



# International Peace Support Training Centre Nairobi, Kenya

## ISSUE BRIEFS

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*A Comparative Analysis of African  
Union and United Nations  
Interventions in Somalia*

*Multinational Corporations and  
Conflict in Africa*



*Changing Trends of Conflicts and Response Strategies in Eastern Africa*

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## Foreward

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is a research and training institution focusing on capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and has evolved to be the regional Centre of Excellence for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. IPSTC addresses the complexities of contemporary United Nations/African Union (UN/AU) integrated Peace Support Operations (PSOs) by describing the actors and multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research conducted covers a broad spectrum ranging from conflict prevention through management to post-conflict reconstruction. The Centre has made considerable contribution in training and research on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa through design of training curriculum, field research and publication of Occasional Papers and Issue Briefs. The Occasional Papers are produced annually, while the Issues Briefs are produced quarterly. These publications are an important contribution to the Vision and Mission of the IPSTC.

The third quarter Issue Brief No. 8 (2015) has two titles on peace and conflict not only in Eastern Africa but Africa as a whole: *Comparative Analysis of African Union and United Nations Interventions in Somalia, and Multinational Corporations and Conflict in Africa*. The Issue Brief provides insights into pertinent peace and security issues in Africa that are useful to policy makers and aims to contribute to the security debate and praxis in the region. The articles in the Issue Brief are also expected to inform the design of the training modules at IPSTC. The research and publication of this Issue Brief has been made possible by the support of the European Union.

**Brig. P M Nderitu**

**Director, IPSTC**

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## Acronyms

<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>AFISMA</b>	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission to Somalia
<b>APSA</b>	African Peace and Security Architecture
<b>BP</b>	British Petroleum
<b>CAR</b>	Central African Republic
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organization
<b>CSR</b>	Corporate Social Responsibility
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization
<b>FDLR</b>	Forces Démocratiques de Libération de Rwanda
<b>FGS</b>	Federal Government of Somalia
<b>FNI</b>	Nationalist and Integration Front
<b>GCA</b>	Global Coalition for Africa
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>ICGLR</b>	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
<b>IGAD</b>	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
<b>IGASOM</b>	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia
<b>IPSTC</b>	International Peace Support Training Centre
<b>LAS</b>	League of Arab States

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<b>MNC</b>	Multinational Corporation
<b>MPLA</b>	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental Organization
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>OAU</b>	Organization of African Unity
<b>OIC</b>	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>PSO</b>	Peace Support Operation
<b>RECS</b>	Regional Economic Organisations
<b>REMs</b>	Regional Mechanisms
<b>SNA</b>	Somalia National Army
<b>SRO</b>	Sub-regional organisation
<b>TCC</b>	Troop Contributing Country
<b>TFG</b>	Transitional Federal Government
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNITA</b>	Union for the Total Independence of Angola
<b>UNITAF</b>	Unified Task Force
<b>UNOSOM</b>	United Nations Operation in Somalia
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>UNSOA</b>	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>USD</b>	United States Dollar

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## Introduction to the Issue Briefs

The topics in this Third Quarter Issue Brief are geared towards creating greater understanding and appreciation of the peace and security situation in the Eastern Africa Region as well as in the continent. While one topic focuses specifically on Somalia the other focuses on the continent of Africa. In particular, the first paper analyses the interventions of the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) in Somalia while the second one examines Multinational Corporations and their contribution to conflicts in Africa.

The first paper, *A Comparative Analysis of African Union and United Nations Interventions in Somalia*, analyses the different interventions in Somalia focussing on United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) I, II and other UN efforts and, currently the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The deteriorating security situation in Somalia since 1991 led the UN in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the AU, to actively engage with the political and security aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful solution to the conflict. Between 1992 and 1995, the UN launched three humanitarian interventions and attempted to end the civil war between competing factions in Somalia. These United Nations interventions are considered to have failed in addressing the conflict culminating, for example, in the tragic deaths of 25 Pakistani and 18 soldiers from the United States (US), some of whose bodies were dismembered and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. However, since the AU intervention in 2007, the people of Somalia are increasingly experiencing a time of hope that can be considered as an opportunity for sustainable peace and development. The al-Shabaab militia group is still fighting back against the government and international forces but, considerable gains in peace and security in the country are being witnessed.

