

CARANA



TRAINING SCENARIO



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The Carana **Base Scenario Package** is intended to provide a foundation for scenario-based training conducted by participant organizations within the African Stand-By Force (ASF).

This Executive Summary is intended to introduce the package to users of the **Base Scenario Package**. It provides a summary of key information contained in the package, together with guidance on the correct use of the package in scenario-based training activities. It does not comprise a part of the Carana scenario itself, but is intended primarily for “real world” use, including exercise planning staffs, VIPs and visitors. **For a detailed understanding of the Carana Scenario, the Executive Summary should be read in conjunction with other package components, in particular the Kisiwa Regional Overview and the Carana Country Book.**

For easy reference, this *Executive Summary* also includes a Chronology of Major Events, (Annex A) and a Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations (Annex B).

BACKGROUND

Origins of the Carana Training Scenario

The Carana Training Scenario was originally developed in 2002-2003 by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO). The scenario package was later used by other peacekeeping training institutions in Africa and elsewhere, and amendments and additions were made to meet specific requirements. The core document was the *Carana Country Study*, which was supported by a body of more exercise-specific documents (e.g. Treaties, Technical Surveys, Security Council Resolutions, etc.)

A more detailed version of the Carana Country Study was later undertaken by the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Kenya. The focus was at the country level, and intended to support training at the political/strategic and operational levels.

In 2008, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) was contracted by EURORECAMP to develop a more comprehensive **Base Scenario Package** based on the Carana Training Scenario. The requirement was identified for an expanded version of the *Carana Country Study*; additional profiles for the neighbouring states; more detail on international issues and dynamics; and a comprehensive mapping package including both topographic and regional mapping.

Scenario Development Principles

In identifying the requirements for ASF training, and of the Amani Africa project, the stakeholders recognized that the existing Carana scenario met some but not all of the needs of an African training audience. In particular, a number of principles were adopted as guidelines which have been used in the creation of the current version of the Carana Base Scenario Package:

- The island of Kisiwa, with its six nation states, forms all or part of a sub-region within the AU; it has regional concerns and security issues typical of other African regions, but derived from its own history and circumstances;
- Carana has been developed in detail, the adjacent states in detail sufficient to support specific scenario development and the remaining states only in sufficient detail to provide a regional context;



- Although Kisiwa has an “African” style colonial heritage, the West European colonial powers involved in that heritage are fictitious;
- Kisiwa should be geographically situated so as not to impinge on the sovereign territories of any other nation state; thus the “reality” of other AU member states is not directly affected by it;
- The development of the island parallels that of mainland Africa, and is intended to result in regional issues appropriate for an African training audience. Other African historical and world historical events may be presumed to have happened as commonly understood, except where a change is specifically identified to support the Kisiwa construct;
- The influence of the surrounding states and regions should be carefully controlled, so as to maintain the “generic African” nature of the scenario; and
- The position of the island (e.g. in the Indian Ocean) has had little or no effect on the development of other African states in terms of their own relations with other neighbouring states; the status quo may normally be assumed.

The **Base Scenario Package** provides information pertaining to Carana and the other Kisiwa states, including a range of potential issues that might contribute to national or regional crises. It does not relate to or describe any one specific initiating crisis, for which an additional stage of scenario development is required.

Although much of the content of the original Carana scenario has been retained, the documents contained within the most current version of the **Base Scenario Package** should be regarded as the authoritative source of information regarding the Democratic Republic of Carana and its neighbours.

CARANA AND THE ISLAND OF KISIWA

The original Carana scenario placed the country and its neighbours (Rimosa, Sumora and Katasi) on the eastern edge of a fictitious land-mass called "The Sixth Continent". As this continent was not a part of Africa, it did not address the deployment requirements of the ASF. Carana and its neighbours have therefore been situated on the eastern half of a large island called Kisiwa, which for exercise purposes is considered to be a part of Africa. Kisiwa measures approximately 1,600 km from east to west, and 1,300 km from north to south. It has a land area of approximately 1,404,941 km². It features a diversity of terrain, from desert to rainforest, and from rugged mountains to level coastal plains. The highest feature on the island is Mount Katasi (1,917 m).




In the current version of the **Base Scenario Package**, Kisiwa is located in the Indian Ocean, approximately 100 km across the Gulf of Kisiwa from the Horn of Africa to the northwest, and about 100 km from the Seychelles archipelago to the southeast. It straddles the Equator (00° latitude), and is centred at a longitude of approximately 55° E. The longitudes, latitudes, and UTM grid system used in the mapping package reflect the current location of Kisiwa. Climatological and other related data are also intended to reflect that location.

The countries of Kisiwa have been depicted so as to reflect a cross-section of the issues facing many contemporary African states. At the same time, no single African state has been chosen as a basis for any single Kisiwa state, and the intent has been to portray these issues in a general rather than a specific sense.

The island's stability is potentially fragile because of the numerous complex issues that lie beneath the surface of island politics. Complex multidimensional relationships, historical issues, and competing national policies among and between the states of Kisiwa are intended to influence both the development of internal and international crises, and the resulting intervention and crisis resolution.

Post-independence relations among the six states of Kisiwa can be largely characterized as cool but stable, with occasional outbursts of violent conflict. All six countries have a shared history of colonialism and have confronted similar challenges in the post-colonial era; this set of common problems has led to cooperative efforts such as the creation of Economic Cooperation Organization of Kisiwa (ECOK) in 1991. Despite the injustices and indignities of colonial rule, both Carana and Rimosia, for example, have maintained mostly cordial and cooperative relations with their former rulers (Azuria and Carmina, respectively), whereas Katasi and, to a lesser extent, Sumora have shunned close relations respectively with Azuria and Carmina. Otherwise, linguistic and cultural divisions, sheltering of political opponents and boundary disputes may also jeopardize cooperation between Kisiwa states and the success of economic and diplomatic relationships.

The history of human settlement on Kisiwa dates back at least 35,000 years. Successive waves of immigration from the African mainland resulted in the settlement of the island by several major groups. (These ethnicities are not modeled on any specific African group.) Smaller Arab and Indian populations would later also settle on the island. For several hundred years of its early history, the population of the island was dominated by the Kori, one of the major ethnic groups, who controlled Kisiwa's interior. Competition for resources brought foreign empires to Kisiwa who extracted resources, and enslaved some tribes with the help of other tribes. These **Azurian**, **Carmine**, and **Sabelian** empires became the colonizing powers that partitioned the island by establishing what are now the international boundaries. In some cases, these boundaries reflect rivers and other natural obstacles; in other cases, they are simply straight lines of latitude or longitude. As a result, historically opposed tribes are grouped together within Kisiwa nations, while other tribes are divided; their populations are not ethnically homogenous.




The Democratic Republic of Carana

Carana (108,417 km² – pop. 8,553,999) is the country developed in the greatest detail, and is intended to provide the primary location for intervention within the Kisiwa construct. It shares borders with Rimosa, Sumora and Katasi, which are developed to a lesser level of detail.

Carana's population includes three major ethnic groups (Falin, Kori and Tatsi), of which the Falin are both a majority and the dominant group. Each ethnic group includes smaller groups, with differences in territory,



culture and religion. There are also other ethnicities, including the Pleioni (refugees from Rimosa who arrived in the late 20th century), the Mahidi (a nomadic people, of whom some are settled and some remain nomadic), and small Azurian-Caranese, Arab, and Indian populations.




Province	Falin		Kori		Tatsi		Miscellaneous		Total
	%	Pop	%	Pop	%	Pop	%	Pop	
Barin	62.08%	408,352	29.70%	195,377	3.00%	19,742	5.22%	34,323	657,794
Fellari	80.80%	2,169,776	14.68%	394,277	1.00%	26,829	3.52%	94,604	2,685,486
Guthar	57.81%	1,101,999	11.00%	209,641	13.00%	247,885	18.19%	346,852	1,906,377
Hanno	66.01%	374,586	24.00%	136,223	1.00%	5,669	8.99%	51,025	567,503
Koloni	3.00%	13,934	91.88%	427,151	0.03%	143	5.09%	23,676	464,904
Leppko	6.80%	84,527	15.70%	195,229	60.49%	752,260	17.02%	211,639	1,243,654
Mahbek	0.62%	5,142	81.51%	681,451	7.51%	62,755	10.37%	86,731	836,079
Tereni	0.60%	1,157	92.48%	177,751	0.60%	1,152	6.32%	12,142	192,202
TOTAL		4,159,473		2,417,099		1,116,436		860,991	8,553,999

The Caranese population is religiously diverse with the majority identifying as Christian, Muslim and/or adherents of traditional religions. Religious tensions have existed in the past, and may be a source of, or contributor to, conflict in Carana. The government has tried to discourage a recent influx of charismatic Protestant and evangelical churches, as well as increasing calls for the institutionalization of Shari'a law by Muslim communities. There are many missionary groups and religious-based charity groups working in the country.

Carana was a colony of the former Azurian Empire (that became the Republic of Azuria in the 19th century), achieving independence in April 1962. Post-independence politics in Carana were characterized by the strong-turned-authoritarian rule of Joseph Uroma, a military coup d'état in 1971 and a further coup in 1975. Since the mid-1980s, Carana has re-established itself as a democracy, electing its National Assembly members and President. The *Falin-led Parti démocratique de Carana (PDC)* continues to dominate the National Assembly, and produced the two most recent elected Presidents (President Roselyn Okatsi, and the current President, Jacques Ogavo).

Although nominally democratic, Carana's present government has tried to perpetuate its power through constitutional change and by discouraging political opposition. Corruption is rife within the public sector at all levels. The government also suffers from a lack of financial resources. In much of the country, infrastructure is crumbling and medical and educational facilities are desperately under-funded. This is especially the case in majority Kori and Tatsi areas, which makes these populations bitter with the government and the Falin majority. Ethnic conflict is further exacerbated by the continued efforts to maintain Falin dominance. The judicial system is debilitated by lack of funding and officials, corruption and the interference of politicians in the judicial process. Traditional and religious systems of law continue to play an important role in the country, and are often prioritized by the population over the judicial system and its body of civil law.



Carana's economy is on a downward spiral following gains in the mid-2000s. Much of the population lives in severe poverty, especially in the south and western provinces of the country and in the large slums of the capital of Galasi. While much of the population is able to sustain itself, an environmental disaster, the halt of government activities and spending or the banning of charity and relief organizations may lead to a humanitarian emergency.

Internal tribal or religious dynamics may also encourage conflict in neighbouring countries to spread across the border into Carana. Foreign interest in Carana's under-exploited natural resources may result in competition for access to these resources.

The major communities in Carana are linked by the National Highway, a two-lane paved road that was built during the colonial period. Secondary and tertiary highways and minor unpaved roads connect other towns, villages and settlements. There is a limited freight and passenger rail system that runs from the capital of Galasi through Amsan, to Corma with connections to both Eres and Folsa. Carana lacks any major deepwater coastal ports. A range of small and medium ports are found along the coast, and in the bigger cities, in some cases accessible through navigation through the major river systems. There are limited passenger and air freight facilities in Carana; the largest civil air facility is 65 kilometres west of Galasi.

The Caranese government controls the Caranese Defence Forces that include an Army, Navy and Air Force, as well as a separate Presidential Guard. Security services include the national Gendarmerie and Police Force. Depending on the specific scenario, these may be represented as more or less effective, more or less politically reliable, and with greater or lesser support for any international intervenors.

Within the Carana construct, a number of regions within Carana might provide a suitable area of operations for an ASF deployment, under a range of possible specific scenarios. The geography of Carana is intended to offer as wide a variety of appropriate terrain as possible, including marshy coastal lowlands, barren mountains, arid deserts, dense rainforests, fertile farmlands, and crowded cities. ASF operations in Carana will work within the constraints imposed by inadequate infrastructure (runways, ports, etc.), variable climatic conditions (a cold and dry season November-April, or a hot and rainy season, May-October) and difficult terrain, including the limited navigability of river systems.

In addition, the history and circumstances of the ethnic communities offer a wide variety of possible responses to an ASF deployment. Populations may turn to religious and traditional leaders for guidance in hostile times, and for indications on how to respond to ASF operations in the country. A number of potentially violent anti-government groups have been introduced (e.g. the *Kori-based Mouvement patriotique de Carana*, the *Tatsi-based Combattants indépendants du sud Carana*, or the *Sumoran-based True Islamist Movement*); these groups were developed to allow a range of motives, means and activities that might confront either the Caranese government or the ASF.

The People's Republic of Katasi

Katasi (81,205 km² – pop. 2,426,981) lies to the west of Carana, and is the smallest, and the only landlocked country in Kisiwa. It is also a former part of the Azurian Empire, but one that achieved independence through a violent revolution. It has had a succession of despotic leaders, and is the poorest and least developed of the Kisiwa states, with a poor human rights record. The current military government took over from a Marxist regime that had replaced the Colonial authorities. The majority of its population are members of the Kori ethnic group, who also form a minority population in Carana.

As a result of both ideology and national interests, Katasi has had poor relations with many of its neighbours and with the outside world. It also has limited mineral resources, which have not been adequately exploited as a result of poor levels of investment and security. Katasi maintains large armed forces for its size, and might respond aggressively to an international dispute. Within the Kisiwa construct, Katasi provides a possible source of cross-border instability and conflict involving Carana.

The Republic of Rimosa

Rimosa (195,304 km² – pop. 12,281,148) lies to the south of Carana, and borders both Carana and Katasi. It is a former part of the Carmine Empire. Rimosa has experienced modest but sustained economic growth, and is a relatively stable and prosperous country. It has a history of ethnic unrest between its ethnic groups. The majority of the population of Rimosa are Tatsi, who form a minority within Carana; the largest minority in Rimosa are the Pleioni, who have had periodic conflicts with the Tatsi in northern Rimosa. The Pleioni are also a minority group within southern Carana.

Within the Carana construct, Rimosa has the potential to be either a participant in a dispute or a possibly helpful third party. It has reasonably good infrastructure, and some access into southern Carana.

The Islamic Republic of Sumora

Sumora (298,935 km² – pop. 4,472,903) lies to the north of Carana, and borders Carana and Namuna. It is a former part of the Carmine Empire. It is the only state on Kisiwa with a Muslim majority. The rest of the country is predominantly Christian. Its political culture includes a combination of Islamic, traditional African and Carmine colonial influences; political power is largely in the hands of the minority Falin, who are also the majority population in Carana. Although agriculture already contributes the largest proportion of GDP, the government's focus is on growing that sector.

Sumora has potential cross-border issues with neighbouring states, including Carana. Although on friendly terms with the Caranese government, it tolerates Islamic radicals who are seen as a threat to the Caranese *status quo*.

The Republic of Mosana

Mosana (394,994 km² – pop. 10,278,325) is in southwest Kisiwa, bordering with Namuna, Katasi and Rimosa. It was a colony of the Carmine Empire. Its population is primarily of Mosanja origins.

Mosana is the largest state in Kisiwa, and the most economically prosperous. Within the Kisiwa construct, it provides a relatively stable participant in regional politics. It is however logistically limited in its ability to support operations in Carana.

The Kingdom of Namuna

Namuna (290,963 km² – pop. 8,228,416) is in northwest Kisiwa, bordering with Sumora, Katasi and Mosana. It was a colony of the Azurian empire. The majority of the population is of Mosanja origins, whose king is the hereditary Head of State. There is a significant Muslim minority in the north of the country. In spite of the nation's rich endowment of mineral resources, the economy is underperforming.

Namuna has endured a long process of reconciling its traditional monarchy with the democratic aspirations of its people. Although not adjacent to Carana, Namuna's regional interests may play a role in enhancing the political complexity of any crisis among Carana and its immediate neighbours.

The Economic Community Organization of Kisiwa (ECOK)

All of the Kisiwa states are members of the Economic Community Organization of Kisiwa (ECOK). ECOK has become one of the Regional Economic Community (REC) pillars of the African Economic Community (AEC), as it has met the prerequisites of the AEC Treaty. ECOK however is not a part of the African Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union; its role is purely economic in nature, and even in this it has achieved relatively little success.

PACKAGE COMPONENTS

Documents

The **Base Scenario Package** includes a number of documents that provide a base level of detail on Kisiwa and its component states, with a focus on Carana:

- *Kisiwa Regional Overview*. A general study of the island as a whole, exploring regional and international relationships and dynamics;
- *Kisiwa Country Studies* and Profiles. General information on each of the other Kisiwa states, using the same internal chapter structure as for the Carana Country Book (see below). Levels of detail are greater for the Country Studies of adjacent states (Katasi, Rimoso and Sumora) than for the Country Profiles of other states (Mosana and Namuna);
- *Carana Country Book*. A more comprehensive study of Carana, including detailed sections on Geography, History, Society, Religion, Governance, Law, Economics, Security, and Geopolitics;
- *Carana Economic Overview* and Summary of Economic Statistics. A collection of reference data for the Caranese economy, including provincial economic data;
- *Constitution of the Republic of Carana*. The base legal document establishing Carana and its government apparatus.


The Chronology of Major Events and List of Acronyms and Abbreviations attached to the end of this document may also be distributed as separate documents as required.

Mapping

The **Base Scenario Package** includes the following types of regional and topographic mapping:

- 1:2,000,000 Regional map: 1 sheet, showing Kisiwa and its political boundaries, adjacent islands and the African mainland, including principal seaports and airports, road and rail routes and population centres;
- 1:1,000,000 Regional map: 1 sheet, showing Carana and adjacent territories of neighbouring states, including principal seaports and airports, road and rail routes and population centres;
- 1: 500 000 Country map: 1 sheet, showing complete area of Carana, including shaded relief, provincial boundaries, seaports and airports, road and rail routes and population centres;

- 1:250 000 topographic maps: 12 sheets, providing complete coverage of Carana; and
- 1:100 000 topographic maps: 29 sheets, providing complete coverage of Carana.



Additional mapping products, such as thematic maps, urban town plans and larger-scale (e.g. 1:50 000 scale) topographic maps may be created from the data sets provided, to meet the requirements of specific users or training events.

Document Formats

The paper documents intended for use within the scenario context are presented in a “page-within-a-page” format. The document within the page-shaped frame is “real”, within the exercise context, and reflects the style and format of its real-world equivalent. Security classifications, etc. inside the frame are for exercise purposes only. The data outside the frame may include the Exercise name, the document’s position within the Exercise Package hierarchy, copyright notices, real-world security classification or other “non-scenario” information.

Electronic Documents and Website

The Base Scenario Package includes all documents in one or more electronic formats. This includes an HTML-based file structure which can be made available over the Internet or a closed Intranet, or installed on a standalone terminal. This includes links to supporting documents, such as maps, in a printable PDF format. The file hierarchy may be expanded to include other exercise-specific documentation.

SCENARIO MANAGEMENT

Specific Scenario Development

The **Base Scenario Package** is intended to describe contemporary Carana and its neighbours, and to present a number of possible “fault lines” which may either:

- initiate conflict, leading to a crisis, leading to intervention; or
- shape the events and outcomes resulting from such a crisis.

Officers Conducting Exercises (OCEs) and their exercise staffs should plan to provide a **Specific Scenario** that creates a background to the crisis, the events of the crisis itself, and the conditions for intervention. Exact requirements and levels of detail will be determined by the exercise specification(s).

A Specific Scenario at a minimum should include the following:

- greater levels of detail on any issues not adequately described in the **Base Scenario Package** documents (Country Book, etc.);
- any changes to data in the Base Scenario Package documents, or imposed limitations (reflecting training requirements or scenario realities – e.g. unavailable infrastructure);
- a historical narrative covering key events from the “end of history” within the **Base Scenario Package** documents to the start of the training audience’s planning process;
- “Exercise Documents”, based upon real world documents, that describe the situation in theatre, international reactions, mandates, legal constraints, planning guidance and other details to frame the training audience perceptions.

Although changes may be introduced to the Base Scenario if required, it is strongly suggested that these be tightly controlled so as to reduce “rogue” documents circulating with potentially dated or inaccurate information.

Scenario Geography Adaptation

As noted previously, the longitudes, latitudes, and UTM grid system used in the mapping package reflect the current location of Kisiwa. Users of the Base Scenario Package have a number of options:

- Assume, “for exercise purposes”, that Kisiwa (in its present location) is a part of whichever sub-region is considered appropriate to meet the defined objectives of the training audience;
- Re-locate Kisiwa to another desired part of the African littoral, assuming, “for exercise purposes”, that the latitudes, longitudes, etc. are unchanged (may require changes to regional mapping as shown above);
- Re-locate Kisiwa to another desired part of the African littoral, and re-project mapping to meet the resulting new latitudes and longitudes;

In each case, users should balance the demands for realism with resource requirements.

Intellectual Property Rights

Rights to the use of the Carana **Base Scenario Package** rests with EURORECAMP who intends to transfer these rights to the African Union following the completion of the Amani Africa cycle. The AU will develop and promulgate policies regarding the package's availability for use by regional training centres, national governments and other agencies.

It should be noted that rights to the use of the original Carana scenario rest with UN DPKO, who have generally permitted its unlicensed use.

ANNEXES

Annex A Chronology of Major Events: Island of Kisiwa

Annex B Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS: ISLAND OF KISIWA

Annex A to Executive Summary Chronology of Major Events: Island of Kisiwa



Note: many key events in the earlier history of the region do not have fixed dates, either because the exact date is not known, or to allow the inclusion of commemorative anniversaries into the detailed pre-STARTEX chronology or into actual exercise play.

Date	Event
	EARLY HISTORY
35000 - 10000 BC	Estimated time when first human life arrived on Kisiwa; the Pleioni, Mahidi and Nakunda peoples.
350 BC	Nzedda ethno-linguistic group arrive on Kisiwa from mainland Africa; first the Falin and Tatsi groups.
300 BC	Mosanja people arrive on Kisiwa
100 BC	Damangi people arrive on Kisiwa
0 BC	Mosanja begin a lucrative trading relationship with spice merchants on route to India from the Aksumite Empire; trading relationship will continue until well into the second century AD.
300 AD	Kori people from the Tondoi ethno-linguistic group immigrate to Kisiwa from mainland Africa.
500	People of Kisiwa are engaged in farming and cultivate groundnut, beans, corn and cotton.
650	Kori people conquer the Damangi.
740	Kori people conquer the Damangi.
800	Kori Kingdom is firmly established and become the dominant military force on the island.
980	Death of the Kori king Yamongo Aso; his nephew Yamongo Asabo becomes the new king.
	EXPLORATION AND COLONIZATION
1070s	The Berber Almoravid Dynasty of Northern Africa establishes itself on the northern portion of the island of Kisiwa.
Mid-1100s	Berber Almoravid Dynasty starts steadily declining on the island.
Early 1300s	Kori people discover gold, which strengthens the Kori Kingdom.
1430s	European explorers discover the island of Kisiwa and begin exploring the island for resources.
1440s	Azurians begin enslaving African populations on the island and sending them overseas.
1450s	Kori fail to expel the Mosanja people from the mouth of the Hudi River, much to the dismay of King Akusa.

Date	Event
1457	King Akusa presents the Mosanja people with part of the Kori land in exchange for access to Mosanja-controlled ports.
1520s	In an attempt to reignite their military strength, the Kori attack the Damangi; the Kori are fought off. The Damangi expel Kori people living among them.
1600s	Azurians establish and maintain trading posts on the coast of Carana.
1860s	Ethnic conflict between the Damangi and the Falin forces tens of thousands of Muslim Falin to flee to Carana.
1882	Kisiwa is divided up at the Conference of Salin; Carana is claimed by the Azurian Empire.
1886	The Kori defeat the Azurian contingents in Katasi.
1887	The Kori once again defeat the Azurian contingents in Katasi.
1914	The Entente Powers attack the busy seaports along the Sumoran coast because the Sabelian Empire is sympathetic to the Central Powers.
1915	Azuria and Carmina (of their former respective Empires) join the First World War on the side of the Entente Powers.
1919	Sumora falls under a Class B League of Nations Mandate under Carmine administration after the disintegration of the Sabelian Empire.
1920s	In Rimosa, governing responsibilities become increasingly decentralized.
1932	Provincial boundary between Barin and Hanno is established (Barin used to be part of Guthar province).
1939-1945	Tens of thousands of soldiers from the island of Kisiwa fight in the Second World War in support of the Azurian and Carmine Empires and their Western Allies.
1945	Sumora becomes a United Nations Trust Territory.
1945	Joseph Uroma participates in the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester, England.
7 July 1946	Uroma organizes a nine-day general strike known as Les neuf grands matins in protest against Azurian policies in Carana.
1953	Joseph Uroma (Carana) and Mambose Asana III (Namuna) represent their respective territories at the Azurian National Assembly.
1955	Tensions between the Kori and the Azurians elevate to the point where the Azurians shift their administration centre from Nanom to Galasi (Carana).
4 September 1957	Day of Independence in Rimosa.
1958	Population votes in an Azurian-administered referendum; Carana to remain part of the Azurian Community of States and Caranese population will elect representative to sit in the Azurian National Assembly.

Date	Event
26 July 1958	Day of Independence in Katasi.
Late 1958	Royal family of King Dagbi IV is forced to flee to Namuna.
1960	King Dagbi IV dies.
4 December 1958	Day of Independence in Mosana.
	CARANA POST-INDEPENDENCE
10 April 1962	Azuria grants full independence to the République démocratique de Carana; Joseph Uroma becomes the country's first President.
1 October 1963	First Caranese Constitution.
1966	President Uroma is re-elected.
1970	President Uroma refuses to conduct scheduled national elections.
1970s	International oil crisis devastates Carana economy.
1971	Général Christian Hakutu takes over government by a bloodless military coup.
30 November 1972	Caranese Constitution is suspended under Général Hakutu.
1975	Coup d'état brings Colonel Idrissa Tarakoni to power.
1982	President Tarakoni seeks IMF and World Bank loan to cope with continued economic turmoil. Loan conditionality requires good governance and the return to democratic rule.
2-4 February 1994	Carana struck by Cyclone Geralda, the worst cyclone to come to shore since 1927, devastating much of the country (infrastructure, agricultural fields, etc).
17 December 1985	Referendum sanctions the new Constitution.
1986	Parti démocratique de Carana (PDC) wins national election ; Roselyn Okatsi becomes President.
1991	President Okatsi is re-elected in national elections.
1996	PDC under Jacques Ogavo win national elections.
2001	President Ogavo is re-elected.
2004	Constitution is amended, removing the maximum number of terms an individual term can serve as President.
2006	President Ogavo is elected for a third term.

	Term	Meaning	Remark
A	ac	Aircraft	
	AD	<i>Anno Domini</i>	Designation used in Gregorian calendar
	AEC	African Economic Community	Of the African Union
	AFCC	Association of Former Carmine Colonies	
	AM	Amplitude Modulation	Frequency band in which AM is used for broadcasting
	AML	<i>Automitrailleuse légère</i>	Light armoured car (lit. "machine gun car")
	AMX	<i>Atelier de Construction d'Issy-les-Moulineaux</i>	Armoured vehicle (tank) manufacturer (France)
	ANSFC	Association nationale des sages-femmes caranaïses	National Association of Caranese Midwives
	APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier	
	APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture	
	Armd	Armoured	
	Arty	Artillery	
	ASL	Above Sea Level	
	ATC	<i>Armée de la terre de Carana</i>	Caranese Army
	ATGM	Anti-Tank Guided Missile	
	AU	African Union	
	Avg.	Average	
	B	B1	Barin sud
B2		Barin est	Department
B3		Barin nord	Department
B4		Barin ouest	Department
Bbl/day		Barrels per day	With regard to oil (production, refinery, etc.).
BC		Before Christ	Designation used in Gregorian calendar
BCC		<i>Banque centrale de Carana</i>	
BGp		Battle Group (Battalion Group)	
Bn		Battalion	
Bty		Battery	
C	CBC	Carana Broadcasting Corporation	Société de Radio-diffusion de Carana (SRC)

	Term	Meaning	Remark
	cbt	Combat	
	CDF	Caranese Defence Forces	Force de la défense de Carana
	cf.	Confer	Compare
	Cfr	Caranese Franc	
	CISC	<i>Combattants indépendants du sud Carana</i>	Tatsi-majority armed group in Carana
	Coy	Company	
D	DDS	Directorate for Documentation & Security	Institution within the Sumoran security forces
	DFF	Damangi Freedom Fighters	Radical group in Sumora
	DFSV	Direct Fire Support Vehicle	
E	E	East (En), Est (Fr)	
	EC	Electoral Commission	
	ECOK	Economic Community Organisation of Kisiwa	Regional Economic Community of Kisiwa countries
	e.g.	<i>Exempli gratia</i>	"for example"
	Elev	Elevation	
	Engr	Engineer	
	Eqpt	Equipment	
	est.	Estimated	
	EU	European Union	
F	F1	<i>Fellari nord</i>	Department
	F2	<i>Fellari nord-est</i>	Department
	F3	<i>Fellari sud-est</i>	Department
	F4	<i>Fellari sud</i>	Department
	F5	<i>Fellari ouest</i>	Department
	FAC	<i>Force aérienne de Carana</i>	Caranese Air Force
	FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	
	FDC	<i>Forces de la défense de Carana</i>	Caranese Defence Forces
	FDI	Foreign Direct Investment	
	FGA	Fighter Ground Attack	
	FM	Frequency Modulation	Frequency band in which FM is used for broadcasting

	Term	Meaning	Remark
G	FNC	<i>Front national caranais</i>	Tatsi-based opposition party
	FPN	<i>Force policière nationale</i>	Caranese National Police Force
	FPP	Free People's Party	Political party in Mosana
	Fr.	French	In Country Book to indicate French-language term
	f.o.b.	Free On Board	With regard to trade commodities
	G1	<i>Guthar nord-est</i>	Department
	G2	<i>Guthar est</i>	Department
	G3	<i>Guthar sud-est</i>	Department
	G4	<i>Gutharsud-ouest</i>	Department
	G5	<i>Guthar nord-ouest</i>	Department
	GC	<i>Gendarmerie caranaise</i>	Caranese Gendarmerie
	GDP	Gross Domestic Product	
	GMT	Greenwich Mean Time	
H	Govt	Government	
	GP	Garde présidentielle	Presidential Guard
	GRN	Gendarmerie royale du Namuna	Royal Namuna Gendarmes
	H1	<i>Hanno nord-est</i>	Department
		<i>Hanno est</i>	Department
		<i>Hanno sud-est</i>	Department
		<i>Hanno sud</i>	Department
		<i>Hanno oust</i>	Department
		<i>Hanno nord-ouest</i>	Department
	Hel	Helicopter	
	HMG	Heavy Machine Gun	
	HQ	Headquarters	
	HR	Human Rights	
	HSIC	Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee	Of NEPAD, of the African Union
	I	ICAO ID	International Civil Aviation Organization Identification
ICC		International Criminal Court	

	Term	Meaning	Remark
	IDP	Internally Displaced People	
	IFI	International Financial Institution	
	IMF	International Monetary Fund	
	incl	includes, included, inclusive	
	Inf	Infantry	
	IO	International Organization	
	IOM	International Organization for Migration	
	ISO	International Organization for Standardization	
	ISP	Internet Service Provider	
J	JLCE	Junior Level Comprehensive Exam	Comprehensive Exam in the education system
K	K1	<i>Koloni sud</i>	Department
	K2	<i>Koloni oust</i>	Department
	K3	<i>Koloni nord</i>	Department
	K4	<i>Koloni est</i>	Department
	Kbp/s	Kilobyte per second	
	KCU	Kisiwa Cooperation Union	Short-lived predecessor to ECOK in Kisiwa
	kHz	Kilohertz	With regard to radio frequency
	Km	Kilometres	
	Km2	Square Kilometres	
	Km/h	Kilometres per hour	
	KTDP	Kisiwa Trade and Development Bank	
	kWh	Kilowatt hour	With regard to electricity (production, consumption)
L	L1	<i>Leppko est</i>	Department
	L2	<i>Leppko sud-est</i>	Department
	L3	<i>Leppko sud</i>	Department
	L4	<i>Leppko sud-ouest</i>	Department
	L5	<i>Leppko nord-ouest</i>	Department
	L6	<i>Leppko nord</i>	Department
	L	Length	
	Li	Light	
M	M1	Mahbek sud	Department

	Term	Meaning	Remark
	M2	<i>Mahbek oust</i>	Department
	M3	<i>Mahbek nord</i>	Department
	M4	<i>Mahbek est</i>	Department
	m	metre	
	M	Million	
	max.	Maximum	
	Mb/s	Megabyte per second	
	MC	<i>Marine caranaise</i>	Caranese Navy
	MCPMR	Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution	With regard to the African Peace and Security Architecture
	Mech	Mechanized	
	MHz	Megahertz	With regard to radio frequency
	ML	Motor Launch	
	mm	Millimeters	With regard to rail gauge
	Mor	Mortar	
	MPC	<i>Mouvement patriotique de Carana</i>	Kori-majority armed group in Carana
N	N	North (En), Nord (Fr)	
	NAM	National Assembly Member	
	NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development	Of the African Union
	NGM	National Gendarmerie of Mosana	
	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization	
	NM	Nautical Miles	With regard to Maritime Claims
	NPC	New Patriots Convention	
O	NPK	National Police of Katasi	
	O	Ouest (Fr)	
	OAU	Organisation of African Unity	
	Offrs	Officers	
P	OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference	
	PCC	<i>Parti de la convention caranaise</i>	Kori-based opposition party
	PCC	Coastal Patrol Craft	

	Term	Meaning	Remark
R	PDC	<i>Parti démocratique de Carana</i>	Ruling party in Carana, majority Falin
	PDC	<i>Police douanière de Carana</i>	
	PNN	<i>Police nationale du Namuna</i>	
	POP	Population	
	PPP	Purchasing Power Parity	
	PSC	Peace and Security Council	Of the African Union
	RCL	Recoilless Launcher	
	RDF	Rimosan Defence Forces	
	REC	Regional Economic Community	Of the African Economic Community
	Recce	Reconnaissance	
	RHIB	Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boat	
	RN	<i>Route nationale</i>	National Highway (Carana)
	RNP	Rimosa National Police Force	
	RORO	Roll on-roll off	With regard to infrastructural facilities
S	RS	<i>Ralliement pour la solidarité</i>	Opposition party
	Rwy	Runway	
	S	South (En), Sud (Fr)	
	SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile	
	SAP	Structural Adjustment Programmes/Policy	
	SF	Special Forces	
	SG	Sumora Gendarmerie	
	SOB	Special Operations Branch	In Mosana
	SRC	<i>Société de Radio-diffusion de Carana</i>	Caranese Broadcasting Services
	SRN	<i>Service de renseignement national</i>	Caranese National Intelligence Service
T	SW	Shortwave	Frequency band in which SW is used for broadcasting
	T1	<i>Tereni ouest</i>	Department
	T2	<i>Tereni nord</i>	Department
	T3	<i>Tereni est</i>	Department
	t	Tonne(s)	

	Term	Meaning	Remark
	TB	Tuberculosis	
	TEU	Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit	With regard to infrastructural capabilities
	TIM	True Islamist Movement	Radical Islamic group based in Sumora
	Tk	Tank	
	TMM	Unknown	Mobile military bridging system (Russia)
	Tpt	Transport	
	TV	Television	
U	ULP	Union for Leadership and Progress	Ruling party in Sumora (de facto single-party)
	UN	United Nations	
	UNCT	United Nations Country Team	
	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	
	UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees	
	UNICEF	United Nations Emergency Children's Fund	
	UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services	
	UPPR	United People's Party of Rimoso	
	USD	US Dollars	
V	VAB	<i>Véhicule de l'avant blindé</i>	Armoured vanguard vehicle
	VBL	<i>Véhicule blindé légère</i>	Light armoured car
	VIP	Very Important Person	
	WHO	World Health Organization	
W	W	Width	
	W	West	
	WB	World Bank	



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
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Historical Overview

The First Settlements


Human life on Kisiwa is estimated to have begun over 35,000 years ago. At this time, ancient descendents of the Pleioni people settled in what would become the south east portion of the island. The *Mahidi*, a traditionally nomadic tribe, and *Nakunda* peoples are thought to have also sailed over from the African continent and settled on Kisiwa tens of thousands of years ago. These ancient peoples lived as hunter-gatherers before the development of agriculture and pastoral farming.



Around 350 B.C., the Nzedda people (sharing common ethno-linguistic roots) began arriving by boat from mainland Africa. The Nzedda who immigrated consisted primarily of people from the Fallin tribes and the Tatsi tribes. These populations mostly settled in the southern part of the island, on what became Mosana and Rimosa. Other groups of people arrived in the following decades and centuries; Damangi populations made the voyage to the island and eventually settled in the north of the island, and people of the Mosanja tribe immigrated and settled in the western portion of the island. Migration from mainland Africa to the island slowed down after this, and only smaller groups of immigrants subsequently arrived in the region.

It is not known whether there would have been other ancient peoples that pre-dated the arrival of the immigrant populations to the island of Kisiwa. Archaeologists believe that while contact between this population and the Nakunda probably happened first, it would be centuries before the Tatsi would come in contact with the Pleioni, who were mostly located in the south east of the island. The discovery of the Mahidi nomadic tribes who roamed the north of the island would happen even later. The Mahidi mostly existed on the other side of the mountains and would not be discovered before the Damangi had successfully crossed the harsh terrain.

Around 300 AD, the *Kori* tribe, descendants of the Tondoi people, came to the island from the mainland. Scientists believe that the Kori would have arrived on Kisiwa in large numbers with more property, including cattle, than when others arrived. It is thought that with the arrival of the Kori people, the indigenous populations (Pleioni, Nakunda and Mahidi) probably became less numerous, and thus more vulnerable, than the immigrant populations. The equity of space between the different groups that had lasted for centuries was interrupted, especially since the Kori arrived with more resources than the other ethnic groups. Diseases, foreign to the indigenous populations, brought over by the Falin, Tatsi, Kori and others, also severely impacted the indigenous communities.




The Domination of the Kori Kingdom

The various settlements throughout the island engaged in farming, and by 500 AD, were cultivating groundnut, beans, corn and cotton. Communities also domesticated animals such as cattle and goats. Populations on the coast performed vital fishing activities. The cultivation of cotton especially flourished under the Kori who had settled in a part of the island where there was thick soil and good rainfalls. The Kori were able to capitalize on this cultivation, and an expanding production resulted in enormous wealth for the Kori tribes. For centuries, the cultivation thrived and the relative wealth of the Kori grew significantly, as did their power and influence over other ethnicities in the interior of the island. Wars for power and resources led to the Kori conquering the Damangi that were settled in the north-interior lands in 650 AD and 740 AD.

From the conquering of some of the Damangi tribes came the birth of the Grand Kori Kingdom that ruled the island for centuries. Having overcome their most immediate adversary for land in the interior of the island, the Kori were easily able to rid the centre of Kisiwa of other populations, specifically the indigenous people that had settled there. The Mahidi peoples in their midst were nearly all eliminated, and the Nakunda and Pleioni (who were more numerous than the Mahidi) were chased out of the interior. By the 800s, the Kori had established themselves as the dominant military force on Kisiwa.

Around 980 AD, with the death of King Yamongo Aso, Yamongo Asabo, the predecessor's nephew, became the new king of the Kori people of Kisiwa. This most important position in Kori society, and most affluent position on the entire island, was transferred by inheritance via maternal uncles. Upon his accession, Yamongo Asabo proved to be a fierce warrior and shrewd leader. During his reign, he established a taxation system that brought huge revenues to the royal Kori court, and continued to assert his people's military fortitude. Before long, King Yamongo Asabo inspired awe and fear from other chiefs in other parts of the island. It was under his twenty-five year rule that the Kori kingdom flourished and took firm control of the central part of Kisiwa.

The kingdom continuously tried to conquer land from other groups, including the Falin. Since their arrival, the Falin had always been the most numerous ethnic grouping in Kisiwa, and they mostly settled along the eastern coast, especially in the area that has become Carana. After their initial arrival, several tribes also established villages and communities closer to the interior of the island in the chain of mountains between Carana and Katasi. For centuries, these inhabitants in the mountains served in defending the Falin tribes against the threat of the Kori, who constantly sought to expand their kingdom. Despite many Kori attempts in the early 1100s, however, the Kori military superiority did not triumph against the Falin's better knowledge of their own terrain.



However, the Kori's discovery of gold in the early 1300s served to further strengthen the kingdom on the island. This resource enabled the Kori royalty to coerce neighbouring chiefdom's armies to swear allegiance to its reign. This allowed the Kori to push their control east and into the mountainous lands that they had failed to conquer against the Falin a few centuries earlier. The Falin tribes fled further eastwards, allowing the Kori tribes to access vital river systems, where they began fishing.

With the Falin's exodus to the eastern coast of the island, the Kori kingdom's further expansion was focused on the Tatsi tribes in the southern lands of Kisiwa. Two incursions by the Kori resulted in the Tatsi tribes falling under the domination of the Kori. Hundreds of Tatsi were forced to work in the King's court, and hundreds

of others were ordered to work in the households of other affluent Kori families. In the wake of this victory, a sizable portion of the Kori population moved southwards and settled in the previously Tatsi-owned lands, which later became part of the country of Rimoso.

The Arab Immigration to Kisiwa

In the 1070s, the Berber Almoravid Dynasty of North Africa started establishing itself on the northern portion of the island, interacting with the Damangi and smaller ethno-linguistic communities there, eventually converting the great majority of these populations to Islam. While Islam spread throughout the northern portion of the island, it was contained to this area due to the heavy mountain range that separates the northern and central parts of Kisiwa. While the Damangi soon became part of the Dynasty, attempts at capturing the faiths and loyalties of the Kori and Mosanja were unsuccessful, and the great majority continued to follow their ancestral religions.

By the mid-1100, the Dynasty was steadily declining. The Damangi converts retained Islam and consequently, successfully thwarted attempts by Christian missionaries to convert them in the centuries that would later follow.

The Mosanja Opposition


The west of Kisiwa, settled by the Mosanja was conducive to profitable cotton cultivation. This, along with the profits of the Mosanja items of artisanship including copperware, pottery and ivory, allowed this group to accumulate significant wealth. The Mosanja not only traded with their neighbours, but established lucrative trading relationships with spice merchants *en route* to India from the Aksumite Empire of north-eastern Africa starting from 3 BC until well into the first century AD. With their growing prosperity, the Mosanja were the only people who could contend with the Kori.

For the most part, this tribe did not suffer the threat of the Kori who were content with dominating groups with weaker leadership. In fact, the strong chiefdom of the Mosanja enjoyed the utmost respect from the Kori kingdom, who needed access to the vibrant Mosanja ports. It was only around 1450 that King Akusa sent warriors to expel the Mosanja from the mouth of the Hudi River. The Kori attack failed, and the Mosanja blocked off access to their ports. While the kingdom had access to seaports by means of their dominance of the Tatsi, these ports were less frequented by traders and merchants. Thus, in 1457, King Akusa presented part of the Kori land to the Mosanja in exchange for access to the ports.

The Disintegration of the Kori Kingdom

The Kori kingdom's failed attempt at conquering Mosanja land and the allocation of some of its territory to the Mosanja under King Akusa marked the beginning of the deterioration of the Kori kingdom. During his reign, it became apparent that the King and his court lacked the military astuteness and ruling strength of their predecessors. Before long, court revenues began to decline as traders evaded taxes, and poor discipline devastated the ranks of the Kori army. The kingdom was thrown into turmoil as successive rulers struggled to re-establish order. Eventually, groups that had been subordinated to the kingdom revolted and sought to re-establish their self-rule.

However, the kingdom continued to fight for their dominance. Around 1520, in an attempt to restore their military dominance, the Kori attacked the Damangi with the aim of capturing parts of the land that eventually became the country of Sumora. The Damangi, by now under the control of the Ottoman Empire, fought off the Kori army. Also during these same years, the Damangi expelled Kori that had settled in their midst, but



had never integrated into Damangi society. As the Kori retreated, Damangi populations moved south, seizing kingdom land and settling around the interior of the country that has become Katasi. Even with this weakening of the Kori society on the island, the Kori leaders remained the most influential leadership on the island.

The Exploration and Colonization of the Island of Kisiwa


Around 1430, Azurian explorers began arriving on the island in search of vital resources and wealth. On their arrival, they first came into contact with Falin and Tatsi populations living along the central eastern coastline of the country that has become Carana. Along these shores, the Azurians established trading posts that would allow them to trade and ship out resources found on the island. Along with the Azurian traders on the island were Christian missions that converted local populations to Christianity.

By the 1440s, Azurians began enslaving the African populations on the island who were transported through ports on the Gulf of Carana. Azurian slavers were aided by the Falin who, in exchange for guns, gunpowder and other supplies, identified Tatsi communities for capturing and exploitation, including some who had already been captured by the Falin from the south of modern-day Carana and northern Rimoso. This betrayal of the Tatsi by the Falin established a deep hostility between the two populations. It also led to sporadic attacks and purging of Falin who lived among the Tatsi for the centuries that followed.

The Azurians also established trading posts on the western coast of the island, where they settled amongst the Mosanja population. They traded with the Mosanja, who were rich with the resources sought by the Azurians. Christian missionaries also accompanied the Azurian traders on this coast, and the Mosanja population was quick to embrace the teachings of the missionaries.

There were also battles between the indigenous populations of the island, especially between the Damangi and the Barini and Hanari Falin subgroups in the north of the island. While all of these populations were Muslim, ethnic conflict between the Damangi and Falin forced tens of thousands of Falin to flee to Carana in the 1860s. While people of the Falin tribes were already in the majority in Carana, these Falin were of the Christian faith. This flow of Muslim Falin into Carana was the first major introduction of Islam to the country of Carana, even though there were Arab Muslims settled within the country.

The Partition of the Island of Kisiwa




By the 1600s, foreign interests had proliferated in Kisiwa. Powerbrokers from not only the Azurian Empire, but also from the Carmine Empire and the Sabelian Empire had firmly established their presence on the island and controlled different parts of Kisiwa. Disputes and attacks arose between different nationalities over control of the island's offerings, and wars between rivals elsewhere in the world were mirrored on the island. This lasted several centuries.

In 1882, colonial powers convened to demarcate the areas of control and to formally end self-rule on Kisiwa, with the signing of the *Treaty of Salin*, where the modern boundaries of the territories of Kisiwa were drawn. Carana, Katasi and North Namuna went to the Azurian Empire, Rimoso and South Namuna to the Carmine Empire, and Sumora to the Sabelian Empire.

Subsequent to the 1882 Treaty of Salin, the other colonial powers began enforcing the agreed upon boundaries, although they encountered great resistance in some of the countries by populations that had previously enjoyed relative freedom of movement across the demarcated borders. This was especially the case in Katasi, where the Kori had fiercely fought to avoid subjugation. Their most significant victories were in 1886 and 1887, when the Kori in Katasi defeated two Azurian contingents. The Kori were eventually suppressed partly due to the betrayal of the Tatsi who harboured great resentment for their use as slaves in

prior centuries. So, while the Azurians fought to consolidate their power in Katasi, the Tatsi acted as spies, alerting the Azurians to areas where pockets of organized resistance by the Kori were planned.



The Azurian rule of its colonies aimed at establishing strong Azurian institutions, complete with mandatory use of Azurian language and currency. These actions came as a surprise to the indigenous populations of their colonies. The effects of the Azurian regime were difficult for the Kori in the colony of Carana. These Kori were the descendants of those who were first isolated from the Kori kingdom when the border was established between Katasi and Carana. Ever since the boundary was established, the Kori had resented colonial rule and had organized many revolts and riots against Azurian authorities who would not let them cross the border. The Kori had strong traditional ties and customs that were negatively impacted by the arbitrary establishment of the boundaries.

The World Wars

In the first decades of the 20th century, the world was engulfed by the First World War and the events leading up to it. Kisiwa was no exception. In 1914, the Entente Powers attacked the coastline of Sumora, since the Sabelian Empire was sympathetic to the Central Powers. The Azurians, who had authority over Carana, lent their support by allowing the Entente forces to use their radio signal towers and sea ports as necessary. In 1915, Azuria and Carmina (formerly of the Carmine Empire) joined the First World War on the side of the Entente Powers. The Entente Powers were never able to gain a strong foothold in Sumora, but fighting in the rest of the world led to the defeat of the Central Powers and its allies, including the Sabelian Empire. After this defeat of 1918, Sumora fell under a Class B League of Nations Mandate, under the administration of Carmine authorities, later becoming a United Nations Trust Territory in 1945.


Upon their arrival in Sumora, Carmina established good relations with some of its indigenous populations, specifically the Falin that largely composed the public service and administrative positions dating back to the

Sabelian rule. Carmine relations with the Damangi people were much more frigid. While the Damangi family of tribes comprised the majority of the population, the Falin inhabited more of the areas where the foreign powers were established, mainly along the Eastern coastline. This resulted in the colonial powers giving responsibilities and allocating power in Sumora to the Falin and not the Damangi.

During the Second World War, Carmine and Azurian forces were able to rely on the support of tens of thousands of soldiers from their colonies in Kisiwa who fought in the Middle East, the Far East and in Eastern Africa. The families of these servicemen were provided family allowances that allowed them to survive while their family members were away. These allowances helped to invigorate the economy of the island, especially Rimosa, from where the biggest portion of the soldiers came. Meanwhile, a high demand for agricultural and livestock products also advantaged Rimosa's economy. After the Second World War, having greatly benefited from the war-economy, the colonies' economies continued to transform. In Rimosa, it became obvious that the return of troops from abroad meant a presence of skilled ex- service people that benefited the public service.

The Process of Decolonization

In the second half of the twentieth century, the territories of Kisiwa, along with much of the rest of Africa, began a period of decolonization. The pressure to decolonize came from growing opposition to colonial rule in Kisiwa, as well as from a decline in the power of the remaining global empires. Independence was achieved by a variety of means, from negotiation to revolt.



Decolonization in Rimosa was gradual and relatively tranquil. Ever since Carmine authorities colonized Rimosa in the 17th century, there had been only small-scale revolts against the authorities. The Carmine rule was never seriously threatened and the relationship between Carmina and the indigenous population had been largely without friction. Carmine rule had infringed relatively little on traditional social structures (in

comparison to other regions in Kisiwa and mainland Africa). In fact, authorities greatly depended on traditional forms of leadership and structure to implement their rule. As early as the 1920s, responsibilities became increasingly decentralized, and little by little through constitutions and treaties, power was transferred to the hands of the indigenous populations. In the early 1950s, Carmine authorities and the people in Rimosa started preparing for self-governance. Independence Day, September 4, 1957, was marked by a grand parade down the streets of Yudifa where African leaders and Carmine leaders walked side by side. This drew wide media coverage and others from around Kisiwa that hoped to achieve independence.

Independence in Katasi was achieved through great struggle. Conditions on the ground had deteriorated such that in 1955, the principal Azurian colonial capital was transferred from Nanom in Katasi to Galasi in Carana. After years of fighting, in 1958 the colonial authorities held a referendum on self-government within the Azurian Community. Recognizing the need for greater self-rule, Azuria had created the Azurian Community of States in January 1958. The revolutionary leaders denounced this and urged the population to vote against it; the People's Republic of Katasi was pronounced that same year on July 26, 1958. During the fight for independence, the revolutionary leaders had managed to convince the populace that the Kori royal family was outdated and that if they were allowed to continue to rule, they would impede the nation's progress. These elements derided King Muta Dagbi IV as a weak and ineffective leader who would hinder Katasi's growth and development, and after independence, they swiftly moved to dissolve the monarchy. The Kori royal family fled into Namuna where they were welcomed by King Mambose Asana III. Deposed King Dagbi IV died in exile two years later in 1960. His family, however, remained in Namuna.

Throughout the 1950s the agitation for independence had dominated the agenda of the North Namuna elite. However, unlike in Katasi, these were not violent events. Rather, natives who had been educated in Azuria and had become versed in the Azurian governing system led the call for independence. Their leader, Mambose Asana III joined Joseph Uroma (of Carana) at the Azurian National Assembly in 1958. That same year, when given the opportunity in a referendum to become an autonomous republic within the framework of the Azurian Community, the north voted in favour of the proposal, its name changing to the Kingdom of Namuna, with Mambose Asana III becoming the first fully independent king. Full independence was attained two years later on May 28, 1960.

In South Namuna, even though the Mosanja did not engage Carmina in long battles, there were enough revolts against them that by 1958, Carmina was ready to hand over administration to the natives. The attainment of Independence by Rimosa and others stimulated events in both North and South Namuna. Sankwaduro Mosindiga, a brilliant lawyer from poor roots found widespread support both among the masses and the elite of South Namuna. As chair of the Free People's Party, he pushed for two successive constitutions in 1954 and 1958 that increasingly granted more powers to the Mosanja. The 1954 Constitution laid the groundwork for complete self rule and led to the proclamation of independence on July 20, 1961 as the Republic of Mosana.

Inspired by events elsewhere on the island, both African and Arab populations in Sumora increased their call for independence. Having won the support of Sumorans, Baliru Amadi led a popular independence movement in the country, which he hoped could remain non-violent. But in September 1956, after protesters in Babani were assaulted by Carmine authorities during a rally against the colonial rule, Amadi urged his supporters to pick-up arms and seek justice and independence for Sumora. Riots and attacks against Carmine rule quickly ensued, and after seven years of fighting, independence was achieved on 25 June 1963, and the colony became the Islamic Republic of Sumora.

Carana became a member of the short-lived Azurian Community of States. Despite this status, internal political pressure and domestic political opposition continued to grow in the country. Public agitation and dissent sparked by various groups and associations in the urban areas increased demand for full independence


from the Azurian Empire. These protests were led by the charismatic Joseph Uroma, their representative to the Azurian National Assembly. Ultimately on April 10, 1962, after calls for self-rule had continually grown louder, the Azurian Empire relented and granted full independence to the *République démocratique de Carana*, Uroma becoming the first indigenous head of state of the country.

Geographic Overview

The island of Kisiwa lies in the Indian Ocean, approximately 100km from the horn of Africa across the Gulf of Kisiwa to the northwest, and about 100km to the Seychelles archipelago to the southeast. It straddles the Equator (00° latitude), and is centred at approximately 55° E longitude. It measures approximately 1,600km from east to west, and 1,300km from north to south. It has a land area of approximately 1,404,941 km². It features a diversity of terrain, from desert to rainforest, and from rugged mountains to level coastal plains. The highest feature on the island is Mount Katasi (1,917m).



Geologically, Kisiwa sits on the north-eastern edge of the Horn of Africa subplate, southwest of the Carlsberg Ridge in the Indian Ocean. It forms one of the 12 distinct physiographic provinces of the South African Platform physiographic division. Kisiwa originated as part of the Gondwana supercontinent. Its west coast was formed when Africa broke off from Gondwana around 165 million years ago.



Kisiwa is rugged and mountainous, with three principal ranges separated by major rivers. The northern and southern halves of the island are separated by the Namu River flowing southwest through Lake Namuna into the Gulf of Kisiwa, and the Lonari River flowing northeast into the Indian Ocean. To the north, the Sumoran highlands rise gradually from the southwest towards the north-eastern coast, to an elevation of about 1,100m. To the south, the mountain range is divided by the Hudi River, running north to south.

To the west, a long ridge covers central Mosana, reaching elevations of almost 1,500m; to the east, another ridge runs north of the Torongo River, reaching elevations of almost 2,000m in central Katasi. South of the Torongo River, a range of low hills covers most of Rimosa.

Because of rainfall patterns and elevation, almost all of the major river systems empty into the ocean along the southern and eastern coasts. Most of these rivers meander across broad flood plains, terminating in estuarine deltas. Most of the major rivers permit navigation part-way into the island's interior by riverine and small coastal craft. Lake Namuna is a large freshwater lake of 19,529 km².

Kisiwa consists of six independent states, which may be described geographically as follows:

Carana (108,417 km²) situated along the east coast, between the Torongo River and the Kalesi River, and including the Mogave River and Kodari River systems; diverse terrain includes coastal savannah, montane rainforest, and rocky desert uplands.

Katasi (81,205 km²): landlocked country in the interior, including moist lowland areas to either side of a relatively arid dividing mountain range.

Mosana (403,322 km²): situated along the south-western coast; a rugged montane jungle interior, with fertile land along the southern shores of Lake Namuna; bordered to the north by Lake Namuna and the Namu River, and to the east by the Hudi River; the Dila River and Kasapi River systems create extensive coastal wetlands to the south.

Namuna (267,770 km²): situated along the north-western coast, with a rugged and hilly coastline; fertile land along the northern shores of Lake Namuna; bordered to the south by Lake Namuna and the Namu River.

Rimosa (225,288 km²): situated along the south-eastern coast, consisting primarily of gentle hills with a mixture of grassland savannah and rainforest; bordered to the west by the Hudi River, and to the north by the Torongo River.

Sumora (315,939 km²): situated along the north-eastern coast, with a barren, rugged and hilly northern coastline; coastal highlands rise steeply from the northern littoral, dropping gradually to the Lonari River valley in the south; the hills of the Gasi peninsula rise steeply between the Lonari River and the Kalesi River which forms the southern border.

Infrastructure Overview

Although relatively rich with natural resources, the states of Kisiwa reflect a level of economic development not significantly different from most of the rest of Africa. All six Kisiwa states have lacked the capital necessary to develop modern infrastructure for transport and delivery of services. The basic distribution of ports, rail lines and roads have changed little since colonial times, and in some cases reflect the pre-existing political divisions.

As the geography tends towards shallow coastal waters, shoaling, sedimentation and marshy river deltas, Kisiwa has relatively few natural harbours, which are located mostly along the southern coast. Some other locations, while geographically advantageous, are located away from population centres, or too close to historically volatile national borders.

The Mosana port of Kuku is the largest and busiest seaport on the island, followed by the Rimosa port of Yudifa. Kuku has a capacity to handle approximately 4.5 million tonnes of cargo. In 2008, the total volume handled at Kuku was approximately 2.45 million tonnes. Total cargo landed was 1.3 million tonnes, while that shipped was 0.7 million tonnes, with 450,000 tonnes accounting for transshipment. Yudifa's handling capacity is approximately 3.45 million tonnes. In 2008, 1.65 million tonnes of cargo was handled. Out of this approximately 0.9 million tonnes was landed, while 0.5 million tonnes was shipped. Transshipment amounted to 250,000 tonnes.

There are numerous small ports along the coast of Kisiwa, visited by coastal vessels plying both internal and international trade. Coastal trade provides an alternative to often poorly-maintained road systems, and inadequate rail networks. The majority of coastal traffic consists of break-bulk cargo, loaded and unloaded by cranes, or occasionally by human muscle.

Water access to the interior is provided by a number of river systems, in particular the Torongo and northern Torongo rivers, emptying into the Gulf of Carana, the Namu River, emptying into Mosana Bay through Lake Namura, and the Lonari River, flowing northeast into the Indian Ocean. All inland waterways are limited by overhead obstructions and elevation features such as rapids and waterfalls which impacts the size and draught of vessels they can carry.

Road transport in Kisiwa is based on a series of national road networks of differing standards and with varying levels of connectivity. The best road on the island is known as the "Coastal Highway" connecting Kuku in Mosana with Yudifa in Rimosa; for most of its distance it is a modern paved two-lane highway, well-maintained and engineered for speeds of 100 km/h. Both countries have other paved roads connecting most of their major communities. Sumora, Carana, and Namuna have fewer paved roads, and Katasi has fewer still. The rugged northern coast of Sumora still lacks a single paved road connecting the small communities along its length.

Rail transport on the island connects Mosana with Namuna and Rimosa, Namuna with Sumora, and Rimosa with southern Carana. However, there is no single rail network connecting all states or their major communities and ports. In addition, the difference between the Carmine (1,067 mm) gauge used by Rimosa and Mosana, and the Azurian (1,000 mm) gauge used by Carana, Namuna, Katasi and Sumora imposes further problems. (Katasi's rail system is effectively obsolete, and no longer connected to the 1,000mm network in Sumora and Namuna.)

Like many islands, Kisiwa ultimately depends on air traffic for the rapid movement of people and products. Each national capital has an international airport. Of these, Nanom can only be reached via Kuku, Yudifa or Galasi. National carriers fly regularly between the various capitals and the African mainland, with the Mosana capital Kuku being the island's principal hub. Kuku has regularly scheduled flights to Europe, North America, Asia and various African destinations.

Kuku International Airport (Mosana) is also the largest airport on the island, and with Yudifa, is capable of handling most large commercial aircraft. The other national and international airports are limited to medium-sized aircraft (e.g. Boeing 737). Many major airports are dual-use facilities, sharing runways and other services with their national Air Forces. All countries have a number of more or less austere airstrips and other minor facilities suitable for light aircraft and some military tactical airlift (e.g. C-130).

Each country in Kisiwa has at least one commercial air carrier, often wholly or partially state-owned, and operating fleets of varying size, age and reliability. (Some are on the list of airlines banned within the European Union) There are also a number of charter services (both fixed and rotary wing), primarily serving the natural resource industries.

Island of Kisiwa Geopolitical Considerations

Post-independence relations among the six states of Kisiwa can be characterised as largely stable, if chilly, with rare outbursts of hostilities. All six countries have a shared history of colonialism and have confronted similar challenges in the post-colonial era and this set of common problems has led to cooperative efforts such as the creation of Economic Cooperation Organization of Kisiwa (ECOK) in 1991. The island's qualified successes often appear to be fragile because of the numerous issues that simmer beneath the surface of island politics.

Potential for intra-Kisiwa tensions play out against a backdrop of historical factors that have shaped the politics and relations among states on the island in the post-independence era. These underlying realities have the potential to flare up, and cause instability and insecurity on the island. If this were to happen, the most likely flashpoint would likely be in Carana, where latent tension lay just beneath the surface.

Political issues

Potential for friction on Kisiwa is heavily influenced by both the similarities and differences in the political experiences of the island's six states. During the colonial period, the relative power structure on the island was forever altered as the Kori lost their dominant status in the central and eastern sections of Kisiwa and other tribes rose to power within the new political boundaries, such as the Falin in Sumora and Carana. Similarly, inter-tribal relationships were fundamentally altered such as the Falin's history of enslaving and selling Tatsi to the colonizing forces from Azuria and elsewhere. This exploitative relationship scarred Falin-Tatsi relations and continues to be felt today in the form of deep rooted animosities between the two groups. In the past, this bitter relationship has spilled over to affect Carana-Katasi relations through localised ethnic disputes almost automatically drawing in tribal relations across the border. The potential to do so again is always great.

Second, these varying colonial experiences have led to differing approaches to maintaining and managing relations with former colonial powers. Despite the injustices and indignities of colonial rule, both Carana and Rimosa, for example, have maintained mostly cordial and cooperative relations with their former rulers (Azuria and Carmina, respectively), whereas Katasi and, to a lesser extent, Sumora have shunned close relations with Azuria (Katasi) and Carmina (Sumora). These histories have had profound consequences for each country. In the case of Carana and Rimosa, relatively close relations with Azuria and Carmina have meant some measure of protection in the UN Security Council, where the former colonial powers sit as permanent members. It has also meant access to slightly better military equipment and training, although both Azuria and Carmina have been very selective with the type and amount of military assistance offered to their respective former colonies.

Conversely, for example, Katasi and Sumora have greatly limited formal connections to their respective former rulers. In the case of Katasi, it is almost an isolationist policy based on a firm rejection of Azuria playing any substantive role in Katasi's political life. This stems from its especially unhappy period of Azurian rule and the violent campaign for independence. Katasi has made few efforts to build supportive relationships with other governments, including its neighbours. This has often left Katasi with no chance of generous aid packages from Azuria or Azurian allies when it has suffered from the volatility of international commodity markets. During the Cold War, Katasi's situation was sufficiently grim that it found itself briefly dependent on the eastern bloc for financial and military assistance. Sumora has likewise pursued a more aloof posture *vis-à-vis* Carmina but more for reasons associated with its theocratic governance model than its violent struggle for independence. Sumora has largely ignored Carmina as a source of guidance and support over the years in large part because its religious leaders made the decision to broaden and deepen Sumora's relations with other Muslim states and other developing countries soon after independence in an act of solidarity and as a symbolic rejection of the

Carmina's development models and priorities. Both Azuria and Carmina have established diplomatic relations with Katasi and Sumora, but, in both cases, these are minimal and perfunctory, as relations are cool and lacking any substance on most issues.

Third, relations among the island's six countries are also influenced by another legacy of differing colonial experiences: language. As is the case in other post-colonial settings, the Kisiwa states can be split between English and French language camps. While island tensions are not directly attributable to this divide, it is a subtle factor in inter-state relations and much more of a factor in influencing relations with other actors off the island. In the case of inter-state relations on Kisiwa, the English-French divide plays out much like it does between the sources of the divide: Azuria and Carmina. There are occasional differences about the language of correspondence, official language status at conferences and perceived language-based blocs on certain issues (usually minor in nature). Off the island, as noted above, the language divide manifests itself differing membership to post-colonial organizations that are *de facto* language based. This leads to different networks and commercial relations and different perspectives on issues. Also, this has an impact on how the governments on Kisiwa engage with larger international organizations that are composed of language-based caucuses.

The fourth political background issue concerns the long-standing practice of some countries giving shelter to political opponents of sitting governments. The idea of neighbours providing safe places of exile or sanctuary to political opponents or rebel groups is not unique to Kisiwa, but it has certainly poisoned relations in the past and remains an everyday irritant in inter-state relations.

Otherwise, there are two high profile cases amongst Kisiwa countries. In the first case, Katasi and Rimosa are at odds over a number of small islands in the upper Torongo River. Confusion over ownership of the islands is traced back to colonial times and the vague and conflicting agreements reached separately by the Azurian and Carmine regimes with local groups, exacerbated further by changes in the river channels caused by natural and man-made erosion. Today, this colonial legacy makes life difficult for the local populations as they struggle to exploit the river's resources and boat traffic without clear lines of border demarcation and governmental authority. The second case involves competing claims by Katasi, Namuna and Mosana to access to the Namu River. This river forms part of the border between these three states and is one of the largest on the island, but it is not fully navigable and can only accommodate small to medium sized river craft. This has led to tremendous pressure from all users to have maximum access to the river's few docking facilities, fishing and resource rights and freedom of movement through some of the river's key bottleneck points. Given its landlocked status, Katasi is especially sensitive to these river access issues.

Religious and Ethnic Factors

Kisiwa is an ethnically and religiously diverse island that was arbitrarily split into six countries by former colonial powers which has domestic and regional implications. In recent history, there have been significant economic migrants, internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees changing the ethnic make-up of certain regions. While none of these ethno-religious tensions have led to full scale war in recent times or to the toppling of a sitting government, the potential for instability remains great.

Military Issues

Five of the six nations in Kisiwa possess militaries of similar size, suggesting a relative equilibrium between them. The exception to this belongs to the Kingdom of Namuna, at roughly 25,000 personnel in uniform, some 11,000 more than its closest rival, Mosana. But, most analysts conclude that Namuna's military, like most others on the island, is poorly trained, equipped and motivated, thereby negating much of its numerical

advantage. Its military, like those of Katasi, Sumora and Mosana, is a conscription-based force. The militaries of Carana and Rimosa are similarly sized and all-volunteer forces that are largely equipped with slightly more modern Western equipment, courtesy of their former colonial rulers and other western allies. The Rimosan military is seen to be the best trained of the six militaries (a reflection of its continued ties with Carmina) but Mosana's military is considered to be the most effective by virtue of its slightly larger numbers, better resources and sufficient training. This perceived overall advantage between these states is, however, slight and all of the governments recognise that an all-out conflict with any neighbour would be terribly costly, regardless of which country would "win". The impact of war would be particularly damaging to civilian populations, given the poor standards of training and discipline of the armies involved and the ethnic and religious factors that would likely be at the centre of any conflict.

