, <http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/2013/01/maritime-security-off-somalia-and-in-the-indian-ocean/> accessed 22 June 2013.

The main objectives of maritime security strategies are to prevent the use of maritime spaces for illegal activities and to secure the movement of people and the flow of vital resources on the world's seas. The current threat to the maritime environment calls for new thinking and a shift in strategic approach. Securing the maritime domain today requires a broad approach that involves a network of agencies, bringing together the whole spectrum of relevant national institutions - navy, coast guard, customs, police, cooperative, etc.; including through bilateral, regional or multinational initiatives; and a comprehensive approach, taking into account the roots of maritime threats at sea as well as on land.¹⁰

The issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia has been framed in legislative records by several actors, namely key states acting through the UN Security Council, NATO, EU, the U.S.A, France, Canada, the Netherlands, and Denmark. In addition, non-state actors, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and World Food Programme (WFP), have been instrumental in defining and documenting incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia, often working in concert with the UN Security Council and member states.¹¹

Effects of maritime insecurity

Many of the current threats in the maritime domain which include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illegal trafficking in drugs, people and arms, and piracy are of a transnational or global nature, and therefore require a concerted approach. In the post-Cold War security environment, the sources of threats as well as their targets have thus become more diverse. Threats from non-state

10 Nato Counter-piracy operations http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm accessed on 22 June 2013.

11 Frames, Humanitarianism, and Legitimacy Explaining the Anti-Piracy Regime in the Gulf of Aden Kevin Kevin McGahan and Terence Lee 2012 pp 149-168 http://www.academia.edu/2130411/Frames_Humanitarianism_and_Legitimacy_Explaining_the_Anti-Piracy_Regime_in_the_Gulf_of_Aden

actors at sea, be it terrorists, pirates, or organised crime, have gained increasing prominence. Additionally, maritime threats pose challenges not only in terms of naval power and dominance, but also in terms of economic welfare, protection of the environment, and the integrity of societies.¹²

Many of the challenges identified are not exclusively maritime challenges and therefore cannot be addressed exclusively through a maritime response. Similarly, many of these challenges are not exclusively of a military nature, and thus require a combination of military and other tools. These threats are also global in character and therefore necessitate a coordinated response, as no state on its own has sufficient resources to address all the threats alone. They also provide a good illustration of the issue of globalisation of security, that is, the necessity for states to tackle threats at their source in order to defend their own security. This in turn requires the capacity to mobilise and project naval power in support of crisis prevention, response or management efforts.

In Somalia, the combination of weak maritime governance, a legacy of illegal fishing, a surge in piracy, and possible links with terrorism, creates a complex and particularly dangerous environment. The situation in Somalia also demonstrates how a maritime threat which has partially developed in territorial waters can have implications for global security. Adequate maritime governance and law enforcement capacity at sea is therefore essential in preventing and addressing maritime security threats.¹³

Some of the consequences of maritime insecurity are highlighted below:

¹² NB; NO FOOTNOTE 12?

¹³ Nato Counter-piracy operations http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm accessed on 22 June 2013.

Terrorism

Al Shabab is not a spent force and still controls swathes of southern and central Somalia. Further, it will seek to profit from gaps existing in any power struggle between disgruntled clans, various groups, militias and money lords. Control of Kismayo port and its large southern hinterland is a political flashpoint, as is control of the charcoal trade, which funded the Islamists at \$15 million per annum. Leaders in Puntland now refer to the '*spillover*' of Al Shabab insurgents flowing north into hitherto ungoverned space from south and central areas in recent months. The Islamist movement has *dispersed* not disappeared. Eradication of maritime insecurity will become even harder if it merges further with Al Shabab, forcing a complex unprecedented scenario. Time is of the essence. The Islamists group is short of money after the loss of its charcoal export and other undercover activities at Kismayo.¹⁴

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA, the threat posed by international terrorism gained a new dimension. Such incidents have demonstrated that terrorists are interested in and capable of using the maritime domain to achieve their objectives. Preventing terrorists from attacking at or from the sea and from crossing maritime borders has thus become a major preoccupation for the international community. Particular attention has been given to addressing the vulnerability to terrorist attacks of sea-based critical energy infrastructure and of maritime flows of energy resources.¹⁵

14 Little R. (2013): << Maritime security off Somalia and in the Indian Ocean>> *The Phoenix Think Tank*, <http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/2013/01/maritime-security-off-somalia-and-in-the-indian-ocean/> accessed 22 June 2013.

15 Nato Counter-piracy operations http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm accessed on 22 June 2013.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Another threat is the use of maritime routes by terrorists or state actors for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction material and technology.¹⁶ Some of the revenue from ransoms paid for the release of ships and hostages is being used to finance an influx of weapons to the area for pirates and others. According to some experts, boats used for pirate attacks are also occasionally used to carry refugees and economic migrants from Somalia to Yemen, and some return carrying arms.¹⁷

The Horn of Africa is home to several ongoing armed conflicts, and armed banditry is a common threat in much of the region. The small arms trade in the Horn and its potential to fuel instability remains a major concern to the international community. Despite the longstanding U.N. arms embargo on Somalia established by Security Council Resolution 733 (1992), U.N. observers have reported “persistent violations.” The embargo was modified in 2007 at the behest of the African Union and others to allow the armament of transitional government forces battling Islamist insurgents, and again in 2008 to allow for counter-piracy operations. According to the Security Council Resolution 1851, “the lack of enforcement of the arms embargo has permitted ready access to the arms and ammunition used by the pirates and driven in part by the phenomenal growth in piracy.”¹⁸

Drug trafficking

The increase in the illegal movement of drugs, human beings and arms as well as the growing flow of illegal immigrants, particularly from Africa to Europe, has raised the problem of effective maritime governance and border control, in particular along the porous maritime borders.¹⁹

16 Ibid

17 United States Congressional Research Service, *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, 27 April 2011, R40528, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4dc259a62.html> [accessed 14 June 2013]

18 Ibid

19 Nato Counter-piracy operations http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm accessed on 22 June 2013.

Piracy

Sea piracy is the act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or other crime and with the capability to use force for furtherance of the act. The incidents of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia in recent years have shown that this threat is far from extinct. In Somalia, piracy poses a threat not only in terms of local or regional security, but also international security. The situation in Somalia has also raised the spectre of a possible collusion of interests between pirates and terrorists. Other unstable regions, such as the Niger Delta, also continue to face significant piracy problems.²⁰

Marine pollution

The survival of the oceanic environment itself is increasingly endangered by marine pollution and by the depletion of marine resources caused by illegal fishing and overfishing, with possibly catastrophic local, regional and global effects. Under Article 9(1)(d) of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, it is illegal for «any transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes: that results in deliberate disposal (e.g. dumping) of hazardous wastes or other wastes in contravention of this Convention and of general principles of international law». According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Somalia has been used as a dumping ground for hazardous waste starting in the early 1990s, and continuing through the civil war there, and European companies found it to be very cheap to get rid of the waste, costing as little as \$2.50 a tonne, where waste disposal costs in Europe are closer to \$1000 per tonne.

