PEACE BUILDERS
NEWS

Implications of Conflict Trends on Peace Support Operations Training in the Region

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Implications of Conflict Trends on Peace Support Operations Training in the Region

I take the opportunity to welcome our readers to the First issue of the Peace Builders Newsletter for the year 2016. The year provides the centre with a chance to contribute towards global peace and security through the numerous events and activities lined up for the year.

The guiding theme for the first issue is 'Implications of Conflict Trends on Peace Support Operations Training in the Region'. The theme emphasises the necessity for training practitioners to recognize that changing conflicts trends have a role in shaping training, which has to be adaptable to new developments on the theatre of operations. In the recent past, missions have faced urgent security risks emanating from improvised explosive devices and complex, multidimensional threats such as transnational organised crime occasioned by new security challenges and conflict dynamics. This scenario requires new strategies to prevent attack, neutralize them when they occur or mitigate the losses that may occur.

While Africa faces a collective fragility in management of crisis, on the positive side, the frequency and intensity of armed conflict has been halved from the peak levels of the early 1990s. New institutions and approaches to prevent conflict have been created, and recent gains in development are encouraging. However, Africa's more fragile countries still witness recurring or cyclical patterns of violence. Indeed, the prevalence of key structural

IPSTC 2016 Research Agenda Workshop Participants

drivers of violence in the region implies a continuation of these trends. All this calls for continuous conflict research and development of strategies to ensure that the trained Peace Support Operations (PSOs) personnel are properly equipped and capacitated in order for them to effectively adapt to any new developments.

The IPSTC undertook key activities in research and training during the first quarter of the year. These included, for example, the development of a Research Agenda and hoisting of a Research Agenda Workshop on 12 February 2016 by the Peace and Security Research Department (PSRD).

The theme of the 2016 Research Agenda being: *Creating an Enabling Environment for Peace and Security in Eastern Africa,* captures a broad spectrum of peace and security issues currently daunting the Eastern Africa region. The IPSTC intends to research on and collate information and data

on these issues not only to inform policy makers but also enable the Centre to design appropriate training interventions.

The 2016 Research Agenda entails several clusters/sub-themes. These include: Peace Support Operations; Protection of Civilians (POC); Radicalization and Terrorism; Disaster Response Management; Governance; Inter-Communal/Crossborder Conflicts; and, Transitional Justice.

These research topics/sub-themes are informed by a survey of felt peace and security needs in the region and discussions among stakeholders. The research will be conducted in Kenya, South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Comoros, Seychelles, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

In addition to the Peace and Security Research Department (PSRD), the other two training

platforms of the IPSTC, that is, the Peace and Conflict Studies School (PCSS) and Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS) continued to provide strategic, operational and tactical training aimed at building PSO capacity for the Eastern Africa Region.

We at the IPSTC appreciate the support of our partners and friends especially the government of Japan through UNDP, European Union and UN Women for their continued funding which has enabled the centre to implement its mandate.

Finally, I wish to encourage all staff to play their various roles effectively in order for us to surpass the targets set for the year and to enhance the quality of products and services offered by the centre.

Thank you.

**Brigadier Patrick M. Nderitu
Director, IPSTC**

PSRD Holds a Research Agenda Workshop

Commander TOMIMATSU Launches the 2015 Publications

The Peace and Security Research Department (PSRD) held a research agenda workshop on Friday, 12 February 2016 at the Karen Campus. The theme for the agenda was *"Creating an enabling environment for peace and security in Eastern Africa"*.

A total of 26 topics were presented in line with the agenda covering the following sub-themes: peace support operations; protection of civilians; terrorism and radicalization; disaster management and response; governance; transitional justice; and, cross border conflicts. The topics were informed by a survey of the felt peace and security needs in the region and discussions among stakeholders.

The research topics covered Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Rwanda, Seychelles and Comoros. Pertinent topics out of the 26 proposals in the research agenda were identified for the 2016

Occasional papers and Issue briefs.

Participants to the research agenda workshop included: policy makers in key national and regional peace security institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in the area of peace and security, UN agencies, and representatives from local academic institutions.

Speaking during the occasion, the Director IPSTC, Brig. Nderitu, extended a warm welcome to all the delegates from various countries and organisations in attendance. He noted that the purpose of the workshop was to analyse the centre's 2016 Research agenda to ensure that it sufficiently addressed pertinent peace and security issues in the region. Brig. Nderitu emphasised that the annual Research gathering enables the centre to build productive dialogue between the IPSTC and experts from a variety of backgrounds. It also provides an invaluable opportunity for networking and fruitful contacts

among workshop participants. He expressed his gratitude to all the participants for accepting the invitation to participate in the workshop. Finally, Brig. Nderitu thanked the government of Japan through UNDP, UN Women-Kenya and the European Union for providing the necessary funding for the 2015 research and publications.

The Japanese Defence Attaché (DA) to Kenya, Commander Tomohiro TOMIMATSU officially opened the research agenda workshop. In his keynote address, the DA genuinely hoped that with the support of distinguished professors in the academic field, the researchers at IPSTC would have a fruitful discussion in formulating relevant research topics. He noted that the theme of the research agenda was very fitting and timely, considering the current security environment in Eastern Africa. He expressed his hope that the outcome of the research activities would make substantive contributions towards

the search for sustainable peace and development in the region. The DA took the opportunity to talk about the training of African Rapid Deployment of engineer capability (ARDEC) that took place at the IPSTC in 2015. He expounded that ARDEC is a triangular-partnership project led by Japan and the UN Department of Field Support, which intends to build up the engineering capability of peace support operation officers. Commander Tomimatsu informed the gathering that during the year, Japan would host an important international development forum, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) in Nairobi to be presided over by the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe. It is expected that the Prime Minister would present the Japanese contribution to peace and security in the African continent. To conclude the opening ceremony, the DA launched the 2015 research products.

While making the closing remarks on behalf of the Director, Col Modest Kombo, the Head of Research Department congratulated the delegates and the discussants for their invaluable support towards making the workshop a success and helping the centre communicate and consolidate its ideas. He acknowledged that the workshop had benefited greatly from the rich contribution and various views from all the participants. Col Kombo noted that the participants were able to candidly interrogate issues related to election management, resource-based conflicts, terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies, youth radicalization, disaster response preparedness and management, DDR-SSR linkages, sexual and gender-based violence, ethical and legal principles in PSOs, women, youth, children in peace and security among others.

Col Kombo concluded by observing that the objectives of the workshop had been attained. He credited this to the participants, who in his opinion had given the centre a clear direction on the areas that it needed to focus in its 2016 research activities.

Maj G O Misiani
Assistant Researcher, IPSTC

Mediating Peace in South Sudan and Burundi

Eastern Africa has witnessed a number of peace processes aimed at mitigating conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Burundi and Rwanda, among others. However, the peace achieved so far, has been more like a lull before the storm. The South Sudan and Burundian cases best illustrate this unfortunate trend.

South Sudan gained its independence on 9 July 2011 following the referendum held in January 2011. The referendum was part of the requirements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the government of Sudan. According to the UNDP, South Sudan ranks among countries with the lowest democratic and development indicators in the world.

Renewed conflict began in July, 2013, when the then vice chairman of Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and vice president of South Sudan, Riek Machar, announced his decision to contest the chairmanship of the SPLM and presidency in the 2015 elections. The conflict that started in Juba, the capital, spread to Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity States. The conflict pitted mainly the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups that the president and his deputy belong to. The violent conflict resulted in major atrocities reportedly committed by both sides in the antagonism. To state the least, the majority of the South Sudanese citizenly are yet to experience any peace since independence as internal conflicts have continued to affect their safety, livelihoods and general security.

Following the outbreak of violent conflict, a mediation process was initiated and was spearheaded by a former Ethiopian Foreign Affairs minister, General Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin, assisted by Kenya's General (Rtd) Lazarus Sumbeiywo

South Sudan's President Salva Kiir Shakes hands with rebel leader and former vice president Riek Machar after signing an agreement at the end of talks in Arusha (AP)

and Sudan's General Mohammed al-Dabbi. The IGAD heads of states oversaw the peace process. President Salva Kiir and SPLM representative, Nhial Deng Nhial and Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement-in Opposition (SPLM-IO) leader Riek Machar and his party representative Taban Deng Gai, represented the warring parties. At the periphery there were also representatives from the civil society, other opposition political parties and religious leaders.

The IGAD mediation process was protracted and severally faced stalemates. Agreements were often flouted followed by a resumption of armed conflict soon after the signing of agreements. By the end of 2014, the conflict had reached a mutually hurting stalemate as no party had any chance of an outright military victory.

It has been variously pointed out that the IGAD mediation process was hampered by the lack of a coherent strategy among member states. For example, Uganda, a member state in IGAD, unilaterally sent forces in support of the government; there was heavy reliance on heads of states to drive the process; and, there was limited participation of all the relevant stakeholders beyond political elites.

To give the mediation process some impetus, the UN Security Council demanded the withdrawer of the Ugandan forces, which was done in October 2014.

South Sudan has had a long history of armed conflict and its politics is dominated by politico-military elites. There is a strong inclination towards the use of force among competing groups. The use of force hinders the growth of democratic values and practices and the implementation of any negotiated peace agreement.

The armed conflict has had a devastating humanitarian crisis and the international community has continuously urged the belligerents to respect their commitments to peace. Unfortunately, the country is yet to establish internal legitimate political and economic dispensation that enjoys trust among all communities. For this reason, the success of implementation of any peace agreement will depend on

many factors including its design and third party security guarantees.

For a long time now, IGAD has played a key role in midwifing the Sudan conflict. Therefore, IGAD remains best placed to spearhead international peace mediation in South Sudan.

A peace agreement was signed on 17 August 2015 between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, Armed Opposition groups and other Stakeholders. The parties agreed to several issues including: establishment of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU); power sharing; enactment of a new constitution; protection of civilians and IDPs; securing access to humanitarian relief; rebuilding and reconciling the country; and, overseeing credible elections.

The realisation of transitional justice in South Sudan is a herculean task since some of the people accused of past human rights abuses are senior political figures. In addition, the SPLM/A is still the mainstream ruling party in the country and has no political will to account for its violations.

Previous transitional justice projects in the country failed due to politicization. It has been argued that Faith based organizations-led reconciliation is preferable to a political-led process. Key among areas of concern is reconciling people who were divided by wars of liberation, strained ethnic relations and violence, atrocities committed by security organs and organized armed groups, injustice/impunity, inequality in access to national resources and relations between the state and the citizenly. Notably, the massive destruction of the social fabric in the country requires a lot of investments in peacebuilding beyond cease-fires.

