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International Peace Support training Centre

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About this Paper

The paper investigates the dynamics of integration of society in South Sudan. Towards this end, the paper seeks to answer questions related to how the lack of governance during the war promoted the emergence of illegal activities, and how these developments have weakened the ties with central authority in current day South Sudan. The paper also looks into socio-economic dynamics and challenges that State administration has to deal with in ensuring integration particularly of the rural community in this polity. As much as the new Republic is striving to establish state structures, the strategic recognition and appreciation of the complexities of South Sudanese societies should form part and parcel of the policy architectures and considerations.



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Centrifugal Forces and Integration in South Sudan: The Case of Parallel Cross Border Economies



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Enhancing Capacity for Peace & Security through Peace Operations Training

*Centrifugal Forces and Intergration in
South Sudan: The Case of Parallel Cross
Border Economies*

Phillip Arthur Njuguna Mwanika

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Foreword

This publication is one of IPSTC's contributions to understanding the conflict situation in South Sudan. The role of the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) as a regional center of excellence is to contribute to the preparedness of the Eastern Africa region in addressing peace and security challenges. This demanding and extensive task comprises two essential aspects; namely the ability to raise awareness about problems that may affect the region, and the identification of possible ways to address them.

The complex conflict situation in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa calls for knowledge based policy making on pertinent issues of peace and security. Specifically the post conflict situation in South Sudan calls for profound research and analysis of the current conflict dynamics. Given the fragility of the new nation and the immense challenges of providing security and basic services to the entire country and initiating development amidst scarce resources; South Sudan requires reliable knowledge of conflict prevention, management and resolution.

Centrifugal Forces and Integration in South Sudan: The Case of Parallel Cross Border Economies; presents the dynamics and challenges of integration of society in South Sudan. This Issue Brief investigates how the lack of governance during the war promoted the emergence of illegal activities, and how these developments have weakened the ties with central authority. It also looks into socio-economic dynamics and challenges that State administration has to deal with in ensuring integration particularly of the rural community in South Sudan.

The International Peace Support Training Center has made considerable contribution in research and training on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. The research products inform the design of our training modules.

I would like to thank the Government of Japan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for supporting the research and publication of this booklet.

IPSTC will continue to collaborate with development partners to publish high quality research products on topical issues of peace and security in the region.

Brigadier R. G. Kabage

Director

IPSTC

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Abbreviations

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
EES	Eastern Equatorial State
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
RSS	Republic of South Sudan
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SSPS	South Sudan Police Service

1 Introduction

During the war with the government of Khartoum, trade and economic ties with the North faded and were replaced by more consistent and continuous relationships with countries along Sudan's southern border. This situation was enhanced by the unavailability of certain goods in the North such as alcohol, the dynamic ethnically-driven cross-border trade, and the absence of effective power in Southern Sudan. Further, topography makes this roughly 2,900-kilometre border extremely difficult to monitor, thus opening the doors to all kinds of activities including illegal cross-border trafficking. Thus, besides legal commercial activities, trans-border criminal activities developed along the Ugandan, Kenyan and Ethiopian borders. Due to lack of transportation infrastructure in Southern Sudan, the remote border areas developed their relationships with neighbours rather than with the heart of the country thus indirectly promoting centrifugal forces in the economic, political, and cultural areas. Lack of clarity on responsibilities and mandates in border monitoring has caused illegal trade activities to spread. Although cattle-raiding remains the most apparent trans-border activity, other illegal activities have flourished and tend to have incorporated business-like patterns such as is observed in illegal timber logging. Furthermore, trade in some goods such as alcohol tend to evade import duties thus denying needed revenues to the government. The absence of government to reverse economic hardships, restore law and order and provide the necessary security in the South has meant that South Sudanese people are left to look for parallel means of accessing security, economic sustenance and other human needs. Illegal cartels and armed groups have continued to foster business links with their cross-border counterparts in an effort to provide alternative means of sustenance. Some of these links existed during the war and left unchecked, they will not only sustain parallel economies but also fuel conflict. This runs the risk of challenging the state's legitimacy as the main provider of security and economic development in the post-independence period.

