



# International Peace Support Training Centre Nairobi, Kenya

## **REPORT ON IPSTC COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM LEARNING AND EXPERT SHARING WORKSHOP**

### **COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM**



Held at Westwood Park Road, Karen  
05 October, 2017  
Nairobi, Kenya

*"Enhancing Strategies and Policies for Border Security and Countering Violent Extremism"*

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## Executive Summary

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is a training and research institution whose focus is capacity building at strategic, operational and tactical for peace operations within the context of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The mission of the centre is to conduct applied research, training and education of military, police and civilian personnel in all aspects of peace operations.

The Centre endeavours to address the complexities of contemporary United Nations and the African Union integrated peace support operations by exposing actors to the multidimensional nature of operations. The training and research undertaken cuts across the broader spectrum of conflict; prevention, management and post conflict recovery. The Peace and Security Research Department of IPTSC undertakes research and conducts thematic workshops for two main purposes; the first being to design training curricula to support operations and the second being to contribute to the policy and praxis debate towards enhancement of regional peace and security. The Workshop Agenda was ***“Enabling Strategies and policies for Border Security and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)”***.

The Workshop, held on the 5<sup>th</sup> of October 2017, aimed at tapping into subject matter experts’ knowledge and insight into:

- The complexity of countering violent extremism
- Border security threat and practices in order to inform training in IPTSC
- National and regional security policies and strategies

Experts presented a number of papers on strategies to enhance border security and countering violent extremism. These papers and strategies were discussed at length. Invited participants then made recommendations on the various ways to ensure implementation of the agenda of the workshop. This report succinctly documents the activities of the Workshop.



## 1. The Workshop Concept

The learning and experts sharing workshop is part of the Peace and Security Research Department (PSRD) of International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) planned activities under the Japan/UNDP funded project for the year 2017. In the context, the Centre has organized the CVE workshop informed by the current overarching research theme of *Enhancing Strategies and Policies for Border Security and Counter Violent Extremism*. The theme reflects IPSTC focus on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in Kenya and Border areas as a contribution to regional security and stability.

Every year the PSRD begins its calendar by formulating an agenda to inform its research activities as one of its key responses to emerging issues in conflict, peace and security in Eastern Africa. This is done through a Research Agenda workshop.

The IPSTC Countering Violent Extremism Learning and Expert Sharing Workshop was organized to provide a forum for discussing pertinent knowledge in the area of CVE on the topics below:

- Countering Violent Extremism in Africa: Understanding threats and responses
- Conceptualizing Countering Violent Extremism
- Assessment of Legal and Operational frameworks on Boarder and CVE Counterterrorism Strategies
- Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya: An Overview of the National CVE Strategy
- Border Security and CVE in Kenya: Strategies, Challenges and Opportunities
- Translating the National CVE strategy into practical reality, and
- Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons Learnt

### 1.1 Specific Objectives of the CVE Workshop

The Workshop aimed at fulfilling the following objectives:

- a. Reviewing and analysing the existing regulatory frameworks of CVE and border security for contextualization.
- b. Provide Critical input to CVE and border security conceptualization, strategies and policies in order to improve effectiveness.
- c. Sharing knowledge and experience in CVE practices.

### 1.2 Expected Outcome

The workshop intended to have three major outcomes:

- a. Provide information for development of a strategy on CVE and border security for use in training and operations of CVE stakeholders.
- b. Consolidating views from stakeholders such as practitioners, and academia to inform policies and strategies and training in CVE.
- c. Strengthen networks of collaborations with different organizations, institutions and partners in CVE

### **1.3 Participants**

The workshop brought together distinguished representatives from the, International Organizations, Government Institutions, Non-Governmental Organisations, Academia and Practitioners

### **1.4 Venue and Date**

The workshop took place at the International Peace and Training Support Centre, Westwood Park Road, Karen, Nairobi, Kenya on the 5<sup>th</sup> October 2017.

## 2. Publications by IPSTC

The Peace and Security Research Department is responsible for among other things, the production of applied research products related to peace and security policy in Eastern Africa.

Applied Research is one of the major branches of the Peace and Security Research Department at IPSTC, which seeks to provide intellectual input to inform theory and practice through training, and policy on peace and security. The Centre has made considerable contribution in training and research on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa through design of training curriculum, field research and publication of Occasional Papers, and most recently the publication of the Africa Amani Journal.

*Occasional papers* are the Centre's research products aimed at informing the IPSTC training as well as policy on regional peace and security. The Occasional papers produced annually, consist of research papers developed by the Centre's researchers.

*Issue Briefs* are short discussion papers, which are demand led aimed at shedding more, light on current peace security issues in the region. Unlike Occasional Papers, Issue Briefs are solely based on secondary data.

*The Africa Amani Journal* launched in December 2014 and is anchored on the strong desire of IPSTC to share findings of peace and security research, as a way of diversifying and improving the Centre's research products. The purpose of the journal is to report on critical research findings that continue to impact peace and security in the region. The journal also expands the Centre's horizons in sharing knowledge and best practices in peace and security. IPTSC seeks to ensure that the Journal will be the key medium for scholars in Africa to exchange innovative ideas on emerging peace and security trends and dynamics. The sharing of knowledge will boost the IPSTC standards of research in peace and security.

The Centre strongly encourages all relevant stakeholders in peace and security and those from related disciplines to contribute to the development of this very crucial academic instrument.

### 3. Opening Remarks



*Major Misiani Geoffrey* began by welcoming guests and briefly highlighting the significance of Workshop. He mentioned that participants included speakers drawn from academia, civil society organizations, international organizations, practitioners as well as government agencies. The diversity of the participants present would ensure that the objectives of the workshop were effectively met.

Major Misiani finally invited the IPSTC Director Brigadier Patrick Nderitu to make his welcoming remarks and officially declare the workshop open.



## 4. Welcoming Address



### ***Brigadier Patrick M. Nderitu – Director, IPSTC***

Brig. Nderitu began by welcoming Commander Masaki Nakagome the Defence Attaché of Japan, Mr Benjamin Gachichio the Head of Administration at the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), invited speakers and all participants to the workshop.

He stated that the IPSTC had two schools in Nairobi, Kenya, one in Embakasi and another Karen, as well as a research department. He then explained that the school in Nairobi was the operational and strategic school as far as support and research training is concerned. He mentioned that the school dealt with issues such as learning how to probe minds and learning how to behave in security situations. He also spoke

on the Research Department which is responsible for applied research and curriculum design and forms the backbone for the training.

Brig. Nderitu thanked the IPSTC partners, Government of Japan, and UNDP, for their continued supporting this important venture and appreciated the presence of the Defence Attaché of Japan, Commander Masaki. He stated that being a Regional Centre of Excellence in research, education and training in peace support operations, IPSTC approaches issues of peace and security holistically and has consequently developed programs that cover the entire spectrum of conflict. He added that its education and training programs are directed towards preparing police, military and civilian personnel for peace support operations. Here to undertake, as mentioned earlier, research on a wide range of areas related to regional peace and security including issues of countering violent extremism. Within this prospect, he stressed that the development of a network of experts and large partnerships has become and continues to be an important component of IPSTC's research education and training.

He thereafter mentioned that the Centre has engaged a wide range of experts from the region and beyond in research design development and delivery of the Centre's programs. He added that for this reason, he was delighted to acknowledge distinguished scholars, practitioners and actors from institutions and organisations working on CVE and other related aspects who have attended the workshop. These institutions included Regional Mechanisms, Missions, Interstate government bodies and non-governmental organisations, UN Agencies, Civil Society Organisations, and Faith Based Organisations among others. He noted that the workshop would provide an opportunity and platform for sharing best practices, collaboration, networking and building a body of knowledge from the experiences of CVE practitioners, actors and stakeholders.

He stated that the workshop was also aimed at tackling subject matter, knowledge and insights into complex CVE border security threats and practices in order to inform training in IPSTC, national and regional security policies and strategies, enhancing collaboration by building a network of CVE actors. Lastly, he mentioned that he looked forward to objective presentations and healthy discussions that would carry on to recommendations that could be used to develop of a strategy on CVE and boarder security for use in training of CVE stakeholders.



## 5. Opening Address



### *Commander Masaki Nakagome - Defence Attaché of Japan*


Commander Nakagome began by stating that it was indeed a great honour to be present to give opening remarks on behalf of the government of Japan. He acknowledged that violent extremism is a global scourge and the increase of terror attacks. He then noted that countering terrorist efforts in many parts of the world while laying emphasis on the prevention of terrorism is the best to counter violent extremism.

He was therefore pleased to note that IPSTC was taking the right approach by organizing and implementing the Workshop which would be helpful and contribute to enhancing regional peace and security and increase capacity on response to conflict.

He commented that Africa experienced a rise in violent extremism and conflict in the recent past and added that for many years the Government of Japan has supported African countries to enhance peace and stability. The Commander mentioned that as a nation rich in natural resources and a nation reliant on trade for our economic well-being, Japan is a strong intercept in seeing the world at peace and also recognised the crucial need to enhance capacity to enhance peace in the region.

He stated that the Government of Japan was proud to support the important workshop which was a foundation in peace keeping and peace building activities in the region. The Workshop, according to him, was very timely considering the current security situation in East Africa. He echoed that providing appropriate answers for the day's theme was very crucial for sustainable development of the East African region. He then thanked the IPSTC, the United Nations and other government agencies that gave their time, resources and their expertise for this workshop. He indicated that he looked forward to a continued collaboration with IPSTC which would pave the way for long term peace and security in the region. He added that countering violent extremism was by no means a simple task and was one we cannot afford to ignore. Cmdr Nakagome reiterated the need to do everything we could to put an end to terrorism which threatens the very foundation of peaceful, democratic and open society. Lastly, he voiced his sincere hope that the information and the expertise shared by the participants during this workshop would help realise the goal of countering violent extremism in the region.