The IGAD agreement provides a number of security guarantees to ensure implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement for South Sudan. The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) brings together the government, international community and civil society. The regional guarantors are the IGAD member countries while international guarantors comprise of: China, Norway, United

Kingdom, United States, European Union and IPF. JMEC will oversee the implementation schedules, timelines and all transitional institutions and mechanisms created by the agreement.

The UN Security Council arms embargo against parties that derail the peace agreement and secondary sanctions against those who facilitate and profit from illicit arms transfer, alongside regional enforcement and oversight by a UN Panel of Experts is required. There is also need for the international community to assist in stemming corruption, protection of human rights, supporting emergence of credible and strong civil society and an independent media to enhance transparency in the country.

South Sudan has a golden opportunity to create a nation based on unity in diversity rather than on ethnic hegemony. This requires the creation of strong devolved systems in the current regional states structure, improving governance through respect for the rule of law and constitutional order and establishing a credible process of holding elections.

The peace agreement should be anchored in the constitution or supreme law of the country with a clear and verifiable evaluation framework. Community peacebuilding including traditional structures should translate national reconciliation into peace dividends on the ground.

The success of the Addis agreement will also be highly dependent on institutional capacity and reforms especially the security sector for effective dispensation of justice and security. Political settlement in the short term may supersede provision of justice and reconciliation services.

Joseph Mbugua
Researcher, IPSTC

Training Needs Assessment and Mobile Evaluation: Outcomes and Implementation

The last Quarterly Newsletter carried an article on what was referred to as 'the IPSTC's newest training initiatives.' These initiatives include: A Mobile Training Team (MTT), Mobile Evaluation Team (MET), and Training Needs Assessment (TNA). The IPSTC and its partners has adopted these initiatives in order to enhance the quality and access of the training and education offered. In the previous article the implementation process (from initial planning to field visits), the significance of the initiatives in achieving IPSTC's primary mandate were described. To continue with this description, this article explains what happens after the field visits with regards to the TNA and MET.

The first step after a TNA/MET field exercise is report writing. The research team that undertakes the field visits is responsible for making a comprehensive report. The report is divided into four main sections that seek to: answer the questions why, how, what and so what. Section one covers the introduction of the exercise and describes why the TNA/MET was conducted. It outlines the course/training area under focus, overall aim of the exercise and its specific objectives. The second section explains how the exercise was conducted by presenting the methodology adopted as well as the study area. The third section outlines what was found in the field that is, the main findings. The last section answers the question 'so what' by giving conclusions and recommendations on the way forward with regard to improving the quality and access of IPSTC training and education programs.

The second step is to integrate the recommendations of the exercise into the IPSTC curriculum. Depending on availability of funds and other necessary resources, this integration is preferably done through a writing board. In this regard, a desk officer from the curriculum design section is tasked to coordinate and call upon a team of internal and external experts to review an existing course or develop a new one. In this case, the team is guided by the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the exercise/report. For example, if the findings highlight new/emerging areas of training, it may necessitate the writing board team to develop a new course(s). However, if the findings outline aspects of improving and strengthening an existing course, then the team will only have to review an existing curriculum.

The IPSTC uses a Systems Approach to Training (SAT). This is referred to as Training Design in the diagram below. It is in Training Design that a course-learning plan is revised/developed. The learning plan document consists of the course aim, training audience, learning outcomes, module specifications, learning methodology, course evaluation processes and a draft block syllabus among others.

As shown in the diagram, the Training Design is a product of the findings from both the TNA and MET (MET also referred to as Training Validation) complemented by observations from Training Evaluation (i.e. daily (individual), group (end of course) and After Action Review (AAR)).

The TNA is usually planned as a first stage of data collection following the initial scoping exercise. In several instances, the MET exercises also include identification of new areas of training, new training audience, and new learning styles.

The training design stage involves a number of pre-, during and post-writing board activities. Upon course review or development, the curriculum design desk officer hands in the updated/developed document to the Head of Curriculum Design for assessment and approval. After approval, the Head of Curriculum Design submits the document to the IPSTC Director through the Head of Research.

Sometimes a number of changes/adjustments are proposed along the design process. The responsible desk officer carries out the necessary changes/amendments. Upon the Director's approval, the course is piloted with the desk officer in attendance to capture any aspects that require modification or review. The results from the observations made during the piloting and other evaluation processes are integrated into the curriculum by an internal team or by a writing board depending on availability of resources.

Margaret Cheptile
Curriculum Designer, IPSTC

Source: IPSTC Training Materials

Addressing the Persistent Challenge of the Protection of Civilians in Africa

Child soldiers on Guard, in South Sudan (EPA)

The United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Regional organisation and humanitarian actors have increasingly engaged in complex tasks aimed at providing wider support to societies emerging from conflict. An issue that has become central in such contexts is the protection of civilians under threat. Protection of civilian approaches has evolved over time based on practical field practices/experiences and subsequent development of policy frameworks. More recently, civilian protection has gained momentum within the context of complex peacekeeping mandates. These include the emerging view that the protection of civilians has a central role in building sustained credibility and the legitimacy of such interventions. The failure of the international community to prevent violence against civilians in countries like Rwanda and the massacre of Srebrenica strengthened the debate around increasing the effectiveness and relevance of international interventions. The "Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts", became a separate item on the Security Council's agenda and the task to "protect civilians under imminent threat of physical danger", was increasingly included into United Nations peacekeeping mandates.

The establishment of the AU in 2002 was seen as enabling Africans to actively respond to the challenges posed by conflicts on the continent. In the recent past, the AU has engaged in the larger debate focused on developing guidelines, operational approaches and responsibilities as a means of strengthening African capacity to prevent violence against civilians. However, the question is whether these developments have made any difference on the ground and whether the UN and AU have succeeded in creating the "culture of protection" as they have endeavoured to do?

Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council is mandated to intervene in situations where the parties to a conflict commit systematic and widespread breaches of international humanitarian and human rights laws, engaging or facilitating genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In 2001, the AU took normative and constitutional steps towards a more robust conflict management capability, which may, in some circumstances and on a case-by-case basis, be employed to prevent or stop ongoing human rights abuses and atrocities.

Despite these efforts by the AU, the challenges to Protection of Civilians in Burundi and South Sudan have demonstrated the existing gaps in effective protection. The two countries have faced security and protection challenges related to internal tensions emanating from ethno-political rivalries.

In South Sudan the fighting has disproportionately affected civilians resulting in hundreds of deaths. In November 2014, the International Crisis Group (ICG) estimated that the death toll had surpassed 50,000 people; this figure is yet to be confirmed as no official count exists. According to the report, since the beginning of the conflict, over 1.9 million people have fled their homes. 1.4 million of them are internally displaced, while the rest are refugees in foreign countries. Some 100,000 people have sought shelter in United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) bases.

The conflict in South Sudan has had serious gender-based violence implications. In particular, women have experienced unprecedented sexual violence perpetrated by both sides of the warring factions. This was noted in a press release by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict after

her visit to South Sudan in October 2014 (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect).

According to Human Right Watch reports, Burundi's progress toward democracy and stability has suffered serious setbacks, as political upheaval and widespread killings continue to grip the country. Around 250,000 Burundians have fled the country mostly to Tanzania and Rwanda. Over 400 people have been reported to have died since April 2015. Increasingly, there has been an escalation of violence and increasing militarisation of the conflict by opposition groups. Dozens of journalists, civil society activists, and opposition party members remain in exile. Violent incidents, such as heavy gunfire, grenade attacks, and armed targeted killings, continue in several neighbourhoods of Bujumbura and other provinces. Local and international human rights organizations have condemned the continued violent crimes against civilians and mass targeted killings taking place in the country.

In the two cases of Burundi and South Sudan, civilians are experiencing mass violation of human rights including killings, torture, disappearance and other forms of mistreatment. Despite various pronouncements by the AU and UN on the two countries, protection of civilians has been inadequate, leading to more human suffering. Failure to protect civilians undermine the reputation of the AU as well as the UN and constitute a betrayal of the ordinary civilians in both countries whose lives are gravely affected by continuing violence and lack of accountability.

In conclusion, there is an urgent need to interrogate the persistent challenges that inform the protection of civilians. These challenges, including the existing policies and frameworks, should be identified and addressed. It is important that the UN, AU and the regional organisations collaborate more closely and ensure that the concept of Protection of Civilians is realized.

Lt-Col NDUWIMANA Donatien
Researcher, IPSTC

Regional Senior Mission Leaders Training

Vice Chief of Defence Forces (KDF) Lieutenant General J K Kasaon having a chat with Director IPSTC and other senior officers during the opening ceremony of RSML course

The 13th Regional Senior Mission Leaders (RSML) Course was conducted from 5th-16th February 2016. A total number of 23 participants attended the course. The participants were drawn from: 8-Kenya, 3-Burundi, 3-Rwanda, 2-Comoros and 1-each from South Sudan, Sudan, Egypt, Mali, Malawi, Somalia, USA, Denmark and China.

The aim of the course was to train the Senior Operational Level Mission Leadership across the components of Military, Police and Civilian for potential deployment in PSO missions under the UN or AU. After the course, the participants can be deployed as Force Commanders (FCs), Police Commissioners (PCs), Head of Missions (HoMs) or sector heads respectively. For the first time in the history of the RSML, a participant from China - an instructor at the Chinese Peace Keeping School, attended adding a fresh dimension into the course dynamics.

The 13th RSML Course was once more fully sponsored by Her Majesty's Government through the British Peace Support Team – Eastern Africa. This is testimony to the continuing tripartite collaboration between the UK, Kenya and IPSTC.

The Greater Horn of Africa continues to face serious peace and security challenges. These range from the post-election challenges in Burundi, the Darfur conflict in Sudan, political instability and violence in South Sudan and the instability in Somalia, among others.

Given this background, the relevance of the RSML cannot be underestimated as the East African Standby Force (EASF) is increasing being called upon to play more effective roles in Peace Support Operations in the region. Presently, the EASF is engaged in four UN and AU PSO interventions.

The diverse component background of the participants – 13-Military, 4-Police and 6-Civilians, is in tandem with the UN/AU guidelines of training together since the contemporary PSO deployments exhibit this same diversity. There were four female participants in the course, which

means that more need to be done towards a better gender balance in the course.

The course content in week one covered the following topics: United Nations Charter and Doctrine, Strategic Leadership, Mission Planning, Africa Standby Force Vision, Legal Framework, Military Operations and UN/AU Policing and Mission Support. Week one culminates with a Saturday excursion to Lake Nakuru National Park where the participants are able to appreciate the Kenyan countryside and also see some wildlife. The excursion usually acts as a bonding session that prepares the participants for syndicate work in week two.

Week two covered the following topics: Civilian Dimension, Humanitarian Affairs, Public Information, Stabilization and Peacebuilding, Security Sector Reform/Rule of law, Human Rights, Gender in PSO, Conduct and Discipline and Safety and Security.