Integration of the mosaic of different peoples found within South Sudan has become a herculean task especially in the post-independence phase. Close to a hundred different ethnic groups that speak over sixty indigenous languages have their domicile in South Sudan. There also exists a demographic mix, whereby there is an un-determined number of nomadic South Sudanese groups of Arab descent who seasonally populate small portions of the western territories. The division of the country into ten states along the South Sudan's three historical territorial delimitations, that is Bahr el Ghazal,

Equatoria, and the Greater Upper Nile, might not have helped improve the level and rate of integration of the peoples internally¹. Questions as to whether the RSS and its people have forged national identity and cohesion abound, and this has been observed since the signing of the CPA in 2005. Even before independence, many parts of the country such as the Greater Upper Nile region which includes Unity State, Upper Nile, and Jonglei States, were prone to insecurity, territorial disputes and inter-communal animosity or wars of a third kind² (new wars). Contestations over land, water, and cattle between residents and returnees from the North and from exile in countries neighbouring South Sudan have been exacerbated by South Sudan's lack of a development strategy. The intricate relationship between a fragile national identity, strong tribal allegiances and a substantial presence of small arms have all contributed to increased violence and unchecked criminality.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Integration and reintegration of the new South Sudan remains the most urgent and difficult task of the new government. There is a host of centrifugal forces that tend to work against efforts at state and nation-building. Criminality and parallel cross-border economies are but two examples of the myriad forces that continue to challenge security, the key pillar of development in any country. These are carry-overs from the war period when illegal activities thrived mainly due to weak governance from Khartoum and the need for the local peoples to provide their own security and means of livelihood or sustenance. These centrifugal forces have direct implications for development of the new nation notably in the areas of infrastructure, health care, food security, and provision of an enabling environment for the growth of local economies. Such growth would be instrumental not only in the integration of the remote areas but also the reintegration of returnees and ex-combatants and achievement of nationhood.

¹ See Menondji M.H.A., *Secession from Sudan: challenges facing the South Sudanese government*, 16 January 2012, Accessible in <http://thinkafricapress.com/south-sudan/secession-sudan-challenges-facing-new-government> , as accessed on 26 September 2012.

²Mary Kaldor asserts that wars of a third kind or new wars are conflicts within which communities and identities have adopted the mystique of statehood as the ultimate and final mode of gaining a political and security advantage and towards survival. See Kaldor Mary, *New and old wars: organized violence in a global era*, 2nd ed. (Stanford University Press, Stanford (CA), 2007), pp. 7-11.

The real extent of the challenges to integration are yet to be fully understood if the new nation is to formulate sound development strategies. This paper seeks to contribute to this understanding by examining the relationship between governance, economy and criminality since the war period and their implications on national development.

1.2 Objectives of the study

The objectives of this policy brief are two-fold: to investigate how weak governance during the war promoted the emergence of illegal activities and how these activities continue to block rapid integration of the new nation in the post-independence period; and to suggest how the centrifugal forces can be overcome to improve national integration and cohesion in post-war South Sudan.

1.3 Scope of the study

The study looks at different but connected factors that challenge integration in South Sudan. The origins and locus of parallel economic activities and criminality are examined as well as factors that continue to facilitate illegal activities along the Southern border. The complexities of state and nation-building and their impact on the integration of South Sudan are looked at. Other challenges of integration that make informal economies attractive are considered. A practical case-study of Eastern Equatoria State on the nature of integration dynamics, challenges and opportunities is also provided.

1.4 Research questions

The study from which this brief is extracted was guided by the following three research questions.

- (i) What factors contributed to the development of parallel economies in South Sudan during and after the war?
- (ii) What challenges do parallel economies and criminal activities pose to nation-building and integration?
- (iii) What are the “best practices” that may inform the process of national integration and cohesion?

2 Centrifugal Forces

Besides insecurity, South Sudan has also had major challenges in terms of border management. There exists large porous borders across which commercial and trade relationships have developed especially in view of the fact that the South was cut off from the North because of the war thus promoting relationships with Southern neighbours. Further, Khartoum's policy of preventing commercial relationships with the South gave birth to the "Operation Lifeline Sudan" (OLS) in April 1989, under the auspices of the United Nations (mainly UNICEF and the World Food Program) to provide assistance to the South. Together with about 35 NGOs, the UN established a logistics line whose hub was located in Lokichoggio, in northwestern Kenya that would channel international aid to Southern Sudan, across the border. The concentration of personnel, goods and services in Lokichoggio, which was also a relief station for humanitarian personnel deployed in South Sudan, attracted not only humanitarian organizations, but also a number of businesses. While some of these businesses were legitimate (though not necessary legal in the eyes of Khartoum), some less legal activities such as timber logging, and cattle trafficking developed in the wake of the latter. These cross-border activities exist to this day. Cross-border trade and transfers may not be illegal *per se*, but they evade import or export taxes that would be an important source of revenue for the country. The drop in revenue that followed the falling oil-price on the international market in 2008, and the pipeline dispute with North Sudan highlighted the need for alternative sources of revenue for the State. After several decades of poor or ineffective border management, the fiscal implications at national level are now being felt.