Beyond their national capacities, however, some of the countries on Kisiwa do have extra resources available to them that might tip the balance in the event of conflict. First, Carana and Rimosa are exploring talks with Mosana about the possibility of conducting joint military exercises in the future. This is perceived as a means to signal to Katasi their collective resolve to contain Katasi's inability or unwillingness to stem its territory being used as a source of much of the illegal smuggling and trafficking on the island. One should keep in mind, however, that Carana's government must also confront domestic opposition to any crack down on smuggling from Katasi because many of the smuggled goods transit through Carana's ports destined for points abroad. Any effort to reduce this flow of goods will run into opposition from both legitimate and illegitimate interests in Carana.

Also, both Carana and Rimosa have standing military agreements with their former colonial powers. Since 2002, Carana has had a defence and military agreement in place with Azuria that gives Carana access to better equipment and training through a joint decision-making process involving both countries. As part of the accord, Azurian troops can be deployed into Carana at the request of the Caranese government, but only in the face of external aggression that endangers Carana's sovereignty. For its part, Rimosa has a similar arrangement with Carmina, but this arrangement is governed by a military assistance agreement involving the loose association of former Carmine colonies and Carmina itself. There are substantial numbers of Carmine military personnel assigned to Rimosan units as advisors and trainers and the Carmine military is a regular visitor to Rimosan ports, bases and airfields. While not a formal collective defence agreement, this arrangement is still controversial for many Rimosans because of the neo-colonial undertones. Neighbouring Katasi has repeatedly denounced the Caranese and Rimosan agreements on the same grounds and characterised them as potential threats to Katasi interests.

Economic Issues

All of the countries on Kisiwa are poor and under-developed and share a history of colonial exploitation that has left all of the six economies at the mercy of continental and international commodity markets or dependent on foreign assistance. While there are a few positive indicators on the economic front, most of the countries on Kisiwa are under tremendous economic pressures which, in turn, can exacerbate if not cause political tensions to rise or conflicts to erupt. The small economic elite of all countries continue to widen their income gap with their fellow citizens and it is not lost on anyone that those wealthy few are closely connected to the ruling parties or families in each country. National foreign debt loads are also on the rise in most Kisiwa countries and this has only added to the pain of national treasuries.

The successes are Mosana, and to a lesser extent, Namuna, where GDP per capita figures are respectable and growth rates, are impressive (5 % and 3.5 % respectively). Both governments, Mosana in particular, continue to make infrastructure investments, modestly pay down debt and pursue international trading opportunities. Rimosa and Sumora are not doing as well as their western neighbours, but their respective economies are still

growing at modest rates and the unemployment figures remain stable, though high. The real problem rests with Carana and Katasi. Both countries are facing economic challenges that put them at risk of total economic collapse with far-reaching consequences for their other Kisiwa neighbours.

Carana is struggling with the after-effects of disastrous structural adjustment policies that were imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the 1980s and chronic mismanagement by the PDC, which has ruled Carana since independence in 1962. High unemployment (38%), corruption and successive failed policies have driven citizen frustration and anxiety levels to new highs in recent years and feed a growing underground economy that has deep ties to other illicit markets on Kisiwa and internationally. Most importantly, underground and criminal economic activity has become a regional reality with Katasi, Rimosa and Sumora. As noted above, Katasi is one of the principal sources of regional instability on Kisiwa and this is largely a result of the dire economic conditions within it. The economy is shrinking by almost 3.5% per year and the unemployment rate stands at an astonishing 45%. If these conditions persist, Carana and Katasi have the potential to infect their neighbours through growing and unchecked regional criminal activity, increasing societal stresses that draw in cross-border tribal relations and dampen international investors' inclinations to move projects forward in other Kisiwa countries, let alone Katasi and Carana.

Any efforts by Carana or Katasi to reverse their untenable course will have to involve greater domestic stability for Carana and a crack-down on illegal activity by the Katasi government as a necessary first step to restoring the formal markets in both countries and to attracting potential foreign investors who will be critical to any plans to develop each country's natural resources. But, both Carana and Katasi will have to play catch-up with their neighbours in terms of promoting and pursuing international trading opportunities, starting with their fellow Economic Community Organisation of Kisiwa (ECOK) members. Both countries have failed to capitalise on the few international trading opportunities on offer since the end of the Cold War relative to their Kisiwa neighbours, and this, in part, explains their current economic plight.

Environmental and Geographical Issues

Kisiwa's tropical climate is not immune to the effects of global climate change. Specifically, recent data suggest a marked increase in the strength of storms that hit the island, especially the south and eastern coasts. This has resulted in increased rainfall that has caused floods in the agricultural regions and stronger than usual winds that have caused great damage to residential shelters and infrastructure. However, there is less rainfall between the storms and few of the storms reach the plains of Sumora. Drought in this country is a growing concern.

Geography has appeared as an issue already, in the context of Katasi's landlocked status and this fact contributes to Katasi aggressively pursuing border and river access disputes with most of its neighbours. Geography, however, plays at least two more noteworthy roles in relations among Kisiwa's six countries. First, the mountains in the eastern half of the island that straddle the borders of Carana, Rimosa, Katasi and Sumora provide the rough terrain favoured by rebel and criminal groups for sanctuary and smuggling routes. Second, the close proximity of Kisiwa to mainland Africa and the island's rugged and sparsely populated and rarely patrolled coastline has become a favoured secondary base of operations for mainland-based pirates and international smuggling operations (primarily, drugs but also weapons and people).

Economic Community Organisation of Kisiwa (ECOK)

History of Cooperation and the Birth of ECOK

The person who first introduced the notion of inter-state cooperation on the island of Kisiwa was former President Johnson Robongo of Rimoso, who during his Presidency strongly advocated for an increase in economic cooperation amongst Rimoso and its neighbouring States (Mosana, Carana and Katasi). This President held that the vitality of the Rimosan economy was contingent with its ability to open its borders to neighbouring states. After his Presidency, Johnson Robongo decided to push for the creation of a sub-regional framework that would make possible the creation of economic agreements between States on the island.

For several years, meetings and conferences were organized to discuss and eventually plan the creation of an economic framework that would enable inter-state cooperation of states on the island.

In July 1984, leaders and Heads of States of the countries of Mosana, Sumora, Namuna, Rimoso and Carana met in Galasi (Carana) to establish the Kisiwa Cooperation Union (KCU). This new organisation had the mandate to make easier the economic cooperation between its Member States with the purpose of increasing growth and development on the island. Due to the political regime of the Government of Katasi, its representatives declined all invitations to participate in the discussions on the economic community.

While the Union was formally created, it never received the funding from its Member-States that would have allowed for its full institutionalization. Only a few meetings and Summits were organized under the banner of the KCU, and they never resulted in decisions or agreements between the Member States due to political differences.

After severe economic hardship in parts of Kisiwa during the 1970s and 1980s, and with the global order veering heavily towards open markets, the Kisiwa Heads of State, including Katasi, got together to create a new Regional Economic Community that would take the place of the KCU. On July 24, 1991, the Treaty for the Establishment of the Economic Community Organisation of Kisiwa (ECOK) was signed by all six States of Kisiwa during this first Kisiwa Summit.

Overview of ECOK

The ECOK Member States comprise Carana, Katasi, Mosana, Namuna, Rimoso and Sumora. The seat of ECOK is in Kuku, the capital of Mosana.

ECOK has become one of the Regional Economic Community (RECs) pillars of the African Economic Community (AEC), as it has met the prerequisites of the AEC Treaty. ECOK however is not a part of the African Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union; its role is purely economic in nature, and even in this it has achieved relatively little success.

The aim of ECOK is to increase the standard of living of the peoples of Kisiwa by facilitating economic cooperation and integration between Member States. During the Summit of Heads of State in 2001, the priorities of ECOK were articulated as follows:

- To increase economic ties and partnerships between Member States, and;
- To establish and promote common strategies for socio-economic development.

The main organs of ECOK are the Summit of the Heads of State and Leaders, the Council of Ministers, the Secretariat, the Consultative Assembly and several Specialized Commissions.

The *ECOK Summit* is comprised of the Heads of States of all Member States to the Community. The Summit meets once a year, though extra-ordinary sessions can be held. The Summit establishes the overall policy directions of the Community, with the purpose of seeing the achievement of the Community's objectives. A Chairperson is elected from the Heads of State for a year-long term.

The current Chairperson of the ECOK Summit is President Baba Sulumani of Sumora. The current deputy Chairperson is King Awuda Baga of Namuna.

The *ECOK Council of Ministers* is comprised of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (or of the Ministry responsible for ECOK affairs) of each Member State, as well as another Minister of the choice of each Member State. The Council of Ministers can create subordinate Working Groups to examine and propose policy implementation options or to consider further technical issues. The Council gives recommendations, regulations and directives related to ECOK policy implementation. The Council of Ministers meets twice a year.

The *ECOK Secretariat* implements the decisions of the Summit, and the regulations of the Council of Ministers. The Secretariat is led by a Secretary-General who is supported by three deputy secretaries-general responsible for the departments of Trade, Development and Agriculture, and of Administration, Human Resources and Finance, and of Specialized Commissions. The Secretary-General is elected for a term of four years, renewable once. The Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Community, and monitors the implementation of policy decisions made by the Summit, and monitor the operations of the Specialized Commissions.

The Current Secretary Général of ECOK is Wawa Mansa, a Rimosan.

The *ECOK Consultative Assembly* consists of 12 representatives from each Member-State that advise the Summit of Heads of State, as well as the Council of Ministers, as required or requested.


The *ECOK Specialized Commissions* assist in the implementation of programmes of the Community, and are established by the Summit. Each Commission is comprised of three representatives of each Member-State. The current Commissions of ECOK are:

- Agriculture, Water-Management and the Environment;
- Trade, Customs and Economic Integration;
- Human Resources, Development and Technology;
- Transport, Infrastructure and Communications.

In 1999, ECOK established the Kisiwa Trade and Development Bank (KTDB).

Following the Maputo Declaration (July 2003) on infectious diseases by the AU's Assembly, ECOK's Council of Minister's established, in November 2003, a standing working group to provide a coordinated approach for ECOK members in implementing their various unilateral and multilateral programmes. This would allow the organisation to benefit from newly available international sources of funding related to infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. AU and UN officials have been putting pressure on ECOK and its Member States to develop and implement common programmes aimed at the public health crises of the island.

The main organs of ECOK are as follows:



ECOK is important to the six Kisiwa states for its symbolic value of being a creation of the six states for the six states. In practical terms, however, its importance and relevance to the types of challenges facing its six members is highly questionable. This assertion is largely supported by a quick review of ECOK's record of accomplishments since its creation in 1991. ECOK can claim a number of modest successes such as a slight increase in intra-Kisiwa trade between Mosana, Namuna and Rimoso. It also succeeded in coaxing Katasi to open itself to trading with its neighbours, or at least providing Katasi a platform for building new trading relationships as its traditional east bloc partners retreat from their preferential policies for Katasi. These achievements, however, pale in comparison with the magnitude of the need for greater intra-Kisiwa trade as a critical channel for speedier and durable economic development on Kisiwa. Moreover, the fact that Sumora, while an ECOK member, continues to focus on building trading relations with non-ECOK partners suggests that there remains deep seated problems in ECOK's current structure or processes.

INTERNATIONAL GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS

African Inter-Regional Geopolitical Dynamics

The Kisiwa States' ties with mainland Africa are various, reaching across the cultural, economic and political spheres. Still, the six Kisiwa countries have had a restricted influence internationally and with the mainland, due to its remoteness and relative population size.

Kisiwa Countries and the African Union

All Kisiwa countries were Member States of the Organisation of African Unity, and are currently members of the African Union (AU); the government of the six States have signed the *Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000)* over the course of 2001 and have been to a more or lesser extent, active members of the AU since its establishment in 2002. All Kisiwa Heads of State (more often than the countries' Heads of Government) meet with their counterparts at the Assembly, the Kisiwa Foreign Ministers sit on the Executive Council, and ambassadors to Addis Ababa sit on the Permanent Representatives Committee. Elected representatives of the six Kisiwa countries occupy seats at the Pan-African Parliament, along with the representatives of the other Member States. No Kisiwa national has yet to hold a high-rank position within the African Union's main bodies. Kisiwa nationals are present in various AU projects, task forces and networks at the continental and sub-regional level.

The governments of the Kisiwa countries are State Parties to numerous OAU/AU treaties, and have occasionally played an active role in their development. The Government of Mosana has been particularly active in the drafting and lobbying relating to some agreements, most importantly 1999's *OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* and 2002's *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*. The Kisiwa governments sometimes have similar signing patterns with regard to these agreements. For instance, none of the countries have signed 1995's *African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty*. But on other occasions, the subjects of these agreements are points of contention between the Kisiwa countries, especially since security and stability on parts of the island appear to be ever more elusive. For instance, the *African Maritime Transport Charter (1994)* has been a major point of division between the Kisiwa countries, with regards to articles on the cooperation between land-locked states (Katasi) and transit countries (the other Kisiwa states). Only Sumora is a State Party to this charter, otherwise, Carana is the only country who is a signatory to the instrument.

Kisiwa countries have been enthusiastic about the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). While no Kisiwa Head of State currently sits on the *Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSIC) of NEPAD* comprising of three states per AU sub-region, both Rimosa and Sumora have expressed an interest in representing the sub-region.

As part of the African Union's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), all Kisiwa countries are all participants to their sub-region's coordinating mechanism and decision-making organs. This involvement ranges from Heads of State, to relevant Ministers and other representatives. Kisiwa countries all contribute to the sub-region's Early Warning System as well as to the associated Continental Early Warning System, as per AU requirements. Since the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2004, it has supported the capacity-building of the Kisiwa countries in coordinating and harmonizing their efforts with regards to these Early Warning Systems. The Kisiwa countries were also to a more or lesser extent involved in the conceptualisation and development of the sub-region's *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution*, within the framework of the establishment of the sub-regions stand-by capacity.

Ever since the mandate of the sub-regional organization has included “peace and security”, activities related to these have sometimes been pressure points between governments of Kisiwa. Political, military, and security tensions between some of the Kisiwa countries, especially Katasi, and the other countries in the sub-region have been seen as detrimental to the functioning and efficiency of the Community. Intergovernmental relations between some of the Member States have at times worsened following particularly challenging meetings on these issues. It was suspected that some of the governments were withholding mandatory payments to the organization due to the animosities created by the security and defence discussions. Strenuous government relations and lack of resources have carried over to the economic forums of the sub-region, where decisions and policies have been less frequent, and harder to monitor.

The governments of the countries on the island of Kisiwa are State Parties to the following OAU/AU treaties¹ :

Date	Treaty	Carana	Katasi	Mosana	Namuna	Rimosa	Sumora
2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union	13-Mar-01	29-Apr-01	2-Feb-01	25-Nov-01	6-Sep-01	30-Mar-01
Abrogated & replaced by the Constitutive Act	OAU Charter, Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963						
1965	General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity	9-Sep-71	(s) 25-Oct-65	13-Nov-66	18-Jan-70	3-Apr-68	8-Feb-69
1980	Additional Protocol to the OAU General Convention on Privileges and immunities						
1967	Phyto-Sanitary Convention for Africa	13-Jul-82				12-Aug-68	
1968	African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources	25-Jun-88		(s) 15-Sep-68	(s) 15-Sep-68	7-Jun-70	4-Dec-73
1969	African Civil Aviation Commission Constitution	11-Oct-84	23-Jun-04	14-Aug-74	4-Mar-74	2-Apr-90	10-Apr-02
1969	AU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa	13-Mar-70	1-Apr-93	17-Nov-71	28-Jan-74	28-Jan-74	3-Mar-81

¹ The dates listed refer to the date of ratification or accession unless indicated by (s), which signifies signature only.

Date	Treaty	Carana	Katasi	Mosana	Namuna	Rimosa	Sumora
1974	Constitution of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations			24-Oct-74		(s) 12-Dec-04	
1975	Inter-African Convention Establishing an African Technical Co-Operation Programme	(s) 14-Apr-03				(s) 17-Oct-04	
1977	Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa,			6-Mar-81		(s) 2-Nov-78	14-Sep-77
1976	Cultural Charter for Africa	24-Apr-90		6-Nov-81			26-Aug-78
1981	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights	4-Mar-90	30-Oct-92	17-May-82	22-Jun-85	13-Feb-87	13-Dec-84
1985	Agreement for the Establishment of the African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI)	(s) 8-Apr-86	2-Jul-94			(s) 8-Nov-05	(s) 8-Apr-86
1985	Convention for the Establishment of the African Centre for Fertilizer Development						
1990	African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child	(s) 28-Feb-92		1-Nov-93	15-Dec-04	7-Aug-00	29-Mar-98
1991	Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa		(s) 30-Jan-91	6-Sep-98	17-May-04		
1991	Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community	14-May-92	14-May-92	15-Mar-93	14-May-92	15-Mar-93	4-Jul-94
1994	African Maritime Transport Charter	(s) 5-Jan-98					9-May-05

Date	Treaty	Carana	Katasi	Mosana	Namuna	Rimosa	Sumora
1995	The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty(Pelindaba Treaty)						
1998	Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights	15-Dec-03		26-Apr-05	(s) 9-Jun-98		
1999	OUA Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism	(s) 23-Mar-99		17-Apr-02	17-Apr-02	8-Dec-04	
2001	Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament	14-Dec-03	2-Mar-03	19-Nov-01	14-Dec-03	31-Mar-02	28-Jul-04
2001	The Convention of the African Energy Commission		(s) 26-Oct-05				
2002	Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union	(s) 9-Jul-02	(s) 9-Jul-02	16-Jun-03	15-Aug-05	16-Jun-03	30-Sep-04
2003	African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Revised Version)				(s) 15-Nov-03	(s) 1-Apr-04	
2003	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa			(s) 17-Sep-03	26-Mar-04	(s) 3-May-03	
2003	Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union			17-Jun-04	(s) 19-Aug-04	(s) 22-Jul-03	(s) 22-Jul-03
2003	Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union			(s) 18-Dec-04	(s) 26-Sep-05		(s) 11-May-03

Date	Treaty	Carana	Katasi	Mosana	Namuna	Rimosa	Sumora
2003	African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption			(s) 12-Mar-04		(s) 2-Feb-05	(s) 9-Feb-05
2004	Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism						
2005	The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact						

Regional economic/commercial relationships

The Kisiwa countries have not been very successful in developing significant trading relationships with mainland African countries. Only Mosana and Namuna count other African countries among their top exporting partners. Reasons for this vary by country but essentially Kisiwa countries have looked past African business opportunities, instead favouring long-standing colonial trading ties or, in the case of Sumora, leveraging religious ties into commercial relationships. This somewhat aloof posture towards mainland Africa is increasingly seen as out-of-date by Mosana, Namuna and, to a lesser extent, Rimosa, who are all now looking for ways to expand mainland contacts and build new trading relationships. The trouble, as is often the case, is that intra-African trade is often hindered by countries trying to sell the same commodities to one another. To avoid this obstacle, these more proactive ECOK countries are looking to industries such as ship repair, oil and services as their points of entry into mainland markets.

From the mainland's point of view, Kisiwa states have had a limited profile internationally for years, in part due to their remoteness and relatively small populations. Also, the years of separation from the mainland dimmed any of the original ethnic connections between Kisiwa and the mainland, thus removing one of the main trans-border connections in African politics. Efforts to draw Kisiwa states into mainland African affairs have had some positive impacts on building stronger connections between Kisiwa and the mainland, but, as will be discussed below, it is widely viewed that more can be done on both sides.

Impact of Regional Criminal Activity

The rise of international criminal activity is becoming an increasing concern for Kisiwa states. Currently, regional governments are focusing on three key areas:

- The regional aspect of the global drug trade;
- Piracy;
- The regional aspect of global smuggling of people and weapons.

Due to the ever-shifting transit routes of drug smugglers and the limitations of governmental authority and law enforcement in the region, especially in international waters, Kisiwa has seen a dramatic increase in these three areas of organised criminal activity. The growth of piracy has reached the point that pirates now seize vessels well off the African coast. Finally, Kisiwa has become a major trans-shipment location for local and international criminals trafficking in people, money, black market commodities such as illegal weapons and mined resources. Some of these groups operate in conjunction with mainland groups or directly with their contacts outside of the region.

All of these activities are a grave menace to governments in the region and internationally. Numerous governments are concerned by the impact of the weapons and drugs smuggling on their streets and that portions of the proceeds from all of this illicit activity may be going to terrorist groups. Kisiwa governments such as Carana's and Rimosas fear that the criminal gangs behind this activity are growing stronger at the expense of the island's governments and are directly or indirectly supporting the various rebel and opposition movements within national borders through the system of informal taxes the smugglers pay to local groups for transiting through territory nominally outside of the central government's control. Given the islands unemployment rates and myriad social, political and religious resentments, the role of criminal syndicates is now seen in many of Kisiwa's capitals as a growing and serious security threat. Because of the deepening connections between groups on Kisiwa and the mainland, this issue is an obvious candidate for region-wide cooperation.

Update on Regional Public Health Crises

Soon after its formation, the African Union declared its intent to combat infectious diseases, chief among them, HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria, at its Assembly in Maputo, Mozambique in July 2003². As part of their respective follow-up to the Assembly, Kisiwa's governments through a special session of ECOK's Council of Minister's established in November 2003 a standing working group to provide a coordinated approach for ECOK members in implementing their various unilateral and multilateral programmes. This was seen as a critical step for the ECOK membership in light of the multiple new international sources of funding being made available over the past five years to tackle these diseases.

Given the variations in state capacities among ECOK members, and the less than ideal interface between ECOK and donors, the results of these efforts differ from country to country. In Mosana, Namuna and Sumora, infection rates of HIV/AIDS and TB have dropped over the last five years by 10-20% and malaria infection rates by 5-10%. In Katasi and Carana, the rates for all diseases appear to be flat or slightly down, while Rimosas is facing slight increases for all diseases, despite its better resourced health care system. These numbers are encouraging for Mosana, Namuna and Sumora but clearly the other three countries are at risk to fall behind not only their neighbours on Kisiwa but also many other countries on the mainland. AU and UN leaders are aware of this mixed record on Kisiwa and there is a new effort in both Addis Ababa and Geneva to engage the Kisiwa governments more vigorously through ECOK to implement more effective delivery programmes.

Relevant Global-Level Geopolitical Dynamics

The diversity of political interests and ideologies amongst Kisiwa states, and the lack of security cooperation have rendered the region potentially unstable. Because of these internal divisions, the region has been unable to protect against threats and possible negative effects from outside the region. Insecurity in mainland Africa and elsewhere in the world continues to have the potential to destabilize the economy and politics of Kisiwa.

The potential for instability had been previously exemplified during the Cold War, when the East and West blocs vied for power over the newly independent states. Because the island of Kisiwa and the Horn of Africa sit at a major maritime crossroads between the West and the East, the region is of considerable strategic importance. Control of Kisiwa would enable better influence over the Arabian Peninsula from the south. A short war in 1976 between Namuna and Sumora, supported respectively by the East and the West, was an illustration of the superpower involvement on the island. The East gave military support to Katasi and Namuna, as well as many other forms of assistance, including education and training. The West assisted and influenced Sumora, Rimosas, Carana and Mosana, while (at the peak of the Cold War), halting much of the aid to Katasi and Namuna.

More recently, the international security situation post-September 11, 2001 has come to have implications for states on the island. Although all six nations have voiced an apparently unanimous condemnation of terrorist activities, they have had varying levels of success in addressing the threat of terrorism. Sumora and Namuna have been dealing with extremist elements with links to international terrorism, with varying degrees of success. The region is under some pressure to respond to possible terrorism threats, with linkages being made between their responses and current/future economic assistance.

Political, Trade and Military Issues

It was noted earlier that Carana has not shut itself off from the outside world. Politically and militarily, Carana has sought to strengthen its connections with Azuria in particular through a defence pact in the event of external aggression that endangers sovereignty of Carana. This agreement is seen as a hedge by Carana against provocations from Katasi. Rimosa has entered into a looser arrangement with Carmina through the association of former Carmine colonies, but its value to Rimosa appears to be very similar as that to Carana, i.e. as a backstop against foreign threats.

Being recognised as reliable and cooperative partners in the fight against terrorism is very helpful to Carana and Rimosa given the importance of counter-terrorism efforts for Azuria and Carmina. But, the focus and derived benefits of the war on terror are not entirely external for Carana. Carana's own ongoing struggle with domestic, ethnically based opposition groups has evolved over the past 10 years; some of these groups have taken up arms and have pursued their causes through violence, including tactics that western analysts would consider terrorism. The three groups of greatest concern to Caranese officials are the *Mouvement patriotique de Carana (MPC)*, the *Combattants indépendants du sud Carana (CISC)* and the *True Islamist Movement (TIM)* based in Sumora.

The MPC is a Kori tribe-based group that is largely driven by long-standing chauvinistic grievances stemming from being displaced by the Falin as the dominate tribe in the country. Separatist politics do not appear to be a prime motivator for the MPC currently, but many observers watch MPC actions and statements carefully for any signal that the group is giving up on regaining political influence within Carana in favour of forming a new independent state or separating from Carana to join Katasi.

The CISC is an even greater concern for the Caranese and Azurian governments. This group, formed in 1991 to protect and promote Tatsi rights and interests in Carana, is not only increasingly more violent and experiencing growing support in the Tatsi community within Carana and across the border in Rimosa but it is also seen to be growing closer to drug smuggling gangs operating within Carana and across its borders. This relationship has meant greater revenue for CISC through its protection services to the drug gangs and a concomitant rise in influence among Tatsi and greater capacity to challenge government authority in certain areas of the country. This dynamic has resulted in greater protection for the drug shipments, which means more arrive safely in their destination markets, which include Azuria and Carmina.

The TIM is a Sumoran group - with suspected ties to that country's government - that is suspected by Caranese and Azurian officials as being the "hidden hand" behind periodic sectarian violence in the north of Carana, near the border with Sumora. This cross-border connection is troubling enough but Azurian officials also suspect that TIM is establishing and/or deepening relations with international extremist groups abroad. Caranese cooperation in tracking and confronting TIM is considered an urgent priority.

Finally, Carana's relationship with Azuria has not provided a clear path out of its dire economic circumstances. While Rimosa has benefited from a bilateral trading relationship with Carmina that has contributed to its relative

economic stability and prosperity, Carana remains in a highly one-sided trade relationship that foremost favours Azuria and other trading partners to a lesser degree. It is unlikely that trade initiatives can have a meaningful impact on Carana's economy in the short-term given the country's very limited international trading profile. But, this disadvantaged trading position, common in the developing world, has made it all but impossible for Carana to get its economy back on track after the disastrous re-centralization of the economy in the mid-1990s. Following this time, there was a brief period of recovery when Carana switched course once again towards a more liberalized economy. However, the economy began a descent into chaos again after President Ogavo unilaterally announced a suspension of the nation's debt servicing. Instead of providing a brake on any further slippage, Carana's current annual trade deficit (currently US\$ 399 million) ensures that it will continue to lack the capital necessary for investments or reforms to the economy. Carana needs to work to re-establish its damaged relationship with the international economic community that followed the suspension of loan payments. The nation's preparation to hold debt re-scheduling meetings with its international partners is a step in the right direction. Carana will need significant international help in stemming the rampant smuggling across its borders and through its ports that is feeding the growth of the underground economy. Diminishing the underground economy is an enormous challenge for any country, and there are significant limitations on just how much any foreign government or international organization can help.

Growing Presence of Multi-National Corporations

As in many other parts of Africa, foreign corporations (public or government-owned enterprises) have arrived on Kisiwa in recent years looking for investment opportunities. The higher-profile cases concern oil companies striking exploitation partnerships with Rimosa, Sumora and Mosana. As Carana (along with Katasi and Namuna) does not have confirmed oil deposits on its territory or off-shore, this mini-boom of international investment has passed it by. There is, however, a growing suspicion in the energy industry that Kisiwa's eastern coastal waters may also hold large natural gas deposits. Rumours abound that one Asian-based company has begun talks with Rimosa, which are denied by both parties. Caranese officials recognise both the potential for natural gas discoveries in their coastal waters and the fact that their country's current political and security circumstances might limit their attraction for potential investors.

Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations

The six states of Kisiwa have all had reason to receive humanitarian relief and development assistance from external sources since their respective independence from colonial rule. Cross-border wars, violent up-risings against colonial powers, post-independence internal conflicts and natural disasters have all ensured that Kisiwa was a frequent destination for international aid organizations. Similarly, in times of peace, various international actors sought to engage in a full range of economic development programmes and strategies that had an equally full range of results for the recipient countries.

Carana has a mixed record in dealing with these external aid actors over the past twenty years. The picture is somewhat clearer in terms of humanitarian aid. Carana's relatively peaceful achievement of independence meant that humanitarian relief organizations did not appear in the country in large numbers until a string of cyclones hit Kisiwa's east coast in the mid-1970s. Rimosa and Sumora were also hard hit and in need of assistance, while inland Katasi escaped much of the serious damage. In the aftermath of the last major storm in July 1975, a few large international relief NGOs remained in Carana, expanding their operations from relief to longer-term development, while other NGOs arrived on the scene to launch new community-based development projects. This proved fortunate, because within months of the storm's passing (and with the clean-up still on-going) a minor humanitarian crisis flared following Colonel Tarakoni's *coup d'état* late in 1975. While there were few deaths and injuries, even this small number of casualties over-burdened many hospitals, especially in the national capital.

NGO's slowly proliferated across the country throughout the rest of the 1970s and 1980s to address humanitarian needs among various rural groups and displaced populations, especially those living along Carana's borders. Since 1996, when a surge in communal violence in Rimosa sent the second wave of Pleioni refugees across the border into Carana, a number of NGO's and UN agencies (with the financial backing of key donor governments) have established a group of camps in the border region to serve this population. (A previous wave of Pleioni refugees in the 1940s was largely settled, although their presence in southern Carana has been a source of friction with the Tatsi population.) There have been subsequent smaller movements of people since 1996, and the vast majority of refugees are reluctant to return to Rimosa. The camps are taking on an air of permanence, as the Caranese government is not willing to grant the refugees full residency or citizenship. The Rimosan government has expressed concern that the camps have become recruitment and training centres for rebel groups. NGO's and donor governments continue with their humanitarian work but are aware that the existing situation cannot continue indefinitely.

International Legal Factors

An issue with Carana is the unilateral restrictions that some western countries have imposed on the travel of some Caranese private business people and government officials due to suspicions that these individuals are involved in the growing underworld economy, drug and weapons trans-shipments in particular. These legal actions target individuals not the government or country as a whole, but they are a major embarrassment for the PDC-ruled government because the individuals named are close to President Jacques Ogavo, so the kind of legal action that would satisfy foreign governments behind the sanctions is not expected any time soon.

In terms of the signing and ratification of international legal instruments, Kisiwa countries often adopt similar positions. With the exception of Katasi, all five other states have signed and ratified many of the important treaties to be opened for signature during the past fifty years. All countries signed the UN Declaration on Human Rights, and all countries except Katasi have ratified the follow-on conventions concerning political, social and economic rights; Katasi only being a signatory to the *Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)*, and having not signed onto the *Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1966)*. Other conventions and optional protocols of instruments of international law remain unsigned and/or non-ratified by some Kisiwa countries. Potentially significant, in the case of an outbreak of war on the island, is that the *Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2000)* on the involvement of children in armed conflict remains unsigned by Carana and Katasi, and non-ratified by Namuna and Sumora.

Still, as elsewhere, the biggest problem has been with the implementation of these agreements within each country's borders. By and large, all countries on Kisiwa are falling well short of meeting their various human rights obligations (as noted by the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and others) but, this track record does not stand out as a particular source of tension between countries on Kisiwa except in those cases where the alleged victims of official abuse appeal to allies across borders for support.

Tension on Kisiwa is more likely to be raised by the differing approaches taken in relation to recent agreements like the Treaty of Rome which established the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the case of the ICC, Carana, Mosana, Rimosa signed and ratified the founding treaty while Katasi has only signed the treaty, and Namuna has yet to sign the instrument. While not a problem in itself, this split reaction to the ICC has led to complications in planning for cooperative responses to common challenges. For instance, the plans for joint military exercises by some of the Kisiwa countries are stalled in part by officials' concerns that any sort of international military exercises or operations could result in personnel being arrested, detained and tried by the ICC as the result of politically-charged accusations or accidents while serving abroad with countries who are parties to the Treaty of Rome.

The governments of the countries on the island of Kisiwa are State Parties to the following international treaties :

Topic	Treaty	Carana	Katasi	Mosana	Namuna	Rimosa	Sumora
Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts	GC I-IV 1949	13-Mar-63	2-May-63	1-Jul-62	27-Nov-61	28-Mar-61	14-Dec-71
	AP I 1977	6-Jan-86	30-Apr-93	12-May-78	23-Jun-83	24-May-84	22-Oct-94
	AP I Declaration 90						
	AP II 1977	6-Jan-86	30-Apr-93	12-May-78	23-Jun-83	24-May-84	22-Oct-94
	AP III 2005						
	CRC 1989	14-Feb-92	11-Mar-92	3-Sep-90	30-Apr-95	7-Jan-90	19-Nov-90
	OP-CRC-AC 2000			13-Jan-04	(s) 13-Sep-01	2-Sep-02	(s) 29-Apr-05
ICC	ICC Statute 1998	1-May-04	(s) 3-Feb-04	5-Nov-99		16-Apr-03	18-Aug-02
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	Hague Conv. 1954			30-Apr-66			8-Jun-03
	Hague Prot. 1954			30-Apr-66			
	Hague Prot. 1999						
Environment	ENMOD Conv. 1954	(s) 18-May-77				(s) 18-May-77	
Weapons	Geneva Gas Prot. 1925	30-Aug-70		24-Jun-68		11-Dec-81	
	BWC 1972			22-Oct-91	3-Dec-78	4-Nov-81	
	CCW 1980			(s) 10-Apr-81		(s) 10-Apr-81	27-Jan-96
	CCW Prot. I 1980						27-Jan-96
	CCW Prot. II 1980						27-Jan-96
	CCW Prot. III 1980						
	CCW Prot. IV 1995						
	CCW Prot. II a 1996						
	CCW Amdt 2001						
	CCW Prot. V 2003						
	CWC 1993	18-Sep-98	22-May-97	29-May-98	3-Oct-98	12-Feb-00	6-Mar-97
	Ottawa Treaty 1997	3-Dec-98	1-Apr-01	13-Dec-02	3-Oct-98	17-Dec-04	8-Oct-98
	Cluster Munitions 2008	(s) 3-Dec-08	(s) 3-Dec-08	(s) 3-Dec-08	(s) 3-Dec-08	(s) 3-Dec-08	(s) 3-Dec-08

Topic	Treaty	Carana	Katasi	Mosana	Namuna	Rimosa	Sumora
Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts	GC I-IV 1949	13-Mar-63	2-May-63	1-Jul-62	27-Nov-61	28-Mar-61	14-Dec-71
	AP I 1977	6-Jan-86	30-Apr-93	12-May-78	23-Jun-83	24-May-84	22-Oct-94
	AP I Declaration 90						
	AP II 1977	6-Jan-86	30-Apr-93	12-May-78	23-Jun-83	24-May-84	22-Oct-94
	AP III 2005						
	CRC 1989	14-Feb-92	11-Mar-92	3-Sep-90	30-Apr-95	7-Jan-90	19-Nov-90
	OP-CRC-AC 2000			13-Jan-04	(s) 13-Sep-01	2-Sep-02	(s) 29-Apr-05
ICC	ICC Statute 1998	1-May-04	(s) 3-Feb-04	5-Nov-99		16-Apr-03	18-Aug-02
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	Hague Conv. 1954			30-Apr-66			8-Jun-03
	Hague Prot. 1954			30-Apr-66			
	Hague Prot. 1999						
Environment	ENMOD Conv. 1954	(s) 18-May-77				(s) 18-May-77	
Weapons	Geneva Gas Prot. 1925	30-Aug-70		24-Jun-68		11-Dec-81	
	BWC 1972			22-Oct-91	3-Dec-78	4-Nov-81	
	CCW 1980			(s) 10-Apr-81		(s) 10-Apr-81	27-Jan-96
	CCW Prot. I 1980						27-Jan-96
	CCW Prot. II 1980						27-Jan-96
	CCW Prot. III 1980						
	CCW Prot. IV 1995						
	CCW Prot. II a 1996						
	CCW Amdt 2001						
	CCW Prot. V 2003						
	CWC 1993	18-Sep-98	22-May-97	29-May-98	3-Oct-98	12-Feb-00	6-Mar-97
	Ottawa Treaty 1997	3-Dec-98	1-Apr-01	13-Dec-02	3-Oct-98	17-Dec-04	8-Oct-98
Cluster Munitions 2008	(s) 3-Dec-08	(s) 3-Dec-08	(s) 3-Dec-08	(s) 3-Dec-08	(s) 3-Dec-08	(s) 3-Dec-08	

Topic	Treaty	Carana	Katasi	Mosana	Namuna	Rimosa	Sumora
Human Rights Instruments	CESCR 1966	16-Jun-86	(s) 4-Apr-92	12-Nov-82	12-Sep-01	17-Apr-92	11-Jan-93
	CCPR 1966	16-Jun-86		12-Nov-82	12-Sep-01	17-Apr-92	11-Jan-93
	OP1-CCPR 1966	16-Jun-86			12-Sep-01	17-Apr-92	
	OP2-CCPR 1989						
	CERD 1966	16-Sep-76	23-Oct-74	3-Mar-71	9-Aug-79	12-Sep-74	18-Nov-78
	CEDAW 1979	27-May-95	16-Apr-82	24-Sep-82	9-Aug-83	2-Feb-94	27-Oct-98
	OP-CEDAW 1999	(s) 24-Jul-02		(s) 9-Sep-00	(s) 13-Nov-04	(s) 3-Mar-01	
	CAT 1984	12-Oct-95	(s) 11-Dec-92	8-Jan-87	23-Apr-95	22-Aug-99	30-Mar-05
	OP-CAT 2002			22-Jun-06	22-Jun-06	22-Jun-06	
	OP-CRC-SC 2000			13-Jan-04	(s) 13-Sep-01	2-Sep-02	(s) 29-Apr-05
	ICRMW 1990			1-Jul-03	(s) 15-Nov-01		
	CRPD 2006			(s) 30-Mar-07	(s) 30-Mar-07		
	OP-CRPD 2006			(s) 30-Mar-07	(s) 30-Mar-07		
	CPPCG 1948	27-Mar-63	13-Mar-68	11-Sep-74			

Kisiwa Countries and International Organizations

The Kisiwa states have a long involvement with international organizations dating back to their respective independence periods. While various international organizations (IOs) have tried to have an effect on the respective governments, the track record above demonstrates the mixed or poor results that can come from misguided and misinformed policies. Nowhere is this clearer than looking at the World Bank's record in many countries in the 1980s and early 1990s. Carana's history of receiving attention from international organizations has perhaps been a less than happy one, but these cases also illustrate the dangers of inconsistent implementation of agreed policies by national governments.

Yet, it would not be fair to characterise the record as entirely negative. Some large development projects had a positive impact. Also, it is fair to note that all of Kisiwa's governments (and their citizens) have benefited greatly from community-level development projects and humanitarian assistance.

The greatest positive impact of international organizations for Kisiwa will hopefully lie in the future. As this paper discussed, a number of international bodies are now paying serious attention to issues in Kisiwa. There

appears to be enough overlap of “great power” interests on issues such as anti-terrorism and anti-piracy that the political differences that made proactive action through IOs impossible may become less relevant. Not only is cooperative action through key IOs possible, but the IOs themselves appear to have absorbed lessons from past mistakes, and new processes and strategies may be expected to be more relevant and effective.

However these high hopes can only be tested through practice and experience. It is possible, even likely, that political, humanitarian and development efforts in Kisiwa will all be tested over the next year, as tensions and pressures continue to build in eastern Kisiwa. There is little doubt that Carana may become a primary focus for attention from a number of IOs. All political actors, Caranese and foreign alike, would be well advised to leverage that attention and the resources and experience that come with it for Carana’s difficult years ahead.

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

The OIC has traditionally played a very small role in the political life of Kisiwa, but since 2001 it has taken a greater interest in policies implemented by external players, such as Azuria and Carmina, in the context of the “war on terror” and how these policies impact on the lives of Muslims around the world. Given Sumora’s membership in the OIC and the external and internal pressure it faces to combat extremism, the OIC pays particular attention to developments in that country.

La Francophonie

As a member of *La Francophonie*, and with strong support from Azuria, Carana enjoys a level of support from this group’s members in diplomatic circles. In spite of the diverse membership in *La Francophonie*, Carana (with Azuria’s help in recent years) has been able use this forum to influence other francophone states, who have gone on to provide support in other settings such as the AU, the EU and the UN. While not usually directly involved in political and security crises, *La Francophonie* has provided Carana with a useful venue to exert influence against Katasi, who is also a member. By failing to support the peace and security initiatives of Katasi, it has alienated itself from the mainstream of *La Francophonie*.

Association of Former Carmine Colonies

In much the same way Carana approaches its membership in *La Francophonie*, Rimosa and Sumora try to mobilise support for their interests within the slightly larger Association of Former Carmine Colonies (AFCC). For Rimosa, this is relatively straightforward due to its active participation in the AFCC’s limited security dimension. Sumora does not share Rimosa’s close connection with Carmina and has been accused by governments on Kisiwa and elsewhere of being soft on extremist groups on its territory, such as TIM. It has also been accused of not making the necessary effort to stop the movement of people and resources across its border into Carana to support radical Muslim groups in that country. Thus, Sumora has manoeuvred defensively at AFCC conferences, defending its record of dealing with extremists and illegal border crossings. Both Rimosa and Sumora also hope to use AFCC membership as a means to push policy positions in other multilateral venues, such as the AU, the EU and the UN.

United Nations

A UN Country Team is present in Carana, with counterparts in Rimosa, Katasi and Sumora. The UNCTs comprise all UN agencies, programmes and departments operating in the countries with some participation by officials from the NGO community in a liaison role. Through these agencies, the UN system has already had a presence in some of the Kisiwa states for many years. The size and operations of each agency varies

according to the needs of each host state. In the case of Carana, the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Emergency Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) are moderately active, while the UNCT chair, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the lead agency. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is managing the refugee camps along Carana's southern border and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is working with the Caranese and Sumoran governments in an effort to mitigate tensions related to the nomadic movements of people across that border. IOM is also overseeing two initiatives concerning nomads on the Namunan and Sumoran border. The IOM is a non-UN system member but has a special status and is usually invited to join the UNCT.

International Financial Institutions

All countries on Kisiwa rely on International Financial Institution (IFIs) - some to a greater extent than others. Mosana and Katasi depend to a lesser extent on these institutions, but for very distinct reasons; Mosana because its own economy has fared comparatively well, and as such has had less of a need to borrow; Katasi because it has primarily looked to the East, and more recently to Asian countries for support. Rimoso, Sumora, Namuna and Carana all depend heavily on IFIs. Carana's relationship with the IFIs has been particularly tumultuous. In the 1980s with the nation's renewed commitment to economic restructuring and democracy, the IFIs supported Carana with massive injections of financial assistance. In the mid-1990s, with the nation's decision to retreat from liberalization policies, these institutions curbed their financial support and it was not until Carana changed course at the beginning of the new millennium that relations were normalized. Carana's recent attempt to unilaterally suspend its external debt has again challenged this relationship.

Interpol

As the smuggling problem has grown more serious, Carana, Rimoso and Mosana have reached out to Interpol for intelligence and technical support. While the resulting cooperative programme is only two years old, some successes can be claimed. Most of the interceptions of smuggling operations have occurred in Mosana, whose airport is the principal air gateway to Kisiwa, but the navies of these three countries, acting with the ships of other navies and on intelligence provided by Interpol, have also made a few arrests in coastal waters and chased off two separate pirate attacks. These initial results have been sufficiently promising that the three states have begun talks with Sumora to expand the programme. However, given the human rights records of the countries involved, some Interpol members are insisting on limits to the programme, so that a fuller range of cooperation should be used as an incentive to desired domestic reforms in the HR and rule of law areas.



THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CARANA

COUNTRY BOOK

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION



Aim: The following Country Study was produced by PFD Associates Limited on contract to the African Union, with the intent of providing the African Standby Forces contingents' Intelligence and Operations staffs a broad ranging document covering a number of key issues.


Scope: This Country Study will provide a basic overview of key subjects covering geography, history, society, religion, governance, economics, law, security, and geopolitics.

The information contained herein is accurate as of time of writing. Updates will be issued as required.



The *République démocratique de Carana* (Democratic Republic of Carana) is one of the six states on the Island of Kisiwa, which lies in the Indian Ocean approximately 100 km off the Horn of Africa and north of the Seychelles archipelago. Carana is situated along the eastern coast of Kisiwa, between the Islamic Republic of Sumora to the north and the Republic of Rimosa to the south. It also shares an interior land boundary with the People's Republic of Katasi.

PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY



Location: Carana is situated along the east coast, between the Torongo River and the Kalesi River and including the Mogave River and Kodari River systems; its terrain includes areas of coastal savannah, montane rainforest, and rocky desert uplands.

The principal river system is the Torongo River, whose south branch defines the border with Rimosa. The Northern Torongo River flows down from the Caranese highlands, dividing them into two ranges; the higher Western Highland range includes the land boundary with Katasi.

The Mogave River system flows directly into the Gulf of Carana, and creates a region of coastal lowlands. This and the north Torongo River valley constitute the country's best agricultural land. The Kalesi River also flows into the Gulf of Carana, and provides the northern boundary with Sumora.

Geographic Coordinates:	Longitude: 56°03'E to 60°38'E Latitude: 01°55'N to 05°07'N
Map Reference:	National Intelligence Agency, 1:1 000 000, KISIWA, 590E040N-1M, Eastern Kisiwa
Area:	108,417 km ²
Area (comparative):	Considerably larger than SIERRA LEONE (71,740 km ²), Slightly smaller than LIBERIA (111,320 km ²), BENIN (112,620 km ²), or MALAWI (118,480 km ²)
Land Boundaries:	Total: 1,708 km Land boundary with People's Republic of Katasi: 561 km Land boundary with Republic of Rimosa: 377 km Land boundary with Islamic Republic of Sumora: 770 km
Coastline Length:	325 km
Maritime Claims:	Territorial Sea: 12 NM Contiguous Zone: 24 NM Exclusive Economic Zone: 200 NM

Terrain: Gentle coastal lowlands along the Gulf of Carana coast, rising from sea level to rugged highlands east of the North Torongo River; rugged forested hills to the south, and low mountains west of the North Torongo River, with an arid plateau to the north, sloping down northwards to rough upland savannah.

Elevation: Carana's maximum elevation is 1,606m, in the Western Caranese Highlands; the highest elevation in the Eastern Caranese Highlands is 820m. Significantly lower ranges of hills rise up from the Torongo River on either side of its intersection with its Northern Torongo tributary.

Lowest Point:	Sea level (0 m)
Highest Point:	Mount Kalari (1,606 m)

Natural resources: Coal, iron, copper, gold, and diamond deposits; unexploited reserves of zinc, tin, lead, coltan and uranium; commercially viable offshore oil and natural gas deposits; tropical hardwoods and other timbers; hydroelectric energy.

Land use:	Arable land: 23.53%
	Permanent crops: 2.37%
	Other: 74.1% (2005)

Natural Hazards: Arid interior regions support limited life, especially in dry season; low-lying areas by major rivers prone to seasonal flooding. Moderate to slight seismic activity; no recorded volcanic activity. Periodic cyclones in coastal areas.

Time zone: GMT + 5 (cf. Islamabad, Ashgabat, Tashkent, Dushanbe, Chelyabinsk)

CLIMATE

The climate is dominated by the southeastern trade winds that originate in the Indian Ocean anticyclone, a centre of high atmospheric pressure that seasonally changes its position over the ocean. Carana has two seasons: a hot, rainy season from November to April; and a cooler, dry season from May to October. There is, however, great variation in climate owing to elevation and position relative to dominant winds. The east coast has an equatorial climate and, being most directly exposed to the trade winds, has the heaviest rainfall, averaging as much as 3.5 meters annually. The coastal region is notorious not only for a hot, humid climate in which tropical fevers are endemic but also for the destructive cyclones that occur during the rainy season. Because rain clouds discharge much of their moisture east of the highest elevations on the island, the central highlands are appreciably drier and, owing to the altitude, also cooler. Thunderstorms are common during the rainy season in the central highlands, and lightning is a serious hazard.

The three westernmost provinces receive practically all of their annual rainfall between November and April. The dry season is pleasant and sunny, although somewhat chilly, especially in the mornings. Although frosts are rare, they occur at higher elevations. The Tereni plateau is desert and semidesert; as little as one-third of a meter of rain falls annually at Alur. Overall, surface water is most abundant along the east coast and in the south. Amounts diminish to the west, and the driest regions are in the extreme west.

Carana suffers the impact of cyclones from time to time. From 2-4 February 1994, Carana was struck by Cyclone Geralda, the worst cyclone to come ashore on Kisiwa since 1927. The cyclone killed fifty people and destroyed enough property to leave approximately 200,000 homeless. The cyclone also significantly damaged the country's infrastructure, most notably coastal roads, railroads, and telecommunications, as well as agriculture.

CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA (UROMA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT –36M ABOVE SEA LEVEL)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Avg. Temperature	26	26	26	26	25	23	22	23	25	25	25	25
Avg. Max. Temperature	30	31	31	32	30	28	27	28	30	30	30	30
Avg. Min. Temperature	22	21	22	22	22	20	18	19	21	21	21	22
Avg. Rain Days	5	5	8	8	7	0	0	1	2	6	9	6

CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA (ALUR – 416 M ABOVE SEA LEVEL)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Avg. Temperature	32	32	30	30	28	28	26	27	27	28	28	31
Avg. Max. Temperature	37	39	36	36	33	36	31	32	33	33	34	36
Avg. Min. Temperature	17	21	22	25	22	20	20	21	22	22	20	18
Avg. Rain Days	2	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	4

CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA (ERES – ES M ABOVE SEA LEVEL)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Avg. Temperature	26	27	28	27	25	24	23	23	24	25	26	26
Avg. Max. Temperature	31	32	32	30	28	28	27	27	28	28	30	31
Avg. Min. Temperature	22	22	23	22	21	20	18	19	20	21	21	22
Avg. Rain Days	12	11	9	7	4	3	2	4	4	5	10	14

PROVINCES OF CARANA

Carana is divided into eight provinces, ranging in size between approximately 9,000 and 20,000 km². Provincial boundaries date largely from Colonial times, and vary between straight bearings north-south or east-west, traditional marked roads, and natural features such as watersheds and the centre lines of rivers. Provinces are divided into further administrative divisions, which are not considered as geographic regions.

Province of Fellari

The province of Fellari (11,906 km²) includes the national capital of Galasi, which lies approximately 60 km inland on the southern edge of the Kalesi River delta. The principal navigable channel of the delta forms the international boundary between Carana and the Islamic Republic of Sumora. A major channel connects this with the natural harbour in Galasi.

The huge (approx. 3,000 km²) delta area itself consists of low-lying marshy areas separated by multiple channels of the Kalesi River, largely covered by mangrove and other dense vegetation. There is a single major route that crosses the delta below Galasi, including three ferries. Owing to seasonal flooding, the delta itself is sparsely populated, but is a rich ecosystem supporting a wide diversity of marine and bird life.

Eastern Fellari consists of coastal lowlands, and a series of small river systems emptying into the Gulf of Carana. Vegetation includes stands of original growth moist tropical forest, however a significant proportion of the land is under cultivation. Principal coastal towns are Tole and Jumi, both lacking any deepwater harbour facility. The coastal areas are flat and slightly elevated, with extensive offshore shoaling creating a network of basins and lagoons. The Mogave River delta extends some distance up the coastline.

The Mogave River is the southern provincial boundary between Fellari and Guthar. The town of Forsata Nar lies on the north bank, upriver from the settlement at the most easterly crossing point at the Guthar town of Amsan. The Mogave delta begins east of Amsan, and consists of many channels, with a single navigable central channel, and extensive mangrove forestation.

West of the Nipsakit and Marmakhi Rivers, the ground rises more steeply, towards the eastern Caranese Highlands, which is the easternmost part of the long mountain range in southern Kisiwa. The boundary with the province of Hanno to the west follows a series of minor rivers through these hills, joining the Yakhat River and meeting the international boundary where it joins the Kalesi. Western Fellari includes more arid tracts of low scrub and bush, with elevations rising to above 400m. The area features several major mines, with underlying deposits of ores bearing copper, gold and diamonds.

The National Highway runs between Galasi and Amsan, with a coastal secondary highway connecting both with the coastal communities. A secondary highway runs west from Galasi to Akabar across the northern edge of the Highlands; another follows a longer route along the southern bank of the Kalesi. A recently completed National Highway runs several kilometres inland from the Kalesi River route, thus avoiding seasonal flooding.

Province of Guthar

The province of Guthar (10,474 km²) is one of two provinces not bordering on a neighbouring state. The provincial capital of Amsan lies on the south bank of the Marmakhi River, and is the principal crossing over the river, which widens to a flat swampy delta (see above). With its highest elevation below 200 m, Guthar is the lowest province in Carana, and consists primarily of moist tropical forest and cleared agricultural land, with some coastal savannah.

The Mogave River and its tributaries run across the northwest corner of Guthar, creating a wide fertile valley extending into neighbouring Barin province. The greater part of the boundary with Barin and Hanno is a north-south line dating from the 1932 division of the two provinces, at approximately 58° 55'E. The highest elevations in Guthar are in the north-west, which are the foothills of the eastern Caranese Highlands.

A range of low hills to the south provides a watershed, with the Salman River system emptying westwards into Baie Grande, the largest body of water in Carana. The lake is divided by the boundary between Guthar and neighbouring Leppko province, which then winds north-northeast towards the Gulf of Carana. The southwest corner of Guthar province contains the majority of the country's iron mines.

The Rikata River rises in the same range of hills as the Salman River, but flows eastwards, entering the Gulf of Carana at the small coastal town of Cereni. Another minor river, the Buktasi, enters the Gulf at Lora, approximately 25 km to the southeast. These two river systems support a large number of small agricultural communities in the most densely-populated part of Guthar.

Like the Fellari coast, the coastal area of Guthar is subject to extensive shoaling, and many basins and lagoons.

The National Highway connects Amsan with a chain of coastal communities, leading to the southern city of Corma. Secondary highways connect Amsan and Corma further inland, and follow the Mogave and Salman Rivers westwards into the interior. A network of minor roads branch off the highway system to serve agricultural, mining and fishing communities.

Province of Leppko

The province of Leppko (20,084 km²) is the largest province in Carana. It is bounded in the south by the great Torongo River, separating Carana from the Republic of Rimosa. The Torongo is a major river system, fed by major tributaries in Carana, Rimosa and Katasi. The river branches at Eres, with the northern Torongo providing a route into the Caranese interior. Further west, the Krasi River provides a short stretch of border between Leppko and the People's Republic of Katasi.

Although navigable for much of its length, the Torongo River meanders through a sparsely-populated flood plain up to 20 km across. A major road bridge connects Carana with Rimosa between Maldosa and Klema, with five other international crossing points further upriver being served by ferries.

The ground rises steeply on both sides of the Torongo flood plain. In Leppko, the Torongo Ridge reaches elevations of over 300 m, descending more gently to the Kodari and Kanani rivers to the northeast and northwest. The southern side of the ridge is predominantly montane jungle, with more populated agricultural areas to the north.

The coastal area of Leppko is similar to Guthar. Recent exploration suggests that there may be commercially viable reserves of offshore oil and natural gas in this area.

The land east of the Kodaki River flattens out and is low and marshy in many places. Unlike most other major rivers in Carana, the Torongo does not have a delta, but empties into the Gulf of Carana through an estuary several kilometres wide.

West of the northern Torongo, the ground is flatter, but still broken, with large areas of lake, swamp and jungle. Numerous small rivers, fed by generous rains, flow into a wide flat plain at the confluence of the Krasi and Torongo Rivers. Another range of steep hills separates the Torongo valley from the rugged plateau south of Folsa. West of Folsa is the Maghitakak dam, the largest hydroelectric project in Carana. The dam provides power for the extensive smelting operations in Folsa, processing iron ore from the mines of southern Guthar.

The northern Torongo itself flows through Folsa and south through a relatively narrow valley, where it is fed further by the runoff from the Khanaan River system. The northern Torongo joins the Torongo at Eres, through a single narrow and fast-flowing channel. Rapids make this channel impassable for larger riverine craft except during the rainy season; however there is considerable riverine traffic between Eres and the Maghitakak dam.

Northern Leppko is a more gentle countryside, consisting of moist tropical forest and farmlands. The southern side of Goran lake is less scarred by mining than the northern side, however contamination from mining operations have threatened a delicate lake ecosystem.

The majority of Leppko's population lives in the cities of Eres and Corma or in the communities along the Kanani valley. The National Highway connects the two cities, and then goes northwards to Folsa. A secondary highway along the edge of the Torongo flood plain connects Eres with Mahbek province and the border town of Mia. Secondary and tertiary routes also cross the border with Rimosa at several ferry points.

Province of Barin

The province of Barin (8,977 km²) is the smallest province in Carana, and completely surrounded by other provinces. It was separated from Guthar during a re-organization in 1932. Its southern boundaries with Leppko and Mahbek provinces follow the northern Torongo River. The northern part of the city of Folsa is the provincial capital. Most of the population lives along the northern Torongo, with major towns including Maui and Suppo. The Nasvakhi River valley north of Folsa contains a number of communities.

The southern edge of Barin lies only slightly above sea level, and the southeastern part of the province is a mixture of tropical forest and farmland similar to northern Leppko and western Guthar. The ground slopes upwards to the northwest, reaching altitudes of over 400m near the northern border with Hanno province. These are the headwaters of the Mogave River, however the higher altitudes are increasingly arid and sparsely populated. Vegetation is mostly scrub and rough pasture, with large barren areas.

The upper Torongo valley runs between the eastern and the western Caranese Highlands. A series of rapids bring the river from about 55m elevation near Nusbet down to 9m elevation above the Maghitakak dam, however there is considerable riverine traffic by small craft between the dam and the waterfall at Goran Volzi. The valley here is relatively narrow with little flood plain, however the surrounding land is reasonably fertile. The valley enjoys a moderate climate.

Barin itself is not well served by the national highway system. The main highway is on the southern and western banks of the north Torongo River, through Mahbek province, with a secondary highway on the northern and

eastern bank. Bridges exist at some but not all major communities, with limited ferries. Secondary highways connect Folsa with Amsan and Suppo, with a tertiary road along the southern edge of the eastern Caranese Highlands.

Province of Mahbek

Mahbek province (11,859 km²) lies west of the northern Torongo River and north of Carana's international boundary with the People's Republic of Katasi. Its eastern border with Leppko province runs through an area of dense jungle between the Krasi and north Torongo Rivers. Mahbek was created, along with Tereni and Koloni, after the "Transtorongo" region of Carana was recognized under the 1882 treaty of Salin as a part of the Azurian Empire.

Southern Mahbek is similar to western Leppko, with a hot moist climate and extensive tropical rainforest. Undulating ground rises gradually away from the Torongo flood plain, towards the foothills of the western Caranese Highlands. The moist climate has created many lakes and networks of streams and rivers in the Krasi and Torongo watersheds. The major border crossing into Katasi is at Mia; more remote road crossings exist near Edu, Faron, Risoun, Lixpet and Madufi.

Central and northern Mahbek are more densely populated, with communities along the north Torongo River and a network of mining towns further west. The area near the northern boundary with Koloni is however also sparsely populated. Much of western Mahbek is semi-arid scrubland, with large barren areas, supporting limited pastoral activity and subsistence farming.

The western boundary with Tereni province follows a traditional migration route originally surveyed by the Azurian colonial authorities; the northern part is a north-south line at approximately 57° 18' E. This intersects the boundary with Koloni, which runs east-west at approximately 03° 30' N, joining the north Torongo River close to Nusbet.

The National Highway runs along the southern and western banks of the north Torongo River. Secondary highways connect with the Katasi border through Faron, Edu and Mia. Other secondary highways connect with Koloni from Taken through Gobel and Lurchi, and with Tereni from Taken through Ludou and Koepi.

Province of Tereni

The Province of Tereni (19,295 km²) is the westernmost province of Carana, the second largest and the most sparsely populated. A large proportion of the province is covered by the Tereni Desert, a barren and rugged part of the western Caranese Highland range. The highest elevation in Tereni is approximately 1,600m, about 30 km northwest of Lurok. Low levels of rainfall in these upland regions result in sparse animal and human populations, and few permanent settlements.

The southern edge of Tereni is the international border with the People's Republic of Katasi, following a series of minor rivers: the Kenabak, Pisabar, and Penagi. The vegetation to the south of the mountain range is mostly low bush and grassland. The ground rises steeply to the mountains east of the provincial capital, Alur.

Northwest of the high peaks of the Caranese Highlands, the Tereni desert consists of a large (approx. 3,200 km²) rocky plateau, which drops away to the northwest, towards the headwaters of the northern Torongo River. The boundary with Koloni province runs east-west at approximately 03° 30' N. The extreme western international boundary with the People's Republic of Katasi and the Islamic Republic of Sumora is a north-south line at approximately 56° 03' E. The three international boundaries intersect in a relatively moist area of dense

montane jungle, where the northern Torongo River rises. A limited number of minor roads cross the border with Sumora in this area.

A network of secondary highways runs through the southern part of Tereni from Mahbek province, connecting the towns of Lillek, Lurok, Melleri, Batto and the capital Alur, then on to the town of Buboul and the western frontier. The main road was built in colonial times, and crosses into Kitasi between Melleri and Batto, with only a minor road on the northern side of the river. The province of Tereni has no metalled roads north of the international border crossing near Buboul.

The majority of the small population of Tereni lives in the southern part, where a network of lakes and rivers make the land relatively arable. The higher mountain region is virtually uninhabited; the desert plateau is inhabited primarily by the Mahidi nomads.

Province of Koloni

The province of Koloni (11,423 km²) is defined by the northern Torongo River, which forms the international border with the Islamic Republic of Sumora and the border with neighbouring Hanno province. The boundary with Tereni and Mahbek provinces runs east-west at approximately 03° 30'N.

In eastern Koloni, the watershed of the Arastak River, a tributary of the northern Torongo, contains a number of towns, including the provincial capital of Suroun. The majority of Koloni's population lives in the Arastak River valley, along the western banks of the northern Torongo, or in the area of Lake Egali in the north. The vegetation consists of upland savannah, grasslands and some cultivated areas. Carana's second-largest border crossing with the Islamic Republic of Sumora lies between Norke and the Sumoran town of Edenstan.

Western Koloni is less fertile, and consists primarily of rugged upland savannah. The Algi River creates a network of lakes joining the northern Torongo River at Oladi. Western Koloni is a seasonal home to many of the Mahidi nomads, who migrate northwards during the dry season.

Most of Koloni is below 400m elevation. From higher ground in the south, the land drops away toward the northern Torongo River. The river drops from an elevation of approximately 340m in the west to 55m in the east, over a linear distance of approximately 350 km.

The National Highway follows the west bank of the northern Torongo River to the international boundary at Norke. A secondary highway connects the towns of Lopkas, Caro and Nixan with the provincial capital of Suroun. Another secondary highway follows the river from Norke to Rusko, and then turns southwards towards Ballad, Molle and Pifke. The province of Koloni has no metalled roads further to the west.

Province of Hanno

The province of Hanno (14,399 km²) lies to the east of the northern Torongo River, and comprises most of the eastern Caranese Highlands. Western Hanno includes part of the northern Torongo valley, and the valley of the Tobhak River which joins the northern Torongo near Kalei. The international boundary with the Islamic Republic of Sumora rises away from the northern Torongo, and then follows the Kalesi River from its headwaters to the Gulf of Carana. The Kalesi River is navigable to commercial riverine traffic as far as Maroni, becoming faster and more treacherous as it gains elevation. The navigable channel follows the international boundary, and is used by ships of both nationalities.

The eastern Caranese Highlands consist of rugged hills rising to above 600m. The western side of the range in

Hanno is drier than in Fellari to the east, and primarily covered by low scrub and grassland. Further north, as the ground slopes down toward the Kalesi River, the vegetation becomes denser tropical rainforest, although huge tracts of this have previously been cleared for forestry and are currently under cultivation or used for pasture. Northeastern Hanno lies on the southern edge of the Kalesi delta, from which the border with Fellari province follows the Yakhat River south into the eastern Caranese highlands.

The National Highway parallels the Kalesi River, connecting the national capital of Galasi with the towns of Toto and Kale, the provincial capital or Maroni. The highway runs inland from an earlier road that is prone to seasonal flooding. A further part of the highway (built along roughly the same route as the first road built into the interior during the colonial period) goes on to the town of Akabar, and crosses the northern Torongo River at Harun Landar.

CHAPTER 3: HISTORY



EARLY HISTORY

The people of modern day Carana descend from the Nzedda people who arrived on the island of Kisiwa when they journeyed from mainland Africa around 350 BC. The main ethnic group to settle in this area were the Falin. Over time, other ethnicities arrived and settled among them, including a major immigration in 300 (AD) from mainland Africa.

By the 1430s, European explorers had discovered Kisiwa, and had begun to explore the island. Eventually, trade ties were established between groups of European explorers and inhabitants of the island. The value of these ties became increasingly important for the explorers; by the early 17th century, the Azurians had become the most important foreign presence in Kisiwa, and were largely based in Carana along the eastern coastline. By the 19th century, the island had become strategically important to numerous empires attempting to secure the flow of overseas goods for their home populations. Competition between empires looking to gain control of the land the island had to offer increased; the Azurians who historically benefited the most from the island, soon were threatened by the Carmine Empire who also sought to secure important resources and markets based in the territory that is now Carana, as in other areas of the island. Competition and hostility grew between these empires, until 1882 when these and other empires met at a conference in Salin that resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Salin that formally partitioned the island amongst the competing powers. As a result of the treaty, the Azurian Empire formalized its claim on the territory of Carana.

DECOLONIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE

Azurian political domination in Carana was unquestionable between 1882 until the mid-20th century. In the 1940s and 1950s in Carana, as in most other colonized countries in mainland Africa and Kisiwa, opposition to colonial rule increased, and the population began more seriously to threaten the rule of Azurian colonial authority.