At the same time, foreign trawlers began fishing illegally in Somalia's seas, with an estimated \$300 million dollars worth of tuna, shrimp, and lobster being taken each year, depleting stocks previously available to local fishermen. With the interception of speedboats, Somali fishermen

20 Ibid

tried either to dissuade the dumpers and trawlers or levy a «tax» on them as compensation. The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) in 2005 issued a report stating that, between 2003 and 2004, Somalia lost about \$100 million in revenue due to illegal tuna and shrimp fishing in the country's exclusive economic zone by foreign trawlers. Under Article 56(1)(b)(iii) of the Law of the Sea Convention: «In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment». Article 57 of the Convention in turn outlines the limit of that jurisdiction: «The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured».²¹

Humanitarian support

The call for greater cooperation required to combat piracy has increased, actors have progressively framed piracy as a threat to humanitarian efforts as well as commercial interests. This frame of piracy as humanitarianism primarily assumes two forms : threats in delivering food aid as well as threats in maintaining logistical support to peacekeeping forces attempting to provide security and stability in Somalia.²²

Piracy also threatens the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance to the Horn of Africa, much of which arrives by sea. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), in Somalia, an estimated 2.4 million people - one-third of the population - expected food aid in 2011, primarily in southern and central Somalia, where poor rains frequently result in crop failure and deteriorating livestock

21 Ibid

22 Frames, Humanitarianism, and Legitimacy Explaining the Anti-Piracy Regime in the Gulf of Aden Kevin Kevin McGahan and Terence Lee 2012 pp 149-168 http://www.academia.edu/2130411/Frames_Humanitarianism_and_Legitimacy_Explaining_the_Anti-Piracy_Regime_in_the_Gulf_of_Aden

conditions. The delivery of U.S. food and humanitarian aid to Somalia was additionally hindered by a non-permissive security environment on land. Food insecurity in the region, caused by drought and instability, has been heightened by high food and fuel prices in the region. Officials from the World Food Programme (WFP), which ships tens of thousands of metric tons of food monthly to the Horn of Africa region, reports that, it has become more expensive to ship assistance to Mogadishu, and that their ability to deliver relief is significantly hampered. In December 2009, Al Shabaab militants demanded that the WFP halt imports of food assistance in favour of purchasing supplies from Somali farmers. The WFP suspended operations in southern Somalia in January 2010, amid growing threats and intimidation. Canada, NATO, and European Union forces assumed escort responsibilities for WFP shipments in late 2008. Russia has also escorted convoys. In March 2010, China's navy offered to assist the European Union forces currently escorting WFP shipments, signalling the expansion of China's naval deployment to the region.²³

Threats to Commercial Shipping and Global Trade

Piracy negatively incurs several types of economic costs to the shipping industry, including ransom payments, damage to ships and cargoes, delays in cargo deliveries, increased maritime insurance rates, and costs to bolster merchant ships against attack. Some of these costs are ultimately passed on to the consumer. The total economic costs of piracy, though large in an absolute sense, are nevertheless only a small fraction of the total value of worldwide ship-borne commerce.²⁴

²³ United States Congressional Research Service, *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, 27 April 2011, R40528, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4dc259a62.html> [accessed 14 June 2013]

²⁴ Ibid

PSO Actors

The role of the United Nations Organisation and the African Union in Somalia in strengthening strategic partnership has to be recognised and welcomed. The importance of close coordination by organisations with the Federal Government of Somalia, other international and regional organisations and Member States cannot be overstated. The role of Somalia's neighbours in promoting long-term stability in the region also needs to be noted. Below is a discussion of the actors in maritime security in Somalia.²⁵

The UN

By examining how actors framed the problem of piracy to develop the regional regime governing the Gulf of Aden, the UN has long been a key actor addressing Somalia's protracted civil warfare and humanitarian crisis since its last functioning government fell in 1991. This process of engagement among the international community, along with the years of conflict, famine, and displacement, helps account for the complexity of actors and agreements governing Somalia. UN Security Council resolution 733 (1992), one of the first international instruments -- repeatedly cited in subsequent resolutions combating piracy of the coast of Somalia -- establishes an arms embargo and financial sanctions against warring factions in the region. This sanctions regime was later strengthened with UN resolution 751 (1992), resolution 1356 (2001), resolution 1425 (2002), and resolution 1725 (2006).²⁶

25 Somalia Conference 2013: Communiqué <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/somalia-conference-2013-communicue> 15-06-2013

26 Frames, Humanitarianism, and Legitimacy Explaining the Anti-Piracy Regime in the Gulf of Aden Kevin Kevin McGahan and Terence Lee 2012 pp 149-168 http://www.academia.edu/2130411/Frames_Humanitarianism_and_Legitimacy_Explaining_the_Anti-Piracy_Regime_in_the_Gulf_of_Aden

Despite the UN sponsored embargo, weapons and money continued to flow into Somalia, fuelling further civil conflict and criminal violence. The UN Security Council subsequently issued statements expressing growing concern over the state of humanitarian emergency in Somalia. Acting with the international community, the UN Security Council continued to address the situation in Somalia through a series of resolutions that generally stressed the humanitarian emergency as a growing problem in need of action. In February 2007, citing Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council adopted resolution 1744 that authorizes a regional peacekeeping force called the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This force replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which was also backed by the UN to establish peace and security.

Although resolution 1744 does not mention piracy, it expressly calls on states to create all “necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance.” In August 2007, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1772, which stresses growing concern regarding the “upsurge in piracy of the Somali coast” as well as urging states to maintain security including taking “appropriate action to protect merchant shipping, in particular the transportation of humanitarian aid.” The resolution is important because it is the first time piracy in traditional maritime threat is recognised explicitly as jeopardizing humanitarian aid. Although it was drafted by member states, several intergovernmental organizations shaped the content and discourse framing of this resolution.

In June 2007, the UN Security Council referenced the UN Secretary General’s quarterly report on Somalia. In his report, the Secretary General noted the UN’s role in providing various humanitarian and security services, including contingency planning for possible UN peacekeeping.

NATO

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa undermines international humanitarian efforts in Africa and the safety of one of the busiest and most important maritime routes in the world: the gateway in and out of the Suez Canal. NATO has been helping to deter and disrupt pirate attacks, while protecting vessels and helping to increase the general level of security in the region since 2008. At the request of UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, in late 2008, NATO began providing escorts to UN World Food Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through these dangerous waters. The escorts were placed under Operation Allied Provider (October - December 2008). In addition to providing close protection to WFP chartered ships, NATO conducted deterrence patrols and prevented, for instance, vessels from being hijacked and their crews from being taken hostage during pirate attacks. This operation was succeeded by Operation Allied Protector (March-August 2009), which continued to contribute to the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation. It also conducted surveillance in the area and fulfilled the tasks previously undertaken by Operation Allied Provider. This operation evolved in August 2009 into Operation Ocean Shield.

Operation Ocean Shield also contributes to providing maritime security in the region and is helping to reduce the overall pirate attack success rate. In order to respond to new piracy tactics, NATO has created greater synergies with other initiatives, while recognising the continued need for regional capacity building, within means and capabilities, and has focused on areas where it provides added value. The March 2012 Strategic Assessment highlighted the need to erode the pirates' logistics and support base by, among other things, disabling pirate vessels or skiffs, attaching tracking beacons to mother ships and allowing the use of force to disable or destroy suspected pirate or armed pirate vessels. NATO is

conducting counter piracy activities in full complementarity with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and with actions against piracy initiated by other actors, such as the European Union.²⁷

AMISOM

According to the EU, AMISOM is an African Union-led mission, mandated by the UN Security Council. Its initial mandate included the provision of support for dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia and the protection of key infrastructure (e.g. government buildings and Mogadishu International Airport) to enable the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), - whose mandate expired in August 2012 when the Federal Government of Somalia was established - to carry out their functions. The mandate also includes support to implement the National Security and Stabilization plan, disarmament and stabilization efforts, as well as the facilitation of humanitarian operations.