The summit of the RSML course is the CARANA Exercise, which tests the understanding of the participants on the PSO planning within the principles of the UN. The participants are divided into three syndicate groups and prepare for the exercise starting on Wednesday and climaxing on Friday when they present their CARANA concepts to their peers and mentors.

The course ends with a Closing Ceremony where certificates of attendance are awarded followed by a barbeque lunch and departure of participants.

The 13th RSML course saw the change of the Director of Studies to Maj Gen (Rtd.) S.N. Karanja who took over from Maj Gen (Rtd.) H. Anyidoho, who has been the course director for the last six years.

Lt Col O O Opiyo
Chief Instructor, PCSS

Insight into the Obstacles facing the Protection of Civilians Agenda

Protection broadly encompasses activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of all individuals in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, regardless of their age gender, social, ethnic, national, religious or other background.

The focus of this article is the protection of civilians in armed conflict, whereby all parties to a conflict are responsible for ensuring that the civilian population is respected and protected.

In contemporary armed conflicts, innocent civilians often constitute an overwhelming majority of victims and have at times been deliberately targeted. The most vulnerable population at risk include women and children, who are often killed, raped and sexually abused, kidnapped, enslaved and in the case of children, taken and forced to become child soldiers. Survivors are often displaced by force or lack of choice, taking refuge in camps where they are often defenceless against armed attacks and harassment. Mines and other indiscriminate munitions maim many of the survivors. Even more die due to other effects of armed conflict such as disease, malnutrition and famine.

Throughout history, ways have been sought to limit the effects of war and protect civilians by regulating how wars are fought, yet one need to only look at the conflicts in Syria, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Libya and Yemen to see the challenges these efforts continue to face.

In regard to Africa, the protection of civilians (PoC) remains a critical challenge within the continent's peace and security landscape. Violent conflicts and subsequent loss of life, dignity and livelihoods that they cause, compel us to ask what tangible progress has been made in enhancing the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

First, the human cost of Africa's wars is enormous. Civilians are the main victims in these conflicts. Even though some people succumb to disease, malnutrition and other challenges arising from the violence, a large majority of the victims are as a result of deliberate targeted attacks.

Second, civilian protection is also a critical component for sustainable political peace. Any peace agreement that tolerates continued violence against civilians does not provide a solid foundation on which to build legitimate governance structures. Indeed, civilian security is a prerequisite for progress toward any political solutions. This means that, indeed, successful civilian protection is a crucial component of a viable exit strategy for peace operations.

The third reason why civilian protection is important is reflected in the number of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) that have called upon peacekeepers to protect civilians. For example, as the seminal Brahimi Report observed, there are an increasing number of peacekeeping situations where it is operationally and morally justified to use force to protect civilians.

Over time, civilian protection has thus become critical to the credibility, legitimacy and success of peacekeeping operations. To date, both the UN and AU peacekeeping operations are faced with significant challenges in the protection of civilians.

While all the actors recognise that complementary protection strategies are necessary, interaction at strategic, tactical and operational levels have faced numerous challenges. For example, the humanitarian community has struggled to reach a consensus on civil-military coordination in

Commandant PCSS, Col Jaldesa receiving a commemorative plaque from a POC course participant

general, and there are some who reject any form of interaction. On their part, international military and peacekeeping forces have at times been dismissive of the contribution that humanitarian actors can make to the safety and security of civilians.

Further, political support is an essential element in the protection of civilians. Mandating organs are responsible for providing missions with the political support to achieve their objectives and engaging consistently and sustainably with the parties to the peace agreements. Despite its primacy in the maintenance of international peace and security, the legitimacy of the Security Council in Africa has been challenged after the Council's late involvement to protect civilians in some of the world's deadliest wars for example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Rwanda, Srebrenica and Sierra Leone.

The protection of civilians requires the involvement of the host government, which retains the primary responsibility for such protection. Ideally, protection strategies would thus be conceived with the relevant government bodies, notably the security forces. However, more often than not, most governments neither have the capacity nor the will to protect civilians. In Africa's contemporary conflicts, host governments have often orchestrated many of the crimes perpetrated against civilians, denied entry to peacekeepers, or obstructed their work.

Despite much talk about peace and protection, governments in many African conflict zones are more interested in defeating their rivals than engaging in genuine conflict resolution. In such circumstances, host governments frustrate rather than facilitate the protection of civilians.

In summary, most PoC actors face operational, security, logistical and ethical dilemmas in their attempts to respond to the needs of people affected by conflict. Some of the challenges stem from inconsistencies and gaps in the UN and AU mandating organs, the lack of political will, capacity within the host governments, lack of coordination amongst protection actors and the absence of operational training for protection purposes.

It can be concluded that the protection of civilians in peacekeeping contexts even though a challenging mandate is not impossible. It is increasingly important for peacekeeping missions to reflect and learn from past successes and failures. This can be done through documenting, analysing and, evaluating past experiences. This analysis should help peacekeeping missions to contextualize their protection of civilian engagements.

KANDIRE G.
Training Intern, PCSS

The Need of Incident Command Systems (ICS) in Mass Causality Incident

A mass casualty incident (MCI), sometimes referred to as multiple-casualty incident or multiple-casualty situation, is any incident in which emergency medical services resources, such as personnel and equipment, are overwhelmed by the number and severity of casualties. As emergency responders, we all respond to hundreds of emergency calls every year, and have attended to many thousands of alarms throughout our careers. A reasonable number of these emergency calls are not serious; maybe a tripped alarm, an overheated automobile on the highway or a routine "frequent flyer" emergency medical call. Most are simply public relations opportunities, but they are all important.

At times we actually respond to substantive emergencies for example, a house fire or a fatal accident. The public expects us to quickly and successfully bring these incidents under control and in most cases we are able to effortlessly do so. Unfortunately, we are not judged on these routine undertakings. Our true value as emergency responders is revealed in our ability to handle more extreme circumstances. We constantly practice and prepare for the routine incidents. We study our protocol books, participate in station drills on fire-fighting tactics,

attend classes to stay sharp on medical emergencies and practice with ladders, among others. Most importantly, we do not forget to practice our MCI-related skills as well.

The following are examples of major incidents in Kenya's recent history. On 12 September 2011, a fuel spill caused a secondary explosion where approximately 100 people died and at least 116 others were hospitalized with varying degrees of burns. A fuel tank, located in the industrial Lunga Lunga area that is part of the pipeline system operated by the state owned Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC) sprung a leak. Suddenly, at about 10 a.m. a massive explosion occurred at the scene and fire spread to the Sinai area.

An oil spill ignition occurred in Molo on 31 January 2009 and resulted in the deaths of at least 113 people and critically injuring over 200 more. The incident occurred when an oil spill from an overturned fuel truck burst into flames as people attempted to salvage remnants of the spillage for personal use. Police have described the carnage as Kenya's worst disaster occurring in a country hit by frequent fuel shortages and just days after a supermarket fire that had killed 25 people. In June 2009, another similar accident occurred, when an oil tanker fire killed at least four and injured nearly 50 people at Kapokyek village near Kericho.

Mass casualties create the need for the expansion of Incident Command Systems (ICS) to include a Medical Sector Officer appointed by the responsible Incident Commander (IC) or Operations Officer. The Medical Officer should in turn designate as needed: Triage Team(s), Treatment Team(s), and a Transport Officer within the ICS. If the incident is a HAZMAT or an intentional chemical, biological or radiological release, it is important to follow the stipulated HAZMAT guidelines on appropriate decon and level of protection.

In most cases, a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) in any community has the potential to quickly exhaust the available resources. For this reason, hospital response capability is dependent on having a comprehensive emergency management plan that takes into account worst-case scenario, like an MCI. Such a plan enhances the level of readiness required to respond to a community's health care needs. Unfortunately, the sudden arrival of a huge number of patients presents logistical challenges to many medical facilities that require rapid processing of a large number of casualties through its systems.

Planning for disasters has changed over the years. A government-centric approach is not enough to meet the challenges posed by catastrophic incidents. Focus has shifted to a 'Whole Community approach', which leverages all of the resources of a community in preparing for, protecting against, responding to, recovering from and mitigating against all hazards. Collectively, teams of partners are called upon to work together to meet the needs of an entire community. This larger group includes: county partners; local, tribal, state and territorial partners; non-governmental organizations including faith-based and non-profit groups; private and public sectors; and individuals. When planning and implementing disaster strategies both the composition of the community and the individual needs of community members, regardless of age, economics, or accessibility requirements, should be accounted for.

Maj Luke Nandasava, HPSS

Dengue Fever – Fact or Fiction?
A personal experience

I joined AMISOM as a Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) officer in Kismaayo on 13 September 2013. Amongst the several CIMIC duties that I undertook was facilitating the treatment of local Somalis in our Level II hospital Outpatient Department (OPD) clinic. I provided a link between the local community and the medical practitioners in the hospital. Several women and children, usually the segment of the society that bears the greatest brunt of war, visited the facility every Monday to Thursday. Majority of the patients reported minor ailments, household-borne injuries or war injuries.

However, it neither clicked in the minds of the medical practitioners nor in mine that there was a particular trend of patients reporting symptoms of fever, headache, muscle and joint pains. This was perhaps because most of the patients responded well to treatment and none would come back reporting the same. To the medical team, this was an ordinary fever that affects people living in hot tropical environments.

It was not until after one of the AMISOM troops developed similar symptoms. The persistence of the symptoms necessitated further diagnosis at a higher medical facility, which established that it was Dengue fever (DF) that was affecting both civilians and AMISOM troops. Sensitization programmes quickly commenced to create awareness amongst troops on the prevention cure and control of the fever. To AMISOM troops at that time, besides being an ordinary fever, Dengue Fever was assumed to affect people consuming green grams locally known as "*Dengu*". One can indeed be excused for this contention or even for relating DF to Malaria given the close similarities of symptoms. So the one-million-dollar question is, what is DF?

Also known as break bone fever, Dengue Fever is a mosquito-borne tropical disease caused by the dengue virus. Symptoms include fever, headache, muscle and joint pains and characteristic skin rash similar to measles. In a small proportion of cases, the disease develops into the life-threatening Dengue Haemorrhagic Fever (DHF), resulting in bleeding, low levels of blood platelets and blood plasma leakage, or into dengue shock syndrome, where dangerously low blood pressure occurs. It is shocking to note that DF is the most emerging mosquito-borne infection worldwide. More than 1/3 of the global population is at

Mosquito causing DF
Source: www.sdnbd.org

risk of potentially life threatening complications associated with severe Dengue or DHF. The disease is predominant in over 100 countries in the tropical and sub-tropical climates mainly in South East Asia, pacific and American-Caribbean regions.