## 6. Keynote Speech: Countering Violent Extremism in Africa: Understanding threats and Responses



*Benjamin Gachichio - Head of Administration, National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)*

Initially, the term ‘terrorist’ was labelled on personalities and groups that directly advocated for the liberation of African countries during the scramble and partition of the continent. Now the terrain has totally changed. The definition of a “terrorist in Africa has now changed dramatically to mean a dangerous extremist prepared to kill, maim and destroy.

In Somalia, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, Al-Shabaab has laid waste to human life and property. In the west, the Boko Haram has abducted boarding school children and indiscriminately murdered civilians in Nigeria. In Maghreb and Sahel countries Al-

Qaeda and its affiliates have gone as far as launching a full scale hot war in Mali after attacks in Algeria, Mauritius, Niger and Chad.

Over the years terrorism has become the most important challenge to peace, security and development in Africa. The terror activities have grown exponentially in the continent not only in terms of the number of attacks but also the number of countries affected due to increased proliferation of terrorist groups. Terrorism has arguably been one of the determining factors of our age. It frequently makes headlines threatening or attacking government, private business and ordinary citizens. It has also been one of the most important threats to peace, security and stability in most parts of the world. What does this mean exactly? What is the nature of this threat? Who or what is threatened? How, by whom and why? What can be done about it or how can we at least limit the impact of terrorism and make sure that terrorists do not make headlines and manage to scare us? These are just a handful of questions that must be addressed. We need to first focus on terrorism as an instrument to achieve certain goals in addition to an exploration of this phenomenon and the difficulties of defining it. What theories, assumptions and conventional wisdom has it produced that could be of help in understanding terrorism and dealing with it?

Some of these groups perpetrating these attacks are embryotic, in that, their only definable characteristics is that they possess extremist Islamic Faith. For this reason, they respect neither political nor geographical boundaries and do not articulate clear local political goals. From what societal wellspring does this deadly militancy arise? How exactly is Africa tackling it?

Billions of dollars have been spent and tens of thousands of troops dedicated to fight Boko Haram in Nigeria and neighbouring countries while in Eastern Africa powerful armies from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are confronting Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya. The presence of regional troops operating under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has prevented Al-Shabaab from taking over the country. In West Africa the recent reorganization of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) by Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin to tackle Boko Haram offered immense hope in many quarters. However, the task force experienced an early setback in January 2015 when Boko Haram fighters overran its headquarters at Baga in Nigeria. After that the MNJTF headquarters moved to N'Djamena in Chad and troops were increased. A new concept of operations under the supervision of the Lake Chad Basin Commission was also recently agreed upon, and in October 2015 the United States deployed 300 Special Forces personnel to Cameroon to help the Surveillance of Boko Haram and to the MNJTF.

The UN Security Council continues its support for AMISOM as well as for the African-dominated UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)- both of them combating militant activities. Militant attacks, including against peacekeepers, continue in both countries. Security Council resolution



2231 of July 2015 urged the African Union to undertake a structured and targeted reconfiguration of AMISOM to boost its efficiency, in particular by strengthening command and control structures, and enhancing cross-sector operations. The efforts by African governments combined with international support to defeat terrorism should ensure the important achievement of ending many wars is not undercut.

In Tunisia, elements of the Al-Qaeda network seek to influence events as well as the democratizing of nations such North Africa- Libya and Egypt by providing guidance, funding and operational assistance to nascent jihadist factions. Ansar al- Sharia, an ISIS affiliate, has been responsible for a large number of terror attacks in Tunisia and is also the main facilitator of ISIS fighters from the country to West Asia.

Most militant attacks in Libya have taken place in the northeast and focused on domestic targets through others, most notably the September 2012 attack on the US consulate in Benghazi as well as attacks directed against diplomatic and humanitarian assets. Since the middle of last year, civilian and Western commercial interests have come under increasing attack. A broad range of groups are capable of carrying out such attacks and militancy in Libya is not solely the province of Islamists such as the State Department-blacklisted Ansar al Sharia collectives. In Sahel, there is a resurgence of al Qaeda, the four terrorist groups that continue to wreak havoc in the region - AQIM, Mokhtar Belmokhtar's al Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine and Macina Liberation Front – have recently decided to combine forces and merge into a single group called *Jama'at Nusrat wal Muslimeen* (Group for support of Islam and Muslims). They have also pledged allegiance to the Al Qaeda leadership.

Terrorism in East Africa is likely to continue disproportionately affecting Somalia and Kenya in the coming months, though neighbouring countries contributing to the African Union Mission in Somalia and Ethiopia also face an elevated threat. Advances against Al Shabaab in Somalia have slowed considerably over the past year as African Union forces become increasingly overstretched. A temporary increase in troop numbers will provide some relief in the short term, but is unlikely to limit Al Shabaab's ability to stage further attacks.

ISIS' plan to establish a caliphate in North Africa was thwarted after it was routed out of Sirte, the last ISIS strong hold, in December 2016 by the Libyan National Army with air support provided by the United States (US). Since 2014, pro ISIS terrorist groups have been active in North Africa, particularly in Tunisia and Libya. In Libya, the instability following the collapse of the Muammar al Gaddafi regime and the presence of numerous indigenous factions as well as the porous borders, provided a fertile ground for the expansion of ISIS in the country. Moreover, Libya's long unmonitored coastline too provided the ISIS with a channel to Europe. Between 2014 and 2016, ISIS expanded its presence in multiple cities in Libya including, Derna, Benghazi and Sirte. While the terror group was driven out of most of the region under its control, there are chances that remnants of the group may reconstitute and again create problems. ISIS is recruiting youth from eastern as well as southern Africa to fight wars in Syria, Tunisia and Libya. In Kenya, coastal Tanzania and Zanzibar, youth from the Muslim communities are vulnerable to the ISIS recruitment drives. Reports suggest that hundreds of youth from South Africa may have joined ISIS. These terrorist outfits are using both internet as well as networks of radical clerics to lure the youth from region.

The main focus is on the terrorist threat, ideology and response as it applies to Kenya, Africa and the World when you consider the aims and operational structure of groups such as Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Before we can speak of counter terrorism, we must grasp the nature and aims of terrorism. When Kenya states that terrorism threatens our existence, it is a profound statement in political, physical and moral terms. It beckons us to not only understand its nature as a tactic and strategy of specific criminal organizations, but also awakens us as citizens alert to the threat to our existence as a Kenyan people living under agreed laws and a valued of a culture of diverse and complementary parts. At the very heart of confronting any criminal or military threat is the adversary's mentality and his system of ideas and ideals. In this case, the terrorist organizations named are characterized by their adherence to the ideology of Salafi-jihadism. Their ultimate aims, motivation, justification and understanding of Kenya and the world are critically informed by this ideology.



Along the way to pursuing these aims they will have shorter term goals and even fellow travellers who intend to get off along the way, that are classically criminal. They seek finances to conduct their operations for which they need the ability to launder money and partake in a range of criminal enterprises. They forge, lie, bribe, assassinate, illegally exploit legal business and charities as well as take oaths they intend to undermine. Like insurgents, they attack uniformed forces and present their arms as legitimate.

In most of the illegal activities described, our response is anchored in the methods of the criminal justice system. We collect intelligence, investigate for evidence and prosecute in courts of law. The bulk of activity by security organizations in Kenya and worldwide is on these very elements of criminality.

So important are these tasks and so demanding, that it is easy to forget that Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda and ISIS are more than criminal organizations. They are carriers of a virulent ideology of exclusion, hatred and oppression. One that is fascist in nature in its celebration of the individual – as a suicide attacker or as a victim who is part of a despised group- being sacrificed on the bloody alter of the group.

They tell us every day that “we love life and they love death” and as a result we must pause to take in this statement, which has as evidence of its truth the hundreds of Kenyans killed by terrorists and the tens and thousands around world. What cause could so powerfully inflame an individual that they would kill non-combatants by the dozens while tearing apart their own flesh in the process?

The cause they tell us is to ensure that a Caliphate of their making rules the world with all other forms of religion and belief violently or voluntarily eliminated. The only difference between ISIS and Al Shabaab is in their timelines with the former seeking an immediate declaration of a caliphate as they have done in Syria and Iraq, while Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda take a long term view.

All these groups speak of carrying out a campaign that starts in Muslim-majority countries and regions then spreading its provinces to countries like Kenya with minority Muslim populations and spreading to the lands originally ruled by the Ottoman Empire before engulfing the world.

A large majority of Muslims disagree with these groups’ *selective literalism* and with the narrow confrontation-seeking interpretations of scripture Salafi Jihadists have and angrily deny the legitimacy of Salafi-Jihadism as a legitimate representative of Islam. It bears repeating that the overwhelming majority of Muslims of these groups are Muslim murdered brutally in their tens of thousands for not adhering to the inhumane puritanical hate-filled religiosity these groups and their supporters embrace.

They announce their cause in many thousands of tweets, hundreds of videos and broadcasts. Those who do not bow to that cause are to be terrorized into submission, have their laws and culture bullied and bribed into changing in time to accord the desired end state.

Kenya has been under constant attack by terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab and ISIS with others also seeking to join them. Their main aim is to:

Destroy African states which are built on democratic and pluralist principles and replace them with the caliphate. Radicalize and recruit African citizens for violent extremist campaigns in Africa and elsewhere.

Destroy the present inter-faith harmony between the Christian majority and the Muslim minority and have conflict and division take its place.

- Destroy faith and confidence in the confidence in the constitutional and bureaucratic underpinnings of the states and utilize the ensuring vacuum to further their ambitions.
- Force Kenya to leave AMISOM under duress, and thus take back control of liberated parts of Somalia.
- Eliminate African states as active regional partners to World trade, security and political actors and in this way sustain a long-term aim to pursue a divide-and-rule strategy.