The second paper, *Multinational Corporations and Conflict in Africa*, examines the contribution of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) to the onset, escalation and sustainment of natural resource-based conflicts in Africa. Liberalism and Marxism

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perspectives have been utilized to provide an in-depth understanding of this link. The main contributions of MNCs to conflicts in Africa has been reported to include the provision of arms and financial support to warring parties, involvement in human rights violations, support of bad governance, and exploitation of natural resources with little regard to the local economy and wellbeing of the people in the resource-rich areas. To this end, various regulatory frameworks and campaigns have been put in place to guide the MNCs' operations in host countries. However, despite these measures, the MNCs continue to contribute to conflicts in Africa. This has been partially attributed to the limited implementation of the frameworks, lack of transparency, economic slump, State failures, and increased market demand for products manufactured from some of the natural resources. The paper proposes that all stakeholders (African governments, MNCs and their home countries, local communities and civil society) work in partnership to ensure MNCs do not continue to contribute to conflicts in Africa. In particular, MNCs should be transparent, promote economic inclusion and social justice and integrate conflict resolution and peace building and initiatives in their operations. Worldwide, all the stakeholders involved in matters of natural resources originating from the African continent need to discuss ways of enhancing the implementation of the necessary natural resource management regulatory frameworks. Lastly, consumers of products manufactured from natural resources should demand for 'conflict-free products'.

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# Comparative Analysis of African Union and United Nations Interventions in Somalia

*Lt Col Donatien Nduwimana*

## **Introduction**

Somalia has experienced violent conflict and instability since 1991. The fall of the central government precipitated the emergence of hitherto, hidden aspects of latent conflict. These included conflicts between different clans and the prevalence of militia and political factions with varying interests and incompatibilities among others, leading to a break out of civil war. The root causes of the conflict was often linked to the disparities in the distribution and sharing of scarce natural resources, the rights and traditions of nomads in a changing political landscape, religion, ideology and identity. Increasingly, Jihadism became more pronounced as the civil war progressed. In addition, new conflict phenomena emerged including piracy and religious fundamentalism. These combined with the traditional challenges of poverty and corruption added to the growing complexity of the conflict. Given this background, it is necessary that analysis of the conflict in Somalia be extensive and comprehensive and takes into account the divergent domestic, regional and international dimensions. In response to the conflict, different actors including the AU, the UN, the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) together with development partners such as the the European Union (EU), the United States of America (USA), Nordic countries, among others, committed to intervene and end the conflict and restore peace in the country.

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## **Background of the UN and AU Interventions in Somalia**

The deteriorating security situation in Somalia since 1991 led the UN in cooperation with the OAU, now the AU, the LAS and the OIC, to actively engage with the political aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful solution to the conflict. On 24 April 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 751(1992) that established a United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM I). It also called on the international community for financial and other support for the United Nation's Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia (Gabissa, 2010).

Despite concerted efforts by the international community, the situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate. International troops based in Mogadishu were routinely targeted and attacked and their vehicles and arms taken. Relief ships were prevented from docking, threatened and even shelled. Airports and seaports came under regular attacks. Continuing disagreements among Somali factions on the United Nations role prevented the countrywide deployment of UNOSOM (Amnesty international, January 2010).

As consequence, the USA initiated Operation Restore Hope under the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) where the United States assumed the overall unified command. UNITAF was established by a UN resolution 794 (3 December 1992) to create a protected environment for conducting humanitarian operations in the southern half of the country and operated from December 1992 to May 1993. Despite the presence of UNITAF, a secure environment could not be established and incidents of violence continued to prevail (Poole, 2005).