IGASOM was intended to replace the Ethiopian forces that were defending Mogadishu's government from the rebel Islamic movement, Al Shabaab. Transferring the mandate from IGAD resulted in the AU calling for greater African involvement in the operation and reluctance by Western states to dispatch their troops to Somalia. On 20th February, 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized AMISOM (UNSC Resolution 1744), thereby endorsing the previous AU decision. As the criteria of a Peace Support Operation led by the AU, the intent was that finally the UN would assume responsibility for the mission within six months. This did not happen. However, even though the UN has since played a secondary role, the support it provides has been crucial for AMISOM.

²⁷ Nato Counter-piracy operations http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm accessed on 22 June 2013.

The mission is also contributing to the Africa-EU partnership on peace and security of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). The strategy, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007, remains the overarching policy framework for EU-Africa relations. The JAES puts EU-Africa relations on a new footing, based on the pursuit of shared values and common interests. Both sides are determined to strengthen their cooperation as equal partners, based on this shared long-term vision for EU-Africa relations in a globalised world.²⁸

The African Peace Support Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been operating since 19th January, 2007 when, through the Resolution of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Union (AU) urged the deployment of troops with the purpose of providing an African response to the multifaceted security challenges and imminent state collapse of Somalia. Despite years of bloody fighting, with limited resources that led to a significant number of casualties among soldiers, a general assessment of AMISOM reflected the importance of this AU-led Peace Support Operation (PSO) in the quest for the stability of the country. The eradication of Al Shabaab forces from the control of strategic areas and the protection of key Government figures are among the most notable achievements of AMISOM.

However, AMISOM faces a number of challenges that remain to be dealt with. These challenges reflect two closely related dimensions: the contextual and the structural dimensions. The contextual dimension refers to challenges that have emerged from the recent political and security situation in Somalia. The structural dimension refers to the difficulties that AMISOM has faced since the beginning of the mission, which originated from the institutional deficiencies of the AU and are

28 European Commission Press release Brussels, 19 March 2013 New EU support to continue improving security in Somalia http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-241_en.htm

no doubt also shared by other AU Peace Support Operations (AU PSOs).

Accordingly, AMISOM also conducts limited maritime operations in close coordination with the ongoing operations initiated by international partners. On 3rd December 2011, the AU Peace and Security Council authorized the training and deployment of vessel protection detachments on board supply vessels for AMISOM. AMISOM Maritime is also used for special assignments by different countries that bring humanitarian aid from Nairobi. Turkey and UAE countries have been sending aid to Somalia, and AMISOM maritime would be assigned to provide security. The Maritime Unit is also meant to ensure security on the Mogadishu coastline when the aircraft is landing and prevent any attacks emanating from the sea. AMISOM also provides security to ships that wait to dock at the Mogadishu and Kismayo seaports.

The AMISOM Vessel Protection Detachment has been training actively with the European Union's Naval Force, Somalia (EU NAVFOR). The training is part of a comprehensive approach to improve AMISOM capabilities, in this case, with enhanced and specialised drills to respond to a potential pirate attack. The troops are trained in pirates' *modus operandi*, tactics, rules of engagement, unarmed combat and detention of suspects and practical drills carried out on AMISOM ships. The troops also did a course on small boat operator. The AU is engaging the UN Security Council to authorize an expanded marine component to help bring security to the coastline of Somalia and deny the al Shabaab the opportunity to benefit from piracy and illegal maritime trade. The naval capability, which was part of the joint AU/UN Strategic Concept of future AMISOM operations and approved in UNSC Resolution 2036, is also meant to play a key role in dislodging Al Shabaab from its coastal strongholds, as well as in subsequent efforts to deny the group the ability to resupply, infiltrate and ferry fighters. It would support international counter piracy efforts

off the Somali coast as well as AMISOM's land-based operations in a country with the longest coastline on the continent. However, the UN resolution did not extend the UN support package to cover the provision of the requisite marine vessels.²⁹

UNSOM

The UNSC resolution 2101 (2013) states that “acting on the recommendations of United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) by 3rd June, 2013 for an initial period of 12 months in support of the Federal Government’s peace and reconciliation process.” Unanimously adopting resolution 2102 (2013), the Security Council decided that the mandate of UNSOM would include the provision of policy advice to the Federal Government and AMISOM on peace building and state building in the areas of governance, security sector reform and the rule of law (including the disengagement of combatants), development of a federal system (including preparations for elections in 2016), and coordination of international donor support.

The Security Council underlined the importance of Somali ownership, and requested the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Nicholas Kay, to align closely UN country team activities with the priorities of UNSOM and the Federal Government, as well as AMISOM, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the European Union and other regional, bilateral and multilateral partners. For his part, the UN Secretary General was requested to keep the Security Council regularly informed of the implementation of UNSOM’s mandate, including steps he was taking to ensure the presence of a structurally integrated mission by 1st January, 2014, as

²⁹ AMISOM (2013) <http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/amisom-maritime/>

well as an assessment on the political and security implications of wider United Nations deployments across Somalia, with a first report to be delivered no later than 2nd September, 2013 and every 90 days thereafter. On issues of security, the Security Council gave UNSOM the mandate to deal with maritime security along Somalia's sea board.³⁰ As UNSOM prepares to begin its mission, it is expected that it will learn from the successes and shortfalls of AMISOM, and be prepared for the challenges that have been experienced. In matters to do with maritime security, it is expected that UNSOM will engage with AMISOM and other PSO actors so that it will produce the expected results. Also among those with whom it should consult is the Somali Government which should not be left behind, since eventually, the government of Somalia will take up the task of maritime security when it is fully functioning, willing and capable of doing so.

30 UNSC Security Council 6959th Meeting <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10944.doc.htm> 15-06-2013

Conclusion

AMISOM has a lead in PSO issues in Somalia. It has had its achievements in some issues while other issues remain a challenge. For maritime security to be enhanced along the sea board of Somalia, neighbouring states and the international community need to work together to ensure that there is security in Somalia, a stable government, and that economic and other issues relating to the reconstruction of the country have been addressed. AMISOM should be equipped to deal with the drivers of maritime insecurity. Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Aden is a security threat not only to Somalia and the neighbouring countries, but also to the rest of the world. This calls for the active participation of the international community if maritime security is to be achieved. If PSO actors achieve maritime security in the Gulf of Aden, it will be a great accomplishment for the world. Now that a new UN body will be taking its place in Somalia, it needs to collaborate with AMISOM to gain maritime security on the sea board of Somalia.

Recommendations

Piracy cannot be stopped at sea; it needs a comprehensive land-based solution. The primary method to combat Somali piracy is to disrupt its economic system. Pressuring and disrupting the flow of finance to the pirates is essential. The international community must put a premium on identifying the key players (Somali and non-Somali) that finance piracy, as well as conduct thorough research to isolate and expose their investment patterns. The supply line of the pirates can be disrupted by identifying the areas where pirates buy their equipment, weapons, global positioning devices, satellite and mobile phones.

The most powerful weapon against piracy will be peace and opportunity in Somalia, coupled with an effective and reliable police force and judiciary. Containing or ignoring Somalia and its problems is not an option that will end well.