The Second World War was a significant event in the development of Caranese nationalism. An estimated three million people from mainland Africa and the island of Kisiwa were recruited as soldiers for the Azurian Empire and the Western Allies during the war. When these veterans returned home, they returned to colonial states that still considered them second-class citizens. Many of the returning soldiers expected that their support and contribution to the Azurian Empire during the war would be recognized, and that they would see improvements in their economic, social and political circumstances. In reality however, soldiers returned home to worse conditions as a result of a weak global economy. The fact that they fought to protect the interests of the Azurian Empire and its allies, only to return to the exploitation and indignities of colonial rule, fuelled these veterans' bitterness and discontent. Encouraged and strengthened by the arrival of these soldiers, nationalist movements throughout Africa became more energized, and in some instances radicalized.

The influence of the Pan-Africanist movement also contributed to Caranese nationalism. The movement aimed to unite Africans and to overcome ethnicity by stressing the similarities and connections among Africans, including the peoples of Kisiwa and blacks in the African diaspora. By the 1940s, nationalist activities in Carana were becoming more radical, and protests against the colonial rule increased. In 1945, the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester, England marked a turning point in nationalist activities, because it attempted to address the issues of colonial rule and racial discrimination.

Joseph Uroma, a young Falin man who had been studying law abroad, attended the 1945 Pan-African Congress, where he met leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and George Padmore of Trinidad. In 1946, Uroma returned home to Carana after completing his studies, and quickly



gained prestige and support from the population for the anti-colonial views of the Congress. He called on the population of Carana to strengthen their political parties and trade unions, promising that this would help bring better policies for the people of Carana. Uroma used the desperately poor social and economic conditions of the people of Carana to demand independence from the Azurian Empire. Uroma became the leader and focal point of Carana nationalism. Inspired by labour strikes elsewhere in Africa, Uroma led a nine-day general strike to protest against Azurian policies in the country beginning on July 7, 1946. This strike, known as *les neuf grands matins*, brought the shipment and delivery of products arriving by sea and land to a halt, and severely interrupted the day-to-day operations of the country.

Although the strike raised tensions between colonial officials and the Caranese population, it ended without major violence. For the next ten years however, protests and industrial action became more frequent, together with demands for better political representation for the people of Carana. The colonial authorities, faced with a deteriorating situation in Katasi, moved the principal Azurian colonial capital to Galasi in 1955, as a result of the Kori Revolution. The government developed a cautiously cooperative relationship with the primarily Falin leaders in Carana, while trying to deal with growing revolt in Katasi. Despite this, the pressure for political change in Carana increased.

To deal with these social and economic upheavals, in 1955, the Azurian government eventually agreed to an amendment to its constitution that enabled citizens of its overseas colonies to gain greater political representation, while remaining a part of the Azurian Community of States. This would see the Caranese people being able to elect a representative to the Azurian National Assembly. In a referendum in 1958, the people of Carana, with the influence of the Azurian officials and the support of Uroma, voted to accept this offer. Uroma himself became the first elected Caranese representative to the Azurian National Assembly.

Despite this vote, internal political pressure and domestic political opposition continued to grow in the country. Public agitation and dissent, sparked by various groups and associations primarily in the urban areas, increased demand for full independence from the Azurian Empire. While initially supporting the idea of remaining part of the Azurian Community of States, Uroma used his seat in the National Assembly to demand fairer policies for the Caranese population. His demands for self-governance for Carana, however met with resistance from the rest of the Assembly. Ultimately on April 10, 1962, after calls for self-rule had constantly grown louder, the Azurian Empire relented and granted full independence to the *République démocratique de Carana*, with Uroma becoming the first indigenous head of state of the country.

While the role of domestic pressures in the granting of full independence in Carana cannot be underestimated, there is no doubt that pressures from the international community also contributed greatly. Changes in global political dynamics, as embodied by the formation of the United Nations in 1948 and its recognition of peoples' right of self-determination, and the independence of other states in Africa since the early 1950s, also contributed immensely.

POST-INDEPENDENCE

When Joseph Uroma took over the reins of power in 1962 after being voted into office, his leadership was greeted with enthusiasm and optimism by the people of Carana. President Uroma was first gratefully hailed as a strong leader; his forceful personality was welcomed as a necessary trait to push the country forward. Uroma's government initially pursued an economic policy that had at its core, a central role for the government. His first few years in government were viewed as a success, as he began implementing economic reforms; he was re-elected in 1966. During this new term, Carana's economic performance began to lag behind the high expectations set during the struggle for independence, and his dominant personality

began to be perceived more as oppressive. Uroma refused to conduct the next round of elections in 1970, and by the start of the 1970s, a number of factors, including his authoritarian rule, economic mismanagement and failed national policies had put the economy in dire straits. The result was growing discontent across the Caranese population and different groups began agitating for Uroma's forced removal from power. President Uroma's rule was ended in 1971 by a bloodless coup by the Caranese Army that installed General **Christian Hakutu** as the new Head of State.

Unfortunately, corruption and notorious governmental inefficiency characterized General Hakutu's regime. Not only was inflation on the rise, but *per capita* income, real wages, and the quality and availability of essential social services such as health and education declined rapidly. As a result of this state of affairs, Hakutu's regime failed to produce the expected and desired socio-economic growth and results, which he had promised when he took power. Besides the worsening economic conditions, Hakutu's military dictatorship was harshly repressive. He dissolved civilian and democratic political institutions and replaced elected regional leaders with military officers. The constitution was suspended, and opposition party political activities were banned while the government ruled by decree.

The Hakutu government introduced a series of *Caranese Public Safety Laws*, to limit the role and influence of various groups in society. For example, under Public Safety Law 1, the government could detain opposition critics without trial for indefinite periods. Public Safety Law 2 required all religious groups to register with the government, thus limiting freedom of religion and association. Some religious groups were subsequently denied the chance to operate on grounds that their activities were a threat to the public good and national security.

During the Hakutu regime, thousands of opposition supporters were imprisoned, and several hundred disappeared, and are widely believed to have been murdered in extra-judicial executions. Other serious human rights abuses committed by military personnel went unpunished. Hakutu promised an eventual return to civilian rule; however he refused to announce any timetable. Instead, the government continued to enforce arbitrary authority through the state's security and coercive apparatus, as well as by close control of the court system. Eventually however, a power struggle within the army led to Hakutu's own removal in a *coup d'état* in 1975 that brought Colonel **Idrissa Tarakoni** to power.

During Tarakoni's era, the authoritarian measures of the previous regime were largely continued. Also, under Colonel Tarakoni, the economic situation worsened, as the international energy crisis of the 1970s hit Carana hard. In the face of a precipitous economic decline and increasing poverty levels, and a failure to obtain financial aid and other forms of assistance from Azuria or from other sources, Colonel Tarakoni decided in 1982 to seek loans and other support from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). As part of the conditions for being granted the loan, the institutions and bilateral agencies in the West insisted on policy changes that included the promotion of good economic governance and the return of democratic rule. During the Cold War, the West saw Carana as a possible ally in the developing world, and saw continued oppression and grinding poverty as an opportunity for instability and a possible Communist-backed revolution (as had happened in Katasi). Thus in the early 1980s, Tarakoni's regime was forced to embark on a programme of reforms to return the country to democratic rule. The Caranese Public Safety Laws were gradually lifted, allowing renewed political activity. Finally, a national referendum was conducted in December 1985 that sanctioned a new Constitution, which as effectively defined the shape of Carana today.

From there, political parties sought to re-establish themselves in time for upcoming elections, which was conducted under the direction and supervision of a national Elections Commission. The principal parties at the 1986 election were the Falin-dominated Parti démocratique de Carana (PDC), the Front national caranais (FNC), which has strong ties to the Tatsi ethnic group, and the Parti de la convention Caranaise (PCC), which

is a Kori based party. The 1986 elections brought the PDC to power under its Falin leader **Roselyn Okatsi**. Okatsi served his first five years before being re-elected in 1991. National elections again took place in 1996. Under a new leader, **Jacques Ogavo**, who had been hand-picked by Okatsi, the PDC got 53 seats, and continued to rule. Ogavo and the PDC won another election that was held in 2001; the PDC increased its majority in the National Assembly from 53 seats to 66 seats.

In 2003, a proposition for the amendment of the Constitution was brought forth to allow for an unlimited number of terms to be held by the President. Previously, a person could serve for a majority of two terms as President; Ogavo's supporters and others had argued that this unfairly limited the freedom of choice of the people and of the Assembly. This amendment was therefore initially approved by the required three-quarters majority of the Assembly, and the Constitution was officially amended 12 months later, with the required four-fifths support of the majority of the Assembly.

Leading up to the 2006 national elections, and believing in his continued popularity among the electorate, Ogavo voiced his desire to be re-elected in order to serve a third term as President of the Republic. Although Ogavo won the presidential elections, the PDC majority was brought down to 54 seats. The conduct and result of the elections drew some criticisms and suspicions from portions of the population, and were openly criticized by the principal opposition party, the Parti pour la convention caranaise (PCC), who maintained that they were cheated out of some seats. Official election results gave the PCC 35 seats, followed by the Front national caranais (FNC) with seven seats, and the Ralliement pour la solidarité (RS) with four.

POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS

Nationality:	Noun: Caranese (singular and plural); Fr. Caranais(e) Adjective: Caranese; Fr. Caranais(e)
Total Population:	8,553,999
Population Density:	79.1 people per square kilometre
Last Census:	2008
Population Distribution:	Male / female rate: 0.97 male(s)/female % rural / urban: 70 % rural, 30% urban
Age Structure:	0-14 years: 44% 15-64 years: 52% 65 years and over: 4%
Population Growth Rate:	3.109%
Net Migration rate:	Not available
Ethnic Groups:	Falin (49%), Kori (28%), Tatsi (13%), Pleioni (4%), Mahidi (1%), Caucasian (2%), Indian (1%), Arab (1%), Other (1%).
Languages:	Official language is French; dozens of other languages and dialects are frequently spoken. (See Spoken Languages section for further explanation)

OVERVIEW OF CARANESE SOCIETY


Caranese society comprises a number of ethnicities, each with several tribal groupings with its own cultural and societal attributes, traditional language, and culture. The three major groups in Carana are the Falin and Tatsi, both descendants of the Nzedda people who arrived on the Island before 350 BC, and the Kori, who are descendants of the Tondoi people who had arrived by 300 AD. These three families constitute a total of 11 major tribal groups in Carana. Other African ethnicities include the Pleioni and Mahidi tribes who, with the Nakunda of western Kisiwa, are believed to be the original inhabitants of Kisiwa. Non-African ethnicities include European (primarily of Azurian origin), Indians, and Arabs.

As in many other African countries, Caranese society is shaped by a complexity of social structures and hierarchies (political, social, and economic), roles (based on gender, age, etc.), legal and customary norms, and religious, cultural and civic values. The framework of these dynamics dictates the maintenance of life-sustaining resources, the upkeep of social structures, and the creation and solving of social dilemmas. Caranese societal organization is a complex phenomenon, due to the complex relationships among the different ethno-religious-linguistic groups.

Some manifestations of the present social relationships among the groups are consequences of bitter historical

experiences which were never formally or adequately addressed, and for which the perceived victims have not been granted justice or apology (see the Tatsi and Falin, below). Through the political dominance of popular Falin politicians such as Joseph Uroma, and the successive military coups d'état which maintained that dominance, the Falin form the majority among the higher-ranking military officers and public servants. However, relationships between the other minor ethnic groups have remained largely civil, with occasional misunderstandings generating tension and sometimes violence. Still, the present economic and international market situations which are affecting the entire Island of Kisiwa have meant that the limited resources in the different Kisiwa states are subject to more intense competition. Greater competition for these resources has the potential to produce a range of socio-ethnic conflicts, based on the existing fault-lines in Caranese society.

Major Ethnic Groups



Province	Falin		Kori		Tatsi		Miscellaneous		Total
	%	Pop	%	Pop	%	Pop	%	Pop	
Barin	62.08%	408,352	29.70%	195,377	3.00%	19,742	5.22%	34,323	657,794
Fellari	80.80%	2,169,776	14.68%	394,277	1.00%	26,829	3.52%	94,604	2,685,486
Guthar	57.81%	1,101,999	11.00%	209,641	13.00%	247,885	18.19%	346,852	1,906,377
Hanno	66.01%	374,586	24.00%	136,223	1.00%	5,669	8.99%	51,025	567,503
Koloni	3.00%	13,934	91.88%	427,151	0.03%	143	5.09%	23,676	464,904
Leppko	6.80%	84,527	15.70%	195,229	60.49%	752,260	17.02%	211,639	1,243,654
Mahbek	0.62%	5,142	81.51%	681,451	7.51%	62,755	10.37%	86,731	836,079
Tereni	0.60%	1,157	92.48%	177,751	0.60%	1,152	6.32%	12,142	192,202
TOTAL		4,159,473		2,417,099		1,116,436		860,991	8,553,999

The Falin

The Falin family of tribes (made up of the Falari, Gatari, Barini and Hanari) represent the largest proportion of the population, making up 49% of the total population of Carana. Since independence, the Falin have also been the dominant group in national politics, in government structures, in institutions of higher education and research centres, and in other important institutions such as the military and the police forces. The Falin constitute the greatest majority in the provinces of Hanno and Fellari, as well as in neighbouring Sumora.

There has been a strong tradition of solidarity between Sumoran and Caranese Falin as a result of their shared ethno-linguistic heritage and common history. However, in more recent years, there have been tensions between Falin of different religious beliefs within Carana, which has caused strains between Falin communities on either side of the Sumoran-Caranese border. Though the majority of the Falin in Carana are Christian (primarily the Falari and the Gatari), 13% of the total Caranese population are Muslim Falin (primarily the Hanari and Barini). This animosity has spread to Muslim Falin in Sumora and to Falin Christians in Carana.

The Kori

The Kori family of tribes (comprising of the Teri, the Kolni, the Mahabi, and the Katsi) represent 28% of the population of Carana. They are the descendents of the once powerful Kori Kingdom that dominated most of what is now Katasi, and parts of Carana. The Kori people are considered the most traditionalist group in Carana, and historically maintained the strongest anti-colonial sentiments against the Azurian colonial authorities. The Kori are also found in Katasi, Mosana and Rimosana where their tribes speak the same traditional language as the Kori of Carana. Their traditional language is Koloni, which has been taught and encouraged by elders and parents to ensure the preservation of the Kori cultural and linguistic heritage.

The roots of Kori anti-colonialist sentiment stem largely from the disintegration of the Kori kingdom as a result of colonial influences. The presence of the Azurian authorities negated the Kori regional military and economic dominance. Their once-powerful kingdom was subsumed into a colonial system in which they lost both military autonomy and economic power. Since independence from Azuria, the Caranese Kori have generally been placed in subordinate roles to the Falin in government, in commerce, and in defence, security and legal structures and institutions.

Kori leaders have criticized the current “first-past-the-post” electoral system, that they say disfavors them. However, while the Kori make up 28% of the population, other ethnic groups have little interest in forging political alliances with them, as they have a historical legacy of dominating others, as a result of the once powerful kingdom. Kori political ambitions are, perhaps sometimes correctly, suspected of including the resurrection of the Kori Kingdom. Falin leaders have on certain instances accused Kori opponents of vote-rigging during national and local elections, though this has never been proven.

The Tatsi

The Tatsi family of tribes (comprising the Lipaki, the Coastal Tatsi and the Elassoni) represent 13% of the population of Carana. Since Carana’s early history, the Tatsi have been dominated by other groups on the island, including what is now Carana. This subjugation was first under the Kori during the 1300s, and later by the Falin during the 1400s (see below). The Tatsi live primarily in the southern provinces of Lepko and Mahbek, and are also a significant proportion of the populations of neighbouring Mosana and Rimosá.

The subjugation of the Tatsi people in Carana led them to form alliances with other minority groups on the island, but their relationships with these groups in Carana have not always been smooth. The Tatsi have always been on the lowest level of socio-economic and political strata, although they have historically voiced fewer political and economic grievances than other populations, especially the Kori. Relatively few have succeeded in achieving any important government appointment or political office. Tatsi leaders have previously lobbied for political reforms that would permit greater representation by minority ethnic groups.

Many of the Tatsi ethnic group resent the Falin for the parts they played during the era of the slave trade in the Gulf of Carana, that began in the 1400s. Falin raiding parties captured Tatsi from Carana, and handed them to slave traders in exchange for guns, gunpowder, and other supplies. Accounts of this have been narrated from generation to generation through a strong oral tradition of story-telling and song, thereby keeping the memories alive. Family lineages of those who were forced into slavery are recognized during traditional ceremonies, which form a key part of the Tatsi ethnic identity. The contribution of this tradition to the fuelling of tensions between the Tatsi and the Falin should not be under-estimated. Historically constrained from violence due to fears of reprisal by the Falin, the Tatsi have instead been eager to tell of their anger against the descendants of the Falin, whose ancestors sold their ancestors into slavery.

Although there are wealthy and powerful Tatsi families in southern Carana, the status of the Tatsi as an underclass has been perpetuated over the years. Although the forestry, mining and smelting industries in southern Carana generate wealth, much of it does not stay in the Tatsi communities, which has bred further resentment against the government and the perceived Falin ascendancy.

The Tatsi in Carana were at one time almost exclusively Roman Catholic. As a result of the work of a small group of Tatsi academics and nationalists, many Tatsi are beginning to analyze and critique the fact that missionaries and slavers worked for the same colonial powers, and thus appeared to have worked side-by-side. This critique has fuelled a growing call for the Catholic Church in Carana to declare its independence from the Roman Catholic Church. They see the Catholic Church as being implicated with the Falin majority in the enslavement of their ancestors.

This has created a split within the Tatsi faith community. Although the idea has been popular among lay members, the ordained ministry has generally supported the church hierarchy, based on the apostolic origins of its authority. Since the Catholic Church trains and is responsible for sending bishops to dioceses, Tatsi bishops have vowed to remain faithful to Rome and the Pope. Priests, who vow obedience to their bishops, feel an obligation to keep these vows. Although there have been admissions that the church turned a blind

eye to these events, the church hierarchy is resisting this movement towards a separate Church. There has therefore been a growing tendency for Tatsi to join other Christian sects, whose influences have been introduced from Rimosa and other external sources.

The Pleioni

The Pleioni people make up 4% of the population of Carana. Archaeological evidence suggests that Pleioni settlements existed in south-eastern Kisiwa at least 35,000 years ago, however Pleioni settlement in Carana, north of the Torongo River, was minimal until ethnic violence in Rimosa resulted in an influx of over 200,000 refugees in the mid-20th century. The majority of these settled permanently across southern Carana, and their numbers have steadily increased. While not strongly politically aligned with any one specific ethnicity, they have banded together with other groups that offer them greater opportunity, if only for a short period, or for limited purposes. Due to this, they have been seen as both the friend and the enemy of various groups, depending on the current political situation.

The Pleioni are seen as industrious and entrepreneurial, valuing creative skill and craftsmanship. For this reason, they have frequently moved ahead of the Tatsi economically, which has generated friction between the two groups. The Pleioni presence in southern Carana has encouraged trade with Pleioni in Rimosa, and there is considerable cross-border movement of people and goods.

The Mahidi Nomads

The Mahidi nomads make up 1% of the total population. They are an ancient people, who are believed to have inhabited the interior of Kisiwa for tens of thousands of years. They are primarily nomadic pastoralists, who move from region to region in search of pasturing for their cattle and goats. They travel with their families, livestock, and possessions, and rarely settle for long enough to build permanent homes. In many other ways however, they share many of the characteristics of the Kori peoples, including the traditional religious beliefs and other practices.

The Mahidi sell livestock to make money for needs such as food and shelter. Since their cattle and goats are their primary source of food and revenue, they guard them closely, and have been willing to use violence to protect livestock and families. Otherwise, the Mahidi are known to be respectful of other people's property, and generally graze their herds in open fields and grasslands not used for organized agriculture. There have been occasional quarrels with the Mahidi during the drier months, when their herds have encroached into people's croplands in search of food.

The Mahidi have little or no interest in participation in formal political processes outside their tribes, or in other aspects of Caranese society, including the formal economy. They are therefore often ignored and marginalized by the other ethnic groups.

The Azurian-Caranese

Other than the tribal groups of African origin above, foreign empires from the Middle Ages through to colonial times have introduced populations to Carana. Caucasians make up 2% of the total population. The Caucasian population in Carana is largely Azurian, and consists primarily of the descendants of colonial administrators, settlers, missionaries and entrepreneurs. Many Azurians fled Katasi during the Kori Revolution, and settled in Carana, along with Azurians from Namuna.

Most of the Azurian population is relatively affluent, and employed primarily in commerce and in the professions. Although there has been periodic resentment of this continued prosperity, there have been no official attempts to discourage Azurian or other non-African inhabitants since the end of the Hakutu dictatorship. Caucasians have been condemned by some populist politicians for the European role in the slave trade and in subsequent colonial oppression.

The Indians

The Indian population makes up about 1% of the total population of Carana. It traces its roots to Indian merchants who were trading spices, textiles and other commodities with inhabitants of Carana and other parts of the Islands as far back as the early 19th century. The Indians in Carana are descendants of these merchants, many of whom inter-married with the Caranese population and remained in the country.

The Indian population live primarily in urban areas in eastern Carana. Their religion is almost exclusively Hinduism. Although some work as artisans, the majority continue their traditional occupations as merchants and shopkeepers.

The Arabs

The Arab population, which makes up 2% of the population, dates back to the first arrival of Muslim Arabs on the Island during the period of the Almoravid Dynasty, early in the 11th century AD. The Arab population grew during the Middle Ages with the growth of the trade in slaves and exports from the region. Allegations of historic complicity in slavery and the slave trade have made the Arabs a target for occasional animosity, especially from Tatsi leaders.

The Arab population live principally in northern Carana, and maintain close links with Arab populations in Sumora. Significant numbers settled in the communities on the east side of the north Torongo River in Hanno province.

Other Populations

The Caucasian, Indian and Arab populations also include newer migrants and expatriate contingents from various parts of the world, working in a wide variety of commercial and non-government sectors. Most of these are in the national capital of Galasi or in other urban centres.

Hierarchies and Structure in Caranese Society

Caranese society is profoundly hierarchical and social relations within these hierarchical structures are often bound to socio-cultural traditions. Hierarchy in Carana exists among and between social classes and is based on heredity, age and socio-economic positions within society. The predominantly Falin leadership understand the influence of traditional hierarchical structure and seek to maintain it, as it ensures the maintenance of their political power. For example, in recruitment and training of military and peace officers, Falin officials have generally ensured the greatest consideration for the areas with the larger populations, which happens to be mainly inhabited by Falin. They have denied demands for a quota-based hiring system, arguing that quotas are un-democratic. This ultimately helps to keep the Falin at the higher echelons of the socio-political spectrum.

This has been noted and condemned by both Kori and Tatsi leaders, but they can do very little. If they were able to forge an effective political alliance, they would still need to get greater support of other minor but

influential ethnic groups to be able to win against the Falin. Since the Kori are frequently suspected of wanting to re-establish the fallen Kori Kingdom, most of the other groups do not want to forge a strong alliance with them.

Politically, the Falin have proven astute, making sure that they have the support of many of the other small but influential ethnic groups such as the Caranese-Azurians, the Indians, the Arabs and the Pleioni. This has included offering jobs that elevate or preserve their economic and social status, but not in numbers enough to support any kind of political or military coup d'état. Thus it can be said that ancient ethnic hierarchies continue to contribute to the social structure; the oppression of some and the handing of privileges to others based on their ethnic identification. The Tatsi continue to occupy primarily the lower echelons of Caranese society while the Falin continue to occupy the higher echelons in most aspects of the economic, social, political and civic life.

Spoken Languages

The official language in Carana is French. It is widely spoken and is the medium of instruction in middle and secondary schools and in universities and other higher education institutes. It is also the language of government, commerce and legal processes. Other languages spoken in Carana include the traditional languages and dialects of the various tribal groups – approximately 20 African languages and dialects. Hindi is spoken by the Indian population, and Arabic by the Arab population. Because most students speak and are taught in their respective traditional language prior to junior secondary school, they can normally use both their own tongue, and French as a *lingua franca*.

While the Caranese society was forced to adopt the French language through Azurian colonization, education and commerce, different ethnic groups still maintained their languages and dialects. There is also an unofficial patois known as *Caranais-français* – a combination of words from Azurian French and the different ethnic groups', as well as some words from neighbouring Sumora, Katasi and Rimosa. It serves as a form of pidgin, or a regional language understood by the majority of the people, old and young, educated or not. This makes communication within the eastern sub-region easier, especially for those with little formal education.

Sports, and Arts and Culture

In spite of the political divisions and occasional animosity among the different ethnic groupings, sports events are among the few social phenomena that unite the entire Caranese population. During the major international events like the Soccer World Cup, the Kisiwa International League and the Olympics, all Caranese rally behind their national teams and provide support through donations for maintaining the training facilities. People congregate in front of televisions for major matches, and whole neighbourhoods erupt into cheering when goals are scored by the home team. There is also enthusiastic listening to sports commentaries and debates on national, provincial and local radio and television stations, as well as extensive coverage by local and national newspapers. Carana becomes football-obsessed during playoffs, and many people buy and display memorabilia and merchandise that show their support for their national and other teams. The national teams are often made up of the best players selected from teams in every part of the country. This is an activity that seems to defy the traditions of hierarchical privilege, because everyone desires the best teams – selection is thus not based on ethnicity but on the ability.

Carana boasts of three major national soccer teams, the Supers *sportifs caranais* (SSC - senior men's national team), the Élités sportives caranaises (ESC - youth men's team), and the *Demoiselles sportives caranaises* (DSC - the women's national team). These teams are well known around Kisiwa, having won the Kisiwa International League several times. Many young people admire the players from Carana who play on professional teams

in Europe, and hope one day to play in the European leagues. Many of these professionals from Carana are often invited by the national team coaches to play for the country during the Kisiwa International League of Nations Cup. Carana has ten professional soccer teams which are sponsored by different provinces and corporations, including financial institutions, communication companies and private individuals. Many young people see sport as a way out of poverty and parents often encourage their children to try out in the open season, when coaches from these professional teams scout high schools for potential professional players.

Basketball is another pastime of growing popularity in the country. Many young people watch NBA games from the United States on satellite television. Though basketball is popular with the minority of people who live close to basketball courts, unlike soccer it is still seen as sports for the elite. In many parts of Carana, there are no basketball courts and many young people have never played it. While there is a tradition among the poor of making soccer balls out of a collection of polythene bags tied together with ropes, basketball has proven more difficult to adapt for impromptu play. While many urban schools have basketball courts, Carana has no professional basketball leagues or teams.

Golf is another game of growing popularity, evolving from being a game for the political and military elites and expatriates. In recent years, many young people, especially young professionals, have gained interest due in part to the influence of Tiger Woods. While for cost reasons it is still a game for the privileged, it is becoming available to anyone who can afford to pay for a tee time on one of the few golf courses. Although the number of courses is growing, economic limitations still restrict access to the game.

Like most of Kisiwa, Carana has experienced the influence of the growing communication media in shaping young people's minds. Apart from sports, many young people learn to play and dance to the tunes of Western music shown on MTV Europe. Due to the availability of European satellite television and the internet, young people are increasingly influenced by American and European styles in dress and fashion. This has caused concern among many that their culture and music will eventually be assimilated and their cultural practices lost by a generation that appears to be more in tune with a cosmopolitan global culture than with that of Carana.

The Caranese in general have always been very proud of their arts traditions. As Caranese society is diverse, so is the range of visual and performing arts; perhaps more-so than some of its neighbours. There are influences from the many ethnic heritages that make up the society; from the traditional African cultures, from the Azurian tradition, and Indian and Islamic arts and music. Paintings and sculptures in public places and government establishments, monuments erected during both colonial and post-colonial eras, and public and private architecture all show a variety of influences. In public offices, Caranese paintings, carvings and other forms of art frequently adorn the walls.

Caranese paintings often portray the picturesque locations in the country, including mountains and rivers, town scenes and the coast along the Gulf of Carana. Local artists and artisans also create paintings and sculptures of the people and aspects of their socio-cultural heritage. Among the Islamic population, art tends to respect the more abstract and non-representational tradition.

In Carana, every aspect of life is also expressed in its music. People express every occasion in music, from the announcement of the birth of a child, to weddings and other social festivities. Spontaneous songs of joy often erupt in market places or on street corners when people receive good news. There are several different genres of traditional music popular among the Caranese. Music played with traditional drums, gongs, and other percussion instruments is still very common in homes and at community events. There is also a range of music played with western musical instruments, including other African-influenced styles such as blues and jazz.

Dance and music are closely linked in Caranese culture. Dance forms a regular part of traditional village life, especially where traditional religions are practiced. Christian worship styles have also been adapted to include traditional musical themes. Music and dance are often used in traditional story-telling, which has resulted in a unique form of theatre, based on the re-telling of folk-legends. This ranges from amateur performances in schools to street-performers to semi-professional troupes based in major cities.

Traditional Leaders in Society

Traditional leadership still plays significant roles in Caranese society. This is partly because of the importance attached to tribal identity and the sense of belonging. Since many ethnic communities and their traditional cultures still play a role in maintaining social order, “unofficial” leaders - tribal chiefs, community elders and leaders within civil society (e.g. clubs for youths and adults) participate actively in decision-making about matters that affect the communities and the individual members.

Traditional leadership also plays an important role in influencing behaviour, both through defining social expectations and through informal processes of addressing deviant and anti-social behaviour. This role originated from the practices of the different tribal groups, and the development of quasi-legal mechanisms of solving their problems without outside interference or involvement. Tribal leaders and elders frequently settle disputes, often in accordance with the customs of the people handed down by oral traditions.

This does not normally challenge the primacy of the police and the judicial system in maintaining law and order, especially with regards to violent crimes, or of the armed forces in national defence. It does not, however, follow that traditional leaders will always act or lead their followers in the interests of the state or government. Rather, the influence of the “unofficial” leadership should be considered as a sometimes separate thread in Caranese social hierarchy.

See also section “Traditional Hierarchies and Rules”, (*Chapter 6: Governance*)

Family Units in Carana

The family unit in Carana may be configured in different ways. For the Caranese, family does not only include parents and siblings. The extended family system is a major part of life. At family gatherings, there is generally little emphasis on the degree of separation; rather, everyone related to one by blood is considered family, and are often referred to generically as brothers and sisters. Some Caranese are reluctant to travel away from their family communities, although this is changing. Modern work conditions are requiring more bread-winners to live apart from their families.

Loyalty to family and family members is important in Caranese society, and is an extension of broader tribal loyalty. Feuds between families are consequently potentially bitter and long-lasting. Divisions within families, when they do occur, can also be deep and enduring, as they are frequently seen to be caused by a betrayal of the family bond.

The practice of polygamy has long been accepted in traditional Caranese agrarian society. Although the Christian colonists condemned it, it has never been abolished officially. Many of those who practiced the traditional Caranese religions also practiced polygamy. Since the Caranese were agrarians, they married according to their ability to take care of many wives and children, who in turn would help in the cultivation of the land. Though subsistence agriculture is less common, many people (especially the Kori) still practice polygamy. Even though Christianity condemns it, some Christian people turn a deaf ear to the Church. The

practice is not an issue for Muslims as they are allowed by their tradition to take more than one wife. Polygamy is less common in more cosmopolitan urban areas, owing to greater opportunities for women and more influence from the modern global culture.

Labour in Society

The Caranese are generally viewed as an industrious and hard-working people. In village agrarian life, physical labour was essential to survival, and work is valued. Gradual increases in the jobless rate resulting from successive economic shocks have caused social as well as financial difficulties. Many people are aware that they have little job security. To compound this problem, there is no established social security system, so if one loses his or her job, there is nothing established by the government as a buffer or to fall back on.

In times of financial difficulties, many organizations donate to and help those in need. Services not provided by the government are supplemented by different not-for-profit and non-government organizations including the Caranese Red Cross Society, the Society for the Propagation of Human Dignity, the Institute for Development, Justice and Peace (IDJAP), and many different religious groups and foundations.

Gender Roles and Relations

Caranese society is strongly patriarchal; though in recent decades there have been increased challenges to traditional assumptions regarding gender roles. Socio-economic changes in recent times have begun to test conventional and stereotypical assumptions about the roles and responsibilities of women in society. The weakening and disintegration of traditional social institutions, as well as new social norms and values have affected identities and relations between the sexes, particularly in urban areas, and especially among the more liberal Falin (Falari & Gatari Falin). In rural areas and principally among the more conservative Kori, Tatsi and Barini & Hanari Falin (the more traditional Falin), the status quo remains entrenched.

Traditionally, male privileges and responsibilities have to do with family economic welfare, politics, and relationships with outsiders to the family-unit. Female roles stress motherhood, child socialization and family nurturing. Even among professional career women, family responsibilities remain a top priority. Thus, women's self-perception of their roles, among the majority, urban and rural, contributes to the perpetuation of often patriarchal values in Caranese society. In most social institutions, women and girls are taught to submit to their fathers and other male figures, and eventually to their husbands. Among the Barini and Hanari Muslim Falin, gender dynamics stem from the restricted mobility of women outside their village and their controlled ability to work outside their homes. These realities are based on women's traditional role as the keepers of family honour, as well as on ownership of the majority of productive assets by men. Among these groups, that a family's social position depends on the public behaviour of its female members is a common principle. Stepping outside prescribed gender roles and behavioural norms in public can lead to moral condemnation, intimidation and social isolation within some communities.

None however dispute the centrality of women in Caranese society; respect for women is characteristic of Caranese social values, even if that appreciation does not translate into equality with men. In some spheres, the role of women is particularly revered; that of childbearing and rearing, and notably, that of elderly women within society who play the important role of providing guidance to younger women in family and societal matters. As well, mothers of chiefs and traditional priestesses, especially from the Kori group, are held in high esteem and are included in important decision-making processes that have community-wide implications. In times past, a number were recognized as important leaders who provided counsel in times of war. One such, Maya Dumpa Anaa, is still considered a national hero for leading a revolt against the Azurian colonists as

they laid claim to the land. Ordinary women in rural areas are also valued for a number of different reasons. For instance, among the Tatsi, after the birth of an eighth child, a woman is celebrated by her husband and community with a traditional ceremony that involves the killing of a cow in her honour and the presentation of gifts from the heads of families in her village.

In the urban areas, and especially among the Falin, women have been encouraged to pursue education and acquire jobs. Women's groups and international non-government organizations in Carana have mounted a campaign in the last decade urging that girls be sent to school, as often family investments in education are concentrated on boys. While working and contributing to family income, women enjoy enhanced status and respect. Urban middle-class and upper-middle-class women tend to have more education than working-class women and are generally employed in teaching, health care, and clerical work. Upper class women may work in the prestigious professions, such as law, medicine, and university teaching. There are a growing number of women who function in public life. In the current distribution within the National Assembly, six of 100 Members of the *Assemblée Nationale* are women. Nevertheless, family pressures, traditional attitudes and religious opposition continue to impose constraints on some women. For instance, a professional woman would still be expected to perform the primary housekeeping and nurturing functions in her family, although upper-class women tend to rely on domestic servants to fulfil these functions. However, many *so-called* modern Kori men with professional wives still insist that their meals be prepared by their wives. This example points to an important observation regarding the unfolding gender dynamics in Carana; and it is that while women's roles are changing, men's roles are not being significantly adjusted to accommodate these shifting roles.

On a broader perspective, policies attempting to "modernize" gender relations in Carana have been accepted and implemented to varying degrees. In its preamble, the Caranese Constitution refers to the "valiant women" of Carana, and allows for citizenship to be passed on by mothers. Still, some policies and national laws continue to subscribe to traditional views on gender roles and interactions, and to a patriarchal society. For instance, in spite of efforts of women in civil society to change Caranese law pertaining to land ownership and inheritance, women's rights remain limited, and despite calls for public participation of women in Carana, the presence of women in areas such as politics remains minimal. Tensions between traditional customary practices and codes (often shaped by religious beliefs that intrude on the rights of women) and policies attempting to modernize gender roles remain widespread. As a result, although the government guarantees many equal opportunities between the sexes, the traditional value system perpetuates gender disparity in almost all spheres of life.

HEALTH CARE

Health Facilities:	1 Hospital per 658,000 inh. (WHO standard: 1/150,000) 1 Health Centre per 167,725 inh. (WHO standard: 1/5,000) 1 Health Post per 11,622 inh. (WHO standard: 1/1,000)
Health Practitioners:	1 medical doctor per 17,351 inhabitants (WHO: 1/10,000) 1 nurse per 7,406 inh. (WHO standard: 1/300) 1 registered midwife per 12,617 inh. (WHO standard: 1/300)
Birth rate/death rate:	42.9 births/1,000 population 11.17 deaths/1,000 population
Infant mortality:	58.5 deaths/1,000 live births (urban) 113.2 deaths/1,000 live births (rural)
Childbirth mortality:	4.5 deaths/1,000 births (urban) 9.6 deaths/1,000 births (rural)
Life expectancy:	Female: 51.6 years Male: 52.1 years
Total fertility rate (Children born/woman):	5.66
HIV/AIDS:	Adult prevalence rate: 2.8% People living with HIV/AIDS: 88 400 (adult and children) Annual deaths: 7,200 (est. 2007)

Major Infectious diseases

<i>Degree of Risk:</i>	Very High
<i>Food or waterborne disease:</i> <i>Typhoid Fever, Cholera.</i>	Bacterial and Protozoal Diarrhoea, Hepatitis A,
<i>Vector borne disease:</i>	Malaria, Yellow fever, African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), Chikungunya fever
<i>Water contact disease:</i>	Schistosomiasis
<i>Respiratory disease:</i>	Meningococcal Meningitis, Tuberculosis
<i>Animal contact disease:</i>	Rabies

Public Health Standards

Carana shares problems similar to many other African countries, including child mortality, maternal death, malaria and sexual diseases (including AIDS). Malaria is the primary cause of morbidity (25%). Malnutrition remains a public health issue; almost 1 out of every 5 children is underweight. Vaccination coverage against the main childhood diseases remains inadequate; only 42% of all children between 12 and 23 months have received all necessary vaccinations. Limited or no access to safe water causes health problems in the rural regions of Carana, affecting the health of children, the elderly, and pregnant women.

HIV infection levels have increased recently – but from a relatively low previous level. AIDS prevention work, including youth education, sensitization, and counselling, have not been given a high priority. Other services, such as AIDS treatment, and psychological assistance to HIV-affected people, are also not delivered effectively.

Although prevention of diseases is on top of the official national health agenda, it is the lack of effective and/or timely treatment that is daily reality throughout Carana, especially in remote regions. Generally speaking, the provinces with the lowest level of health care provision and hence the greatest problems in public health are the provinces in the west and in the south (Tereni, Hano, Mahbek, and Barin) with limited access to medical facilities/professionals, or with poor medical infrastructure. The lack of infrastructure and medical professionals also results in a high disparity in quality and extent of health services between urban and rural regions, which has also resulted in disparate data on health and other social indicators throughout the country.

Medical Services

The health budget of Carana is composed approximately of 53% from government, 11% from the population, 6% from communities and 30% from international donors and partners. Each community contributes to the communal budget by paying fixed fees for consultancy, vaccination, immunization, child health, and pre- and postnatal services.

In relation to the administrative structure of the country with eight provinces, and numerous departments and communes, the organizational structure of the national healthcare system in Carana is divided in four levels:

- Provincial Hospitals (*Hôpitaux provinciaux*);
- Health Centres (*Centres de santé*);
- Health Posts (*Postes de santé*);
- Health Points (*Cases de santé*).

In addition to that, the country has one university hospital and a number of private clinics, which have no real effect on health care for the vast majority of the population. On the lowest level there are numerous “health points” that refer patients to the health posts. Many of these are run by local religious organizations, funded in part by the government.

In rural areas, the highest level is the health centre, with limited operating facilities, one or two medical doctors and 15 to 20 other health staff. The health posts (*postes de santé*) have about four to five health workers, with no regular medical doctor. The number of health posts per health centre depends on the size of the district and its population density. Under each health post there are numerous health points, with one or two health agents and a midwife.

The Caranese health system suffers from an endemic lack of training and education, as well as a lack of motivation for staff to work in rural regions. Doctors and medical personal from Galasi do not like to work in rural regions far from their families. They often do not understand local people and their culture and vice versa. These circumstances and the absence of continued training on medical issues after university education result in a very low motivation and effectiveness of their work.

In addition to that, there are two categories of employers in the health sector of Carana: The government health administrators and the workers employed by the National Health Committee. The latter have a lower salary and a lower position with less power in the province they work and are therefore discouraged; but due to financial constraints the National Government has not contracted additional health administrators for 10 years.

The low level health workers (midwives, health workers at health points, and volunteer workers) are more or less working without any regular salary and therefore are not motivated to deliver services more efficiently.

Summarized below are the specialized facilities and treatments found in the public hospitals of carana

Province	# of Hospitals	# of Beds	Hospital Capacity within Province
Barin	1	66	Casualty and emergency; intensive care
Fellari	4	693	Teaching hospital, specialized paediatric, maternity facilities; psychiatric facilities; intensive care; surgical suite; casualty and emergency; forensic and pathology; burn unit; oncology unit
Guthar	2	156	Surgical suite; intensive care; casualty and emergency; maternity facilities
Hanno	1	53	Casualty and emergency
Koloni	1	93	Casualty and emergency; intensive care
Leppko	2	272	Intensive care; casualty and intensive care; maternity facilities; psychiatric facilities.
Mahbek	1	86	Casualty and emergency
Tereni	1	42	Casualty and emergency

Barin	Department	Health Institution	Location	Hospitals	Centres	Posts	Beds	Doctors	Nurses	Midwives
	Barin S	Hôpital provincial de Barin	Folsa	1			66	13	36	
	Barin S	Centre de santé de Folsa	Folsa		1		13	2	3	
	Barin S	Centre de santé psychiatrique	Maui		1		9	1	4	
264,779	Barin S	Centre de santé Mabono	Maui		1		15	2	6	
		Departmental Subtotal		1	3	8	103	18	49	21
		Estimated in Private Sector						27	12	3
169,779	Barin E	Centre de santé de Maui	Suppo		1		7	1	4	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	16	7	1	4	12
		Estimated in Private Sector						4	7	2
108,135	Barin N	Centre de santé de Nusba	Nusbet		1		13	2	5	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	23	13	2	5	6
		Estimated in Private Sector						2	3	3
115,854	Barin O	Centre de santé de Muffo	Muffo		1		17	2	6	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	22	17	2	6	8
		Estimated in Private Sector						1	2	3
657,794		Provincial Statistics								
			Totals	1	6	69	140	23	64	47
			Ratio 1: population	657,794	109,632	9,533	4,699	28,600	10,278	13,996
			Per 1000 people	0,002	0,009	0,105	0,213	0,035	0,097	0,071
			Total with Private Sector					57	88	58

Guthar	Department	Health Institution	Location	Hospitals	Centres	Posts	Beds	Doctors	Nurses	Midwives
	Guthar N-E	Hôpital provincial de Guthar	Amsan	1			93	33	51	
834,408	Guthar N-E	Centre de santé d'Amsan	Amsan		2		16	2	5	
		Departmental Subtotal		1	2	42	109	35	56	33
		Estimated in Private Sector						23	5	7
341,542	Guthar E	Centre de santé de Cereni	Cereni		1		8	1	4	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	31	8	1	4	20
		Estimated in Private Sector						13	6	7
310,189	Guthar S-E	Hôpital Richard Singuémou	Lora	1			63	17	40	
	Guthar S-E	Centre de santé de Lora	Lora		1		9	1	4	
		Departmental Subtotal		1	1	27	72	18	44	18
		Estimated in Private Sector						23	6	8
194,203	Guthar S-O	Centre de santé de Kalzo	Kalzo		1		22	1	5	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	10	22	1	5	8
		Estimated in Private Sector						4	2	5
226,036	Guthar N-O	Centre de santé d'Arum	Arum		1		21	1	12	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	6	21	1	12	12
		Estimated in Private Sector						3	4	8
1,906,377		Provincial Statistics								
		Totals		2	6	116	232	56	121	91
		Ratio 1: population		953,189	317,730	16,434	8,217	34,042	15,755	20,949
		Per 1000 people		0.001	0.003	0.061	0.122	0.029	0.063	0.048
		Total with Private Sector						122	144	126

Hanno	Department	Health Institution	Location	Hospitals	Centres	Posts	Beds	Doctors	Nurses	Midwives
153,125	Hanno N-E	Hôpital provincial d'Hanno	Maroni	1			53	13	25	
	Hanno N-E	Centre de santé de Maroni	Maroni		1		16	2	7	
		Departmental Subtotal		1	1	13	69	15	32	8
		Estimated in Private Sector						17	4	7
59,584	Hanno E	Centre de santé d'Akabar	Akabar		1		8	1	5	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	8	8	1	5	3
		Estimated in Private Sector						2	0	1
34,516	Hanno S-E	Centre de santé de Cerves	Cerves		1		8	1	2	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	2	8	1	2	7
		Estimated in Private Sector						1	1	0
76,887	Hanno S	Centre de santé de Torta	Torta		1		9	1	2	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	8	9	1	2	6
		Estimated in Private Sector						3	0	0
112,714	Hanno O	Centre de santé de Chute-Garani	Chute-Garani		1		15	2	9	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	4	15	2	9	3
		Estimated in Private Sector						3	0	1
130,677	Hanno N-O	Centre de santé de Pfoksol	Pfoksol		1		14	1	9	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	5	14	1	9	4
		Estimated in Private Sector						2	1	3
567,503		Provincial Statistics								
		Totals		1	6	40	123	21	59	31
		Ratio 1: population		567,503	94,584	14,188	4,614	27,024	9,619	18,307
		Per 1000 people		0,002	0,011	0,070	0,217	0,037	0,104	0,055
		Total with Private Sector					49	65	43	

Koloni	Department	Health Institution	Location	Hospitals	Centres	Posts	Beds	Doctors	Nurses	Midwives
	Koloni S	Hôpital provincial de Koloni	Suroun	1			93	25	65	
174,120	Koloni S	Centre de santé de Suroun	Suroun		1		15	2	7	
		Departmental Subtotal		1	1	23	108	27	72	8
		Estimated in Private Sector						18	3	2
74,235	Koloni O	Centre de santé de Molle	Molle		1		8	2	3	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	18	8	2	3	8
		Estimated in Private Sector						1	0	0
78,499	Koloni Nord	Centre de santé de Norke	Norke		1		8	1	2	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	13	8	1	2	6
		Estimated in Private Sector						2	0	1
138,052	Koloni Est	Centre de santé de Karo	Karo		1		11	2	2	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	30	11	2	2	11
		Estimated in Private Sector						3	0	1
464,904		Provincial Statistics								
		Totals		1	4	84	135	32	79	33
		Ratio 1: population		464,904	116,226	5,535	3,444	14,528	5,885	14,088
		Per 1000 people		0.002	0.009	0.181	0.290	0.069	0.170	0.071
		Total with Private Sector					58	87	37	

Leppko	Department	Health Institution	Location	Hospitals	Centres	Posts	Beds	Doctors	Nurses	Midwives
	Leppko E	Hôpital provincial de Leppko	Corma	1			175	21	130	
	Leppko E	Centre de santé de Corma	Corma		1		21	2	9	
	Leppko E	Centre de santé de la côte	Maldosa		1		16	3	8	
383,407	Leppko E	Centre de santé publique	Xilli		1		17	1	6	
		Departmental Subtotal		1	3	14	229	27	153	11
		Estimated in Private Sector						44	5	2
134,422	Leppko S-E	Centre de santé d'Ude	Ude		1		8	1	3	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	39	8	1	3	13
		Estimated in Private Sector						13	0	2
	Leppko S	Hôpital Marie-Reine Tamou	Eres	1			116	18	61	
	Leppko S	Centre de santé d'Eres	Eres		1		17	2	9	
	Leppko S	Centre de santé du sud	Arte		1		19	2	7	
	Leppko S	Centre de santé Tobongo	Flossi		1		18	2	7	
281,075	Leppko S	Centre de santé du grand fleuve	Soberri		1		11	1	3	
		Departmental Subtotal		1	4	28	181	25	87	26
		Estimated in Private Sector						11	3	7
99,817	Leppko S-O	Centre de santé de Kika	Kika		1		16	1	8	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	18	16	1	8	8
		Estimated in Private Sector						3	1	3
159,138	Leppko N-O	Centre de santé de Kuka	Muka		1		17	1	9	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	24	17	1	9	8
		Estimated in Private Sector						3	0	0
185,695	Leppko N	Centre de santé de Sarazzo	Sarazzo		1		22	1	8	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	45	22	1	8	12
		Estimated in Private Sector						1	0	1
1,243,654		Provincial Statistics	Totals	2	11	168	473	56	268	78
		Ratio 1: population		621,827	113,059	7,403	2,629	22,208	4,641	15,944
		Per 1000 people		0.002	0.009	0.135	0.380	0.045	0.215	0.063
		Total with Private Sector					158	285	98	

Mahbek	Department	Health Institution	Location	Hospitals	Centres	Posts	Beds	Doctors	Nurses	Midwives
	Mahbek S	Hopital provincial de Mahbek	Faron	1			86	15	51	
286,482	Mahbek S	Centre de santé de Faron	Faron		1		15	1	7	
		Departmental Subtotal		1	1	23	101	16	58	13
		Estimated in Private Sector						13	1	3
190,674	Mahbek O	Centre de santé de Ludou	Ludou		1		13	2	6	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	19	13	2	6	4
		Estimated in Private Sector						2	0	0
167,227	Mahbek N	Centre de santé de Perkes	Perkes		1		17	3	7	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	13	17	3	7	7
		Estimated in Private Sector						1	2	0
209,695	Mahbek E	Centre de santé de Mla	Mla		1		23	1	10	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	33	23	1	10	9
		Estimated in Private Sector						3	2	4
836,079		Provincial Statistics								
		Totals		1	4	88	154	22	81	33
		Ratio 1 : population		836,079	209,020	9,501	5,429	38,004	10,322	25,336
		Per 1000 people		0.001	0.005	0.105	0.184	0.026	0.097	0.039
		Total with Private Sector						41	86	40

Tereni	Department	Health Institution	Location	Hospitals	Centres	Posts	Beds	Doctors	Nurses	Midwives
	Tereni O	Hôpital provincial de Tereni	Alur	1			42	7	19	
77,312	Tereni O	Centre de santé d'Alur	Alur		1		24	1	15	
		Departmental Subtotal		1	1	13	66	8	34	11
		Estimated in Private Sector						2	2	4
37,581	Tereni N	Centre de santé de Lurok	Buboul		1		6	1	3	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	8	6	1	3	2
		Estimated in Private Sector						1	0	4
77,309	Tereni E	Centre de santé de Lurok	Lurok		1		12	1	6	
		Departmental Subtotal		0	1	13	12	1	6	2
		Estimated in Private Sector						1	0	2
192,202		Provincial Statistics								
			Totals	1	3	34	84	10	43	15
			Ratio 1 : population	192,202	64,067	5,653	2,288	19,220	4,470	12,813
			Per 1000 people	0.005	0.016	0.177	0.437	0.052	0.224	0.078
			Total with Private Sector					14	45	25

NATIONAL HEALTH INSTITUTION STATISTICS:

National Statistics	Hospitals	Centres	Posts	Beds	Doctors	Nurses	Midwives
Totals	13	51	736	2,175	493	1,155	678
Population	Ratio 1: population	658,000	11,622	3,933	17,351	7,406	12,617
8,553,999	Per 1000 people	0.006	0.086	0.254	0.058	0.135	0.079
	Total w/ Private Sector				1,164	1,308	825

HEALTH INSTITUTIONS BY PROVINCE:

Distribution	Population	Hospitals	Centres	Ratio 1:	Posts	Ratio 1:
Barin	657,794	1	6	657,794	69	9,533
Fellari	2,685,486	4	11	671,372	137	19,602
Guthar	1,906,377	2	6	953,189	116	16,434
Hanno	567,503	1	6	567,503	40	14,188
Koloni	464,904	1	4	464,904	84	5,535
Leppko	1,243,654	2	11	621,827	168	5,653
Mahbek	836,079	1	4	836,079	88	9,501
Tereni	192,202	1	3	192,202	34	5,653
Total	8,553,999	13	51	658,000	736	11,622

Distribution	Population	Doctors	Ratio 1:	Nurses	Ratio 1:	Midwives	Ratio 1:
Barin	657,794	23	28,600	64	10,278	47	13,996
Fellari	2,685,486	273	9,837	440	6,103	350	7,673
Guthar	1,906,377	56	34,042	121	15,755	91	20,949
Hanno	567,503	21	27,024	59	9,619	31	18,307
Koloni	464,904	32	14,528	79	5,885	33	14,088
Leppko	1,243,654	56	22,208	268	4,641	78	15,944
Mahbek	836,079	22	38,004	81	10,322	33	25,336
Tereni	192,202	10	19,220	43	4,470	15	12,813
Total	8,553,999	493	17,351	1,155	7,406	678	12,617
			0.058		0.135		0.079

Note Bene: Health professionals in Carana, almost always doctors, practice in both the public and private sectors. The workers are indicated in the sector in which they spend most (over 50%) of their time: Midwives figuring in these statistics are those registered with the Association nationale des sages-femmes caranaises (ANSFC).

COMMUNICATIONS AND THE MEDIA ENVIRONMENT

Media Environment

The media is playing an ever-increasing role in Carana. Both print and electronic media have been used by government to draw the attention of the people to their civic responsibilities. Without the media, the government and political parties cannot reach out to the electorate across Carana. The media are thus the most significant avenue for the dissemination of information to create mass awareness for the public. People in Carana form their opinions about public policies based on what they see, hear or read about an issue. As a result of this, the Caranese Constitution is mandated to provide freedom of expression – an environment appropriate for the emergence of a dynamic media. It was stated at the time of the adoption of the new Caranese Constitution that no hindrances should be placed in the way of any person who seeks to establish a newspaper or other media publication for dissemination of information. The hope was that the private independent newspapers and radio stations could disseminate news and information that were critical of the government without fear of retribution. Furthermore, a National Commission for the Media (NCM) was later established in law in order to ensure the independence of the media as well as regulate and monitor their performance.

As a result of these measures, Carana has a number of local radio stations (especially FM) that focus mostly on local and national issues as well as national ones that focuses on national and international affairs. Carana also has a large state-owned radio and three state-owned TV stations that are heavily controlled and censored by the PDC government. Although there has been talk in recent times for the creation of private TV stations, approval and licensing have yet to be granted.

Finally, there are many newspapers, some which are government-owned and some which are privately-owned. Despite these, the PDC government has managed to stifle and suppress the growth of an independent media, especially the private press.

Through various strategies such as declaring libel as a criminal offence, arrest and detention without trial, closing of media houses and harassment of publishers, the media have in effect been stifled by successive Caranese governments. Moreover, although provisions in the Caranese Constitution aim at ensuring that the state-owned media are impartial, that has not been the case. It is not uncommon to see the opposition parties criticize the government-owned media's coverage of election campaigns as biased in favour of the ruling party. With the environment in Carana in which the media operate generally influenced in favour of the PDC by biased political reporting, the opposition is unable to compete with the PDC. Also, the PDC has been able to restrict the revenue base of media outlets seen as unsympathetic to the government by only advertising in state-owned newspapers and a handful of the private press, which toe the line of the ruling PDC. These financial challenges faced by media outlets perceived as hostile to the government, and their inability to independently generate adequate revenue for their businesses, makes them susceptible to bankruptcy as well as to manipulation by wealthy and powerful political patrons.

Telephone, Television and Internet Systems

Telephone system:

Main lines in use: inadequate; fixed-line network characterized by aging, deteriorating equipment with fixed-line tele-density stuck at 1 per 100 persons; 110,300 main lines in use.

Domestic: intercity traffic by wire, microwave radio relay, and radiotelephone communication stations, fixed and mobile-cellular systems for short-range traffic;

Mobile cellular: mobile-cellular usage, in part a reflection of the poor condition and general inadequacy of the fixed-line network, is fast increasing, but the number of main lines is still deficient; 600,000 mobile cellular telephones in use.

International: country code – 301, satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Indian Ocean)

Television: *Broadcast stations: 3*

Television programming in Carana is fairly limited; television content often comes from state-owned enterprises, serving as an outlet for the government messaging, and is subject to strict government regulations. There are some smaller stations with a more provincial focus for programming and current news. Sporting events, nation-wide talk shows and news agencies fill most of the airtime on Caranese television. Competition is coming increasingly from a largely-unregulated trade in satellite receivers, providing access to hundreds of channels beyond the control of the Caranese government.

Internet system: *Internet country code: .aa*

Internet service providers (ISPs): 10

Internet users: 111,000

While Carana does have a limited broadband capability (via satellite), it is so expensive it can only be accessed by the very wealthy and the government. Dial-up connections (max. speed 56kbp/s) are less expensive, and are in use mostly with educational institutions. In recent years, small numbers of télékiosques have opened in Galasi, allowing the general public to access the internet on a short-term basis for a fee.

The following are the Internet Service Providers in Carana:

Province	Name	Type	Owner	Location	Bandwidth
Barin	Carana Surf	Dial-up	Private	Folsa	56 kbit/s max
Fellari	Sat-Link	Satellite	Private	Galasi	128 kbit/s to 34 Mbit/s. Government largest client
	AT&T (Africa Telephone & Telegraph)	Satellite	Private	Galasi	128 kbit/s to 34 Mbit/s. Used by major corporations/businesses/foreigners
	Carana En Ligne	Dial-up	Govt	Galasi	56 kbit/s max
	Fellari Infomatique	Dial-up	Private	Amsan Ouest	56 kbit/s max

Province	Name	Type	Owner	Location	Bandwidth
Guthar	Telecom Plus	Dial-up	Private	Amsan	56 kbit/s max
	Internet Solutions	Dial-up	Private	Amsan	56 kbit/s max
Hanno	Flashnet	Dial-up	Private	Maroni	56 kbit/s max
Koloni	No Internet Available				
Leppko	iSurf Global	Dial-up	Private	Corma	56 kbit/s max
Mahbek	GlobalConnect	Dial-up	Private	Faron	56 kbit/s max
Tereni	No Internet Available				

Radio

Radio broadcasting in Carana is an important medium for local Caranese to receive information. There are a variety of radio stations in Carana, which are a mix of public and privately owned stations, offering varying content. The largest stations in Carana belong to the Carana Broadcasting Corporation, (Société de Radio-diffusion du Carana, SRC) which is the state-owned media organ. SRC also manages the three television stations in the county. Radio SRC consists of three stations; two FM stations covering international & national news, as well as cultural programming. SRC Radio 3 is a shortwave station which broadcasts selections of SRC Radio 1&2 programming to remote regions. The Caranese government also owns a number of affiliate stations in each province, which rebroadcasts SRC programming in addition to local programming and government messages. There are also a number of privately-owned stations broadcasting a mix of local news, political statements, cultural programming, music, and religious content. These stations are mostly independent, but are actively monitored by the Caranese Ministry of Transportation and Communications for illegal content, and some stations have had their licences suspended for making anti-government statements. In addition to the listed stations, there are a small number of illegal pirate radio stations, largely in the western and southern regions of Carana. The platforms of these stations are generally anti-government in nature, and are a target of government efforts to close them down.

The following are the major Broadcasting Stations in Carana:

Province	Name	Frequency	Type	Location	Transmitter Power/Range (Typical Range)	Format
National	SRC - Radio 1	105.2 MHz (FM)	Govt	Galasi	100 kW/National (95km)	National/International News
	SRC - Radio 2	90.2 MHz (FM)	Govt	Folsa	80 kW/National (80 km)	Culture
	SRC - Radio 3	3320 kHz (SW)	Govt	Corma	30 kW/National (1,000 km)	National/International News
Barin	La Voix du PDC	93.1 MHz (FM)	Govt	Folsa	50 kW/Provincial (60 km)	Local/National News; Music
	Radio de la cité	99.9 MHz (FM)	Govt	Folsa	15 kW/Provincial (35 km)	Local/National News; Music
	Radio Émergence	105.1 MHz (FM)	Private	Maui	5 kW/Local (25 km)	Music/Sports
	KISS 96.1 FM	96.1 MHz (FM)	Private	Nusbet	6 kW/Local (26 km)	Music/Local News
	Radio-Islam	101.2 MHz (FM)	Private	Folsa	3 kW/Local (20 km)	Religious Broadcasting
Fellari	Radio de la capitale nationale	101.2 MHz (FM)	Govt	Galasi	15 kW/Provincial (35 km)	Local/National News; Music
	Radio Carana	101.7 MHz (FM)	Govt	Galasi	40 kW/Provincial (50km)	Local/National News; Music
	Fellari FM	99.8 MHz (FM)	Govt	Galasi	20 kW/Provincial (40 km)	Music/Sports
	Radio -Horizon FM	89.6 MHz (FM)	Private	Galasi	5 kW/Local (25 km)	Music
	Radio Pulsar FM	98.2 MHz (FM)	Private	Jumi	10 kW/Local (30 km)	Music/News
	Radio-Savane FM	99.6 MHz (FM)	Private	Clave	7 kW/Local (28 km)	Music
	Radio Diffusion	3592 kHz (SW)	Private	Feri Rao	8 kW/Local (29 km)	Music/Local News
	Radio Notre-Dame	90.9 MHz (FM)	Private	Amsan O	4 kW/Local (22 km)	Religious Station
	Le son de l'Afrique	97.4 MHz (FM)	Private	Galasi	5 kW/Local 25 km)	Music/Local News
	Radio FM Al Quoran	105.2 MHz (FM)	Private	Galasi	5 kW/Local (25 km)	Religious Station
	Radio FM Liberté	3111 kHz (SW)	Private	Galasi	10 kW/Local (30 km)	Politics/Talk Radio
	Radio Jam FM - Galasi	96.7 MHz (FM)	Private	Galasi	6 kW/Local (26 km)	Music/Sports/News
Guthar	Guthar FM	97.7 MHz (FM)	Govt	Amsan	75 kW/Provincial (77 km)	Local/National News; Music
	La Vérité 97.0 FM	97.0 MHz (FM)	Govt	Atum	20 kW/Provincial (40 km)	Politics/Talk Radio
	Radio Zenith FM	102.4 MHz (FM)	Private	Cereni	7 kW/Local (28 km)	Local News/Music
Hanno	Radio-diffusion Maroni	105.4 MHz (FM)	Govt	Maroni	25 kW/Provincial (44 km)	Local/National News; Music
	Iqra FM	102.9 MHz (FM)	Private	Akabar	10 kW/Local (30 km)	Religious Broadcasting
	Radio Nostalgie	105.6 MHz (FM)	Private	Maroni	5 kW/Local (25 km)	Music

Province	Name	Frequency	Type	Location	Transmitter Power/Range (Typical Range)	Format
Koloni	Koloni FM	103.6 MHz (FM)	Govt	Suroun	100 kW/Provincial (98 km)	Local/National News; Music
	Radio rurale de Koloni	990 kHz (AM)	Private	Suroun	900 kW/Local (150 km)	Local News/Music
Leppko	Radio Eres	88.2 MHz (FM)	Govt	Corma	100 kW/Provincial (97 km)	Local/National News; Music
	Joie FM	3420 kHz (SW)	Private	Sarazo	7 kW/Local (250 km)	Religious Station
	Leppko en Direct	89.7MHz (FM)	Private	Corma	12 kW/Local (32 km)	Local News/Music
Mahbek	Radio Faron	94.2 MHz (FM)	Govt	Faron	75 kW/Provincial (77 km)	Local/National News; Music
	Cosmo FM	104.6 MHz (FM)	Private	Perkes	5 kW/Local (25 km)	Local News/Music
Tereni	Radio Alur	750 kHz (AM)	Govt	Alur	850 kW/Provincial (100 km)	Local/National News; Music

The following are the major Caranese Print Media products:

Pop	Region	Name	Type	Location	Circulation	Weekly Distribution	Focus	Notes
8,553,999	National	Carana Aujourd'hui	Govt	Galasi	National	170,000	National/ Regional News	Publishes on Mondays, Wednesdays, Thursdays
657,794	Barin	Le Champion Quotidien	Govt	Amsan O	National	125,000	National/ Regional News	Publishes on Tuesdays, Thursdays, Fridays
		Le Soleil	Govt	Folsa	Provincial	15,000	Local/ Regional News	Weekly Paper
		Le Barinois	Private	Folsa	Provincial	9,000	Current Events/ Entertainment	Weekly Paper
2,685,486	Fellari	Fellari Aujourd'hui	Govt	Galasi	Provincial	65,000	National /Local News	Offshoot of Carana Aujourd'hui - Weekly Paper
		Fellari Presse	Govt	Galasi	Provincial	15,000	Financial News/ Business	Published every two weeks
		La Voix du Villageois	Private	Galasi	Provincial	30,000	Local News	Weekly Paper
		Jeunesse-Carana	Private	Galasi	Communal	15,000	Youth Issues	Magazine popular with Youth; some spread outside of Galasi
		L'indépendant	Private	Galasi	Provincial	12,000	Politics	Shut down by Government in 2007; Still closed
1,906,377	Guthar	Guthar Aujourd'hui	Govt	Amsan	Provincial	40,000	National/ Local News	Offshoot of Carana Aujourd'hui - Weekly Paper
		Le Messenger	Private	Amsan	Provincial	8,000	Local News	Weekly Paper
		L'Actualité	Private	Amsan	Provincial	5,000	Politics	Weekly Paper
567,503	Hanno	Hanno Aujourd'hui	Govt	Maroni	Provincial	25,000	National/ Local News	Offshoot of Carana Aujourd'hui - Weekly Paper
		Le Quotidien	Private	Maroni	Provincial	8,000	Local News	Weekly Paper
464,904	Koloni	Koloni Aujourd'hui	Govt	Suroun	Provincial	15,000	National/ Local News	Offshoot of Carana Aujourd'hui - Weekly Paper
		La Nouvelle Tribune	Private	Suroun	Communal	7,000	Local News	Weekly Paper
1,243,654	Leppko	Leppko Aujourd'hui	Govt	Corma	Provincial	40,000	National/ Local News	Offshoot of Carana Aujourd'hui - Weekly Paper

Pop	Region	Name	Type	Location	Circulation	Weekly Distribution	Focus	Notes
		La Matinée	Private	Corma	Provincial	10,000	Local News	Weekly Paper
		Fraternité	Private	Corma	Provincial	6,000	Politics	Weekly Paper
836,079	Mahbek	Mahbek Aujourd'hui	Govt	Faron	Provincial	20,000	National/ Local News	Offshoot of Carana Aujourd'hui - Weekly Paper
		La Vérité	Private	Faron	Provincial	9,000	Local News	Weekly Paper
192,202	Tereni	Tereni Aujourd'hui	Govt	Alur	Provincial	5,000	National /Local News	Offshoot of Carana Aujourd'hui - Weekly Paper
		L'Opinion	Private	Alur	Communal	3,000	Local News	Damaged by Fire in 2008; Re-opening in 2009

EDUCATION SYSTEM

Literacy: Definition: age 15 and over who can read and write
Total population: 42.7%
Male: 50.3%
Female: 35.1%

The majority of Caranese are educated in an Azurian/Western style of formal education. There is no free education. However, the cost for tuition is relatively low compared to other countries on Kisiwa.

The education system in Carana is divided into four phases:

- Pre-primary (before age 6);
- Primary (ages 6-11);
- Secondary (ages 12-18);
- Tertiary (age 18 and above).