It is estimated, that close to four million South Sudanese were displaced during the civil war. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has tracked over 2.5 million returnees to South Sudan since 2005, with over 360,000 returning in 2011 alone. The returnee phenomenon to South Sudan has driven demand and there is significant commercial investment in the country³. New trade routes are developing but the government has not strengthened border management in order to capitalize on the increased revenues that could be gotten from legal cross border trading. The migration

³See IOM (International Organization for Migration), *Border Management Newsletter*, March 2012, http://www.iom.int.jahia/.../site.../south_sudan_ibm_newsletter_0312.pdf, as accessed on 12 September 2012.

into and out of South Sudan has also been characterized by illegal cross-border economies. This is partly due to the long porous and unmanned borders and partly by government inefficiency that has prompted the parallel economies. For example, customs processing at border points in South Sudan is often very slow. There are problems of poor roads that increase the time in reaching markets, and the existence of informal or corrupt payments between the border posts and the destination points. This drives up the price of trading⁴. This is but one example of the State's inability to provide and facilitate the incentives of integration.

⁴ Ibid.

3 State vs. Nation-building in South Sudan

Because South Sudan is a new country, it faces the double challenge of building simultaneously a State and a Nation with institutions and a common vision. At independence, South Sudan did not seem to have collective national identity and vision. The government's role in enhancing integration should begin with building a stable state based on a coherent and inclusive national identity. A closer look at South Sudan's history reveals decades of marginalization, oppression, civil strife and war, deep-seated political and ethnic divisions and weak institutional capacity. Secondly, integration should be manifested in the relations between the government and the people of South Sudan. In the current political-security environment, it is apparent that the rampant inter-communal conflicts or new wars have a large ethno-social component⁵. The latter are based more on mechanisms towards resolving domestic conflicts which have challenged integration generally. The state of South Sudan is such that its society continues to be ingrained in violence within itself. For example, reports from the United Nations indicate that already, about 1,400 people have been killed in internal conflicts in all of the 10 states since 2011 i.e. since independence⁶.

There are also no less than seven major rebel militias currently fighting against the government plus an undetermined number of other localized armed groups⁷. Another point of concern could be seen in recent developments. By late September 2011, a good number of individuals had launched or coordinated at least seven insurgencies against the South Sudan government. Rebel militia activity stretches from near the South's border with Ethiopia to multiple points along its border with Sudan, including Darfur⁸. Consequently, violent clashes have been a major occurrence between these armed groups and the SPLA giving rise to massive displacements. The Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs in

⁵ See McGuinness Kate and Angelo Victor, *Security in Practice 7. Security and Stability: reflections on the impact of South Sudan on regional political dynamics*, Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, pp. 20-21.

⁶ See Reuters. *Some 1400 killed in South Sudan violence*, 29 June 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/29/us-sudan-south-killings-iUDSTRE75S3QJ20110629>, as accessed on 7 September 2012.

⁷ See Small Arms Survey, *Fighting for spoils: armed insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile*. Sudan Issue Brief - Human Security Baseline Assessment, (Geneva, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2011), p.3

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3

2012 indicated that an estimated 300,000 people have been displaced since 2011. Towards remedying this situation, government reactions have often been cited as inadequate or excessive. In terms of law enforcement, there is apparent inability of the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) to counter the complex security dynamics. This has sometimes invited the intervention of the SPLA national defence forces which has often been seen as overly excessive.