If nothing else, it is essential that the international community formulate a plan to ensure that the supply of food aid to Somalia is not interrupted. It is of paramount importance that a replacement for Canada is found to escort WFP ships. If there is no permanent solution to the issue of escorting WFP ships, then Somalis will starve and the already severe problems in the region are likely to get worse.

The international community cannot afford to view the issue of Somali piracy as a sideline issue. The danger that international shipping will avoid the Gulf of Aden and that the subsequent increased costs will be passed on to consumers should be of grave concern during a time of economic uncertainty. The potential environmental damage from a botched attack could be catastrophic and long-lasting. And if the nightmare scenario occurs and Somali pirates become tools of international terrorism, failure to act now will be disastrous.

The prevalence of piracy off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden should be viewed and understood in the context of the failure of government, which has resulted in a climate of insecurity in Somalia. This has led to the development of a criminal economy in Somalia and further afield. Furthermore, a situation of conflict in Somalia created an environment for violence in the maritime context. In other words, land and maritime insecurity are intertwined, as insecurity on land eventually causes maritime insecurity.

Generally, more often than not, piracy occurs when there is poverty and a weak or non-existent government. Again, this reiterates the point that insecurity on land – potentially – extends to maritime insecurity. Moreover, in the African context in general, where the absence of effective navies, coupled with a lack of co-operation among littoral states in the relevant regions is the order of the day, piracy has proliferated and poses serious challenges to the international community.

Of particular concern is the prevalence of maritime insecurity around the Horn of Africa. From the above analysis it is clear furthermore that the required good order at sea is directly dependent on good governance and efforts should be made to address governance by strengthening all the relevant institutions and mechanisms to tackle the root causes of maritime piracy in the affected regions. After all, most security challenges confronting Africa have their origin in the lack or failure of governance as states are the primary actors and agents of good order at sea. Thus the required good order at sea should be viewed as a function of how Somalia will exercise jurisdiction at sea to secure busy sea lanes and also to protect the safe harvesting and extraction of resources, whether oil exploration or fishing, to contribute to the desired good order.

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
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MAP OF SOMALIA SHOWING PIRACY THREAT ZONES



Map courtesy of Wikipedia: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7e/Somalian_Piracy_Threat_Map_2010.png

Cooperation of Humanitarian Actors and Peace Support Operations: The Case of Somalia

Lt. Col. Donatien Nduwimana

Introduction

In recent years, the United Nations Organisation and the African Union have experienced both qualitative and quantitative changes in their activities related to peace, security, and humanitarian endeavours. While some intractable ideological and regional conflicts have been resolved, others of a different nature have emerged with the end of the Cold War. Micro-nationalism like self-determination and ideological wars is a threat to the integrity of modern states. Attacks on and uprooting of civilian populations have often become objectives of war, as we have witnessed in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo. Such attacks have caused human suffering on an unprecedented scale. These forced movements of populations constitute a threat to international peace and security and reflect policies and practices that are essentially destabilizing and intolerable.

Such a tragic global situation has led to closer cooperation between political, military, and humanitarian facets of international concern. Today, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) protects and assists over 27 million people in more than 140 countries, including refugees, internally displaced persons, victims of war, and people who have returned to their countries but still require significant care and consideration . In recent years, international organizations have

worked closely with military forces in humanitarian actions, both within and outside the framework of United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building operations. These actions have given opportunities to examine, review, and reflect on the relevance of humanitarian principles and on the most desirable working relationship between humanitarian actors and military forces.

In the case of Somalia, many humanitarian agencies continue to face security challenges and are obliged to interact with the African Union force (AMISOM) as Al Shabaab has increasingly become an obstacle to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. Over the years, the group has solidified its stance against the activities of aid organizations, claiming that many American and UN-funded organizations have a Christian agenda and do not pursue the best interests of the Somali people. Local NGOs have also faced pressure from al Shabaab to end their activities. The group has frequently accused aid workers of spying for Western intelligence agencies or has targeted those organizations whose operations also support residents living under the authority of the UN-backed Federal Government. The case of Somalia will help us to analyse how humanitarian actors and the military have improved their cooperation to face contemporary crises.

The Necessity for Cooperation and Coordination of Civilian and Military Organizations

The interdependence of civilian and military organizations that respond increasingly to frequent and devastating complex emergencies around the world is becoming more evident. Better understanding of cultural differences between civilian humanitarian assistance organizations (HAOs) and the military could help HAO personnel and the military

work together more effectively in complex emergencies, as well as in peace operations and disaster response.

The purpose of foreign humanitarian assistance is to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, diseases, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or loss of property. It is sometimes in the best interest of the the International community to deploy military forces to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need. In addition, humanitarian and political considerations are likely to make humanitarian assistance operations commonplace in the years ahead. This has led to the need to understand the complexity of actual crises where interventions require both military and humanitarian expertise.

Efforts are underway through joint NGOs and military-sponsored seminars, publications and military training exercises to help civilians and military personnel working in crisis situations better understand each other. More joint training is essential for improved mutual understanding. Effective humanitarian assistance operations require civilian and military cooperation to facilitate unity of effort and to attain those states' desired end.

Dana Priest, author of *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*, stated: "As the U.S. Army's experience in Kosovo shows, the mind-set, decision-making and training of infantry soldiers rarely mixes well with the disorder inherent in civil society. This mismatch of culture and mission can distort the goal of rebuilding a country. This is a lesson that we all must remember in the rebuilding of Iraq."³¹

General John M. Shalikashvili, then Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized the need for good cooperation when he said, "What's

31 Dana Priest: *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 19.

the relationship between a just arrived military force and the NGO that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other.”³²

State of Cooperation Between Humanitarian and Military in Peace Support Operations

The United Nations has deployed thousands of peacekeepers in many countries to protect and assist NGOs in delivering aid and to help terminate the hostilities. Although NGOs and peacekeepers have worked together in the past, a new working relationship was made necessary by the extremely harsh environments faced by the missions in countries, where lawlessness was the norm.³³

This new relationship has not been without its major difficulties. It has been strained by factors such as differing organizational cultures, structures, and decision-making processes, as well as by varying interpretations of impartiality and the use of force. Improved humanitarian-military cooperation is vital to the success of future joint NGO-UN peacekeeping operations. An examination of the factors hampering cooperation suggests that several attempts to improve the humanitarian-military relationship have been put in place and many coordination structures or mechanisms have been implemented. However, there still remain many challenges when it comes to working in coordination and cooperation so as to maximise efforts of the military and humanitarian actors in areas of high insecurity like Somalia.

32 The U.S. Army, Joint Task Force (JTF): Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations (Fort Monroe, VA: Joint War fighting Center; 16 June 1997), 11-12.

33 André BEAUREGARD: Civil (NGO) – Military Cooperation: Lessons from Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; *the Ploughshares Monitor* December 1998 Volume 19 Issue 4

Coordination Mechanisms in Somalia

Coordination and cooperation are dependent on a series of key factors, including proper communication and consultation, an understanding of each other's cultures, and organizational structures – all of which are crucial to successful intervention. In the joint humanitarian operations in Somalia, former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, several formal mechanisms were utilized to facilitate coordination, cooperation and assistance in the field. These included Civil-Military Operation Centres (C-MOCs), established by UN peacekeepers and On Site Operation Centres (OSOCs), established by UN agencies.

The Civil-Military Operation Centres in Somalia are located in the UN operation's headquarters (HQs) and key field offices. They provide a forum for NGO and UN agency personnel and peacekeepers to discuss the situation at hand: who was doing what, where, how to improve cooperation and how to prevent the duplication of services. At this centre all elements of the delivery process are discussed, including the type of military assistance, route, departure time, final destination, and participating organizations.