In 1993, the Security Council Resolution 814(1993) established UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II had a strength of approximately 28,000 military and police personnel with a provision for some 2,800 international and locally recruited staff. UNOSOM II ended in 1995 when the UN withdrew all troops from Somalia due to the lack of progress in the peace process and lack of co-operation between the different Somali parties and factions, which undermined the UN objectives. It marked the

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first time that the United Nations left a country without completing its mission (UNSCR 954).

The AU began its earliest engagement in Somalia in early 2007. This engagement changed the conflict landscape in the country. The AU Peace and Security Council mandated African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) entailed the following tasks (Errickson, 2013): protecting senior Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) officials and others engaged in the political reconciliation process, conducting an enforcement campaign against al-Shabaab and other actors determined to destroy the TFG, supporting the Somali security forces, implementing a range of civil-military assistance projects (including delivery of water and medical services to the population), engaging in policing tasks and providing training and logistical support to TFG security forces (Errickson, 2013).

## **Focus and Scope of the Study**

This report seeks to interrogate interventions under UNOSOM I, II and other UN efforts. The UN Security Council is the final legal authority responsible for mandating peace support and humanitarian interventions in any conflict situation. Depending on the context, such interventions vary considerably. Increasingly, the interventions have come under close scrutiny with questions asked around the cumbersome UN structure, the lack of any uniform interpretation of the UN Charter and inability to circumvent the self-interests of individual member states in carrying out given mandates (Williams, 2014). The scrutiny has extended and even those meant to benefit from the missions question the operations. This was the case with the Somali populace during UNOSOM I and II.

On their part, regional actors like the AU and its partners including the Regional Economic Organisations (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) have been relatively more effective in their interventions. This could be attributed to the fact that such actors have a higher stake in ensuring peace and security as conflict in any one country has significant impact on the general safety of citizens and security of member states in the affected regions and the continent as a whole.

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This report uses the Somalia conflict as a case-study and endeavors to compare the UNOSOM and AMISOM interventions with the aim of highlighting their respective successes and challenges and thereby drawing lessons that can be applied in future similar missions.

## **Objectives**

The specific objectives of the study are:

- To describe the structure and processes of UN and AU interventions in Somalia
- To assess the successes and failures of both UN and AU interventions in Somalia
- To identify and document lessons learnt from both UN and AU interventions in their pursuit of a peaceful Somalia and how they can be replicated elsewhere.

## **Statement and Significance of the Problem**

The deteriorating conflict situation in Somalia led the UN in cooperation with the AU, the LAS and the OIC, to actively engage with the political aspects of the crisis and to push for a peaceful solution to the conflict. A number of military and civilian interventions to restore peace in Somalia have taken place since 1992. However, the volatile security situation in the country has forced actors, including the UN, to occasionally, withdraw personnel from Somalia. This has had negative consequences on the country's stability, that of the Horn and East Africa as well as internationally. The conflict has seen the death of an estimated 300,000 people with many more either internally displaced or forced to seek refuge outside the country. Besides, the country has witnessed deplorable human rights abuses and violations (Candless and Karbo, 2011).

Fortunately, since the African Union intervention in 2007, the people of Somalia are increasingly experiencing, for the first time in a generation, an opportunity for sustainable peace and development. This is despite the continued presence of remnants of the al-Shabaab militia that continue to fight the government and international forces. Luckily, the government of Somalia together with the

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AMISOM is winning the battle against the al Shabaab. These successes are a testimony of the potential of the AU in dealing with conflicts in the continent despite many challenges, chief among them lack of adequate resources.

## **Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

Currently, in the UN interventions, two main theories have been guiding military interventions: Strong Regionalism of security functions and, Hegemonic Globalist Realism centred in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), (Adibe, 2003). The Hegemony theory has been developed by Marxists, international relations theorists and international political economists. According to the Hegemonic Stability theory, the stability of the international relations system and the relevance of their institutions is possible if a hegemonic state is able to enforce institutional norms and rules including the principle and practice of subsidiarity (Kindleberger, 1973). The first intervention in Somalia happened under the Hegemonic Realism theory that prioritised the perceived capacity and legality of the intervention as opposed to addressing other important factors, for example, culture and geopolitics, among others, that bear on the success of the interventions.