Dengue is transmitted by several species of mosquito within the genus *Aedes*, principally *A. aegypti*. The revolution of Mosquito borne diseases ranging from Malaria, DF to the recently discovered Zika virus outbreak in at least 20 countries in Latin America and Cape Verde in West Africa is a subject of study by medical scholars and practitioners.

There are several myths that have been spread concerning DF particularly in Africa? Dr. Nur Hidayati, a Malaysian medical researcher has tried to shed light on some of these myths as follows:

Myth 1 – Dengue fever is harmless

This is absolutely not right. Dr Hidayati, reports that about 61 people in Malaysia alone died from DF between January-November 2013. Alarmingly, at the same time, 29,754 cases of DF were reported with an increase of 11,486 cases, or 63 per cent rise of cases compared to 18,268 dengue cases reported in the same period the previous year.

Dr Hidayati, points out that, people have the notion that dengue is harmless because many of those affected get well without any treatment. Some people can get very mild cases of dengue that do not exhibit any symptoms at all; others may not be as lucky. Most will get fever. Others develop facial flushing, redness of the skin, generalized body/muscle/joint aches and headaches. Many may also develop loss of appetite, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain and sometimes diarrhoea. Some will display bleeding symptoms like gum bleeding, prolonged menstruation, bleeding from the gut and bleeding of the skin or oral mucosa which appear like multiple small red dots on the skin and the mouth.

Myths 2 – If you have had dengue before – you are forever immune to it

Dr. Hidayati, explains that dengue virus is not only one type but consists of four distinct types: DEN-1, 2, 3 and 4. Each episode of infection will give a patient life-long protective immunity to the same serotype but gives him/her temporary and incomplete protection against subsequent infection by the other three serotypes.

Myth 3 – Dengue is a tropical disease. You do not get it in cold countries

According to Dr Hidayati, before 1970, only nine countries experienced severe dengue epidemics. But now, more than 100 countries in Africa, America, Eastern Mediterranean, South-east Asia and the Western Pacific suffer from dengue infection. The American, South-east Asia and the Western Pacific regions are seriously affected by the disease. This is attributed to the extensive international air travel across the globe. The World Health Organization (WHO) has reported dengue as one of the new emerging global pandemic in the last decade. The threat of a possible outbreak of dengue fever now exists even in Europe and local transmission of dengue is being reported in parts of Africa. That means therefore that if you are staying in cold temperate climate countries, you are still susceptible to dengue fever.

Myth 4 – There is a vaccine for Dengue

Dr. Srikant Sharma, an Indian medical consultant at the Moolchand Medcity College, notes that there is no vaccine to protect against dengue. However, he has pointed out that there has been recent progress in the field of vaccine development. In the meantime, no vaccine exists against DF.

In conclusion, Gautama Buddha, an Indian spiritual leader, once remarked that, "Ignorance is the most serious disease of mankind and is the cause of all illness. Healing is achieved through knowledge". The efforts by the United Nations Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS) is therefore very critical in enhancing the capacity of AMISOM medical staff to handle the challenges not only for Dengue but also any other disease that may affect the Somali population and the AMISOM troops in and out of mission. Such efforts should therefore be encouraged.

Capt. Patrick Mukundi
Course Facilitator, HPSS

SOMALIA:
A Battlefield for the Mighty

A Chief Guest presenting a certificate to AMISOM FHQs course participant

The African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA) training for the AMISOM Force Headquarters staff was aimed at reinforcing and refining the skills of the military personnel about to be deployed and those already in deployment. Particularly, the training was meant to equip the personnel with comprehensive Peace Support Operations (PSO) aspects at Force Headquarter level. The training was also aimed at enhancing the professional, competent and efficient execution of the AMISOM mandate.

The modern battlefield has increasingly taken an asymmetrical approach. The Al-Shabaab threat in Somalia stands out as an example of this development. The terrorists inside Somalia for example, have committed themselves to the use of Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIEDs) as a weapon of choice. This approach is a 4th generation warfare that belligerents have adopted as a combat support component in terrorist operations against conventional military strategy and resources.

Asymmetrical warfare renders enemy actions and activities hard to predict and hence, calls for detailed intelligence collection, analysis and timely dissemination of information to the relevant security agencies.

The intelligence dominance of the Al-Shabaab has presented challenges to the AMISOM forces. This is especially in regards to the administration of law given that the Al-Shabaab continues to advocate for the implementation of Shari'a law. Al Shabaab imposes a strict version of Shari'a in the areas under its control. In these areas, administration regimes are created to oversee the implementation of Shari'a and other matters relating to law and governance. This development has endeared the Al-Shabaab to certain sections of the community. For this reason, it is necessary to develop and adopt a comprehensive strategy by all Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and the AMISOM Headquarters in Mogadishu to address the threat of Al-Shabaab.

Troop deployment by the African Union has positively managed to stabilize operations in Somalia long regarded as one of the most inimical countries to humanitarian aid workers. The advance of the AMISOM multi-dimensional forces and the use of military strategies have gained substantive success and humanitarian aid is reaching a large population in the country.

One of the key approaches for supporting the AU troops operating under AMISOM is to empower both Commanders and Staff Officers in detailed planning of joint operations executed by the multidimensional force. Pre-deployment training for staff supporting the decision makers in the mission is critical.

The teaching approach adopted by ACOTA was aimed at preparing the Staff Officers to operate in a multidimensional environment inside Somalia with a view towards combating terrorism, insurgency and propaganda warfare. The focus was on understanding the ideologies of the Al-Shabaab and how best TCCs can be of assistance to the Government of Somalia in establishing a lasting state of peace and security in areas that are under terrorist threat.

Maj F N Ddaiddo
SO2 Coord, HPSS

The Growing Challenge of Organization Management vis-à-vis Strategic Security Planning: A case of Kenya Ports Authority

A section of UNSOC participants keenly following a session

According to Richard et al. (2009), organizational management captures organizational performance plus the myriad internal performance outcomes normally associated with more efficient or effective operations. It also captures other external measures that relate to considerations that are broader than those simply associated with economic valuation (either by shareholders, managers, or customers), such as corporate social responsibility.

Strategic security planning is one of the functions of strategic management, which is the process of choosing the organization's goals and ways to achieve them. Strategic security planning provides the basis for all management decisions, functions of the organization, motivation, and control focused on the formulation of strategic plans. Not taking advantage of strategic planning, organizations as a whole and individuals will be deprived of a clear method for evaluating the goals and direction of the corporate enterprise. A strategic planning process provides a framework for the management of an organization (Anderson, 2011).

Management collaborative reveals how top management teams manage activity and share vision in organizations. Security concerns are not a preserve of one management level in an organization but spans across all levels of management. Management collaborative is important in enhancing the performance in firms. Where the entire executive has strong relationships, it has a positive effect on its employees. According to Sekomo (2013), security policies are the first line of defense for any organization. To provide effective security, security policy and creation of procedures must begin at the top of an organization with senior management. These policies and procedures must then flow throughout the company to ensure that security is useful and functional at every level of the organization. Understanding company security

Counselor Ashraf Swelam Director of the Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) visit to IPSTC on 21 January 2016

Key Visits and Events at IPSTC

During the First quarter of 2016, the International Peace Support Training Centre welcomed key personalities across the globe to various events. This included various delegations from other training institutions, partners and other dignitaries.

Director IPSTC handing over a commemorative plaque to head of a French delegation that paid a visit on 11 March 2016

Chief of Staff Lt Col Gilby briefing a German Defence Delegation during a visit on 17 February 2016

Cabinet Secretaries Interior and Defence Kenya plant a tree during a Symposium at IPSTC on 3 February 2016

A visit by US war college delegation on 4 March 2016

HE Mr Ralf Heckner, Swiss Ambassador to Kenya during a visit to IPSTC on 13 January 2016

Brig Gen Beukering Assistant Chief of Staff for International Cooperation for Netherlands handing over books donated to IPSTC library on 9 March 2016

A group photo of a delegation from US JTF- HOA during a visit on 17 February 2016

must begin with an understanding of the basic laws, regulations, and legal liability issues to which the company must adhere to in order to protect the company and its assets, as well as its employees and customers.

Strategic security planning touches on the core values of the company management. Core values are the emotional engine that drives people and organizations forward. Being explicit about a strategic direction and how it links to the organization's core values and competencies helps everyone understand why the energy, focus, and costs are worth the effort applied. Security convergence is more than integration of security departments throughout an organization, although that is a start. Developing a holistic view for convergence issues requires a collaborative dialogue between multiple functions within an organization to better understand the common risk concerns, challenges, and possible solutions. The concerns include: physical, personnel, and information security, disaster recovery, disaster preparedness, emergency services, and safety (Wilson, 1990). The focus is on getting security solutions integrated throughout the company's business architecture from operations and sales to product and service delivery. Security's job is to help build value throughout the value chain of the organization through cost-efficient risk mitigation.

The Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) was established in June 2004 to regulate, co-ordinate, and oversee all maritime affairs in Kenya. The Authority holds that terrorism, maritime piracy, and armed robbery; arms trafficking; narcotics trafficking; human trafficking; illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; illegal immigration; and marine pollution are crimes that, if not put under control, may flourish and undermine the political stability and economic development of Kenya and the region in general. Mombasa is Kenya's principal port through which international seaborne trade is routed. The port is also the economic lifeline of the rich agriculture hinterland countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, northern Tanzania, Southern Sudan, and Somalia. Given its importance, port authorities regularly update port security measures in compliance with

The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code (African Center for Strategic studies, 2009).

Maritime rights, piracy, pollution, migration, and illegal trafficking of persons, weapons, and drugs are all growing challenges for many African states. These challenges affects both communities living close to the sea as well as bilateral and multilateral relations at the international level. To safeguard their waters, maritime trade, and ocean resources, African states will need to build stronger and more stable security and judicial

institutions. In addition, working on solutions at the political level, especially with civil society support, is crucial to reinforcing security responses (Sekomo, 2013).

Kenya has formulated a national strategy on anti-terrorism, enacted maritime security legislation, and conducted security assessment at the port of Mombasa. It has also reviewed and updated security plans and measures to prevent acts of terrorism in all Kenyan seaports. Reports indicate that since the Kenya Ports Authority started implementing the IMO anti-terrorism inspired measures, crime incidents at the port have been reduced by 85 per cent.

African countries are trying to tackle the menace of maritime threats and insecurity. However, the countries require international support especially due to the fact that the region remains plagued by general instability and also lacks adequate maritime capacity. Fortunately, through close dialogue and cooperation, countries in Africa are forging partnerships and building positive relationships that will enhance maritime security on the continent (African Center for Strategic studies, 2009).