Carana boasts 2 universities, the University of Carana, situated in the national capital Galasi in the Province of Fellari, and the University of Amsan located in Amsan in the Province of Guthar. In addition, there are 3 teacher training colleges and 7 technical institutions at the tertiary level. There are 300 secondary schools divided into junior (first three years) and senior (next four years) levels. To enter the junior level, primary 6 pupils sit a nationwide exam known as the National Secondary Entrance Exam. At the end of the junior level, students write a comprehensive exam known as the Junior Level Comprehensive Exam (JLCE) to permit entrance into the senior level. Candidates who pass the JLCE enter the senior level, while many who fail enter the informal market, with a few rewriting the exam the following year following private tutorship. At the end of the senior level, students sit the Baccalauréat, the requirement for entrance into university and other tertiary institutions. There are 2215 primary schools, and hundreds of kindergartens and nurseries at the pre-primary level. Care for very young toddlers is provided by mothers, other female family members and relatives or by domestic servants in the case of wealthy urban dwellers.

For religious education, there are several Islamic schools (Madrassas) for school-aged children, established in Maroni, in the Province of Hanno, and two Qur'anic schools established at mosques in the cities of Maroni and Akkabar (also in Hanno). Arabs in Guthar have established one Islamic college as well as two Qur'anic schools where young people learn recitation and pronunciation of the Qur'an. There is also a major seminary established for the formation of Catholic priests in Galasi (Province of Fellari), as well as two minor seminaries, one in Galasi near the major seminary, and the other in Suroun (Province of Koloni).

Enrolment rates¹ in the formal education system drop off sharply between primary and secondary schools. While that of primary schools is relatively high at 79% (88% - male, 70% - female), that for secondary schools is only 13% (17% - male, 9% - female). At the tertiary level, the rate is 4% (8% - male, 1% - female).

Generally, the school year in Carana commences in the first week of September, and finishes in June. For primary and secondary schools, the year is broken into three terms: September to December, January to early April and late April to end of June, with each term ending with examinations. Tertiary institutions do not necessarily follow this schedule.

¹The enrolment rate represents the number enrolled as a percentage of the total number in that age group.

French is the language of instruction, but as well, English and one vernacular are taught at the primary and junior secondary level. All schools within a province offer the same native language. The selection of the vernacular is based on the major ethnic group resident in the province. For instance, all schools in Koloni offer the most widely spoken Kori dialect. Further study of English and vernacular is by choice beyond the junior secondary level.

The Falin family of tribes have the highest literacy rate of any group in Carana, and are the best represented within post-secondary institutions. Because of the Falin dominance in government structures, the Falin are also better situated to take advantage of scholarship opportunities and other educational incentives from foreign governments and overseas schools. While scholarships are usually competitive, the Falin retain an advantage, as Falin academics usually recommend the candidates to the funding bodies. This is a sour point between Falin and the small numbers of Kori and Tatsi intellectuals, who complain that their numbers are not adequately represented in such opportunities.

Most of the primary and secondary educational institutions are run by the state, with about 25% run by religious groups and other private individuals. Many wealthy parents prefer to put their children through the independent schools or those run by the religious denominations due to frequent strike actions by teachers in the public system. This constant striking is in turn a result of the government's reluctance to meet the demands of both academic and non-academic staff; consistently attributed to low government revenues as a result of the harsh economic conditions in Carana.

The Ministry of Education, Research, Culture and Sports oversees the education system in Carana, with the mandate of ensuring that procedures and standards are maintained. This ministry has been confronted with significant financial challenges as cuts to education and other services were introduced first under the Structural Adjustment Programmes, but more recently as Carana's economic conditions have deteriorated, and the nation's political tensions have seen the bolstering of the military budget at the expense of other services, including education. Currently, education forms 7% of the government's budget. As a result, standards in many institutions are not as high as they could be, with the basic supplies that schools normally provide such as tables and chairs, in many schools, particularly in the rural areas, in a deplorable state.

The net effect of the prevailing circumstances is small well-educated elite attending exclusive schools in Carana and overseas; a larger group paying fees for whatever education they can afford; and a very rudimentary education if any for the great majority who lack the resources to pay. In significantly deprived areas, International Non-Governmental Organizations and International Organizations are attempting to fill in the gaps. Still, the need for significant funding of Carana's education remains considerably high.

Below is the breakdown by province of formal education institutions in Carana:

PROVINCE OF BARIN (POP. 657,794):

Department	Universities	Technical Institutions	Teacher Training Colleges	Secondary Schools	Primary Schools
Barin S			1	20	140
Barin E				9	73
Barin N				5	35
Barin O				7	49
Total	0	0	1	41	297

PROVINCE OF FELLARI (POP. 2,685,486):

Department	Universities	Technical Institutions	Teacher Training Colleges	Secondary Schools	Primary Schools
Fellari N	1	2	2	63	537
Fellari N-E				10	79
Fellari S-E				7	26
Fellari S		1		13	97
Fellari O				9	59
Total	1	3	2	102	798

PROVINCE OF GUTHAR (POP. 1,906,377):

Department	Universities	Technical Institutions	Teacher Training Colleges	Secondary Schools	Primary Schools
Guthar N-E	1	2		30	163
Guthar E				7	42
Guthar S-E				7	37
Guthar S-O				12	76
Guthar N-O				8	50
Total	1	2	0	64	368

PROVINCE OF HANNO (POP. 657,503):

Department	Universities	Technical Institutions	Teacher Training Colleges	Secondary Schools	Primary Schools
Hanno N-E				11	75
Hanno E				5	41
Hanno S-E				3	22
Hanno S				2	17
Hanno O				3	15
Hanno N-O				3	17
Total	0	0	0	27	187

PROVINCE OF BARIN (POP. 657,794):

Department	Universities	Technical Institutions	Teacher Training Colleges	Secondary Schools	Primary Schools
Koloni S				5	39
Koloni O				2	16
Koloni N				2	10
Koloni E				4	23
Total	0	0	0	13	88

PROVINCE OF LEPPKO (POP. 1,243,654):

Department	Universities	Technical Institutions	Teacher Training Colleges	Secondary Schools	Primary Schools
Leppko E		1		10	85
Leppko S-E				2	18
Leppko S				6	52
Leppko S-O				2	13
Leppko N-O				3	21
Leppko N				4	32
Total	0	1	0	27	221

PROVINCE OF MAHBK (POP. 836,079):

Department	Universities	Technical Institutions	Teacher Training Colleges	Secondary Schools	Primary Schools
Mahbek S		1		8	82
Mahbek O				2	18
Mahbek N				3	24
Mahbek E				6	63
Total	0	1	0	19	187

PROVINCE OF TERENI (POP. 192,202):

Department	Universities	Technical Institutions	Teacher Training Colleges	Secondary Schools	Primary Schools
Tereni O				3	39
Tereni N				1	10
Tereni E				2	20
Total	0	0	0	7	69


NATIONAL STATISTICS (POP. 8,553,999)

Province	Universities	Technical Institutions	Teacher Training Colleges	Secondary Schools	Primary Schools
Barin	0	0	1	41	297
Fellari	1	3	2	102	798
Guthar	1	2	0	64	368
Hanno	0	0	0	27	187
Koloni	0	0	0	13	88
Leppko	0	1	0	27	221
Mahbek	0	1	0	19	187
Tereni	0	0	0	7	69
Total	2	7	3	300	2215

NATIONAL CENSUS DATA

National Population: 8,553,999 (2008)

Falari	2,351,908	27.49%	MISCELLANEOUS																			
Gatari	738,388	8.63%																				
Barni	628,607	7.35%																				
Hanari	440,571	5.15%																				
Teri	461,518	5.40%																				
Kolhi	568,190	6.64%																				
Mahabi	943,131	11.03%																				
Katsi	444,261	5.19%																				
Lipaki	600,923	7.03%																				
Coastal	257,306	3.01%																				
Elassoni	256,207	3.02%	TATSU																			
Azurian	171,726	2.01%																				
Indian	101,589	1.19%																				
Arab	86,220	1.01%																				
Pleioni	327,427	3.83%																				
Mahidi	110,464	1.28%																				
Other	63,566	0.74%																				
													FALIN									
			KORI																			
			FALIN																			
			TATSU																			
			MISCELLANEOUS																			
			MISCELLANEOUS																			



PROVINCE OF BARIN: CENSUS DATA

	Chef-lieu	% (National)	% (Province)	Total
Département de Barin sud (B1)	Folsa	3.10%	40.25%	264,779
Département de Barin est (B2)	Maui	1.98%	25.70%	169,025
Département de Barin nord (B3)	Nusbet	1.26%	16.44%	108,135
Département de Barin ouest (B4)	Nusbet	1.35%	17.61%	115,854
Province of Barin	Folsa	7.69%	100.00%	657,794

	Falari		Gatari		Barini		Hanari		FALIN	
B1	10.80%	28,585	4.76%	12,615	40.04%	106,019	3.80%	10,065	59.40%	157,284
B2	7.89%	13,336	1.67%	2,824	44.09%	74,526	2.46%	4,158	56.11%	94,844
B3	8.11%	8,774	1.23%	1,334	52.86%	57,162	5.12%	5,542	67.33%	72,812
B4	8.80%	10,199	1.96%	2,274	52.04%	60,285	9.20%	10,654	72.00%	83,412
	27.49%	2,351,908	8.63%	738,388	7.35%	628,607	5.15%	440,571	48.63%	4,159,473

	Teri		Kolni		Mahabi		Katsi		KORI	
B1	2.23%	5,905	1.06%	2,818	21.95%	58,109	5.27%	3,957	30.51%	80,789
B2	2.09%	3,530	1.16%	1,961	27.99%	47,304	4.18%	7,060	35.41%	59,856
B3	2.23%	2,412	2.33%	2,514	16.66%	18,011	7.36%	7,953	28.57%	30,890
B4	2.36%	2,728	0.28%	325	10.93%	12,668	7.01%	8,120	20.58%	23,841
	5.40%	461,518	6.64%	568,190	11.03%	943,131	5.19%	444,261	28.26%	2,417,099

	Lipaki		Coastal		Elassoni		TATSI	
B1	4.82%	12,749	0.15%	403	0.34%	913	5.31%	14,064
B2	1.90%	3,216	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	1.90%	3,216
B3	0.33%	359	0.01%	10	0.00%	-	0.34%	369
B4	1.79%	2,079	0.00%	-	0.01%	13	1.81%	2,092
	7.03%	600,923	3.01%	257,306	3.02%	258,207	13.05%	1,116,436

	Azurian		Indian		Arab		Pleioni		Mahidi		Other		MISC.	
B1	0.06%	161	0.04%	1	0.81%	2,147	2.29%	6,066	0.35%	939	1.22%	3,221	4.77%	12,642
B2	0.02%	31	0.01%	16	0.74%	1,255	4.41%	7,453	0.56%	941	0.84%	1,412	6.57%	11,108
B3	0.02%	21	0.03%	31	0.52%	564	2.43%	2,627	0.62%	667	0.14%	154	3.76%	4,064
B4	0.04%	52	0.02%	26	0.56%	650	4.21%	4,872	0.62%	715	0.17%	195	5.62%	6,509
	2.01%	171,726	1.19%	101,589	1.01%	86,220	3.83%	327,427	1.29%	10,464	0.74%	63,566	10.07%	860,991

PROVINCE OF FELLARI: CENSUS DATA

	Chef-lieu	% (National)	% (Province)	Total
Département de Fellari nord (F1)	Galasi	17.35%	55.26%	1,484,014
Département de Fellari nord-est (F2)	Clavo	3.52%	11.21%	301,084
Département de Fellari sud-est (F3)	Jumi	1.14%	3.62%	97,122
Département de Fellari sud (F4)	Feri Rad	5.93%	18.89%	507,250
Département de Fellari ouest (F5)	Amsan Ouest	3.46%	11.02%	296,016
Province of Fellari	Galasi	31.39%	100.00%	2,685,486

	Falari		Gatari		Barini		Hanari		FALIN	
F1	55.10%	817,730	3.16%	46,839	9.34%	138,565	3.81%	56,597	71.41%	1,059,731
F2	83.10%	250,194	3.02%	9,087	4.82%	14,501	1.48%	4,447	92.41%	278,230
F3	62.96%	61,147	9.71%	9,426	9.77%	9,486	9.33%	9,063	91.76%	89,122
F4	68.84%	349,169	11.04%	55,996	7.64%	38,767	2.87%	14,537	90.38%	458,469
F5	79.39%	234,992	11.49%	34,005	4.29%	12,689	0.86%	2,538	96.02%	284,224
	63.80%	1,713,232	5.78%	155,354	7.97%	214,008	3.25%	87,183	80.80%	2,169,776

	Teri		Kolni		Mahabi		Katsi		KORI	
F1	3.77%	55,947	8.15%	121,001	5.92%	87,823	5.48%	81,318	23.32%	346,088
F2	0.96%	2,900	1.35%	4,060	1.54%	4,640	1.31%	3,944	5.16%	15,545
F3	0.27%	266	0.12%	121	0.93%	906	0.56%	544	1.89%	1,837
F4	0.27%	1,346	0.32%	1,615	1.08%	5,492	3.45%	17,499	5.12%	25,952
F5	0.02%	51	0.29%	846	0.17%	508	1.17%	3,451	1.64%	4,855
	2.25%	60,509	4.75%	127,643	3.70%	99,369	3.98%	106,756	14.68%	394,277

	Lipaki		Coastal		Elassoni		TATSI	
F1	0.31%	4,554	0.57%	8,457	0.35%	5,204	1.23%	18,215
F2	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.00%	-
F3	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.00%	-
F4	0.00%	-	0.53%	2,692	0.00%	-	0.53%	2,692
F5	0.00%	-	2.00%	5,921	0.00%	-	2.00%	5,921
	0.17%	4,554	0.64%	17,070	0.19%	5,204	1.00%	26,829

	Azurian		Indian		Arab		Pleioni		Mahidi		Other		MISC.	
F1	0.53%	7,806	0.83%	12,360	0.88%	13,011	0.04%	651	1.71%	25,371	0.05%	781	4.04%	59,980
F2	0.19%	580	0.71%	2,127	0.13%	387	0.03%	77	1.35%	4,060	0.03%	77	2.43%	7,309
F3	0.04%	36	0.62%	604	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	5.66%	5,498	0.02%	24	6.35%	6,163
F4	0.04%	215	0.11%	538	0.00%	-	0.02%	108	3.76%	19,060	0.04%	215	3.97%	20,137
F5	0.17%	508	0.17%	508	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.34%	1,015
	0.34%	9,146	0.60%	16,137	0.50%	13,398	0.03%	836	2.01%	53,990	0.04%	1,098	3.52%	94,604

PROVINCE OF GUTHAR: CENSUS DATA

	Chef-lieu	% (National)	% (Province)	Total
Département de Guthar nord-est (G1)	Amsan	9.75%	43.77%	834,408
Département de Guthar est (G2)	Cereni	3.99%	17.92%	341,542
Département de Guthar sud-est (G3)	Lora	3.63%	16.27%	310,189
Département de Guthar sud-ouest (G4)	Kalzo	2.27%	10.19%	194,203
Département de Guthar nord-ouest (G5)	Arum	2.64%	11.86%	226,036
Province of Guthar	Amsan	22.29%	100.00%	1,906,377

	Falari		Gatari		Barini		Hanari		FALIN	
G1	19.62%	163,699	23.25%	194,013	4.50%	37,514	4.86%	40,546	52.23%	435,772
G2	28.62%	97,749	28.86%	98,576	2.71%	9,262	1.94%	6,616	62.13%	212,202
G3	14.69%	45,569	36.98%	114,721	1.89%	5,851	2.46%	7,624	56.02%	173,765
G4	22.45%	43,601	25.97%	50,428	10.43%	20,259	2.10%	4,074	60.95%	118,363
G5	27.37%	61,866	26.72%	60,407	8.23%	18,596	9.30%	21,027	71.62%	161,897
	21.64%	412,484	27.18%	518,145	4.80%	91,483	4.19%	79,887	57.81%	1,101,999

	Teri		Kolni		Mahabi		Katsi		KORI	
G1	3.27%	27,283	5.22%	43,577	5.18%	43,198	6.90%	57,598	20.57%	171,656
G2	0.19%	662	0.73%	2,481	1.69%	5,789	1.02%	3,473	3.63%	12,405
G3	0.86%	2,660	0.25%	780	0.51%	1,596	0.69%	2,128	2.31%	7,163
G4	1.16%	2,246	1.42%	2,753	2.55%	4,955	1.25%	2,422	6.37%	12,376
G5	1.29%	2,917	0.02%	36	1.10%	2,480	0.27%	608	2.67%	6,041
	1.88%	35,768	2.60%	49,627	3.04%	58,017	3.47%	66,229	11.00%	209,641

	Lipaki		Coastal		Elassoni		TATSI	
G1	3.86%	32,209	3.04%	25,388	1.09%	9,094	7.99%	66,692
G2	7.26%	24,809	6.30%	21,501	2.18%	7,443	15.74%	53,754
G3	6.00%	18,618	9.60%	29,788	2.00%	6,206	17.61%	54,612
G4	14.91%	28,958	2.44%	4,735	1.81%	3,523	19.16%	37,215
G5	12.37%	27,955	2.85%	6,442	0.54%	1,215	15.76%	35,612
	6.95%	132,549	4.61%	87,855	1.44%	27,482	13.00%	247,885

	Azurian		Indian		Arab		Pleioni		Mahidi		Other		MISC.	
G1	8.45%	70,481	2.82%	23,494	3.72%	31,072	3.54%	29,557	0.41%	3,410	0.27%	2,274	19.21%	160,288
G2	12.30%	42,010	1.55%	5,293	1.02%	3,473	3.05%	10,420	0.34%	1,158	0.24%	827	18.50%	63,181
G3	11.95%	37,058	1.89%	5,851	1.43%	4,433	8.23%	25,533	0.34%	1,064	0.23%	709	24.07%	74,648
G4	3.35%	6,496	0.79%	1,541	1.59%	3,083	6.97%	13,543	0.82%	1,586	0.00%	-	13.52%	26,249
G5	2.63%	5,956	0.86%	1,945	2.47%	5,591	2.96%	6,685	1.02%	2,309	0.00%	-	9.95%	22,486
	8.50%	162,002	2.00%	38,124	2.50%	47,652	4.50%	85,737	0.50%	9,527	0.20%	3,810	18.19%	346,852

PROVINCE OF HANNO: CENSUS DATA

	Chef-lieu	% (National)	% (Province)	Total
Département de Hanno nord-est (H1)	Maroni	1.79%	26.98%	153,125
Département de Hanno est (H2)	Akabar	0.70%	10.50%	59,584
Département de Hanno sud-est (H3)	Cerves	0.40%	6.08%	34,516
Département de Hanno sud (H4)	Torta	0.90%	13.55%	76,887
Département de Hanno ouest (H5)	Chute-Garani	1.32%	19.86%	112,714
Département de Hanno nord-ouest (H6)	Pfoksol	1.53%	23.03%	130,677
Province of Hanno	Maroni	6.63%	100.00%	567,503

	Falari		Gatari		Barini		Hanari		FALIN	
H1	21.07%	32,261	1.81%	2,771	1.08%	1,649	37.79%	57,859	61.74%	94,540
H2	30.43%	18,130	1.91%	1,136	2.37%	1,410	42.98%	25,610	77.68%	46,285
H3	30.00%	10,354	6.27%	2,164	4.31%	1,489	41.05%	14,170	81.64%	28,178
H4	20.21%	15,539	1.91%	1,470	3.22%	2,478	34.08%	26,206	59.43%	45,692
H5	16.31%	18,378	1.53%	1,723	0.74%	835	41.09%	46,312	59.66%	67,248
H6	17.03%	22,259	1.59%	2,079	1.54%	2,018	50.73%	66,286	70.89%	92,642
	20.60%	116,921	2.00%	11,342	1.74%	9,879	41.66%	236,443	66.01%	374,586

	Teri		Kolni		Mahabi		Katsi		KORI	
H1	0.88%	1,346	23.05%	35,296	1.03%	1,583	2.80%	4,288	27.76%	42,513
H2	1.58%	940	7.43%	4,425	0.99%	587	1.34%	799	11.33%	6,751
H3	1.64%	568	8.90%	3,071	1.38%	475	1.38%	475	13.29%	4,588
H4	1.37%	1,050	26.55%	20,410	0.16%	126	0.49%	378	28.57%	21,964
H5	1.07%	1,201	23.30%	26,262	2.08%	2,350	3.01%	3,394	29.46%	33,206
H6	1.64%	2,140	17.27%	22,564	0.95%	1,247	0.95%	1,247	20.81%	27,199
	1.28%	7,244	19.74%	112,029	1.12%	6,368	1.86%	10,581	24.00%	136,223

	Lipaki		Coastal		Elassoni		TATSI	
H1	1.29%	1,979	0.11%	172	0.13%	198	1.53%	2,349
H2	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.11%	63	0.11%	63
H3	0.35%	121	0.07%	23	0.07%	23	0.49%	168
H4	0.15%	118	0.00%	-	0.05%	42	0.21%	160
H5	0.93%	1,044	0.06%	63	0.37%	418	1.35%	1,525
H6	0.66%	856	0.05%	61	0.37%	489	1.08%	1,406
	0.73%	4,118	0.06%	319	0.22%	1,233	1.00%	5,669

	Azurian		Indian		Arab		Pleioni		Mahidi		Other		MISC.	
H1	0.03%	40	0.06%	92	2.97%	4,552	0.00%	-	1.81%	2,771	4.09%	6,268	8.96%	13,723
H2	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.33%	196	0.00%	-	7.14%	4,253	3.42%	2,036	10.88%	6,485
H3	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	1.69%	582	2.90%	1,001	4.58%	1,582
H4	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	9.56%	7,349	2.24%	1,722	11.80%	9,071
H5	0.01%	10	0.02%	21	0.23%	261	0.00%	-	6.90%	7,780	2.36%	2,663	9.52%	10,735
H6	0.01%	12	0.00%	-	3.09%	4,036	0.00%	-	1.54%	2,018	2.57%	3,363	7.22%	9,429
	0.01%	62	0.02%	113	1.59%	9,045	0.00%	-	4.36%	24,752	3.00%	17,052	8.99%	51,025



PROVINCE OF KOLONI: CENSUS DATA

	Chef-lieu	% (National)	% (Province)	Total
Département de Koloni sud (K1)	Suroun	2.04%	37.45%	174,120
Département de Koloni ouest (K2)	Molle	0.87%	15.97%	74,235
Département de Koloni nord (K3)	Norke	0.92%	16.88%	78,499
Département de Koloni est (K4)	Karo	1.61%	29.69%	138,052
Province of Koloni	Suroun	5.43%	100.00%	464,904

	Falari		Gatari		Barini		Hanari		FALIN	
K1	1.33%	2,317	0.62%	1,076	1.00%	1,738	1.24%	2,152	4.18%	7,283
K2	1.15%	854	0.00%	-	0.48%	356	0.53%	391	2.16%	1,601
K3	1.18%	922	0.05%	40	0.66%	521	0.20%	160	2.09%	1,644
K4	1.18%	1,629	0.48%	666	0.38%	518	0.43%	592	2.47%	3,406
	1.23%	5,722	0.38%	1,782	0.67%	3,133	0.71%	3,296	3.00%	13,934

	Teri		Kolni		Mahabi		Katsi		KORI	
K1	28.57%	49,741	52.05%	90,627	3.56%	6,207	7.37%	12,828	91.55%	159,404
K2	32.34%	24,010	54.38%	40,372	0.72%	534	6.18%	4,589	93.63%	69,504
K3	28.25%	22,177	54.82%	43,031	1.28%	1,003	6.39%	5,013	90.73%	71,224
K4	31.38%	43,317	54.12%	74,713	1.13%	1,555	5.39%	7,434	92.01%	127,019
	29.95%	139,245	53.50%	248,743	2.00%	9,298	6.42%	29,864	91.88%	427,151

	Lipaki		Coastal		Elassoni		TATSI	
K1	0.03%	50	0.00%	-	0.02%	33	0.05%	83
K2	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.00%	-
K3	0.01%	8	0.00%	-	0.01%	8	0.02%	16
K4	0.02%	30	0.01%	15	0.00%	-	0.03%	44
	0.02%	87	0.00%	15	0.01%	41	0.03%	143

	Azurian		Indian		Arab		Pleioni		Mahidi		Other		MISC.	
K1	0.02%	33	0.02%	33	1.66%	2,897	0.00%	-	0.76%	1,324	1.76%	3,062	4.22%	7,349
K2	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.57%	427	0.00%	-	2.06%	1,530	1.58%	1,174	4.22%	3,130
K3	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	4.34%	3,409	0.00%	-	1.07%	842	1.74%	1,364	7.15%	5,614
K4	0.01%	15	0.01%	15	2.84%	3,924	0.00%	-	0.70%	963	1.93%	2,666	5.49%	7,582
	0.01%	48	0.01%	48	2.29%	10,657	0.00%	-	1.00%	4,659	1.78%	8,265	5.09%	23,676

PROVINCE OF LEPPKO: CENSUS DATA

	Chef-lieu	% (National)	% (Province)	Total
Département de Leppko est (L1)	Corma	4.48%	30.83%	383,407
Département de Leppko sud-est (L2)	Ude	1.57%	10.82%	134,522
Département de Leppko sud (L3)	Eres	3.29%	22.60%	281,075
Département de Leppko sud-ouest (L4)	Kika	1.17%	8.03%	99,817
Département de Leppko nord-ouest (L5)	Muka	1.86%	12.80%	159,138
Département de Leppko nord (L6)	Sarazzo	2.17%	14.93%	185,695
Province of Leppko	Corma	14.54%	100.00%	1,243,654

	Falari		Gatari		Barini		Hanari		FALIN	
L1	4.89%	18,751	3.23%	12,383	0.37%	1,415	0.28%	1,061	8.77%	33,611
L2	0.67%	903	0.22%	301	0.22%	301	0.06%	75	1.17%	1,580
L3	4.37%	12,274	1.56%	4,384	0.26%	731	0.26%	731	6.45%	18,119
L4	0.63%	630	0.00%	-	1.32%	1,314	0.05%	53	2.00%	1,997
L5	3.12%	4,971	0.96%	1,530	3.46%	5,507	0.72%	1,147	8.27%	13,154
L6	1.22%	2,268	6.82%	12,664	0.61%	1,134	0.00%	-	8.65%	16,067
	3.20%	39,798	2.51%	31,261	0.84%	10,401	0.25%	3,067	6.80%	84,527

	Teri		Kolni		Mahabi		Katsi		KORI	
L1	2.95%	11,321	0.23%	884	2.58%	9,906	7.84%	30,073	13.61%	52,185
L2	1.79%	2,408	0.34%	451	1.62%	2,182	10.51%	14,144	14.26%	19,185
L3	2.18%	6,137	0.26%	731	1.92%	5,406	13.57%	38,137	17.94%	50,411
L4	2.37%	2,364	0.79%	788	6.95%	6,935	11.16%	11,139	21.27%	21,226
L5	2.02%	3,212	0.38%	612	6.44%	10,248	10.67%	16,978	19.51%	31,051
L6	1.63%	3,024	1.12%	2,079	0.25%	473	8.40%	15,594	11.40%	21,170
	2.29%	28,467	0.45%	5,546	2.83%	35,151	10.14%	126,065	15.70%	195,229

	Lipaki		Coastal		Elassoni		TATSI	
L1	17.21%	65,983	30.17%	115,691	9.09%	34,849	56.47%	216,522
L2	29.31%	39,424	13.14%	17,680	24.33%	32,728	66.78%	89,832
L3	27.97%	78,612	4.05%	11,397	23.13%	65,023	55.16%	155,032
L4	25.90%	25,850	0.05%	53	31.16%	31,104	57.11%	57,007
L5	45.85%	72,961	0.67%	1,071	16.58%	26,385	63.10%	100,417
L6	51.20%	95,078	2.90%	5,387	17.76%	32,984	71.86%	133,450
	30.39%	377,908	12.16%	151,279	17.94%	223,073	60.49%	752,260

	Azurian		Indian		Arab		Pleioni		Mahidi		Other			
L1	0.02%	71	5.08%	19,459	0.05%	177	14.26%	54,661	0.00%	-	1.75%	6,722	21.15%	81,090
L2	0.00%	-	2.96%	3,987	0.00%	-	13.48%	18,132	0.00%	-	1.34%	1,806	17.79%	23,925
L3	0.02%	58	3.74%	10,521	0.06%	175	14.50%	40,767	0.00%	-	2.13%	5,991	20.46%	57,512
L4	0.00%	-	2.79%	2,785	0.04%	42	15.69%	15,657	0.00%	-	1.11%	1,103	19.62%	19,587
L5	0.00%	-	1.54%	2,447	0.06%	92	6.58%	10,478	0.03%	46	0.91%	1,453	9.12%	14,516
L6	0.00%	-	2.34%	4,348	0.00%	-	4.84%	8,979	0.04%	76	0.87%	1,607	8.08%	15,008
	0.01%	129	3.50%	43,546	0.04%	486	11.95%	148,674	0.01%	121	1.50%	18,682	17.02%	211,639

PROVINCE OF MAHBK: CENSUS DATA

	Chef-lieu	% (National)	% (Province)	Total
Département de Mahbek sud (M1)	Faron	3.14%	32.11%	268,482
Département de Mahbek ouest (M2)	Ludou	2.23%	22.81%	190,674
Département de Mahbek nord (M3)	Perkes	1.95%	20.00%	167,227
Département de Mahbek est (M4)	Mia	2.45%	25.08%	209,695
Province of Mahbek	Faron	9.77%	100.00%	836,079

	Falari		Gatari		Barini		Hanari		FALIN	
M1	0.25%	667	0.21%	558	0.21%	558	0.01%	14	0.67%	1,798
M2	0.25%	472	0.18%	344	0.03%	49	0.03%	49	0.48%	915
M3	0.44%	732	0.00%	-	0.39%	650	0.01%	10	0.83%	1,392
M4	0.21%	430	0.09%	187	0.14%	299	0.06%	121	0.49%	1,037
	0.28%	2,301	0.13%	1,090	0.19%	1,557	0.02%	194	0.62%	5,142

	Teri		Kolni		Mahabi		Katsi		KORI	
M1	0.81%	2,179	0.05%	136	75.33%	202,261	5.43%	14,574	81.63%	219,150
M2	8.77%	16,727	2.73%	5,215	69.82%	133,125	8.41%	16,038	89.74%	171,104
M3	1.46%	2,439	4.13%	6,910	77.90%	130,270	1.40%	2,337	84.89%	141,956
M4	0.98%	2,056	0.00%	-	60.97%	127,841	9.23%	19,344	71.17%	149,242
	2.80%	23,401	1.47%	12,261	70.99%	593,496	6.25%	52,293	81.51%	681,451

	Lipaki		Coastal		Elassoni		TATSI	
M1	8.62%	23,154	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	8.62%	23,154
M2	1.81%	3,444	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	1.81%	3,444
M3	2.86%	4,776	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	2.86%	4,776
M4	14.84%	31,119	0.02%	37	0.11%	224	14.97%	31,381
	7.47%	62,493	0.00%	37	0.03%	224	7.51%	62,755

	Azurian		Indian		Arab		Pleioni		Mahidi		Other		MISC.	
M1	0.02%	54	0.76%	2,043	0.04%	109	7.61%	20,430	0.09%	245	0.56%	1,498	9.08%	24,380
M2	0.01%	20	0.15%	295	0.02%	39	4.39%	8,363	2.94%	5,608	0.46%	886	7.98%	15,211
M3	0.00%	-	0.55%	915	0.06%	102	7.72%	12,905	2.61%	4,369	0.49%	813	11.42%	19,104
M4	0.00%	-	0.04%	93	0.00%	-	12.75%	26,727	0.04%	93	0.53%	1,121	13.37%	28,035
	0.01%	74	0.40%	3,346	0.03%	250	8.18%	68,426	1.23%	10,316	0.52%	4,318	10.37%	86,731

PROVINCE OF TERENI: CENSUS DATA

	Chef-lieu	% (National)	% (Province)	Total
Département de Tereni ouest (T1)	Alur	0.90%	40.22%	77,312
Département de Tereni nord (T2)	Buboul	0.44%	19.55%	37,581
Département de Tereni est (T3)	Lurok	0.90%	40.22%	77,309
Province of Tereni	Alur	2.25%	100.00%	192,202

	Falari		Gatari		Barini		Hanari		FALIN	
T1	0.43%	334	0.19%	144	0.03%	19	0.02%	12	0.66%	509
T2	0.11%	43	0.01%	5	0.02%	7	0.03%	12	0.18%	68
T3	0.23%	178	0.28%	217	0.16%	126	0.08%	59	0.75%	581
	0.29%	554	0.19%	366	0.08%	153	0.04%	83	0.60%	1,157

	Teri		Kolni		Mahabi		Katsi		KORI	
T1	79.84%	61,726	2.16%	1,669	1.00%	776	8.23%	6,367	91.24%	70,538
T2	76.25%	28,657	4.45%	1,671	4.26%	1,600	6.86%	2,578	91.82%	34,505
T3	80.10%	61,926	1.79%	1,382	3.83%	2,962	8.33%	6,437	94.05%	72,708
	79.24%	152,309	2.46%	4,723	2.78%	5,338	8.00%	15,382	92.48%	177,751

	Lipaki		Coastal		Elassoni		TATSI	
T1	1.00%	776	0.41%	318	0.00%	-	1.42%	1,095
T2	0.05%	18	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.05%	18
T3	0.02%	16	0.00%	-	0.03%	24	0.05%	39
	0.42%	810	0.17%	318	0.01%	24	0.60%	1,152

	Azurian		Indian		Arab		Pleioni		Mahidi		Other		MISC.	
T1	0.00%	-	0.06%	47	0.05%	39	1.96%	1,514	1.56%	1,203	3.06%	2,368	6.69%	5,171
T2	0.00%	-	0.00%	-	0.06%	21	0.52%	196	4.78%	1,795	2.60%	978	7.96%	2,990
T3	0.00%	-	0.06%	47	0.07%	55	1.33%	1,027	1.08%	837	2.61%	2,014	5.15%	3,981
	0.00%	-	0.05%	94	0.06%	115	1.42%	2,736	2.00%	3,836	2.79%	5,360	6.32%	12,142

CHAPTER 5: RELIGION



OVERVIEW OF RELIGION IN MODERN-DAY CARANA

Religion plays an important role in the life of the people of Carana. Religious practice is an important aspect of people's lifestyles. For many, faith is a primary lens through which they view the world, giving them a sense of purpose and hope for the future. Most members of all of the primary ethnic groups in Carana consider themselves religious. Some ethnicities are however more homogeneous than others, in terms of their belief systems.

Members of the Falin family of tribes adhere to the two major religions of Christianity and Islam. People of the Falari and Gatari tribes are usually Christian; those from the Barini and Hanari tribes are generally Muslim. The Tatsi people from the Lipaki, Coastal Tatsi and Elassoni communities are also generally Christian. Other Christian populations include the Pleioni, as well as most of the Caucasian population. In total, Christians make up around 55% of the population. Catholicism is the most common denomination, although other denominations, especially various sects of Evangelicism, followed by Anglicanism, are growing rapidly in the country.

Along with the predominantly Muslim Barini and Hanari tribes, the Arab minority population helps to comprise the approximately 15% of the Caranese population that forms the Islamic community of Carana. Hinduism is practiced by the Indian community, comprising roughly 1% of the population.

The majority of the Kori people, who constitute 29% of the population, mostly follow traditional religions, and are the largest single group of traditional religionists. Like tribal religions from other parts of the world, traditional Caranese religious traditions are defined largely along community lines. Traditional religions involve teachings, practices, and rituals that lend structure to indigenous Caranese societies. These traditional religions also play a large part in the cultural understanding and awareness of the people of their communities.

Current situation: The government, whose members are mostly Catholic, has recently begun to clamp down on a number of religious groups that have been seen as critical of the government. This violation of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religious practice has been especially apparent against evangelical denominations. This has taken the form of official denial of the status of certain churches, and occasional arrest and harassment of religious leaders. While there have not yet been any major violence arising from this situation, it is evident that the government's involvement in the religious affairs of the country risks creating an increasingly hostile environment. Government officials have defended the limitations on certain religious groups, by claiming that they threaten public order.

TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS IN CARANA

Before the arrival of Christian missionaries in the territory that is now Carana, African populations had practiced traditional religions that had been passed down for millennia. These populations, much like those on mainland Africa, are known to have been very religious, with each ethnic people having their own belief systems and accompanying practices. The migrant communities to arrive on the island around 350BC from mainland Africa also brought their religious traditions with them.

These beliefs were manifested in rituals and ceremonies which would provide a set of guiding principles (i.e. unwritten codes of conducts) for their followers. In the world view of the early Caranese, the world was filled with spirits and gods who oversaw and directed the affairs of humans. In that sense, there were no irreligious people; everyone engaged in the rituals and practices that governed both the temporal and the spiritual worlds. These two worlds were seen to be inseparable, since the spirits dwelt among the people. The three main types of rituals in the traditional religions of Carana were those of appeasement, of thanksgiving, and of asking for favours.



Traditional religions continue to flourish in Carana, although not in isolation, as was previously the case. While the Kori mostly continue to follow their ancestral religions, other groups combine their devotion to the major world religions (e.g. Christianity and Islam) with elements of their ancestral religions. The following description of Caranese traditional religions refers not only to the practices of the past or of the Kori people, but to a wide segment of Caranese society. The influence of traditional religion also goes beyond its willing or conscious adherents, and influences the ways of thinking of the population as a whole.

The concept of “the individual” does not exist in the traditional religions that were brought to Carana. The individual does not exist apart from kin and community. The fact of being human is tied to active participation in the rituals, beliefs and festivities – in other words, tied to the life of the ethnic community. In these communities, both historically and among those who continue to follow traditional religions, all ceremonies have religious undertones, ranging from prayers to offering libations to the gods. Especially in previous centuries, to detach oneself from the religious practices of the tribe would guarantee being ostracized.

Traditional religions in Carana have no structured dogma associated to them. People are born into the religion, and this religious life carries through beyond an individual's death. The religious life does not begin with birth, nor does it end with death; the gods know individuals even before their conception. People have assimilated the belief system and practices through oral tradition, folklore, rituals, ceremonies and anecdotes. There is no canon of written scripture. Historically, the beliefs have undergone evolutionary changes based on the needs of the people, and the context and circumstances in which they exist.

Because traditional Caranese religions have no systematic dogma, they contain variations that reflect the customs of each ethnic entity. Still, found within all traditional religions historically found in Carana is the belief of a Supreme Being who is responsible for all of nature and humanity, as well as the physical and spiritual realms. There is also the belief in the gods, who are manifestations of this Supreme Being who manifest themselves through mountains, animals, rivers, the sun, the moon, thunder and lightning, as well as other natural phenomena.

There is no official priesthood in most traditional religious practice in Carana. However, some people are chosen by the gods to be spirit-seers in charge of the affairs within the shrines and villages. These people are seen as very powerful since they speak to the gods for the people on earth and are the only ones with the ability to communicate with the spiritual world. There are also healers who use natural herbs and roots to heal. Healing is ultimately achieved with the help of spirits; traditional healers invite the spirits to aid in the healing of the physical and spiritual ailments of community members.

There was significant diversity in religious practices in Carana prior to colonialism, even within the large ethnic groups. For instance, within the Falin family of tribes, specific communities and tribes would have affinities to a particular god; though always a manifestation of the Supreme Being. The traditional religions are largely henotheistic in nature; each clan gave allegiance to the community's own god while still accepting that other gods exist. Because the Falin have always been the dominant ethnic community in Carana, some elements of their ancestral religions have exerted a notable influence on Caranese society.

In ancient times, the Falin peoples worshipped the god of the mountain, who lived above Mellen, on the Katsi border (where a prehistoric shrine still exists). While rooted in this common worship, each grouping worshipped other minor gods. The Falari worshipped the god of bronze (associated with the copper mines in the north-eastern Caranese Highlands); the Gatari, living in the north Torongo river valley, worshipped the god of land fertility; the Barini worshipped the god of the forest, whose shrines once stood in the rain-forests of northern Hanno (now extensively deforested); and the Hanari worshipped the goddess of the river, who lived at the headwaters of the Mogave River.

In the case of the Kori peoples, the Teri people worshipped a goddess of the earth and sky; the Kolin worshipped the python god; the Mahabi worshipped the warrior god; and the Katsi worshipped the god of thunder. These gods were all members of a greater Kori pantheon, but generally not associated with one specific location (e.g. the river god was present in all rivers).

Among the Tatsi peoples, the Lipaki worshipped the goddess of the cave; the Coastal Tatsi worshipped the goddess of the sea; and the Elassoni worshipped the elephant god.

The Mahidi people, who are nomadic pastoralists, primarily worship a god of rain, who is associated with the fertility of the land. This traditional religion pre-dates the arrival of the Falin, Kori, and Tatsi from mainland Africa.

These diversities imply that there were, and continues to be, differences in the way groups and sub-groups express their beliefs through worship and ceremonies

CHRISTIANITY

Current-day religious dynamics and presence in Carana can not be understood without understanding the history of the Christian religion on the island. In the early 1400s, European explorers began arriving on the island, and came into contact with some of the Falin and Tatsi tribes along the Gulf of Carana, where they established and maintained trading posts. Here, missionaries established churches, and soon many Caranese had been converted to Christianity. The Falari and Gatari tribes were especially quick to embrace this new faith. Religious conversion was an integral part of colonialism; both worked hand-in-hand. After the successful conversion of some of the Falin tribes, missionaries also successfully converted the Tatsi populations of Carana to the Christian faith.

Roman Catholicism

The Roman Catholic Church established its first major seat of power in Carana with the establishment of an ecclesiastical headquarters in the capital of Galasi. This "ecclesiastical province" continues to cover directly the provinces of Fellari and Hanno, and has the Cathédrale de l'Assomption in Galasi as its archdiocesan seat, under Archbishop Jean-Pierre Mabano, who is appointed the Cardinal Archbishop of Galasi. The archdiocese's pastoral responsibilities include the Roman Catholic dioceses of Katasi and Sumora.

Three subordinate Catholic dioceses are based in the country: in Amsan at the Cathédrale de Notre-Dame, which covers Barin and Guthar provinces and which has Bishop François Tomassi as its head. Then, there is a diocese in Corma, led by Bishop Jérôme Nyerio at the Cathédrale Marie-Reine-du-Monde for Leppko province. Finally, for the provinces of Koloni, Mahbek and Tereni, there is Bishop Louis-Jean Okanda at the Cathédrale Saint-Michel, in Alur. Diocesan boundaries do not perfectly reflect the internal administrative boundaries of Carana.

The basic tenets of the Catholic Church include: the belief in one God who created everything; the belief that Christ is both God and man, and came down from heaven for the salvation of all humans; the belief that Christ suffered, died and rose again on the third day. The central moment of Catholicism is the celebration of the Eucharist, during which, through the actions of the priest, the bread and wine of sacrifice become the body and blood of Christ.

Within the Roman Catholic tradition, there is a well-defined hierarchical structure that has the Pope in Rome at the apex, followed by the College of Cardinals. There is then the Cardinal Archbishops and the Archbishops who head the provincial metropolis, and the Bishops in charge of dioceses. After this, there are priests who are responsible for parishes, then the nuns, and finally the lay Catholics. The rights and obligations within the

Catholic hierarchy are codified in the Canon Law of the Catholic Church. This code deals with all aspects of relationships among the faithful as well as between the people and their priests and bishops, the archbishops of the ecclesiastical metropolitan provinces, and with the Vatican.

The Catholic Church fought for the faith of the Caranese population by establishing educational institutions where young people learned how to communicate with, and understand, their colonial masters. Those who attended these Church schools had the benefit of being able to act as translators and mediators between the missionaries, Azurian authorities and merchants on the one hand, and the local population on the other. Besides establishing churches, the Church also imported Azurian priests to teach at Church schools and to work as missionaries. Schools were established with Christianity and Catholicism at the core of the curriculum, and other missionaries taught adult converts outside the school structure. As a result, these teachings served the purpose of facilitating commerce, while at the same time embedding religious beliefs into the population.

The Anglican Church

Anglicans are a minority within the Caranese Christian population. The earliest Anglican presence resulted from missionaries from the Carmine Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, based in Rimosa, who established schools in southern coastal Carana during the nineteenth century. The majority of Anglicans, however, are members of the Pleioni tribe who migrated from Rimosa, and live primarily in the south of the country. Anglican churches in major towns and cities have attracted converts from various tribal groups.

Anglicans in Carana are in the pastoral charge of the Bishop of Rimosa, based in Yudifa. The Anglican Communion has attempted to maintain strong ecumenical relations with both the Roman Catholic and Protestant movements in Carana, encouraging a collaborative approach to fostering Christian unity. However the church itself, like much of the Anglican Communion in the developing world, is troubled by divisive issues such as same-sex marriage and the ordination of women.

The Kori and Christianity

Dating back to the time of the Kori Kingdom, the Kori people have been fiercely resistant to conversion to new faiths, especially Christianity. Until recently, the Kori had largely succeeded in maintaining almost exclusively their ancestral beliefs and practices that originate from the time when their ancestors first moved from mainland Africa to Kisiwa.

At the peak of the presence of Christian missionaries, the Kori felt that these outsiders had come to the island to dominate them, which they have always ferociously resisted and resented. Their strong devotion to their ancestral religion motivated their resistance to the missionaries, together with the view that Christianity did not offer anything different from what they already had. Christians believed in a Supreme God, in a spiritual world (heaven or hell), much like they did. The Catholic belief in intercession by saints paralleled the Kori belief that ancestors should be appealed to in times of need. Angels seemed to parallel the Kori belief in spirits who help with their battles with rival ethnic groups and communities.

Today, while there are some nominal Kori Christians, many aspects of the traditional religion continue to appeal to them. Diviners and seers are consulted to ensure that one's future is free from evil spiritual attacks or accidental death. This service is appealing to those who are unsure about their physical security, and think that their life may somehow be at risk. Kori people largely remain entrenched in their traditional practice, although younger generations are increasingly less aware of this, and many have begun to abandon traditional rituals.

Christian Evangelism and the Push for Religious Revival

Despite official discouragement (see above), Protestant evangelical movements have been attracting a wave of new followers. One reason cited for the rise in Christian evangelism is the search for meaning by young people who believe that the more evangelical Christian traditions offer a release for frustrations they have, especially in tough economic times, especially through music and other forms of liturgical movement such as dancing and swaying. Evangelical traditions also claim to be more true to Christian scriptures and tradition, and offer the formula for a fulfilling life.

These claims by the new charismatic Protestant and evangelical church leaders has become a sensitive issue between them and the Catholic Church, which has been losing members to the newer denominations. In return, the Catholic Church is seeking ways to bring back those who no longer identify with the faith. All of this has re-ignited passionate competition for people's faiths (at the same time generating profits for broadcast companies, who have benefited from different groups using the television to broadcast their beliefs).

Many evangelical denominations are supported by their parent branches in the United States and Europe. Some have secured generous funds from overseas, and are attempting to obtain permission from the Caranese government to establish religious universities and colleges. This has largely been resisted by the powerful Falin Catholics working within the government structure.

In light of the competition between different religious groups, Kori and other traditional worshippers are trying to strengthen ancestral religion by convincing young people that their identities and culture are linked to this tradition. Young people are urged to understand and live by their traditions, as opposed to succumbing to those imposed by the colonialists and other outsiders. Kori religious leaders have used the electronic media to bring their beliefs and practices to mainstream society, although they have had little success in attracting non- Kori people to the Kori ancestral religion. Traditional religion is also less popular among those Kori who have moved away from Kori-dominated areas for work or education.

ISLAM

Carana's neighbouring state of Sumora embraced Islam since its first introduction to the island during the Almoravid Dynasty, and through to the Matola Caliphate. However, Islam was barely present in Carana during this early history, until the arrival of Barini and Hanari tribe members, who fled Sumora for Carana during a war with the Damangi in the 19th century. As the Damangi pushed south across the Lonari river, the Barini and Hanari were forced into the Caranese highlands. The immigration of Arabs to Carana, of which the great majority were Muslim, also increased the presence of Islam in the country.

Over the centuries following their arrival in Carana, the Barini and Hanari people built the two Great Mosques in Maroni and Akkabar, as well as many smaller mosques. They established a madrassa in Maroni, as well as an Islamic charitable foundation – an organization that still supports Muslims in Carana, especially those in financial trouble.

For the majority of Muslims, three beliefs are fundamental to their faith: tawhid or the belief in One God, risalah or the belief in prophet-hood, and qiyamah or the belief in the Last Day of Judgment. The first belief is shared with other monotheistic traditions, such as Christianity and Judaism. The specific Qur'anic name for God is Allah. In the formula for the statement of belief a Muslim affirms that he or she affirms Allah to be the one and only God; and that Muhammad is Allah's messenger. This is the common belief of all Muslims. Muslims believe in the prophet-hood of all biblical prophets and that Muhammad is the last prophet and the Qur'an the last revelation. Muslims also believe that the Torah and Bible were revealed to Moses and Jesus

respectively, from Allah. Muslims believe that at the end of this life everyone will be judged according to his or her actions. Hence, those who perform good acts will be rewarded whereas those who perform bad deeds will be punished.

The five pillars of Islamic faith are the foundations of Muslim life. They are: the belief in the Oneness of God, and the finality of the prophet-hood of Muhammad; the establishment of daily prayers (said at dawn, mid-day, late afternoon, sunset, and nightfall); alms-giving to the needy; self-purification through fasting; and the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca (Makkah) for those who are able to do so. Because of their relative proximity to Saudi Arabia, many Caranese Moslems have made the Hajj.

Not all Muslims in Carana belong to the same sect of Islam. These differences imply minor variations in ritualistic prayers and interpretations of the Qur'an. The Barini are Wahhabi Muslims, the Hanari are Shias, and most of the Arab population is Sufi.

In recent years, a growing portion of Muslims in the country have been calling for Shari'a law to be formally recognized within the Islamic community and guaranteed by the country's constitution. This is compared with the existing tolerance for traditional "village justice" systems in the Kori areas of the country, where tribal elders are appointed to judge its people on matters of marriage dissolution, family affairs and land disputes. Muslims hope to convince the government on this matter by arguing that the institutionalization of a Shari'a law and court system reduces the pressure on the existing legal system. This appeal has caused considerable debate in Carana; heated discussions on religious rights and demands are prominent in the popular media.

CELEBRATIONS AND FESTIVITIES

The Caranese people celebrate numerous ceremonies and major festivities during the course of the year. The most important events are the traditional New Moon Festival, the Harvest Festival, the New Yam Festival (when farmers who cultivate yams invite people to their barns, and offer them roasted yams with the traditional palm wine), Naming Festival (in which a newborn is given his or her name. This is followed by either a baptism (for Christians) or another religious observance of initiation or acceptance for the other populations. Religions in Carana also have traditional ways of celebrating marriage which is often accepted as legally binding in civil law.

There are also festivals held by the Caranese traditional worshippers who celebrate different gods by offering sacrificial animals at their shrines, often by spreading blood on the altar. The animals are then roasted and community members partake in the eating of the sacrificial meals. These rituals are often accompanied with music, dancing, and drinking.

Christians celebrate major Christian feasts including Christmas and Easter, as well as various saints' days (for the Roman Catholic population). Caranese Christian celebrations of these are not greatly different to their celebration elsewhere in Africa and the world. Similarly, the Islamic community observes the normal festivals and observances of the Moslem calendar, including Muharram, Ramadan, Eid Al-Fit'r, and Eid Al-Adha. Hindu practitioners also celebrate their own festivals. These festivals include Diwali (festival of Lights), Skanda Sashti (festival of Lord Subramanya), Karwa Chauth (a ritual of fasting celebrated by married women who seek the well-being and prosperity of their husbands), Krishna Janmashtami (birthday of Lord Krishna) and other festivals.

Other than these, there are also civic holidays such as New Year's Day, Labour Day, Independence Day, the UNICEF-sponsored Children's Day, and other commemorations such as the birthday of Joseph Uroma.

CHAPTER 6: GOVERNANCE



OVERVIEW

Name:	Conventional long form: Democratic Republic of Carana Conventional short form: Carana Vernacular long form: République démocratique de Carana Vernacular short form: Carana
Government Type:	Republic
Capital:	Galasi
Provinces:	8 provinces: Tereni, Mahbek, Leppko, Barin, Guthar, Koloni, Fellari, Hanno
Maritime claims:	Territorial Sea: 12 NM Contiguous Zone: 24 NM Exclusive Economic Zone: 200 NM Continental Shelf: 200 NM, or to the edge of the Continental Shelf
Constitution:	First Constitution drafted and instated on October 1, 1963; suspension on November 30, 1972 under Général Christian Hakutu; new constitution on 17 December 1985; amendment in 2004 under Jacques Ogavo.
Independence:	April 10, 1962, from the Azurian Empire
National Holiday:	April 10 (1962), Independence Day
Executive Branch:	Head of State/Head of Government: Jacques Ogavo, since 1996 (Directly elected) Chairman of the National Assembly: Cheb Habdadu State Council: State Council appointed by the President.

Legislative Branch: Under the Caranese Constitution, elections are expected to be held once every five years to a unicameral legislature called the National Assembly (Assemblée Nationale). The National Assembly is a parliament where bills are introduced, discussed and either accepted or rejected as law. The 100 National Assembly Members (NAMs) (Membre de l'Assemblée Nationale) are elected by direct universal vote from single-member districts.

The following is the current distribution of seats in the National Assembly:

- Parti démocratique du Carana (PDC) 54 seats
- Parti de la convention caranaise (PCC) 35 seats
- Front national caranais (FNC), 7 seats
- Ralliement pour la solidarité (RS) 4 seats

Elections: Last held, on July 10, 2006 (third term re-election of Jacques Ogavo)

Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal



Electoral System: First-past-the-post or winner-take-all electoral model, wherein the winning candidate in a district simply needs to win more votes than any other candidate to represent the district. Constituency boundaries are based on existing departmental boundaries. Seat allocation is in proportion with the total population of the jurisdiction, for a National Assembly total of 100 seats.

The following is the current distribution of seats in the National Assembly, by department:

Province/Department	Capital/ chef-lieu	% of Nat Pop	Population	Seats
Province de Barin	Folsa			
Département de Barin sud	Folsa	3.10%	264,779	3
Département de Barin est	Maui	1.98%	169,025	2
Département de Barin nord	Nusbet	1.26%	108,135	1
Département de Barin ouest	Nusbet	1.35%	115,854	1
Provincial Subtotal		7.69%	657,794	7
Province de Fellari	Galasi			
Département de Fellari nord	Galasi	17.35%	1,484,014	17
Département de Fellari nord-est	Clavo	3.52%	301,084	4
Département de Fellari sud-est	Jumi	1.14%	97,122	1
Département de Fellari sud	Feri Rad	5.93%	507,250	6
Département de Fellari ouest	Amsan Ouest	3.46%	296,016	3
Provincial Subtotal		31.39%	2,685,486	31
Province de Guthar	Amsan			
Département de Guthar nord-est	Amsan	9.75%	834,408	10
Département de Guthar est	Cereni	3.99%	341,542	4
Département de Guthar sud-est	Lora	3.63%	310,189	4
Département de Guthar sud-ouest	Kalzo	2.27%	194,203	2
Département de Guthar nord-ouest	Arum	2.64%	226,036	3
Provincial Subtotal		22.29%	1,906,377	23
Province d'Hanno	Maroni			
Département d'Hanno nord-est	Maroni	1.79%	153,125	2
Département d'Hanno est	Akabar	0.70%	59,584	1
Département d'Hanno sud-est	Cerves	0.40%	34,516	1
Département d'Hanno sud	Torta	0.90%	76,887	1

Province/Department	Capital/ chef-lieu	% of Nat Pop	Population	Seats
Département d'Hanno ouest	Chute-Garani	1.32%	112,714	1
Département d'Hanno nord-ouest	Pfoksol	1.53%	130,677	2
Provincial Subtotal		6.63%	567,503	8
Province de Koloni	Suroun			
Département de Koloni sud	Suroun	2.04%	174,120	2
Département de Koloni ouest	Molle	0.87%	74,235	1
Département de Koloni nord	Norke	0.92%	78,499	1
Département de Koloni est	Karo	1.61%	138,052	2
Provincial Subtotal		5.43%	464,904	6
Province de Leppko	Corma			
Département de Leppko est	Corma	4.48%	383,407	3
Département de Leppko sud-est	Ude	1.57%	134,522	2
Département de Leppko sud	Eres	3.29%	281,075	3
Département de Leppko sud-ouest	Kika	1.17%	99,817	1
Département de Leppko nord-ouest	Muka	1.86%	159,138	2
Département de Leppko nord	Sarazzo	2.17%	185,695	2
Provincial Subtotal		14.54%	1,243,654	13
Province de Mahbek	Faron			
Département de Mahbek sud	Faron	3.14%	268,482	3
Département de Mahbek ouest	Ludou	2.23%	190,674	2
Département de Mahbek nord	Perkes	1.95%	167,227	2
Département de Mahbek est	Mia	2.45%	209,695	2
Provincial Subtotal		9.77%	836,079	9
Province de Tereni	Alur			
Département de Tereni ouest	Alur	0.90%	77,312	1
Département de Tereni nord	Buboul	0.44%	37,581	1
Département de Tereni est	Lurok	0.90%	77,309	1
Provincial Subtotal		2.25%	192,202	3
TOTAL		100%	8,553,999	100

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

President and Executive Branch

The Executive Branch of the Government of the République démocratique de Carana is comprised by the seat of the Head of Government (President), an Office of the President, a State Council and a series of ministries.

The President is elected by the National Assembly for a five-year term (the eligibility for re-election for only a second term was changed by constitutional amendment before the 2006 elections). The President is both the Head of State and Head of Government and is Head of the State Council, Commander-in-Chief of the Caranese Defence Forces and Head of the National Assembly. (Meetings of the Assembly are however moderated by a Chairman of the National Assembly.) As head of government, the President sets the national political agenda, decides on the size of State Council, and appoints and removes State Council and other senior government officials.

The Office of the President is a supporting body to Carana's Head of State, and is currently comprised by a Chef de Cabinet and four counsellors who counsel the President on the following themes and issues: Political and Provincial Affairs; Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence; Economic and Social Affairs; and Commissions and Appointments.

The State Council is comprised of National Assembly Members (NAMs) and other non-elected people, appointed by the President to be responsible for the various ministries.

The Ministries are headed by Ministers who are usually National Assembly Members or by exception non-elected people, all appointed by the President. To ensure national unity, it is generally expected that the government and the executive as a whole will be quite representative of the diverse nature of Caranese society. However, during Roselyn Okatsi's second term, the Executive staff and State Council members that had been representative of the Kori and Tatsi populations began being replaced by Falin people. With Jacques Ogavo, this trend continued.

The ministerial structure follows the hierarchy of, Minister, Deputy Minister, Assistant Deputy Minister, Director-General, Director, and Deputy Director. Governmental agencies that are Commissions are normally structured with a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner and then revert to the normal civil structure.

Current Commissions include an Elections Commission, a National Media Commission and a Judicial Service Commission;

The executive branch of Carana currently includes 14 ministries, as described below:

Ministry	Responsibilities
Ministry of Agriculture, Land, Water and Environment	Responsible for the assurance of food security through agricultural policy and programs, including fisheries; the regulation and use of land and water in an environmentally sustainable manner.

Ministry	Responsibilities
Ministry of Defence	Responsible for defence policy and the Caranese Defence Forces, as well as preparedness or support to other ministries in emergencies.
Ministry of Education, Research, Culture and Sports	Responsible for primary and secondary education, post-secondary technical colleges and universities, research support, cultural policy and institutions, youth policy and promotion of sports.
Ministry of Energy, Mines and Natural Resources	Responsible for the development and regulation of energy resources and transmission, mineral resources and other natural resources including forestry; and, for production and transmission of electricity through the Caranese Power Corporation.
Ministry of Finance and Revenue	Responsible for matters relating to economic policy, the central government budget, taxes, banking, insurance, the general economic condition of all levels of government; plus the collection of customs and revenue
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cooperation	Responsible for the conduct of foreign relations, to assist in realizing overall foreign policy goals through bilateral, regional and broader international relationships, and to coordinate foreign policy throughout government.
Ministry of Health, Social Welfare, Family and Women's Affairs	Responsible for policy and programs relating to health care and medical services, social welfare and services, public housing; protection and care of the family, and assurance of participation of women in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the country.
Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Employment	Responsible for industrial and commercial development, the labour market and conditions, and the business sector.
Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism	Responsible for the Caranese Office of Information; broadcasting policy and licensing; the management of Caranese State Radio and the Caranese Broadcasting Service; and, the promotion of tourism.

Ministry	Responsibilities
Ministry of the Interior	Responsible for law enforcement; intelligence and counter-intelligence; court and correctional services; and, citizenship and immigration control. Particular organs of interest falling under the responsibility of this Ministry include: Commissioner for the Caranese National Police, Commissioner for the Caranese Gendarmerie (Directorate of Uniformed Services; Directorate of Investigations; National Intelligence Directorate; Counter-Intelligence Directorate), Commissioner for Prisons and Probation, Commissioner for Citizenship and Immigration, including Border Security
Ministry of Law and Justice	Responsible for matters relating to administrative and constitutional law, civil and criminal law, and the judiciary.
Ministry of Local Government	Responsible for matters relating to lower levels of government as well as levels of administration including supervising government appointees, and administrative and technical capacity-building.
Ministry of Public Works and Administrative Affairs	Responsible for property owned by the state; and for administrative matters of a cross-ministerial nature including the contracting and provision of supplies, services and accommodation; and, in cooperation with the Public Service Administration, for the provision civil service personnel.
Ministry of Transportation and Communications	Responsible for the development and regulation of transportation, communications and infrastructure through agencies such as the National Harbours Board, the National Air Transport and Airport Authority, the National Railway, and the Post and Telecommunications Commission which is also responsible for the operation of Carana Telecommunications and Carana Wireless Communications Corporation.

Levels of Administration and Local Governments

Other than the national government situated in Galasi, responsibilities are decentralized to two other levels of nationally recognized local governments: provinces and communes. These local governments have legal and financial autonomy and can undertake any activity aimed at promoting economic, social, and cultural development of the commune/province.

For administrative purposes, the country is subdivided into three levels: provinces (8), departments (37) and 2064 villages and settlements. For these purposes, provinces are headed by a Governor (gouverneur), and departments, by prefects (préfets); all appointed by the central government. These appointees and their staff supervise and coordinate all ministerial services and other competencies at the provincial and departmental levels.

At both the provincial and departmental levels, tasks are divided between two division chiefs, one of whom is responsible for administrative and general affairs including supervision of the police, civil affairs and the administration of subordinate levels of government, the other being responsible for economic, financial and social affairs including the budget, public works, health and education and the supervision of markets and price controls. There is also a Chef de cabinet, who acts as the administrative aide responsible for intradepartmental affairs and liaison with the central government ministries located in Galasi.

In some cases, government ministries have officials located outside of the capital region of Galasi, at the provincial level. These Provincial Administrators exist at the provincial level representing different ministries, and are directly responsible to the central government.

Provincial level (governor and staff, provincial assembly) is responsible for:

- General, technical and vocational secondary education
- Specialist education
- Provincial hospitals
- Road and communication infrastructure for which it is responsible
- Tourism
- Energy
- Decentralized powers relating to,
 - o Budgets and accounts; town and country planning, development programmes
 - o Creation and management of local government organs, works and supply contracts, leases and other agreements, levying of taxes and setting of their levels of accordance with the law
 - o Loans and grants of subsidies, methods of applications or personnel service regulations, etc.

Departmental level (prefect and staff) is responsible for:

- Basic education
- Health and preventive health centres
- Road and communication for which it is responsible
- Waterworks

The lowest level of local authority is the commune; in order to be achieved, the local community must be able to mobilize local financial resources to run the local government. A "rural commune" should have at least 5,000 inhabitants and local economic activities should have a potential of generating 75 per cent of its budget to meet its responsibilities. The thresholds for an "urban commune" are 10,000 inhabitants and 75 per cent

of its budget. The administrative city (chef-lieu) of a department has the status of a commune regardless of these thresholds, as does the provincial capitals. Communes have elected communal councils (conseils communaux) made up of representatives of village (village; rural) and wards (quartiers; urban). Communes are administered by Mayors (maires), who are elected amongst the council. Rural settlements and nomadic fractions that do not comprise a rural commune are the responsibility of the department.

The power and responsibilities of the governments at the commune level include some service-delivery and revenue-generation responsibilities such as the collection of property tax on behalf of the central government (and as directed by higher levels of administration). Communes are managed by a communal council, elected by directly by universal suffrage. The mayor and his/her staff comprise the communal office are elected by the councillors. Communes are responsible for providing the conditions likely for ensuring equitable access to local services and resources, and for meeting the basic needs of their citizens. The difference between rural and urban communes has to do with the competencies transferred to them.

Communal level (elected mayor and staff, communal council) is responsible for:

- Pre-school and elementary education
- Dispensaries, maternity and community health facilities (health posts)
- Road and communication for which it is responsible
- Public transport and traffic plans
- Fairs and markets
- Rural or urban waterworks
- Sport, arts and culture
- Decentralized powers relating to,
 - o Budgets and accounts; town and country planning, development programmes
 - o Creation and management of local government organs, works and supply contracts, leases and other agreements, levying of taxes and setting of their levels of accordance with the law
 - o Loans and grants of subsidies, methods of applications or personnel service regulations, etc.

At the sub-communal level there are usually assemblies and councils (i.e. village councils), but they do not comprise an official level of government administration, and do not regularly receive government funding. At these councils, local needs and projects are discussed and deliberated.

- Province de Barin:
 - o 4 departments ; 4 rural communes; 3 urban communes ; 209 rural settlements
- Province de Fellari:
 - o 5 departments ; 13 rural communes; 6 urban communes ; 208 rural settlements
- Province de Guthar:
 - o 5 departments ; 8 rural communes; 3 urban communes ; 279 rural settlements
- Province d'Hanno:
 - o 6 departments ; 9 rural communes; 6 urban communes ; 194 rural settlements
- Province de Koloni:
 - o 4 departments ; 15 rural communes; 23 urban communes ; 132 rural settlements
- Province de Leppko:
 - o 6 departments ; 27 rural communes; 13 urban communes ; 734 rural settlements
- Province de Mahbek:
 - o 4 departments ; 15 rural communes; 18 urban communes ; 246 rural settlements
- Province de Tereni:
 - o 3 departments ; 14 rural communes; 7 urban communes ; 62 rural settlements

Administrative breakdown	Local Government	Administration Division	Elected Body	Executive Body
8 Provinces	x	x	Assemblée provinciale	Gouverneur
37 Departments		x		Préfet
105 Rural and 78 Urban Communes	x		Conseil communal	Maire
Villages and Settlements		x	Conseil de village	Chef de village

Current Situation: The functioning of the decentralised structure of Carana varies considerably from one province to another, from one department to another, and from one commune to another. This is mostly due to the capacity of the actors to take on their responsibilities, many of which are unclear. Low literacy levels are a problem among rural elected officers and there is inadequate supervisory help from the State and its Ministry of Local Government. In parallel, development issues are rallying populations to very different degrees, and there is a lack of appropriately skilled administrative and technical staff. The presence or absence of development organisations willing to provide both technical and financial support to local government, and the ability of elected officers to attract them, also accounts for this variance.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS

To ensure fairness in the electoral process, one of the primary steps taken to enhance the reputation and integrity of Carana’s democratic system centres around the establishment of an independent Electoral Commission (EC). To ensure its autonomy, the position and power of the Board of Electoral Commission are enshrined in the Constitution and they cannot be dismissed without parliamentary approval. The autonomy and independence of the EC is also supposed safeguarded under the Caranese Constitution. An article in the Caranese Constitution states that in the discharge of its roles and responsibilities, the Electoral Commission “shall not be subject to the control of any person or authority.”