The lack of performance of the UN intervention in Somalia combined with other competing demands led to the subtle disengagement of the UN in direct engagement with African conflicts. This led to a call for a renewed regionalism in the institutional security architecture. This approach was underscored in the regional-global security mechanism proposal by regional agencies responsible for security (Graham and Felicio, 2006).

It is as a result of this that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has become the main reference on security issues in the continent including in the case of AMISOM. Subsidiarity has been proposed as the main principle for governing inter-institutional relationships within APSA, between the AU and its Sub-Regional Organisations (SROs), and between the AU (the custodian of APSA) and the UN. The subsidiarity principle prescribes that the allocation of power should be to the lowest levels unless it is determined that a more centralised level can better perform the tasks.

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On one hand, regionalism of security functions emerged from a background of increased social, economic, cultural and political interactions and interdependence between regional states in the post-Cold War-setting. On the other hand, security realities themselves were regarded as interconnected among states in specific regions, as suggested in regional security complex theories (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The allocation of power to regions or Sub-Regional Organisations( SRO) from a more centralised organisation, for example, the UN, has been controversial, particularly regarding responsibility in military interventions. The main drivers towards lower allocation of power in military interventions include: lower costs, the organisation's proximity to the area of intervention, synergies of actors in terms of language, cultural sensitivity, local knowledge and politics, interoperability and, importantly, self-interest in solving the conflict due to the fear of spill-over across international borders. Despite the obvious advantages of subsidiarity, there are challenges including lack of impartiality, logistical difficulties, vulnerability to domestic politics and lack of financial, technical and coercive resources (Diehl, 1993). In addition, non-UN interventions lack the moral authority (Dorn, 1998) or unique legitimacy (Bellamy and Williams, 2005) that a UN mandated mission confers. Moreover, non-UN interventions also lack adequate accountability as opposed to the UN mandated ones (Weiss *et al*, 2007).

## **UN and AU Interventions in Somalia: Different Contexts**

The UN interventions in Somalia were motivated by the collapse of the central government and the consequent outbreak of the civil war in 1991. These setbacks were exacerbated by the effects of a devastating drought and famine that created a major humanitarian crisis in the country. Relief Convoys by various actors often failed to reach the intended affected communities because of obstruction and attacks by warlords and their militias. Consequent to this, nearly 4.5 million people were threatened with severe malnutrition and related diseases with about half a million dying from hunger by the end of 1991. On April 1992, the UNSC resolution 751 established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) after a ceasefire agreement reached between the interim president Ali

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Mahdi and General Frah Aidid (Valladares, 2005).

The context of AU intervention, AMISOM, was however quite different. Different resolutions of the United Nations Security Council have been explicit in authorizing AMISOM to reduce the threat posed by the al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia. Despite the underlying political objectives contained in the mandates, AMISOM is, still, primarily seen as a military intervention aimed at creating an enabling security environment where a wider political strategy can be implemented. Another underlying context establishing the AMISOM was the principle of regionalization of interventions as espoused in the maxim of 'African solutions to African problems' where the continent takes primary responsibility for security in the continent.

## **The Process and Structure of the UN and AU Interventions**

Since 1992 the United Nations has launched three humanitarian interventions in Somalia: UNOSOM I (April 1992-March 1993); UNITAF (December 1992-May 1993); and, UNOSOM II (May 1993-March 1995) aimed at ending the civil war in the country. The dismal impact of the UN interventions in Somalia as well as in other African countries, particularly Rwanda in 1994, prompted the clarion call for 'African solution to Africa's problems' that has shaped the AU deployment starting with AMISOM in 2007 (Wiklund and Ingerstad, 2015).