African ports administrators are unhappy about plans to introduce a stringent new security system aimed at checking cargo being shipped into and from the United States (US). African authorities describe the plans as another burden for cash-strapped economies. The Maritime Transportation Security Act passed in the US House and Senate, requires an assessment of security at foreign ports, and it allows the US to block entry to vessels arriving from foreign ports that are found to lack effective anti-terrorism measures. US-bound freight containers are expected to go through a tracking, identification and screening system, and foreign ports must enforce steps including restricting access to security-sensitive areas, background checks and the issue of security identification cards (CNSNews.com, 2008).

A group photo of UNSOC course participants

Maj Luke Nandasava, HPSS

Understanding the "Whole Community" Approach concept in Disaster Management

In the world today, the effects of both natural and man-made disasters have increased in frequency and have become more complex. Hence, there is need to involve all aspects of the community in working together to develop collective and mutually supporting local capacities to withstand the effects. This concept looks beyond the traditional government centred approach to disaster management and tries to embrace a philosophy that leverages and serves the whole community. The achievement of the collective capacity requires innovative approaches from across the full spectrum of community actors to expand and enhance existing practices, institutions and organizations that help improve the social infrastructure and meet community needs during disasters.

The **"Whole Community" concept** is defined as a philosophical approach by which residents, emergency management practitioners, organizational and community leaders and government officials can collectively understand and assess the needs of their respective communities and determine the best ways to organize and strengthen their assets, capacities, and interests. A community in this case may be a place, a belief or a circumstance, which may exist geographically or virtually (e.g. online forums). This requires the engagement of the full capacity of the private and non-profit sectors, including businesses, faith-based and physically challenged advocacy organizations, and the general public working in partnership with the local, county and national government. Emergency managers have to understand how to work with the diversity of groups and organizations and their different policies and practices in order to improve their ability to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from any type of threat or hazard effectively.

The benefits of this approach include: a shared understanding of community risks, needs and capabilities; greater empowerment and integration of resources from across the community; stronger social infrastructure; establishment of relationships that facilitate more effective emergency management activities; increased individual and collective preparedness, and greater resiliency at both the community and national levels.

There are a number of factors, which contribute to the resilience of communities and effective emergency management outcomes. However, the "Whole Community" approach is guided by the following three principles:

Understand and meet the actual needs of the whole community: This is important as it will enable a deeper understanding of the unique and diverse needs of a population, including its demographics, values, norms, community structures, networks, and relationships. The more we know about our communities, the better we can understand their real-life safety and sustaining needs and their motivations to participate in emergency management-related activities prior to an event.

Engage and empower all parts of the community. Engaging the whole community and empowering local action will put the stakeholders in a better position to plan for and meet the actual needs of a community and strengthen the local capacity. This requires that all members of the community be part of the emergency management team, which should include diverse community members, social and community service groups and institutions, academia and agencies that may not traditionally have been directly involved in emergency management. When the community is engaged it becomes empowered to identify its needs and the existing resources that may be used to address them.

Strengthen what works well in communities on a daily basis. This involves finding ways to support and strengthen the institutions, assets, and networks that already work well in communities and are working to address issues that are important to the community. Existing structures and relationships that are present in the daily lives of individuals, families, businesses, and organizations before an incident occurs can be leveraged upon and empowered to act effectively during and after a disaster strikes.

Whole Community Strategic Themes: These represent the ways the Whole Community approach can be effectively employed in emergency management and hence represent pathways for action to implement the principles. The themes include:

Understand community complexity: Also referred to as understanding the community 'DNA'. This involves learning how the communities' social activities are organized and how needs are met under normal conditions. A better understanding of how segments of the community resolve issues and make decisions, both with and without government as a player, helps uncover ways to better meet the actual needs of the whole community in times of crisis.

Recognize community capabilities and needs: This is important as it helps in broadening the team and it involves recognizing communities' private and civic capabilities, identifying how they can contribute to improve pre- and post-event outcomes, and actively engaging them in all aspects of the emergency management process.

Foster relationships with community leaders: Within every community, there are many different formal and informal leaders, such as community organizers, local council members and other government leaders, non-profit or business leaders, volunteer or faith leaders, and long-term residents, all of whom have valuable knowledge and can provide a comprehensive understanding of the communities in which they live. These leaders can help identify activities in which the community is already interested and involved in as people might be more receptive to preparedness campaigns and more likely to understand the relevancy of emergency management to their lives. This can be achieved through meeting them where they are thus building trust through participation in community activities.

Build and maintain partnerships: A collective effort brings greater capabilities to the initiatives and provides greater opportunities to reach agreement throughout the community and influence others to participate and support activities. The critical step in building these partnerships is to find the overlapping and shared interests around which groups and organizations can be brought together. Equally important is to sustain the motivations and incentives to collaborate over a long period of time while improving resilience through increased public-private partnerships.

Empower local action: Empowering local action requires allowing members of the communities to lead, not follow in identifying priorities, organizing support, implementing programs, and evaluating outcomes. The emergency manager promotes

and coordinates, but does not direct, the conversations and efforts. Social capital becomes an important part of encouraging communities to own and lead their own resilience activities. Community ownership of projects provides a powerful incentive for sustaining action and involvement.

Leverage and strengthen social infrastructure, networks, and assets: This means investing in the social, economic, and political structures that makes up daily life and connecting them to emergency management programs. A community in general consists of an array of groups, institutions, associations, and networks that organize and control a wide variety of assets and structure social behaviours. Local communities have their own ways of organizing and managing this social infrastructure. Emergency managers can strengthen existing capabilities by participating in discussions and decision-making processes that govern local residents under normal conditions and aligning emergency management activities to support community partnerships and efforts.

While there are many similarities that most communities share, communities are ultimately complex and unique. Ideas that work well in one community may not be feasible for another due to local laws or regulations, available resources, demographics, geography, or the people's culture. Some communities have fully integrated Whole Community concepts into their operations. For other communities, this is a new concept.

On one hand, if this concept is familiar to you, think about what you can teach and share with others. On the other hand, if you are looking to begin a Whole Community approach or expand existing programs, the following questions help get you started.

Commandant HPSS Col Gitonga presenting an appreciation certificate to Dr Adaneo a Lead facilitator for Disaster Preparedness planning course

- How can we better understand the actual needs of the community we serve?
- What partnerships do we need to develop and understand the community needs?
- How do we effectively engage the whole community in emergency management to include a wide breadth of community members?
- How do we generate public interest in disaster preparedness?
- How do we tap into what communities are interested in to engage in discussions about increasing resilience?
- What activities can emergency managers change or create to help strengthen what already works in communities?
- How can communities or emergency management support each other?

Disaster Preparedness Planning recognizes the "Whole Community" approach as a fundamental concept that is key in ensuring individual preparedness and more widespread community engagement to enhance the overall resiliency and security of communities. It puts more emphasis on incorporating the specific communities in finding solutions for their own challenges. After all it is said that, "Only the wearer knows where the shoe pinches."

Major Bernadette Eyanae, HPSS

Military Capabilities - The Strategy for Complex Peace Operations

The single most important aim of any peace operation is to establish the conditions for sustainable security for the civilian population. Traditional peacekeeping seeks to achieve this through monitoring a ceasefire between states that have been at war. This normalization of relations is intended to allow state institutions to maintain order within their respective territories. When a peace operation attempts to bring order to a territory in which the institutions of the state have ceased to function, the United Nations and other international actors confront the dilemma of whether and how to use the military to provide internal security. A related dilemma frequently arises: whether to regard 'spoilers' that challenge the new regime as political opponents, criminal elements, or military enemies, a factor that worsens the conflicts for example, in Syria. The stability of a peace accord and the credibility of peacekeepers depend greatly on first impressions. The first six to twelve-week period is critical for establishing the basis for an effective international presence. Credibility and political momentum lost during this period can be difficult to regain.

UN peacekeeping missions are out of sync with the challenges facing African peace operations on the ground. Indeed, the UN principles that have informed the African Standby Force (ASF) doctrine, for example, needs to be adjusted to reflect today's realities. Asymmetric and hybrid security challenges, religious extremism and transnational criminal networks intersect in several countries, creating new challenges to peacekeeping. Captured in the term 'glocality', the linkages between extremism, trafficking, high demands on smuggling and elite networks raise

African peace operations. It further complicates efforts geared towards long-term peacebuilding and state-building. Thanks to intensive efforts, piracy off the Horn of Africa has waned, but is on the rise in other areas. Militant groups and jihadist terrorist networks are changing their modus operandi and, in some areas, collusion between criminal or militant actors, business actors and state structures brings additional challenges. However, while religious extremism and terrorism are important factors, they should not be over- emphasized or allowed to mask deeper political and socio-economic challenges that are at the risk of becoming 'securitized'.

The United Nations has generally been reluctant to allow military units under its command to use force. The three peace operations in which troops under UN command engaged in the use of force on a significant scale - Congo from 1960–1963, Somalia in 1993, and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1994-1995 - were traumatic experiences for the organization. The controversies that arose were only surpassed by two occasions on which force was not used at all, in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Such reluctance is consistent with the traditional conception of peacekeeping as an impartial activity undertaken with the consent of all parties, in which force is used only in self-defense. However, over the years, all three characteristics of traditional peacekeeping (consent, impartiality, minimum use of force) have been brought into question.

Recommendations

■ The strict division between peacekeeping and enforcement operations is increasingly untenable. Keeping the artifice may be necessary to ensure that consent for certain peacekeeping operations is granted, but in such situations, it should be understood that:

(i) 'consent' takes place at the strategic rather than the tactical level;

(ii) 'impartiality' is not the same as neutrality; and

(iii) whether or not an obligation to protect civilians is explicit in the mandate of such a force, the UN must be prepared to respond to expectations created by its very presence.

■ Studied ambiguity in Security Council mandates and inconsistent rules of engagement between different troop contributors severely undermine UN peace operations. The Brahimi Report recommendation that the mandate of a peace operation should determine the resources - rather than the other way around - would remedy part of this problem. In addition, rules of engagement should be robust, but more importantly should be explicitly agreed to between different troop contributors. The more willing and able an operation is to use force, the less likely it is to have to do so.

■ When a peace operation is deployed in the aftermath of conflict, especially when that conflict has seen the partial or total collapse of national security institutions, it should have a robust mandate to protect civilians and restore order. If needed, civilian police should be deployed as quickly as possible. But in the interim, responsibility for law and order either falls upon the military or no one. Without security, none of the more complex political tasks that are intended to justify the use of force in the first place can be achieved.

■As Brigadier-General Anthony Zinni, Deputy for Operations of UNITAF in Somalia, once dryly observed, UNISOM II's various contingents came to the battlefield with many different rules of engagement, 'which makes life interesting when the shooting begins'. The obvious solution would be for the United Nations to develop standard rules of engagement, which might follow the production of standard operating procedures and mandates from the Security Council.