Despite these provisions in the constitution, the independence and performance of the Electoral Commission has left much to be desired. This is because the PDC leadership deliberately refuses to provide the EC with the necessary logistic, financial and human resources that will enable it to carry out its electoral mandate. While the EC expenditure processes and cash flow are controlled by a government ministry and subject to government rules and procedures, there are delays in critical disbursements of funds. At the same time, the EC has been accused of printing more ballot materials and recruiting more election staff than necessary. As independent from the executive branch, the EC may have taken advantage of the perception that they are not subject to the controls on spending applied to government agencies. In addition, the EC is generally seen as not being fair, neutral and objective to all the political parties that compete in elections.

The PDC has continuously used their political advantage to control the electoral process in order to maintain power. The ruling government has been accused of imposing restrictions on political opposition that ultimately limits its ability to compete fairly during elections.

The restrictions imposed by the government on opposition parties have in the past prevented them from having representation at polling stations, from witnessing the counting of ballots and from holding campaign meetings. All these fail to create a level playing field for all the parties during elections. Hence, although the PDC government is officially and in theory a democratic and constitutionally-elected government with the FNC as the official opposition, Carana has largely turned into a de facto single-party state. With no strong and effective opposition to hold it in check and accountable for its policies and actions, it is also increasingly

authoritarian. With the PDC dominating the National Assembly, the political process in Carana risks creating a single party political dynasty.

Because of the absence of regulations on private funding of political parties in Carana, the Falin-majority PDC has been the biggest beneficiary of large amounts of donations by secret donors, since the Falin control the majority of the wealth in the country. Human rights and democracy advocates have been decrying the lack of effective rules governing the receipt of private sources of support to political parties and individuals in political parties. Wealthy Falin, Indians, Arabs, Pleioni and Azurian-Caranese are easily able to buy influence by donating as much as they want, thus silencing the voices of other groups and populations. There are no public funds given to political parties or candidates in Carana. While this issue is frequently discussed in the National Assembly, that the funding of political parties and candidates puts these at risk of losing their independence from the State, and thus losing their ties with civil society. Due to the financial troubles of the government, the PDC has long argued that it is best to fund hospitals and schools, and the give taxpayers' dollars to political parties.

These developments are worsened by a generally weak party system. The opposition parties in Carana are usually small organizations with limited capacity and rather homogenous and focused membership bases. Because many of the existing political parties have been unable to develop a truly national character and platform, very few opposition parties have succeeded in extending their membership and support bases beyond ethnic, religious and geographical boundaries. In the past, some organizations were banned and some activities were restrained by the government because of alleged "anti-progressive" activities and sentiments. Overall, opposition parties in Carana have a limited influence and impact on the government decision-making and policies. As a result of this, the Electoral Commission and the electoral process as a whole are not held in high esteem in Carana.

TRADITIONAL HIERARCHIES AND RULERS

The Caranese state structure has also coexisted with a decentralized traditional social leadership structure. Informal leadership structures exist amongst different communities, tribes and religions throughout Carana. There is an advisory House of Chiefs (Conseil de chefferies), composed of a combination of traditional hereditary rulers and of chiefs elected from various tribal districts. The government is currently undertaking a review of the role of the House of Chiefs, and its role may be changed in coming years. Although chiefs and headmen are important figures both in villages and nationally, and rule over those who support various political parties, they are forbidden from being directly active in party politics. Any traditional ruler wanting to participate in partisan politics is expected to abdicate their position in the House of Chiefs. The barring of traditional authorities from politics stems from the fear that their involvement could bring divisions and tensions within local communities.

Leadership roles within the traditional structures in Carana are sometimes based on heredity, property, social status, age or a combination of these, and come with a great range of titles, depending on ethnic group and local custom. Provincial and local commanders may wield considerable power, backed by money and coercion, and may either work around or through the sub-national government structures.

The coexistence of both formal and traditional authorities has sometimes been a source of conflict between the Falin government and the traditional leaderships of the Tatsi and Kori people. Though, the strong loyalties of the Kori people have enabled Kori chiefs to negotiate with government officials for additional government resources for certain projects when government officials need the support of the Kori, the Tatsi leadership has not been as successful in bargaining with Falin officials.

Also see section on "Tribal Leaders in Society", (Chapter 4: Society).

OVERVIEW

Although the Constitution establishes the independence of the judicial system from the executive and legislative branches of government, there have been incidences of abuses by government officials. Extortion and other forms of corruption have also become commonplace in Carana. While government authorities have committed to reinforcing the Government's judicial system, there have been indications of members of the executive and legislative branches interfering with the judicial process.

NATIONAL LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Structure: Carana's court system is based on civil law. The Judiciary is divided into a four-tier court system, with a National Supreme Court at the top, which has appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under Caranese law. The Supreme Court and the lower courts are the responsibility of the Ministry of Law and Justice. The Supreme Court includes a cassation bench with the authority to review and overturn verdicts issued by lower courts containing fundamental errors of law. At the request of the prosecutor general or the president of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court can review any case from another court – not just those appealed to it. The Supreme Court has the power of sole power of interpretation of the Constitution, and in hearing and adjudicating upon any charges against a President who has been impeached by the National Assembly.

The Supreme Court judges are appointed by the National Assembly from a pool of nominees forwarded by the President (in coordination with the Ministry of Law and Justice) who receives the names from the Judicial Service Commission. The president and vice president of the Supreme Court are recommended by the President and appointed by the National Assembly. Judges serving the high, middle-level and district-level courts are appointed by the Provincial Councils, from a list of names provided by the Provincial Judicial Commissions.

Beneath the Supreme Court are the courts having original jurisdiction occurring under Caranese law. There is a total of eight High Courts; one in each of the provincial provinces. Middle-level Courts exist at the département level, and Courts of First Instance exist at the commune level. Jurisdiction for each of the court-levels is established by law.

The structure of courts having appellate jurisdiction is as follows: an appeal of the decision of a district-level court refers to a middle-level court in whose area of jurisdiction the district-level court lays; a middle-level court refers to the High Court; and the High Court refers to the Supreme Court. A second appeal refers from a decision of the middle-level court in its appellate jurisdiction to the High Court, and the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.

The following is the distribution of the High, Middle and First Instance Courts in Carana. The Supreme Court is situated in the national capital of Galasi:

Department	Population	High Courts	Middle Courts	First Instance Courts
Barin S	264,779	Folsa	Folsa	2
Barin E	169,779		Maui	3
Barin N	108,135		Nusbet	6
Barin O	115,854		Muffo	3
Fellari N	1,484,014	Galasi	Galasi	13
Fellari N-E	301,084		Clavo	3
Fellari S-E	97,122		Jumi	2
Fellari S	507,250		Feri Rad	6
Fellari O	296,016		Amsan Oouest	5
Guthar N-E	834,408	Amsan	Amsan	6
Guthar E	341,542		Cereni	2
Guthar S-E	310,189		Lora	3
Guthar S-O	194,203		Kalzo	2
Guthar N-O	226,036		Arum	3
Hanno N-E	153,125	Maroni	Maroni	3
Hanno E	59,584		Akabar	4
Hanno S-E	34,516		Cerves	2
Hanno S	76,887		Torta	5
Hanno O	112,714		Chute-Garani	2
Hanno N-O	130,677		Pfoksol	2
Koloni S	174,120	Suroun	Suroun	2
Koloni O	74,235		Molle	5
Koloni Nord	78,499		Norke	1
Koloni Est	138,052		Karo	1
Leppko E	383,407	Corma	Corma	8
Leppko S-E	134,422		Ude	6
Leppko S	281,075		Eres	4
Leppko S-O	99,817		Kika	8
Leppko N-O	159,138		Muka	4
Leppko N	185,695		Sarazzo	3
Mahbek S	286,482	Faron	Faron	3
Mahbek O	190,674		Ludou	6
Mahbek N	167,227		Perkes	3
Mahbek E	209,695		Mia	5
Tereni O	77,312	Alur	Alur	4
Tereni N	37,581		Buboul	5
Tereni E	77,309		Lurok	5
Total	8,553,999	8	37	150

Current Situation: The judiciary in any country is expected to be the one political institution responsible for guarding and also interpreting provisions in the constitution as well as applying the laws of the land. Unfortunately, the judiciary has been quite ineffective in Carana. Besides lacking effective judicial officers, they also lack the necessary resources that will enable them to effectively undertake their responsibilities. Furthermore, the judiciary in Carana is often seen as protecting the interests of the political and economic élites. They have in the past been accused by critics of doing little to control electoral fraud by the PDC, or limit the influence and power of the executive.

Although the Constitution in Carana establishes the independence of the judiciary from the other organs of government, there is little doubt that the executive has generally interfered in the activities of the judiciary. While an independent and effective judicial system can help to deal with the problem of corruption and abuse of power, as well as protect human rights and political and civil rights and liberties in any country, the judiciary has generally and historically been seen as being manipulated by the PDC government to determine and reflect the prevailing interests of the PDC at the expense of political opponents. Even in instances where there is no evidence of the judiciary being manipulated and influenced directly by the leadership of the PDC, it is certainly the case that the judiciary in most instances make decisions to please the executive and PDC. Nowhere was this executive interference in the judiciary more evident than in the case of the leader of the CISC (Combattants indépendants du sud Carana), Niba Manzi, who together with other executive members of CISC were tried, convicted and sentenced to death by firing squad on trumped up charges of sedition and treason in 1998. The execution of Manzi obviously contributed to further ethnic and political tensions in Carana since the Tatsi saw this as further evidence of Falin and PDC domination in society.

MILITARY AND POLICE DISCIPLINARY LAW

The Caranese military (including the Gendarmerie) operates under a Code of Military Discipline, and the Security Forces operate under a similar code. These disciplinary codes permit the Armed Forces and Security Forces to convene internal tribunals to try both criminal offences and specific offences under the respective codes. Special mechanisms are also constituted for the conduct of investigations and the administration of punishment.

Although these disciplinary codes ostensibly hold members of the Armed Forces and Security Forces to a higher standard than the general public, these processes have been criticized for a lack of transparency and public oversight. As a result, there have been many instances where personnel tried by internal tribunals have allegedly escaped adequate punishment, or in which internal investigations have succeeded in concealing misconduct by uniformed personnel.

TRADITIONAL LOCAL LAW

Customary law plays a complementary role in the legal system through incorporation and enjoys a great deal of importance in practice. Its lack of uniformity, due to its variations along ethnic and provincial lines, makes blanket customary law application impossible. It has, however, maintained its importance in the Caranese legal system through informal incorporation in the official judicial system, especially in lower courts. The lack of capable judicial officers and the scarcity of resources in many areas hamper effective operation of the courts that has led, in some cases, to a significant backlog of cases. In part due to this weak judicial system, a greater reliance has been placed on the use of local traditional law to maintain law and order, embodied in the authority of tribal and village elders. The Kori people are known for favouring customary law over official legislation, and thus have a strongly developed traditional justice system that bypasses the justice system.

RELIGIOUS AND OTHER LAW

While Shari'a Law has never been formally instituted in Carana, it plays an important role in the lives of some of the Muslim populations, including the Arabs and the Muslim Falin, mostly of the Hanari and Barini tribes. Amongst the demands put forth by Hanari and Barini leaders in recent decades has been the recognition and institutionalization of Shari'a law for Moslems in Carana. This has been largely opposed by certain groups of the population, including the non-Muslim Falin population that comprises the majority of the people in government positions.

Within hierarchical church organizations such as the Roman Catholic Church, ecclesiastical courts wield jurisdiction in matters of canon law, however this has no formal State recognition. In practical terms however, the Catholic Church exerts a quasi-legal jurisdiction over its officials, which has in the past been tacitly recognized by civil authorities. Other professional bodies (e.g. doctors, lawyers, etc.) have limited professional jurisdiction over their own memberships.

THE GOVERNMENT OF CARANA AND OAU/AU TREATIES

Date	Treaty	Carana ¹
2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union	13-Mar-01
Abrogated & replaced by the Constitutive Act	OAU Charter, Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963	
1965	General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity	9-Sep-71
1980	Additional Protocol to the OAU General Convention on Privileges and immunities	
1967	Phyto-Sanitary Convention for Africa	13-Jul-82
1968	African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources	25-Jun-88
1969	African Civil Aviation Commission Constitution	11-Oct-84
1969	AU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa	13-Mar-70
1974	Constitution of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations	
1975	Inter-African Convention Establishing an African Technical Co-Operation Programme	(s) 14-Apr-03
1977	Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa,	
1976	Cultural Charter for Africa	24-Apr-90
1981	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights	4-Mar-90
1985	Agreement for the Establishment of the African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI)	(s) 8-Apr-86
1985	Convention for the Establishment of the African Centre for Fertilizer Development	
1990	African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child	(s) 28-Feb-92
1991	Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa	
1991	Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community	14-May-92
1994	African Maritime Transport Charter	(s) 5-Jan-98
1995	The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty(Pelindaba Treaty)	

¹Identifies date of ratification or accession unless indicate with (s), in which date indicated signature of treaty only.

Date	Treaty	Carana ¹
1998	Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights	15-Dec-03
1999	OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism	(s) 23-Mar-99
2001	Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament	14-Dec-03
2001	The Convention of the African Energy Commission	
2002	Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union	(s) 9-Jul-02
2003	African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Revised Version)	
2003	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	
2003	Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union	
2003	Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union	
2003	African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption	
2004	Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism	
2005	The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact	

THE GOVERNMENT OF CARANA AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

Topic	Treaty	Date ²	Reservation/declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)
Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts	GC I-IV 1949	Geneva Conventions (I - IV)	13-Mar-63
	AP I 1977	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of international Armed Conflicts	6-Jan-86
	AP I Declaration 90	Declaration provided under article 90 AP I	
	AP II 1977	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts	6-Jan-86
	AP III 2005	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem	
	CRC 1989	Convention on the Rights of the Child	14-Feb-92
	OP-CRC-AC 2000	the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict	
ICC	ICC Statute 1998	Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	1-May-04

²Identifies date of ratification or accession unless indicate with (s), in which date indicated signature of treaty only.

Topic	Treaty	Date ²	Reservation/declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	Hague Conv. 1954	Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
	Hague Prot. 1954	First Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
	Hague Prot. 1999	Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
Environment	ENMOD Conven. 1954	Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques	(s) 18-May-77
Weapons	Geneva Gas Prot. 1925	Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases	30-Aug-70
	BWC 1972	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction	
	CCW 1980	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects	
	CCW Prot. I 1980	Protocol on non-detectable fragments (I)	
	CCW Prot. II 1980	Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices (II)	
	CCW Prot. III 1980	Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (III)	
	CCW Prot. IV 1995	Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention)	
	CCW Prot. II a 1996	Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Bobby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention)	
	CCW Amdt 2001	Amendment to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III)	
	CCW Prot. V 2003	Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III)	
	CWC 1993	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction	18-Sep-98
	Ottawa Treaty 1997	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction	3-Dec-98
	Cluster Munitions 2008	Convention on Cluster Munitions	(s) 3-Dec-08

Topic	Treaty	Date ²	Reservation/declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)
Human Rights Instruments	CESCR 1966	the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	16-Jun-86
	CCPR 1966	the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	16-Jun-86
	OP1-CCPR 1966	the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	16-Jun-86
	OP2-CCPR 1989	the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	
	CERD 1966	the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination	16-Sep-76
	CEDAW 1979	the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	27-May-95
	OP-CEDAW 1999	the Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	(s) 24-Jul-02
	CAT 1984	the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	12-Oct-95
	OP-CAT 2002	the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	
	OP-CRC-SC 2000	the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography	
	ICRMW 1990	the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families	
	CRPD 2006	the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	
	OP-CRPD 2006	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	
	CPPCG 1948	Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	27-Mar-63

** The following section is an overview of Carana's Economy. For a detailed analysis of the economic environment of this country, please refer to the document "Economic Overview and Summary of Economic Statistics" for the Republic of Carana.

ECONOMIC PICTURE AT A GLANCE

Population:	8,553,999	
GDP (PPP) : ¹	US\$4.6 billion	
GDP – per capita (PPP):	US\$535	
GDP real growth rate (annual %):	-1.7%	
GDP – composition by sector:	Agriculture	49%
Industry		41%
Services	10%	
Labour force (estimated):	4.47 million	
Labour force – by occupation:	Agriculture	66%
Industry		22%
	Services	12%
GINI index : ²	62.9	
Human poverty index : ³	47.3	
Human development index : ⁴	0.381	
Unemployment rate:	38%	
Inflation rate (consumer prices):	11.7%	
Budget:	Revenues	US \$111.36M
	Expenditures	US \$407.16M

¹ "Purchasing Power Parity"

² The Gini index measures the extent of inequality in family income distribution within a nation. Zero implies perfect equality, while 100 represents perfect inequality.

³ A measure of the extent of human deprivation within a country developed by the United Nations. The higher the index, the greater the poverty.

⁴ A composite measure of human development created by the United Nations that assesses health, standards of living and knowledge. The higher the index, the better of the nation is.

Agriculture – products:	cotton, cocoa, corn, cassava, palm nut/oil, fish, livestock
Industries:	mining (diamond, gold, iron, copper, coal), lumbering, paper, food processing, cotton textiles, soap
Electricity – production:	264.4 million kWh
Electricity – consumption:	264.4 million kWh
Oil – production:	0 bbl/day
Oil – consumption:	3,011 bbl/day
Oil – exports:	0 bbl/day
Oil – imports:	3,047 bbl/day
Oil proven reserves:	0 bbl/day (speculation of potential reserves)
Exports:	US\$250.56M f.o.b.
Export – commodities:	diamonds, gold, iron, copper, timber, cocoa, cotton, textiles, fish, soap
Export – partners:	Azuria 10.1%, France 9.7%, India 7.9%, United States 7.2%, Rimoso 5.6%
Imports:	US \$649.6M f.o.b.
Imports – commodities:	petroleum, capital goods, machinery and equipment
Import – partners:	Azuria 31.7%, France 8.6%, Germany 7.7%, India 5%, United Arab Emirates 4.8%
Debt – external:	US \$4.79b
Currency (code):	Caranese franc (CFr) ISO code = CAF
Exchange rates:	CFr/USD: 2,962 : 1
Fiscal year:	Calendar year

OVERVIEW

In the late 1980s, Carana's government unsuccessfully attempted to implement a series of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). The government's later efforts to discard the process and revert back to a controlled economy proved disastrous. Consequently, the government in the last decade has returned to the abandoned policies. However, a number of economic missteps in 2006, in addition to grave challenges in the agriculture sector, have resulted in a descent into economic chaos. Although rich in diamonds, gold, copper, timber and other resources, with a dearth of infrastructural and capacity development, as well as economic mismanagement and a troubled political atmosphere, the economy has failed to grow. All sectors have been negatively impacted, and the nation is currently plagued with high inflation, unemployment, increasing poverty, and activity within the underground economy continues to expand. If further economic turmoil is to be averted, it is imperative that the government tackle rising political tensions, and address matters of budget sustainability, job creation, corruption, expansion of infrastructure, and strengthening of government capacity.

RECENT ECONOMIC HISTORY

On the heels of economic mismanagement, policy failures and the oil crisis of the 1970s, Carana turned to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for assistance. These provided loans to Carana on condition that the nation reforms its economic and political structures.

Economic restructuring, in the form of the SAPs implementation, occurred in two phases; first stabilization policies were introduced, and these were followed by structural changes. Included in the stabilization policies were tighter monetary policy in the form of higher interest rates, aimed at reducing demand and curbing inflation; freezing of civil servant salaries, also directed at decreasing local demand, particularly for imported goods; reduction in government spending that manifested itself in the form of removal of agricultural subsidies, cuts to key services such as education and health care; and the devaluing of the exchange rate, with the aim of making exports from Carana cheaper for importing economies. These stabilization measures were then followed by policies aimed at changing the structure of the economy, and these included among others, trade liberalization – the removal of quotas, reduction in tariffs; privatization of state owned enterprises; and, liberalization of capital markets.

The reforms resulted in economic growth that was reflected in higher gross domestic product over the next few years. These gains were brought about primarily by a surge in foreign direct investment in the mining sector, particularly in diamond operations. The revamped timber and fish industry also contributed to the growth of the economy. Soon tourism was on the rise, and the near devastation of the cocoa industry in Namuna caused by the swollen shoot disease diverted international buyers from Namuna to Carana and brought about much needed relief for cocoa farmers.

In spite of these gains, the restructuring was not without its significant costs; many from the middle class through to the poorest in society were gravely affected. The freezing of civil servant salaries caused great agitation, and was a major factor in causing a precarious situation in which many government workers such as teachers and medical staff had not been paid in months on end, to spill over into demonstrations and strikes. The removal of subsidies for agriculture in particular, coupled with the opening up of agricultural import markets, gravely reduced the incomes of farmers, as cheap agricultural produce was dumped on the local markets. This disproportionately impacted the Kori and Tatsi who were mainly farmers, and resulted in the government falling largely out of favour with the rural populace.

Agriculture was not the only sector that suffered from the premature opening up of the markets. Industry sustained its share of casualties. Here too, a wide variety of cheap goods flooded the markets. Although industry in Carana was very limited, those that operated were not in a position to compete with goods from better established and funded foreign companies, leading to a fair number closing shop. This, together with the privatization of government-owned enterprises, brought about an increase in unemployment. The government's retrenchment scheme made it widely unpopular in urban areas in general, and in Galasi in particular.

Further, the vast majority of the Caranese population was not in a position to buy up many of the privatized ventures, and as such the bulk of corporations were sold to foreigners, although there were instances of part-ownership with government, as well as Caranese buying shares in privatized companies. Still, the privatization of state-owned enterprises because a sore issue for many Caranese who felt that certain enterprises, particularly mining operations, were a source of national pride and should not have been opened up to foreign ownership.

In addition, government cuts to services including health and education meant that services that were once free now had to be paid for, worsening the plight of an already impoverished people. Clinics for instance could refuse to treat a patient unless they had their cash in hand, making access to an inadequate health system more remote for the bulk of the population.

These were but some of the consequences of adjustment on the general populace in Carana. Although the economy registered gains in the form of a higher gross domestic product, the plight of the average man worsened, at least in the short-term.

Whether or not the SAPs implemented would have in due time produced results that would have trickled down to many in Carana and resulted in sustained economic growth and human development will remain unknown. The government, with the election of Ogavo in 1996, began to change course and tighten its reigns on the economy, which plunged the economy into a downward spiral. Changes made included re-introducing controls on imports and prices, re-regulating the exchange rate, and re-valuing the Caranese Franc.

Many who had been buoyed up with promises of economic success prior to adjustment, and marginalized groups including the Kori and Tatsi who had been assured of better fortunes, now blamed the Falin-led PDC government for the economic hardships, especially since it was believed that some in government had personally benefited from loans received from the international financial institutions.

CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION

With the introduction of changes in the last decade, the Caranese economy has not fared better. With the economic reversals, some of the mines that had been taken over by foreigners experienced reductions in output, and some investors withdrew in fear that some operations might be nationalized. (Those fears were not unfounded as all coal and copper mines had been nationalized following Ogavo's election.) Output of Carana's key resource exports has fallen slightly. While the output of cocoa over the following years increased due to increased labour and ownership of farms, price volatility of the export resulted in shocks and meant that earnings have been inconsistent.

Additionally, with imports limited, surviving industries have not always had adequate access to the necessary inputs or in some cases when they did obtain inputs to the production process it was at very high prices. As well, prices of imported consumer goods increased sharply due to the import restrictions imposed.

Unemployment within the nation has remained high, as redundant labour resulting from the SAP was not absorbed into the private sector at the rate at which it had been projected by the administration. In hindsight, it became clear that the expectations of post-reform private sector expansions had been far too optimistic. A proportion of laid-off workers have returned to rural areas and engaged in agriculture (particularly in cocoa production), boosting output from that sector. Some have joined the informal economy. With many unemployed and underemployed, the government's tax revenue has taken a sharp dive, resulting in curtailment in spending on key services and on infrastructure.

These policy reversals reduced the flow of aid from international financial institutions, and as such the economy was plunged into severe difficulties. As a result of worsening economic conditions and wishing to be re-elected in 2001, Ogavo conceded that the policy reversals had not served the country well, and announced a return to a more laissez-faire economy. The international community encouraged Ogavo in this direction of openness, once again providing massive funds for the country. With these new changes and greater funding, Carana's economy began to improve. However, as the nation's stock of debt grew, so did its loan repayment obligations. Debt servicing became increasingly challenging to the point where Ogavo felt he had no choice but to suspend payments unilaterally in 2006. The Caranese government had anticipated that there would be serious consequences to bear, but it was not prepared for the extent of the sanctions that were imposed. This miscalculation on the part of the government has led to a further deterioration in the economic fortunes of the nation.

Overall, the current economic picture in Carana is that, while mining activities, cash crops, and the money sent home by a large Caranese Diaspora have somewhat sustained the economy, many aspects of the economy are in essence collapsing.

Economic Sectors

The agricultural sector in Carana is the primary contributor to the nation's GDP and the most important employer of the labour force. While a majority of the population is involved with subsistent agriculture, many are also involved in the production of cash crops, primarily cocoa and cotton for exports. The main agricultural products are cocoa, cotton, corn, cassava, palm nut, fish and livestock. Much of the farming in Carana takes place on small-scale farms. Fishing and forestry are important sub-sectors. The former not only provides approximately 10 percent of the country's food supply, but also contributes significantly to food exports. In agriculture, floods that destroyed the cotton fields, as well as the pod rot (phytophthora) infestation of cocoa trees in 2008 have caused a decline in output from the sector.

Carana is endowed with vast stretches of forest. While this resource is mostly exported, a small proportion of lumber is used in paper mills and in construction within Carana. Legal timber exports are threatened as the smuggling of logs across the border with Katasi is becoming commonplace.

In industry, mining is the major contributor to GDP. While there are known zinc, tin, lead, coltan and uranium deposits, diamond, gold, copper and iron are the main export earners. Coal is also mined for the production of electricity, which is otherwise produced by oil and hydroelectric generators. In the industrial sector, output has been reduced as the level of foreign direct investment into the sector has fallen, and diamond smuggling has increased. Growing evidence of oil deposits (and possibly gas) in the Gulf of Carana could very well change the fortunes of the Caranese economy in due course.

In the manufacturing sector, production of cotton textile, food and fish processing and soap production from palm oil dominate.

The service sector in Carana consists mainly of trade, financial and banking services, mostly in support of the domestic Caranese economy, with no major international investment. At one time, the tourism industry was a huge contributor to the service sector. However, due to the mounting political tensions in the nation, this sector has all but collapsed.

Economic Performance by Province

Province of Barin

The Province of Barin contributes 15.1 percent to Carana's GDP. Next to the Province of Leppko, it is the second largest contributor to agriculture in Carana. Its total contribution from agriculture to the nation's GDP is 8.5 percent. The southern part of Barin is made up of farmland and tropical forest. It is a large producer of two of Carana's top agricultural exports - cocoa and cotton. Its cocoa production in 2008 has been reduced as a result of the pod rot disease that has attacked cacao plants. Barin also produces the bulk of cassava exported from Carana. As well there is logging along the southern part of the province, and fishing communities are present along the Nasvakhi River which runs north of Folsa, the provincial capital.

Barin houses the Maghitakak Hydroelectric Dam which supplies a large proportion of Carana's electricity. It is situated to the west of Folsa and is the main source of power for the intensive smelting activities in that city. Iron ore mined in the south of the Province of Guthar is smelted in Folsa. Barin's heavy industry, located mostly in Folsa allows the province to contribute 5.5 percent to Carana's industry sector.

A large fraction of the GDP contribution from the service industry in Barin comes from revenues from tourism, with the province's islands being a major tourist attraction. Altogether, services contribute 1.1 percent to GDP. In terms of communication, there are 5 radio stations in Barin, as well as one internet provider. Television broadcast from the Carana Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) is available throughout the province. Currently, there is one hospital with a casualty and emergency, as well as intensive care capabilities, and six health centres within the province. However, preliminary plans are under way to contrast a second hospital. Barin's water supply is generally superior to that of most other provinces. A large segment of Folsa has tap water, while many of Barin's rural areas are equipped with communal pumps. Even still, many in the rural areas directly draw their water from the Nasvakhi River. Due to the presence of the Maghitakak Dam, electricity supply within Barin is better than in most other provinces.

Province of Fellari

Fellari is the largest contributor to Carana's GDP at 23.5%. Large portions of the province are under cultivation, and the main crops grown for export include pineapples, plantain, banana and egg plants. Food crops are also cultivated and sent to major markets in Galasi. In animal husbandry, cattle raising is the most prominent. Along with the provinces of Guthar and Leppko, it is a major fishing area, with much of the fish catches in Fellari coming from the communities of Jumi and Tole. The province further boasts of moist tropical forest which sustains a lumber industry. Overall, agriculture's contribution to Carana's GDP is 4.5 percent.

Fellari is the nation's leader in industry with a GDP contribution from the sector of 15%. The province is resource rich with major diamond, gold and copper mines to the west. The copper mines suffered a major set when after 1996, as part of Ogavo's plans to reverse the SAPs, he nationalized them, with the result that funds to that industry dried up. As Ogavo relaxed his hold on the economy by the end of the 1990s, the copper mines were again opened up to foreign investors. All of Carana's, and indeed some of Katasi's international shipments go through the port in Galasi. Fellari is also home to a large proportion of Carana's light industry including paper mills, food and fish processing factories, household goods manufacturers, and others.

In service, as in industry, Fellari is the national leader. 4% of all of Carana's services originates within the province. The decline in tourism has hit the province hard, with resorts like those in Tekla receiving drastically reduced numbers of tourists. Carana's banking and finance industry is primarily based in Fellari. There are 2 television stations operating within the province, with one of them having nationwide reach. Both stations are owned by the Carana Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). 12 radio stations are also present, and 4 internet service providers (ISP) are also registered. The province has 4 hospitals, included within them are a teaching hospital, specialized paediatric care, maternity facilities, psychiatric facilities, intensive care, and surgical units, among others. The province also has 11 health centres, and while the number may seem small compared to the population, it is primarily because the 4 hospitals caters to the majority of the population. Still, their capacity is limited and overcrowded, and points to the cuts that the government has made to such services over the years. Water supply within Galasi is better than most other urban cities across Carana, but even here, many areas are not connected to the mains, and it is not uncommon to see urban household purchasing tap water from households that have a connection. Many of the rural communities within the province obtain their water from open surface sources including the Kalesi, Mogave, Nipsakiti and Marmakhi Rivers, as well as from wells. All of Fellari has electricity connection, but supply is sporadic, even in Galasi. Power cuts are rampant, although electricity fees within Galasi are higher than any where else in the country.

While Fellari has the largest provincial economy within Carana, it also faces some of the greatest challenges, the unemployment rate in the capital, Galasi, is higher than the rest of the country at approximately 42%, and underemployment is rife. Part of this latter phenomenon is accounted for by the many civil servants that were laid off as part of the retrenchment programme who were not well absorbed into the private sector. As well, the ever increasing migration of people from rural areas of Carana to Galasi, who either find themselves unemployed or underemployed for long periods of time, is a contributing factor. Fellari has the largest underground economy in Carana.

Province of Guthar

Guthar's share of Carana's GDP is 13.4%. In agriculture, Guthar's contribution to the nation's GDP is 6%. There is both a strong inshore and offshore fishing industry. The Marmakhi, Salman, Mogave and Buktasi water bodies, as well as the Gulf of Carana feed this industry. Northwest Guthar has a rich fertile valley that grows much of the sugarcane exported out of Carana. The province is also well known for its oil palm plantations. The moist tropical forests of Guthar are at the base of the timber industry within the province. As civil society within Carana has grown, there have been calls for more responsible forestry within the country. As such, the government began a pilot reforestation programme within the province. To date however, the programme has met with very limited success.

Iron ore and coal are mined in the south of Guthar, and while the iron mines have continued to perform well, the coal mines which were privatized in the 1980 and then nationalized in the 1990s under Ogavo, have encountered major funding challenges. Sugar and soap production form the bulk of the manufacturing industry. Overall, the province's contribution to Carana's industry is 6 percent.

The province makes the second largest contribution to Carana's service sector, after Fellari. The well-maintained resorts along Guthar's magnificent coastline, combined with comparatively better infrastructure than in most other provinces, allows Guthar to receive the highest traffic of tourists to Carana. Guthar is the only other province in Carana apart from Fellari in which CBC has a local broadcast. As well, there are 3 radio stations – one privately owned and two that are owned by the government. Two ISPs are present, with Amsan, the capital of Guthar having internet kiosks opening shop. Guthar currently has 2 hospitals, and 6 health centres. Among the capacity of the hospitals are surgical units, intensive care, casualty and maternity facilities. A third, state-of-the-art hospital is under construction. Water supply in Guthar is fairly good in the

urban areas, and problematic in the rural areas. Electricity supply is more constant than in other parts of the country, due to the proximity to the Hydroelectric Dam in Barin. The coal mined is also converted to electricity.

Province of Hanno

Hanno contributes 7.3% to the total GDP of Carana. The area surrounding the Kalesi River comprises of dense tropical rainforest, however, for the most part, much of the forest reserves in Hanno have already been cleared. As such the bulk of agric revenue comes from the growing of cash crops. Wide tracts of land are used to cultivate cocoa and cotton. During the implementation of the SAPs, agricultural production from Hanno increased significantly. With the mass lay off in the civil service, some individuals turned to agriculture as a source of livelihood. Many moved into the lucrative cocoa industry in Hanno, Barin and Leppko, boosting output of cocoa from these provinces. In 2008, the pod rot disease that hit the cocoa industry, severely reduced the volume of cocoa produced from this region, while the severe flooding across the low lying cotton producing areas, conversely reduced cotton output. Thus, Hanno's contribution from agriculture to the nation's GDP of 5% in 2008, is a considerable reduction from previous years. The Province of Hanno is the largest producer of cattle in Carana.

The province's contribution to Carana's industry is 1%. This limited contribution from industry is explained by the fact that many of the paper mills that operated in the province shut down as the timber industry in the region contracted with the shrinking of forest reserves in the province. As well, during the opening up of Carana's markets under the economic restructuring that took place in the mid-to-late 1980s, Hanno was one of the provinces that were greatly impacted. Many of its light manufacturing ventures could not effectively compete against higher quality cheaper goods flooding the market from the international market once trade was liberalized. Consequently, many companies were forced to close down. Even though Ogavo's government has attempted to rejuvenate Hanno's industry, pumping money into the textile industry, to date only limited progress has been made.

In the service sector, the Province of Hanno contributes 1.3% to GDP. It has 3 radio stations, one government owned, and two privately owned, of which one is a secular broadcast, and one is a religious (Islamic) broadcast. The national television broadcast is available in the province, and 1 ISP provides internet services to cafes and limited users in the capital Maroni. There is 1 hospital with casualty and emergency facilities, as well as 6 health centres. Some households in Maroni are connected to the mains, but for the most part, there is large reliance on boreholes and open water sources in the rural areas. Electricity access in Hanno is better than in many of the other provinces since supply was extended when majority of the manufacturing ventures were set up.

Province of Koloni

Altogether, Koloni's share of Carana's GDP is 2.1%. Of this, its greatest contribution (1.5%) is from its agriculture sector. Corn and millet are cultivated in the east; the western part of Koloni is far less fertile. The greater proportion of the population lives in the Arastak River Valley, along the western banks of the northern Torongo River, and Lake Egali in the north. As such, inshore fishing forms a fair share of Koloni's agriculture sector.

Koloni's industry consists of a few food processing ventures, a number of which have only recently been re-opened, following their closure during economic restructuring. As well, the clothing and shoe producing enterprises that once produced traditional attires and shoes sold all over the nation, have all but collapsed. Overall, Koloni's contribution to the nation's industry sector as of 2008 is 0.4%.

The province's contribution to the service sector is even smaller at 0.2%. CBC's television broadcast from Fellari reaching Koloni. Furthermore, there are two radio stations; one public the other private. There are no internet service providers operating within the province. There is 1 hospital with casualty and emergency capabilities, in addition to 4 health centres. Water supply is poor, and most residents rely on open surface water from the northern Torongo River, Arastak River and Egali Lake, as well as rainwater collection. The communal pumps present in some communities are the result of spending on infrastructure by the Falin-led government prior to elections. The same is true for the electricity connections in some areas. Electricity supply in Koloni remains very limited. While the introduction of tap water and electricity to some areas have been appreciated by the recipient communities, the Kori leadership for the most part have seen these gestures as tokenistic attempts by the Falin to win Kori votes.

Province of Leppko

Leppko contributes a total of 22% to Carana's GDP. The province has the strongest agric economy in all of Carana, contributing 16 percent to Carana's GDP. The forestry industry is strong. Western Leppko is covered with extensive tropical rainforest, while northern Leppko consists of tropical forest and farmlands. These farmlands produce the largest share of cocoa in Carana. All through the years however, there have been problems between the impoverished Tatsi cocoa farmers and the Falin-led government regarding matters of revenue from cocoa. This is because the cocoa farmers in Leppko, and other provinces, receive only a small fraction of the gains from the sale of cocoa on the international market. Most of the revenue goes to the Cocoa Sales Board, a government agency which purchases cocoa from local farmers and exports the crop. This Board invests the profits from the international sale of cocoa in other industries. Cocoa farmers have complained for decades that the pay they receive hardly covers their basic living costs. Furthermore, they accuse corrupt government officials of lining their pockets with the profits of the farmers' hard work. The economic conditions for cocoa farmers have been particularly challenging in 2008, as the reduction of cocoa output, the result of pod rot infection, has meant that farmers have received even less pay. In addition to cocoa, sugarcane is also grown for exports in the province, although some of the crop finds its way to the sugarcane factory in Guthar. While Leppko still remains one of the main fishing provinces, in the last few years, its catches have been reduced due to illegal fishing by international trawlers off the province's coast. Most of Carana's goats and sheep are reared in Leppko.

Currently, Leppko's industry sector's contribution to GDP is 5%. The diamond mines in Leppko's northwest accounts for a large fraction of this figure. As well, meat factories, paper mills, wood processing and furniture companies have been opened by Pleioni and Indians within the province. While some of these manufacturing ventures are new, some are old ones that collapse under the weight of trade liberalization during the economic restructuring in the late 1980s/early 1990s and have recently been resurrected. If speculation from recent explorations suggesting that commercially viable reserves of offshore oil and gas are present off the coast of Leppko turns out to be true, the province would very well overtake Fellari as the richest province, in terms of contribution to GDP. However, given the current dynamics of mistrust between the Tatsi and Falin-led government, the potential for a crisis situation to arise from these offshore resources would be high.

Leppko's contribution to GDP from services is 1%. While a few areas can boast of good services, the reverse is true for the greater part of the province. There are 2 hospitals and 11 health centres in the province with intensive care, casualty, maternity and psychiatric facilities. As well, there are three radio stations, 1 government owned, one owned by a Pleioni company, and the other by an Indian company. The national television broadcast is accessible in the province. One ISP provides internet services to the urban areas. Tap water supply is fair in the urban areas, with some rural areas having communal taps installed during electoral campaigns by the PDC. Most rural areas rely on rivers and ponds for their water needs. Electricity supply

outside of the mining and urban areas is poor. Here too, the party has attempted to gain votes through the extension of electricity to some rural Tatsi communities.

Province of Mahbek

Mahbek's contribution to Carana's GDP is 15.9%. Of that, the share of agriculture is 7%. Although cotton grown for exports is a major contributor to this figure, forestry is the top income earner. The southern part of the province is covered with extensive tropical rainforest, with dense jungle to the east along the border with Leppko. Sheep and goats are reared in great numbers in Mahbek. Much of western Mahbek is however, semi-arid and consequently, only limited pastoral activity and farming takes place there.

The province's share of the national industry sector is 8%, the second highest after the Province of Fellari. This is primarily attributed to the diamond mines to the northwest of the province which have received high levels of foreign direct investment in recent years. Mahbek also houses three meat processing factories and two canneries.

In services, its contribution to the nation's GDP is 0.9%. Mahbek is served by the national television broadcast out of the Province of Fellari, as well as 2 radio stations – 1 government owned, one privately owned. Like the Province of Koloni, Mahbek has 1 hospital and 4 health centres, even though its population is nearly twice that of Koloni. The hospital has casualty and emergency as well as intensive care capabilities. Water supply is surprisingly good in many parts of the province. Those not connected to the mains use boreholes, communal pumps and drinking fountains. Many in remote areas draw water directly from lakes, streams and rivers. Electricity supply outside of the mining and urban areas is however limited, especially in the western part of the province.

Province of Tereni

Due to its arid conditions, the Province of Tereni contributes relatively little (0.5%) to Carana's agriculture sector. The low levels of rainfall make large-scale farming impossible. The exception is to the growing of oranges. The bulk of Carana's orange exports are grown in Tereni and mostly exported across the borders into Katsi and Sumora.

The lack of industries in the province, has led many NGOs to focus their economic efforts within Tereni. As such, many inhabitants of this province receive micro-credit and are involved in small-scale ventures such as textiles enterprises. Tereni's contribution to industry is negligible at 0.1%.

As well, its contribution to services is minimal (0.1%). The province has 1 government-owned radio station and receives the national television broadcast. There are no internet service providers in the province. There is however, 1 hospital and 3 health centres with casualty and emergency facilities. Water supply is poorest in this area, and indeed the Mahidi nomads clash with the settled populations over access to water. Outside of the provincial capital Alur, electricity supply is extremely limited. Even so, there are areas that benefited from efforts to win Kori allegiance through the provision of electricity during election campaigns.

Altogether, while the economy of Carana in general is gravely underperforming, that of Tereni is even more dismal. As such, criminality across the border with Katsi is high. The Kori in Tereni have continually complained that the government has done very little to assist them out of their poverty; the Government of Carana ignores the concerns of this severely deprived region at great political cost.

Informal Markets

An important and growing portion of the economic activity in Carana takes place through illicit and illegal markets, which form part of a larger “informal” market. Carana is becoming a link for several transnational networks in the export of narcotics; the harbours of Carana are now being used as a transfer point for narcotics. In addition, rare animals being smuggled from countries on Kisiwa, particularly from Katasi, exit Kisiwa through Carana’s ports.

Avoidance of taxes have become common-place in Carana. The fall in production caused by investors pulling out has contributed to increases in unemployment and reduction in the tax base of government; a problem the government has chosen to tackle by increasing income taxes. Under the prevailing high tax environment, tax evasion is at an all-time high. Not all activities within the informal market are viewed as fraudulent by the Caranese, even if they involve tax evasion. For instance, people do not generally consider an unregistered roadside banana seller as engaging in criminal activity, but rather as an individual attempting to make a living. Overall, the size of the informal economy in Carana, while unknown, is deemed to be large.

Contributions from the Diaspora

While the exact figure is unknown, it is estimated that close to a million Caranese (nearly 10% of the population of Carana) currently resides outside of the country. After independence, many qualified secondary school graduates, mostly Falin, were granted scholarships to study abroad, mainly in Azuria, but also in other developed countries. While a small segment of these individuals returned to Carana after graduation, the vast majority took up residences in the countries in which they furthered their education. Throughout the remainder of the 20th century, more educated Caranese professionals sought greener pastures in the West, Mosana, and in mainland African countries in which they could earn a better living than in Carana. Every year, a steady mix of Falin, Kori, Tatsi and members of other ethnic groups in Carana have migrated to other parts of Kisiwa, mainland Africa, and around the globe. These have over the years contributed substantially to Carana’s economy through remittances sent home to family members. (Carana, in spite of its own economic difficulties, is home to a population of economic refugees from Katasi who likewise remit funds to their families back in their homeland.)

Donor Assistance

In the wake of SAP reversals, the international community initially withdrew much of its financial support for Carana. The first to do so were the IFIs, and as Ogavo tightened his grip on the economy, other international bodies, and then individual countries, sought to influence national policy by reducing or eliminating financial assistance. These cuts had a significant impact on services such as education and health which the government in its budget had often relied on foreign aid to deliver. However, as Ogavo became more liberal in his economic policies, the international economic community once again worked with the nation, providing it with funds. These were halted again when Ogavo suspended loan repayments. At present, Carana receives donor funding in the form of emergency humanitarian assistance, which supports sectors such as health and education.

Trade and Internationalization

Carana is a relatively small actor in both regional and international trade. It primarily exports to Azuria, France, India, United States and Rimosa.

While Carana has been a member of the Economic Community of Kisiwa (ECOK) since its inception in 1991, this has not enabled the country to be properly integrated into the regional economy as hoped. While the organization is mandated to facilitate cooperation and linkages on issues such as agriculture and rural development, transport and human resource development, political challenges in the region have translated into ECOK being unable to create and maintain a unified economic stance.

TRANSPORTATION

Road Transport

General (Land): Carana's first president, Uroma, invested significantly in road infrastructure in his years in government. The lull in expansion in the road network that followed Uroma's defeat was temporarily broken by Okatsi, particularly in his first term in government. However, as his rule continued, the number and quality of the roads he constructed decreased, and by the time Ogavo came into power in 1996, investment in roads in particular, and infrastructure in general, had fallen sharply. The current state of the road network is quite poor. Carana's railway network was constructed primarily during the colonial period.

Roads:	Total:	9,720 km
	Two-lane paved (continuous):	
	Route nationale (RN)	973 km
	Other	60 km
	One/Two-lane paved:	4,291 km
	Unpaved highway:	4,396 km

The National Highway System

The National Highway (Route nationale - RN) was based upon a network of roads built during the colonial period, and was one of the major infrastructure projects begun by the Uroma government. Although sections have fallen into some disrepair, the RN was intended to provide an unbroken paved link between the major communities in Carana. It was most recently modernized under the Okatsi government in the late 1980s with the help of IMF loans.

Beginning in the capital, Galasi, the RN runs inland south to Amsan, before following the coast to Corma. A branch route through Maldosa crosses the Torongo River and joins the Rimosa road system at Klema. From Corma, the main highway passes north of the Torongo ridge westward to Eres, and then follows the southern and western banks of the northern Torongo River north to Harun Landar, and then eastwards to Galasi. Another branch route leads north to the border crossing at Norke, joining the Sumoran road system.

The RN is, officially, a two-lane paved highway, with a maximum posted speed limit 80 km/h. Additional limits are imposed in built-up areas and for other potentially hazardous conditions. With occasional exceptions, the RN is assumed to be capable of carrying wheeled traffic in both directions, to a maximum axle load of 20t. The road specification includes a minimum lane width of 3.5m, and a minimum vertical clearance of 6m. (The latter applies in the case of bridges, etc., but not necessarily for tree branches and other natural impediments.) Lay-bys, passing lanes, etc. occur infrequently. In some cases, bypass routes exist around urban centres; in many other cases, the highway passes straight through communities. The RN was built to avoid areas prone to seasonal floods, however washouts do frequently occur in the rainy season. Standards of road maintenance are higher than for other road systems, and repairs to the RN are a priority, however temporary route closures do occur.

Traffic density along the RN varies considerably. There are sometimes heavy volumes of freight traffic between major urban centres that slow traffic and increase transit times. Pedestrian and animal traffic along the edges of the RN is common and also reduces safe transit speeds. Accidents resulting in death or injury, vehicle damage and/or traffic slowdowns are relatively common. Bulk refuelling (gas and diesel) and maintenance services are generally located close to the RN in larger communities.

Secondary and Tertiary Highways

Carana has a network of secondary paved highways covering most of the country except for the extreme western part, much of which is the Tereni Desert. Although normally two-lane roads, lane widths and clearances do not follow the common standard of the RN, and frequently follow routes that prevent the consistent higher speeds of the RN. In eastern Carana, some of the paved routes date from the colonial period. Many of the other secondary routes were paved under the Uroma government's infrastructure programme; other roads have been paved since that time. (The rationale behind many road paving projects is seen as political as much as economic.) Posted speed limits vary between 80 and 30 km/h, however road conditions, and pedestrian and animal traffic frequently make these limits irrelevant.

There is also a network of paved tertiary highways, which are frequently too narrow for two large vehicles to pass each other. Some of these are older roads which have since been replaced by better-sited parallel routes; others provide access to more remote upland areas or parts of western Carana. In towns, these are frequently congested by pedestrian traffic; in villages and farming areas there is also congestion from livestock.

Standards of road maintenance vary considerably along secondary and tertiary highways. Refuelling and limited maintenance services are available in most communities. Where highways are in low-lying areas near rivers, flooding is common during the rainy season, and roads may be water covered and potentially closed for significant periods. Collisions with large wildlife have been reported occasionally in remote areas.

Bridges other than those on the RN vary considerably in load classification and state of repair. Most bridges on secondary highways are able to take vehicles up to 20t gross weight in one direction; however occasional bridge collapses occur as a result of poor maintenance and/or over-weight vehicles. Truss bridges and others with bridge superstructure above the road surface may present additional clearance problems.

With regard to the movement of heavy tracked and all-wheel-drive vehicles, some smaller bridges on main roads crossing smaller rivers have nearby fording areas, used by military and civilian vehicles. Off-road movement is otherwise constrained in many areas by gradients, embankments, soil conditions, vegetation, structures and rocky terrain.

Other Roads

Carana has many other minor unpaved roads, ranging from crushed-rock, and metalled roads to seasonal cart-tracks. Most roads appearing on national topographic maps are passable to vehicles with reasonable ground clearance (e.g. a minibus) in dry and semi-dry conditions. All may be subject to erosion, wash-out, flooding and other degradation. Bridges should not be assumed to meet the load-bearing characteristics of their respective roads. Some fording of shallow rivers and ponds may be required.

Urban areas

Roads and streets in urban areas vary considerably. In the centre of the national capital, there are a number of broad boulevards that originated in the colonial period and were further enhanced under the Uroma

government. Most other main roads are paved or unpaved two-lane routes. Side roads, rarely paved except in more affluent neighbourhoods, are frequently single-lane only (but still have two-way traffic), and in many older neighbourhoods are too narrow for heavy vehicles.

Drainage is a recurring problem in urban areas, as buildings and paved surfaces prevent the absorption of water, and ditch systems are not always able to compensate. In some cases, rivers and streams have been canalized into land-drains, which fill rapidly in wet weather and inundate low-lying areas. In some cases, flash-floods occur and subside rapidly – in others, areas may remain submerged for significant periods.

Railway Transport

Rail Systems

Carana has a limited system of freight and passenger rail, based on a track system built during the colonial period; a single-track 1,000mm gauge rail line runs from Galasi through Amsan to Corma (approx. 220 km), with a triangular single-track loop connecting Corma with Eres and Folsa (approx. 400 km). Sidings at major stops permit trains to travel in both directions. A short spur line runs from Corma to the Rimosan border, where a break-of-gauge is required to connect with the Rimosan 1,067mm gauge system. The track system was privatized as part of a structural adjustment programme in the early 1990s, and is currently owned by a Mosana-based consortium with significant Indian ownership.

There are no catenary wires or other power infrastructure, requiring locomotives to be self-sufficient (e.g. Diesel-electric). Despite improved maintenance over the last fifteen years, the rail-bed is aging, and train speeds are limited in many areas by safety concerns. In the absence of alternate routes, occasional derailments, breakdowns and other accidents can stop other rail traffic for significant periods. The majority of road/rail crossings are level, and are generally signposted but not equipped with safety barriers.

Freight Rail

The single biggest commodity transported by rail in Carana (in terms of weight over distance) is iron ore, carried from mines in Guthar to smelters in Folsa, and rails and other low-grade steel products shipped for export to ports such as Eres and Galasi. However, petroleum, lumber and a range of other materials are also transported by rail.

Passenger Rail

A regular passenger rail service connects Galasi and Corma, with onward connections to Folsa and Eres. Although not significantly faster than road transport, it is well used, and fares are subsidized to make rail transport accessible to more people. Locomotives and rolling stock date from the 1950s and are approaching obsolescence.

Water Transport

Ports: As a result of heavy shoaling along its coastline, as well as most major cities being inland or at the head of large deltas, Carana lacks a major coastal deepwater port. The closest major international port is Yudifa in Rimosa, which boasts one of the world's largest natural harbours. Significant ports with sea access in Carana are as follows:

- Galasi. Medium-sized seagoing merchant vessels are able to navigate the Kalesi River to the port of Galasi. As the Port of Galasi is within a major delta system, the Kalesi requires regular dredging. Galasi receives the bulk of containerized traffic in Carana, and has a single gantry crane capable of moving approximately 250 TEU/day, and an austere RORO (Roll on-roll off) capability. The country's single oil refinery has a terminal for offloading crude oil, approximately 4,500 tonnes of crude oil/month are brought by coastal tankers; most onward transport is by road or rail.
- Maroni. Maroni is located at the head of the Kalesi delta and is the head of ocean navigation for the Kalesi River. It is used primarily for lumber and other break-bulk cargo.
- Amsan. Amsan is located at the head of the Mogave delta and is the head of ocean navigation and the most seaward bridging point on the Mogave River. It has several docks with warehouses for break-bulk cargo, and is used primarily for bulk ore shipments.
- Turen. Turen is the principal naval station on the coast, and the best salt water harbour in Carana. It has little commercial capacity, but includes a limited RORO facility. It is a port of call for refuelling point for small coastal vessels.
- Corma. Corma is situated on the Kodari River, which requires periodic dredging. Its proximity to the coast has made it an alternative to Eres, especially for containerized cargo, however it is limited to vessels of relatively shallow draught.
- Eres. Eres is situated 250 km inland by river, at the confluence of the Torongo and North Torongo Rivers, and is the head of ocean navigation for the Torongo River. Before the development of the smelting industry in Folsa, it was a major port for ore exports, but is now increasingly a transfer point for riverine cargoes into Katasi and the Caranese interior.

Port Name	Maximum Draught	Annual Cargo Handled (2007)	Available Facilities & Condition				
			Container	RORO	Bulk Mineral	Bulk Fuel	Break-bulk Cargo
Galasi	9 m	198,500 tonnes	Fair	Fair	Fair	Good	Fair
Maroni	8 m*	56,300 tonnes	Nil	Nil	Poor	Nil	Fair
Amsan	6 m	89,300 tonnes	Nil	Nil	Good	Nil	Fair
Turen	5 m	33,100 tonnes	Nil	Poor	Nil	Fair	Poor
Corma	5 m*	19,900 tonnes	Poor	Nil	Nil	Nil	Fair
Eres	4 m*	52,900 tonnes	Nil	Nil	Good	Fair	Fair

* Additional clearance restrictions imposed by overhead bridges downstream.

Riverine Transport: The Torongo River along the southern border of Carana is a major inland waterway, used by Carana, Rimoso and Katasi. Three tributaries in Carana – the Kodari, northern Torongo and Kراسي Rivers – provide additional access to settlements in the Caranese interior. As the rivers gain elevation however, periodic rapids and waterfalls (including man-made dams) necessitate the portage of goods between stretches of navigable water. Between Corma and Eres there are a number of self-gearred barges capable of self-loading/offloading containers without the need for on-shore cranes.

Riverine cargo vessels used in Carana tend to be long and narrow, with flat bottoms and shallow draughts. In larger waterways such as the Torongo, multiple hulls may be towed or pushed by a single prime mover. Buoyant cargoes such as lumber may also be rafted. Many riverine cargo vessels carry passengers on a more or less informal basis.

Traffic along the Torongo and Kalesi Rivers is regulated by international commissions appointed by the Caranese government and the governments of adjacent states. The river commissions normally supervise safety and environmental issues, vessel licensing and registration, charting and navigation, and ferry services, as well as cooperating with the law enforcement authorities of the participating states regarding border security, immigration and smuggling.

Ferries: Bridges across the major rivers in Carana are limited in number by a combination of poor infrastructure, soft ground (especially in river deltas and flood plains), and the clearance required for riverine transport vessels. Car ferries provide crossing services at a number of points along the Torongo River between Carana and Rimosa and Katasi. A series of small car ferries crosses the Kalesi River delta downriver of Galasi, avoiding a detour of almost 200 km to the bridge at Kale. There are also several small car ferries across the northern Torongo River below Folsa. Pedestrian ferries, some of which are also able to carry light vehicles and livestock, exist at various points along other major rivers.

Coastal Transport: The largest international ports in Kisiwa are Yudifa (Rimosa) and Kuku (Mosana), both of which are used as transshipment ports for cargo destined to smaller ports which are not capable of handling large ships. The majority of Caranese inbound sea-borne traffic is routed to either port, where it is then cross-loaded into smaller, coastal vessels bound for Carana, and vice versa. There is also considerable coastal shipping between major Caranese ports such as Galasi and Amsan and other Kisiwa coastal ports, particularly in Sumora and Rimosa.

Further, sizeable fleets of small inshore fishing craft and other vessels operate out of small coastal communities along the coast of the Gulf of Carana. These vessels may be used to move anything from fuel to dried fish, however, such cargoes are increasingly moving by road.

Air Transport

Civilian Air Facilities:	Total:	22
Paved runway: (asphalt/concrete)	Total:	2
	Over 1,000 m:	2
	Under 1,000 m:	0
Unpaved runway: (gravel/grass/turf)	Total:	18
	Over 1,000 m:	7
	Under 1,000 m:	11


Infrastructure

Carana has limited passenger and air freight facilities. The largest civil air facility is Uroma International Airport, 65 km west of Galasi. This former Azurian air force base was reactivated in 1992 to replace Galasi Airport, to meet the needs of medium-sized passenger and freight aircraft (e.g. B-737). Scheduled passenger flights connect Uroma with other Kisiwa capitals. A range of refueling and maintenance services are available. Galasi Airport is still used for government and military purposes, but there are no scheduled commercial flights; it

is able to handle some heavy transport aircraft. Air Force facilities at Amsan and Suroun are normally not available to non-military aircraft.

The closest major international airport able to handle large wide-bodied aircraft is Yudifa (Rimosa), which has road and rail links to Carana, as well as connecting flights to Galasi. The largest international airport on Kisiwa, the Mosinda International Airport, is in Kuku (Mosana), which has numerous daily passenger flights to and from international destinations in Europe, Africa and Asia. A limited number of these flights also stop in Yudifa.

There are also a number of austere airstrips in the interior of Carana, built originally either for military reasons or to support mining, forestry or other resource extraction activities. Runway conditions vary, and aviation services are very limited.



Civil Aviation Services

Caranair is a government-owned airline, operating a mixed fleet of jet and propeller-driven aircraft providing passenger and freight service between Carana and other Kisiwa population centres. It is the only Caranese carrier providing scheduled services; some other national carriers also fly into Galasi. Caranair's attempts to operate a scheduled bi-weekly passenger service to Paris were suspended following an EU ban in 2006 for aircraft maintenance reasons. There are a few other independent carriers offering charter passenger and freight services on Kisiwa that are licensed to operate in Carana. Some of these also offer helicopter lift, which is able to reach parts of Carana that lack airstrips.


AIRPORTS IN CARANA:

ICAO ID	Facility	Type	Rwys	Runway Type	Elev (m ASL)	Latitude	Longitude	Rwy L (m)	Rwy W (m)	Remarks
CRC4	Akabar	Civil	1	Gravel/Turf	267	4.543675488 N	58.0773905 E	914	30	
CRL4	Alur	Military	1	Concrete	427	2.466643825 N	56.60820681 E	1,219	23	Military Airstrip
CRCH	Amsan	Military	1	Concrete	33	4.06699958 N	59.4432689 E	1,798	46	Main Air Force Base
CRB5	Bihari Shidak	Civil	1	Turf	8	3.338230211 N	60.07952405 E	838	46	
CRX3	Borokvari	Civil	1	Grass	91	2.583865272 N	58.3386113 E	1,219	23	
CR2	Buboul	Civil	1	Turf	359	2.642122893 N	56.12108414 E	884	18	
CRK3	Chute-Garani	Civil	1	Treated Gravel	217	4.092317411 N	57.90400912 E	914	23	
CRG4	Corna	Military	1	Concrete	65	3.230227958 N	59.9522387 E	914	24	Military Airstrip
CRN8	Farasi	Civil	1	Dirt	301	4.299047385 N	57.47082174 E	1,402	23	
CRR3	Felorenville	Civil	1	Dirt	155	3.441604895 N	57.9520504 E	1,646	30	
CRBF	Galasi	Dual Use	1	Asphalt/ Concrete	59	4.684077245 N	59.21794989 E	1,372	30	Old National Airport and Secondary Air Force Base
CRCL	Garali	Civil	1	Asphalt/ Concrete	40	5.033270898 N	58.80519462 E	1,829	46	New National Airport
CRS5	Hafлак	Civil	1	Grass	130	3.045368675 N	59.58735216 E	628	72	
CRE3	Jonapar	Civil	1	Grass	259	3.585192514 N	58.26831049 E	1,219	16	
CRI4	Kalharak	Civil	1	Grass	396	3.74065382 N	58.49725969 E	1,219	12	
CRS4	Kalzo	Civil	1	Dirt	15	3.192047094 N	59.15932549 E	1,219	15	
CRG3	Kisvak	Civil	1	Sand/Gravel	43	3.060822969 N	58.49704948 E	914	24	
CRY3	Lora	Civil	1	Treated Gravel	122	2.733999171 N	59.42570314 E	914	18	
CRB7	Lurok	Civil	1	Dirt	124	2.651445611 N	57.21907699 E	1,437	30	
CRS3	Mla	Civil	1	Gravel	29	2.220777339 N	58.23964781 E	914	23	
CRM3	Sevak	Civil	1	Dirt	411	4.225962248 N	58.95551504 E	945	18	
CRH7	Suroun	Military	1	Concrete	163	3.701124658 N	57.65877192 E	2,267	46	Secondary Air Force Base
CRD3	Takeeri	Civil	1	Gravel	147	3.164088599 N	58.01203036 E	914	23	
CRA4	Tole	Civil	1	Grass	21	4.795449707 N	59.79975379 E	914	23	

SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The Caranese Constitution mandates the existence of Defence Forces and Security Forces, which are further constituted under law. Responsibility for defence and security rests respectively with the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior. Command of the armed forces, but not the security services, is vested symbolically in the President. The Caranese Gendarmerie is a paramilitary police force, under the Ministry of Defence, but under the operational control of the Ministry of the Interior during peacetime. The President also exercises direct operational control over the Presidential Guard.

The national security architecture is illustrated down to operational command level in the following diagram.



CARANESE DEFENCE FORCES

The Caranese Defence Forces (Forces de la defense de Carana - FDC) include the Army, Navy and Air Force, and total almost 14,000 uniformed personnel). Military service is voluntary. The majority of equipment in the CDF is Western in origin, and includes limited numbers of light armoured vehicles and support weapons. The Air Force includes one squadron of ground attack aircraft (Alpha Jet), and the Navy consists of three coastal and two riverine patrol vessels.

The President is the Commander-In-Chief of the Caranese Defence Forces, however the Chief of the Caranese Defence Staff (currently Lieutenant-General Télisphore Houpé) is effectively in command.

Carana also maintains a Presidential Guard of about 1,500 personnel, under separate command from the CDF.

Caranese Defence Forces: Summary

Total Forces (officers - other ranks):

Active: 13,730 (1,391 - 12,390)

Ministry of Defence/Caranese Defence Staff: 642 (237 – 405)

Army: 9,947 (758 - 9,189)

Bases: Galasi (HQ);

Major Bases: Corma, Faron, Maroni, Amsan;

Minor Bases: Eres, Alur, Chute-Garani

3 x Regional Commands

Reserve Command

Support Command

3 x Territorial Defence BGp (each 2 Inf Bn, Armd Recce Coy, Arty Bty, Engr Coy)

1 x Mech BGp (2 Mech Bn, Armd Bn, Arty Bty, Engr Bn)

1 x SF Bn (under direct CDF HQ control)

Presidential Guard: 1,548 (134 - 1,414) (under direct Presidential control)

Bases: Galasi (HQ); Clavo

2 x Guard Bns

1 x Special Duty Bn

Major Ground Eqpt:

Li Tk: 36 AMX-13

DFSV: 8 AML

Recce: 169 VBL

APC: 176 VAB 6x6; 214 VAB 4x4

Towed Arty: 105mm: 38 M-101

Mor: 120mm: 38; 81mm: 63

RCL: 106mm: 37 M-40A2

ATGM: Eryx

SAM: Mistral

Engr: 18 TMM

Navy: 335 (71 - 311)

Bases: Galasi (HQ); Turen; Corma
Patrol and Coastal Combatants: 7
Patrol, Coastal: 3 Joseph Uroma (Fr L'Audacieuse) P-400 PCC, with 40mm gun, 20mm gun, 2 12.7mm HMG
Riverine: 4 Galasi (Fr Plascoa) ML, with 20mm gun, 12.7mm HMG
Several small craft, incl RHIBs

Air Force: 1,258 (187 - 1071); 6 cbt ac, no armd hel

Bases: Galasi (HQ); Amsan (primary base; 1,798 m runway); Suroun (secondary base; 1,827 m runway); Galasi (dual use facility; 1,372 m runway); Corma (airstrip; 914 m runway); Alur (airstrip; 1,200 m runway).

Aircraft:
FGA: 6 Alpha Jet
Recce/Liaison: 4 Reims-Cessna FTB 337, 4 Pilatus PC-6B
Tpt: 2 C-47, 3 F-27-400 (1 VIP)
Hel: 3 SA-318C, 2 SA-330, 1 AS-350 (VIP)

Military Doctrine and Policy

Caranese military doctrine is based primarily on the requirements of territorial defence in the event of a regional crisis, and the possible requirement to respond to internal unrest in any part of the country. Recognized secondary tasks include disaster response (humanitarian and security) and technical and logistic support to police and other government agencies. Doctrines at the tactical level reflect some of the Azurian military influence from the colonial period, and participation in subsequent Azurian military training assistance programs.

The forces lack any significant capability to project power beyond their own borders, although they are regarded as quantitatively and qualitatively capable of matching any aggression from neighbouring states. It possesses significantly more power than any non-statutory organization in Carana. Despite this, its actual capabilities are limited by a number of factors, including limited training funds, poor maintenance, and obsolete equipment, in spite of increasing military expenditures. (To this might also be added excessive political influence in the upper echelons of the officer corps; the lack of an effective and professional senior non-commissioned officer corps; and a recruiting base from among the less-well-educated in Caranese society.)


The internal cohesion and political reliability of the Caranese army would be a major factor in the event of civil unrest, insurrection or revolution. Its ethnic composition includes representation from across Caranese society, although senior ranking personnel are predominantly from the dominant Falin tribal group. The existence of the Presidential Guard as a separate formation, composed predominantly of Falin and answering directly to the President, is seen as a means of balancing the potential power of the Army and the Ministry of Defence.