### **UNOSOM I**

In April 1992, the Security Council (SC) adopted resolution 751(1992), in which it decided to establish a United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM). The SC also asked the Secretary-General, in cooperation with LAS, OAU and OIC, to pursue consultations with all Somali parties towards convening a conference on national reconciliation and unity. It also called on the international community for financial and other support for the Secretary-General's 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia.

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UNOSOM I was composed of 50 military observers, 3,500 security personnel and up to 719 military support personnel, supported by international civilian and local staff. International staff were drawn from Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan and Zimbabwe (Diaz-Criado, 1998).

Between May and July 1992, the UNSOM I undertook extensive consultations with various Somali leaders and elders and other personalities throughout the country. In July 1992, the mission reported to the SC on the complex political and security situation in Somalia, as well as the desperate situation the country faced in terms of needs for humanitarian assistance, recovery programmes and institution-building. This report concluded that the UN needed to re-contextualize its engagement in Somalia. In particular, it was recommended that the UN required to enhance its efforts in order to bring about an effective ceasefire throughout the country, while at the same time promoting national reconciliation (Report S/24343). A technical team was then sent to Somalia to identify all security and humanitarian needs of the affected population.

The technical team's report described a number of urgent steps to mitigate the widespread starvation in the areas most seriously affected by the civil war. The report noted that the humanitarian assistance efforts were undermined by the lawlessness and lack of security prevailing throughout the country. Looting, by heavily armed gangs, of supplies from delivery and distribution points, as well as attacks on incoming and docked ships and at the airports and airstrips hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people in need (Human Rights Watch, Vol. V, Issue No. 2, 1993).

Given these difficulties, a preventive zone on the Kenya-Somali border was proposed as well as the deployment of additional security units to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centres. Consequently, the total strength of UNOSOM was revised to 4,219 (all ranks), including a unit of 500 authorized for Mogadishu and 719 staff to oversee the necessary logistics (UNIDIR/95/30).

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Despite all these efforts , the mission did not succeed in containing violence in Mogadishu or in delivering humanitarian assistance where it was needed. The lack of a central government, the failure of various factions to cooperate with UNOSOM, extortion and robbery of relief supplies, blackmail, repeated attacks on the personnel and destruction of equipment owned by the United Nations and other relief agencies were key contributory factors limiting the effectiveness of the UN mission (Human Right Watch, June 1993).

## **UNOSOM II**

Following the failure of UNOSOM I, the United States offered to lead a force intervention, made up of American personnel. This was accepted by the UN and made possible through UNSCR 794 authorizing the use of “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia” (Weiss and Hubert, 2001). The SC urged the Secretary-General and member states to facilitate the unified command and control of the deployed military forces (UNSCR 794). The U.S. contribution was known as Operation Restore Hope, which joined a multinational force becoming the United Task Force (UNITAF); consequently, the operations of UNOSOM I ceased. UNITAF, consisted of four distinct phases:

- The first phase was the initial deployment of troops to provide secure harbor and airport sites in Mogadishu, from where the entire operation would be managed.
- The second phase was the expansion of the security zone to the surrounding regions of southern Somalia. As a result of favorable operational environment complemented by the presence of NGOs, UNITAF forces accomplished phase two of its mandate a couple of weeks ahead of schedule.
- The third phase included a further expansion of the security zone into Kismayo and Bardera and the maintenance of secure land routes for humanitarian operations throughout the security zone.
- The fourth and final phase consisted of the handing over of operations to the United Nations and the withdrawal of the UNITAF forces (Allard, 1994).

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On 3 March 1993, UNOSOM II was officially launched and authorized to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance (Allen, 1997). In addition, UNOSOM II was requested to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the tasks begun by the Unified Task Force of restoring peace, stability, law and order in the country. After suffering significant casualties, the US in 1994 and the UN in 1995 ceased operations in Somalia. Unfortunately, at the time of their departure, law and order had not been restored in the country. People continued to flee out of the country and internal displacement to different regions of the country intensified (Møller, 2009).