You can therefore see the nature of the threat as political. It threatens the continuity of nations as republics established under constitutions and laws passed in democratic countries. The threat does not stop there however. The ideology of major terrorist groups contains a powerful apocalyptic element. This ideology envisions the “end days” and entails war in a world that is divided into two giant armies. The first being a large indestructible terrorist group and the other being the non-believers. What this means is if given the means to wreak havoc using weapons of mass destruction, these groups would not hesitate. The death of millions is no moral barrier to their aims and as a result this should be at the forefront of every counter terrorism official, leader and citizen.

The claims and justifications of the terrorists turn our moral world upside down. They make what is wrong right, sin becomes virtue, murder becomes life, corruption becomes innocence, cruelty becomes bravery and savagery becomes service.

There has been no cause with this character since the Hutu Power killers of Rwanda in 1994, the Khmer Rouge of the Cambodian genocide, and the Nazis with their gas chambers and shallow graves for millions. Make no mistake ladies and gentlemen, Al Shabaab, Boko Haram, ISIS and Al Qaeda is by their nature genocidal. Only the means and opportunity stop them from murdering millions and wiping out entire peoples as they have tried with the Yazidis in Iraq and Borno region in Nigeria.

Counter terrorism must go beyond the normal criminal justice approach to the many crimes that terrorist groups commit and consider the ideological and moral claims of the terrorist. Leaders at the global, national and local levels of government as well as those in all other sectors, must internalize the full extent of this threat. This is crucial in order to align all political, bureaucratic, religious and cultural resources to protect civilized life.

So what can Africa do to arrest the situation? Below is a list of specific responses:

- All African nations ought to customize the United Nations counter terrorism strategy according to the specific needs of each country.
- Such strategic plans should include some of the following as key programs to focus on battle of ideas to fight ideology; Governments should use broadcast institutions nationally to fight the war of ideas by discriminating a counter-dawa message, highlighting the work of Muslim reforms and non-Islamist Muslims. If an NGO cannot show verifiable progress in curbing its support for subversive dawa activities, governments should punish that NGO in concrete terms, for example by trade sanctions or cuts in aid payments.
- Diplomacy - As a condition of friendship, the Governments should require foreign governments as well as Islamic NGOs to stop supporting and financing subversive Islamist activities in Africa. Of particular interest are some “philanthropic” foundations.
- States will need to synchronise policies on counter violent extremism as well as the support of AU. States must also discontinue any Jihadist programs supported in certain universities and affected students and lectures rehabilitated.
- Africa should designate some Islamic chapters as foreign terrorist organization for clear connections to terrorism. Governments should implement effective ideological screening of chaplains employed by the



Departments of Justice, Law and Order; the Prisons, the Defence (military chaplains), and the sensitive departments. The Prisons, the security sensitive departments, various state correctional systems, and the Department of Defence must stop relying on the Islamic/Jihadist linked societies for chaplain vetting.

- Immigration- Governments should subject immigrants and refugees to ideological scrutiny, as happened during the Cold War. Individuals requesting temporary entry, permanent residency, or citizenship must be asked about their commitment to Islamism/Jihadist/ Sharia and related concepts such as the death penalty for apostasy and support for sharia law and the subjugation of women. If individuals are found to have lied in their immigration or citizenship applications about their commitment to the constitution by engaging in subversive dawa activities after establishing residency, their residency or citizenship must be revoked. The immigration/ Intelligence/ Police should deny entry to foreign individuals involved with or supportive of Islamism and related groups as well as refuse permanent residency and naturalization to such individuals.
- Nations should implement the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) and consult with experts to maximize its effectiveness. The Nations should prioritize entry to Africa of immigrants who have shown loyalty Africa.
- The African governments should continue conventional military operations against jihadist organizations in order to capture or kill Islamist terrorists, deny them safe heavens, and holster the efforts of our allies against them. The administrations should wage cyber war on organizations engaged in “dawa” as well as those engaged in Jihad.
- Capture /neutralization of core leaders- This, will not only prevent the terrorist groups from organizing, recruiting and launching attacks, it will also deny it support. States should solicit joint operations and supportive operations from neighbouring counties to accomplish this task.
- Improve ideological operations- Ideology remains the core strength of Boko Haram adherents because many of the group’s ideologies are linked to classical Islamic doctrine, which appeal to the wider Muslim population. To counter these ideologies, the government must establish counter-ideological committees to pick on the vulnerability of interpretations by the sect’s leadership.
- Addressing legitimate grievances-A commitment to resolve the crisis would require addressing some of the grievance of those who resort to violent extremism.
- Create greater employment opportunities- As part of creating capacity and local empowerment and as an element of reintegration.
- Dialogue and national reconciliation- A long period of instability has deepened the It-existing religious and ethnic fault-lines.
- Amnesty- Granting of amnesty for those who unconditionally renounce terrorism will be necessary, but this offer should only be made to members who have not been directly involved in the violation of human rights, so that the government will not be seen rewarding the guilty. Amnesty is a programme that weakens insurgent groups by encouraging surrender and defection.

Due to the legal change wrought by SLAA 2014, and policy direction by the national security leadership, the Kenya Government is in a transition to delivering counter terrorist impact on the strategic and policy dimensions of the challenge, particularly in developing tools for the prevention of violent extremism. Fundamental changes have been made in its objectives, priorities, methods and administrative structures. Its main objectives today are:

- Ensure that Kenya’s counter terrorism strategy and policies keep pace with evolving and complex terrorist threats.
- Provide thought leadership and coordination in the development of an effective terrorism prevention approach (‘soft power’) that is a regional and global benchmark.
- Encourage and educate Kenyans – and relevant communal, religious and regional audiences- to reject Jihadi- Salafist ideology and aims.
- Increase the flow of information from the public to security agencies on radicalization and terrorist activity in a structured way that provides rapid and effective response.
- Coordinate the implementation of violent extremist disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration. This includes returning foreign terrorist fighter, in prisons; and in voluntary or court-appointed rehabilitation.
- Build a counter terrorism orientation and responsiveness in GOK ministries, departments and agencies.



- Work with the private sector to harden critical infrastructure and soft targets and thus promote investment, economic growth and resilience.
- Bring discipline, active consultation,
- and strategic awareness to Kenya's foreign partnerships in counter terrorism and CVE.
- The Kenya national strategy for CVE is being customized and implemented at the county or devolved levels of government through county action plans [CAPS] by all stakeholders
- With the focus of galvanizing Kenyans to fight terrorism by creating resilience, to dry the pool of radicalization and winning the minds and hearts of the affected and vulnerable.

## 7. Introduction of Workshop Participants



### *Professor Timothy Gatara- IPSTC Senior Researcher & Workshop Moderator*

Prof. Gatara began by inviting all participants to introduce themselves. Thereafter, he spoke briefly on the history of terrorism. He stated that the question to keep in mind is whether we are mutating just as fast as the problem is. He then referred participants to the massacre that took place in Las Vegas where the experts of the Cable News Network (CNN) mentioned that it was not terrorism but mass killing and raised the following questions:

- Are people born with extremist ideologies or they are taught the same?
- Are the measures being taken correct?
- What is in the environment that encourages this?
- Is there something in society leading to this extremism?

He thereafter invited Professor Kagwanja to make his presentation.

## 8. Workshop Presentations

Speakers made six presentations, which sought to address border security and countering violent extremism. The moderator, Professor Timothy Gataru requested the audience to keenly make observations and note the important issues raised by the presenters, and welcomed the audience to raise substantive issues during the plenary session.

### 8.1 Applied Academic Perspective: Conceptualizing Countering Violent Extremism



#### *Professor Peter Kagwanja – Africa Policy Institute*

He stated that he intended to focus on the middle ground between the academic and policy perspective and went further to mention that if he was to change the title of his presentation he would rename it “*An Understanding of God’s warriors*”. This concept of an understanding of “Gods warriors” was popularised by CNN news anchor Christiane Amanpour who basically explored the role of religion in violent extremism. She identified two mainstream faiths that have been for a long time identified with terrorism and these are Judaism (which has brought about Judo-Christian extremism) and Islam (which is very closely related culturally with Judaism). What has not been discussed at length is the emerging “God’s warriors” in Africa yet this is a new phenomenon. The concept of the warrior tradition has

indeed been discussed at length by the late Al Mazrui who basically talked about the warrior tradition in Africa and went ahead to understand how violence has been used for good or for bad. Violent extremism today is a fast evolving transnational security threat. Perhaps the only existential threat to humanity.

It is therefore necessary to understand what it is essentially and what concepts we’re deploying in order to understand this phenomenon. The concepts of terrorism and radicalization are used conterminously with the concept of violent extremism. However, violent extremism constitutes a complex hybrid of civil wars, insurgencies, separatism, terrorism, political violence and criminality. It is also deeply rooted in the networks of internal, regional and globalized conflict. These concept of violent extremism, terrorism and radicalization do not occur in isolation. They are closely linked to natural disasters, effects of climate change, farming, food insecurity, widespread poverty, underdevelopment and unemployment affecting what we are now calling the youth bulge in Africa. These concepts need to be brought in to play to better understand this particular problem.

Violent extremism is complicated by geo political tensions that have undermined a common approach to global security challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The cooperation seen previously in the world has begun to collapse through the rise of the Trump phenomenon of “America First” as well as Brexit. Violent extremism has continued to undermine the efforts for peace, stability and sustainable development. In other words, violent extremism is now the greatest threat to development as a force that is supposed to liberate humanity from poverty and other extreme experiences. Effectively preventing and countering violent extremism is an urgent agenda. It demands consulted efforts at all cost which have been driven by sound strategies.