■Dr Trevor Findlay's suggestion for avoiding such confusion in the future is to replace the line between peacekeeping and enforcement with a clearer line between Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations: all missions involving armed military personnel would receive a Chapter VII mandate, with Chapter VI restricted to unarmed observer missions and peacebuilding missions with no uniformed personnel. Moreover, all Chapter VII mandates should 'make it explicit that the United Nations is obliged to protect civilians at risk of human rights abuses or other forms of attack'. These new Chapter VII operations would be termed peace enforcement. This would clarify the questions of impartiality and use of force.

Maj L Nandasaba, HPSS

Use of Force for Peace and Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in UNMISS Compounds

The United Nations (UN) is increasingly providing protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and managing conflict in more hostile environments, and clarity is needed on the use of force. The protection of IDPs is a national responsibility. UN peace operations can play an important role in supporting governments to execute that responsibility. Closing the gap between what is asked of missions to protect IDPs and what UN missions can provide demands improvements across several dimensions including: assessments and planning capabilities, timely information and communication, leadership and training, as well as more focused mandates. The main objective of this article is to describe the socio demographic challenges of protecting IDPs in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) compounds and in addition discuss the dilemma of UN missions in the use of force for protection of IDPs in South Sudan.

IDP Situation in South Sudan

One of the world's worst man-made humanitarian crises continues to unfold in South Sudan. After more than 20 months of fighting, a peace agreement was signed in August 2015. The UN has declared South Sudan a level 3 emergency, the highest level of humanitarian crisis; the country also ranks second in the European Commission's Global Vulnerability and Crisis Assessment index (after the Central African Republic).

South Sudan was the world's most fragile State in 2014 and 2015. Following the crisis, the Security Council, by its resolution 2155 (2014), reinforced UNMISS and reprioritized its mandate towards the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring, and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. The outbreak of violence in December 2013, saw the increase in the number of IDPs from 189,000 to 2 million people according to UNHCR 2016 reports. Nearly 180 000 people have sought refuge at UN Mission compounds. Despite the signed Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace agreement, insecurity and lack of access to many areas is still of great concern in many conflict areas. As shown in the map below some of the IDPs are within the UN base camps while others are outside. Indeed, given that the displacement situation is highly fluid, populations are widely dispersed, onward movement and repeated displacement are poorly tracked, and a significant number of IDPs still live in areas that are difficult to access, the actual number of displaced persons could be very high.

Socio Demographic Challenges of Protecting IDPs

The population of IDPs in South Sudan is estimated to be over two million people. This translates into one in every five people in the country having been forced to flee their homes since the conflict began. It is estimated that half (50%) of the IDPs are children. It is further estimated that more than 245,000 children under 5 years of age are severely undernourished. IDPs are at great risk of disease outbreaks. Poor water, hygiene and sanitation conditions in IDPs camps, renders them a looming risk of disease outbreaks according to World Health Organization (WHO) reports of 2015.

There is another generation that is at risk. Nearly one in every three schools in South Sudan has been destroyed, damaged, occupied or closed, impacting on the education of more than 900,000 children, including some 350,000 who have been forced out of school by the conflict.

More than 686,200 children under age 5 are estimated to be acutely malnourished, including more than 231,300 who are severely malnourished. Estimates have also indicated that between 15,000-16,000 children have been recruited by armed forces in South Sudan. Over 10,000 children have been registered as unaccompanied, separated or missing and an adolescent girl in South Sudan is three times more likely to die in child-birth than complete primary school, (OCHA South Sudan, 2015).

The South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) is a pooled funding mechanism that supports the allocation and disbursement of donor resources to meet the most critical humanitarian needs. Under the 2016 South Sudan

Map showing IDP sites in south Sudan (Source UNCHR 2015)

Humanitarian Response Plan, the need to deliver protection and assistance in accordance with the internationally agreed principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence is a priority.

South Sudan presents a uniquely challenging operational environment where humanitarian space is compromised by generalized insecurity, targeting of civilians, denials of access, bureaucratic impediments and attacks against humanitarian staff and assets making it difficult to implement protection mandates.

Challenges for Protection of IDPs under UNMISS

Unlike traditional settings for IDPs, these displaced people are living under the watch of armed peacekeepers. While UNMISS has generally succeeded in providing protection to those within its camps from threats posed by organized armed forces, its ad hoc camps have also resulted in significant overcrowding, poor health conditions and, reportedly, crime. By allowing civilians inside its compounds, UNMISS implemented its mandate to protect civilians under threat of physical violence. This mandate highlights that civilian protection is a strategic goal and provides tools to achieve it "by all necessary means" including the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The influx of IDPs placed UNMISS in a challenging position because, as in all such missions, it relies upon cooperation with the host government. In addition to the general deterioration of sanitation facilities and crowded shelters,

crime also became a problem. Many IDP leaders sought to establish impromptu community watch programs. UN Police patrol the camps to maintain security for IDPs as well as to UNMISS staff, but patrols alone do not deter crime. UNMISS was not authorized or resourced to perform criminal justice functions. Ordinarily, if peacekeepers detain someone, the primary objective is to facilitate hand over of the person to government authorities. In this case, however, were UNMISS to return criminals to the government of South Sudan, the act may have violated the principle of non-refoulement, as the IDPs, including the criminals amongst them, had sought protection from persecution by antagonists who included the government forces.

There was, moreover, little hope that criminals of the "wrong" ethnicity would get fair treatment in South Sudan's courts and prisons. UNMISS is thus faced with difficult questions regarding how to best deal with IDPs who committed crimes under its auspices that is, which law should apply? What criminal justice process, if any, should be followed?

The mission's solution remains work in progress, forged in the heat of a crisis and implemented in the most difficult of circumstances. Whatever the merits or shortcomings of this particular response, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and its partners should be more readily engaged in providing better-defined guidance for future crises. Indeed, the Security Council (SC) appears to have recognized the importance of providing missions a degree of authority through its mandate for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

For MINUSCA, the SC authorized peacekeepers facing widespread ethnic violence and a government that was near total collapse, to take "urgent, temporary measures" to address issues of law and order.

Peacekeepers of today find themselves more frequently sent to address ongoing conflicts with the protection of civilians as a primary goal. In such environments, the challenges faced by UNMISS over the past ten months and the legal questions raised are certain to resurface. While peacekeeping is always context-sensitive, its legal framework would benefit from clarification of the peacekeepers' powers and duties, clearer mandates and better and faster policy development processes, among others.

Way forward

Protection mandates must be realistic and linked to a wider political approach and engagement with host countries and local communities, that helps the mission and ensure that it does no harm. Community engagement would also help the mission to design better protection strategies that ensure the mission is more effective in improving the lives of the people it is deployed to serve and protect. In many instances, protection results are mixed and the gap between what is asked for and what peace operations can deliver continues to widen especially in difficult conflict environments.

Closing the gap between the mandate to protect and what the UN mission can provide demands improvements across several dimensions including: assessments and planning capabilities, timely information and communication, leadership and training, as well as more focused protection mandates. In addition, there is need to encourage conflicting parties to include specific issues relating to the participation of women in conflict mitigation and prevention, recovery and reconciliation, as well as protection measures, in peace agreements.

Dr Eunice Njambi
Curriculum Designer, IPSTC

An overview of Peacekeeping Missions in Mali and Central African Republic (CAR)

UN Soldier in patrol in Northern Mali. www.un.org

In recent years, Mali has been confronted with profound crisis characterised by serious political, security, socio-economic, humanitarian and human rights challenges. The crisis stems from long-standing structural conditions such as: weak State institutions; ineffective governance; fragile social cohesion; deep-seated feelings of neglect, mistreatment and marginalisation among communities in the north by the central Government; negative effects emanating from environmental degradation, climate change; and, economic shocks, among others.

In January 2012, a Tuareg movement, along with Islamic armed groups including Ansar Dine and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, together with deserters from the Malian armed forces, initiated a series of attacks against the government forces in the north of the country. In March 2012, a mutiny by disaffected soldiers from the units defeated by the armed groups in the north staged a military coup d'état and suspended the Constitution and dissolved Government institutions. Immediately after the coup, the

Heads of States and Government of ECOWAS appointed the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore, to mediate in the crisis and in April of the same year the military Junta and ECOWAS signed a framework agreement that led to the resignation of the then President of Mali and provided for the establishment of a transitional government headed by a prime minister with executive powers.

Following the coup d'état, a deployment in mid-January 2013 of the United Nations Mission in Mali – a multidisciplinary UN presence - was authorised by the Security Council resolution 2085. This was to provide coordinated and coherent support to the on-going political and the security processes, including support to the planning, deployment and operations of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). The deployment of AFISMA in the same year was authorised by the terms of the same Security Council's resolution and mandated to: to contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in close coordination with other relevant international partners; support the

Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorists, extremist and armed groups; transition to stabilization activities to support the Malian authorities in their primary responsibility to protect the population; and, to support the Malian authorities to create a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

However, the security situation in Mali continued to deteriorate, especially when elements of Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, with the support of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, advanced southwards and captured the town of Konna. This led the Malian transitional authorities to request the assistance of France to defend Mali's sovereignty and restore its territorial integrity. In response, military operations against terrorist and associated elements were initiated on 11 January 2013 under "Operation Serval", led by France, in support of the Malian defence and security forces. The deployment of AFISMA was accelerated following the military intervention, allowing some of the contingents to move into different parts of northern Mali in February 2013. As a result of the French and African Union military operations alongside the Malian army in the north, the security situation in Mali significantly improved. By the end of January, State control had been restored in most major northern towns, such as Diabaly, Douentza, Gao, Konna and Timbuktu.

Despite these gains, serious security challenges remained, including continued terrorist activities and military operations in some areas. The need to restore the integrity of Mali's territory and ensure the physical security of communities in the north continued to be a central priority and options for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Mali were accepted by the UN Security Council. Consequently, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by UNSCR 2100 (April, 2013) to support political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-

Central African Republic falls into anarchy. www.aljazeera.com

related tasks. The mission was initially tasked with supporting the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap, focusing on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, creating conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections. Since then, the Security Council has continuously revised the mandate of MINUSMA in order to effectively address emerging security, political, human rights and governance issues in the country.