## **Africa Union Mission in Somalia**

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission deployed by the African Union with the approval of the UN. It is mandated to support the central government of Somalia, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and support the Federal Government of Somalia's forces in their battle against the Al-Shabaab militants (Hull and Svensson, 2008).

AMISOM replaced the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) which was a proposed IGAD protection and training mission to Somalia approved by the African Union on September 14, 2006 (Terry Mays, 2009). IGASOM had been approved by the UNSC on December 6, 2006.

The UNSCR 2093(2013) mandates the deployment of AMISOM, with a maximum level of 22,126 troops, until 30 November 2015. As at August 2015, the military component was comprised of troops drawn from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia deployed in six sectors across south and central Somalia.

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## **UN and AU Interventions in Somalia: Successes and Challenges**

The aim of the UN and AU interventions in Somalia was to create a secure environment for humanitarian operations in the country, restore state authority and ensure sustainable peace and security. The interventions have faced many challenges but are, increasingly, achieving their intended goals.

### **Relative Humanitarian Success**

By 1992, there were six main United Nations organizations at work in Somalia coordinating overall humanitarian efforts: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Program (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, more than 30 NGOs were working in Somalia as implementing partners of the United Nations. The ICRC, for example, continued to provide assistance under very difficult situations (Lofland, 1992). There were also many local NGOs that worked with the United Nations and the international NGOs.

The overall effort to accelerate humanitarian relief activities led to a high-level of inter-agency cooperation in Somalia. A major outcome of the missions was the decision to develop a 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance. The 100-Day Programme was qualified as the First Coordinated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia since the outbreak of the civil war. The Programme sought to highlight priority actions which were needed to prevent famine and the high levels of death and deprivation in the country (Herbst, 2011). The emphasis was placed on those areas and populations of the country that required priority attention. The Programme also identified the additional resources required to meet its objectives including:

- massive infusion of food aid;

- 
- aggressive expansion of supplementary feeding;
  - provision of basic health services and a mass measles immunization campaign;
  - urgent provision of clean water, sanitation and hygiene;
  - provision of shelter materials, including blankets and clothes;
  - simultaneous delivery of seeds, tools and animal vaccines with food rations;
  - prevention of further refugee outflows and promoting returnee programmes; and,
  - building institutions and civil society rehabilitation and recovery (Zelalem, 2011).

It is important to note that, the lack of a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict through UNOSOM did not mean that the mission did not make any positive security impact. Among the successes of the mission was an end to active combat in 40% of the country where it had been most violent, and the creation of relative peace where functional forms of business could develop and delivery of humanitarian aid take place.

## **Identified Challenges of the UN Interventions**

For many observers, Somalia is viewed as a powerful symbol of the United Nations peacekeeping failure (Jacobson, 2012). The inability of the international community to respond quickly to Somalia's mass famine and internal warfare in the early 1990s is often cited as a strong critic of the ineffectiveness of the UN. The UN force lacked sufficient resources, political and financial support for an effective humanitarian mission. The initial UN operation, begun in April 1992 headed by the Algerian diplomat, Mohamad Sahnoun, who tried to implement a decentralized distribution and economic development plan to help rebuild Somalia's shattered social fabric. The US and other Security Council members opposed Sahnoun's nontraditional approach, and he was forced to quit. He was replaced, after a brief interim period, with an American admiral who followed the more traditional and flawed policies that Washington favored (Woods, 1997).

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Most Somalis had viewed the UN and US interventions with high hopes of relieving the famine and ending the conflict. But, while mass starvation was halted, the political and economic roots of the crisis remained unresolved. The US commanders' insistence on dealing only with military leaders rather than crucial voices of Somalia's civil society served to undermine local efforts toward humanitarian reconstruction and normalization of the country. Following decades of armament in the country, the tacit support through the US intervention served to exacerbate existing difficulties by further empowering the already strong militia leaders (Gareth and Sahnoun, 2012).