In 1996 Samuel Huntington, an American scholar, published a book called “*Clash of Civilization and The Remaking of the New World Order*”. At the time he was dismissed as a war monger and was almost isolated in the academy because of that book. This was because his argument was a response to another argument by Francis Fukuyama who was celebrating the tolerance of liberalism after the fall of communism. Fukuyama was also criticised however Huntington’s criticism of Fukuyama was seen as another extreme. Fukuyama simply stated that communism had collapsed therefore liberalism is the last man standing and so we can all go to sleep and enjoy the rest of our lives because history has ended. This kind thinking was based on, the German Thinker, Fredrick Hego who had earlier said that the end of history has arrived and the world has therefore reached a Utopia after



1989. The point of mentioning this that the clash of civilization was seen to be regional and was therefore not important in thinking hence Huntington was overlooked up until September 11<sup>th</sup> 1991 (9/11). This book defined conflict in terms of the conflict between civilizations and prominently the clash between Islam as a civilization and Liberalism as another western civilization. The clash between Liberalism and Confucianism as far as China and others are concerned. These are the paradigms that have tended to define our world. The UN have highlighted the dialogue of civilizations or the collaboration of civilization as the paradigm that should govern humanity but the underlying paradigms are informed by the thinking of the clash of civilization.

Our challenge has therefore been to look at what aspects of Islam civilization is clashing with liberal civilization and vice versa. What is complicating this clash of civilization is the crisis of international liberal order itself. The rise of Trump and the ideology which he represents in terms of populism is not necessarily liberal but is instead conservative, is undermining liberalism from within. Brexit brings in notions of isolationism which undercut the idea of collaboration globally to confront common pertinent threats to humanity. Now in Africa we have seen the proliferation of “Gods warriors” such as Al Shabaab and Boko Haram. These “God’s warriors” are not Muslim the cut across boards. It is a question of which category of “God’s warriors” is dominant. They are collaborating Christian, Muslim extremists and neo traditional extremists (like Mungiki) which creates a challenge for policy thinkers. How do you differentiate them? How do you characterise this violence that takes numerous lives?

It is important that we understand in a very clearly and precisely and in a very scientific way of what violent extremism is and what it is not. Violent extremism, whether we are talking of preventing or countering, is a new terminology and confusion still lingers on this term. How is it connected to the related concept of terrorism which is older and perhaps better understood, counter terrorism and radicalization. At a basic level, violent extremism has been used synonymously with terrorism and radicalization. It is widely assumed to include other forms of politically motivated and communal violence which is also seen as extremism. In many ways the three terms, that is, violent extremism, terrorism and radicalization are closely interlinked and interdependent. Together the three concepts greatly threaten national and global security in a very interlocking way. However, as an operational concept, violent extremism should be seen as different from terrorism and radicalization. Violent extremism refers to an ideology or a strategy, terrorism refers to the act of deploying violence to achieve a certain goal and radicalization refers to a process (the process through which you create and recruit extremists).

We need an official definition of violent extremism. This official definition is essentially lacking and even the UN has shied away from defining this term because doing this might create a problem. Prevailing definitions therefore lack precision and vigour however they exhibit two tendencies that are important in understanding the phenomenon. The first is a clear focus on violent extremism as a means to an end that highlights more what the concept seeks to achieve than what it actually is. The second is that violent extremism is characterised as the beliefs and actions that sanction, encourage and justify the use of fear and terror and violence to achieve ideological, religious, political and socioeconomic goals. Underlining the idea of beliefs and actions. That forms the interconnection between the security aspect and the religious aspect of violent extremism. Violent extremism refers to two things, it is purely an ideology of violence and it’s primarily a grand strategy by those battling extremism not those exerting it. Countering violent extremism was therefore brought into vocabulary to enable policymakers deal with things that are not necessarily military in nature.

What are our responses to violent extremism? Literature tries to understand what violent extremism is as a strategy. Of course this entails drawing a clear line in knowing what the phenomena means and what the responses are. The first response is counter terrorism which is essentially the use of hard power as opposed to soft power. The argument now is that counter terrorism is no longer important and that is not correct because it is a very important to tackle this issue.

Another way of handling violent extremism is to shift to the use of soft power in response to terrorism and radicalization. This is again a response to the failure of militaristic hard power way to completely wipe out violent

extremism. It is essentially a final resort showing that the problem is not entirely military in nature. It may have military aspects but it is not entirely a military problem.

The third response is risk reduction. Violent extremists are not necessarily active in society. In order to radicalize and recruit the environment within societies must be on enabling them to recruit. Targeting those grievances is important a means of risk reduction. The three responses mentioned above are the policy pillars of a strategy to counter violent extremism.

The strategic shift means that we have moved from hard power as the only response to the threat and incorporated elements of soft power which academia and policy makes are seeking to redefine. One must differentiate them from what has been the case in the past. Until we define who the enemy is, a messy job is inevitable. It is important to be very precise about who the targets of hard power and soft power are. In terms of differentiating this there are two categories. The first is to establish who the owners of the war of violent extremism are. These are the people who control the ideology and infrastructure for radicalization and propagate violent extremism in communities. These owners of war are not repentant. This group must be met with counter terrorism without getting to the point of letting innocent communities suffer. The owners of war must be destroyed through hard power. The concept of the global war on terror must focus on the owners of the war and therefore identify these owners of war without getting into the messy job of victimizing communities and violating their human rights. This requires an intelligence led form of counter terrorism.

The second category is the disenfranchised who must be identified. These are the peoples who have complaints some of which are so trivial but are politicized. This makes them feel like these grievances are a manifestation of marginalization by the state.

This group needs to be the targets of soft power to counter radicalization.  
The core strategic issues therefore are;

- a) Identify the sites of radicalization.
- b) Vulnerability of states. States are vulnerable in different ways and there are three categorisations of states with regards to vulnerability;
  - i. Those in the epicentre of violent extremism e.g. Somalia, Nigeria and Egypt
  - ii. Spill over states(Neighbours e.g. Kenya or Djibouti);
  - iii. Countries at risk (Uganda or Tanzania)

It is important as a strategy to violent extremism, to look into the security- religious nexus in order to understand the link between the religion and violence. It is not just Muslims there is inter faith extremism as well.

Finally, there needs to be a good balance between security and development horizons. To deal with plethora of problems the world is facing we need to focus on development. However, security is essentially a driver of development. Therefore, how can one reconcile the war on countering violent extremism and the trajectory or imperatives of development? This must be looked in to. Policy actions to reduce the threat existing are largely short term. The imperatives of development are however long term and multi-generational so the idea is to ensure that the short term imperatives of security do not undermine the long term imperatives of development because if that is the case both imperatives will have failed.



In conclusion we have four categories of Extremists. This is essential in order to know what is an individual war and what is a war that requires collaboration.

- a) International Terrorist groups e.g. Al Qaeda, ISIS
- b) Affiliates of major International terrorist groups(Syndicates)
- c) Indigenous or Home-Grown Extremists. Someone you know and terrorise the community e.g. Al Mujahidin
- d) Non- Islamist Indigenous Militant Organisations e.g. the Lords Resistant's Army in Uganda.

All these groups require different and targeted approaches by looking into who is doing what. Some strategies we are using are likely to complicate the fight against CVE. There must be division of labour among security forces to properly counter violent extremism. Lastly, we need to look into how to define and deal with returnees. How can the state determine whether these returnees are agents posing as returnees? To avoid incubating criminals pretending to seek amnesty, it is important for intelligence to keenly monitor who is a genuine returnee.

## 8.2 Legal Frameworks: An Assessment of Legal and Operational framework on Border and CVE Counterterrorism Strategies



### *Ms Muthoni Kimani - Attorney General's Chambers*

Kenya is a multi-party democratic state, a member of the United Nations and signatory to several International multilateral treaties, Regional and Bilateral Agreements aimed at combating Terrorism and violent extremism. Kenya has the policies, strategies and domestic Legislation to enable it combat terrorism and counter violent extremism. These laws and policies have been made in compliance with the Constitution Article 2(6) and also taking into account the Rights and freedoms provided under (Article 26, 29, 49 and 50) and meet international standards as per the UN Convention on Civil & Political Rights and the optional Protocol on the Convention Against Torture & other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or treatment.

### 8.2.1 International Conventions & UN Resolutions

Article 2(6) provides that any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya forms part of the Kenya law. Kenya has signed several international instruments on combating terrorism and preventing violent extremism. Kenya is under obligation to implement these international agreements and the President is required under Article 132(iii) to submit a report to Parliament on the progress made in fulfilling the international obligations. Currently there are 19 International Conventions and Protocols which relate to terrorism and countering violent extremism. The key conventions in combating terrorism are the 1977 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the Financial Action task Force (FATF) 2012, 40 recommendations on Anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.

#### 8.2.1.1 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist Bombing Convention)

This convention was adopted to enhance the fight against terrorism by establishing a regime of universal jurisdiction over the unlawful and intentional use of explosives and other lethal devices in, into, or against various defined public places with intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury, or with intent to cause extensive destruction of the public place.



### 8.2.1.2 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention)

The convention requires State parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists, whether direct or indirect and commits States to hold legal persons which finance terrorism civilly or administratively criminally liable for such acts. It also extends criminal liability to individuals and provides for the identification, freezing and seizure of funds allocated for terrorist activities.

### 8.2.1.3 Financial Action Task Force Recommendations (FATF)

Recommendation No. 5 on Terrorism Financing recommends countries to criminalize terrorism and terrorist financing (link between ML, organized crime & Terrorism) and freezing and confiscation of assets used to facilitate or obtained from terrorist activities.

### 8.2.1.4 UNSC Resolutions

The UNSC is established under Chapter III of the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security. The Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) is established under the UNSC and its mandate is to monitor implementation of UN Resolution 1373 (2001). The Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate assists the CTC and also implements the global strategy on counter terrorism and the Plan of Action to prevent violent extremism. UNODC provides technical support to member States.