4 Parallel Economies and Integration Dynamics

4.1 Economic Survival Mechanisms

It has been argued that in under-developed societies, especially in Africa, informal economies usually overwhelm the formal sectors. For example, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated that the informal economies represent 72% of economic sustenance activities outside agriculture.⁹ The question therefore is, what exactly are these informal sectors? The informal economies or sectors are not typically regulated, taxed, documented and protected by governments or any legitimate or recognized authority. These economies are normally referred to as underground, clandestine, hidden, shadow, subterranean and even as parallel economies or simply the black market. They entail extra-state exchange systems¹⁰. There are major considerations that make informal economies attractive to actors in under-developed societies and especially immediate post-war countries. A major pull factor is that the agrarian or agricultural sector and the official formal economies in these societies do not have the capacity to absorb labour, which is also compounded by high rates of population increase, prompted either by normal growth or the return of displaced persons and refugees and also ex-combatants who have been demobilized. Another major pull factor is that such societies experience significant challenges and obstacles in terms of their people getting entry into formal economies and this is prompted by cumbersome and less understood regulations, high business registration fees and also corruption. Predatory States in essence tend to erode the legitimacy of the formal economy and entry into the same. This in turn stimulates growth in the parallel or informal economies.

⁹See Lesser Caroline and Moise-Leeman Ervdokia. *Informal cross-border trade and trade facilitation reform in Sub-Saharan Africa Final Report*, In, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No 86, Paris, OECD, 2008, and also Mathembu-Salter Gregory. 2003. *Beyond the record: the political economy of cross border trade between Cyangugu, Rwanda and Bukavu, Democratic Republic of Congo*, Capetown: University of Cape Town. P 10.

¹⁰ See Kristina Flodman Becker, *The informal economy: fact-finding study*, Stockholm, Swedish International Development Agency, SIDA, 2004, p.3; and also Lamb Guy. *Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies: the cases of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan*. (Washington DC: The international bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank, 2012)p.12.

Another factor that provides a justification for people to engage in parallel economies is that the post-war States normally lack the capacity or have weak capacity to provide training and establish relevant infrastructure to facilitate absorption into the formal economies. Another aspect, as is the case of South Sudan, is that high levels of underdevelopment, poverty and crime have stimulated demand for low-cost goods and services, which are provided more readily and efficiently than by the formal State-sanctioned economies. These parallel economies were therefore more pronounced during war and are still active currently in the post-war period.¹¹ A classic case in South Sudan of the dynamics of informal economies and how they affect integration in the country is seen in Eastern Equatoria State (EES).

4.2 Informal or Parallel Economies in South Sudan

Intra-community conflict and cross-border criminality have continued to obstruct integration and peace in the post-CPA period. Eastern Equatoria lies in South-eastern South Sudan and experiences chronic and recurring armed violence. Both internal conflicts and cross-border violence have characterized this region over time with widespread cattle-raiding, lawlessness and general criminality.¹² Eastern Equatoria State also borders Uganda to the south, Kenya to the South-East, and Ethiopia to the East. Conflict and criminality in this region emanate from the systematic marginalization of the pastoralist and agro-pastoralists that live in this State. There is poor government presence in terms of access to basic services, security, water supply, etc.¹³ To survive, the inhabitants have turned to livelihood opportunities created by parallel economies such as cattle-raiding, and other activities related to small arms smuggling. Consequently, a culture of cattle-raiding has flourished in this State which has been worsened by the ready and widespread access to small arms and light weapons. In terms of understanding the push factors or centrifugal forces that legitimize parallel economies in EES, it is important to understand the state of development in the region and livelihood security in essence. Livelihood security in EES is

¹¹ See Sudharshan Canagarajah and S.V. Sethuraman, *Social protection and the informal sector in developing countries: challenges and opportunities*, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series, No. 0130, (Washington DC, World Bank, 2001)

¹² See Munyes John, *The International Conference on Peace and Development among the "Ateker" communities in the Horn of Africa*. Juba, South Sudan. Unpublished Concept Paper. 22 July 2007.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

characterized by a major reliance on subsistence agriculture and to a lesser extent prospecting in terms of natural resources and mining. Economic opportunities are limited and employment is widespread. EES is also characterized by unpredictable climatic variations and this has more often affected the cropping seasons with a negative effect on subsistence agricultural activities.¹⁴

The State also harbours a high number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and has a rising number of refugees returning from neighbouring states in the post-independence period¹⁵. EES is also viewed as the most ethnically diverse region in South Sudan with six ethnic groups across its counties. For a long time, EES has been experiencing humanitarian challenges and aid has more often been disrupted. This is due to the protracted inter-communal conflicts and insecurity, which have restricted access to many areas in the State. For example, in Magwi County where the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) once operated, this Ugandan rebel group often diverted humanitarian cargo¹⁶. Other pull factors are related to 'regional commonalities' of human security challenges. Eastern Equatorians do share a number of key experiences and structural similarities with equally marginalized communities from neighbouring states. In Uganda and Kenya for example, there are the Karamoja and Turkana regions respectively that are inhabited by pastoralist communities. These two communities have a lot in common with EES. Law enforcement and security are poor in this triangle and widespread circulation of arms is rife internally and across the border. This is the cyclical nature of small arms and light weapons¹⁷. Eastern Equatoria, just

¹⁴ See Mc Envoy Claire and Murray Ryan, *Gauging fear and insecurity: perspectives on armed violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North*. Geneva, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2008, p. 15.