Another civil-military coordination mechanism are the On Site Operation Centres (OSOCs), established by the UN agencies. Weekly coordination and working group meetings are held at OSOCs, where maps and relevant information about the current situation are made available.

Informal coordination methods are also frequently used, such as the exchange of liaison officers and personnel between UN/AU peacekeeping contingents and humanitarian agencies. This process is a practical way of ensuring quick dissemination of information. The exchange of liaison officers and personnel also help to “put a human

face on the relationship between the organizations.”³⁴ However, these channels are not always used,. The principal explanation is that information would take too long to travel through several levels of the chain of command before reaching the Force Commander.

Factors Influencing Cooperation

Perceptions of the efficacy of cooperation and communication in the humanitarian-military relationship vary. Commanding Officers and senior military officers often emphasized that the level of coordination and communication was good, while peacekeepers and relief workers operating in the field stated that the relationship was poorer, in part because there existed a significant ideological gap as a result of different cultures and operating procedures. Although the level of cooperation improved from the operation in Somalia to the former Yugoslavia to Rwanda, six principal factors hampered civil-military cooperation and coordination.

Varying Cultures and Ideologies

Varying cultures and ideologies have a significant impact on the degree of humanitarian-military cooperation, a problem which has been emphasized by past and present relief workers and by military personnel. In general, relief workers see themselves as nonviolent people who have dedicated part of their lives to assist those who are less fortunate, while in most cases peacekeepers are soldiers trained for war. These different mindsets and ideologies contribute to the negative perceptions that many members of these groups have of the other. Some military personnel perceive relief workers as peace activists left over from the 1960s, and they tend to underrate the importance of NGOs in humanitarian crises. This has

34 *Working With the Military*, Training Module, UNHCR, 1995

been manifested by military personnel whose actions are based on some chauvinistic attitudes, arrogance, and the dismissal of information and opinions offered by relief workers. This disrespect for relief workers can easily destroy the already fragile level of cooperation and coordination existing on the ground.

Organizational Structures

The organizational structures of UN/AU forces and NGOs are for the most part polar opposites. The field command and control structure of a UN/AU peacekeeping force is vertical. Authority flows from top to bottom, from the Force Commander to the commanding officers of contingents to platoon commanders to the individual soldier in the field. By contrast, the operational structure of most professional NGOs is horizontal and fluid, with significant decision-making authority lodged at the site with the most information, usually in the field. Many NGOs follow a consensus-based approach. These varying structures hamper cooperation and coordination on several grounds. For example, because some NGOs and peacekeepers are unfamiliar with each other's organizational structure, they have difficulty establishing a compatible communication link with the appropriate contact or decision-maker.

Communication Breakdown

Several factors account for communication breakdown, including incompatible equipment or lack of agreed communication procedures within the NGO community, within the UN/AU force, and between the UN/AU force and NGOs. The use of incompatible communication equipment (field phones, satellite phones, short wave radios) is a prevalent problem. Some UN/AU military contingents have more technically advanced equipment than those of NGOs, making communications in the field difficult and often impossible.

Lack of pre-established communication links and pre-established procedures between various national contingents and relief organizations also hamper cooperation. This problem was prevalent during the early stages of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operation in Bosnia. Andrew Bair, a former Political Affairs Officer with UNPROFOR, has stated that “the failure of certain national contingents to communicate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in their sectors resulted in both organizations severely lacking engineering services and logistical support.”³⁵ Poor communication procedures can drastically limit the level of possible cooperation and waste precious time required for the delivery of life saving supplies. It can also lead to the overlap of resources and turf disputes.

Another problem is that of language. Peacekeepers and relief personnel come from a wide variety of countries and speak different languages, and adequate translation services are not always available. If people cannot communicate, little can be achieved.

Independence of NGOs

Many NGOs refuse to accept military assistance, believing that it undermines their independence or compromises other principles. Some such NGOs have accepted limited military assistance in the form of logistics and security support in situations of extreme violence. Some, however, refuse military assistance in almost any circumstance. One such organization is the ICRC, where “only on direct order from ICRC headquarters will delegates even converse with any military force, let alone work with them operationally.”³⁶ Many NGOs oppose military

35 Andrew Bair, “The Changing Nature of Civil-Military Operations in Peacekeeping,” in Alex Morrison, ed, *The New Peacekeeping Partnership*, 1995, p. 66.

36 Andrew S. Natsios, the International Humanitarian Relief System, *Parameters*, Spring 1995, pp. 73-74.

assistance in the belief that being seen with any military organization, including peacekeepers, can increase the chances of the NGO being attacked and/or denied permission to travel freely.

Impartiality

Similar to independence, impartiality is one of the central principles of professional relief organizations. A relief organization must be perceived as impartial to be able to perform its duties and survive in a conflict zone, and the importance of impartiality cannot be underestimated. For this reason, relief organizations are very hesitant to cooperate or co-locate with UN/AU forces, especially if the use of force has been authorized. No organization wants to be seen or viewed as working with any organization perceived as partial toward one or more of the belligerents as this can seriously jeopardize the welfare of the mission and that of relief workers, and significantly limit freedom of movement.

Impartiality is also one of the key principles of UN peacekeeping. However, peacekeepers can have great difficulty in maintaining the perception of impartiality in operations where force has been authorized. The loss of impartiality can have severe repercussions, because “without impartiality, there can be no prospect of preserving the confidence and cooperation of conflicting factions.”³⁷ *Wider Peacekeeping*, a British army field manual, describes in detail the worst case scenario if a peacekeeping operation’s impartiality is lost.

At worst, the loss of impartiality could trigger an uncontrolled escalation in a peace enforcement scenario leading to widespread and unrestrained violence, heavy civilian and military casualties and the failure of the mission.³⁸

³⁷ *Wider Peacekeeping*, Army Field Manual, London, HMSO, 1995, p. 4-2.

³⁸ *Wider Peacekeeping*, pp. 4-2 to 4-3.

Use of Force

The use of force is one of the most contentious elements in the civil-military relationship. The use of force, whether appropriate or not, can singlehandedly terminate civil-military cooperation and coordination. In many situations, UN/AU peacekeepers and civilian components of joint humanitarian operations have very different attitudes and interpretations regarding the use of force. Certain NGOs grant that the use of force might be a necessary evil in extreme circumstances, as when all means to deliver aid have failed. One such example occurred when UNPROFOR and NATO threatened to use force to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies to besieged towns and cities in the former Yugoslavia. However, the vast majority of relief workers favour negotiations with the protagonists and the possibility of handing out food packages (known as handing out samples) rather than the use of force in such situations, fearing that NGOs might become targets of retaliation.

Inappropriate or excessive use of force also hampers civil-military cooperation. An example of inappropriate use of force, at least according to several relief workers, is the use of a shot fired in the air to gain the attention of a group of people. This has been utilized by UN forces as a tool to control crowds and to maintain a certain degree of decorum when transporting or handing out aid. However, some relief workers think that this type of force can have unpredictable consequences, causing civilians to stampede in fear, or increasing the level of violence. On the other hand, some peacekeepers believe that this is an acceptable use of force, which in the vast majority of circumstances establishes the desired results. Differences in opinion over such tactics have caused significant tensions between peacekeepers and relief personnel, thus limiting cooperation.