### 8.2.1.5 Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999)

The Resolution was passed in September 1999 immediately after the US September 11 bombing. It requires States to: freeze the assets of, prevent the entry into or transit through their territories by, and prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer of arms and military equipment to any individual or entity associated with Al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden and/or the Taliban as designated by the 1267 Committee.

### 8.2.1.6 Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)

Requires States to establish domestic frameworks for improved international cooperation against terrorism including by obliging States to criminalize and prosecute acts of terrorism, and to disrupt and prevent the financing of terrorism through:

- Prevention of movement of terrorists by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents.
- Providing for freezing without delay any funds related to persons involved in acts of terrorism
- Denying all forms of financial support to terrorist groups
- Suppressing safe havens or sustenance of support of terrorists
- Sharing information on terrorist groups
- International Co-operation in investigation, detection, arrests, extradition and prosecution
- Criminalization of active and passive assistance for terrorism in domestic law

#### 8.2.1.7 Security Council Resolution 1456 (2003)

This resolution reaffirms that States' measures to combat terrorism must comply with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law. It also emphasizes the importance of the broader context in strengthening the fight against terrorism, including an enhanced dialogue and understanding among civilizations in order to prevent the targeting of different religions and cultures, and the need to address unresolved regional conflicts and the full range of global issues, including development issues.

#### 8.2.1.8 Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

This establishes a framework for States to prevent non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting or transferring nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

#### 8.2.1.9 Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004)

This establishes the working group tasked with considering the possibility of establishing an international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts. The working Group submits recommendations to the Council on practical measures to be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee.

#### 8.2.1.10 Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005)

This resolution addressed the threat posed by incitement to commit acts of terrorism through the internet and social media and calls on States "to prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts" as well as to prevent such acts.

#### 8.2.1.11 Security Council Resolution 2178(2014)

This resolution condemns violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism and the commission of terrorist acts by foreign terrorist fighters. It also demands that all foreign terrorist fighters disarm and cease all terrorist acts and participation in armed conflict. Additionally, it requires States to implement measures that will prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups. These measures include effective border controls, controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents as well as preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents.

#### 8.2.1.12 The UN Sanctions List

CTC established under Security Council Resolution 1267 to monitor implementation of the sanctions regime. The CTC is responsible for the designation of individuals or entities associated with Al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden and/or the Taliban. Individuals and entities so designated are placed on the "Consolidated List".

Member States are required to take the following actions in relation to individuals and entities included on the Consolidated List:

- Freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of designated individuals and entities [assets freeze];
- Prevent the entry into or transit through their territories by designated individuals [travel ban];
- Prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer from their territories or by their nationals outside

their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related material of all types, spare parts, and

- Technical advice, assistance, or training related to military activities, to designated individuals and entities [arms embargo].
- Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1455 (2003), Member States must report to the 1267 Committee on the implementation of the resolutions.

### 8.2.2 Regional framework for Combating Terrorism & CVE These include;

- a) The AU Peace and Security Council
- b) 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism
- c) 2004 Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism
- d) A.U Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism
- e) IGAD Action Plan to Counter Violent Extremism

### 8.2.3 Domestic Legal framework for Combating Terrorism

These include;

- a) *Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA, 2012 & POTA Regulations)*

The Act criminalizes terrorism and related activities. A person who, among other activities, promotes or facilitates the commission of a terrorist act or receives military training for the purpose of carrying out or facilitating the commission of a terrorist act in a foreign State, commits a crime, punishable on conviction by a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison.

The POTA Regulations, 2013 establishes the Inter-Ministerial Committee for implementing UN Resolution for listing & de-listing designated entities and domestic listing. The Committee is also mandated to supervise the implementation of the National Strategy and Action Plan on Counter Financing of Terrorism.

- b) *Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act*
- c) *Prevention of Organized Crime Act Cap 59*

Criminalises organized Crime and aims at enhancing the prevention, investigation, and punishment of organized crimes which include terrorism. The Act also provides for tracing, confiscation, seizure and forfeiture of property belonging to persons suspected of belonging to an organized criminal group.

- d) *Security Laws (Amendment Act), 2014*

Amended 20 existing laws to further strengthen Kenya's legislative framework to fight terrorism & special investigative mechanisms. It laid out the foundation for a coordinated border control agency and strengthened the mandate of National Counter-terrorism Centre. The Act allowed intelligence officers to arrest terrorist suspects as well as provided for prosecution guidance in investigations.

- e) *Mutual Legal Assistance Act, 2011*



- f) Witness Protection Act, 2008*
- g) Prisons Act (Cap 90) and Transfer of Prisoner Act, 2015*
- h) Probation of Offenders Act, (Cap 64) 1944 Pre-trial, pre-bail & pre-sentence & after care services*
- i) Prevention of Torture Act, 2017*
- j) Extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Act 1968*
- k) Extradition (Contiguous and Foreign Countries) Act, 1966*
- l) Cyber & Computer Crimes Bill*

#### 8.2.4 Institutional and Operational Framework

These include;

- a) National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC)
- b) Kenya Defence Forces
- c) National Intelligence Service
- d) National Police Service
- e) Director of Public Prosecution
- f) Office of the Attorney General
- g) Financial Reporting Centre
- h) Asset Recovery Agency
- i) Department of Immigration Services
- j) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- k) Ministry of Interior & Coordination of National Government
- l) Judiciary

In conclusion we have the requisite legal & institutional framework comprising of law enforcement and other institutions for implementing CVE Counterterrorism strategies- There is however a need to strengthen co-ordination & co-operation as well as continuous vetting of staff involved in counter terrorism and ensure continuous review of terrorist activities & emergent issues.

### 8.3 National CVE Strategy: An Overview of the National CVE Strategy



***Mr Tom Adalla – Head of Strategy, National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)***

NCTC is a multi-agency instrument primarily of security agencies intended to provide a coordinating mechanism for counter terrorism. It was created in 2004 by a Cabinet decision to coordinate counterterrorism and established in law by the Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014. By law, the National Security Council appoints the NCTC Director and decides on adding to its multi-agency character. It is located in the Executive Office of the President and is headquartered in Karen-Nairobi.

The legal mandate of the NCTC is to;

- a) Coordinate National Counterterrorism/CVE efforts.
- b) Establish a Counter Terrorism Database to assist Law Enforcement Agencies.
- c) Conduct Public Awareness on Prevention of terrorism.
- d) Develop Strategies such as counter and de-radicalisation.
- e) Facilitate Capacity Building in CT/CVE and Prevention.
- f) Co-ordinate with other Government Agencies to provide security certifications for Aviation Schools.
- g) Be a coordinating centre for policy/strategy, Legislative development, across-government CVE efforts, SOPs, new approaches, joint training, counter-messaging, identifying, developing & driving adaptation of new CT/CVE tools.
- h) Ensure coordinated government communications on terrorism.
- i) Engage the media on CVE.
- j) Coordinate private sector and government CVE collaboration at scale.
- k) Sustain public support for CVE.
- l) Coordinate prevention and counter radicalisation.
- m) Be a focal point for government CVE initiatives with foreign partners.

Kenya is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, & multi-cultural democracy in a region in which violent extremism threatens security and stability. Kenyan citizens, economy & the state have been subjected to violent attacks by terrorist groups with a regional and global character. Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda & ISIS all have hostile aims & operational ambitions threatening Kenya. Terrorist actors seek to undermine Kenya's economic development, inter-faith harmony, social cohesion, and political stability. Main threat is from Al Shabaab demands three things, withdrawal from Somalia, claiming North Eastern Frontier and aspirations for an East African Caliphate.

The NCTC developed the strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE). It also developed the Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism-Counties Action Plan (P/CVE-CAP). The County action plan started off in Kwale, Kilifi etc. and the centre basically gave all counties a template for them to customize to their needs. Risk assessment tools provided by the Centre also help those dealing with returnees for them to know how to deal with them before rehabilitation. The Centre also came up with a Returnee Disengagement & Rehabilitation framework (innovated RADAR-Risk Assessment and Decision Making Response tool). The strategy is aimed at centralising the County Security & Intelligence Committees as primary government implementers of CVE. It is also aimed at collaborating with credible & capable non-state actors as well as dovetailing Kenya's policies with UN/AU/IGAD/EAC CT/CVE policies (e.g. the UNSG's Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism).

To successfully make the journey to the Strategic End State, we need certain qualities or attributes as institutions, networks, communities, and as a country. The NCTC's theory of change is that an evidence-based counter-terrorism and de-radicalization efforts that are collaborative, accountable, and sensitive to the risks and mandates of national and human security, and focused on engaging and empowering the public will sharply reduce and eventually end radicalization and recruitment into terrorist and violent extremist groups. This assumption is central to our collective work, which is arranged in Strategic Approaches and Work Pillars, and is how we will achieve the Must Have Qualities. The strategic outcomes sought by this work, in its operational and strategic dimensions, will be continuously measured in terms of monitoring and evaluation as a means to judge Kenya's progress in fulfilling progress to the Strategic End State. The NCTC is guided by an Implementation Plan which has a set of national goal and strategic objectives. The national goal is to rally all sectors of Kenyan social, religious and economic life to emphatically & continuously reject VE ideologies & aims in order to shrink the pool of individuals that terrorist groups seek to radicalize & recruit. The strategic objectives are as follows;

- a) At the individual, communal & national levels, disrupt the reach & appeal of extremist ideologies.
- b) Ensure that elected leaders, policymakers & staff in national & county governments undertake efforts to change socio-economic conditions that provide breeding grounds for radicalization.
- c) Harness and promote a dedicated community of practice in P/CVE composed of all stakeholders.