The Army is the dominant branch of service, and the Air Force in particular exists primarily to support land operations (including limited support to police and law border security operations). Beyond such support, the Defence Forces do not practice any "joint" doctrine to speak of.

The Caranese Army


The Caranese Army (l'Armée de la terre de Carana - ATC) was established following independence. It was initially staffed by Caranese members of the pre-existing Colonial Defence Force, an Azurian fencible unit. Although the defence force had included many supporters of independence, the political reliability of the Army was sometimes questioned, and Joseph Uroma's government acted to ensure that the senior ranks in the armed forces included predominantly Falin political loyalists.

The Army is commanded by a Major-General, who will normally go on to become Chief of the Caranese



Defence Staff. It is responsible for the territorial defence of Carana, and the country is divided into three Territorial Commands: north, south and west. Each Command is under a Brigadier-General, and may have manoeuvre forces assigned to it as required. This is normally a battle group, consisting of two infantry battalions, an armoured reconnaissance company, a towed artillery battery, an engineer company, and a service support unit.

There is also a Reserve Command, normally allocated a mechanized battle group consisting of two wheeled mechanized infantry battalions, a light armoured battalion, a towed artillery battery, an engineer battalion, and a service support unit. Elements of this group might be allocated to other battle groups as circumstances demanded, or the entire battle group might be allocated to a Territorial Command. A separate Support Command includes training, supply and maintenance capabilities. Medical support beyond level one and level two response at unit level is provided by government-run civilian facilities, where military personnel receive priority treatment.




The Caranese Navy

The Caranese Navy (la Marine caranaise - MC) is the smallest of Carana's armed forces. During the colonial period, coastal and riverine security were provided by an Azurian naval detachment, who left a number of small coastal craft behind which became the nucleus of a Caranese Navy. Perhaps because of its small size, the Navy has lacked political influence. Good relations with Azuria and other countries' navies have resulted in an officer corps with extensive international training and exposure. It was re-equipped with its current fleet in the late 20th century, and has been involved in continued low-level operations against smuggling and piracy in the Gulf of Carana and across Carana's river borders.

The Navy is commanded by a Rear-Admiral. It comprises two operational commands: Coastal and Riverine. The coastal command consists of three P-400 class patrol boats (the Joseph Uroma, the Roselyn Okatsi, and the Salifou Amaré), and a number of smaller craft, and is based in the port town of Turen, which features one of Carana's few good coastal harbours. The Riverine Command is split between the Torongo and Kalesi river systems, with each river assigned two Plascoa class motor launches (the Galasi, the Maroni, the Eres and the Corma), as well as a number of smaller craft.

The Navy includes a maintenance depot in Turen, which is also able to send repair crews to other parts of the country as required. Major maintenance and refits are conducted by civilian contractors, either in location or in the boatyards in the Rimosan port of Yudifa. There is also a small training cadre in Turen, responsible for seamanship training; basic recruit training is conducted by the Army. Naval officers frequently attend advanced courses overseas.



The Caranese Air Force

The Caranese Air Force (la Force aérienne de Carana - FAC) was established in the 1970s with the acquisition by the Army of a number of light helicopters and small propeller-driven aircraft, primarily for liaison and reconnaissance. The Air Force became a separate service in 1988, and acquired its fleet of Dassault/Dornier Alpha Jet jet strike aircraft at about the same time.

The Air Force is commanded by an Air Major-General. It consists of two operational commands: Strike Command and Air Transport Command. Strike Command comprises two operational squadrons: one with six Alpha Jets, and a reconnaissance and liaison squadron with a mixed fleet of Cessna FTB 337s and Pilatus PC-6Bs. Air Transport Command comprises two more operational squadrons: a fixed-wing squadron with C-47s and F-27-400s, and a rotary-wing squadron with SA-318Cs, SA-330s, and a single AS-350 reserved for the use of the President.

There is also an Air Support Command that includes a technical training cadre; basic recruit training is conducted by the Army. Pilot training is conducted overseas, under one or more international training assistance programs. The Air Support Command also includes a general support squadron with supply and maintenance functions, and an airfield maintenance squadron that provides construction, repairs and security at air bases.

Caranese Special Forces

The Special Operations Command was created under the rule of Colonel Tarakoni in 1977, largely to replace some of the functions of the Presidential Guard (see below). Its current organization and capabilities are not

fully known. Members of the Special Operations Command may not always operate in uniform, and may be seconded to support the civilian security forces.

The Special Operations Command is a part of the Army, but under the direct operational control of the Caranese Defence Staff. It is commanded by a Brigadier-General. It may also include seconded Navy and Air Force personnel and equipment. The Command Headquarters directs the actions of a single Special Forces Battalion of about 300 personnel, collocated with the Air Force base in Amsan.

Special Operations tasks may include covert surveillance and reconnaissance, either in Carana or across international borders. SF Personnel are also trained for direct action against human and infrastructure targets. The SF Battalion includes elements with specialized skill-sets such as sniping, close protection (for senior Caranese military personnel), and a limited capacity for hostage rescue. Some members of the SF Battalion may have trained previously alongside Azurian or other Special Forces.

The Presidential Guard

The Presidential Guard (la Garde présidentielle - GP) was originally established as a part of the Army under Joseph Uroma, tasked with the defence of the national capital and public buildings, VIP security and a number of ceremonial functions. Following the Hakutu coup d'état, it was marginalized, and largely relegated to a ceremonial role. Hakutu's successor, Tarakoni, established the Caranese Special Forces, which assumed many of the security functions. With the election of Roselyn Okatsi, the Presidential Guard was removed from control of the Caranese Defence Staff, and placed under direct Presidential control.

Despite its small size, the Guard is commanded by a Brigadier-General, giving it a status almost equivalent to the other services. It has proportionally more officers than comparably-sized Army formations. The Guard conducts its own recruit training, relying on the Army to provide some technical training. Members enjoy better pay and living conditions than in the Army, which has been a cause of some rivalry and resentment. Moreover, the commander enjoys a close relationship with the president.

The Presidential Guard comprises just over 1,500 personnel, mostly Falin. It is divided into two Guard Battalions, and a smaller Special Duty Battalion. The Guard Battalions are mechanized units that alternate between training (at the base in Corma) and public duties (in the capital) on an approximately quarterly cycle. The Special Duty Battalion is responsible for the personal security of the President and key Government officials, and has been rumoured to be able to engage in other activities, such as direct action against political opponents. Its exact organization is uncertain.

CARANESSE SECURITY FORCES

The Caranese Security Forces consist of the National Police Force, Border Police Force, National Intelligence Service and a National Gendarmerie, totalling about 14,500 personnel. They do not have a unified command structure, but are all under the control of the Ministry of the Interior.

The estimated "peacetime" strengths and dispositions of the Security Forces are as follows:

Province/Département (Station Designator)	Location	National Police	Gend- armerie	Border Police	Intellig- ence Service	TOTAL	Offrs/ 1000 pop	Offrs/ km ²
National Capital	Galasi							
National Headquarters	Galasi	653	784	198	54	1,689	n/a	n/a
National Resources	Galasi	235	1,957	65	187	2,444	n/a	n/a
National Capital Subtotal		888	2,741	263	241	4,133	n/a	n/a
Zone du Nord								
Zone HQ	Galasi		97		15	112	n/a	n/a
Zone Resources	Galasi		216		34	250	n/a	n/a
Zone Subtotal			313		49	362	n/a	n/a
Province de Fellari	Galasi	67	207	28		152		
Département de Fellari nord (F1)	Galasi	1,565		46		1,641	1.11	n/a
Département de Fellari nord-est (F2)	Clavo	256				286	0.95	n/a
Département de Fellari sud-est (F3)	Jumi	63				93	0.96	n/a
Département de Fellari sud (F4)	Feri Rad	360				390	0.77	n/a
Département de Fellari ouest (F5)	Amsan Ouest	92				122	0.41	n/a
Provincial Subtotal		2,403		74		2,684	1.00	0.23
Province d'Hanno	Maroni	67	237	28		152		
Département d'Hanno nord-est (H1)	Maroni	100		78		208	1.36	n/a
Département d'Hanno est (H2)	Akabar	29				59	0.99	n/a
Département d'Hanno sud-est (H3)	Cerves	22				52	1.52	n/a
Département d'Hanno sud (H4)	Torta	50				80	1.04	n/a
Département d'Hanno ouest (H5)	Chute- Garani	103		36		169	1.50	n/a
Département d'Hanno nord-ouest (H6)	Pfoksol	85		36		151	1.16	n/a
Provincial Subtotal		456		178	83	954	1.68	0.07
Zone Total		2,859	757	252	132	4,000	1.23	0.15
Zone du Sud								
Zone HQ	Corma		97		15	112	n/a	n/a
Zone Resources	Corma		216		34	250	n/a	n/a
Zone Subtotal			313		49	362	n/a	n/a

* Note: numbers provided for the Intelligence Service are not considered exact.

Province/Département (Station Designator)	Location	National Police	Gend- armerie	Border Police	Intellig- ence Service	TOTAL	Offrs/ 1000 pop	Offrs/ km ²
Province de Barin	Folsa	67	177			124		
Département de Barin sud (B1)	Folsa	272				302	1.14	n/a
Département de Barin est (B2)	Mauï	86				116	0.69	n/a
Département de Barin nord (B3)	Nusbet	30				60	0.56	n/a
Département de Barin ouest (B4)	Nusbet	35				65	0.56	n/a
Provincial Subtotal		491				668	1.01	0.07
Province de Guthar	Amsan	67	207	28		152		
Département de Guthar nord-est (G1)	Amsan	542		36		608	0.73	n/a
Département de Guthar est (G2)	Cereni	222				252	0.74	n/a
Département de Guthar sud-est (G3)	Lora	102				132	0.42	n/a
Département de Guthar sud-ouest (G4)	Kalzo	96				126	0.65	n/a
Département de Guthar nord-ouest (G5)	Arum	107				137	0.61	n/a
Provincial Subtotal		1,136		64		1,407	0.74	0.13
Province de Leppko	Corma	67	237	28		152		
Département de Leppko est (L1)	Corma	249		72		351	0.92	n/a
Département de Leppko sud-est (L2)	Ude	87		36		153	1.14	n/a
Département de Leppko sud (L3)	Eres	283		72		385	1.37	n/a
Département de Leppko sud-ouest (L4)	Kika	65		36		131	1.31	n/a
Département de Leppko nord-ouest (L5)	Muka	63				93	0.59	n/a
Département de Leppko nord (L6)	Sarazzo	76				106	0.57	n/a
Provincial Subtotal		890		244		1,371	1.10	0.07
Zone Total		2,517	934	308	49	3,808	1.00	0.10
Zone de l'Ouest								
Zone HQ	Faron		97		15	112	n/a	n/a
Zone Resources	Faron		216		34	250	n/a	n/a
Zone Subtotal			313		49	362	n/a	n/a
Province de Koloni	Suroun	67	177	28		152		
Département de Koloni sud (K1)	Suroun	113		36		179	1.03	n/a
Département de Koloni ouest (K2)	Molle	48		108		186	2.51	n/a
Département de Koloni nord (K3)	Norke	51				81	1.03	n/a


Province/Département (Station Designator)	Location	National Police	Gend- armerie	Border Police	Intellig- ence Service	TOTAL	Offrs/ 1000 pop	Offrs/ km ²
Département de Koloni est (K4)	Karo	90				120	0.87	n/a
Provincial Subtotal		369		172		718	1.54	0.06
Province de Mahbek	Faron	67	177	28		152		
Département de Mahbek sud (M1)	Faron	175		72		277	1.03	n/a
Département de Mahbek ouest (M2)	Ludou	124		36		190	1.00	n/a
Département de Mahbek nord (M3)	Perkes	109				139	0.83	n/a
Département de Mahbek est (M4)	Mia	136		72		238	1.14	n/a
Provincial Subtotal		610		208		995	1.19	
Province de Tereni	Alur	67	147	28		152		
Département de Tereni ouest (T1)	Alur	50		36		116	1.50	n/a
Département de Tereni nord (T2)	Buboul	24		72		126	3.36	n/a
Département de Tereni est (T3)	Lurok	50		36		116	1.50	n/a
Provincial Subtotal		192		172		511	2.66	0.03
Zone Total		1,172	814	552	49	2,587	1.73	0.06
TOTAL		7,435	5,246	1,375	471 *	14,527	1.70	0.13

The Caranese Gendarmerie


The peacetime role of the Caranese Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie caranaise - GC) is to uphold the law of Carana and the security of the Caranese Government, through tasks such as disaster response, court and prison security, rural policing, and public order (e.g riot control). In wartime, its tasks could also include augmenting the Caranese Army, again primarily in roles relating to security and public order. The Gendarmerie comprises approximately 5,000 uniformed personnel.

Because of its wartime role, the organization of the Gendarmerie parallels that of the Army, with three Gendarmerie Zones: North, South and West. The Zone HQ is responsible for command and control of Gendarmerie activities, and for coordination with other security services. Each zone is normally allocated a battalion of Gendarmes, including subunits responsible for security tasks (courts and prisons); immediate response to public order incidents; and rural security (one subunit per province).

There is also a Gendarme battalion in Galasi, specifically responsible for security of public buildings, security at the Supreme Court and national penal institutions, VIP escort, and immediate response to public order incidents. The Gendarmerie also maintains a mobile reserve element, consisting of two battalions of gendarmes (comprising multiple public order response companies and support elements), and a Special Services company that includes elements such as bomb disposal, surveillance, shooter and tactical teams, and a band.



Gendarmerie units vary somewhat in size depending on their area and scope of operations, however a sub-unit is usually somewhere around 100-200 personnel.




The National Police

The Caranese National Police Force (Force policière nationale – FPN) are responsible for law enforcement throughout Carana, but are based out of and operate primarily in urban centres, with the Gendarmerie providing rural law enforcement. The National Police comprise approximately 7,500 uniformed personnel.

Each province has a police force within the national police structure, with a detachment based in each Departmental capital. Force and detachment sizes vary with province and town populations. Below Department level, forces may be further divided between major communities.

In addition to command and control of the National Police, a number of specialized functions are embedded at the national level, including Forensic services, internal investigations, serious crimes, counter-narcotic and counter-smuggling operations and security investigations.



The Border Police

The Caranese Border Police (Police douanière de Carana - PDC) are responsible for enforcing customs and immigration laws along the Caranese land frontier and at points of entry into and exit from Carana. The Border Police comprises approximately 1,300 uniformed personnel.

The majority of Border Police work in the Land Borders division. There are six major land border crossing points that are manned on a 24/7 basis; one into Rimosa, three into Katasi, and two into Sumora. Of these, the busiest are those crossing into Rimosa at Maldosa-Klema and into Sumora at Norke-Edensbar. At many other road-crossings, including five ferry points along the Torongo river, mobile teams operate random checkpoints; at some road crossings in remote parts of western Carana, roads have been blocked off and made impassable to vehicles or pedestrians. Border Police teams patrol the frontier and the roads into Carana.

There is also a division responsible for ports and airports, with permanent points of entry at the ports of Galasi, Eres and Amsan, and at the international airports at Galasi and Garali.

The security of Carana's seawards approaches is a responsibility of the Caranese Navy, however Border Police (based in Amsan) have a limited inshore coastal patrolling capability.

The National Intelligence Service

The Caranese National Intelligence Service (Service de renseignement national – SRN) is responsible for domestic and international security intelligence collection and analysis. Its exact strength is unknown, but is estimated at around 500 personnel. Although an Intelligence Service uniform exists, and its personnel are considered to be officers in the Security Services, most personnel operate in plainclothes.

The activities of the National Intelligence Service are highly secretive, and are believed to include foreign intelligence collection by both legal and illegal agents, as well as domestic surveillance and infiltration of alleged anti-government organizations. The Service's scope of activities is believed to be primarily within Kisiwa, although Service officials may be present in any Caranese diplomatic mission.

The Service is believed to operate a network of informants among the Caranese Diasporas in Europe and North America. Past Service activities have allegedly included actions against legitimate opposition groups within Carana, in support of the Government. The Service has been accused of using agent provocateurs within opposition groups, and of tactics such as murder and intimidation of opposition leaders, although these allegations remain unproven.

SECURITY ISSUES & TRENDS

In recent years, key issues in government and politics that Carana has had to contend with have centred on the security concerns in the country. With the PDC dominating the political scene and generally made up of members of the Falin ethnic group, members of other ethnic groups, especially the Kori and Tatsi, have began allying themselves to local politicians with the views of disrupting the electoral dominance of the PDC. More militant minority factions have promoted minority areas seceding from Carana. A Kori pressure group known as the - Mouvement patriotique de Carana (MPC) was formed in 1988 by Alexis Routa to try and wrestle power from the PDC both through non-violent and (increasingly) violent means. The dissatisfaction of Routa and the MPC stems partly from the fact that the Kori were the dominant group prior to the coming of the Azurians to Carana. As descendants of the once powerful Kori Kingdom, they politically, economically and militarily dominated and controlled affairs in Carana. However, with the Falin becoming the most dominant ethnic group since independence, many Kori have found it difficult to come to terms and accept their current subordinate and secondary role and position in Carana.

Apart from the MPC, there is also the more militant Combatants indépendants du sud Carana (CISC), a Tatsi rebel group, which was formed in 1991 by Niba Manzi to ensure improved conditions for the Tatsi people. These groups and militias continue to use legitimate grievances, such as marginalization in political and economic activity in Carana, poverty, widespread corruption among public officials, human rights abuses, environmental destruction and government corruption, to justify attacks (sometimes very violent in nature), against the PDC government. More significantly, the CISC has exploited the growing anger among its people arising from inadequate access to public and social services such as health and education. The continued

dominance of PDC officials at all levels of government has only increased resentment about the perceived failure of the government to provide basic social programs, necessities of life, and tangible economic benefits for impoverished residents.

Civil populations, already grappling with poverty, disease and other social ills, have borne the brunt of occasional violent clashes between the Caranese military and police forces on one side, and the militias and rebels on the other. With support for CISC and other militias coming from other Tatsis and sympathizers and associates in Rimoso and Katasi, some areas within the Kori and Tatsi territories in Carana have become major transshipment points for the international drug and narcotic trade, as well as for the arms trade, illegal resource extraction, and smuggling of prohibited goods. Drug trafficking in particular has led directly to increased instances of violent crime. A high incidence of what are perceived as drug related contract killings in Carana in recent times has raised concerns. Moreover, the “drug barons” in Carana are not only associating themselves with the CISC, but have also tried to infiltrate the ranks of the security services that are mandated to combat their activities. These issues and trends have the potential to contribute further to political instability and might form the basis for future crises.

These security problems have raised concerns of Carana being able to assert its own sovereignty. To address these security and drug-related problems and challenges, Caranese military and security forces are currently involved in limited regional cooperation with some of the other countries on the island of Kisiwa to try and deal with the increased rate of drug-related offences. In addition, and under pressure from the international community, Carana is trying to reform its drug policies to include harsher punishments for drug offences, including large fines and severe jail sentences. Some politicians have called for capital punishment to deal with violent drug-related offences.

*** NOTE: The following section is an overview of the most important issues affecting stability in Carana. A complimentary description of the geopolitical dynamics involving Carana and other Kisiwa states is found in the "Regional Overview Document".*

NATIONAL ISSUES

As is the case in most of Africa, the boundaries of Kisiwa's six countries were largely drawn arbitrarily by former colonial powers with scant regard for the ethnic, linguistic or religious character of the people living on the ground. This causes chronic sources of tension as tribes, clans and families find themselves suddenly separated by an arbitrary international border and groups that might have been in the majority are now in the minority in a new political context. Sudden movements of people due to natural disasters or conflict across post-colonial borders can trigger political tensions as can the traditional movements of nomadic groups. These factors are now at play across a number of borders on Kisiwa.

The government of Carana is struggling to cope with displeased ethnic minorities in the country. Most importantly, the Kori and Tatsi communities of Carana have been voicing opposition against the Falin-controlled government, and have pleaded for support from ethnic kin in neighbouring countries, to their diaspora and beyond. The Tatsi and Kori populations of Carana have developed an increasingly explosive rhetoric, and have been increasingly suggesting violent means to convey their discontent towards the government and the Falin majority. On this, the three groups of greatest concern to Caranese officials are the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC), the Combatants independent du sud Carana (CISC) and the True Islamist Movement (TIM) based in Sumora. (See the Security Chapter for more detailed information on these groups.)

There is also religious tension within Carana between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations that have trans-border connections to the Islamic Republic of Sumora. The minority Muslim clans of the Falin tribe (the Barini and the Hanari) have been pushing for the application of Shari'a law in their parts of the country and for Shari'a to be recognised in the Caranese Constitution. While all religious groups have co-existed relatively peacefully for years in Carana, this issue holds the potential for future flashpoints because younger and more radical voices are assuming positions of leadership within Muslim and non-Muslim communities alike, and there is a growing acceptance among the non-Muslim population that neighbouring Sumora is providing material support, training and inspiration to the religiously radical elements within the Barini and Hanari leadership.

The dispute between Muslim and non-Muslim populations within Carana has begun to spill over into the country's northern neighbour of Sumora. Non-Muslim populations resist the Barini and Hanari peoples' call for the application of Shari'a law and maintain that Sumora has been providing assistance and support to the radicalizing voices within these tribes' leadership.

Currently, the Caranese government is also coping with an influx of refugees from Rimosa and smaller groups of economic refugees from Katasi. Likewise, the governments of Carana, Namuna and Sumora are trying to mediate a range of conflicts between nomadic and farming groups that stretch along the broad highland plain and river valley of the northern part of the island and across two borders. A lack of a shared vision for acceptable solutions to these regional issues, however, has meant that these efforts have met with limited success.

REGIONAL ISSUES

The landlocked state of Katasi continues to be a source of regional tension and concern as a result of the numerous unhelpful policies pursued by its military government. Chief among these policies is a rather defiant

and contrarian attitude towards regional diplomacy in general and the government's desperate need for foreign currency. This has led to an intentionally lax approach (if not direct involvement in) to illegal activities such as the smuggling of weapons, people, natural resource and drugs from Katasi into other countries on Kisiwa. In the case of the government's belligerent relations with its neighbours, Katasi officials argue that their counterparts in other countries, Carana and Namuna in particular, give sanctuary to opponents of the Katasi government (Namuna hosts the deposed royal family, who continues to criticise the military regime in Katasi, namely Muta Dagvi VI). The view from the other capitals is that the Katasi military regime refuses to give up its nostalgic vision of returning Katasi to its past position of domination that it enjoyed under the Kori Kingdom.

Illicit markets on the island of Kisiwa are incessantly growing and causing socio-economic disturbances and security challenges. It is widely known that Carana's western border with Katasi is the route through which many of these trades take place, probably encouraged by Katasi's military government. The illegal trade and smuggling of weapons, people, natural resources and drugs from/through Katasi have caused havoc to many populations of the island, especially Carana.

Also, the effects of the arbitrarily-established borders found on the island of Katasi are enduring. There are cleavages between rival tribes who were forced together as well as grievances within ethnolinguistic communities who were separated against their will. Changes in the social make-up of countries on the island have also been caused by a series of displacements due to natural disasters and conflict. These changes have caused power struggles and socio-economic pressures throughout the island. In Carana, there are major challenges to dealing with the arrival of refugees from its southern neighbour of Rimosa due to hostilities in the north of the country, and economic refugees from poverty-stricken Katasi. Addressing frequent violent strife between nomadic groups and pastoral and farming groups along the highland plain and river valley of the northern part of the island has proven difficult for the governments of Carana, Namuna and Sumora who do not have a shared vision of the best solution.

There are some unresolved questions of sovereignty regarding the boundaries of the territorial waters between Carana and both Sumora and Rimosa, with consequent effects on the definitions of contiguous and exclusive economic zones. These stem in part from the changing channels of rivers, especially the Kalesi, which forms the international boundary between Carana and Sumora. Changes in river channels further inland as a result of natural and man-made erosion also have the potential to spark future disputes. Although the coastal issues are unresolved, the possible development of offshore mineral resources has the potential to make minor anomalies into more serious sovereignty issues. There have also been previous issues with the extreme western border with Katasi, based on electromagnetic anomalies and survey errors; Katasi has not yet formally approved the boundary line most recently surveyed by Carana.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

An issue in Carana's present-day affairs are the sanctions that have been placed on certain individuals. Some western countries have imposed unilateral restrictions on the travel of individuals and government officials. These restrictions were imposed in relation to a growing illicit economy, especially in the trade of drugs and weapons. Some of those affected are considered to be in the close circles of President Jacques Ogavo, which has caused embarrassment to the PDC government.

The Government of Carana has continually attempted to strengthen its ties with Azuria, and continues to enjoy a defence pact that allows Azurian troops to be stationed in certain bases of the country. It is widely accepted that this pact may allow Azuria to protect its commercial interests, but also to lend itself to anti-terror initiatives relative to the island. Azuria's military presence on the island and their participation in the "war on

terror” has allowed Carana to be seen in a more positive light by “war on terror” allies, beyond Azuria. With the growing competition between multi-national corporations to tap into profitable resources and markets on the island, Carana has missed out on much this attention due to its lack of oil deposits on its territory or offshore. However there is growing evidence that there may be significant natural gas deposits in the Gulf of Carana. This has the potential to stimulate the Caranese economy. However, there is an attendant risk of greater international instability and heightened internal dissent regarding how this resource is exploited, and to whose benefit.



CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CARANA (1985, amended 2004)

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PREAMBLE

We the people of Carana, committed to the independence and sovereignty of this Democratic Republic, a country that we have freed from the chains of colonialism;

Appreciating that the Caranese society is comprised of many hard-working and courageous people who are now freely united under the same banner, and that the State of the Democratic Republic must ensure the respect, integrity and opportunities of all Caranese citizens;

Cognisant of the duty that has been bestowed upon us by the courage and resilience of our ancestors, to uphold and defend the integrity of this great African State, for which, to see its birth, they had to endure so much;

Determined to pay respect to those before us who lived on this land without the rights and freedoms that, from this day forward, will permeate State policy and guide those who will be chosen to lead this country into its future of great liberty;

Recognizing that the achievements of Caranese society and of its Democratic Republic will be no greater than the strength and resilience of its families, the core of our society, from which all successes and measures of happiness derive;

Conscious of the solidarity which we share with the international human family, especially the African peoples;

Solemnly declaring our will to fight against regimes founded on authoritarianism, oppression, and injustice;

Pledging to all Caranese man, woman and child that the policies of the State of the Democratic Republic will be developed, first and foremost, to ensure the dignity of the lives of every Caranese citizen; and

Pledging further to all citizens the duty of the State to uphold and defend the laws of the Caranese people;

Do hereby, on this historic date, approve, enact and give ourselves this Constitution, and the fundamental law of our great Democratic Republic.

CHAPTER I: THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CARANA

Declaration of the Democratic Republic

1. (1) Carana is a sovereign Democratic Republic, founded on the principles of dignity and equality.
- (2) The territory of Carana consists of all its territories, including the islands, territorial waters and airspace, delineated by internationally recognized boundaries.
- (3) The territory of Carana shall be divided into eight provincial territories, which territories shall be those of Barin, Fellari, Guthar, Koloni, Leppko, Mahbek, and Tereni, as defined by their current and traditionally-recognized boundaries, as they may be amended by law.
- (4) The language of government of Carana shall be French.
- (5) The national capital shall be Galasi.

Sovereignty of the People

2. (1) The Sovereignty of Carana resides in the people of Carana in whose name and for whose welfare the powers of government are to be exercised in the manner and within the limits laid down in this Constitution.
- (2) The Caranese people express their sovereignty by way of elected representatives and by referendums, of which the conditions for a referendum are determined by law.
- (3) Any activity of a person or group of persons which suppresses or seeks to suppress the lawful political activity of any other person or any class of persons, or persons generally is unlawful.

Public Seal

3. The Public Seal of the Democratic Republic shall be such as may be prescribed by and under an act of the National Assembly.

National Flag

4. The Caranese Flag shall have an inverted red triangle bearing an eight-pointed image



National Anthem

of the Sun, with a background of black on the left side and green on the right. The exact description of the Flag shall be determined by law.

State of the Democratic Republic

5. Carana shall have a National Anthem and a Coat of Arms appropriately reflecting the history and the aspiration of its people. The details of these shall be such as the National Assembly shall prescribe.

6. (1) The State that is to be established by a democratic process to represent the people's sovereignty shall have strong institutions, capable of accommodating people's participation and of serving as foundation of a viable democratic and political order.
- (2) The State shall strengthen the stability and development of the country by encouraging democratic dialogue and national consensus through participation of all citizens; by building strong political, cultural and moral foundation; and by promoting national unity and social harmony.
- (3) The State shall ensure peace and stability by establishing appropriate institutions that encourage people's participation and by creating the necessary conditions capable of guaranteeing, hastening and engendering equitable economic and social progress.
- Citizenship* 7. (1) Every person who, on the coming into force of this Constitution, is a citizen of Carana by law shall continue to be a citizen of Carana.
- (2) Any person born on Caranese soil is a Caranese citizen by birth, unless otherwise prohibited by law.
- (3) Any person born of a Caranese father or mother is a Caranese citizen by descent.
- (4) Any foreign citizen may acquire Caranese citizenship pursuant to law.
- (5) The details concerning citizenship shall be regulated by law.
- Separate Status, Function and Duty of the Executive* 8. The executive shall be responsible for the initiation of policies and legislation and for the implementation of all laws which embody the express wishes of the people of Carana and which promote the principles of this Constitution.
- Separate Status, Function and Duty of the Legislature* 9. The legislature when enacting laws shall reflect in its deliberations the interests of all the people of Carana and shall further the values explicit or implicit in this Constitution.
- Separate Status, Function and Duty of the Judiciary* 10. The judiciary shall have the responsibility of interpreting, protecting and enforcing this Constitution and all laws and in accordance with this Constitution in an independent and impartial manner with regard only to legally relevant facts and the prescriptions of law.

CHAPTER II: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF CARANA

- Supremacy of the Constitution* 11. (1) This Constitution is the supreme Law of Carana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.
- (2) All organs of the State, all public and private associations and institutions and all citizens shall be bound by and remain loyal to the Constitution and shall ensure its observance.
- (3) Pursuant to the provisions of this Constitution and other laws, the conduct of the affairs of government and all organizations and institutions shall be accountable and transparent.
- Alteration of the Constitution* 12. (1) A proposal for the amendment of any provision of this Constitution may be initiated and tabled by the President or 50 percent of all the members of the National Assembly.
- (2) Any provision of this Constitution may be amended as follows:
- where the National Assembly by a three-quarters majority vote of all its members proposes an amendment with reference to a specific Article of the Constitution tabled to be amended; and
 - where, one year after it has proposed such an amendment, the National Assembly, after deliberation, approves again the same amendment by four-fifths majority vote of all its members.
- The Laws of Carana* 13. (1) The laws of Carana shall comprise,
- this Constitution;
 - laws made by or under the authority of the National Assembly as established by this Constitution;
 - any orders, rules, regulations and other statutory instruments made by any person or authority pursuant to a power conferred in that behalf by this Constitution or any other law;
 - the existing law, unless repealed by the authority of the National Assembly;
 - customary law as defined in Sub-Article 3 below; and
 - the civil law.
- (2) The civil law of Carana shall comprise the rules of law generally known as the civil law, the rules of law generally known as the doctrines of equity, and any additional rules of law determined by the Supreme Court.
- (3) Customary law means the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Carana, as recognized by law.
- (4) The existing law shall, except as otherwise provided in clause (1) of this article, comprise the written laws of Carana as they existed immediately before the

coming into force of this Constitution and any statutory instrument issues or made before that date which is to come into force on or after that date.

- (5) Subject to the provisions of this section, the existing law shall not be affected after the coming into force of this Constitution
- (6) The existing law shall be construed with such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this Constitution or otherwise to give effect to or enable effect to be given to any changes effected by this Constitution.
- (7) Any Order, Rule or Regulation made by a person or authority under a power conferred by this Constitution or any other law,
 - a. shall be laid before the National Assembly;
 - b. shall be published in the Gazette on or before the day they are so laid before the National Assembly;
 - c. shall come into force at the expiration of a period of twenty-one days of being so laid unless the National Assembly, before the expiration of the said period of twenty-one days, annuls any such orders, rules or regulations by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the National Assembly Members.

Interpretation

14. In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires:
 - (1) "Democratic Republic" means the Democratic Republic of Carana;
 - (2) "Act of the National Assembly" means a law enacted by the National Assembly;
 - (3) "the Gazette" means the official Gazette of the Government of Carana;
 - (4) "oath" includes affirmation;
 - (5) "the oath of allegiance" means such oath of allegiance as may be prescribed by law;
 - (6) "public office" means an office of emolument in the public service;
 - (7) "public officer" means a person holding or acting in any public office;
 - (8) "session" means the sittings of the National Assembly beginning when it first sits after the coming into operation of this Constitution or after the National Assembly is prorogued or dissolved at any time and ending when the National Assembly is prorogued or is dissolved without having been prorogued;

CHAPTER III: THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS

- National Unity and Diversity* 15. As the people and government struggle to establish a united and developed Carana, within the context of the diversity of Carana, they shall be guided by the basic principle of unity in diversity.
- Equality under the Law* 16. (1) All persons are equal before the law.
(2) No person may be discriminated against on account of race, ethnic origin, language, colour, sex, religion, or social or economic status.
- Duty of the National Assembly* 17. The National Assembly shall, pursuant to the provisions of this Article, enact laws that can assist in eliminating inequalities existing in the Caranese society.
- African Charter of Human and People's Rights* 18. The rights and responsibilities guaranteed by the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, ratified by Carana in 1992, are integral to the present Constitution and to the laws of Carana (2004, Amendment).
- Rights Enshrined Herein* 19. The fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in this chapter shall be respected and upheld by the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary and all other organs of government and its agencies and, where applicable to them, by all natural and legal persons in Carana, and shall be enforceable by the Courts as provided for in this Constitution.
- Right to Development* 20. Every person has a right to development and to their personal fulfillment in the material, temporal, intellectual and spiritual dimensions of life, as long as these rights do not encroach on those of others.
- Right to Education* 21. (1) Every person has a right to education. Primary education is mandatory, and it is the responsibility of the State to create the conditions favourable to this.
(2) The State shall provide public education to youth and shall work to ensure the eventual offering of public education free of charge.
- Right to Culture* 22. Every person has a right to culture. The State has the duty to preserve and promote the national values of its civilisations, be they material or spiritual, as well as cultural traditions.
- Right to Language* 23. Every community that comprises the Caranese nation has the liberty to use their spoken and written language, and to develop their own culture whilst respecting those of others.
- Right to Life* 24. Every person has a right to the life, to freedom, to security and to the integrity of his person.

Right to
Property

25. (1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-Article 2 of this Article, any citizen shall have the right, anywhere in Carana, to acquire, own, and dispose of all property individually or in association with others and to bequeath to his heirs or legatees.
- (2) All land, water and natural resources below and above the surface of the territory of Carana belong to the State; the usufruct rights of citizens shall be determined by law.
- (3) The State or any of its organs authorised by law may expropriate property in the national or public interest, subject to the payment of just compensation and in accordance with due process of law.

Right to Liberty
Right to Privacy

26. Every person has the right to personal liberty.
27. (1) Every person shall have the right to privacy.
- (2) No person shall be subjected to unlawful search, including his home or other property; there shall be no unlawful entry of his premises and no unlawful seizure of his personal possessions; nor shall the privacy of his correspondence, communication or other property be violated.

Right to Live Free of
Forced Labour and
Enslavement

28. (1) No person shall be held in slavery or servitude or be required to perform forced labour or traffic or
- (2) No person shall participate in any traffic in human beings, including children.
- (3) For the purposes of this section the expression "forced labour" does not include,
- a. any labour required in consequence of a sentence or order of a court; or
 - b. labour required of any person while he is lawfully detained, which though not required in consequence of the sentence or order of a court, is reasonably necessary in the interest of hygiene or for the maintenance of the place in which he is detained; or
 - c. any labour required of a member of a defence force in pursuance of his duties as such or, in the case of a person who has conscientious objections to service as such a member, any labour which that person is required by law to perform in place of such service; or
 - d. any labour required during a state of emergency which threatens the life or well-being of the community;
 - e. communal labour or labour which forms a part of other civic obligation.

Death
Penalty

29. (1) The death penalty may not be imposed except as punishment for the most serious crimes, in accordance with law.
- (2) A sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age, and shall not be carried out on pregnant women,

on lactating women, except two years after their most recent live birth, or on persons above the age of seventy.

Duty to Defend the Nation and Fulfill Civic Duty 30.

Every citizen has the duty to defend the Democratic Republic and to fulfill their civic obligations, as determined by law.

Duty to Respect the Constitution and Law 31.

Every citizen has the duty, in all circumstances, to respect this Constitution and the laws that regulate the people of Carana, as legitimately legislated by the National Assembly.

CHAPTER IV: EMERGENCY POWERS

Limitation Upon Fundamental Rights and Freedoms

32. (1) The fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under this Constitution may be limited only in so far as is necessary in a just and democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, health or morals, for the prevention of public disorder or crime or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
- (2) Any law providing for the limitation of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed in this Constitution must:
- be consistent with the principles of a just and democratic society;
 - be of general application and not negate the essential content of the right or freedom in question;
 - specify the ascertainable extent of such limitation.
- (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of Sub-Article 1 of this Article and other Articles of this Constitution to the contrary, the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under Articles 17 (1) and (2), 27 (2), of this Constitution shall not be limited.

State of Emergency

33. (1) The President may declare a state of emergency only when,
- Carana is at war;
 - Carana is in imminent danger of invasion or involvement in a state of war; or
 - There is actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the whole of Carana or any part thereof to such an extent as to require extraordinary measures to restore peace and security; or
 - There is a clear and present danger of an actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the whole of Carana or any part thereof requiring extraordinary measures to avert the same; or
 - There is an occurrence of imminent danger, or the occurrence of any disaster or natural calamity affecting the community or a section of the community in Carana; or
 - There is any other public danger which clearly constitutes a threat to the existence of Carana.
- (2) The President shall declare a state of emergency by Proclamation, which shall be published in the *Gazette*
- (3) Every declaration made under subsection (1) shall lapse,
- in the case of a declaration made when the National Assembly is sitting, at the expiration of a period of seven days beginning with the date of publication of the declaration, unless it has in the meantime been approved by or superseded by an Act of the National Assembly, supported by the votes of two-thirds of the National Assembly Members; and

- b. in any other case, at the expiration of a period of twenty-one days beginning with the date of the declaration, unless it has in the meantime been approved by or superseded by an Act of the National Assembly, supported by the votes of two-thirds of the National Assembly Members, following the reconvening of the National Assembly by the President.
- (4) A declaration made under subsection (1) and all measures taken thereunder shall, at any time before being superseded by an Act the National Assembly, be deemed valid and lawful and shall not be enquired into by any court or tribunal.
 - (5) During a period of emergency, the President may make such regulations and take such measures as appear to him to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of maintaining and securing peace, order and good government in Carana or any part thereof.
 - (6) Without derogation from the generality of the powers conferred by subsection (5) and notwithstanding the provisions of this Chapter, the regulations or measures may, so far as they appear to the President to be necessary or expedient for any of the purposes mentioned in that subsection,
 - a. make provision for the detention of persons, the restriction of the movement of persons within defined localities, and the deportation and exclusion of persons other than citizens of Carana from Carana or any part thereof;
 - b. authorise,
 - i. the taking of possession or control on behalf of the Government of any property or undertaking;
 - ii. the acquisition on behalf of the Government of any property other than land;
 - c. authorise the entering and search of any premises;
 - d. amend any law, suspend the operation of any law, and apply any law with or without modification, provided that such amendment, suspension or modification shall not apply to this Constitution :
 - e. provide, in respect of the grant of issue of any license, permit, certificate or other document for the purpose of the regulations, for charging such fees as may be prescribed by or under the regulations;
 - (7) Regulations made under this section shall apply to the whole of Carana or to such parts thereof as may be specified in the regulations.
 - (8) Regulations made under this section may provide for empowering such authorities or persons as may be specified in the regulations to make Orders and Rules for any of the purposes for which the regulations are authorities by this Constitution to be necessary or expedient for the purposes of the regulations.

Person Detained 34. Where a person is restricted or detained by virtue of a law made pursuant to a declaration of a state of emergency, the following provisions shall apply,

- a. he shall as soon as practicable, and in any case not later than seventy-two hours after the commencement of the restriction or detention, be furnished with a statement in writing specifying in detail the grounds upon which he is restricted or detained and the statement shall be read or interpreted to the person restricted or detained;
- b. the spouse, parent, child or other available next of kin of the person restricted or detained shall be informed of the detention or restriction within seventy-two hours after the commencement of the detention or restriction and be permitted access to the person at the earliest practicable opportunity, and in any case within seventy-two hours after the commencement of the restriction or detention;
- c. not more than twenty days after the commencement of his restriction or detention, a notification shall be published in the Gazette and in the media stating that he had been restricted or detained and giving particulars of the provision of law under which his restriction or detention is authorized and the grounds of his restriction and detention;
- d. Not more than twenty days after commencement of his restriction or detention, and after that, during his restriction or detention, at intervals of not more than three months, his case shall be reviewed by a tribunal composed of not less than three judges of a High Court, appointed by the Chief Justice;
- e. He shall be afforded every possible facility to consult a lawyer of his choice who shall be permitted to make representations to the tribunal appointed for the review of the case of the restricted or detained person;
- f. At the hearing of his case, he shall be permitted to appear in person or by a lawyer of his choice.

CHAPTER V: EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS

- The President*
35. (1) There shall be a President of the Democratic Republic of Carana and his mandate shall be of five years.
- (2) The President shall be the Head of State, Head of Government, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces of Carana.
- (3) The President shall uphold and defend this Constitution as the supreme law of Carana, the integrity of the territory and of the State, and define the policy of the nation.
- (4) The President shall provide executive leadership in the interest of Carana, in accordance with this Constitution and the laws of the Democratic Republic.
- (5) Other than complying with the provisions found in this Constitution and the laws of the Democratic Republic in the execution of his duties and responsibilities, the President shall be free from having to follow advice from, or direction of, others.
- Powers and Duties of the President as Head of State*
36. In his role as Head of State, the President of the Democratic Republic shall have power to:
- (1) address the nation through messages and other communications;
- (2) inform the Assembly of the Democratic Republic every year on the general state of the nation;
- (3) decide on the holding of referenda on amendments to the Constitution or on matters of fundamental interest for the nation, as per Article 49.
- (4) issue proclamations in regard to such matters as elections, states of emergency and other matters as prescribed by law;
- (5) convene and dissolve the Assembly of the Democratic Republic in accordance with Chapter VII of this Constitution;
- (6) appoint the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court;
- (7) appoint, exonerate and dismiss the Attorney-General and Deputy Attorney-General of the Democratic Republic;
- (8) grant pardons and commute sentences;
- (9) declare a state of war and its termination, a state of siege or a state of emergency;
- (10) make treaties with other sovereign states;
- (11) confer, within the terms of the law, titles, awards and distinctions.

Powers and Duties of President while Directing Government Activity

37. In his role as Head of Government, the President of the Democratic Republic shall have power to:
- (1) convene and preside at sessions of the State Council;
 - (2) establish ministries and ministerial commissions;
 - (3) appoint, exonerate and dismiss:
 - a. Ministers and Deputy Ministers;
 - b. Provincial Governors;
 - c. Rectors and Deputy Rectors of State universities;
 - d. the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of Carana

Powers and Duties of President while Acting as Commander-In-Chief

38. In his role as Commander-In-Chief, the President shall have power to:
- (1) order general or partial mobilization; and
 - (2) appoint, exonerate and dismiss the Chief of Defence Staff, the commanders of the various wings of the Defence Forces, and other officers of the defence forces in the terms established by law.
 - (3) appoint, exonerate and dismiss the Commanders of the Security Forces, and other officers of the security forces in the terms established by law.
 - (4) appoint, exonerate and dismiss the Commander of the Presidential Guard.

Election and Term of Office of the President

39. (1) The President shall be elected in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution in such manner as may be prescribed by Act of the National Assembly and, save where this Constitution provides otherwise in Article 42, the ballot in a Presidential election shall take place concurrently with the general election for members of the National Assembly.
- (2) The President shall be elected by a simple majority of the electorate through direct, equal and secret universal suffrage.
- (3) The President shall proclaim the date of the Presidential and National Assembly elections, within 180 days following the fourth anniversary of the first session of the current National Assembly, which elections shall take place no sooner than 90 days from the date of announcement and no later than the fifth anniversary of the first session of the current National Assembly.
- (4) The mandate of the President shall begin with the expiry of the mandate of his predecessor.
- (5) The President shall be eligible for re-election (2004 Amendment).

Qualifications to
be a Candidate to
the Office of the
President

40. (1) No person shall be eligible for nomination as a candidate for election as President unless he,
- a. is a citizen of Carana by birth or descent;
 - b. has attained the minimum age of thirty-five years and a maximum age of seventy five years on the date of the Presidential Election;
 - c. is a member of, and a candidate nominated by, a political party recognized by the Electoral Commission;
- (2) No person shall be eligible for nomination as a candidate for election as President if that person,
- a. is a citizen of another country;
 - b. has been adjudged or declared to be of unsound mind;
 - c. has been found guilty, by a competent court or tribunal established by law, of a criminal offence involving dishonesty or moral turpitude, or;
 - d. has been found guilty of a violation of law relating to the election of the President, or of the members of the National Assembly;
 - e. is the holder of a judicial appointment,
 - f. is a member of any Commission established under this Constitution, or a member of the Defence or Security Forces, or a public officer, or an employee of a Public Corporation established by an Act of the National Assembly, or has been such a member, officer or employee within six months prior to the date on which he seeks to be elected;
- (3) Names and registration forms of nominated candidates are to be delivered to the Electoral Commission between forty and sixty days before the date of the election. Each registered political party may submit one candidacy only for the office of President. Thirty-nine days before the election date, the Electoral Commission shall publish the list of candidates.
- (4) In the case of the death, or unquestionable inability of a candidate to the office to participate in the election, as determined by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court shall determine whether or not to re-open the list of candidates to allow for new candidacies, in which case, a new election date following the guides of Sub-article 3 of this Article shall be established.
- (5) The electoral campaign shall open thirty-five days before the day of the election, and close the day before the election at midnight.

Vacancy of the
Office of President

41. (1) In the event of the death, resignation or permanent incapacitation of the President of the Democratic Republic, his functions shall be assumed on an interim basis by the Chairman of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic.
- (2) The Chairman of the Assembly of the Democratic Republic shall assume office as Interim President of the Democratic Republic before representatives of the organs of sovereign authority.

- (3) The Interim President of the Democratic Republic shall be sworn into office by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
- Extraordinary Presidential Election*
42. (1) In the event of the death, resignation or permanent incapacitation of the head of State, the election of a new President of the Democratic Republic shall take place within 90 days thereof, unless an election date has been proclaimed in accordance with Section 39 of this Constitution;
- (2) The Interim President of the Democratic Republic shall be excluded from running as a candidate in this Election.
- (3) The new President of the Democratic Republic shall hold office until the next ordinary elections shall take place in accordance with Section 39 of this Constitution.
- Oath*
43. The person assuming the office of President, shall, before entering the office, take and subscribe to such oaths as may be prescribed by or under an Act of the National Assembly.
- Oath*
44. (1) There shall be a State Council consisting of the President who shall preside the State Council and such Ministers and Deputy Ministers as may, from time to time be appointed by the President.
- (2) The State Council shall exercise the powers and functions assigned to it by this Constitution or an Act of the National Assembly and shall be responsible for advising the President with respect to the policies of the Government and with respect to such other matters as may be referred to it by the President.
- Secretary to the State Council*
45. There shall be a Secretary to the State Council who shall be appointed by the President and whose office shall be a public office, and who shall,
- (1) have charge of the State Council office;
- (2) be responsible, subject to the directions of the Council, for arranging the business, and keeping the minutes of the Council;
- (3) convey the decisions of the Council to the appropriate persons or authorities; and,
- (4) have such other functions as the Council may decide.
- Government departments*
46. (1) There shall be Ministers and Deputy Ministers, who shall be appointed by the President and who shall exercise such powers and functions, including the running of Government departments, as may be prescribed by the President subject to this Constitution.
- (2) Every Government department shall be under the supervision of a Principal Secretary who shall be under the direction of a Minister or Deputy Minister, and whose office shall be a public office.

- Ministerial Accountability* 47. All Ministers shall be responsible to the President for the administration of their own departments.
- Oath of Ministers and Deputy Ministers* 48. A Minister or Deputy Minister shall not enter upon the duties of his office unless he has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and such oath for the due execution of this office as may be prescribed by or under an Act of the National Assembly.
- Calling a Referendum* 49. The President, after consultation with the Chairman of the National Assembly and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court can take the initiative of having a referendum on all matters relating to the promotion and reinforcement of human rights, on regional or sub-regional organization, and on the organization of public powers.

CHAPTER VI: ELECTIONS

The Electoral Commission

50. (1) There shall be an Electoral Commission which shall consist of a Chairman who shall be a Judge nominated by the President, upon recommendation by the Judicial Service Commission, and not less than six other members, as may be appointed in accordance with an Act of the National Assembly;
- (2) These Members shall comprise the Board of the Electoral Commission;
- (3) A person shall not be qualified to hold the office of a member of the Electoral Commission if that person is a Minister, Deputy Minister, a National Assembly Member or a person holding public office.
- (4) Subject to this section, a person shall cease to be a member of the Electoral Commission,
- at the expiration of four years from the date of his appointment, unless re-appointed to a new four-year term; or
 - if any circumstances arise that, if that person were not a member of the Electoral Commission, he would be disqualified for appointment as such.
- (5) Members of the Electoral Commission shall not be removed by the President without the approval of the National Assembly: removal from office shall be on the ground of incapacity or incompetence in the performance of the duties of that office.

Powers and Functions

51. (1) The Electoral Commission shall exercise such functions in relation to elections as are conferred upon it by this Constitution or by an Act of the National Assembly.
- (2) The Electoral Commission shall not be subject to the control of any person or authority.
- (3) The duties and functions of the Electoral Commission shall include,
- to determine constituency boundaries impartially on the basis of ensuring that constituencies contain approximately equal numbers of voters eligible to register, subject only to considerations of population density;
 - to determine electoral petitions and complaints related to the conduct of any elections;
 - to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Constitution and any other Act of the National Assembly;
 - to ensure the registration of voters according to law;
 - to regulate the activities of political parties in the Democratic Republic through registration and regulation according to law; and
 - to perform such other functions as may be prescribed by this Constitution or an Act of the National Assembly;

- The Electorate* 52.
- (1) All persons shall be eligible to vote in any general election, by-election, presidential election, local government election or referendum, subject only to this section.
 - (2) Subject to subsection (3), a person shall be qualified to vote in a constituency if, and shall not be so qualified unless, upon or before the day that an election is proclaimed, that person:
 - a. is a citizen of Carana or, if not a citizen, has been ordinarily resident in the Democratic Republic for seven years;
 - b. has attained the age of eighteen years; and
 - c. is ordinarily resident in their constituency of registration, or was born there or is employed or carries on a business there.
 - (3) No person shall be qualified for registration as a voter in a constituency if that person,
 - a. is under any law in force in the Democratic Republic adjudged or otherwise declared to be mentally incompetent;
 - b. is under sentence of death imposed by a court having jurisdiction in the Democratic Republic, either before or after the appointed day; or
 - c. is disqualified from registration as a voter on the grounds of his having been convicted of any violation of any law relating to elections passed by the National Assembly and in force at the time of, or after, the commencement of this Constitution.
 - (4) Where any person is qualified to be registered in more than one constituency as a voter, he may be so registered in only one of these constituencies.
 - (5) No person shall exercise more than one vote in any one election.

CHAPTER VII: LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS

- National Assembly 53.
- (1) There shall be a National Assembly which shall be the supreme representative and legislative body within the Democratic Republic.
 - (2) The National Assembly shall enact an electoral law, which shall prescribe for and ensure the representation and participation of the Caranese people in its election.
 - (3) The number of seats in the National Assembly shall be determined by law.
 - (4) The National Assembly shall legislate and control Government action.
 - (5) Sessions of the National Assembly may be adjourned in a manner that best serves the Democratic Republic, by a resolution of the National Assembly supported by a simple majority of all National Assembly Members.
 - (6) Once adjourned, the National Assembly shall reconvene on the request of the Chairman of the National Assembly, or of the President in the event of a state of emergency.
 - (7) The National Assembly shall have no power to enact a law establishing a one-party state.
- Chairman of the Assembly 54.
- (1) There shall be a Chairman of the National Assembly who shall be elected by the National Assembly Members from among the National Assembly Members.
 - (2) The Chairman shall be elected for the session of legislature of the National Assembly within the conditions prescribed by law.
 - (3) The Chairman shall vacate his office,
 - a. if he is appointed a Minister of State or a Deputy Minister; or
 - b. if he resigns from office by writing signed by him and addressed to the Clerk to the National Assembly; or
 - c. if any circumstances arise that, if he were not Chairman, would disqualify him for election as a National Assembly Member; or
 - d. if he is removed from office by a resolution of the National Assembly supported by the votes of not less than three-quarters of all National Assembly Members.
 - (4) No business shall be transacted in the National Assembly other than an election to the office of the Chairman, at any time when the office of the Chairman is vacant.
 - (5) When he replaces the President of the Democratic Republic, in the case of the vacancy of the office of President, the Chairman shall be replaced by the Deputy Chairman, in accordance with Article 55 of this Constitution.

- (6) The Chairman may, where there is a matter which is the subject of debate in the Chamber over which he is presiding and which is a matter solely pertaining to his constituency, temporarily vacate the Chairman's seat and participate in that debate and exercise a deliberative vote where there is voting on that matter
- (7) the Chairman of a Chamber shall not have a deliberative vote, but if the votes of the Chamber over which that Chairman is presiding are equally divided upon any question, he shall exercise the deciding vote.

Deputy Chairman of the Assembly

55. (1) There shall be a Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the National Assembly Members from among the National Assembly Members.
- (2) The Deputy Chairman shall replace the Chairman on a temporary or permanent basis, and shall discharge the duties of the Chairman, under the circumstances described at Article 54 of this Constitution.

Representation of the People of Carana

56. (1) Members of the National Assembly shall be elected by direct and secret ballot by all citizens who are qualified to vote.
- (2) Elected representatives to the National Assembly shall be called National Assembly Members.
- (3) Each National Assembly Member is a representative as a whole; any imposed mandate shall be null and void.
- (4) The qualifications and election of the members of the National Assembly and the conditions for vacating their seats shall be determined by law.

Qualifications for Membership in the National Assembly

57. Any person who,
- a. is a citizen of Carana; and
 - b. has attained the age of twenty-one; and
 - c. is an elector whose name is on the register of electors.

Shall be qualified for election as such a National Assembly Member.

Disqualifications for Membership in the National Assembly

58. (1) No person shall be qualified for election as a National Assembly Member,
- a. if he is a naturalized citizen of Carana or is a citizen of a country other than Carana having become such a citizen voluntarily or is under a declaration of allegiance to such a country; or
 - b. if he is a member of any Commission established under this Constitution, or a member of the Defence Forces, or a public officer, or an employee of a Public Corporation established by an Act of the National Assembly, or has been such a member, officer or employee within six months prior to the date on which he seeks to be elected; or

- c. if under any law in force in Carana, he is declared to be of unsound mind; or
 - d. if he has been convicted and sentenced for an offence which involves fraud or dishonesty; or
 - e. if he is under a sentence of death imposed on him by any court;
 - f. if he is for the time being the President, a Minister or a Deputy Minister under the provisions of this Constitution.
 - g. if he is a chief.
- (2) A person shall not be qualified for election if he is convicted by a court of any offence connected with the election of National Assembly Members or the President. In such a case, the period of disqualification shall not exceed five years from the date of the election following the one for which he was disqualified.
- (3) A person who is the holder of any office the functions of which involve responsibility for, or in connection with, the conduct of any election to the National Assembly or the compilation of any register of voters for the purposes of such an election shall not be qualified for election to the National Assembly.

Vacancies in the
National Assembly

59. (1) The seat of a member of the National Assembly shall become vacant,
- a. if the National Assembly has been dissolved;
 - b. if the member dies or resigns his seat;
 - c. if the member ceases to be a citizen of Carana;
 - d. if any circumstances arise that, if he were not a member of the National Assembly, would cause that member to be disqualified for election under this Constitution or any other Act of the National Assembly;
 - e. if the National Assembly declares a member's seat vacant in accordance with such Standing Orders as may permit or prescribe the removal of a member for good and sufficient reason provided that they accord with the principles of natural justice;
- (2) The Chairman of the National Assembly shall give notice in the Gazette in the event that the seat of any member of the Assembly shall become vacant under this section:
- a. The National Assembly shall make provision for holding by-elections to fill any vacancy that shall occur;
 - b. any by-election to fill any vacancy that occurs shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in no event later than sixty days after the seat of any member of the National Assembly becomes vacant; and
 - c. any member elected at a by-election shall serve until such time as his seat becomes vacant in accordance with subsection (1).
- (3) The Chairman may, upon a motion of the National Assembly, postpone the declaration of a vacant seat for such period as that motion prescribes so as to permit any member to appeal to a court or other body to which an appeal

- lies against a decision which would require that member to vacate his seat in accordance with this section
- Duration of the National Assembly* 60. (1) The first session of the National Assembly shall be held within 30 days following a general election.
- (2) The term of the National Assembly shall be no less than four years and no more than five years from the date of commencement of its first session. Following the dissolution of the National Assembly, elections shall take place in accordance with Article 39 of this Constitution.
- (3) Where there exist a state of emergency, which would prevent a normal general election from being held, the National Assembly may, by resolution supported by not less than two-thirds vote of all its members, extend the life of the National Assembly for a period not exceeding six months.
- Dissolution of the National Assembly* 61. The President may issue a proclamation dissolving the National Assembly:
- (1) Within the period of time required by Article 39 of this Constitution;
- (2) At the request of a resolution of the National Assembly supported by the votes of not less than three-quarters of all National Assembly Members.
- Immunities of National Assembly Members* 62. (1) No member of the National Assembly or of its committees may be sued, arrested or charged for any votes castes or opinions expressed in the exercise of his functions, even after the expiration of his mandate.
- (2) Except in cases of flagrante delicto, deputies shall not be arrested or charged for crimes during the session of the National Assembly. All proceedings of flagrante delicto brought against a National Assembly Member must be brought to the attention of the Assembly.
- (3) When not in session, a Member of the National Assembly shall not be arrested without the authorization of the National Assembly. The detention or pursuit of a National Assembly Member is suspended if this is required from the National Assembly.
- Office and Committees of the National Assembly* 63. (1) The National Assembly shall have a secretariat under the direction of its Chairman and committees for various fields of interest, as circumstances may dictate.
- (2) The various committees established pursuant to the provisions of Sub-Article 1 of this Article shall have the power to call any person to appear before them to give evidence or to submit documents.
- Oaths to be Taken by Chairman and National Assembly Members* 64. The Chairman of the National Assembly, before assuming the duties of his office, and every National Assembly Member before taking his seat therein, shall take and subscribe before the Assembly such oath for the due execution of their office as may be prescribed by or under an Act of the National Assembly.

CHAPTER VIII: THE JUDICIARY

The Judiciary

65. (1) The judicial power shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such other lower courts as shall be established by law and shall be exercised in the name of the people pursuant to this Constitution and laws issued thereunder.
- (2) In exercising their judicial power, courts shall be free from direction, control and supervision of any person or authority. Judges shall be subject only to the law, to a judicial code of ethics determined by law and to their conscience.
- (3) A person exercising judicial power shall not be liable to any suit for any act or omission in the course of exercising that judicial power.
- (4) All organs of the State shall accord to the courts such assistance as they may require protecting their independence and dignity so that they may exercise their judicial power appropriately and effectively pursuant to the provisions of this Constitution and laws issued thereunder.

The Supreme Court

66. (1) The Supreme Court shall be the court of last resort; and shall be presided by the Chief Justice.
- (2) The Supreme Court shall have the power of:
- sole jurisdiction of interpreting this Constitution and the constitutionality of any law enacted or any measure undertaken by government;
 - sole jurisdiction of hearing and adjudicating upon charges against a President who has been impeached by the National Assembly in accordance with an Act of the National Assembly; and
 - hearing and adjudicating cases appealed from lower courts pursuant to law.
- (3) the organization and operation of the Supreme Court shall be determined by law.
- (4) The tenure of justices of the Supreme Court shall be determined by law.

Lower Courts

67. The organization, jurisdiction and the procedures of lower courts and the tenure of their judges shall be determined by law.

The Judicial Service Commission

68. (1) There shall be established a Judicial Service Commission, which shall be responsible for submitting recommendations for the recruitment of judges and the terms and conditions of their services.
- (2) The powers, organization and duties of the Judicial Service Commission shall be determined by law.

Removal of Judges from Office

69. (1) A judge may be removed from office before the expiry of his tenure of office by the President only, acting on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, pursuant to the provisions of Sub-Article 2 of this Article for physical or mental incapacity, violation of the law or judicial code of ethics.

- (2) The Judicial Service Commission shall investigate whether or not a judge should be removed from office on grounds of those enumerated in Sub-Article 1 of this Article. In case the Judicial Service Commission decides that a judge should be removed from office, it shall present its recommendation to the President.
- (3) The President may, on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, suspend from office a judge who is under investigation.

Oath

70. No judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court shall enter upon the duties of his office unless he has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and such oath for the due execution of his office as may be prescribed by or under an Act of the National Assembly, provided that a person who has once taken and subscribed the said oaths may enter upon the duties of any such office without again taking and subscribing such oaths.

CHAPTER IX: MISCELLANEOUS

- Auditor General* 71. (1) There shall be an Auditor General who audits the revenues and expenditures and other financial operations of government and who reports annually his findings to the National Assembly.
- (2) The Auditor General shall be appointed for five years by the President with the approval of the National Assembly. He shall be accountable to the National Assembly.
- (3) The detailed powers, duties and organization of the Auditor General shall be determined by law.
- National Bank* 72. (1) There shall be a Bank of Carana, which performs the functions of a central bank, controls the financial institutions and manages the national currency.
- (2) The Bank of Carana shall have a Governor appointed by the President. There shall be a Board of Directors presided by the Governor and whose members shall be appointed by the President.
- (3) The detailed powers, duties and organization of the Bank of Carana shall be determined by law.
- Public Service Administration* 73. (1) There shall be established a Public Service Administration, which shall be responsible for recruitment and selection of civil servants as well as for determining the terms and conditions of their employment including their rights and duties.
- (2) The detailed powers, duties and organization of the Public Service Administration shall be determined by law.



ECONOMIC OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY
OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS
1996-2008



Global Economic Development
Research Institute

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BCC	Banque centrale de Carana
CBC	Carana Broadcasting Corporation
Cfr	Caranese Franc
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ISP	Internet Service Provider
PDC	Parti démocratique de Carana
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme

ABSTRACT

Carana's economic journey in the past three decades has been tumultuous. In the 1980s the nation attempted to transform its economy through restructuring. In the mid-1990s it abandoned the recovery programme that improved GDP but increased individual poverty, and then returned to those discarded policies by 2000 only to fall out of favour with the international economic community. The nation's real GDP growth rate as of 2008 is -1.7%. It is expected that the economy will make very modest gains in 2009, with the real GDP growth rate projected to hover around -0.9% as the agriculture sector recovers from recent setbacks. Any real gains, however, will require substantive changes to different facets of the Caranese economy.


KEY WORDS: Carana – Economy – Gross Domestic Product – Macroeconomic Policies – Agriculture – Industry – Service

** Note: The analysis presented in this document is based primarily on data provided by various Government of Carana ministries. As with most economic data of its nature, a level of imprecision is inevitable. The reader is thus asked to be mindful of this caveat.*

THE CARANESE ECONOMY


With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2008 of \$4.6 billion (Caranese Franc (CFr) 13.6 trillion) and a per capita income of \$535 (CFr 1,584,670) Carana's economy, given its resource capacity, is grossly underperforming. In decades past, the expectation was that Carana would be an economic leader on the Island, but economic mismanagement, a failed Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) implementation, attempts to reverse those policies and a challenging political atmosphere have combined to ensure that more than 45 years after achieving independence, the economy of Carana is in turmoil.

Figure 1



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue (Carana), Economic Community Organization of Kisiwa

Figure 2



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue


By the time Ogavo took over the helm of affairs in 1996, Carana's GDP had made some modest gains, but the populace had not fared much better. The Structural Adjustment policies implemented in the late 1980s included stabilization policies, among them tighter monetary policy in the form of higher interest rates, aimed at reducing demand and curbing inflation; freezing of civil servant salaries, also directed at decreasing local

demand, particularly for imported goods; reduction in government spending that manifested itself in the form of removal of agricultural subsidies, cuts to key services such as education and healthcare; and the devaluing of the exchange rate, with the aim of making exports from Carana cheaper to importing economies. As well, structural changes, including trade liberalization – the removal of quotas, reduction in tariffs; privatization of state-owned enterprises; and, liberalization of capital markets, were introduced. These policies, while improving the nation's GDP (due mainly to a surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the mining sector), negatively impacted the lives of the ordinary Caranese, in particularly the Kori and Tatsi.

In a show of solidarity for the plight of the average Caranese, Ogavo in 1996 announced the reversal of many policies that had been put in place in the decade before his rule. In a gesture uncharacteristic of the Parti démocratique de Carana (PDC), an admission was made that while the government had been aware that difficult sacrifices would have to be made, the immensity of the suffering as began to unfold in the 1990s had, to a large extent, not been anticipated. Consequently, many of the policies implemented began to be changed.

To this end, Ogavo tightened his grip on the economy, causing gains in GDP to slide. A move of particular significant consequences on the nation's GDP was the nationalization of a number of ventures starting with coal and copper operations. This caused fear within the investor community and foreign investors commenced withdrawing funds as is evident from Figure 3.

Figure 3



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue

The imposition of restrictions on imports delved a serious blow to manufacturing as many inputs to the production process were in short supply and prices skyrocketed. The area in which there were gains was in agriculture, where the retrenchment programme of government meant the return to rural areas of some civil servants who turned their attention to the cultivation of cash crops – particularly cotton and cocoa.

This change of course was highly criticized by the international economic community and resulted in Carana's government falling out of favour with the international financial institutions. As the latter's warnings to Ogavo to keep Carana's trade open and its market liberalized went unheeded, loans to the nation from these institutions were halted and bi-lateral aid from many Western nations ceased or were sharply reduced. The result was

a reduction in government spending as budget support shrank, and a curtailment of numerous projects that were sourced with foreign financial assistance.


In spite of the reversals, and given the reduction in loans and grants to Carana, the public complained as the millennium approached that their circumstances had not changed for the better. Rather, in many ways those conditions had deteriorated. Strikes were rampant, and the populace vented their anger through demonstrations which often turned violent and were brutally suppressed by the government, the repression spurring greater resentment.