Sources of Insecurity for Humanitarian Actors in Somalia

The primary factor affecting the security of humanitarian workers in Somalia is the overall security environment, which since 2006 has been characterized by pervasive insecurity and a complete absence of the rule of law. However, there are also more specific factors at play.

First, attacks on humanitarian workers are often economically motivated, as humanitarian assistance has become part of the war economy.

Second, divisions and loose alliances between various armed groups have made it difficult for humanitarian organizations to identify who is in control in certain areas, and determine whether security assurances made by commanders or leaders will be respected in practice by other allied groups or junior members.

Third, absence of the rule of law has meant that most incidents are not investigated by the Somali authorities, while perpetrators are not brought to account and there is therefore no effective deterrence.

Fourth, some armed groups are suspicious of humanitarian organizations and feel that they have ulterior motives, such as collecting intelligence for Western governments, supporting the TFG or opposition forces, pursuing personal enrichment or wanting to proselytize the Christian faith. This has led to abductions, interrogations and threats against some humanitarian organizations and staff.

In addition, actual or perceived association with the TFG, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the US government has been used by Al-Shabaab to justify attacks against humanitarian workers. In a letter dated July 2009, the group warned humanitarian organizations against association with opposition forces, and accused several UN agencies of supporting the government, training its troops and raising

funds for AMISOM. The UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Department for Safety and Security and UNPOS were expelled from Al-Shabaab areas. International Medical Corps (IMC) and CARE were expelled in 2008 for allegedly spying and gathering intelligence that led to the assassination of Al-Shabaab leaders.

The State of the Humanitarian–Military Cooperation in Somalia

Fundamentally, the cooperation between military and humanitarian actors may be defined as that of essential dialogue and interactions between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and pursue appropriate common goals.

The humanitarian mandate of AMISOM is limited to a facilitation role. The mandate provides that AMISOM shall “Facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).”³⁹ In implementing its limited humanitarian mandate therefore, AMISOM, since its deployment in March 2007, has effectively secured all the necessary humanitarian corridors (seaport, airport and key streets of Mogadishu), thus allowing for humanitarian access to the needy population. AMISOM provides essential escorts to humanitarian convoys headed for distribution points in and around Mogadishu.

In terms of coordination and cooperation with humanitarian agencies, AMISOM Humanitarian Affairs Unit works closely with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (OCHA), UNICEF-Somalia, UNHCR-Somalia, WFP and other UN agencies and NGOs to establish coordination mechanisms and the sharing of information.

³⁹ AMISOM mandate

AMISOM also collaborates with the Somali Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Resettlement, Ministry of Health and other relevant authorities.

Beyond the context of winning hearts and minds as a force protection tool, AMISOM field hospitals and medical personnel have been rendering medical services to the civilian population, although the facilities were designed to provide medical attention to the deployed troops. Given the depth of problems in Somalia, AMISOM medical facilities have now become the one medical point that the civilian population around Mogadishu depends upon. The three hospital departments treat over 12,000 patients per month on average. Their treatments vary from chronic medical diseases to surgical cases both acute and chronic. Over 90 percent of these patients are from the local population, including TFG troops and officials, most of them requiring emergency surgical interventions.⁴⁰

Challenges of Cooperation Between Humanitarian and AMISOM in Somalia

The cooperation between humanitarian actors and AMISOM in Somalia have led to some challenges that need to be addressed. These challenges include limited access to the field for aid agencies, the small presence of a civil component and the asymmetric conflict.

Limited Access to the Field for Aid Agencies

In war contexts, access to the population remains the most difficult issue. In Mogadishu, and during the first decade of the crisis in Somalia (1991-2000), access was relatively easy, even if at a cost.⁴¹ From 2001, access to populations has always been difficult and dangerous, but nevertheless

40 AMISOM Bulletin, February 2010

41 In 1991-92, aid agencies accepted to work under the protection of armed militias from clans or wealthy politicians and found that they could not extricate themselves from this system. It became the modus operandi of humanitarian action in Somalia and a highly rewarding business for those in power locally.

feasible. Despite the inherent dangers, agencies managed to work in environments like Sarajevo, Grozny, Huambo, Mogadishu, Kisangani and Kabul while they were under siege.

However, the launching of the ‘war on terror’ in 2001 drastically changed this situation. Western aid actors were seen as part of the war on terror and therefore perceived as potential enemies. Working in certain cities and rural areas of Somalia, such as Mogadishu, Kismayo, Afgoye involves many security challenges with approximately 3.7 million people requiring humanitarian assistance, 1.55 million people internally displaced and over 560,000 living as refugees in neighbouring countries.⁴²

Limited access to the field has been exacerbated by the conflicts related to the ‘war on terror’ and the confrontations between Western powers and movements driven by irredentism and fundamentalism. The conflicts between the Taliban and NATO, and between Al-Shabaab and the troops of the AMISOM have made Afghan and Somali cities more dangerous than ever.⁴³

Not only is there a risk that aid agencies will inadvertently be caught up in conflict, they are also targeted directly: bomb attacks against guest houses and hotels, hostage taking, etc. are now frequent. Most aid actors visiting Mogadishu limit their movements to the airport and the AMISOM base, which is only accessible with an escort.

The AMISOM Civilian Component

Security challenges in the mission area have not allowed for the full deployment of the civilian component in Mogadishu, thus compelling this key component to operate from Nairobi. Although there are some officers engaged in political affairs, humanitarian affairs, finance, and

42 UNHCR report, January 2010.

43 François GRUNWALD, Béatrice Boyer, Domitille KAUFMANN, and Julie PATINET: Humanitarian aid in urban setting: Current practice, future challenges, December 2011.

administration currently based in Mogadishu, while other civilian staff travel regularly to Mogadishu to work for extended periods of time, It has still been a challenge for them to implement their tasks fully. This frequent shuttle between Mogadishu and Nairobi has substantial financial, logistical and other humanitarian (emotional and psychological) impacts on the effective implementation of the civilian tasks of the mission mandate. It has also a negative impact on the cooperation and collaboration between AMISOM and humanitarian agencies.

The work of the mission management, in particular the Head of Mission, is severely hampered because they are unable to interact freely and regularly with the respective stakeholders in Mogadishu, including the government officials and Somali citizens. This impacts negatively on the implementation of the mission management's tasks on the ground. Every time a civilian staff member has to travel out of the secure zone, they require full military escorts in Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), and this puts a strain on the military component, as the Force Commander has to divert his limited resources (manpower and APCs).⁴⁴

Dangerous Working Conditions for Humanitarians in Somalia

Somalia is a place of extremes for intended beneficiaries and for aid workers. Those who survive the conflict, the suffering, vulnerability and indignity have reached their limit. For those who seek to assist, much of Somalia remains difficult to access, a dangerous place to operate and full of dilemmas which challenge humanitarian principles.

The humanitarian community must find a careful balance between the imperative to address humanitarian needs and the perils encountered in Somalia, such as costs and risks in terms of financial resources,

⁴⁴ Lamii KROMAH: the role of AMISOM's civilian component

the possibility of corruption, security concerns, and the threats to humanitarian principles.⁴⁵

The asymmetric conflict in Somalia has a negative impact on the cooperation between humanitarian actors and AMISOM. The Al-Shaabab still has the capacity to carry out planned assassinations and suicide attacks within TGF-AMISOM controlled areas. That situation undermines the capacity of AMISOM to provide security to humanitarian workers effectively.