¹⁵ Interview sentiments of a senior official at the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in Juba as forwarded to the author on August 2012.

¹⁶ See Shanmugaratnam N., *Resettlement, resource conflicts, livelihood revival and reintegration in South Sudan: a study of the processes and institutional issues at the local level in Magwi County*. Noragric Report No. 58. December 2010, p. 1

¹⁷ See Buchanan Smith and Lind Jeremy, *Armed violence and poverty in Northern Kenya: a case study for the armed violence and poverty initiative*. Bradford: Centre for International Cooperation and Security, Bradford University, March 2005, Accessible through, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/country/afr-pdf/africa-kenya-2005-9.pdf> as accessed on August 2012; and also, Mkutu, Kennedy Agade, Small arms and light weapons among pastoral groups in the Kenya-Uganda border area. *African Affairs*, Vol. 106, No.422, 2007, pp. 52-53.

like its pastoralist neighbours, has experienced the watering down of traditional systems of authority and conflict resolution.

4.3 From Informal to Illegal Economy

The acquisition of sophisticated illegal weaponry heightens the high levels of criminality and lawlessness through organized crime especially cattle-raiding. Illegal trade in weapons from the region have also gone unchecked due to corrupt law enforcement officials and largely porous borders with its neighbours. The informal and/or illegal economies in EES have provided an environment of both antagonism and interdependence between and among the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist groups¹⁸. In terms of illegal transfers and the small arms and light weapons economy, internal demand for weapons combined with the availability of the same have created a thriving illegal economy. Between 2008 and 2009, it was also reported that the South Sudanese traders from Eastern Equatoria moved with their cattle across the border to Agoro market in Uganda where they exchanged their livestock for firearms and ammunition. Cross-border illegal trade in arms and ammunition is reportedly still active to this day, though its scale might be difficult to establish¹⁹. In addition, arms are reported to be traded along traditional pastoralist cattle routes, in particular along the Ethiopia-Kenya border. For example, the Buya seasonally move north to Jonglei State for pasture and water but in the process come into contact with the Murle and brisk trade in arms ensues.²⁰

The recurrent inter-communal conflicts that challenge integration are often related to cross-border transactions. Conflicts in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana have often been brought about by retaliatory attacks between local communities. This has been the case between the Sudanese Toposa and Kenyan Turkana. As such, pastoralists in the Eastern Equatoria region have since the CPA engaged in bitter inter-ethnic competition²¹. For instance, in

¹⁸ See Akabwai, Darlington and Ateyo E. Priscillah, *The scramble for cattle, power and guns in Karamoja*. Medford, MA: Feinstein International Centre, December 2007, pp. 18-19.

¹⁹ These are sentiments of a senior official at the Ministry of Interior during an interview with the author in Juba on August 2012.

²⁰ Interview with the author of a local authority official in Torit, Eastern Equatoria, who is also a Chairman of an association of elders and traditional authorities in EES, August 2012.

²¹ See Sudanese Church. *Statement of the Sudanese church on the situation in Sudan and the issues at stake*, Unpublished, 26 March 2008.

May 2007, there was a Toposa cattle-raid on the Didinga community in Ngauro Payam which killed a large number of civilians and led to the loss of scores of cattle and goats²². A more recent example of insecurity are the events that occurred immediately after 2010 in two counties in EES. Since 2010, the Torit and Ikoto have engaged in raids and revenge attacks²³. Between 2010 and 2011, it is reported that cattle raids occurred almost fortnightly with an estimated death toll of 5-10 per month²⁴. This sort of criminality usually takes place through attempts by aggrieved communities to recover stolen cattle through revenge attacks²⁵. In 2009, in Ikoto County, revenge attacks were conducted between the Logir and Dongotono which escalated into serious clashes between the two Lango sub-clans, leading to close to two weeks of fighting and serious insecurity between villages until the SPLA was brought in to stop the fighting.²⁶ Apart from criminality connected to cattle-raiding, EES's integration is also affected by significant levels of killings due to banditry and highway robbery mainly along major trunk roads. This is often reported to be carried out by small organized criminal gangs and is often in the form of looting trucks for food and cash, as well as attacks at gunpoint on people traveling between villages²⁷.