With his eye on re-election in 2001, and realizing that his policy reversals had failed to stimulate the economy, Ogavo began to relax his hold on the economy. Once the government realized the severity of the impact of capital flight as a result of nationalization, the process was halted; Ogavo convinced investors that coal and copper were the only ventures to be nationalized and that those who lost their investments would be highly compensated. With difficulty, Ogavo managed to allay the fears of investors particularly those in diamond operations. As a result FDI began to rise again in Carana from 1999 (see Figure 3). To garner support from the voting public for the upcoming elections, Ogavo went on a spending spree.

The West encouraged Ogavo in this new direction of liberalization by once again opening up their coffers and providing loans and grants to Carana. This assistance led, among other things, to increases in infrastructure investments, which in turned increased economic growth. After Ogavo won his second presidential term, he continued his policies of trade and market liberalization, with the result that some sectors including manufacturing benefited and the nation's gross domestic product improved. From 2001 the price of diamonds on the world market rose dramatically providing a boost to GDP.

Alongside these gains, Carana's stock of debt rose drastically from 2001, as the international financial community lent the nation greater amounts of loans. With the rise in the stock of debt came a sharp increase in debt servicing obligations. The payments placed a huge strain on the economy, particularly given the widening trade deficit. As the debt serving obligation grew, so did pressure on Ogavo at home to push for debt cancellations. The issue of repudiation also entered the national debate, and while some argued that the long term negative economic consequences would be dire, most were of the view that threatening repudiation would simply speed up debt cancellation by creditors.

Figure 4




Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue

In 2006, Ogavo declared that Carana would unilaterally suspend its debt payments in light of the nation's inability to meet its servicing requirements. The response from the international economic community was swift and firm; it was unanimous in its condemnation of Carana, and this time, not only was financial assistance withdrawn by international financial institutions, but additionally, trade sanctions were imposed by a number of developed countries. Carana continued to service small amounts of loans owed to primarily a few Far Eastern countries. However by the end of 2008, such was the economic downturn in the nation that Carana was back at the negotiating table with the international economic community with the aim of rescheduling its loan payments and resuming debt servicing.

The economic mayhem resulting from the attempted debt repudiation, together with the pod rot disease (phytophthora) that infected cocoa farms and nearly decimated the industry in 2008, and a natural disaster that impacted the agriculture sector, as well as a decline in industry, in large part due to a reduction in FDI (see Figure 3), caused the real GDP growth in 2008 to fall to -1.7% shown in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5




Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue

MACROECONOMIC POLICIES

Fiscal Policy

Unemployment


Carana's fiscal policies over the years have failed to address its unemployment crises. The current rate rests at 38%, and underemployment as well is widespread, with many Caranese finding jobs in the informal sector. The retrenchment programme of the 1980s coupled with the failure of the private sector to absorb this excess labour, the closing shop of many manufacturing ventures that were unsuccessful in remaining competitive as markets were opened, and a lack of good job creation policies under the PDC have all been factors affecting the situation of high unemployment in Carana. Though the rate began to drop at the end of the 1990s due to greater economic growth, this gain is being steadily wiped out since 2005, as a result of the worsening economic conditions in Carana.



Source: Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Employment

Government Expenditure and Revenue

Figure 7




Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue

Government Revenue

Taxation

First the retrenchment programme of the late 1980s and early 1990s meant a much smaller tax base from which the Carana Revenue Service could collect. Then, in spite of his goal of alleviating the suffering of the Caranese when he took office, Ogavo, raised taxes to make up for shortfalls in the government's budget created by the withdrawal of financial support from donors following his reversal of the Structural Adjustment Policies. This increase in corporate and income taxes resulted in only minor increases in government revenue as the high tax levels led to much greater tax evasions than had been common in Carana prior to the 1990s. Consumption taxes also took a hit as many turned to the underground market for their consumption needs. Revenue from customs duties collected by the Customs and Excise Department were reduced with the imposition of quotas on imports of consumer goods, a move aimed at boosting local manufacturing towards the end of the 1990s. This was off-set to a degree by raising tariff duties on imported goods. As the government granted tax concessions to businesses from 2000 its tax revenue was significantly reduced. Recovering only after the overhaul of the tax system in 2002 brought more individuals into the tax bracket. To boost revenue in anticipation of funding losses after the announcement of sanctions in 2006, Ogavo raised taxes, but this time greatly increased penalties for black market activities.

Figure 8




Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue

Commodity Prices

Commodity prices for the top primary exports have had a notable impact on government revenues. From 1997, world cocoa prices drastically fell. However, the longer term impact of the loss from this drop on government revenue was minimized by high cotton prices over the 1998/1999 period. In 1999 world cocoa prices began to increase, and together with the spike in world diamond prices from 2001, increased government revenue. The 2002/2003 period was a particularly good year for cotton and cocoa prices. However, gains from cocoa were short-lived as prices began a steep plunge until 2004 when cocoa prices levelled off. During 2004 to 2005, however, high diamond prices resulted in increased revenues for the government in spite of the slump in cocoa prices. By 2008 government revenue from the main primary exports had shrunk as a result not only of the devastation in the agricultural sector, but also due to a huge increase in diamond smuggling. Following Ogavo's altering of the constitution to accommodate his third term in office, more radical Kori belonging to the of the Movement patriotique de Carana (MPC), began smuggling diamonds across the Carana/Katasi border, exchanging them for Eastern bloc weapons left over from the Cold War in Katasi.

From Figure 7 it is evident that the above fluctuations in world market prices have impacted export revenues. However, it must be noted that there are other factors affecting export revenues gained, including the level of FDI in resource extraction as well as output levels. For instance, growth in FDI from 1999 was partly responsible for the increase in export revenues in that year, and the destruction of cocoa and cotton crops in 2008 conversely contributed to the reduction in export revenues between 2007 and 2008.

Figure 9



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue

With the combined impact of less taxes, volatile world commodity prices, natural disaster and widespread smuggling across Carana’s borders, the government’s revenue by the end of 2008 was significantly reduced.

Government Expenditure

The reduction in support from the international economic community, following Ogavo’s reversal of a number of Structural Adjustment Policies, led to a reduction in government spending from 1996. However, in spite of the decreased financial support, expenditure rose in the period before elections in 2001 as Ogavo opened up the government treasury in exchange for votes.

5 Year Medium-Term Plan

The government couched its spending spree in the 1999/2000 period in a 5 year Medium-Term Plan (2000 – 2005) drawn up by the Ministry of Finance and Revenue. This Plan outlined the priority areas that the government intended to tackle once it was voted into power again. The primary goal of the plan was poverty reduction through pro-poor spending on education, health, sanitation, assistance for agriculture, micro-enterprises and rural development ventures. As part of its election strategy, Ogavo’s government argued that removing the Parti démocratique de Carana from power would mean the discontinuation of these pro-poor initiatives by an elected opposition that would be too willing to ignore the plans of the former government, without regard to their benefit to the populace. Alongside the Medium-Term Plan, the nation, together with its international partners, penned a Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework. This collaboration was possible as the international community was by 2000 working closely with Carana once again, given the nation’s renewed efforts at opening up trade and liberalizing the economy.


Fiscal Discipline and Military Spending

From 2001, Ogavo, at the insistence of the international financial institutions worked to maintain fiscal discipline. What minor achievements resulted were soon lost when after Ogavo’s third term in office began in

2006, it became clear that rebel elements were beginning to arm themselves; Ogavo responded with massive spending on the military.

As the security situation in Carana deteriorates, it is expected that expenditure on the military will rise, alongside a growing budget deficit. Due to Carana's history of coup d'etats, the civilian government of the Parti démocratique de Carana that was voted into power in 1986 was initially wary of strengthening the army, as such military spending initially remained low. However, as the ruling party consolidated its power over the nation, and appointed its supporters into key positions, the government assured of the backing of the establishment then increased spending on the military, with particular emphasis on the presidential guard. In time for the 2001 election, the military budget was increased. The same fears of a rebellion by the public may have prompted the spike in spending in the period preceding Ogavo's third term election. Perhaps the increases just before the next government is decided are merely coincidental; the one undeniable fact, however, is that as the military budget grows, so does the budget deficit, even though funding to other institutions, and for infrastructural development are cut.

Figure 10




Source: International Military Research Institute

MONETARY POLICIES

Exchange rate

The floating of the Caranese Franc in the late 1980s freed the nation from having to keep large foreign currency reserves in order to maintain its peg to the US dollar. However, the intense fluctuations that followed led to a loss of confidence in the Caranese Franc. With the abandonment of the flexible exchange rate system in 1996, and the return to a fixed exchange regime regulated by the Banque centrale de Carana (BCC), the aforementioned burden returned. From the beginning of the new millennium however, the government allowed the currency to float once again. Since then, the Caranese Franc, vis-à-vis major world currencies, has mostly depreciated as the trade deficit has grown. It had been hoped that the devaluation would increase demand for Caranese goods abroad. However, with the exception of a slight increase in the volume and value of exports to Rimosa and other Kisiwa states, the devaluation does not appear to have had any major impacts on Carana's export revenues.

Figure 11



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue

Inflation


Public sector employees whose salaries had been frozen as part of the SAP implementation began to demand pay increases as the economic reforms of the 1980s were cast aside. The granting of these demands contributed to the rise in inflation from 1996. The same pattern of calls and concessions would be repeated during Ogavo's second bid for the 2001 presidency.

Also from 1996, with the imposition of import controls, prices in Carana shot up, worsening inflation, until government spending, curbed in part due to dwindling international financial support, forced inflation downwards.

With increased budgetary support from the donor community from 2000 onwards, Ogavo's government significantly increased expenditure with the aim of ensuring that it was voted into power once again. The government commenced commissioning rural electricity and water projects on a much grander scale than had been the case over the past decades. As well, new schools, health facilities and other social amenities were opened up in Kori and Tatsi areas that had complained of neglect in the past. While these added to infrastructure and improved the welfare of the rural inhabitants, it caused inflation to rise steeply.

International support following Ogavo's changes in policy left more funds at the disposal of the government. Not even the withdrawal of financial support from donors after the 2006 repudiation of external debts stemmed the rise of inflation. From 2008 however, a slump in industry, a poor performance by the agricultural sector, and decrease in government revenues from primary exports, and conversely, a decrease in government spending, exerted a downward pressure on inflation. Still, the 2008 inflation rate of 11.7% is nonetheless considered high and harmful to the economy.

Figure 12




Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue

It must be noted that in latter 2002/early 2003 period experienced a bumper harvest that increased the supply of agricultural goods on the local market, causing prices to fall and accordingly exerting a slight downward pressure on inflation.

Interest Rates

Over the years, Ogavo's government has sought to stem the tide of rising inflation by using open market operations and manipulating the reserve requirement ratios. In the case of the first, treasury bills and government bonds have been utilized to absorb the surplus money supply, as happened when the donor community commenced providing loans and grants to Carana post 2001. As well, banks' required reserve ratios have been increased during times of high inflation. However, to rein in the high level of inflation discussed above, the BCC has principally resorted to changes in the short term rate of interest. With his presidential post secure after 2001, Ogavo turned his attention to decreasing the inflation rate in Carana mainly by sharply increasing interest rates at the beginning of 2002, and again toward the end of 2007. The impact was a reduction in borrowing and a simultaneous slight increase in savings.


Figure 13



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue

PERFORMANCE BY SECTOR

Figure 14



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue


Agriculture

Farming

Agriculture's contribution to GDP soared by 1997 as a result of the decline in industry caused by the fall in FDI. Falling cocoa prices between 1998 and 1999 pushed the sector's contribution down further, as cocoa is the second major contributor to the primary sector. The bumper harvest in 2002 across the agric sector reduced

revenue to the sector as high levels of supply forced down the prices of domestically consumed produced. The further decline in agriculture's share of GDP between 2004 and 2005 had as much to do with an increase in the productivity of the mining and manufacturing sector, as it had to do with the result of a huge drop in the world market prices for corn and cassava. The impact of fluctuating prices on cash crops is shown in Figure 15, which illustrates how high cocoa prices from 1996 and again from 2002 greatly increased revenues. On the contrary, low prices in 1998 and 2003 reduced gains. Additionally, volume produced has a considerable impact; in 2005, output was increased, and as such revenues rose. Since then, output has steadily declined. The floods that destroyed the cotton fields, as well as the outbreak of pod rot disease that infested cocoa trees in 2008 ensured that agriculture's contribution to GDP eventually dropped down to 49% in 2008 from 53% in 2007. In spite of the reduced share, the importance of this sector cannot be overemphasized, as it employs approximately 66% of the population.

Figure 15



Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Land, Water and Environment

Food for consumption in Carana is generally produced by small-scale farmers farming family plots of approximately 1-2 hectares, as opposed to cash crops which are generally produced on larger family farms of between 4 to 8 hectares. Much of the farming is down in rural areas.

The government of Carana lists as one of its top priorities, food security. The food security improvement plan includes the expansion of irrigation projects, provision of subsidies, and assistance to farmers to fight disease. This last goal was tested in 2008 with the outbreak of the pod rot disease, after which it has become evident that measures put in place are inadequate. Among the challenges that have confronted farmers include poor

infrastructure, and lack of credit and scarcity of inputs. The extension services and fertilizer grants promised to farmers, has chiefly been limited to cash-cropping, in spite of assurances given to farmers producing for local consumption. As well, banks in Carana, generally reluctant to lend to the agricultural sector, are even more hesitant to loan monies to food crop producers. International NGOs and development agencies are attempting to assist farmers by mobilizing small-scale farmers into cooperatives and providing them with funds; still the greater share of their support has gone to the export sector.

TOP TEN FOOD CROPS BY VOLUME - 2008

Table 1

Produce	Tons (Thousand)
Corn	732
Cassava	326
Pineapple	35
Sugar cane	15
Plantain	15
Millet	14
Palm oil	13
Egg plant	10
Banana	6
Orange	4

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Land, Water and Environment

NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK - VESTO2008 (THOUSAND)

Table 2

Year	Cattle	Goats	Sheep
1996	568	338	26
1997	570	341	29
1998	575	344	31
1999	581	350	34
2000	574	353	35
2001	453	356	37
2002	452	359	42
2003	455	362	45
2004	457	367	48
2005	452	361	51
2006	460	365	55
2007	480	372	52
2008	310	255	49
2008	290	252	50

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Land, Water and Environment

Fishing

Fish produces approximately 10% of Carana's food supply and contributes a fair share to its exports. However, fish stock in Carana is being depleted in part due to over-fishing in some areas by local fishermen. In the past, there were days when fishermen did not fish on Wednesdays, a custom observed in order to allow fish stock to replenish. In modern Carana, this tradition has been abandoned in most areas. Much more problematic has been the presence of illegal foreign trawlers in Carana's waters. These criminal elements have for years posed a problem for Carana, and in the last half decade their activities have grown more pronounced.

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Land, Water and Environment

FISH EXPORTS - PO96-2008

Table 2

Year	Fish Exports (Tonnes)
1996	90
1997	87
1998	92
1999	95
2000	110
2001	114
2002	118
2003	121
2004	123
2005	120
2006	117
2007	115
2008	111
2008	102

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Land, Water and Environment

Forestry

Timber exports have been bedrock of the Caranese economy. Much of the logging is done in the provinces of Mahbek, Leppko and Guthar. The main varieties felled are okoume, sapele, wawa, mahogany and pine wood. Much of the wood is exported unprocessed mainly to Azuria and other European countries. Although the government after 2001 attempted to force processing by imposing a punitive tax of 22% on unprocessed wood exports, much of the wood continues to be exported without extra value added. On the local market demand for logs by paper mills, furniture makers and traditional artisans are easily met. The forest resources further serve the needs of the general public, particularly the rural populace that rely on firewood and charcoal for their cooking and daily living needs.

For decades trees felled for all manner of purposes were not replaced. Rather, the areas under concession rapidly expanded, especially as more companies commenced operations with the opening up of trade once more. It is only in the last two years, after repeated calls from civil society, that the Ministry of Energy, Mines

and Natural Resources has initiated a re-forestation programme, mainly in Guthar. Even so, efforts made in this direction have been minimal.

As illegal logging and smuggling increases, the revenue generated from this sector is expected to fall. Unlike diamond, and other mineral resources, timber is not easily smuggled due to its bulk and the transportation challenges that presents. As such, much of the smuggling in timber is done in collusion with the respective government officials and border authorities.

Figure 16




Source: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Natural Resources

Industry

Mining

Carana is richly endowed with minerals, and as a result mining has formed the backbone of industry since the colonial period. While the main export earners are diamond, gold, copper and iron, the nation has rich deposits of coal, zinc, tin, lead, coltan and uranium. Most mines are partly owned by government and partially owned by foreign investors, with wealthy Caranese holding shares. Overall, the mining sector, in particular diamond mining, has received the most foreign direct investment in Carana. Although foreign direct investment fell drastically after 1996, it began to increase from 1999 when Carana's economy moved towards greater liberalization. (Refer to Figure 3 above). Despite the government's attempt to direct greater investments toward the manufacturing sector, the greater portion of FDI has gravitated towards the primary sector. Gains from mines have fluctuated as world prices have vacillated. Furthermore, as diamonds smuggled by Kori into Katasi in exchange for weapons have increased, gains to Carana have diminished. Coal mining is of particular importance to the local economy as the resource is utilized for domestic energy. It supplements production from the Maghitakak Hydroelectric Dam and diesel electricity production units.

Figure 17



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue


Manufacturing

The vision of Carana's leaders after independence was to swiftly industrialize the nation. As such, they invested extensively in manufacturing, at a point in time, restricting imports and establishing import substitution industries. Measures were put in place to protect infant industries, with the intention to abandon the safeguards once the industries advanced. Unfortunately, many ventures never matured, and by the time restrictions were lifted in the late 1980s, a large share of manufacturing enterprises were not ready to compete with well established international corporations producing better quality goods at cheaper prices. At once the Caranese market was flooded with such commodities, drowning out sales of locally produced goods. The result was a massive decline in the manufacturing sector, and an increase in unemployment as local companies went out of business. The return to a more closed economy after Ogavo took power marginally assisted manufacturing as competition was reduced. At the same time, inputs to the production process became more expensive, and as such the end products were pricier. This time though, there were less difficulties competing with imported goods, as their prices had shot up on the Caranese local market. This was due to limited supply because of restrictions on imports, and in more recent times, in spite of an open economy, due to the reduction of goods coming in by sea as a result of the growing presence of pirates off Carana's coast hindering ships that are calling into port with commodities; more and more, vessels are reluctant to pass through Carana's waters where due to weakening security, pirates are growing increasingly aggressive.

Currently, the main manufacturing ventures in Carana include paper production, food processing, cotton textiles and soap manufacturing. Much of the FDI attracted by the manufacturing sector goes into the paper producing

industries, where foreign companies are taking advantage of the vast forestry resources which translates into cheap raw materials, and consequently cost effective paper production. Fish processing dominates the arena of food production. While much of the fish caught in Carana is frozen and shipped off without any extra value being added, there are three main plants processing fish for exports. The largest is Okatsi Fisheries, which cleans and cans fish exported mainly to Europe, particularly to Azuria. King of Fish is the second largest fish factory with a sizeable local market share and an export venture primarily targeting mainland Africa. Tambuni Foods is a relatively smaller venture that cleans and distributes fish locally to culinary establishments including hotels, restaurants and boarding schools across the nation, and also exports to neighbouring Kisiwa countries. Carana has a long history of producing cotton textiles, and is known on the island for its Jumbaji cloths. Oil palm plantations have been a mainstay of the economy for decades, and the production of soap from it is not novel; women from time immemorial have made soap sold within Carana and in other parts of Kisiwa. What is new, is the large-scale manufacturing meant for the global export market.

Figure 18



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue


Service

Communications

Communication facilities, in contrast to most other infrastructure, have seen the most advances in the recent past. Although the fixed-line network has not been extensively expanded, and the number of phone booths remains low at 200, there have been significant increases in mobile phone usage. Whereas mobile phone users only numbered approximately 13,000 by the year 2000, in 2008, the count was 600,000. The increase in cellular phone companies setting up shop in Carana from 2005, and the corresponding drop in the price of mobile phones and services due to increased competition, is largely responsible for the increase in the number of users seen in Figure 19. There are currently 10 internet providers with approximately 111,000 internet

users mostly utilizing the facility in internet cafes that have sprung up across Galasi, but also in other major cities in Carana. The monopolistic control of the internet providers, and consequently the high price of residential connections, has ensured that home access has remained extremely limited.

Figure 19



Source: Ministry of Transportation and Communications


Transportation

Carana's transportation network is limited, and what exists is in poor condition. While opening up the country through an expansion of the nation's road network has been a goal of the current government, problems remain. Despite the number of paved roads being increased under the PDC from 845kms in 1986 to 5324kms in 2008, the quality of many of the new roads is in question. Additionally, many of the older roads have not been maintained, as at times, the funds meant for particular projects have not arrived from donors as expected, and at other times, the funds meant for projects have been siphoned off into the foreign accounts of government officials.

Tourism

The tourism traffic in Kisiwa from Europeans has usually gone to Rimosa and Mosana, given the comparatively better infrastructure in these countries. Particularly from 2001, however, the Caranese government commenced an advertising blitz targeted at Azurians in particular and Europeans in general. Such was the effectiveness of the marketing campaign by the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism that the growth in contribution of services to Carana's GDP was notable. However, in the last few years, with reports of growing tensions in Carana, tourists have stayed away from the nation, negatively impacting revenues to the service sector.

Figure 20



Source: Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism

Supply of Water and Electricity

The supply of water and electricity remains under government control, as attempt to privatize the state corporations operating these services met with immense resistance in 2000. More recently, the agenda is back on the discussion table and this time, the government is determined to forge ahead with its privatization programme.


As Carana's government has encountered financial shortfalls as a result of the trade sanctions imposed by the international economic community, it has cut funding to major and important facilities including the Water Works Department and the Carana Power Corporation. These in turn have supplemented their incomes by increasing the rates charged to the population, an increase most cannot afford.

The supply of potable water in urban areas is fair in some neighbourhoods, and inadequate in most. Rural water infrastructure is severely limited, and extension of pipe borne water has been used as a political tool to win votes during elections. The gap in the supply of potable water is being filled by NGOs and development agencies in Carana, however, their efforts to supply pipe borne water and fund well constructions, remain marginal compared to the need.

Much of Carana's electricity supply comes from the Maghitakak Dam and coal facilities, which together supply the mining and urban areas. There is no extensive national power grid, and rural areas with electricity are serviced by diesel stations. Price discrimination in electricity production exists; urban dwellers subsidize rural consumers by paying much higher rates for the same service.

Carana's energy production has not matched its growing needs, and electricity supply is hampered by severe power outages. 2001 witnessed a particularly poor supply due in part to the lack of rainfall that considerably reduced productivity from the Maghitakak Dam as is evident from Figure 21. In 2008, with growing demand and an ailing infrastructure (lack of maintenance and upgrade due to insufficient funds), the supply of electricity in Carana is sporadic at best; its production requires an extensively overhaul.

Figure 21




Source: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Natural Resources

PERFORMANCE BY PROVINCE

Province of Barin



Figure 22



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue


The smallest province in Carana, Barin is inhabited by 7.69% (657,794) of the nation's population, most of whom reside along the northern Torongo river, primarily in the towns of Maui and Suppo. As well, a number of major communities are present in the Nasvakhi River Valley. Majority of the population is Falin (408,352), mainly from the Barini subgroup. This group is followed in size by the Kori (195,377); with smaller groups also present.

The province of Barin contributes 15.1% to Carana's GDP. Next to the province of Leppko, it is the second largest contributor to agriculture in Carana. Its total contribution from agriculture to the nation's GDP is 8.5%. The southern part of Barin is made up of farmland and tropical forest. It is a large producer of two of Carana's top agricultural exports - cocoa and cotton. Its cocoa production in 2008 has been reduced as a result of the pod rot disease that has attacked cacao plants. Barin also produces the bulk of cassava exported from Carana. As well there is logging along the southern part of the province, and fishing communities are present along the Nasvakhi River which runs north of Folsa, the provincial capital.

Barin houses the Maghitakak Hydroelectric Dam which supplies a large proportion of Carana's electricity. It is situated to the west of Folsa and is the main source of power for the intensive smelting activities in that city. Iron ore mined in the south of the province of Guthar is smelted in Folsa. Barin's heavy industry, located mostly in Folsa allows the province to contribute 5.5% to Carana's industry sector.

A large fraction of the GDP contribution from the service industry in Barin comes from revenues from tourism, with the province's islands being a major tourist attraction. Altogether, services contribute 1.1% to GDP. In terms of communication, there are 5 radio stations in Barin, as well as one internet provider. Television broadcast from the Carana Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) is available throughout the province. Currently, there is one hospital with a casualty and emergency, as well as intensive care capabilities, and six health centres within the province. However, preliminary plans are under way to contrast a second hospital. Barin's water supply is generally superior to that of most other provinces. A large segment of Folsa has tap water, while many of Barin's rural areas are equipped with communal pumps. Even still, many in the rural areas directly draw their water from the Nasvakhi River. Due to the presence of the Maghitakak Dam, electricity supply within Barin is better than in most other provinces.


Figure 23



Source: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Natural Resources

Province of Fellari

Figure 24



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue


With 31.39% (2,685,486) of the population, Fellari is the most heavily populated province of Carana. It also hosts the seat of government within the provincial and national capital of Galasi. The principal coastal towns are Tole and Jumi. The Delta, made up of low lying marshy regions divided by channels of the Kalesi River, is lightly populated as a result of seasonal flooding that occurs in the area. While all ethnicities are represented within the province, the Falin are native to the area, and make up the bulk of the population (2,169,776). As well, there is a sizeable Azurian (9,146), Indian (16,137) and Arab (13,398) population mostly living in Galasi. The province is host to the largest grouping of Mahidi. While some have settled, others in the rural areas are still nomadic.

The province of Fellari is the largest contributor to Carana's GDP at 23.5%. Large portions of the province are under cultivation, and the main crops grown for export include pineapples, plantain, banana and egg plants. Food crops are also cultivated and sent to major markets in Galasi. In animal husbandry, cattle raising is the most prominent. Along with the provinces of Guthar and Leppko, it is a major fishing area, with much of the fish catches in Fellari coming from the communities of Jumi and Tole. The province further boasts of moist tropical forest which sustains a lumber industry. Overall, agriculture's contribution to Carana's GDP is 4.5%. Fellari is the nation's leader in industry with a GDP contribution from the sector of 15%. The province is resource rich with major diamond, gold and copper mines to the west. The copper mines suffered a major

set when after 1996, as part of Ogavo’s plans to reverse the Structural Adjustment Policies, he nationalized them, with the result that funds to that industry dried up. As Ogavo relaxed his hold on the economy by the end of the 1990s, the copper mines were again opened up to foreign investors. All of Carana’s, and indeed some of Katasi’s international shipments go through the port in Galasi. Fellari is also home to a large proportion of Carana’s light industry including paper mills, food and fish processing factories, household goods manufacturers, and others.

In service, as in industry, Fellari is the national leader. 4% of all of Carana’s services originates within the province. The decline in tourism has hit the province hard, with resorts like those in Tekla receiving drastically reduced numbers of tourists. Carana’s banking and finance industry is primarily based in Fellari. Overall, there are 2 television stations operating within the province, with one of them having nationwide reach. Both stations are owned by the Carana Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). Twelve radio stations are also present, and 4 internet service providers (ISP) are also registered. The province has 4 hospitals, included within them are a teaching hospital, specialized paediatric care, maternity facilities, psychiatric facilities, intensive care, and surgical units, among others. The province also has 11 health centres, and while the number may seem small compared to the population, it is primarily because the 4 hospitals caters to the majority of the population. Still, their capacity is limited and overcrowded, and points to the cuts that the government has made to such services over the years. Water supply within Galasi is better than most other urban cities across Carana, but even here, many areas are not connected to the mains, and it is not uncommon to see urban household purchasing tap water from households that have a connection. Many of the rural communities within the province obtain their water from open surface sources including the Kalesi, Mogave, Nipsakit and Marmakhi Rivers, as well as from wells. All of Fellari has electricity connection, but supply is sporadic, even in Galasi. Power cuts are rampant, although electricity fees within Galasi are higher than any where else in the country.

Figure 25




Source: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Natural Resources

While Fellari has the largest provincial economy within Carana, it also faces some of the greatest challenges, the unemployment rate in the capital, Galasi, is higher than the rest of the country at approximately 42%, and underemployment is rife. Part of this latter phenomenon is accounted for by the many civil servants

that were laid off as part of the retrenchment programme who were not well absorbed into the private sector. As well, the ever increasing migration of people from rural areas of Carana to Galasi, who either find themselves unemployed or underemployed for long periods of time, is a contributing factor. Fellari has the largest underground economy in Carana.

Province of Guthar

Figure 26



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue

With 22.29% of the population (1,906,377), the province of Guthar has the second largest population in Carana. It is mostly made up of Falin (1,101,999) of the Falari and Gatari subgroups, but also includes a fair share of Kori (209,641), Tatsi (247,885) and other groups. Most Azurians (162,002) in Carana live in Guthar, along with significant numbers of Arabs (47,652) and Indians (38,124).


Overall, Guthar's share of Carana's GDP is 13.4%. In agriculture, Guthar's contribution to the nation's GDP is 6%. There is both a strong inshore and offshore fishing industry. The Marmakhi, Salman, Mogave and Buktasi water bodies, as well as the Gulf of Carana feed this industry. Northwest Guthar has a rich fertile valley

that grows much of the sugarcane exported out of Carana. The province is also well known for its oil palm plantations. The moist tropical forests of Guthar are at the base of the timber industry within the province. As civil society within Carana has grown, there have been calls for more responsible forestry within the country. As such, the government began a pilot reforestation programme within the province. To date however, the programme has met with very limited success.

Iron ore and coal are mined in the south of Guthar, and while the iron mines have continued to perform well, the coal mines which were privatized in the 1980 and then nationalized in the 1990s under Ogavo, have encountered major funding challenges. Sugar and soap production form the bulk of the manufacturing industry. Overall, the province's contribution to Carana's industry is 6%.

The province makes the second largest contribution to Carana's service sector, after Fellari. The well-maintained resorts along Guthar's magnificent coastline, combined with comparatively better infrastructure than in most other provinces, allows Guthar to receive the highest traffic of tourists to Carana. Guthar is the only other province in Carana apart from Fellari in which CBC has a local broadcast. As well, there are 3 radio stations – one privately owned and two that are owned by the government. Two ISPs are present, with Amsan, the capital of Guthar having internet kiosks opening shop. Guthar currently has 2 hospitals, and 6 health centres. Among the capacity of the hospitals are surgical units, intensive care, casualty and maternity facilities. A third, state-of-the-art hospital is under construction. Water supply in Guthar is fairly good in the urban areas, and problematic in the rural areas. Electricity supply is more constant than in other parts of the country, due to the proximity to the Hydroelectric Dam in Barin. The coal mined is also converted to electricity.


Figure 27



Source: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Natural Resources

Province of Hanno

Figure 28



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue

Hanno's population, which makes up 6.63% of the population of Carana (567,503), is made up mostly of Falin (374,586) that are predominantly from the Hanari Muslim subgroup. As well, there is a sizeable Arab (9,045) and large Mahidi population (24,752) among others.


Overall, the province contributes 7.3% to the total GDP of Carana. The area surrounding the Kalesi River comprises of dense tropical rainforest, however, for the most part, much of the forest reserves in Hanno have already been cleared. As such the bulk of agric revenue comes from the growing of cash crops. Wide tracts of land are used to cultivate cocoa and cotton. During the implementation of the SAPs, agricultural production from Hanno increased significantly. With the mass lay off in the civil service, some individuals turned to agriculture as a source of livelihood. Many moved into the lucrative cocoa industry in Hanno, Barin and Leppko, boosting output of cocoa from these provinces. In 2008, the pod rot disease that hit the cocoa industry, severely reduced the volume of cocoa produced from this region, while the severe flooding across

the low lying cotton producing areas, conversely reduced cotton output. Thus, Hanno's contribution from agriculture to the nation's GDP of 5% in 2008, is a considerable reduction from previous years. The province of Hanno is the largest producer of cattle in Carana.

The province's contribution to Carana's industry is 1%. This limited contribution from industry is explained by the fact that many of the paper mills that operated in the province shut down as the timber industry in the region contracted with the shrinking of forest reserves in the province. As well, during the opening up of Carana's markets under the economic restructuring that took place in the mid-to-late 1980s, Hanno was one of the provinces that was greatly impacted. Many of its light manufacturing ventures could not effectively compete against higher quality cheaper goods flooding the market from the international market once trade was liberalized. Consequently, many companies were forced to close down. Even though Ogavo's government has attempted to rejuvenate Hanno's industry, pumping money into the textile industry, to date only limited progress has been made.

In the service sector, the province of Hanno contributes 1.3% to GDP. It has 3 radio stations, one government owned, and two privately owned, of which one is a secular broadcast, and one is a religious (Islamic) broadcast. The national television broadcast is available in the province, and 1 ISP provides internet services to cafes and limited users in the capital Maroni. There is 1 hospital with casualty and emergency facilities, as well as 6 health centres. Some households in Maroni are connected to the mains, but for the most part, there is large reliance on boreholes and open water sources in the rural areas. Electricity access in Hanno is better than in many of the other provinces since supply was extended when majority of the manufacturing ventures were set up.


Figure 29



Source: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Natural Resources

Province of Koloni

Figure 30



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue


The province of Koloni, which contains 5.43% of Carana's population (464,904), is one of two poorest provinces in Carana. The population is mostly Kori (427,151), who claim that they have been gravely marginalized by the Falin-led government (most Falin in government are of the Falari and Gatari subgroups). As well, there is a sizeable Arab population (10,657), among others. The small Mahidi population (4,659) that inhabit western Koloni are still nomadic, and travel northwards into Sumora during the dry season.

Altogether, Koloni's share of Carana's GDP is 2.1%. Of this, its greatest contribution (1.5%) is from its agriculture sector. Corn and millet are cultivated in the east; the western part of Koloni is far less fertile. The greater proportion of the population lives in the Arastak River Valley, along the western banks of the northern Torongo River, and Lake Egali in the north. As such, inshore fishing forms a fair share of Koloni's agriculture sector.

Koloni's industry consists of a few food processing ventures, a number of which have only recently been re-opened, following their closure during economic restructuring. As well, the clothing and shoe producing

enterprises that once produced traditional attires and shoes sold all over the nation, have all but collapsed. Overall, Koloni's contribution to the nation's industry sector as of 2008 is 0.4%. The province's contribution to the service sector is even smaller at 0.2%. CBC's television broadcast from Fellari reaching Koloni. Furthermore, there are two radio stations; one public the other private. There are no internet service providers operating within the province. There is 1 hospital with casualty and emergency capabilities, in addition to 4 health centres. Water supply is poor, and most residents rely on open surface water from the northern Torongo River, Arastak River and Egali Lake, as well as rainwater collection. The communal pumps present in some communities are the result of spending on infrastructure by the Falin-led government prior to elections. The same is true for the electricity connections in some areas. Electricity supply in Koloni remains very limited.

Figure 31




Source: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Natural Resources

While the introduction of tap water and electricity to some areas have been appreciated by the recipient communities, the Kori leadership for the most part have seen these gestures as tokenistic attempts by the Falin to win Kori votes.

Province of Leppko

Figure 32



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue

The province of Leppko has the largest area in Carana. With a share of 14.54% of the country's population (1,243,654), the province, has the third largest population in the nation. The population is mainly Tatsi (752,260), with a significant Indian (43,546) population residing in the province. As well, an extremely large population of Pleioni (148,674) are present in the area. The Pleioni and Indians are particularly enterprising, heading many of the businesses in the province. As such the Tatsi consider both groups a threat, and tensions between the Tatsi on one hand and the Indians and Pleioni on the other hand are high. Majority of the population lives in Corma, Eres and along the Kanani River. Even though the province is the second richest one in Carana in terms of contribution to GDP, most Tatsi consider themselves to be heavily marginalized.


Leppko contributes a total of 22% to Carana's GDP. The province has the strongest agric economy in all of Carana, contributing 16% to Carana's GDP. The forestry industry is strong. Western Leppko is covered with extensive tropical rainforest, while northern Leppko consists of tropical forest and farmlands. These farmlands produce the largest share of cocoa in Carana. All through the years however, there have been problems between the impoverished Tatsi cocoa farmers and the Falin-led government regarding matters of revenue from cocoa. This is because the cocoa farmers in Leppko, and other provinces, receive only a small fraction of the gains from the sale of cocoa on the international market. Most of the revenue goes to the Cocoa Sales Board, a government agency which purchases cocoa from local farmers and exports the crop. This Board

invests the profits from the international sale of cocoa in other industries. Cocoa farmers have complained for decades that the pay they receive hardly covers their basic living costs. Furthermore, they accuse corrupt government officials of lining their pockets with the profits of the farmers' hard work. The economic conditions for cocoa farmers have been particularly challenging in 2008, as the reduction of cocoa output, the result of pod rot infection, has meant that farmers have received even less pay. In addition to cocoa, sugarcane is also grown for exports in the province, although some of the crop finds its way to the sugarcane factory in Guthar. While Leppko still remains one of the main fishing provinces, in the last few years, its catches have been reduced due to illegal fishing by international trawlers off the province's coast. Most of Carana's goats and sheep are reared in Leppko.

Currently, Leppko's industry sector's contribution to GDP is 5%. The diamond mines in Leppko's northwest accounts for a large fraction of this figure. As well, meat factories, paper mills, wood processing and furniture companies have been opened by Pleioni and Indians within the province. While some of these manufacturing ventures are new, some are old ones that collapse under the weight of trade liberalization during the economic restructuring in the late 1980s/early 1990s and have recently been resurrected. If speculation from recent explorations suggesting that commercially viable reserves of offshore oil and gas are present off the coast of Leppko turns out to be true, the province would very well overtake Fellari as the richest province, in terms of contribution to GDP. However, given the current dynamics of mistrust between the Tatsi and Falin-led government, the potential for a crisis situation to arise from these offshore resources would be high.

Leppko's contribution to GDP from services is 1%. While a few areas can boast of good services, the reverse is true for the greater part of the province. There are 2 hospitals and 11 health centres in the province with intensive care, casualty, maternity and psychiatric facilities. As well, there are three radio stations, 1 government owned, one owned by a Pleioni company, and the other by an Indian company. The national television broadcast is accessible in the province. One ISP provides internet services to the urban areas. Tap water supply is fair in the urban areas, with some rural areas having communal taps installed during electoral campaigns by the Parti démocratique de Carana. Most rural areas rely on rivers and ponds for their water needs. Electricity supply outside of the mining and urban areas is poor. Here too, the party has attempted to gain votes through the extension of electricity to some rural Tatsi communities.


Figure 33



Source: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Natural Resources

Province of Mahbek

Figure 34



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue


Close to 10% (9.77%) of the population of Carana resides in Mahbek. Of this population of 836,079 people, the majority are Kori (681,451), with a very large group of Pleioni (68,426) and sizable group of Mahidi (10,316) also present. Most of the population lives in the central and northern parts of the province. There are communities along the northern Torongo River. The area close to the northern boundary with Koloni in comparison is thinly populated. Here too, while the province as a whole relatively fares well, the Kori claim that they are marginalized.

Mahbek's contribution to Carana's GDP is 15.9%. Of that, the share of agriculture is 7%. Although cotton grown for exports is a major contributor to this figure, forestry is the top income earner. The southern part of the province is covered with extensive tropical rainforest, with dense jungle to the east along the border with Leppko. Sheep and goats are reared in great numbers in Mahbek. Much of western Mahbek is however, semi-arid and consequently, only limited pastoral activity and farming takes place there.

The province's share of the national industry sector is 8%, the second highest after the province of Fellari. This is primarily attributed to the diamond mines to the northwest of the province which have received high levels of foreign direct investment in recent years. Mahbek also houses three meat processing factories and two canneries.

In services, its contribution the nation's GDP is 0.9%. Mahbek is served by the national television broadcast out of the province of Fellari, as well as 2 radio stations – 1 government owned, one privately owned. Like the province of Koloni, Mahbek has 1 hospital and 4 health centres, even though its population is nearly twice that of Koloni. The hospital has casualty and emergency as well as intensive care capabilities. Water supply is surprisingly good in many parts of the province. Those not connected to the mains use boreholes, communal pumps and drinking fountains. Many in remote areas draw water directly from lakes, streams and rivers. Electricity supply outside of the mining and urban areas is however limited, especially in the western part of the province.


Figure 35



Source: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Natural Resources

Province of Tereni

Figure 36



Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue


Tereni is the poorest and most sparsely populated province in Carana, contributing a meagre 0.7% to the nation's GDP. It is predominantly settled by the Kori. As well, a small Mahidi population (3,836), along with other small groups, is present. Overall, its population makes up 2.25% (192,202) of Carana's total population. Most of the population resides in the southern part of the province where the land is arable due the system of lakes and rivers running through the area. The elevated mountain region of Tereni is virtually uninhabited. The desert plateau on the other hand, is home to the Mahidi who to this day remain nomadic.

Due to its arid conditions, the province of Tereni contributes relatively little (0.5%) to Carana's agriculture sector. The low levels of rainfall make large-scale farming impossible. The exception is to the growing of oranges. The bulk of Carana's orange exports are grown in Tereni and mostly exported across the borders into Katasi and Sumora.

The lack of industries in the province, has led many NGOs to focus their economic efforts within Tereni. As such, many inhabitants of this province receive micro-credit and are involved in small-scale ventures such as textiles enterprises. Tereni's contribution to industry is negligible at 0.1%.

As well, its contribution to services is minimal (0.1%). The province has 1 government-owned radio station and receives the national television broadcast. There are no internet service providers in the province. There is however, 1 hospital and 3 health centres with casualty and emergency facilities. Water supply is poorest in this area, and indeed the Mahidi nomads clash with the settled populations over access to water. Outside of the provincial capital Alur, electricity supply is extremely limited. Even so, there are areas that benefited from efforts to win Kori allegiance through the provision of electricity during election campaigns.

Figure 37



Source: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Natural Resources

Altogether, while the economy of Carana in general is gravely underperforming, that of Tereni is even more dismal. As such, criminality across the border with Katsi is high. The Kori in Tereni have continually complained that the government has done very little to assist them out of their poverty; the Government of Carana ignores the concerns of this severely deprived region at great political cost.

OUTLOOK FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CARANA

Carana's government has managed to increase its revenues through profits from the primary export sector particularly in cocoa and cotton in the agricultural sector, and diamonds, gold, iron and other extracted resources in mining, when output has been high and/or international prices have been favourable. As such, as the agriculture sector bounces back, the government must increase investment in the sector and ensure the growth of export volumes. Additionally, the government must halt the rapidly expanding diamond smuggling trade, and must arrest the illegal transportation of logs across Carana's borders. This later challenge especially would necessitate a campaign against corruption as smuggling of logs is too often done through collusion with bribed government officials. If this development continues unchecked, the industry will contract sharply over the next few years.

Furthermore, the government must address the high unemployment and inflation rate, add to the nation's inadequate and crumbling infrastructure, and tackle budget sustainability problems. Over the years, imports have outstripped exports by an ever-increasing margin. While shrinking the trade deficit has been a goal of government, for the most part, this and other major challenges have seemingly remained a priority on paper only; this trend must be reversed.

None of these measures, even if implemented with the outmost diligence would be utterly effective if Carana continues to alienate the international economic community, given the interdependency of economies in the current globalized world market. The nation has taken a step in the right direction in commencing talks with its international economic partners on its debt repudiation stance. If, however, political tensions and instability in Carana worsen, it is likely that any gains the economy recovers and creates would be lost.



The following document outlines the primary characteristics of the six countries on the island of Kisiwa, on the subject of geography, history, society, religion, governance, law, economy, security and geopolitics. The countries of Carana, Katasi, Sumora and Rimosa are described through a Country Study which contains pertinent information on each of the nations, while the countries of Namuna and Mosana are described in a Country Profile, which provides a comparatively shorter summary.

Country Studies:

People's Republic of Katasi.....	1 - 1-13
Republic of Rimosa.....	2 - 1-12
Islamic Republic of Sumora.....	3 - 1-12

Country Profiles :

Republic of Mosana.....	4 - 1-11
Kingdom of Namuna.....	5 - 1-11

République populaire katasienne

SQUARE KILOMETRES: 81,205 KM²

POPULATION: 2,426,981

INDEPENDENCE: JULY 26, 1958

GEOGRAPHY

At 81,205 square kilometres, Katasi is the smallest country on the island of Kisiwa. It is landlocked, with its only water access coming through river systems leading to the Gulf of Kisiwa and the Indian Ocean on either side of the island.

HISTORY

Katasi has had a very turbulent history. It was once the territory occupied by the grand Kori Kingdom, since the 500s. For over a thousand years, the Kori dominated all groups on Kisiwa, except the Mosanja, who had a powerful society of their own.

Throughout their colonial history, the Kori held a strong anti-colonial sentiment against the Azurians who had authority over their country, and resisted them at every possible juncture. Independence in Katasi was achieved through great struggle; the transition from colony to independent state happened through popular uprising which led to a revolution.

By the early 1950s, there was an internal power struggle between the Kori King, Muta Dagbi IV and his dwindling number of supporters, and a group of revolutionaries and their growing number of followers. Both of these groups called for the independence of Katasi, but disagreed as to who should form the government. The revolutionaries claimed that the monarchy was archaic, and though it also called for the independence of the country, would merely subjugate the country under the royal family. The revolutionary movement called for a new collectivist-minded form of government and thus gained significant popular support. Although the Kori King had been considered the unofficial leader of native Katasians, independence would eventually come by revolution, led by this new group of leaders.

With the revolutionary movement having gained enough popular support, the group took-up arms and began demanding the withdrawal of the Azurians from their land. When violence erupted in 1955, the Azurian authorities moved their regional office (where they administered both Carana and Katasi) from Nanom, Katasi to Galasi, Carana. Thousands of Azurians escaped to Carana from the revolutionary movement in Katasi.

Eventually, the Azurians relented and a referendum was held to offer "eventual self-governance" within Azurian supervision and structure to all of the colonies of the Azurian Empire. The revolutionary leaders convinced the population to vote "No" at the referendum, opting instead to become fully independent immediately. Shortly there after, on July 26, 1958, Katasi became fully independent. The few Azurians that remained in the country returned to Azuria, or joined other Azurian sympathizers in Galasi, Carana.

After independence, the revolutionary leadership dissolved the monarchy, forcing King Muta Dagbi IV and the rest of the royal family to flee to Namuna. The King died two years later of a heart attack in 1960, and it would be his grandson who would later attempt to fight for the family's rightful place in Katasian society decades later.

The new leaders in Katasi then instituted a Socialist regime that continued until the late 1970s when the military led a coup d'état against the leader, Bariku Mori. This coup d'état was precipitated by unpopular actions taken by Mori, who became the leader of the Socialist regime in 1973. The military after ousting Mori, established a transitional civilian government to organize nation-wide elections, but this government refused to hand over power.

In 1991, a military regime again took control of the government, this time under the direction of Général Akpa Lamouné; the military has been in power ever since. It has however, been faced with repeated threats from King Muta Dagbi IV's grandson who, though still in exile in Namuna, has a strong following of Kori supporters both within Katasi and among the Kori Diaspora on the island and throughout the world.

SOCIETY

The population of Katasi is approximately 2.4 million. The male to female ration is 0.98 male(s)/female. The age structure of Katasi is as follows: 63.6% below 15 years, 35.4% between 16 and 60 years, and 1% above 60 years. The nation has the youngest population and highest growth rate (3.7%) on the island.

Katasi's population is almost entirely of African descent. Of the Afro-Katasian population, the majority are the Kori; representing 68 % of the population. During the glory days of the Kori Kingdom, this group was the most influential and revered on the island. Though the Kingdom had begun its decline by the first wave of colonization in the 15th century, the Kori still retained much of their authority and influence over other ethnicities. Their high standing continued to the point where, by the 19th century when modern day Katasi's borders were drawn, the King was the most powerful native in the nation. They continued to dominate Katasian traditional society; chiefs of other groups unquestionably accepted the Kori royalty as the top of the traditional leadership hierarchy. This lasted until the monarchy was abolished by the leaders of the revolutionary movement, who obtained power after independence. Even with their King in exile, the Kori maintained a high status in society, since the Kori had played a crucial role in the violence that led to the country's independence. To this day, the Kori continue to be the dominant and most affluent group in major political and social institutions in the country.

The next major ethnic group in Katasi are the Damangi who make up 12 % of the population. The presence of this group in Katasi dates back to the 16th century when, in an attempt to fight the declining power of the Kori Kingdom, a Kori ruler staged a failed effort to capture parts of the territory that is now Sumora, from the Damangi. The Damangi fiercely fought back and defeated the Kori, and sealed their victory by taking some of the Kingdom's land. With the drawing of Katasi's borders during the Treaty of Salin in 1882, the Damangi who had settled on these lands became part of Katasi. Over the years, the Damangi have mostly resided in rural areas of the country as cattle grazers, and rarely appear in political office, in military ranks or in the civil service. Though, in recent times many Damangi have begun being more engaged in national politics, partly linked to the increase of this group's education and literacy. Damangi-associated lobby and interest groups have increasingly begun giving a voice to this population on the national stage.

At the height of the Kingdom's rule, Tatsi (6% of Katasi's population) originating from Carana were captured and forced to serve in the courts and households of Kori royalty and other affluent families. As such, most of the current Tatsi population of Katasi are the descendents of these slaves, and continue to be regarded as the least successful and powerful group of Katasian society. The Tatsi continue to bear the burden of their past, and contempt from other ethnic communities in Katasi, due to their history of having acted as spies for the Azurians during colonization, which was especially never forgiven by the Kori. Consequently, they are covertly marginalized from high offices in the country, or are often openly discriminated against in many

venues. This mutual animosity has increasingly manifesting itself through violent clashes between the Tatsi and Kori population, with the Katasian government mostly responding through physical action against Tatsi, further fuelling this community's anger.

The remaining 14 % of the population consists of a myriad of other African ethnic groups, including the Falin, the Nakunda and the Mosanja, as well as minuscule Caucasian, Indian and Arab populations. None of these groups figure prominently in national politics and economic activity.

The official language of Katasi is French, although altogether, there are over 40 different languages and dialects spoken in the country. The most widely spoken language in the country is Bupuye, known by approximately 75 % of the population; Bupuye is the main language of the Kori people.

RELIGION

The Kori mostly subscribe to indigenous religions. During the colonial period, the Kori resisted attempts by missionaries to convert the population to Christianity. During this time, the Kori Kingdom had begun its decline, and thus, the Kori population clung to the vestiges of their former glory and identity, which was firmly grounded in their traditional religious practices and beliefs. The Kori saw these traditional beliefs as an intrinsic part of their identity; rejecting these beliefs would have implied denying their royal and powerful heritage. This conviction has been carried into modern times, to the extent that the average Kori and even government institutions continue to identify strongly with the religious traditions that flourished during the kingdom's era.

Still, there is an increasing portion of Kori who identify with various Christian denominations and Muslim sects. It is not infrequent for this population to fuse indigenous beliefs with their new faiths. Some Kori go to Church on Sundays or to the Mosque on Fridays, but observe days declared off by the traditional religious leaders. Another example would be for Kori women in rural areas to not carry their wares to the market on the first Tuesday of each month in honour of their village gods, while also being practicing Muslims or Christians. However, there are new converts, especially those who have joined charismatic churches that have distanced themselves from their traditional beliefs altogether.

The Damangi in Katasi, are mostly Muslim, with small portions of the remaining population following major world religions such as Hinduism and Judaism. The presence of these religions is a relatively new trend in Katasi.

GOVERNANCE

Katasi has been governed by a military regime since 1991 under the leadership of Général Akpa Lamouné since its takeover from the previous transitional government. The military regime is yet another stage in a very turbulent political history of the country. The regime justified their taking control from the civilian transitional government, by stating that the previous government had become authoritarian and was unable to govern unselfishly.

After the initial military coup in 1979 that ousted Bariku Mori, military officials acknowledged that the military should not govern the country, and made clear that a civilian transitional government would be soon established. But, ever since the most recent coup in 1991, officials have not scheduled a change of government. Lamouné's office has stated that the military would remain in power as long as it was needed by the people of Katasi. No elections have been scheduled.

Lamouné's government has severely restrained the civil and political rights of its citizens, notably through frequent arrests due to protests against the regime. Also, the military has established many austere rules that include strict curfews in the major cities. Media institutions work under a heavy dose of censorship, and political groups have been accused of sabotaging the potential for fair and just governance in Katasi.

Muta Dagbi V, the grandson of King Muta Dagbi IV, the famous Kori King who was forced to flee to Namuna after independence, has publicly stated his concern for the harsh environment of the country under Général Lamouné.

LAW

While the official judicial system in Katasi is based on civil law, in practice, customary laws play a large role in the lives of the Katasian population. For most people, traditional forms of justice take precedence over the official judiciary system.

The judicial system in Katasi is under-resourced, leaving it fragile and functioning haphazardly. Getting access to law-enforcement officers and legal professionals is often difficult, and legal processes are often delayed and drawn-out. Also, many cases of extra-judiciary executions have been reported, and impunity for powerful people is customary.

The Government of Katasi is currently a State Party to the following African treaties¹ :

Date	Treaty	Katasi
2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union	29-Apr-01
Abrogated & replaced by the Constitutive Act	OAU Charter, Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963	
1965	General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity	(s) 25-Oct-65
1980	Additional Protocol to the OAU General Convention on Privileges and immunities	
1967	Phyto-Sanitary Convention for Africa	
1968	African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources	
1969	African Civil Aviation Commission Constitution	23-Jun-04
1969	AU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa	1-Apr-93
1974	Constitution of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations	
1975	Inter-African Convention Establishing an African Technical Co-Operation Programme	
1977	Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa,	
1976	Cultural Charter for Africa	
1981	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights	30-Oct-92
1985	Agreement for the Establishment of the African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI)	2-Jul-94

¹ Identifies date of ratification or accession unless indicate with (s), in which date indicated signature of treaty only.

Date	Treaty	Katasi
2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union	29-Apr-01
1985	Convention for the Establishment of the African Centre for Fertilizer Development	
1990	African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child	
1991	Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Trans-boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa	(s) 30-Jan-91
1991	Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community	14-May-92
1994	African Maritime Transport Charter	
1995	The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty(Pelindaba Treaty)	
1998	Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights	
1999	OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism	
2001	Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament	2-Mar-03
2001	The Convention of the African Energy Commission	(s) 26-Oct-05
2002	Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union	(s) 9-Jul-02
2003	African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Revised Version)	
2003	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	
2003	Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union	
2003	Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union	
2003	African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption	
2004	Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism	
2005	The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact	

The Government of Katasi is currently a State Party to the following international treaties ² :

Topic	Treaty	Date	Reservation/ declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)
Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts	GC I-IV 1949	Geneva Conventions (I - IV)	2-May-63
	AP I 1977	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of international Armed Conflicts	30-Apr-93
	AP I Declaration 90	Declaration provided under article 90 AP I	
	AP II 1977	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts	30-Apr-93
	AP III 2005	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem	
	CRC 1989	Convention on the Rights of the Child	11-Mar-92
	OP-CRC-AC 2000	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict	
ICC	ICC Statute 1998	Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	(s) 3-Feb-04
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	Hague Conv. 1954	Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
	Hague Prot. 1954	First Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
	Hague Prot. 1999	Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
Environment	ENMOD Convention 1954	Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques	

² Identifies date of ratification or accession unless indicate with (s), in which date indicated signature of treaty only.

Topic	Treaty	Date	Reservation/ declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)
Weapons	Geneva Gas Prot. 1925	Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases	
	BWC 1972	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction	
	CCW 1980	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects	
	CCW Prot. I 1980	Protocol on non-detectable fragments (I)	
	CCW Prot. II 1980	Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices (II)	
	CCW Prot. III 1980	Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (III)	
	CCW Prot. IV 1995	Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention)	
	CCW Prot. II a 1996	Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Bobby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention)	
	CCW Amdt 2001	Amendment to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III)	
	CCW Prot. V 2003	Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III)	
	CWC 1993	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction	22-May-97
	Ottawa Treaty 1997	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction	1-Apr-01
	Cluster Munitions 2008	Convention on Cluster Munitions	(s) 3-Dec-08

Topic	Treaty	Date	Reservation/ declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)	
Human Rights Instruments	CESCR 1966	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	(s) 4-Apr-92	
	CCPR 1966	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights		
	OP1-CCPR 1966	Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights		
	OP2-CCPR 1989	Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights		
	CERD 1966	International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination	23-Oct-74	<i>Reservation: "The People's Republic of Katasi does not consider to be bound by the provision of article 22 and wishes to restate that for the submission of any dispute to the International Court of Justice for decision in terms of the said article, the consent of all parties to such a dispute is necessary in each individual case."</i>
	CEDAW 1979	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	16-Apr-82	
	OP-CEDAW 1999	Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women		
	CAT 1984	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	(s) 11-Dec-92	
	OP-CAT 2002	Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment		
	OP-CRC-SC 2000	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography		
	ICRMW 1990	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families		
	CRPD 2006	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities		
	OP-CRPD 2006	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities		
CPPCG 1948	Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	13-Mar-68		

ECONOMY

Population:	2.4m
GDP (PPP):	\$993m
GDP – per capita (PPP):	\$414
GDP real growth rate (annual %):	-3.4%
GDP – composition by sector:	Agriculture 86.9% Industry 5.4% Services 7.7%
Labour force:	850,000
Labour force – by occupation:	Agriculture 87% Industry 8% Services 5%
Gini index:	41.3
Human poverty index:	56.7
Human development index:	0.31
Unemployment rate:	45%
Inflation rate (consumer prices):	9.2%
Budget:	Revenues \$79.44m Expenditures \$105.26m
Agriculture – products:	fruits, groundnuts (peanuts), pigs, sheep, poultry, cotton
Industries:	timber, gold, zinc, tin, meat processing
Electricity – production:	219.9m k Wh
Oil – production:	0
Oil – consumption:	2616.3 bbl/day
Oil – exports:	0
Oil – imports:	2629.6 bbl/day
Oil proven reserves:	0

Exports:	\$886.67m f.o.b.
Export – commodities:	timber, gold, fruit and nuts, cotton, live animals and animal products
Export – main partners:	Russia 31.9%, China 26.7, Namuna 6.1%, Sumora 4.4%
Imports:	\$2.29b f.o.b.
Imports – commodities:	petroleum, consumer goods, rice
Import – main partners:	China 14%, Pakistan 13.4%, Russia 8.4%, Iran 5.2%
Debt – external:	\$4.4b
Currency (code):	KatAsian lura (₺)
ISO code:	KAL
Exchange rates:	₺ /USD: 16000
Fiscal year:	Calendar year

With the departure of Azurian authorities during the revolution, Katasi was left in a desperately war-torn state. The new socialist regime eventually turned to the Eastern bloc for support, and was granted assistance in the form of grants, loans and assistance. Initially, the bulk of the loans went towards the provision of infrastructure, including rail and road networks as well as dams. Some countries of the Eastern bloc chose to exchange consumer goods and machinery for Katasi raw materials. Though, the capital goods that were imported often required maintenance and additional purchases that were also purchased from the East; thus, deepening the country's external dependence on the power. During this time, opportunities were provided for Katasians to study in Eastern bloc countries; while some returned to Katasi after their studies with the aspiration of contributing to the development of the country, many established permanent residency in their country of study.

The assistance provided to Katasi from the Eastern bloc boosted its production during the 1960s, and into the first half of the 1970s. Still, the country's development lagged severely behind other Kisiwan countries, such as Mosana and Rimosana who more easily prospered after independence. This was mostly due to the government's repeated use of funding to purchase weaponry and other military assets; while this may have contributed to national security, it did not contribute to stimulating the economy. Also contributing to their lagging economy during this period was the absence of many profitable raw materials or at least, well-developed natural resource industries. While, the discovery and mining of gold historically propelled the Kori Kingdom, few other mineral deposits or other resources have been discovered.

Under President Mori, much of the aid received in the second half of the 1970s was diverted into personal projects of members of government or siphoned into overseas accounts. Infrastructure was left to deteriorate, and support for potentially productive ventures was largely halted. Subsidies to the agricultural industry that employs an immense portion of the labour force were cut. All of these factors caused a backlash from the populace that eventually led to a military coup against Mori.

This happened at the same time as the political and economic powers of the Eastern bloc began to wane. By

the end of the 1980s, Katasi was left without the support of the East, with a huge burden of debt, and little ties with the West. These internal and external factors led to the all-but-complete disintegration of the Katasian economy, from which the country has yet to recover.

Katasi is now considered one of the world's poorest countries. The military government firmly controls the economic activities in the country. Katasi currently receives most of its foreign aid from Asian countries; much of the aid that is received is used to address the severe unemployment rates of the country. Recent hikes in international food prices adversely affected Katasi, as it relies heavily on imported rice. Even in the face of increasing penalties, the island's illicit economy continues to flourish in Katasi. Weapons originating from the Cold War are sometimes common in the illegal dealings on the island. Recently, weapons originating from Katasi were said to be traced to the Pleioni in northern Rimosa and the Kori in parts of Carana, thus having the potential of significantly fuelling insecurity of these areas.

SECURITY

The Katasi Army numbers approximately 10,000 personnel, making it a significant size for its population. It includes a small tactical aviation component equipped with fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft with a limited strike capability. A limited number of small river patrol boats are also under Army control. The great majority of Army personnel are dismounted or truck-borne infantry.

Katasi equipment is almost exclusively obsolete Eastern Bloc pattern, and includes armoured vehicles and a small number of tanks (T-54/55 pattern). Small quantities of modern weapons and equipment have been issued to elite units in the national capital region.

The Katasi Army suffers from chronic shortages of parts and equipment, and low levels of training and discipline. The military enjoys a strong influence throughout the country, and frequently operates in support of the police forces.

Police forces exist in most towns and urban areas, but suffer from widespread corruption. (The military fills a gendarmerie/internal security role if required.)

Policing services in Katasi is a responsibility shared between two organizations: the National Police of Katasi, Police nationale katasienne (PNK), which falls under the Ministry of the Interior, and the Katasi Gendarmerie, Gendarmerie katasienne (GK), which falls under the Ministry of Defence. The PNK is a force of approximately 2,600 police officers, and has the mandate for the security and policing of cities and larger towns in Katasi, as well as administration of the prison system. They are not considered to be particularly effective, and are widely criticized for being corrupt. This stems in large part to a chronic lack of pay as well as equipment. The corrections system in particular has been the focus of criticism. Police officers are not given any special corrections training to work in prisons, and the prison system has been chronically under funded for many years. This has resulted in over-crowded prisons, staffed by under-paid and untrained prison guards.

The Gendarmerie force, numbered at 1,500, is mandated to provide policing services to rural areas, as well as provide security for airports, and borders. The GK also conducts internal security operations, and is equipped to deal with civil disturbances. Security of public buildings and security of government officials is provided by special units the armed forces of Katasi. Though better equipped and paid than their PNK counterparts, the level of training within the GK is also not very high, and they have been criticized by several human rights groups for numerous abuses of power and for dealing harshly with government critics.

GEOPOLITICS

National Dynamics

Severe restraints of human rights have caused heightened tensions between the military regime and certain groups of the population. The student population in the country's universities has been the most outspoken on the infringement of civil and political rights by the government, including the right to freedom of expression and the right to assembly. These students have been receiving support from students and human rights advocates from neighbouring countries, decrying the military regime and its austere rule.

Regional Dynamics

Many weapons in possession of the population of the island of Kisiwa originate from Katasi, where the country was lavishly equipped with weaponry during the Cold War. Many people in Katasi have successfully bartered stolen weaponry to neighbouring populations in exchange for money, diamonds and other luxury goods.

Katasi is at the centre of two high profile cases with other Kisiwa countries. In the first case, Katasi and Rimosa are at odds over a number of small islands in the upper Torongo River. Confusion over ownership of the islands is traced back to colonial times and the vague and conflicting agreements reached separately by the Azurian and Carmine regimes with local groups, exacerbated further by changes in the river channels caused by natural and man-made erosion. Today, this colonial legacy makes life difficult for the local populations as they struggle to exploit the river's resources and boat traffic without clear lines of border demarcation and governmental authority. The second case involves competing claims by Katasi, Namuna and Mosana to access the Namu River. This river forms part of the border between these three states and is one of the largest on the island, but it is not fully navigable and can only accommodate small to medium sized river craft. This has led to tremendous pressure from all users to have maximum access to the river's few docking facilities, fishing and resource rights and freedom of movement through some of the river's key bottleneck points. Given its landlocked status, Katasi is especially sensitive to these river access issues.

Diplomatic relations between Katasi and all other countries in Kisiwa are frigid at best. Relations are particularly sour with neighbouring Namuna, who has been harbouring the lineage of Kori royalty; currently, Muta Dagbi V, the grandson of the king who was exiled during the Kori revolution.

The regime has had difficult relations with neighbouring countries, and is seen as the biggest impediment to cooperation and diplomacy on the island, as well as the work of the Economic Community Organisation of Kisiwa (ECOK).

Republic of Rimosa

SQUARE KILOMETRES: 225,288 KM²

POPULATION: 12,281,148

INDEPENDENCE: SEPTEMBER 4, 1957

GEOGRAPHY

Rimosa is the fourth largest country on the island of Kisiwa. It is 225,288 square kilometres and is bordered to the west by Mosana, to the north by Katasi and Carana and with the Indian Ocean along its coastline.

HISTORY

The Carmines were the first non-Africans to settle permanently in Rimosa, after establishing trading posts along the Rimosan coast.

Decolonization in Rimosa was gradual and relatively tranquil. Ever since Carmina colonized Rimosa in the 17th century, there had only been small-scale revolts against these authorities. The Carmine rule was never seriously threatened and the relationship between the Carmine authority and the indigenous population was largely without friction. Carmine rule infringed relatively little on traditional social structures (in comparison to other regions in Kisiwa and mainland Africa). In fact, authorities greatly depended on traditional forms of leadership to implement their rule. As early as the 1920s, responsibilities became increasingly decentralized, and little by little through constitutions and treaties, power was transferred to the hands of the African population.

After the Second World War, having greatly benefited from the war-economy, the colony's economy continued to prosper. The return of troops from abroad meant that Rimosa had a presence of ex-service people that had received skills training during their time in service that benefited the public service in Rimosa. In the early 1950s, Carmine authorities and people in Rimosa started preparing for self-governance, as conventions and political parties started demanding independence. Independence came on September 4, 1957.

Johnson Robongo who led Rimosa to independence was revered as "Father of the Nation". His immense popularity guaranteed his re-election to a second term, and what should have been by Rimosa's constitution his final term in office. However, at the end of that term, he changed the constitution to permit his continued rule. Though still considered a great leader, this act diminished popular opinion towards him, and a large segment of the population began to see him as a self-centred autocrat. Although the situation did not result in a civil war, it came close; as his rule continued, tensions heightened. By the beginning of the 1990s, it was clear that if Robongo did not step down, Rimosa would be flung into violent conflict. Robongo finally agreed to hold multiparty elections in 1993; an election in which Togwe Donibwa unseated him in a landslide victory.