Similar to Mali, the Central Africa Republic (CAR) has been plagued by decades of instability and fighting which have badly impoverished the country. CAR witnessed a resumption of violence in December 2012 when the mainly Muslim Alliance rebel coalition launched a series of attacks. A peace agreement (Libreville Agreement) was reached in January 2013, but the rebels seized the capital, Bangui, in March 2013, forcing the President to flee. A transitional government was established and entrusted with restoring peace. However, by December 2013, the conflict had increasingly taken sectarian overtones as the mainly Christian anti-*Balaka* (anti-machete) movement took up arms and inter-communal clashes erupted again in and around Bangui. Months of violence resulted in wrecked State institutions, leaving millions of people on the brink of starvation and threatening to suck in the wider region. Thousands of people

are believed to have died. From the beginning of the crisis, the UN together with other international and regional actors, including the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the AU, EU, and France, worked tirelessly trying to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, stop the killings, protect civilians and provide humanitarian relief.

The UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in CAR (BINUCA), which had been deployed to the country since January 2010 to help consolidate peace and strengthen democratic institutions, had to adjust its priorities and continued to stay throughout the crisis despite the looting of its offices and staff residences and the curtailing of its operations due to insecurity. By December 2013, the situation in CAR seriously deteriorated with new dynamics of violence and retaliation that threatened to divide the country along religious and ethnic lines and potentially spiralling into an uncontrollable situation. In response, the Security Council authorised, through resolution 2127 (December 2013), an AU-led International Support Mission to CAR (MISCA) and French-backed peacekeeping force (Operation Sangaris) to quell the spiralling violence. At the same time, the Council conferred additional tasks to BINUCA in support of the expanded AU operation and called on the Secretary-General to expeditiously undertake contingency preparations and planning for the possible transformation of MISCA into a UN peacekeeping operation.

The swift deployments of MISCA and Operation Sangaris forces proved critical to saving the lives

of civilians and preventing an even greater tragedy in CAR. However, given the scale and geographic breadth of the crisis, the security requirements on the ground far exceeded the capabilities of the deployed number of international troops. Violence and human rights violations continued to take place throughout the country despite the deployments. The troops also lacked the civilian components to adequately protect civilians under imminent threat or tackle the root causes of the conflict.

Concerned with the security, humanitarian, human rights and political crisis in CAR and its regional implications, the Security Council authorised, in April 2014, the deployment of a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation – MINUSCA – with the protection of civilians as its utmost priority. Its other initial tasks included support for the transition process; facilitating humanitarian assistance; promotion and protection of human rights; support for justice and the rule of law; and disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation processes. MINUSCA subsumed BINUCA on the date of its establishment. On September 2014, MISCA too transferred its authority to MINUSCA, in accordance with resolution 2149 (2014).

In conclusion, both of these countries have experienced political and humanitarian crises in recent years. MINUSMA in Mali is at present considered as the most dangerous UN mission with dozens of rebel groups and the threat of terrorists and extremists in the north. Similarly, in CAR, the conflict has taken on religious (Christians vs. Muslims) and ethnic dimensions. Again, in both countries, the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and the UN have tried to intervene and look for a solution to the conflicts, through dialogue and the use of force. The French forces have also been invited by both Mali and CAR; to drive out the terrorists in the north of the former and to quell the spiralling violence in the latter respectively. In addition, peace support operations in both countries have increasingly taken on a multidimensional approach.

Carolyne Gatimu
Researcher, IPSTC

Elections and Democracy at Cross roads in Eastern Africa

An EMM course participant receiving a certificate from Mr Chiloba CEO Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

Eastern Africa is a region characterized by instability emerging from an array of issues including democratic transitions. This has over the years improved with respect to holding of regular elections by member states. At least all Eastern African countries have held some form of elections. Based on the nature of the state, the level of democracy, overall security situation and the individual histories, it can be attested that political elections continue to pose a major litmus test to each state's democratic fabric and the general peace, security and stability. This is notwithstanding the varied conceptual understanding and interpretation of democracy in each country. Interestingly, while all countries in the region boast some form of democracy, their tendency towards free, fair and credible electoral processes are but a bag of mixed results. The countries can either be categorized as 'flawed democracies' or 'dictatorial democracies'.

In ensuing discussions during the eighth Electoral Management Course (EMM) course that drew representation from 11 countries, it was evident that election fever had continued to dominate the region from 2015 and was likely to go a notch higher in 2016/17. A glimpse at scenarios in a number of countries portrays a region at crossroads and the crucial question is whether the region is advancing democratically or is in retrogression.

Burundi, right from the onset of preparation, during and post the election period, continue to be characterized by tensions, low scale violence that has been criticized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and seen the deployment of AU peace and human rights monitors months after the disputed elections. The political crisis in the country was hugely attributed to the incumbent president's intent to vie for a third term and the inconsistency in legal interpretation of the constitution by relevant regulatory bodies. The courts determination on the disputed clause on presidential limit in the Constitution and that of Arusha Peace Agreement divided the country and thus undermined electoral reforms in favour of the incumbent. The president used his position to determine the electoral process and consequently plunged the country into unrest and insecurity. The entire electoral process was considered a charade.

In Burundi's next-door neighbour, Rwanda, the region has witnessed a referendum seeking to extend the presidential term limit in a country that has witnessed positive development post the genocide crises in 1994. While the process has relatively been peaceful and acceptable to the people of Rwanda, commentators have observed that such moves undermine the tenets of democracy and automatically limit the space for any dissenting voices as well as credibility of the electoral process. However, it must be noted that other neighbouring countries including Uganda, and Congo Brazzaville have employed constitutional measures to legitimize the incumbents' stay in office. Such measures, despite them reflecting supposed aspirations of the citizenry also go against the AU's ideals of governance and democratic principles enshrined in its Charter. As one ponders on this, far off in Senegal, the incumbent president is working at mobilizing the citizenry to reduce the presidential term limit from seven to five years of two terms; a move that has been highly applauded and considered to be a step in the right direction.

The Case of Uganda has not been without controversy. The situation undoubtedly exposed the intricacies of security that is, the thin line between electoral security, fear and intimidation. While it is generally agreed that security is critical for successful electoral processes in fragile states, it is common knowledge that there is a noticeable variation of security approaches in stable democracies, those in transition and those that are in conflict. Traditionally, the Pearl of Africa, besides her history, is today considered a fairly stable country, in a region marred by instability. However, during and post the election, opponents were arrested and the electoral play-ground was considered uneven and in favour of the incumbent. Social media access was blocked and the integrity of the electoral body was questioned following its comments and position towards the opposition. This notwithstanding, the elections in Uganda was given a clean bill of health and was considered as fair and credible by the AU observers.

Observers from international organizations hesitated to give their verdict. According to the UN, despite the prevailing peace, the aftermath of the elections point to a country slowly sinking into a state of negative peace.

The situation in Tanzania has been markedly different. Despite being the hottest contested elections in her history, the elections in the country were considered to be fair, peaceful and credible and reinforced Tanzania's status as a maturing democracy in the region.

Kenya is in the preparatory phase of her 2017 elections. Already the country is polarized with an electoral process that is characterized by mistrust among political actors and institutions involved. Kenya is a country considered to be permanently on a campaign mode. This disposition severely limits the space for confidence building and constructive engagement towards a fair, peaceful and credible electoral processes.

In regards to South Sudan and Somali the current fluid security situation in each country does not support any prospects for credible electoral processes.

For the region, whether countries are stable, in transition or in conflict, the desirable end result of any electoral process is political stability, economic viability and social cohesion. Paradoxically, this has not been the case for most of the countries. In peacetime, elections are the largest civilian events in any country. Despite this fact, only minimal investments are directed towards building the capacity for holding effective elections. Effectiveness here refers to integrity and professionalism in the discharge of duties by relevant electoral bodies, participation of the electorate in pursuit of their desired aspirations and the conduct of research that inform continuous improvement among stakeholders on electoral issues. Only when these aspects are radically improved, will the region pride itself as moving towards the conduct of credible elections.

Ruth Bolline Aluoch
Directing staff, IPSTC

ONE on ONE

With

Lt Col Markus Fischer
HoD Evaluation and Simulation

Lt Col Fischer in the office during the interview

Thank you sir for giving part of your time for this interview amid your busy schedule of handing over.

A. You are welcome. I have been looking forward to talking to you since the day I received communication on the intended interview.

Q. Kindly share with me your background of service as an army officer?

A. I hail from Switzerland where I have served in the Swiss army for 23 years in the Federal Customs Force.

Q. When did you join IPSTC?

A. I have worked in IPSTC since August 2014 to date.

Q. Have you ever worked in any Peace Support Environment or Institution before?

A. I have had external service experience twice in South Korea between 2001 to 2002 and 2007 to 2008 and in Ghana at the Kofi Annan

International Peace Training Centre (KAIPTC) from 2012 to 2014.

Q. What are some of the outstanding aspects that IPSTC has?

A. IPSTC is very unique and more expansive both in its training curricula, courses offered and the fact that it has two training platforms, the PCSS and HPSS.

The Simulation Amani village at the HPSS also makes IPSTC more unique and interesting for learning. At IPSTC the selection of participants is done through the EASF, which sends calling notices to institutions and organizations that express interest based on the courses.

Q. What does your office entail?

A. My office is under the research department and I conduct training evaluation and management of simulation for the department.

Q. How does your office connect with the two training platforms of IPSTC?

A. My office is responsible for training evaluation for the school.

Q. How do you undertake the process of evaluation?

A. We conduct daily evaluation of courses delivered in the school from the student feedback forms. Three months of leaving the IPSTC, we track and send out questionnaires to participants to collect their responses on how they have been able to make use of the lessons learnt from the course.

We also conduct Mobile Evaluation Training where a team of researchers follows the students to the field to analyse the way they have been able to make impact in their day to day duties in line with the knowledge and skills acquired during their training at IPSTC.

Q. What major achievements or contributions has your office made in the IPSTC's PSO training?

A. We have been able to achieve an increase in the response rate of the student evaluation. At the time I joined the institution the response rate was about 8% but now it is well over 40%, which is remarkable within one year.

Q. Sir, in the course of your work at IPSTC, have you encountered any challenges that have hindered your achievement as per your expectations?

A. I am disappointed that my big desire to operationalize the simulation centre did not come to fruition as expected. I really longed to have the Simulation Centre start working but unfortunately I have to leave before seeing it to actual operationalization. However I am pleased that at least the required hardware has been brought and is on location. I had started the process of working with IPSTC partners to acquire the necessary software. I am confident that the simulation Centre will begin working under the leadership of my successor.

Q. Is there anything else that your office does to assist IPSTC, as a regional centre of excellence, remain competitive and compliant in the world of PSO training?

A. Apart from the daily work of training evaluation, my office has also been able to help IPSTC build networks and promote contacts with the international community with interest on matters of Peace and security. During my stay here the Swiss Government was able to sponsor a Security Sector Reform Course and has pledged to increase its support to the Centre in 2016; this includes seconding an additional Lt Col to IPSTC to be based at HPSS.