Lastly, the following are the National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism pillars;

- a) Psychosocial - It is important to address the psychosocial needs of individuals who have been radicalised and even joined violent extremist groups.
- b) Education - The aim is to address radicalisation in learning institutions, and to offer the vocational and educational opportunities.
- c) Political - Engaging political leaders at the local, county, and national levels, and ensuring that the work of prevention has clear political support and narratives.
- d) Security - To ensure that radicalisation is met with the full force of law, and that violent extremists are not able to intimidate.
- e) Faith Based and Ideological - The aim of this pillar is to 'immunise' the Kenyan population to violent extremist ideologies.
- f) Training and Capacity Building includes the crucial goal of vocational and job training for the youth, citizens at risk of radicalisation.
- g) Arts and Culture Pillar - The focus is on protecting and promoting the diverse cultural and social heritage at the county level.
- h) The Legal & Policy Pillar and the Media & Online Pillar.



## 8.4 Border Security and CVE in Kenya: Strategies, Challenges and Opportunities



### *Ibrahim Jillo – Director of Training and Reforms, Administration Police*

One working definition of countering violent extremism is “the use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives.”

CVE components includes:

- Intervening in an individual’s path toward violent extremism,
- Interdicting in criminal activity
- Reintegrating those convicted of criminal activity into society

CVE and terrorism run side by side. The fears that terrorism is becoming the substitute for the great wars of the 1800s and early 1900s coupled with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction does not mean that most terrorist groups are likely to use them in the foreseeable future, but some almost certainly will, in spite of all the reasons militating against it. CVE strategies must be looked in sync with terrorism and its components of motive and application which range from; drawing public attention, killing indiscriminately on a massive scale, radical Islamic terrorism, apocalyptic terrorism, terrorists on the brink among other factors.

Historically, terror and extremism have been used in a wide array of issues ranging from religion, political, class, race, ethnic, colour, and culture among others. Meaning that there are religious, political, class, race and cultural extremists. All these extremists are always driven by certain beliefs, ideologies and/or interests. In assessing drivers of and pathways to radicalization, the line between extremism and terrorism is often blurred. Terrorist groups very often draw upon ideologies which have been developed, disseminated and popularized by extremist organizations that appear to be non-violent.

The Administration Police Service (APS) given the above definition of CVE, is involved in interdiction of criminal activities and to some extent intervening in an individual’s path toward violent extremism. This is mainly done in delivery of the APS mandate/functions in its day to day activities as well as through specialized Units such as the Rural Border Patrol Unit (RBPU) and the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU). Through Community Engagement commonly referred to as Community Policing, the APS is able to gather information from the Community and also share information with the Community hence the ability to trace and intervene on violent extremism cases.

The current threat level to Kenya from terrorism is severe. This means that an attack is highly likely and could occur without warning at any time. The most significant terrorist threat we face comes from Al-Shabaab, its affiliates and like-minded terrorist organizations inspired by violent Islamism. The issue of lone wolves is an emerging trend that also needs to be addressed. The threat from violent Islamist terrorism has continued to diversify. More regional terrorist groups have a global agenda and aspire to attack targets here in Kenya and in other countries.

All terrorist groups need to radicalize and recruit people to their cause. How, where and to what extent they try to do so will vary. Some groups do not seek to expand their membership beyond a small number of people while others aspire to be mass movements and to transition from being terrorists to insurgents, with the aim of using armed conflict to overthrow recognized governments e.g. Al Qaeda. They aspire to radicalize and recruit people in large numbers, in this country and elsewhere, to be part of an international network with an international agenda. Al Qaeda and its allies believe that terrorism around the world against military and civilian targets is a legitimate means to this end. The Al-Shabaab in our case have regionalized the agenda with a myriad of reasons ranging from withdrawing the KDF from Somalia, occupying the North Eastern Frontier, non-alliance to the USA and the Western Culture among others.

Al Qaeda and related groups (especially the Al-Shabaab) pose the greatest current threat to the country and our interests overseas and because they seek recruitment and radicalization on a significant scale. Prevent work has been directed to controlling their activities through border control/patrol, counter-insurgency, elimination of cells and their funding, cooperation with local administration and leaders to identify perpetrators of terrorism and radicalization. A small percentage among all faith groups support violence as a way of dealing with injustice or in the name of religion or even support terrorism here and overseas. The aspirations of Al Qaeda and like-minded groups like the Al-Shabaab in this country have not been realized. However, approval of violent extremism is higher amongst young people and for people from lower income and socio-economic groups.

Radicalization occurs as people search for identity, meaning and community thus can find in terrorism a “value system”, a community as well as a “just cause”. Social movements and social networks indicate that radicalization is a social process particularly prevalent in small groups. Radicalization is about ‘who you know’. Group bonding, peer pressure and indoctrination are necessary to encourage the view that violence is a legitimate response to perceived injustice. Radicalization in this country is being driven by an ideology that sets Muslim against non-Muslim.

Support for all kinds of violent extremism is more prevalent not only among the young but among lower socio-economic and income groups. It is significantly associated with a perception of discrimination and the experience of racial or religious harassment. It is also associated with a negative view of policing. It is also closely associated with a lack of trust in democratic government and with an aspiration to defend Muslims when they appear to be under attack or unjustly treated.

Strategies to tackle this issue are organized around four work streams, each comprising a number of key objectives;

- **Pursue - To stop terrorist attacks**

The purpose of pursuing is to stop terrorist attacks in this country and against our interest overseas. This means detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible stage, disrupting terrorist activity before it can endanger the public and, wherever possible, prosecuting those responsible. It involves continuous assessment of our counter-terrorism powers and ensure they are both effective and proportionate. It also entails improving our ability to prosecute people for terrorist-related offences and the need to increase our capabilities to detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist threats. Ensuring that judicial proceedings in this country can better handle sensitive and secret material to serve the interests of both justice and national security is also crucial with regards to pursuing violent extremism. We must work with other countries and multilateral organizations to enable us to better tackle the threats we face at their source as well as maintain close dialogue between the police, security and intelligence agencies is the basis of successful counter-terrorism work.

- **Prevent - To stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism**

Prevention entails establishing a stronger sense of common ground and shared values, which enables participation and the empowerment of all communities as well as provides social mobility. This brings about the need to work with a wide range of sectors (such as education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the media and health) where there are risks of radicalization which we need to address. The APS’ purpose is to reach the much smaller number of people who are vulnerable to radicalization. We must mobilize and empower communities not give the impression that they need to be convinced terrorism is wrong.

Success in Prevention will mean that:

- a) There is a reduction in support for terrorism of all kinds in this country and in states overseas whose security mostly impacts on our own.
- b) There is more effective challenge to those extremists whose views are shared by terrorist organizations and used by terrorists to legitimize violence; and
- c) There is more challenge to and isolation of extremists and terrorists operating on the internet.



- **Protect - To strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack**

The purpose of protection is to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack in Kenya or against our interests regionally/overseas and so reduce our vulnerability. Significant progress has been made with on Protection related work in the past few years, notably in securing our borders, the Critical National Infrastructure, in assessing and managing down the risks to crowded places and in safeguarding hazardous materials which may be used by terrorists in an attack. More resources need to be devoted to border security, improving both the technology for identifying who enters and leaves this country and the coordination of our law enforcement response. Protection endeavours are necessary to strengthen the Kenyan border security and reduce the vulnerability of the transport network (especially public transport buses and planes). This is also important to increase the resilience of the Kenya's infrastructure as well as improve protective security for crowded places.

- **Prepare - To mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack.**

The purpose of preparing work is to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where that attack cannot be stopped. This includes work to bring a terrorist attack to an end and to increase our resilience so that we can recover from its aftermath. An effective and efficient response will save lives, reduce harm and aid recovery. We believe that it is right to build resilience in a coordinated way to all kinds of threats and hazards. This 'generic' approach makes best use of our resources and avoids needless duplication.

The Strategic Security lay emphasis on the need to tackle the root causes of instability. It should also address the immediate threat of attacks and the long term factors which enable terrorist groups to grow and flourish as well as the need to embrace multi-agency approach. The APS strategy is proportionate to the risks we face and only engage in activity which is necessary to address those risks.

With regards to opportunities, tackling CVE will produce a community that finds terrorism and violent extremism repugnant. It will also foster a government that is willing to fund efforts to curb terrorism and violent extremism. Furthermore, it will produce security agents who are willing to take risks to fight terrorism and curb violent extremism repugnant as well as a friendly international community who are willing to support our endeavours in fighting terrorism and countering violent extremism repugnant.

There are a number of challenges. These include:

- Lack of a clear definition of what CVE is and what it entails.
- Terrorists continue to obtain resources through buying, stealing or sponsorship.
- The use of unforeseen weapons such as the use of motor vehicles to cause mass killing.
- Marginalization of boarder communities which leads to the creation of avenues for radicalization.
- Force to space ratios where security agents are fewer in number than a target population and this is worsened by the constant innovation in technology.
- Disastrous compartmentalization of intelligence and police services hence lack of coordination and information sharing.
- Lack of communication between security agencies.
- Overdose of zeal in how security agents react leaving an unpleasant impression of discrimination and abuse of human rights.



The following are recommendations to efficiently tackle CVE:

- Conforming to an agreed definition of what Violent Extremism is and what CVE entails.
- Need to legislate what terrorism is and what violent extremism pertains.
- Technical fixes in terms of raising the capability of security agents to prevent arms proliferation and counter violent extremism.
- Empowering marginalised communities and ensuring equitable distribution of resources.
- Improve level of national disaster management and increase preparedness in dealing with CVE.
- De-compartmentalization and training
- Improved (good) intelligence

In conclusion, we need to look at terrorist capabilities in terms of indoctrination to violent extremism, executing violence and causing massive casualties. We also need to look at their reasoning in terms of their (terrorist) motives and application of violence. Lastly, we need to be able to predict all these, that is, capabilities, motives and application. Opinion-leaders/Policy Makers ought to discern between the likely, the feasible, the unlikely, and the horror story (violent extremism).