SOCIETY

Rimosa has a population of 12,281,148 people. Its male to female ratio is 1 male(s)/female, with its age structure being: 40 % under age 15, 55.3 % between the ages of 15 and 60 and 4.7 % above 60 years. The population growth rate in Rimosa is 2.42 %. The greater aging population (in comparison to other Kisiwan states), and lower population growth rate is deemed to be the result of the government's priority on establishing a well-functioning health services system throughout the country.

The three major African ethnic groups found in Rimosa are the Pleioni (45%), the Tatsi (of the Ellassoni tribe – 28 %), and the Kori (12%). Political power in Rimosa is not concentrated in the hands of any one group, but is often distributed among members of these three main ethnicities. In the social sphere, though not the largest group, the Ellassoni are the most prominent and enterprising. While initially settling in the north of Rimosa, in recent decades, many have migrated to the south and have been crucial to the economic development of the capital of Yudifa, and the major city of Brigatar. Yudifa continues to be the recipient of the effects of a huge urbanization phenomenon, especially by the Ellassoni.

There is also a non-African population (3.75%) in the country, primarily descendents of Carmine administrators and business people who moved to the country in earlier centuries. After independence, the Government of Rimosa offered citizenship to the Carmine population who chose to remain in the country. In recent decades, there has also been a migration of Chinese business people to the oil industry in Rimosa engaging in oil exploration activities, and they make up (0.25%) of the population.

Numerous other African ethnicities are also present and make up 11 % of the population. They include Falin, Coastal Tatsi, Damangi and others that migrated from other parts of Kisiwa to work on the sugar plantations in two waves, first in the 1940s, and then again in the 1980s when the sector began to recover from its near collapse in the 1970s following heaving flooding of the sugarcane plantations.

Prostitution has been another major draw for surrounding countries. Women from Carana and Katasi looking to escape the economic hardships in their respective nations travel south to their richer neighbour to partake in the illicit trade. In spite of Rimosa's better healthcare system, the prevalence of HIV/Aids in the nation is highest on the island, and as such, there is concern about the booming sex trade there.

As well, the trafficking of young girls from Katasi and Carana to work as domestic staff in Rimosa has become commonplace. It is a known issue that remains largely ignored by all countries in Kisiwa. However, in recent times, both local and international NGOs have exposed the practise and are requiring the Rimosan government, especially, to address the problem.

The official language of Rimosa is English. The majority of the population speaks a version of pidgin, which is a combination of English and a few local languages. Altogether, there are over 40 different languages and dialects spoken in Rimosa representing the diversity of ethnicities and tribes present in Rimosa.

RELIGION

Christianity is the most prominent religion in Rimosa, with the Ellassoni Tatsi, Pleioni and some Europeans, who together make up nearly 75% of the population, all practicing the religion. While other denominations are present in the country, historically, Anglicanism has held a position of importance. This is partly because a large segment of Rimosan Christians are Anglicans, but is particularly due to the fact that the Ellassoni, the most influential ethnicity in politics are Anglicans. As such, Anglicanism has played a significant role in the politics of Rimosa. Since multi-party elections became a staple on the Rimosan political scene, leaders of both the ruling party and many of the opposition parties have been Anglican. It is accepted that Rimosans generally vote along religious lines, and as such it is imperative to have a leader that the masses can identify with.

The Anglican Church in Rimosa, like others in Africa, is in disagreement with its western counterparts as to the acceptance of homosexuality within the church. As more attention has been paid to the issue, the government has stepped up efforts to prevent same sex unions in society.

In recent times, there has been a surge in the membership base of Evangelical churches that have sprung up

in Rimosa in the last two decades. A combination of new Christian converts, and Elassoni and Pleioni Anglican youth in the central and southern parts of the nation are fuelling this trend.

As in other parts of the island, the Kori in Rimosa generally follow indigenous African religions. However, there is a growing number of Kori here who are joining Pentecostal churches. The Kingdom of Jehovah's Witness has a visible presence in Rimosa, and is also attracting a share of the Kori converts.

As well, a small segment of the Rimosan population adheres to Islam.

GOVERNANCE

Ever since the powerful rule of President Robongo was brought down by ballot in 1993, the transition towards multiparty politics in Rimosa has faced many challenges, causing some disillusion and disappointment. Initially, President Donibwa and his party, the United People's Party of Rimosa (UPPR) who gained power in 1993, were not able to keep all of their campaign promises. This reality was met with great discontent and a sudden growth to no less than 77 political parties in Rimosa, with 10 main parties competing for seats in parliament. As a result, Rimosa has been governed by numerous coalition governments, resulting in frequent elections and changes in government positions. This has caused significant interruptions in governmental affairs and programmes and placed a strain on government finances, but the resource-rich economy has so far been able to somewhat sustain the pressures. The competitiveness of the field has also boosted several key figures to the national stage, all of whom rely on making very optimistic campaign promises that are not always achievable. However, the current State and government under President Kawla Yubango (who has been in power since 2003) and the head of government, Prime Minister Michael Ribabwe (who has been at his role since 2007) seems relatively stable, and has received positive feedback from the population.

The resource-rich economy of Rimosa has allowed some pockets of the population, including many within the government structure to become very wealthy. Accusations and findings of corruption have become common on the political scene.

The Government of Rimosa's continued strong ties with Carmina have received criticism from some of the population that deem this close relationship as neo-colonial.

LAW

Under the Carmine Empire, a system of common law was established in Rimosa, which includes a criminal law and a penal code. Prior to this, traditional law had governed social relations amongst the people of Rimosa.

After nearly a century of development, the common law system in Rimosa is well established and is overseen by a functioning judicial system. The court system is well established, but could benefit from additional resources. In Rimosa's rural areas, customary forms of justice continue to play an important role in the lives of the population, especially the Kori, for whom traditional laws continue to take precedence over formal law system on certain matters.

The Government of Rimosa is currently a State Party to the following African treaties¹ :

Date	Treaty	Rimosa
2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union	6-Sep-01
Abrogated & replaced by the Constitutive Act	OAU Charter, Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963	
1965	General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity	3-Apr-68
1980	Additional Protocol to the OAU General Convention on Privileges and immunities	
1967	Phyto-Sanitary Convention for Africa	12-Aug-68
1968	African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources	7-Jun-70
1969	African Civil Aviation Commission Constitution	2-Apr-90
1969	AU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa	28-Jan-74
1974	Constitution of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations	(s) 12-Dec-04
1975	Inter-African Convention Establishing an African Technical Co-Operation Programme	(s) 17-Oct-04
1977	Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa,	(s) 2-Nov-78
1976	Cultural Charter for Africa	
1981	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights	13-Feb-87
1985	Agreement for the Establishment of the African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI)	(s) 8-Nov-05
1985	Convention for the Establishment of the African Centre for Fertilizer Development	
1990	African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child	7-Aug-00
1991	Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Trans-boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa	
1991	Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community	15-Mar-93
1994	African Maritime Transport Charter	
1995	The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty(Pelindaba Treaty)	
1998	Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights	
1999	OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism	8-Dec-04
2001	Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament	31-Mar-02
2001	The Convention of the African Energy Commission	

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Date	Treaty	Rimosa
2002	Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union	16-Jun-03
2003	African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Revised Version)	(s) 1-Apr-04
2003	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	(s) 3-May-03
2003	Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union	(s) 22-Jul-03
2003	Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union	
2003	African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption	(s) 2-Feb-05
2004	Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism	
2005	The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact	

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	AP I 1977	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of international Armed Conflicts	24-May-84
	AP I Declaration 90	Declaration provided under article 90 AP I	
	AP II 1977	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts	24-May-84
	AP III 2005	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem	
	CRC 1989	Convention on the Rights of the Child	7-Jan-90
	OP-CRC-AC 2000	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict	2-Sep-02
ICC	ICC Statute 1998	Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	16-Apr-03
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	Hague Conv. 1954	Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
	Hague Prot. 1954	First Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
	Hague Prot. 1999	Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
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Weapons	Geneva Gas Prot. 1925	Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases	11-Dec-81
	BWC 1972	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction	4-Nov-81
	CCW 1980	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects	(s) 10-Apr-81
	CCW Prot. I 1980	Protocol on non-detectable fragments (I)	
	CCW Prot. II 1980	Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices (II)	
	CCW Prot. III 1980	Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (III)	
	CCW Prot. IV 1995	Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention)	
	CCW Prot. II a 1996	Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Bobby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention)	
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	Ottawa Treaty 1997	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction	17-Dec-04
	Cluster Munitions 2008	Convention on Cluster Munitions	(s) 3-Dec-08

Topic	Treaty	Date	Reservation/declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)	
Human Rights Instruments	CESCR 1966	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	17-Apr-92	
	CCPR 1966	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	17-Apr-92	
	OP1-CCPR 1966	Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	17-Apr-92	
	OP2-CCPR 1989	Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights		
	CERD 1966	International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination	12-Sep-74	
	CEDAW 1979	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	2-Feb-94	
	OP-CEDAW 1999	Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	(s) 3-Mar-01	
	CAT 1984	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	22-Aug-99	<i>Declaration: "[The Government of Rimosa declares] in accordance with Article 30 (2) of the said Convention that the submission under Article 30 (1) to arbitration or the International Court of Justice of disputes between State Parties relating to the interpretation or application of the said Convention shall be by the consent of ALL the Parties concerned and not by one or more of the Parties concerned."</i>
	OP-CAT 2002	Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	22-Jun-06	
	OP-CRC-SC 2000	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography	2-Sep-02	
	ICRMW 1990	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families		
	CRPD 2006	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities		
	OP-CRPD 2006	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities		
CPPCG 1948	Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	28-Mar-61		

ECONOMY

Population:	12.3m
GDP (PPP):	\$7.25b
GDP – per capita (PPP):	\$589
GDP real growth rate (annual %):	2.2%
GDP – composition by sector:	Agriculture: 65% Industry: 25% Services: 10%
Labour force:	6.8m
Labour force – by occupation:	Agriculture: 71% Industry: 17% Services: 12%
Gini index:	65
Human poverty index:	40.1
Human development index:	0.44
Unemployment rate:	24.3%
Inflation rate (consumer prices):	6.5%
Budget:	Revenues \$320m Expenditures \$418m
Agriculture – products:	sugarcane, wheat, millet, rice, mangos, vegetables, sheep, goats
Industries:	mining, small commercial ship repair, sugar, cement, tourism
Electricity – production:	326m k Wh
Oil – production:	0
Oil – consumption:	7389 bbl/day
Oil – exports:	0
Oil – imports:	7440 bbl/day

Oil proven reserves:	16m bbl
Exports:	\$390m f.o.b.
Export – commodities:	copper, aluminum, bauxite, nickel, fish, sugar
Export – main partners:	Carmina 49.9%, UK 20.7%, China, 4.6% Carana 4.1%, Madagascar 3.2%
Imports:	\$1.0374b f.o.b.
Imports – commodities:	chemicals, petroleum, machinery and equipment, capital goods
Import – main partners:	Carmina 12.2%, UK 9.5%, Mosana 8.3%, China 6.9%, Pakistan 5.8%, Japan 5.8%, Netherlands 5.4%, USA 4.2%
Debt – external:	\$1.4b
Currency (code):	Rimosan dollar (R\$)
ISO code:	RID
Exchange rates:	R\$/USD: 1438
Fiscal year:	Calendar year

Rimosa's relatively stable political situation has allowed the nation to experience modest, yet sustained economic growth. With its rich natural resources, the years following independence were prosperous for the nation. The government invested significant portions of its mineral export earnings into the agricultural industry, focusing on sugarcane production and exports. For years, sugarcane plantations employed the bulk of farmers, although many others practiced subsistent farming on the side or exclusively. However, the sugarcane industry was nearly devastated in 1970 and 1971 when heavy floods swept through much of the growing fields. It took numerous years, and significant international assistance for the industry to recover from this shock. Henceforth, the government invested in sugar producing factories, and soon the country was exporting sugar. Gradually, the government expanded its investments into manufacturing ventures, cement production, and later into small commercial ship repair. The service sector grew, primarily on the strength of the tourism boom in the south along Rimosa's sandy beaches.

Although agriculture has consistently been the biggest contributor to GDP, the mining sector contribution has constantly grown. Both wealthy natives and Azurian refugees that fled Katasi during its revolution, (and to a lesser extent, from Carana when this country's economy spun out of control) have invested in this sector. Though by far, the mining sector has received its greatest injection of funds through foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly from Asia. In recent times, the Chinese especially, have been investing in oil exploration activities, further boosting industry's contribution to economic growth.

In spite of the gains made in the mining sector, the industry has been the source of hostilities in the northern parts of the country, where the Pleioni and Elassoni (Tatsi) have engaged in periodic fights over control of small mining operations for decades. As a result of this, northern Rimosa remains extremely poor and

underdeveloped in comparison with the rest of the country; here, the quality of infrastructure is shockingly different to the rest of the country. Consequently, many have fled into southern Carana, and in more subdued times, migrated to southern Rimosan cities. The capital of Yudifa has been at the receiving end of a sizeable proportion of migrants from the north, in addition to normal rates of migration. The capital city is thus struggling to cope with the associated negative impacts of this urbanization phenomenon including the proliferation of slums throughout the city.

Other challenges facing the economy include price volatility linked to its resource exports; foreign exchange earnings have continued to fluctuate even though, this becomes less of a problem as industry expands. Of great concern to the Rimosan government is the country's large shadow economy which has reduced the government's tax base. Heavy regulations have been implemented to halt Rimosa's ports being used as a transit point for the narcotics. Like other countries on the island, Rimosa continues to struggle with piracy and vandalism activities attacking vessels pulling into its ports.

SECURITY

The Rimosan Defence Forces (RDF) number 11,000 personnel, divided between the Army (7,000), Navy (1,500) and Air Force (2,500). Recent reforms have resulted in a comparatively modern and well-equipped force. Much of the older equipment is Western in origin; recent acquisitions have included the Piranha MICV.

The RDF is an all-volunteer force, recognized as having among the highest training standards in the region. It has participated in multinational exercises and deployed limited numbers on peacekeeping operations elsewhere in Africa.

Police in Rimosa are under local government control, and there is no gendarmerie force. The RDF may be tasked to act in aid of the civil power or to provide other support to police forces as required. Police-military cooperation is assessed as good.

The Republic of RIMOSA has a single police force, the Rimosa National Police Force (RNP), which falls under the Ministry of Justice. The RNP number approximately 18,600, and are have the mandate for all policing services in Rimosa. Separate organizations, falling under the RNP, manage security for ports, airports, borders, customs and the security of sensitive locations. The largest numbers of police are in urban areas, with smaller detachments in rural areas. RNP in rural areas generally works quite well with traditional leadership in communities, who usually prefer local customary law over the more modern (and Carminian-based) common law which dominates in urban areas.

The RNP is comparatively well run and funded compared to other national police forces in KISIWA. That said, salaries for lower-ranking police officers are quite low, particularly in comparison with average salaries of those in the military, which is a point of friction between the two services. To offset the low salary (especially for those in cities, where the cost of living is quite high) police officers frequently rent out their services to businesses and other organizations (particularly those in urban areas with high crime rates) for extra money. While this practice is technically illegal, senior police officers tend to turn a blind eye. This has caused some concern by groups in Rimosa, as some police officers have been accused of being involved in organized criminal organizations and other illegal activity.

GEOPOLITICS

National dynamics

Tensions between the Elassoni (Tatsi) and Pleioni populations have existed for many centuries, and the discovery of copper in the 1940s has exacerbated these tensions. The illicit export of copper and other resources across the border with Katasi has also fuelled tensions between these populations and government officials in Rimosa, especially in lower levels of government. Government officials have been turning a blind eye to the issue of illicit exports into Katasi, as well as the tensions that sometimes erupt into conflict between the Elassoni and Pleioni.

The arrival of Chinese oil companies conducting oil explorations in the country has been met with stark condemnation by some who consider these companies exploiters. Oil company executives and workers have been the victim of targeted attacks along the southern coast of the country, where many of the explorations are taking place. Many attacks against Chinese oil workers and executives have been reported, including several kidnappings and killings. These attacks have been met with disapproval by leaders and politicians and many unemployed people, fearing that the Chinese companies will leave Rimosa, and that hundreds of potential jobs would be lost. The Rimosan population is polarized, and many protests against the Chinese companies have been frequented by supporters of the projects, and have turned violent.

Even though the political scene is enjoying a calm period and the coalition government is functioning relatively well, disappointment and discontent in the post- Robongo era and recent corruption scandals have provoked an erosion of public trust in the State and its politicians. Protests against the State and government are frequent, and popular support is a rarity.

Regional dynamics

The conflict in the north of the country has taken on a regional dimension as refugees have poured into southern Carana. The Rimosan government claims that some instigators of the current conflict are masquerading as refugees in southern Carana. As such, it has requested that Carana extradite these rebel leaders to be tried in Rimosa; a request the Caranese government has turned down, indicating that it has no way of tracking these individuals.

In spite of its challenges with Carana, the Rimosan government is attempting to work together with the nation, and also with Mosana to find solutions to the negative impacts of Katasi's smuggling activities on their respective economies.

Al Jumhuriyah al Islamiyah al Sumorah
Islamic Republic of Sumora

SQUARE KILOMETRES: 315,939 KM²

POPULATION: 4,472,503

INDEPENDENCE: JUNE 25, 1963

GEOGRAPHY

At 315,939 square kilometres, Sumora is the second largest country on the island of Kisiwa behind Mosana. Located on the northeast side of the island, it is bordered on the southeast by Carana, southwest by Katasi, west by Namuna, and by the Indian Ocean on the north and east of the nation.

HISTORY

The territory that is now Sumora came under the influence of the Berber Almoravid Dynasty in the 1070s, and that of white traders and slavers in the 1400s. With the 1882 Treaty of Salin, the Sabelians were left in control of Sumora. After the collapse of the Sabelian Empire, Sumora became a League of Nations mandated territory, administered by the colonial empire of Carmina, and later a United Nations' Trust Territory.

The period after the end of the Second World War had already proven difficult in the country, and resistance against colonial rule was increasing. With thousands of ex-servicemen and service soldiers on their way back from missions where they had witnessed strong nationalism, Sumoran nationalism was soon born.

In Sumora, the news of Rimosa's independence was received enthusiastically. Many people had traveled to Rimosa to witness the independence proceedings and listen to the coverage on the radio. Since this event in 1957, both African and Arab populations increased their call for independence.

Prior to this, Baliru Amadi, having won the support of Sumorans, led a popular independence movement in the country which he had hoped could remain non-violent. But in September 1956, after protesters in Wabaga were assaulted by Carmine authorities during a rally against the colonial rule, Amadi urged his supporters to pick-up arms and seek justice and independence for Sumora. Riots and attacks against Carmine rule quickly ensued, and after seven years of fighting, independence was achieved on June 25, 1963.

At independence, power was transferred from the Carmine authorities to primarily the Falin who were the most educated group in the country, and already occupied many posts in the civil service.

Since independence, Sumora has been a de facto single party State under the Union for Leadership and Progress (ULP), with a succession of Falin leaders being elected as Head of State. Though the Falin have been in power for four decades and have managed to amass wealth, the drilling of oil on Damangi land has helped enrich this population, and could well tip the power scale in their favour.

SOCIETY

The population of Sumora is 4,472,503, with the male to female ratio being 0.93:1. The age structure is as follows: 55.8% under age 15, 42.2% between 15 and 60 and 2% above 60. The current population growth rate is 3.42, the second highest on the island after Katasi.

Sumoran society consists primarily of the Damangi who make up approximately 64% of the population. At one time, this group was predominately nomadic, but in more recent times, many have settled and are engaged in agricultural production. Still, about a tenth of the population is currently identified as nomadic. Even though the Damangi are the majority ethnicity in Sumora, they are also the least educated group in the country.

The Damangi are followed in size by the Falin (mostly of the Hanari (8%) and Barini (14%) subgroups), and though small in number, are the most educated and powerful group in Sumora. A multitude of other African ethnic groups are present and constitute approximately 4% of the populace.

A sizeable Arab population making up 8.9% of the population also resides in Sumora. These are descendants of traders from the Middle East who eventually settled in the country. Though not wielding an exceptional portion of the political power, this group occupies a position of privilege in Sumoran society. Lebanese businessmen and their families, and Caucasians investors, development workers and diplomats account for the remainder of the population. The remaining non-African population makes up the remaining 1.1% of the population.

A multitude of languages are spoken among these ethnicities, with the official languages being Arabic and English.

RELIGION

The state religion of Sumora is Islam. The Damangi converted to the religion when the Almoravid Dynasty established itself in modern day Sumora in the 12th century. Later the religion would be re-energized by the influence of the Matola caliphate.

The Damangi, Hanari Falin, Barini Falin and Arabs (descendants of settlers from the Middle East) in Sumora are Muslim, though of different sects. As with other major religions on the island, the natives incorporated their own traditional beliefs and customs into Islam. Ultimately, differences developed among the various ethnicities. While many of these disparities did not pose any challenges, disagreements between the Barini and Hanari Falin degenerated into conflict that forced segments of these two groups to flee south to Carana, and thus their presence in Caranese society today. For decades however, major tensions had been absent between the groups.

Even with Islam being the state religion, religious freedom currently exists. There is a small Christian population made up of other Africans, Caucasians and Lebanese (some Lebanese are Muslim). Proselytizing Christian religions have enjoyed growing popularity, which has become a contentious issue among Islamic conservatives in government.

GOVERNANCE

Islam has been the religion of the great majority of the Sumoran population, since its early history. For centuries, Muslim leaders have occupied a vital role in the political affairs of the country, as well as in civil society at large. These religious leaders traditionally occupied a role of community caretakers, responsible for bringing guidance, provision and education to their followers. To this day, Muslim leaders provide food, shelter and education to populations that would not otherwise have access to these in the country.

Muslim leaders have always had an influential voice in the politics of the country. During decades of instability resulting from changes in administrative powers, Muslim leaders were a stabilizing and calming force to many in the population. When the country was administered by the Carmine authorities, civil servants sought the advice of Muslim leaders, specifically on religious affairs, but also in other domains, due to the religiosity of the population. Through this affiliation, Muslim leadership became an influential voice in the governance of the country, and gained access to certain powerful roles within the administration.

With independence, power was mostly transferred to a population of Muslim Falin who occupied important roles in the civil service during colonization. These new governors had close ties with the religious leadership of the country, and many of them were religious figures themselves. It naturally ensued that an independent Sumora would be governed as an Islamic Republic. The Islamic roots and traditions of the country are the centre of Sumoran culture and pride.

The Islamic nature of the Sumoran government has rarely been a point of internal debate in the country. While there have been periods of popular unrest, these were mostly directed at the de facto one-party State under the Union for Leadership and Progress (ULP), not the Islamic nature of government. In the post-independence period, there have also been bouts of dispute, sometimes turning violent, between groups of Muslim leaders of different sects and tribes, vying for prestigious and powerful roles within Sumoran society, and the State.

Sumora has been holding democratic multiparty elections since 1986. The current President Baba Sulumani has been in power since 1996, and is in his third term in office.

LAW

The judicial system in Sumora is based on Common law, but with significant elements of Shari'a law. Traditional forms of justice are practiced amongst the non-Muslim population, though these norms are not recognized in the judicial system.

Ever since the Common law system was established under the Carmine Empire, a portion of the Muslim population has called for its abolishment, and for the subsequent institutionalization of Shari'a law; this proposition has never received significant traction within government. Outside of the big cities, judicial procedures are often influenced by local authorities, who are often Muslim leaders.

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1968	African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources	4-Dec-73
1969	African Civil Aviation Commission Constitution	10-Apr-02
1969	AU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa	3-Mar-81
1974	Constitution of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations	
1975	Inter-African Convention Establishing an African Technical Co-Operation Programme	
1977	Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa,	14-Sep-77
1976	Cultural Charter for Africa	26-Aug-78
1981	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights	13-Dec-84
1985	Agreement for the Establishment of the African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI)	(s) 8-Apr-86
1985	Convention for the Establishment of the African Centre for Fertilizer Development	
1990	African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child	29-Mar-98
1991	Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa	
1991	Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community	4-Jul-94
1994	African Maritime Transport Charter	9-May-05
1995	The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty(Pelindaba Treaty)	
1998	Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights	
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2003	Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union	(s) 11-May-03
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	AP III 2005	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem	
	CRC 1989	Convention on the Rights of the Child	19-Nov-90
	OP-CRC-AC 2000	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict	(s) 29-Apr-05
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	Hague Prot. 1954	First Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
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	CCW Prot. I 1980	Protocol on non-detectable fragments (I)	27-Jan-96	
	CCW Prot. II 1980	Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices (II)	27-Jan-96	
	CCW Prot. III 1980	Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (III)		
	CCW Prot. IV 1995	Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention)		
	CCW Prot. II a 1996	Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Bobby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention)		
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	CCPR 1966	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	11-Jan-93	<i>Reservation: The Government of Sumora interprets the provisions of article 23, paragraph 4, on the rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage as not affecting in any way the prescriptions of the Islamic Shariah.</i>
	OP1-CCPR 1966	Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights		
	OP2-CCPR 1989	Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights		
	CERD 1966	International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination	18-Nov-78	
	CEDAW 1979	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	27-Oct-98	
	OP-CEDAW 1999	Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women		
	CAT 1984	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	30-Mar-05	
	OP-CAT 2002	Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment		
	OP-CRC-SC 2000	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography	(s) 29-Apr-05	
	ICRMW 1990	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families		
	CRPD 2006	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities		
	OP-CRPD 2006	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities		
	CPPCG 1948	Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide		

ECONOMY

Population:	4.5m
GDP (PPP):	\$2.42b
GDP – per capita (PPP):	\$538
GDP real growth rate (annual %):	1.7%
GDP – composition by sector:	Agriculture 72% Industry 12% Services 16%
Labour force:	1.9 m
Labour force – by occupation:	Agriculture 82% Industry 10% Services 8%
Gini index:	39.5
Human poverty index:	45.0
Human development index:	0.383
Unemployment rate:	27%
Inflation rate (consumer prices):	3.8%
Budget:	Revenues \$193.6m Expenditures \$256.5m
Agriculture – products:	coffee, cassava, vegetables, corn, papaya, beans, banana, pineapples, cattle
Industries:	glassware, diamond and copper mining, food processing, small-scale manufacturing
Electricity – production:	167.4m k Wh
Oil – production:	0
Oil – consumption:	6240 bbl/day
Oil – exports:	0
Oil – imports:	6500 bbl/day

Oil proven reserves:	400m bbl
Exports:	\$399m f.o.b.
Export – commodities:	diamond, coffee, bananas, cassava, glassware, light consumer goods, pineapples
Export – main partners:	Carmina 12.1%, UK 10.1%, Pakistan 8.6%, Kenya 6.5%
Imports:	\$600m f.o.b.
Imports – commodities:	Petroleum, foodstuffs, consumer goods
Import – main partners:	Saudi Arabia 9.7%, UAE 9.4%, UK 8.9%, Germany 7%, Katasi 6.5%, Iran 5.4%
Debt – external:	\$1.7b
Currency (code):	Sumoran dinar (SD)
ISO code:	SD
Exchange rates:	SD/USD: 4941
Fiscal year:	Calendar year

Sumora is primarily a resource-based economy. Its main exports are coffee, diamonds, banana, and cassava. Although the service sector has grown over the last two decades, agriculture has remained the country's most important sector, with the export of coffee bringing in the bulk of its foreign reserves. Sumora has had a comparatively stable political situation since independence and as such, continuity in economic policies and implementation has been possible, although the nation has not been spared from the international economic conditions that have impacted other African countries.

With its diamond deposits and reputation for producing high grade coffee beans, Sumora's economy was one of the fastest growing in the years following independence on the island, and was on track to becoming the outright economic leader. Not wanting to be left behind in the push for industrialization, the government made the decision to borrow huge sums to finance two mega dam projects and build up its manufacturing base. However, as with other countries on the island and on mainland Africa, the oil crisis of the 1970s hit the nation hard. Many manufacturing ventures shut down, and the construction of the second dam was suspended. To make matters worse, the nation was hit by drought and famine in the mid to late 1970s. That, coupled with the country's bout of armed hostilities with Namuna in 1976, caused its production of coffee to plunge.

Under these deteriorating economic conditions, Sumora turned to the international financial institutions for assistance. These provided loans under the condition that the country's economy was restructured. The Sumoran government agreed, and set about implementing changes from the mid-1980s. In the 1980s and 1990s, the country attempted to rebuild its manufacturing sector, but the opening of the markets meant that many of these ill-equipped ventures proved uncompetitive and went out of business. Cuts to services and other negative socio-economic impacts rendered the government unpopular among the Damangi majority,

many of whom took to the streets to protest against the government. After years of unsuccessful attempts at growing the manufacturing sector, in 2000, the government decided to invest in agriculture. This was a welcomed move, as over 80% of workers in Sumora are employed by the agriculture sector, and it is the biggest contributor to national GDP.

In recent years, the government has invested in the provision of greater numbers of agricultural officers to assist farmers in boosting production. To address price volatility concerns, the government has diversified the export base and branched into non-traditional exports, helping to increase production particularly in the horticultural industry. Over the last five years, pineapples and bananas have emerged as the greatest export earners in the horticultural industry. More emphasis has been paid to these two as similar transportation conditions are required for both fruits. Since 2000, the non-traditional export sector, which also includes processed and semi-processed goods, has raised its contribution to gross domestic product by 5 %.

Currently, the nation's economic growth rate is positive and has been increasing over the past few years, even if only gradually. The discovery of oil reserves has the potential to speed up the growth process if the resource is handled properly. However, there are already signs of trouble, as the Damangi who own the oil-rich areas, are crying foul at government proposals to resettle them. There have been incidents of rebel elements kidnapping Chinese oil executives and Falin government officials for extortionist purposes and to draw international attention to their plight.

Furthermore, unemployment among the Damangi is very high, and many have resorted to illegal mineral and arms trade. Currently one diamond mine is controlled by a rebel group that identifies itself as the Damangi Freedom Fighters (DFF). If Sumora's economy is to continue to grow, its government would have to effectively tackle these challenges.

SECURITY

The armed forces of Sumora total 12,000, including the Sumoran Army (8,500), Navy (750) Air Force (1,250), and Gendarmes (1,500). The officer corps is almost exclusively drawn from the Falin minority, and political loyalty plays an important part in military life. The armed forces maintain a range of fairly old equipment types of mostly Western origin. Service is by selective conscription.

Military training is assessed as limited, with a strong focus on internal security and support to police forces. The exception would be the Army "Palace Guard" (1,000), composed primarily of Falin, and receiving better pay, training and equipment. Morale elsewhere in the armed forces is assessed as poor.

The Gendarme force is responsible for border security, customs and immigration and support to local police forces (maintained at provincial level).

The Islamic Republic of Sumora has a dual system for policing services, with a Gendarmerie present at the federal level, and a provincial-level police force. Regular policing services in Sumora are provided at the provincial level. Each province maintains its own police force, and is responsible for general policing duties, investigations of minor crimes, traffic control, and policing in rural areas. The provincial police total approximately 4,000 police officers. The ethnic balance within the police force is more regionally representative, however nearly all the senior positions are taken by Falin. The Provincial Police suffer from chronic under funding and a lack of standardized training across the provinces. Further, there is significant friction between the Provincial Police and the Gendarmerie, mainly stemming from the significant pay disparity between the two services.

The Sumora Gendarmerie (SG) falls under the Ministry for Internal Security & Civil Protection. Numbering approximately 1,500 (exact numbers are difficult to determine), the SG is responsible for border services, ports and airports, provision of Formed Police Units for riot control, serious criminal investigations, and the protection of state buildings. Another group of note within the SG, known as the Directorate for Documentation & Security (DDS), have been at the centre of a number of alleged human rights abuses, are widely believed to be behind a number of criminal activities, such as harassment, illegal detainment, and surveillance of critics of the Government of Sumora. The SG is dominated by the Falin, the most influential ethnic group in Sumora, and the senior ranks of the SG are all Falin elites. Consequently, the SG enjoys better wages than their provincial police counterparts, and has a much higher standard of training.

GEOPOLITICS

National dynamics

Successive governments have sought to control the populace through the control of information and the suppression of free speech. All broadcasting stations and major newspapers are state-owned, and the government heavily censors other media. In response to international criticism of the state's oppressive stance mostly directed at the Damangi, the Falin-led government of Sumora has claimed that this is necessary to prevent dissidents from stirring up trouble. What is certain is that the ongoing repression is heightening tensions between the Damangi and Falin.

Since the commencement of oil drilling, tensions are brewing between the government and the Damangi who occupy the oil-rich zones. Oil drilling has forced some populations to move, and while the government has built new villages intended for the affected populations, some Damangi are refusing to move, making claims of ancestral land. Those who are moving to the new villages are seeking a larger share in the profits than was originally promised. There have been serious riots, and both government officials as well as foreign company executives have been the targets of increasing violence. In the wake of these riots, the Damangi have also gained control of one of the four small diamond mines. These occurrences are reminiscent of conflict that occurred during the forced move of Damangi for the construction of dams, one of which was not completed due to a existing economic conditions at the time.

Further straining the relationship between these two groups is the long-standing socio-economic marginalization of the Damangi majority, especially their nomadic communities. This population has been clashing with police over the free movement of their animals; no resolve is expected in the near future. Overall, there is growing discontent among the Damangi, and their grievances, if left to fester, would likely result in a large-scale outbreak of violent conflict.

Regional dynamics

Tensions between the Sumoran and Caranese governments are growing as negative rhetoric from either side escalates in relation to growth in radical activities of the True Islamist Movement. This extremist group is based in Sumora, but is expanding its influence into Carana.

Early in his first term, former President Mahma Bgami fought a strong war of words against the first President of Mosana, Sankwaduro Mosindiga, who accused the Sumoran state of, among other things, being inflexible, and consequently retarding the growth and development of the nation. Relations between the countries have however improved under succeeding Presidents, but remains reserved.

Relations are also historically hostile between the Sumoran State and the Namunan monarchy. President Baba Sulumani and King Awuda Baga have broken off relations, and ambassadors from each country have been withdrawn. The Namunan royal family have long since decried the religious state as repressive. The arbitrary boundary between Namuna and Sumora has been at the centre of long-standing disputes and violence. Religious minority populations on either side of the border (Christians in Sumora and Muslims in Namuna) are often labelled as ungrateful and disloyal populations, sympathizing with the religious views of their neighbouring state more than their own. This backlash has been particularly harsh in Namuna, against the Muslim minority along the border. Disputes and attacks between nomadic populations that roam on both sides of the border and settled populations in the area have also been a grave security concern, though the governments disagree on how to resolve the situation.

International dynamics

A radical organization calling itself the True Islamist Movement, in the last decade has been calling for stricter adherence to Islam among “slack” followers; claims have been made that this group has links to radical terrorist groups internationally. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States of America, this group has come under international scrutiny, with the Sumoran government being asked to disassemble the group.



Republic of Mosana

SQUARE KILOMETRES: 403,322 KM²

POPULATION: 10,278,325

INDEPENDENCE: JULY 20, 1961

GEOGRAPHY

With an area of 403,322 square kilometres, Mosana is the largest country on Kisiwa. The country is surrounded by the Indian Ocean on all sides with the exception of the border it shares with Katasi at its north-eastern corner, and another it shares with Rimosa on its east.

HISTORY

Modern-day Mosana was part of a larger area originally occupied by the Mosanja who amassed wealth through the widespread cultivation of cotton and the sale of crafts to merchants en route to India. They came into contact with white traders in the 1400s, and with the Treaty of Salin came under the control of Carmina.

The attainment of independence by Rimosa and other states inspired events in Mosana. Sankwaduro Mosindiga, a lawyer from poor roots found widespread support both among the masses and the elite of Mosana. As chair of the Free People's Party (FPP), he pushed for two successive constitutions in 1954 and 1958 that increasingly granted more powers to the Mosanja. The 1954 Constitution laid the groundwork for complete self rule and led to the proclamation of independence in December 1958. On July 20, 1961, Mosana became the independent Republic of Mosana.

SOCIETY

The population of Mosana is 10,278,325, with a male to female ratio of 1.01 male(s)/female. The age structure is as follows: 36.7% below the age of 15 years, 58.3% between 15 and 60 years and 2.4% above 60 years. The nation has the lowest population growth on the island at 1.82%.

The Mosanja, the major ethnic group, make up approximately 67% of the population. This group dominates traditional hierarchies and public office in Mosana. It is followed by the Nakunda with 16%, who are leaders in commerce. Other ethnic minorities include the Kori (6%), who are perceived as clinging to their past perceptions and the Tatsi (3% - mostly Elassoni) and the Pleioni 1%, who are generally the most dominated group in Mosana. Numerous smaller African ethnicities are present and make up 6.4% of the population. Many are migrants from other parts of Kisiwa in search of better economic fortunes. Indians (0.5%) who are descendants of merchants that migrated to the area in the 19th century and more recent Malaysians (0.05%) and Chinese (0.05%) migrants also reside in the country. More than 150 languages and dialects are spoken between these ethnicities. The official language of Mosana is English.

RELIGION

With the first arrival of white traders and missionaries, many of the Mosanja, Nakunda, Elassoni Tatsi and Pleioni converted to Christianity. Roman Catholicism was the main denomination for centuries, followed later by Methodism, Presbyterianism and Anglicanism. In recent decades, there has been a further proliferation of charismatic Christian movements within the country.





As with their counterparts in Katasi, and elsewhere on the island, the Kori in Mosana mainly follow indigenous African religions. However, in more recent times, a few have joined churches.

The small Indian population, descendants of 19th century traders on the continent, is mainly Hindu, while the more recent Malaysian migrants are primarily Muslim.

GOVERNANCE

Mosana has had a functioning democracy since independence; the current president is Bawudi Amudaganda. The first president, Sankwaduro Mosindiga, upon serving out his two terms handed over power to the next elected president, Nankumune Asanduyinda. While a good president and well-admired, he was forced to give up the presidency after only two years in government due to poor health. His vice president, Mosondura Masa, took over from him and was re-elected two years later. Since then, successive presidents have had a term each in office. Though they have all been elected from the main party – the Free People’s Party (FPP) – the democratic process in Mosana has been put forward as an example to other Kisiwa nations, especially given the active participation of opposition parties in the process of government.

The Nakunda, the second largest ethnicity in Mosana, who control a fair share of the private sector in Mosana, have constituted the strongest opposition group through their party the New Patriots Convention (NPC). In the last elections NPC managed to add to their parliamentary seats. They have since argued that this new trend is an indication of fatigue with the ruling party, and that while the FPP has served the country well, they believe that a new government is needed to take the nation’s economy to new commanding heights.

LAW

The judicial system in Mosana has its origins in the old Carmine common law system, though it has often been modified over the years by statutes passed by the government and judicial decisions. Prior to the establishment of the current judicial system, there existed a variety of indigenous legal systems. Under the current system, these customary laws receive recognition but are not incorporated into the general law of the country.



The Government of Mosana is currently a State Party to the following African treaties ¹ :

Date	Treaty	Mosana
2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union	2-Feb-01
Abrogated & replaced by the Constitutive Act	OAU Charter, Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963	
1965	General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity	13-Nov-66
1980	Additional Protocol to the OAU General Convention on Privileges and immunities	
1967	Phyto-Sanitary Convention for Africa	
1968	African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources	(s) 15-Sep-68
1969	African Civil Aviation Commission Constitution	14-Aug-74
1969	AU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa	17-Nov-71
1974	Constitution of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations	24-Oct-74
1975	Inter-African Convention Establishing an African Technical Co-Operation Programme	
1977	Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa,	6-Mar-81
1976	Cultural Charter for Africa	6-Nov-81
1981	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights	17-May-82
1985	Agreement for the Establishment of the African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI)	
1985	Convention for the Establishment of the African Centre for Fertilizer Development	
1990	African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child	1-Nov-93
1991	Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Trans-boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa	6-Sep-98
1991	Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community	15-Mar-93
1994	African Maritime Transport Charter	
1995	The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty(Pelindaba Treaty)	
1998	Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights	26-Apr-05
1999	OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism	17-Apr-02
2001	Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament	19-Nov-01

¹ Identifies date of ratification or accession unless indicate with (s), in which date indicated signature of treaty only.

Date	Treaty	Mosana
2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union	2-Feb-01
Abrogated & replaced by the Constitutive Act	OAU Charter, Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963	
2001	The Convention of the African Energy Commission	
2002	Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union	16-Jun-03
2003	African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Revised Version)	
2003	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	(s) 17-Sep-03
2003	Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union	17-Jun-04
2003	Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union	(s) 18-Dec-04
2003	African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption	(s) 12-Mar-04
2004	Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism	
2005	The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact	

The Government of Mosana is currently a State Party to the following international treaties ² :

Topic	Treaty	Date	Reservation/declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)
Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts	GC I-IV 1949	Geneva Conventions (I - IV)	1-Jul-62
	AP I 1977	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of international Armed Conflicts	12-May-78
	AP I Declaration 90	Declaration provided under article 90 AP I	
	AP II 1977	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts	12-May-78
	AP III 2005	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem	
	CRC 1989	Convention on the Rights of the Child	3-Sep-90
	OP-CRC-AC 2000	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict	13-Jan-04
ICC	ICC Statute 1998	Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	5-Nov-99
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	Hague Conv. 1954	Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	30-Apr-66
	Hague Prot. 1954	First Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	30-Apr-66
	Hague Prot. 1999	Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
Environment	ENMOD Convention 1954	Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques	

² Identifies date of ratification or accession unless indicate with (s), in which date indicated signature of treaty only.

Topic	Treaty	Date	Reservation/declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)
Weapons	Geneva Gas Prot. 1925	Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases	24-Jun-68
	BWC 1972	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction	22-Oct-91
	CCW 1980	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects	(s) 10-Apr-81
	CCW Prot. I 1980	Protocol on non-detectable fragments (I)	
	CCW Prot. II 1980	Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices (II)	
	CCW Prot. III 1980	Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (III)	
	CCW Prot. IV 1995	Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention)	
	CCW Prot. II a 1996	Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Bobby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention)	
	CCW Amdt 2001	Amendment to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III)	
	CCW Prot. V 2003	Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III)	
	CWC 1993	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction	29-May-98
	Ottawa Treaty 1997	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction	13-Dec-02
Cluster Munitions 2008	Convention on Cluster Munitions	(s) 3-Dec-08	

Topic	Treaty	Date	Reservation/declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)
Human Rights Instruments	CESCR 1966	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	12-Nov-82
	CCPR 1966	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	12-Nov-82
	OP1-CCPR 1966	Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	
	OP2-CCPR 1989	Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	
	CERD 1966	International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination	3-Mar-71
	CEDAW 1979	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	24-Sep-82
	OP-CEDAW 1999	Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	(s) 9-Sep-00
	CAT 1984	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	8-Jan-87
	OP-CAT 2002	Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	22-Jun-06
	OP-CRC-SC 2000	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography	13-Jan-04
	ICRMW 1990	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families	1-Jul-03
	CRPD 2006	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	(s) 30-Mar-07
	OP-CRPD 2006	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	(s) 30-Mar-07
CPPCG 1948	Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	11-Sep-74	

ECONOMY

Population:	10.3m
GDP (PPP):	\$25.75b
GDP – per capita (PPP):	\$2500
GDP real growth rate (annual %):	5%
GDP – composition by sector:	Agriculture 32.4% Industry 48.9% Services 18.7%
Labour force:	6m
Labour force – by occupation:	Agriculture 57.5% Industry 17.5% Services 25%
Gini index:	41.3
Human poverty index:	30.2
Human development index:	55.1
Unemployment rate:	7.5%
Inflation rate (consumer prices):	5.9%
Budget:	Revenues \$2.839b Expenditures \$3.519b
Agriculture – products:	cotton, fish, vegetables, dairy products, grains
Industries:	mining (gold, diamond, iron ore), steel, small commercialship building, light manufacturing, sawmills, textile, food processing, tourism, rubber
Electricity – production:	2.32b k Wh
Oil – production:	80,000 bbl/day
Oil – consumption:	43,370 bbl/day
Oil – exports:	35,000 bbl/day
Oil – imports:	0

Oil proven reserves:	78m bbl
Exports:	\$2.005b f.o.b.
Export – commodities:	diamonds, gold, steel, fish, processed foods, textiles, petroleum
Export – main partners:	Carmina 49.9%, UK 20.7%, Germany 4.6%, Rimosa 4.3%, Canada 4.1%
Imports:	\$4.0875b f.o.b.
Imports – commodities:	capital equipment, consumer goods, medical supplies, transport equipment
Import – main partners:	South Africa 9.7%, Carmina 9.4%, UK 8.9%, Tanzania 7%, Namuna 5.9%, India 5.4%
Debt – external:	\$915m
Currency (code):	Mosanjan cika (c)
ISO code:	MOC
Exchange rates:	c/USD: 482
Fiscal year:	1 July – 30 June

Mosana has a relatively healthy economy. Presidents since independence have made it a priority not only to maintain and upgrade infrastructure from the colonial era, but have also added in transportation networks and built new ports with modern technology, all of which have aided the expansion of agricultural and other exports. While agricultural exports contribute a large share to GDP, the main export commodities are diamonds, gold and steel. With its inviting beaches and well preserved historic sites, a tourism industry has developed and contributes significantly to the GDP of the nation. New industries have grown rapidly over the last decade, including food processing, textiles, small commercial ship building, light manufacturing, and sawmills. With its reserve, Mosana exports oil to other countries on the island. Additionally, the nation exports electricity to its neighbours - Katasi and Namuna.

In spite of its endowment of natural resources, it is the sound policies followed by Mosana's governments that can be credited with the steady economic growth that the nation has enjoyed. For instance governments have from independence made education a top priority, with emphasis on research and development. Consistently, the government has provided scholarships to its university graduates for further and specialized training both at home and abroad, as well, providing a framework within which these workers can be effectively integrated into the labour force upon completion of their studies. This has produced a pool of well trained professionals within the economy, and has ensured that the brain drain predicament facing other island and mainland economies are reduced in Mosana.

As with all countries on Kisiwa, Mosana faces its share of economic problems, inter alia, debt servicing, an arguably challenging international trading environment which includes high tariffs on agricultural produce

exported to major markets and price volatility of resource exports. On the home front, corruption, albeit to a lesser degree than other Kisiwa countries, a large shadow economy, and poverty among a sizeable segment of the population prevails. The Kori in Mosana are complaining about economic marginalization.

SECURITY

Mosana's armed forces total approximately 14,000 personnel, and include an Army (10,000), a Navy (1,500) and an Air Force (2,500). The Army has limited armoured vehicles, including tanks (T-62). The Navy includes two coastal corvettes and other smaller vessels. The Air Force has strike aircraft and armed helicopters.

Mosana's military equipment has historically come from a variety of sources, including both East and West. It has been modernizing its equipment over the last decade, and is believed to have the strongest overall force capability on Kisiwa.

Mosana also maintains numerous local police forces and a National Gendarmerie of 1,500 personnel with a small helicopter flight.

The Republic of Mosana, despite being a former Carmine colony, maintains a small gendarmerie as well as a large national police service. The National Police Service of Mosana (NPSM), numbering approximately 12,000, have a wide range of responsibility. Sub-divided into provincial policing districts, federally the NPSM is also responsible for management of the prison system within Mosana (as a separate branch within the NPSM), maintain a number of Formed Police Units (FPUs) for riot control, and have a number of directorates for specialized investigations/tasks. The level of training is considered to be adequate, though low pay and the poor administration/ supervision of police in rural areas has resulted in allegations of corruption and involvement in organized crime. There have been numerous allegations of police involvement in facilitating cross-border smuggling, but this has not been substantiated.

The National Gendarmerie of Mosana (NGM) is a small service, numbering approximately 1,500. Belonging to the Ministry of Defence, their mandate is for the maintenance of the security of state borders. The NGM has the primary responsibility for border protection and security, and is present at all ports and airports, as well as at border crossings. They maintain a small helicopter unit, which is used for aerial surveillance of land borders in inaccessible areas. Further, the NGM has a small section known as Special Operations Branch (SOB). Their mandate has never been publicly released, but they are believed to be involved in surveillance and intelligence collection. The NGM is believed to have used the SOB for the surveillance of members of the political opposition, members of the media critical of the Government of Mosana, as well as employing them in neighboring countries. This has been officially denied by the Government of Mosana, but there is compelling evidence to the contrary.

GEOPOLITICS

National dynamics

Relatively fewer tensions exist between the ethnic groups in Mosana as compared to other Kisiwan countries. However, conflict between the Pleioni and Elassoni has at times mimicked the outbursts in Rimosa. Still, most skirmishes have been contained.

More problematic have been the Kori residing in the north-eastern most part of Mosana. Centuries ago, the only Kori King to have attacked the Mosanja was forced to sue for peace when his conquest failed. To appease

the Mosanja, a sizable parcel of land was provided to them. In present day Mosana, this area which shares a border with Katasi is mainly inhabited by the Kori. These Kori were separated from their relatives in Katasi when the island was officially divided up by Azurian and Carmine colonist under the Treaty of Salin. This group in Mosana has claimed socio-economic marginalization and neglect by the government of Mosana.

Regional dynamics

Since their neighbour gained its independence in 1958, many Kori in Mosana have demanded the right to join Katasi. In 1962, the issue was put to the Kori in a plebiscite. However, three major factors combined to ensure that the Kori stayed with Mosana. The first was the promise of change in Kori circumstances made by Sankwaduro Mosindiga, the then -president, during his run for re-election. Second was the prevailing uncertainty in Katasi. The monarchy in Katasi had been dismantled by the leaders of the Katasian revolution, forcing the royal family to seek refuge in Namuna, and thus some were uncertain as to the future of Katasi. Lastly, the economy in Mosana showed far greater prospects than that of Katasi which was in disrepair partly because of the regressive economic policies followed there by the Azurians, and also because of the destruction of the limited infrastructure during the Revolutionary Wars. Under these circumstances, the Kori decided by a narrow majority to stay with Mosana.

The improvements in circumstances sought by the Kori, however, have yet to materialize. As such riots and protests have been frequent. The Government of Mosana has responded with repressive measures against the Kori irredentist movement, worsening relations between the Mosanja and Kori in both Mosana and in Katasi.

Mosana, Namuna and Katasi have long-standing disagreements with regard to access to and regulation of shipping the Namu River. This involves competing claims by Mosana, Namuna and Katasi to access the Namu River. This river forms part of the border between these three states and is one of the largest on the island, but it is not fully navigable and can only accommodate small to medium sized river craft. This has led to tremendous pressure from all users to have maximum access to the river's few docking facilities, fishing and resource rights and freedom of movement through some of the river's key bottleneck points. Environmental issues affecting Lake Namuna are also becoming increasingly significant.

Royaume de Namuna

SQUARE KILOMETRES: 267,770 KM²

POPULATION: 8,228,416

INDEPENDENCE: MAY 28, 1960

GEOGRAPHY

Namuna is the third largest country on Kisiwa with an area of approximately 267,770 square kilometres. It is mostly surrounded by the Indian Ocean and is bordered to its east by Sumora and Katasi.

HISTORY

Modern-day Namuna was originally part of the larger area of Mosana, occupied by Mosanja who amassed wealth through the widespread cultivation of cotton and the sale of goods to merchants en route to India. They came into contact with white traders in the 1400s, and by the Treaty of Salin had been placed under Azurian control.

Throughout the 1950s, the agitation for independence had dominated the agenda of the natives. However, unlike other countries of the island, they were non-violent. Rather, Namunans, led by the Mosanja royal family, heightened the call for independence. In 1958, when given the opportunity in a referendum to become an autonomous country within the framework of the Azurian Community, Namuna voted in favour of the proposal. Full independence was attained two years later in May 1960 when the nation became known as the Kingdom of Namuna under the rule of King Mambose Asana III, on May 28, 1960.

SOCIETY

The population of Namuna is 8,228,416, with a male to female ratio of 1.053 male(s)/female. The age structure is as follows: 50 % under age 15, 47.6 % between 15 and 60 and 2.4 % above 60. The nation has a high population growth of 3.12 %.

The Mosanja people comprise the largest ethnic group with 65 % of the population. It is from this group that the ruling royal family descends. The Mosanja are followed by the Damangi (13% - a tenth of which are nomads) who found themselves in Namuna when the arbitrary border between Namuna and Sumora was drawn centuries earlier by colonising powers. The Nakunda make up 5 % of the population. Though small in number, along with the Indians (4%), they are considered the most enterprising ethnicity in Namuna. There is a significant Arab presence (4%) and Caucasian settlement (3%). The latter includes Azurians who remained after independence as well as some who relocated from Katasi to Namuna during the 1950s violent revolution in Katasi. A multitude of other African ethnicities make up the remaining 6 % of the population. About 100 different languages and dialects are spoken between the major ethnicities and their sub-groups, with French being the official language.

In African societies, traditional rulers occupy a place of prominence, and presently, nowhere is this more so on the island than in Namuna, where the nation is ruled by a monarchy. The ruling family controls the nation's wealth and is highly revered as much out of custom as of fear; criticism of the monarchy and its rule can land one in jail. Nonetheless, in recent times, the younger generation has been vocal about its disapproval of the authoritarian rule, and what it views as the enriching of a few at the expense of an increasingly poor majority.

RELIGION

In Namuna, the majority of the population is Christian. This includes the Mosanja and Nakunda main ethnicities, numerous minor African ethnicities, as well as the European population in the country.

The northern part of the country, where the Damangi reside, is predominantly Muslim. The Damangi migrated to Namuna from Sumora where they had first come into contact with Islam when the Berber Almoravid Dynasty arrived on the island from North Africa. Arabs settled in the country are also Muslim. While nearly the entire Muslim population practices their religion in peace, in recent times, following the events of September 11, 2001, a small violent religious sect, calling itself the Islamic Frontier Fighters have arisen in the city of Parani.

Owing to the presence of Indians, a small Hindu population exists in Namuna. While a few are new immigrants, many are descendants of Indian spice and textile traders that eventually settled in the area.

With a monarch as head of government, traditional belief systems play an essential role at all levels of society. Still, in an effort to accommodate a broad spectrum of society, the Kingdom recognizes both Christian and Muslim holidays.

GOVERNANCE

King Asana III's rule was deemed successful, and he was praised for being a stabilizing force in Namuna. His nephew Awuda Baga who ascended to the throne in 1984, has been heavily criticized by the younger generation of the country in the last decades. Student protests and riots in the late 1980s forced King Baga to allow greater forms of democracy and political reform. Namuna's Constitution was signed by King Baga in late 1991 and went into affect in September 1992.

King Baga is the Head of State and he appoints a Prime Minister (currently Kwamua Ahensu) who becomes the head of government, from the elected members of Parliament following legislative elections.

LAW

The Azurian Empire left Namuna with a mixed legal system comprising of old Azurian law and customary law in which rural constituencies under the control of hereditary chiefs reported directly to the King. This dual legal system continues to exist in Namuna today. The supreme legislative authority is vested in the King who is the head of state; the King and parliament are empowered by the Constitution to make laws to govern the people of the land.

Since Namuna is perceived by the King and Parliament as a relatively homogenous society with comparatively minimal divisions along clan or tribal lines, it is largely believed that its customary law is uniform, and is thus an important component of the formal law. However, for a "custom" to be worthy of the name, it must be practiced by many people and must refer to a socially-recognized norm.

The Government of Namuna is currently a State Party to the following African treaties¹ :

Date	Treaty	Namuna
2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union	25-Nov-01
Abrogated & replaced by the Constitutive Act	OAU Charter, Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963	
1965	General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity	18-Jan-70
1980	Additional Protocol to the OAU General Convention on Privileges and immunities	
1967	Phyto-Sanitary Convention for Africa	
1968	African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources	(s) 15-Sep-68
1969	African Civil Aviation Commission Constitution	4-Mar-74
1969	AU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa	28-Jan-74
1974	Constitution of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations	
1975	Inter-African Convention Establishing an African Technical Co-Operation Programme	
1977	Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa,	
1976	Cultural Charter for Africa	
1981	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights	22-Jun-85
1985	Agreement for the Establishment of the African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI)	
1985	Convention for the Establishment of the African Centre for Fertilizer Development	
1990	African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child	15-Dec-04
1991	Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Trans-boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa	17-May-04
1991	Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community	14-May-92
1994	African Maritime Transport Charter	
1995	The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty(Pelindaba Treaty)	
1998	Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights	(s) 9-Jun-98
1999	OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism	17-Apr-02
2001	Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament	14-Dec-03

¹ Identifies date of ratification or accession unless indicate with (s), in which date indicated signature of treaty only

Date	Treaty	Namuna
2001	The Convention of the African Energy Commission	
2002	Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union	15-Aug-05
2003	African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Revised Version)	(s) 15-Nov-03
2003	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	26-Mar-04
2003	Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union	(s) 19-Aug-04
2003	Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union	(s) 26-Sep-05
2003	African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption	
2004	Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism	
2005	The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact	

The Government of Namuna is currently a State Party to the following international treaties² :

Topic	Treaty	Date	Reservation/declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)
Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts	GC I-IV 1949	Geneva Conventions (I - IV)	27-Nov-61
	AP I 1977	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of international Armed Conflicts	23-Jun-83
	AP I Declaration 90	Declaration provided under article 90 AP I	
	AP II 1977	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts	23-Jun-83
	AP III 2005	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem	
	CRC 1989	Convention on the Rights of the Child	30-Apr-95
	OP-CRC-AC 2000	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict	(s) 13-Sep-01
ICC	ICC Statute 1998	Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	Hague Conv. 1954	Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
	Hague Prot. 1954	First Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
	Hague Prot. 1999	Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict	
Environment	ENMOD Convention 1954	Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques	

² Identifies date of ratification or accession unless indicate with (s), in which date indicated signature of treaty only.

Topic	Treaty	Date	Reservation/declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)
Weapons	Geneva Gas Prot. 1925	Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases	
	BWC 1972	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction	3-Dec-78
	CCW 1980	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects	
	CCW Prot. I 1980	Protocol on non-detectable fragments (I)	
	CCW Prot. II 1980	Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices (II)	
	CCW Prot. III 1980	Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (III)	
	CCW Prot. IV 1995	Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention)	
	CCW Prot. II a 1996	Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Bobby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention)	
	CCW Amdt 2001	Amendment to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III)	
	CCW Prot. V 2003	Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III)	
	CWC 1993	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction	3-Oct-98
	Ottawa Treaty 1997	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction	3-Oct-98
	Cluster Munitions 2008	Convention on Cluster Munitions	(s) 3-Dec-08

Topic	Treaty		Date	Reservation/declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)
Human Rights Instruments	CESCR 1966	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	12-Sep-01	
	CCPR 1966	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	12-Sep-01	
	OP1-CCPR 1966	Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	12-Sep-01	
	OP2-CCPR 1989	Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights		
	CERD 1966	International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination	9-Aug-79	
	CEDAW 1979	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	9-Aug-83	<i>Reservation: "The Government of the Kingdom of Namuna declares that it does not consider itself bound by article 2 to the extent that it conflicts with Namuna's constitutional stipulations relative to succession to the throne of the Kingdom of Namuna and law relating to succession to chieftainship. The Namuna Government's ratification is subject to the understanding that none of its obligations under the Convention especially in article 2 (e), shall be treated as extending to the affairs of religious denominations. Furthermore, the Namunan Government declares it shall not take any legislative measures under the Convention where those measures would be incompatible with the Constitution of Namuna."</i>
	OP-CEDAW 1999	Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	(s) 13-Nov-04	<i>Reservation: "The Government of the Kingdom of Namuna cannot guarantee at all times to provide free legal assistance in accordance with the provisions of article 18 paragraph 3(d)."</i>
CAT 1984	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	23-Apr-95		

Topic	Treaty	Date	Reservation/declaration made upon ratification (if applicable)
OP-CAT 2002	Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	22-Jun-06	
OP-CRC-SC 2000	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography	(s) 13-Sep-01	
ICRMW 1990	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families	(s) 15-Nov-01	
CRPD 2006	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	(s) 30-Mar-07	
OP-CRPD 2006	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	(s) 30-Mar-07	
CPPCG 1948	Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide		

ECONOMY

Population:	8.2m
GDP (PPP):	\$8.04b
GDP – per capita (PPP):	\$980
GDP real growth rate (annual %):	2.5%
GDP – composition by sector:	Agriculture 40.2% Industry 54.7% Services 5.1%
Labour force:	3.9m
Labour force – by occupation:	Agriculture 72% Industry 15% Services 13%
Gini index:	45.7
Human poverty index:	37.3
Human development index:	0.48
Unemployment rate:	20%
Inflation rate (consumer prices):	10.8%
Budget:	Revenues \$623m
Expenditures \$994m	
Agriculture – products:	cotton, cocoa, palm oil, fish, tea
Industries:	mining (diamond, gold, copper), timber, cotton
Electricity – production:	4644m k Wh
Oil – production:	0
Oil – consumption:	9280 bbl/day
Oil – exports:	0
Oil – imports:	10282 bbl/day
Oil proven reserves:	0

Exports:	\$450m f.o.b.
Export – commodities:	diamond, gold, copper, tea, cotton, timber, palm oil, fish
Export – main partners:	Azuria 25.3%, France 20.5%, Russia 5.5%, Kenya 4.6%
Imports:	\$776.5m f.o.b.
Imports – commodities:	foodstuffs, petroleum, capital goods
Import – main partners:	Mosana 15.4%, France 10.4%, Kenya 7.8%, Germany 5.5%, Russia 4.9%
Debt – external:	\$3.9b
Currency (code):	Namunan kuddi (Nk)
ISO code:	NKI
Exchange rates:	Nk /USD: 1686
Fiscal year:	1 April – 31 March

Like Carana, Namuna's structural adjustment implementation programme has encountered significant challenges. While the loaning institutions have blamed failures on inconsistent implementation, lack of budgetary restraint and extenuating circumstances such as inadequate rainfall for agriculture, Namuna has claimed that its economy has faced post-adjustment troubles as a result of undue pressure and interference from the loaning bodies. The government has cited as an example the instance in which loans were withheld in response to the monarchy's firm response to the Damangi's sometimes violent outbursts in the country.

Whichever party is to blame, the fact remains that Namuna's current economy is performing under capacity. Even though the country has similar resources to Mosana, and perhaps could have fared as well, its economic situation differs starkly from the latter. Currently, unemployment is at an all time high, and inflation has remained high for years. Workers in many professions are striking as the increasing cost of living has for years not been matched with salary adjustments. The pay of key professionals such as doctors and nurses are deemed to be extremely low, and most civil servants have not been paid in months. The unfavourable economic climate has kept out foreign investors.

In international trade, although the government has attempted to move away from the export of primary goods to the export of processed products, these efforts have proved futile thus far. The lack of success can be attributed to an underdeveloped infrastructural base, weak private sector and heavy debt servicing burden, among others. The country is attempting to qualify for the list of "heavily indebted poor countries" (HIPC) initiative. Namuna was the leading cocoa producing nation in Kisiwa; that was, until the war with Sumora in 1976, and the subsequent swollen shoot disease that attacked the crop in the late 1980s devastated the cocoa export industry in the nation.

The fact that Namuna's GDP is larger than some Kisiwa countries despite all of the former's challenges is to a large extent due to its rich endowment of diamond, gold and other natural resources. There is, however, growing discontent as the gains from these exports are not trickling down to the populace, and are viewed as principally going into the coffers of the royal family.

SECURITY

Namuna's armed forces total 25,000, and include a primarily conscript Army (17,500), a Navy (2,000), an Air Force (3,000), a border security force (1,500) and a paramilitary gendarmerie (1,000). Equipment types include tanks (T-54/55, T-62), however, the majority of soldiers are motorized infantry. Naval and air forces have mostly older pattern East bloc equipment.

Despite its large numbers, training and discipline are poor, and the vast majority of equipment is obsolete and in many cases non-operational.

Namuna also has a large national police force (10,000+), however, it is poorly equipped and dependent on the armed forces for various types of support.

The Kingdom of Nimuna maintains a police force as well as a gendarmerie. The National Police of Nimuna, Police nationale du Namuna (PNN), who fall under the Ministry of the Interior, are responsible for policing services in all major towns and cities, as well as a very small department dealing with severe crimes and the provision of technical/specialist police services at the national level. Numbering approximately 8,000, the PNN suffers from a number of issues. First, corruption within the PNN is pervasive, largely stemming from low pay and a lack of benefits at the lower levels. Second, there is a great deal of internal friction between the Mosanja (the dominant ethnic group in Namuna), and others. Last, the PNN have come under increasing public criticism by the government for failing to maintain law and order in Nimuna, which has created intense dissent within some elements of the PNN. In fact, the increasing number of civil disturbances have largely been against the ruling monarchy, due to increasing unemployment, rising inflation, and a decrease of public health services.

The Royal Namuna Gendarmes, Gendarmerie royale du Namuna (GRN), numbering approximately 2,000 (exact numbers are considered sensitive information), are largely responsible for the provision of law and order in rural areas, as well as the provision of Formed Police Units for riot control, as well as the security of borders, ports, and airports. The gendarmes are also known for monitoring the activities of journalists critical of the monarchy, and have been accused by a number of human rights groups of illegal detainment, extra-judicial killings, and eliciting confessions under torture.

GEOPOLITICS

National dynamics

Since the Constitution was signed and political reforms were adopted, the royal family had enjoyed a period of appeasement when the population was satisfied with the government. However, animosity towards the monarchy has been renewed recently and fuelled by the declining economic fortunes of the country. Students and labour groups have led large protests against the monarchy, in light of the high unemployment and inflation rate. The country's student movement has accused the royal family of taking an inflated quantity of the wealth built up by the country's exports.

Tensions caused by the economic discontent are threatening to spill over into violent conflicts. Demonstrations held by different professional groups have been viciously crushed by the monarchy, and many arrests have been made. The Mosanja have in recent times been demanding that non-natives in their midst, particularly the Damangi and Indians, as well as other foreigners leave the country. These xenophobic sentiments have at their core the belief that foreigners are engaging in economic ventures that should be undertaken by natives.

Regional dynamics

Unprovoked attacks against some Damangi in the east of Namuna have sent many fleeing into Sumora. This situation is worsening an already strained relationship between Namuna and Sumora; Governments of the two countries never fully reconciled following the 1976 conflict between the two nations. This conflict first arose when Damangi militants in Sumora crossed the border into Namuna to provide support to Damangi residing in Namuna engaged in a vicious uprising against the Namunan government. Namuna accused the Sumoran government of masterminding what it termed "interference" in its domestic affairs, and soon, both governments were plunged into hostilities.

Additionally, Namuna and Katasi are at odds over Namuna's granting of asylum to the dethroned Katasi King and his family.

Namuna, Katasi and Mosana have had major disagreements with regard to access to the Namu River. This river forms part of the border between these three states and is one of the largest on the island, but it is not fully navigable and can only accommodate small to medium sized river craft. This has led to tremendous pressure from all users to have maximum access to the river's few docking facilities, fishing and resource rights and freedom of movement through some of the river's key bottleneck points.

International dynamics

Much of the Namunan Diaspora living elsewhere in Kisiwa and around the world has begun to publicly oppose the monarchy under King Baga. Opinion pieces published in many widely-read newspapers by members of this Diaspora have called for the total abolishment of the monarchy.

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