Humanitarian agencies were sometimes obliged to negotiate access to the beneficiaries and engage talks with different groups on the opposing sides of the conflict: local leaders, armed groups, state and non-state actors, as well as groups perceived as illegitimate, in order to negotiate and achieve access to those they wish to assist.

However, negotiating and implementing the distribution of items that are indispensable for survival was still being undertaken, until about 2005, by a limited number of actors who had the capacity and the credibility to do so. The ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) are among the very few agencies that have managed to maintain a presence in Somalia together with a handful of very dedicated 'Dunants' NGOs.

Opportunities to Enhance the Cooperation Between Humanitarian Actors and the Military in Somalia

Cooperation of humanitarian actors and the military in peace activities have taken place in many UN/AU peace operations missions through the years, particularly since 1989. In fact, the experiences of the UN in its different peace operations missions, especially in Somalia, laid the groundwork for the development of the modern cooperation concept.

45 Ann Mary Olsen : Working in High-risk Environments and Fragile State, 2011

Civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) is the modern cooperation concept which mandated UN commanders to develop and coordinate their activities with the other UN, international and local actors in their environment. In Somalia coordination structures, procedures and policies have been implemented to facilitate the cooperation between military contingents and the various humanitarian agencies and NGOs.⁴⁶

The Nature of Insecurity in Somalia

The general security environments throughout Somalia remain fragile. Violence, insecurity and the near impunity of many armed groups have led to great difficulties for aid workers to move around safely and monitor the results that humanitarian organizations set out to achieve.

Attacks on humanitarian workers, peace activists and human rights defenders have been observed in many places of Somalia. Amnesty International has investigated 150 cases between 2006 and 2011 in which humanitarian workers and members of Somali civil society were killed in robberies or kidnappings.⁴⁷

As a precondition to the work carried out in the field, a strict security protocol needs to be put in place. Organizations need to conduct daily risk assessments and consider security threats. That can be possible when coordination teams between humanitarian bodies and AMISOM are in place. The military units ensure that they update the daily security situation on the ground which then needs to be analysed by humanitarian workers before the latter go to their field work. This therefore constitutes an opportunity for both sides to enhance their

46 Cedric de Coning: Civil-Military Cooperation in UN Peace Missions-The need of a New Holistic Mission Approach

47 Samir Elhawary: The impact of UN integration on aid worker security in Somalia, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, 2012

level of cooperation to improve security measures in respect of their guidelines and principles.

The AMISOM Mandate

The humanitarian situation in Somalia is characterized by a war weary population, which is constantly being displaced due to the continued fighting between the transitional government and the insurgent groups. Violence against civilians and humanitarian workers, perpetrated by the extremist groups has adversely affected humanitarian aid delivery. Natural catastrophes, including flooding, drought and health epidemics, have also contributed to a deterioration of the overall humanitarian situation.

The AMISOM mandate therefore includes humanitarian, security, political and development dimensions. The civilian component's tasks cover political, humanitarian, civil affairs, public information and mission support that specifically relate to coordinating with partners (donors and other international actors), humanitarian agencies and NGOs to facilitate humanitarian aid and services delivery in Somalia.

In terms of coordination and cooperation with humanitarian agencies, AMISOM works closely with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance United Nations Offices of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Somalia, UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) Somalia, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Somalia, World Food Programme (WFP) and other UN agencies and NGOs to establish coordination mechanisms and the sharing of information. On the part of the Somalia Government, AMISOM collaborates closely with the Somali Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Resettlement, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Family Affairs, Ministry of Social Affairs and an NGO – the Coalition of Grassroots Women Organization (COGWO).

Enhancing Cooperation Between AMISOM and Humanitarian Actors in SOMALIA

The security situation in Somalia led to the understanding that military and humanitarian actors ought to work together and need to adapt constantly in order to improve the level of cooperation. Traditionally, humanitarian actors were attached to their autonomy and rarely worked in cooperating and coordinating their activities with the military. In Somalia, humanitarian agencies have realized that there needs to be some level of cooperation with the military to ensure their effectiveness. Indeed, conflicts today are different from the major conflicts of the Cold War, and military operations have changed in nature. Today, the military not only engage in these wars to stop the conflict, but also to restore peace, and therefore need to add a humanitarian agenda to their strategy.

The Contribution of AMISOM

AMISOM has implemented a programme of winning hearts and minds as a confidence-building and mission-protection tool in Somalia. The success of that programme will depend on how AMISOM will perform the communication strategy with all stakeholders. The strategy cannot work without the full adherence to humanitarians who provide support and needs to the population.⁴⁸ Winning the hearts and minds of Somali people can then be understood as a global programme which requires the effective participation of all actors on the ground in the mission.

In order to respond adequately to this need, AMISOM has established a public Information unit, responsible for the implementation of the AMISOM communication strategy. This strategy is aimed at maintaining credible visibility and vibrancy in the media through regular interaction with local and international media on AMISOM activities, and coordination

48 François Grünewald: Humanitarian aid in Somalia: managing insecurity, 2009

between AMISOM and partners including the Somalia Government, UN and other stakeholders. Major tools for the implementation of the AMISOM communication strategy include radio, website, online newsletters and Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).

The public information unit has ensured that the work of the mission is shared with stakeholders, including the local population, in a credible manner, despite the hostile propaganda of armed groups. Media interest in AMISOM, including from giant international networks has remained high, as evidenced by the numerous visits to and requests by these media organizations to visit the mission area. Such visits, facilitated by the mission's public information unit, have been used to inform the wider local and international public of events taking place in the area and to correct misrepresentations and misinformation propagated by various armed groups.

The Contribution of Humanitarian Agencies

All the civilians and humanitarian actors present in Somalia belong to either international organizations (IO), including UN agencies, or international, regional, or local NGOs.

The humanitarian imperative, the ethical basis of most humanitarian organizations, declares that there is an obligation to provide assistance unconditionally, wherever and whenever it is needed.⁴⁹ When Al-Shabaab refused access to humanitarians to work in the south and some parts of central Somalia, many agencies developed structures that could help them to reach the people and address their needs. A UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) capacity was implemented in the OCHA country offices by developing and delivering tailored training packages at the country and regional

⁴⁹ Beat Schweizer : Moral dilemmas for humanitarianism in the era of humanitarian military interventions,2004

level. There were many improvements in the level of collaboration and coordination between humanitarian actors and AMISOM.

The efforts and achievements in cooperation between AMISOM and humanitarian agencies and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) are extensively covered by The AU/UN-Information Support Team's Newsroom. These efforts from both sides helped to reduce the kind of competition that used to be observed between agencies and between humanitarian actors and military units on the ground.

Conclusion

Somalia is one of the world's most dangerous operational environments alongside Afghanistan, Iraq and most recently, Darfur. It is also one of the contexts in which the needs are greatest. There are more than three million people living in conditions of extreme vulnerability. This is a major challenge for humanitarian actors and donors.⁵⁰

After the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab terrorists in many areas of Somalia, the security situation has evolved into an explosion of small militia groups that no longer have any political purpose or legitimacy. Somalia has entered an era of very large mobile crimes, which take its inspiration in the development of the industry of the hostage.

The security situation is then constantly monitored by various entities that interact and share their information: intelligence Mechanisms related to embassies following the evolution of the political, security, AMISOM military and humanitarian action need to be better coordinated so that they are better able to follow the evolution of the region, links with international terrorism and the chances recovery of a minimum of law and order necessary for the stability of the Somalia. NGOs have established a specific institution, the Somalia NGO Safety Preparedness and Support Programme (SPAS) that interact closely with AMISOM.