Q. What future plans does your office have?

A. I hope my successor will be able to have the Simulation Centre up and running as soon as the required software is acquired and also to facilitate training of local staff to build capacity for sustainability and ownership of the project.

This office is also working hard to see to it that there is improvement in the evaluation process of our courses at both our training platforms, PCSS and HPSS.

Q. In your assessment, where do you see IPSTC in the next 5 years?

A. With the growing number of courses, IPSTC is standing out to be not only a regional centre of excellence but also an internationally recognized centre of training in PSO.

Q. From your vast experience, is there anything you may recommend to IPSTC to help improve its performance and become more responsive to the needs of regional peace and security?

A. The research department must continue working hard to ensure the courses remain up to date and relevant to the changing contexts of conflict in the region and the world at large. This will ensure that IPSTC continues to stand out and keep its position in the PSO training arena.

Q. It has been a pleasure talking to you and I wish you safe travel back home. We will always remember you, especially for your contribution as a member of the Peace and Security Research Department of IPSTC.

A. Am also thankful for the period we have worked together and I give my appreciation to all the team at the research department and the Centre as a whole for the good work they do. I will miss my friends and colleagues at IPSTC.

WO1 George Mutuku

Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM), IPSTC

Q. Thank you sir for giving part of your time for this interview.

A. You are welcome Michael.

Q. Kindly share with me your background of service before joining the IPSTC?

A. I am a logistician by trade from the Armed Forces Corps of Ordinance. Prior to joining IPSTC, I held various regimental responsibilities. I worked at Kenya Army Ordinance Corps (KAOC) at Defence Forces Ordinance Department (DEFOD) as Deport Sergeant Major from January 2004 to October 2011. I was then posted on promotion to the Humanitarian

Peace Support School (HPSS) as the Regimental Sergeant Major on 30th October 2011.

Q. How long have you served in the military?

A. I have served for a total of 36 years and 10 months.

Q. With such a long service, how has this been acknowledged by the army?

A. I have been awarded a total of seven Medals of honour during my service including the coveted medal of Long Service and Good Conduct (LSGC) Medal.

Q. When did you join IPSTC?

A. I was transferred to the IPSTC on 7th July 2012 and appointed the Regimental Sergeant Major, the position I have served in to date.

Q. As an RSM, what key achievements have you made at IPSTC?

A. My duties involves various responsibilities. I would say I managed to ensure that all the staff of IPSTC maintained high standards of discipline throughout the period I have been in office.

Q. Are there any challenges that you have encountered during your tenure as the RSM?

A. Challenges have been enormous. Being a multi service institution that has both local and international staff consisting both military and civilians, management of the personnel and the high profile delegations and students who visit the institution has had to be above board. This ensures that the highest standards of discipline and hospitality are accorded at all times and to all. Nevertheless, it has also been a good working experience to interact with senior officers and participants from different countries, who frequently visit us.

Q. Have you ever worked before in any Peace Support Environment?

A. I have worked with the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Namibia as a peacekeeper and later was nominated to train the first Battalion of Namibia Army in 1990.

WO1 Mutuku Welcoming UNDP Country Director to a past function

Q. What vision do you have about IPSTC in the future?

A. As the institution continues to expand, I look forward to seeing it grow into a university.

Q. In your assessment, where do you see IPSTC in the next 5 years?

A. With the growing number of courses, IPSTC is standing out to be not only a regional centre of excellence but also an internationally recognized centre of training in PSO. So I see a continuous growth of the Centre.

Q. From your vast experience, is there anything you may recommend to IPSTC to help improve its performance and become more responsive to the needs of regional peace and security?

A. All the staff should continue working hard the way they have always done to ensure that the institution remains a regional centre of excellence and the courses remain up to date and relevant to the changing contexts of conflict in the region and the world at large. This way they will ensure that the IPSTC stands out and keeps its position in the PSO training arena.

Interviews done by

WOI Osew, Librarian IPSTC

POETIC CORNER

The Paradox of War and Peace

Does civilized techno-man fight less or more?

Does he kill more or less?

Does he kill more efficiently than his barbaric predecessor?

Is he geared towards (Kantian perpetual peace) or Hobbes' war of all against all?

Philosophers like Immanuel Kant, Leo Tolstoy, Clausewitz, Thomas Hobbes - sought intellectual pathways to peace

Peace researchers such as Johan Galtung, Arend Lijphart, Jan Oberg, John Lederarch, William Zartman, Gilbert Khadiagala, Sam Makinda – Seek answers to the elusive journey of peace

Peace leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Mother Theresa, Nelson Mandela – illuminated the journey of peace

War leaders such as Shaka Zulu, Sundiata, Kinje Ketile, Hitler, Mussolini, Napoleon, Bismarck, Churchill, Eisenhower – paid homage to the god of war as the mother of peace!

The Abrahamic religions – Christianity, Islam, Judaism – Celebrate peace and war alike!

Peace like justice escapes the confines of the Church, Synagogue and the Mosque

Violence is prosecuted in the name of Jesus and Mohammed (PBUH) today and for centuries past

Wars in Syria, Somalia, Mali, Libya, Ukraine – divide families, religions and nations across the globe

There is no scientific or social advancement of man against war

There is no teleological pathway to peace

If there is one go tell it to the mountains

The cave man fought as fiercely as the gun powder, the machete, atomic and the nuclear man

And so did the horseman, automobile, the plane, the rocket, the penicillin and the net man

Peace and war rolls like day and night

Mimicking the death and rebirth of heavenly stars

Like objects and their shadows

Like Siamese twins

To unfurl the secrets of life and death since time immemorial

What way for utopian peace makers?

What way for optimistic peace researchers?

Pretenders to pacifism

Those who turn the other cheek

Those patiently waiting for the coming of a peace messiah

To usher in an era of peace across the earth

Where brothers and sisters shall rejoice in eternal bliss

To banish prophets of war and their paraphernalia to eternal damnation

To exorcise violence out of the world

To demolish divisive shrines of war

To cleanse hearts and minds of men from the bondage of divisive ideologies

To usher a season of epiphany

A time of re-union across race, colour, tribe, creed and nation

A time to sing and rejoice

To break pillars of war

To build pyramids of peace

To create mosaic of serene and solemn motifs

In the canvas of time and space

In the catharsis of war and peace

In the paradox of war and peace

Joseph Kioi Mbugua

Researcher, IPSTC

INTERNS CORNER

Ms Naeema registering invited guests for IPSTC Gender Policy Launch

My current internship experience at the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is nothing short of exciting. I have been here for quite some time now and it is safe to say that I am gaining considerable experience and knowledge at both a personal and professional level. The reason why I consider my current stay at IPSTC as exciting is due to the unique working environment. Working along military personnel and civilians is unique and undoubtedly, a novel opportunity. Indeed, I am delighted to have this rare opportunity.

I have had the advantage of working with both the Curriculum Design and Applied Research departments. At first, I was assigned to work with the Curriculum Design department. Despite not having any background in this field of expertise, I have learnt a lot. The various tasks I undertook consisted of editing and engendering courses as well as attending and assisting in preparation of workshops.

I am currently with the Applied Research department, here I assist researchers with their tasks, contribute in setting up Research Agenda and workshops and I am currently writing an issue brief.

Given my academic background in International Relations, Peace and Conflict, my experience at the IPSTC reassures me that I have made the right career choice. It also grants me the opportunity to critically analyse significant issues occurring within the global and regional setting. This has been possible since the centre provides me with the right environment to seek and understand issues revolving around peace and conflict. This is precisely what constitutes International Relations. Additionally, the experience and the exposure I am getting at the IPSTC has solidified my passion to further my studies in Security Studies.

Finally, I thank the IPSTC for giving me the chance to undertake my internship and for providing me with a platform to build my future career path. Indeed, through the internship, I have learned more about myself as an individual that is, my strengths and challenges. I am also polishing my future endeavours by enhancing my communication abilities as well as my writing skills. In addition, the attachment has also offered me the opportunity, during workshops and conferences, to network with people in the same professional field.

Naeema Bashir

Intern, IPSTC

IPSTC Second Quarter Course Calendar 2016

PEACE & CONFLICT STUDIES SCHOOL

S/No	EVENT	DESCRIPTION	TARGET AUDIENCE
1	**Sexual and Gender Based Violence** 18-29 April 2016	12 days course funded by UK-BPST	Selected officers serving in AMISOM
2	**Dialogue Negotiation and Mediation** 25 April – 06 May 2016	12 days course funded by Denmark	Multi-dimensional Staff to be deployed to mission.
3	**Exercise Mission Planning** 02-13 May 2016	12 days course funded by DMTC	Selected Individuals to be deployed in future exercise planning roles in EASF and other regional organisations.
4	**Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM)** 12- 20 May 2016	9 days course funded by MSAG	Selected individuals deployed or will be deployed in mission in charge of security and safety of stockpiles
5	**Sexual and Gender Based Violence** 23 May - 03 June 2016	12 days course funded by UK-BPST	Selected Military, police and civilian officers serving or will be serving in AMISOM
6	**Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration** 30 May - 10 June 2016	12 days course funded by Denmark	Multi-dimensional Staff to be deployed to mission.

HUMANITARIAN PEACE SUPPORT SCHOOL

S/No	EVENT	DESCRIPTION	TARGET AUDIENCE
7	**Personnel Safety and Security in the Field (PSSF)** 11-15 April 2016	5 days course funded by REDR(UK)	RED R UK.
8	**UN Staff Officers Course** 18 April – 06 May 2016	18 days course funded by GPOI	Selected officers who may be serving in a Brigade level headquarters within EASF or AU/UN Missions.
9	**AMISOM Force HQ (AMISOM HQ)** 09 May - 10 June 2016	33 days course funded by AFRICOM/ACOTA	Selected individuals who are serving or will be serving as staff officers at the mission HQ in AU/UN multinational force.
10	**Security Management (SM)** 23 – 27 May 2016	5 days course funded by REDR(UK)	RED R staff.
11	**Gender in PSO** 06 – 10 June 2016	5 days course funded by GPOI	Military, police and civilian officers to be deployed as planning officers, training officers, operations officers, CIMIC officers and legal officers in mission environment.

PEACE AND SECURITY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

S/No	EVENT	DESCRIPTION	TARGET AUDIENCE
12	Gender as a Tool for Mediation and Management in the Context of SALW Management in Eastern Africa Workshop	1 day event funded by BPST	Invited Gender and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) experts
13	**Amani Lecture Series** 15 April 2016	1 day event funded by IPSTC	Invited Peace Support Operations (PSO) stakeholders and experts.
14	**Gender Research Agenda Workshop** 29 April 2016	1 day event funded by UN Women	IPSTC Staff, Regional research institutions, Universities and peace and Security Practitioners.

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