## 8.5 Countering Violent Extremism Practitioners Perspective

### 8.5.1 Translating the National CVE Strategy into Practical reality



***Prof Hamadi Iddi Boga - Vice Chancellor (Ag.) Taita Taveta University***

Kenya has struggled with the problem of radicalisation and violent extremism since 1980. Major headline grabbing incidents include:

- a) The Norfolk Hotel Attack 1980 (External)
- b) The US Embassy Bombing 7 August 1998 (External and Internal)
- c) Kikambala Paradise Hotel Bombing 2002
- d) Westgate Attack ((21st September 2013)
- e) Garissa University College attack (5th April 2015) (180 Dead)
- f) Mpeketoni attacks (15th to 17th June 2014, ongoing)  
(police stations, Township, Pandanguo etc)
- g) Mandera attacks (Bus, Quarry) (22nd November 2014, 21st Dec 2015)

Increasingly terrorism in Kenya has taken a domestic face. Foreign fly in operatives have been replaced by local actors connected to the global enterprise but acting locally and there is an increasing number of local youth radicalised and inducted into violent extremism. Many have travelled to Somalia and returned (returnees, defectors). Hotspots of violent extremism in Kenya include: Kwale, Mombasa, Lamu, Garissa, Isiolo, Mandera and Nairobi. Further localization along the coast include; Kwale (Bongwe, Mbuani, Ukunda), Mombasa (Shikaadabu, Majengo, Kisauni), Lamu (Kiunga, Dar es Salaam point), Kilifi (Kikambala, Malindi, Mamburui), Nairobi (Eastleigh, Majengo).

The evolution of strategies against violent extremism has taken place in three stages, the global war on terrorism, the counter terror strategy and the CVE strategy. The global war on terrorism strategy involved;

- Renditions
- Torture
- Enforced disappearances
- Extra judicial Killings
- War (Afghanistan/Iraq)
- Jailing Abu Ghreib and Guantanamo which fuelled more terrorism)

The counter terrorism strategy involved;

- Preventing individuals from engaging in terrorism;
- Detecting the activities of individuals and organizations who may pose a terrorist threat;
- Denying terrorists, the means and opportunity to carry out their activities; and
- Responding proportionately, rapidly and in an organized manner to terrorist activities and mitigate their effects.

#### **8.5.1.1 The UN Proposals on CVE Interventions**

The international community has sought to address violent extremism primarily within the context of security-based counter-terrorism measures. These measures were adopted in response to the threat posed by Al-Qaida and its affiliated groups. There is a growing international consensus that such counter-terrorism measures have not been sufficient to prevent the spread of violent extremism. “Violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism”, requires collective efforts, “including preventing radicalization, recruitment and mobilization of individuals into terrorist groups and becoming foreign terrorist fighters”. Member States are required to enhance efforts to counter this kind of violent extremism”, recognizing that “international cooperation and any measures taken by Member States to prevent and combat terrorism must comply fully with the Charter of the United Nations.”

#### **8.5.1.2 Addressing the Issue of Ideology**

Universities, researches as well as Muslim scholars need to study the teachings on Aboud Rogo, a notorious radicalizer, and develop a strong counter narrative. There is also need to clarify misconceptions about Islam to ensure that innocent Muslims are not unfairly prejudiced creating a further rift in tackling the problem.

Non-Muslim and the general Muslim public do not understand the issues around VE which poses a problem. Introduction of sensitization on CVE in school activities is therefore a helpful strategy to fix this disconnect.

With regards to the mosque and Imams, the following can be done:

- Require formal registration of mosques
- Capacity Building and Training of Mosque Committees
- Strengthen Waki Commissioners of Kenya to support Imams across the country
- Develop a criterion for qualifying an Imam and a requirement for registration
- Set Minimum requirements for madrassa Teachers



- Pedagogy Training for Madrassa teachers
- Adopt a madrassa curriculum (Wahabbi or Tariqa)
- Develop an Awareness and sensitization programs for Imams and Ustadha
- Sensitization of local imams on risk mitigation
- Support from non-local imams

In conclusion, everyone is called upon to be a Jihadist for a just, peaceful, tolerant, inclusive and prosperous society. We must take back Jihad so that we can mobilize Muslim Communities in the Jihad against violence and extremism State actors must support Muslims and communities involved in this Jihad and work with them.

## 8.5.2 Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons Learnt



***Hussein Khalid - Executive Director, HAKI AFRICA***

HAKI Africa is a human rights organisation working to promote and protect civil liberties and fundamental freedoms as enshrined in the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Its main operations are on human rights and security and promoting the inter link between the two by enhancing a human rights based approach to security. The organisation has worked with other stakeholders including the NCTC in developing the Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MCAP-PCVE)

Kenya ranks 12 in the Global terrorism index and no other Sub Saharan country has been more victim to terrorism than Kenya.

### 8.5.2.1 National and Local Efforts to Fight Terrorism

These efforts include:

- Setting up of agencies such as ATPU and NCTC to address terrorism
- Operation Linda Nchi
- The National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism (NSCVE)
- International support to Kenya in combatting terrorism
- CVE programs by various civil society organisations
- County strategies for countering violent extremism

### 8.5.2.2 Lessons learnt

- Terrorism is not synonymous with any religion. In simple terms, not every Muslim is a terrorist and not all terrorists are Muslims.
- Terrorism affects all people and not only those who do not proclaim the Muslim faith. Contrary to popular belief, it affects Muslims the most as is the case in the Gulf States.
- There are two sides of terrorism: anti-terrorism and counter terrorism/violent extremism (referred to by others as hard and soft approaches).
- In countering violent extremism, community approach (partnership) is the best approach.

- e) To counter violent extremism, partnership with government and government entities such as NCTC is vital.
- f) In countering violent extremism, local actors, particularly religious leaders, civil society and academicians are crucial and necessary. Dissenting voices should be heard.
- g) Research and documentation of practices and experiences are vital when it comes to countering violent extremism in order to identify what works at what time and where.
- h) Extra judicial killings and enforced disappearances of terror suspects exacerbates radicalisation and violent extremism.
- i) Networking with international actors to learn and share new methodologies and approaches in a free and democratic society that with good governance, human rights and rule of law promotes resilience against violent extremism is important.

In conclusion CVE remains an evolving ideological phenomenon. Local communities need to be allocated adequate resources to address violent extremism in their midst. Community approaches sometimes work best to counter violent extremism if coupled with partnership across all levels (state/non state, local/international, modern/traditional).



## 9. Summary of Plenary Session



After the presentations by the various speakers, Professor Gatara invited participants to provide feedback and air their various views on how to tackle violent extremism. Some of the issues raised included:

- There is need for legislation to provide for a detailed definition of what violent extremism and terrorism is, what it entails as well as an elaborate description of what CVE encompasses.
- Local communities should be allowed time to address VE in their midst and should also be involved in the coming up with strategies to tackle it head on. Community approaches sometimes work best to counter violent extremism.
- Some of the solutions for dealing with CVE lie in the education sector. The UNESCO development

Guide called the “Teachers Guide on Preventing Violent Extremism” gives examples of schools and community engagement and explains the role of family and media in tackling extremism. It also gives practical examples and activities they can undertake when faced with the threat of violent extremism. We need to recognize and transform the minds of easy targets of radicalization through education. Essentially, focusing mainly on the youth has not been an easy task therefore the focus needs to shift to earlier ages, as early as class four and class three to impart proper values. Starting these conversations at an early age will make it easier to engage with them when they are older on such sensitive issues.

- As much as we are focusing on terrorism, IPSTC should not forget the aspect of traditional conflict in Kenya.
- When coming up with elaborate definitions for CVE and terrorism we should remember that these concepts have been borrowed from different environments and therefore it is very important to contextualize these concepts so that they resonate with the situations we face as a country in so far as CVE is concerned. We need to be able to understand how to use these concepts and the environment in which they are to be used.
- There is need for all stakeholders to collaborate and work together, however, in order to work together certain standards of engagement must be set. This is because there needs to be strong element of trust to foster good partnership.
- Though the development and use of County Action Plans have proved extremely useful, their implementation still poses a challenge. This is seen in instance where state and non-state actors begin to work seamlessly with a specific county official to implement an action plan and the official is suddenly transferred to a different county during the process of implementation. This poses a great problem especially where the County Action Plan states that the County Commissioner is the convener of CVE.
- The background of violent extremism seems to vary and this loophole can essentially work against tackling this problem. Within the background stated in the papers presented there are some significant Islamic history and in some contexts, they might be wrong. The IPSTC should therefore come up with a proper background that is acceptable with all aspects of Islam (e.g. conservative and moderate) and not one that looks like the government is waging war on Islam.
- There is the issue of group grievances as being a factor fueling violent extremism. Especially in the sense of historical injustices vis a vie the disconnect between the County Government and the National Government. For CVE to be properly implemented there must be a way created in which the County Government administration will embrace and tackle it holistically, given the genesis is political and being politicians some official tend to simply capitalize on these grievances without any follow through.



- There is a strain between communities affected by violent extremism and security forces. Dialogues with these communities show that security personnel cannot be trusted and this does not strengthen partnerships.

- There should be a focus on all affected communities not only those that are known to be affected directly i.e. those of Muslim faith. Given that violent extremism is based on ideologies, the IPSTC needs to look into what exactly motivates these ideologies to begin with in order to dig deeper and understand why these ideologies exist.

- It was noted that there seems to be a focus only on the coastal and Muslim dominated areas as hot spots for radicalization and violent extremism

however the radicalizers are looking elsewhere and changing tactics. It is useful for the IPSTC to pay close attention to these new budding areas.