²² See Mc Envoy Claire and Murray Ryan, *Gauging fear and insecurity*, 2008, op. cit., p. 24.

²³ This was noted during an interview between the author and an official of the State Law office in Torit on August 2012.

²⁴ These are sentiments provided by a senior official in the South Sudan Police Service and in the Ministry of Internal Affairs during an interview with the author on August 2012.

²⁵ Views of a senior African Inland Church Member and elder involved in the Eastern Equatoria Church based peace committee during an interview with the author on August 2012.

²⁶ See Small Arms Survey, *Symptoms and Causes; insecurity and underdevelopment in Eastern Equatoria*, Sudan Issue Brief No.16. Geneva, Human Security Baseline Assessment, Small Arms Survey, 2010, p.3.

²⁷ These are views of the Attorney General's office in Torit, EES during with the author in Torit on August 2012.

5 Enhancing Integration and Reversing Parallel Economies

Obstacles to integration partly stem from the incessant inter and intra-communal violence and criminally found in the lawlessness that results from the lack of confidence by the South Sudanese people in the State's capacity to protect them.²⁸ Although different Southern communities have actually offered their views, remedies and thoughts on a comprehensive roadmap for peace through avenues like petitions to the central government, it is argued that responses have remained largely 'reactive'. Reactions have been ad-hoc and not based on communities' own experiences and analysis of the situation on the ground.

Another obstacle to integration is the disgruntled youth. Most youth perpetuate the violence and criminality on perceptions of exclusion from any peace, policy or strategic deliberations and plans towards remedying the situation. The youth constitute a major socio-cultural resource and avenue for peace in South Sudan. There is therefore need for a coordinated and long term realistic plan by government in tandem with the international community for tackling the root causes of the conflict and criminality. Long-term processes of reconciliation among groups are also important. There is need for mainstreaming the justice and security sectors equally among all ethnic groups in the States²⁹.

²⁸ See Rolandsen, O and Breidlid, I.M., *A critical analysis of cultural explanations for the violence in Jonglei state, South Sudan*, Conflict Trends 1/2012. Durban: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2012, p. 2.

²⁹ See De Costa Felix Diana, *Reponses to inter-communal violence in Jonglei State*, 18 June 2012, accessible at <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/18/responses-to-intercommunal-violence-in-jonglei-state/> as accessed on August 2012.

6 Conclusion and Recommendations

The war left South Sudan without effective centralized governance prompting regions to develop economic ties with the neighbouring countries without planned or coordinated approaches. The installation of the Government of South Sudan did not change this reality. As a result of the topography, the lack of a communication infrastructure that would make the various regions of the country interdependent and the long absence of a centralized management, the legitimacy of a central authority that would govern the development of the country remains elusive. The absence of centralized governance not only favoured a decentralized type of development and opened the door to organized criminal activities, but also did not provide a common vision that would stimulate the emergence of a national mind-set.

There is need for integration of the different communities of South Sudan through a holistic perspective. Inter-communal and intra-communal cohesion can only be realized when government presence on the ground is felt by the local communities in terms of infrastructural development, law enforcement, enhancement of local economies and general security. Criminality, illegal transfers along Southern Sudan's borders and related war economies are just symptoms of unresolved social and structural issues. As much as the new Republic is striving to establish state structures, the complexities of South Sudanese societies should inform the policy architecture on integration and reintegration. There should be an inclusive decision-making web that takes into account the views of the local people through their representatives. This could provide the necessary impetus towards providing realistic remedies to reverse the currently worrying integration quagmire and domestic conflicts that are certainly challenging the State's legitimacy.

State-building and nation-building should be the major priority of the Government of South Sudan in the post-conflict reconstruction period. The two complement each other and it is only after the current administration recognizes this that there will be long term management of the complex integration woes, inter and intra-community tussles and related criminality. Bringing the state closer to the people would be a major task for government having in mind that the complex political-administrative system in South Sudan should be de-mystified to the population. Civilians need to understand and have a grasp of the different State avenues that facilitate delivery of economic, legal, political and security goods to them.

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