The SPAS monitors the situation, compiles the information to identify potential threats and informs the players of these threats through Short Message Service (SMS). This allows the production of maps that compare a date to another for instructive information. The system allows military and humanitarian actors to identify safe levels of the various areas of Somalia and determine the presence and mobility of UN staff.

50 www.usaid.gov/au: Framework for working in fragile and conflict-affected states, Guidance for staff

There is no doubt that AMISOM has played a vital role in creating a more secure environment in Somalia, for the benefit of Somalis in need of aid, as well as for the development of the country and the work of humanitarian agencies. It is worth noting that in 2011, 16 humanitarian agencies were banned by Al-Shabaab militia from its areas of control in southern and central Somalia, regions where drought and famine conditions were most acute.

Despite the AMISOM contribution to enhance the security level for humanitarians, the cooperation between military and humanitarian actors in Somalia has been a subject of critics from some agencies. They argue that the cooperation, especially military escorts, have negative effects on independence and neutrality of humanitarian actors and therefore contribute to increasing their insecurity. Yet despite these critics, the cooperation and collaboration between humanitarian actors and the military in Somalia has improved after the al-Shabaab attacks on aid workers. The nature of conflict which promotes killings and hostage-taking of humanitarian personnel was the chief reason for redefinition of aid delivery in the case of the Somalia conflict. AMISOM's mandate was accordingly reviewed through the UN resolution on the protection of civilians to play an important facilitation role and ensure that all key stakeholders are able to deliver much-needed humanitarian services.

In fact, the AMISOM humanitarian unit works closely with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and other UN agencies as well as Somali and international NGOs to establish coordination mechanisms and the sharing of information. It also collaborates closely with the relevant Somali government agencies and ministries.

It has been assessed that without an effective cooperation between AMISOM and humanitarian agencies, many areas where the population is in serious need of aid could not have been reached. That means that the

principles of independence and neutrality must sometimes be reviewed in the interest of Somalis who may be victims of those principles when they can be ignored for understandable reasons. Although humanitarian principles are very important and must be understood, there is need to put into consideration each country's security profile.

The Somalia conflict has shown that actual peace operation missions can conduct peace operations and run humanitarian activities. AMISOM has implemented many humanitarian activities which were highly appreciated by the population. In situations where insecurity dictates that the military must be involved in humanitarian activities, the cooperation with humanitarian actors becomes inevitable, specifically in complex emergencies as in Somalia.

Recommendations

As the security situation in Somalia is complex and volatile, it is important for AMISOM and humanitarians to develop a joint understanding of their roles and functions and to improve interagency and inter-force cooperation before and during operational deployments.

Despite the fundamental differences in structure and approach to peace building between civilian and military actors, there is also clear evidence that permanent joint training, institutional socialization, and shared experiences through collaboration on the ground can help to bring AMISOM and humanitarian actors together and facilitate effective and meaningful cooperation.

Socialization and training would not only help civilian and military actors alike to prepare for their respective responsibility, but would also sensitize members of each community to each other and build the skills for effective and quick improvisation on the ground, thereby simultaneously building mutual respect for and more effective utilization of humanitarian and military space.

Whenever possible, humanitarian agencies/organizations should establish clear lines of communication with AMISOM military and vice –versa.

On security issues, military and humanitarian actors have to coordinate within the framework of the weekly integrated meetings. AMISOM officers may be in charge of briefing the humanitarian community on security issues when attending periodical meetings. However, AMISOM military may not share certain confidential information relating to specific military operations, notably details about planned operations. On the other hand, humanitarian agencies and organizations might not share information that might compromise their independence,

neutrality, impartiality or their security in the field (for instance, certain information relating to political or military positions of armed groups or other entities).

Information they deem might be detrimental to the security of victims and individuals in their care. Identities of victims or individuals being assisted or protected should in principle not be shared unless absolutely necessary.

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Highlights of Key Messages in the Issue Briefs

This fact sheet is a quick reference guide regarding issues discussed in the two papers.

The Key messages include:

Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa Sea Board: The Role of Peace Support Operations (PSO)

- Maritime insecurity has been exacerbated by political, social, legal and security issues. In Somalia this has been made worse by the fact that the Somali state has not been not a stable government for a long time, culminating, among other issues, in maritime insecurity. This is due to Somali's long Sea Board, terrorism, piracy, proliferation of illegal weapons, drug trafficking, marine pollution among others.
- Maintaining maritime security requires the effort of both the Somali government and the international community. The Somali state needs considerable assistance in dealing with security issues since the country lacks sufficient structures and personnel to address the problem. More importantly, the sea board of Somalia is used by other states and the international community for both economic and humanitarian purposes.
- The negative effects of maritime insecurity are of a transnational nature that require a concerted approach. Stability of the Somali state is central to solving most if not all of the state's problems, including maritime insecurity. The Somali government requires the collaboration of the international community to assist it in stabilizing the country.

Cooperation of Humanitarian Actors and Peace Support Operations: The case of Somalia

- Today, the military is more heavily engaged in humanitarian operations than before. This involvement is vital as civilian authorities turn to the military for help in dealing with humanitarian operations within complex security situations.
- It has been assessed that without effective cooperation between AMISOM and humanitarian agencies, many areas where the population is in serious need of aid would not be accessible. It is therefore important for AMISOM and humanitarian actors to develop a joint operational framework to reduce the insecurity risks on the ground and apply appropriate security measures.
- It is possible to improve the humanitarian-military relationship and gain overall efficiency, continuing to clarify the roles while enhancing coordination and cooperation of the different bodies. Military and humanitarian agencies have to coordinate in the framework of the weekly integrated meetings. AMISOM officers may be in charge of briefing the humanitarian community regarding security issues when attending periodical meetings.

About the Authors

Lt Col Donatien Nduwimana

Lt Col Donatien NDUWIMANA is a senior army officer of the Burundi National Defense Forces. He is currently a researcher at the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC).

His career as a military Officer began when he was commissioned into Burundian National defense forces in 1988. He completed military and academic training in 1994. Since then he has held key positions in staff and command some of which include those of Battalion Commander between 2007 and 2010 and Ministry of Defense Advisor in Studies and strategic Planning in 2012.

He has attended several career military courses during his time of service including senior staff course at the Combined War College in Yaoundé, Cameroun, Junior Staff Course in Libreville, Gabon, and Multinational Battalion Commander in peace operations course in Bamako, Mali.

He holds a Master's Degree in Strategy, Defense, Security, Conflict and Disaster Management from the University of Yaoundé in Cameroun and a Bachelor's degree in Economics sciences (Management and Administration).

Laura Muriithi

Miss Muriithi Laura is a Curriculum Developer with IPSTC. She has work experience in the field of peace and security in the legal perspective. She has worked with UNHCR and dealt with refugees from South Sudan, Sudan, DRC Congo, Ethiopia and Somalia. She has written a paper on Child Soldiers in Uganda and DRC Congo. She holds a LLB Degree from University of South Africa (UNISA), Post-Graduate Diploma in Law from the Kenya School of Law and Masters in International Relations from United States International University (USIU-Africa). She is an advocate of the High Court of Kenya. Her areas of academic interest are International Humanitarian Law and in particular Conflict, Refugee and Migration law.



International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC)

P.O. Box 24232 – 00502, Karen, Kenya

Tel: 254 20 388 3157/58, Fax: 254 20 388 3159

Email: info@ipstc.org

www.ipstc.org