- Non-governmental Organizations often struggle with the issue of starting off very good projects in the area of CVE then suddenly donors withdraw leaving these organizations without funding. This habit makes programs that could have had a great impact on handling violent extremism end even before they begin. IPSTC was requested to look into ways to sustain good practices so that these NGO's have funding to completion with regards to their intervention efforts.
- There is need to investigate and undertake extensive research on the role of women in violent extremism. It is largely assumed that violent extremism and terrorism are male dominated. Research however shows that there is a very active involvement of girls and women in violent extremism.
- Amnesty for returnees requires proper regulation and legislation to aid counties to know how to appropriately deal with them.
- The IPSTC should ensure that security forces, specifically the police, are included in programs and workshops on CVE to build their capacity and to train them on ways to build trust between them and the communities they work in.

Prof. Gatara summarised the issues discussed during plenary and gave the audience feedback on the steps that the centre would take in reviewing the suggestions made by the discussants and the audience.

Prof. Gatara then invited Ms. Amanda K. Serumaga, the UNDP Country Director, to give her closing remarks.



## 10. Closing Remarks

### 10.1 Amanda K Serumaga - UNDP Country Director



Madam Amanda Serumaga began by congratulating all the participants for their invaluable support towards making the workshop a success and more so the discussants that helped the Centre communicate and consolidate its ideas. She also invited the audience to have a look at the research recently done by the UNDP from Mali to Lake Chad to the horn of Africa. She added that even if what had been discussed during the workshop was context specific a lot can be drawn from the experiences across the continent. The stark reality is that 33,300 people have lost their lives to violent extremism since 2011 and one of the interesting things, which is a question posed by one of the participants, is what is the tipping point in journey to violent extremism? She stated that some of the findings that UNDP had gathered were that essentially 71% of the people who have tipped into violent

extremism sight a specific government action i.e. extra judicial killing of a family member tipped them over into violent extremism. The majority of the recruits come from boarder lines or peripheral areas that have suffered generations of marginalization. She stated that voluntary recruits tend to report no parental involvement in the lives of their children which leads to the point about education. 16% of recruits have two or fewer years of education whereas 39% have five to ten years of education. She added that more than half of voluntary recruits site religious reasons for joining and extremist group however 57% of them admit that they either don not read or have very little or no understanding of those religious texts and interpretations. 55% of the recruits, express moderate to severe economic conditions and employment is most frequently sighted at the time of joining.

She raised these issues because when we look at the journey to violent extremism there has always been an urge to have a security response to violent extremism. Having spoken to the youth and people from the horn of Africa and so on, it is clear that there is a need for a development response as well to violent extremism to truncate, mitigate and disrupt the journey from marginalization to violent extremism. She reiterated that 85% of voluntary recruits believed that the government looks after its own interests over small groups and 75% of them place no trust in politicians, in the state or in the security apparatus. She therefore stated that there is need to interrogate and investigate how that perception of their relationship with the state and the relationship within their community can be made a better experience.

She mentioned that the UNDP hoped to share the specific research and specific findings from Kenya. She stated that UNDP was very proud to be supporting the peace building and disaster management and prevention of violent extremist efforts in Kenya and in partnership with key stakeholder such as IPSTC. She added that the partnership between IPSTC and UNDP was initiated in 2009 under the Peace Support Operations Training and Capacity Enhancement Project. The partnership has been very successful and to date it has seen programs valued at over nine million USD implemented. The programming which initially focused in undertaking research and training of military, police and civilians resulted in increased knowledge in the thematic areas of peace operations, conflict prevention and conflict management. The program has recently expanded to include CVE, PVE and disaster management. Under the current project which is titled “*Enhancing Security and Response to the Rise of Violent Extremism in Kenya*” she mentioned that UNDP together with IPSTC with the generous support of the government of Japan aimed to support the country to achieve security, stability and resilience with a particular focus on communities bordering Somalia, Ethiopia, the coast like and the Lake Victoria region. The project which builds on the achievements and lessons learnt in the 2016 project, which was also supported by the government of Japan with about a million USD. The specific outcomes envisioned for the project include; research project which are core, training of 230 government officials on border security, CVE and disaster management and knowledge sharing in the regional context.

She was pleased to note that already significant progress has been made in achieving these objectives. The progress includes making a research agenda, training of 38 officers in disaster management, education and early warning and training managers of disaster response. She added that the project had entailed applied research which we have heard about, particularly, looking into an assessment of maritime insecurity along the Kenya maritime domain. She stated that the UNDP was hopeful that these achievements will contribute to the growing body of knowledge that the participants had put together in term of the research that was done. She also hoped that this would enhance collaboration between organizations, institutions and partners within the region. This outcome combined with others delivered on the project will contribute to Kenya's ability to prevent and mitigate violent extremists. Finally, she stated that the UNDP looked forward to continued collaboration with IPSTC in the coming years and continue to leverage the results between this and previous projects. UNDP remains eager to support process of combating violent extremism and improving disaster management in Kenya as well as strengthening institutions in both National and county level.

## **10.2 Brigadier Patrick Nderitu - Director, IPSTC**

The Director begun by thanking Madam Serumaga for her kind words about IPSTC. He stated that it was indeed an honour to have hosted all the participants at the IPSTC for this workshop. He was delighted that many distinguished scholars and practitioners including peace and security agencies have shared their knowledge in the area of violent extremism in the region that will inform training in IPSTC, national regional and security policies and strategies which include legal and operational framework in CVE. Brig Nderitu mentioned that he was greatly humbled by the depth and content that the presenters and participants candidly handled various issues that surrounded the shaping and the development of a strategy on CVE and boarder security for training and operations of CVE stakeholders in the region. The discussions have come up with recommendations that security stakeholders need to review the following among others:

- Rethinking the definition of CVE
- Assessing the responses of different actors to CVE in response to regional threats.
- Strengthening partnerships at all levels
- Strengthening the capabilities of regional organizations and institutions to meet their role of tackling violent extremism

He took the opportunity to sincerely thank all the sponsors, UNDP and Japan for making the workshop possible and a success. He encouraged participants to have look at the IPSTC website to see the products the institution offers with regards to peace and support missions. He then declared the CVE workshop officially closed.



## Attendance List

S/No	Rank/ Title	Names	Gender M/F	Organization	Nationality
	Brig	Patrick M Nderitu	M	International Peace Support Training Centre	Kenyan
	Ms.	Amanda Serumaga	F	United Nations Development Programme	
	Cmdr	Masaki Nakagome	M	Embassy of Japan	Japanese
	Mr.	Sel Hashimoto	M	Embassy of Japan	Japanese
	Brig	Simon Wachira	M	National Counter Terrorism Centre	Kenyan
	Col	Joyce C Sitienei	F	International Peace Support Training Centre	Kenyan
	Col	Evans O Oguga	M	International Peace Support Training Centre	Kenyan
	Col	David N Ngare	M	Kenya Defence Forces	Kenyan
	Col	S M Kasura	M	Kenya Defence Forces	Kenyan
	Col	Gideon Mbithi	M	Kenya Defence Forces	Kenyan
	Mr.	Benjamin Gachichio	M	National Counter Terrorism Centre	Kenyan
	Ms.	Muthoni Kimani	F	Attorney General's Chambers - Kenya	Kenyan
	Prof	Peter Kagwanja	M	Africa Policy Institute	Kenyan
	Lt Col	Kang'ethe Githae	M		Kenyan
	Ms.	Cindy Koyier	F		Kenyan
	Mr.	Dominic Pkalya	M	Peace Building & Conflict Transformation at ACT	Kenyan
	Dr.	Kimani M.J	M	Consultant	Kenyan
	Ms.	Marie-Astrid Blondiaux	F		Belgian
	Ms.	Linda Ngesa	F		Kenyan
	Dr.	Philip Mwanika	M	International Committee of the Red Cross	Kenyan
	Col	Nduwimana Donatien	M	International Peace Support Training Centre	Burundian
	Dr.	Eunice Njambi	F	International Peace Support Training Centre	Kenyan
	Prof	Hamadi Iddi Boga	M	Taita Taveta University	Kenyan
	Prof	Khamis J Mwakimako	M	Pwani University	Kenyan
	Dr.	Othman Mjahid Bwana	M	Center for Sustainable Conflict Resolution (CSCR)	Kenyan
	Mr.	Athumani Mohamed	M	The Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya - Mombasa	Kenyan
	Mrs.	Betty Sidi Mohamed	F	Huria	Kenyan
	CIP	John Amadadi	M	Administration Police - Border Patrol School	Kenyan

	IP	Nicholas Ndaisi	M	Administration Police - Border Patrol School	Kenyan
	Ms.	Lilian Wamuyu	F	CVE Consultant	Kenyan
	Ms.	Joan Onyango-Obunga	F	Kenya Law Reports Commission	Kenyan
	CP	Ibrahim Jillo	M	Commissioner of Police (CP) - Director Training	Kenyan
	SP	Masisi Kiilu	M	National Police Service - Staff Officer Training	Kenyan
	Mr.	Tom Adalla	M	National Counter Terrorism Centre	Kenyan
	Ms.	Jacqueline Njeru	F	Kenya National Commission for UNESCO	Kenyan
	Dr.	Joseph Nasongo	M	National Cohesion & Integration Commission	Kenyan
	Mr.	Joseph Mbugua	M	International Peace Support Training Centre	Kenyan
	Mr.	Paul Chege Rukanga	M		Kenyan
	Ms.	Aisha Salim	F	HAKI AFRICA	Kenyan
	Mr.	Hussein Khalid	M	HAKI AFRICA	Kenyan
	Ms.	Nicolle Ndamu	F		Kenyan
	Mr.	Watson Karuma	M	International Peace Support Training Centre	Kenyan
	Prof	Timothy Gatara	M	International Peace Support Training Centre	Kenyan
	Ms.	Catherine Njeru	F	International Peace Support Training Centre	Kenyan
	Maj	Geoffrey Misiani	M	International Peace Support Training Centre	Kenyan





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