## **Relative Success of AMISOM**

AMISOM has made an important and substantial contribution to improving the security situation in Somalia. Key to this contribution being the capture of Mogadishu from al-Shabaab in 2011. The capture has been attributed to several factors, including the 2010 authorisation of an increase in AMISOM troop numbers. Another important factor was the support provided to AMISOM by its partners including, the UN, EU and individual states, which strengthened the mission at different levels. This included enabling the deployment of troops, providing training and increasing the capability of the troops and the planning of operations. The advances made in Mogadishu were, however, also enabled by the weakening of al-Shabaab, a factor not directly attributable to AMISOM, but rather as a consequence of a range of factors inherent to al-Shabaab itself, including the political process that sought to end the transitional status of government, the reduction of support among the Somali population and the military interventions of Kenya and Ethiopia (Drumtra, 2014).

Other major security gains, such as the control of the cities of Kismayo and Baidoa from the al-Shabaab, are directly attributable to separate security interventions launched by Kenya and Ethiopia. One notable aspect of this is that, at the time of the seizure of Kismayo, the Kenyan troops had been integrated into AMISOM and, as such, cannot be ascribed to a separate unilateral intervention, but rather to

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the increase in AMISOM troop levels, with better equipped and skilled soldiers (Africa Report, 2012).

The fundamental dynamic within AMISOM, that has enabled the mission to contribute to the improved security in Somalia has been the changes of its mandate. The mandate was revised in 2012 to allow the mission to expand both geographically and in terms of scope, enabling a more offensive approach, using all necessary means to defeat al-Shabaab (Security Council Report S/2014/726). Another major internal enabler has been the support provided to the mission by international partners. In particular, this support has been crucial in making AMISOM a viable force, after struggling for several years to reach the authorised troop levels of initially 8,000-12,000 in 2010 to 17,700 in 2012 and finally 22,000 in 2013 (Wiklund, 2013). This was done by providing funding for troop allowances and providing strategic airlift to actually get the troops and their equipment to Somalia. In addition, the external support increased the capacity of AMISOM in terms of improved management, planning and training (Ishahilidza, 2012).

Other than the circumstances external to AMISOM that have facilitated the improvements in the security situation and which have already been mentioned, thus, the bilateral interventions of Ethiopia and Kenya as well as the weakening of al-Shabaab, the advances made in the political processes in Somalia are equally important factors that explain the increased positive developments in the country (Eriksson, 2013).

These political advances, which in 2012 yielded a new government that is widely considered to be legitimate, are the primary drivers of peace and security in Somalia, now and in the future. In examining the role of AMISOM, some critics have argued that AMISOM, by itself, has only had a limited impact on the security situation in Somalia as al-Shabaab was, in fact, weakened, not so much by AMISOM's offensives but, by a reduction in popular support resulting from the establishment of a generally acceptable government. However, it is also true that the presence of AMISOM enabled the realization of the political processes that resulted in the

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weakening of the al-Shabaab and at the same time gave credence to AMISOM (Lunn and Gavin, 2012).

Like many other factors, AMISOM is clearly an important piece of the Somalia conflict puzzle. Indeed, AMISOM can be considered as having achieved some peacekeeping success, in that it has contributed to the stabilisation of Somalia. The mission is delivering on its mandate; particularly, in its contribution of essential support to the Federal Government (FG) and its institutions. As a result of its contribution to the stabilization of Somalia, AMISOM is regarded, by some observers, as a blueprint for 'African solutions to African problems', with African boots on the ground supported by international resources (Veber, 2014). In his March 2013 report on Mali, the UN Secretary-General suggested a similar format for the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), whereby troops would be supplied by the countries in the region with the UN only providing a similar support structure to that of AMISOM (Wiklund, 2013).

## **Challenges Facing AMISOM**

AMISOM and the FGS have not been able to provide effective administration and basic services in all the captured areas in the country. AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA), with support from some local militias have conducted a series of offensive operations against al-Shabaab forces across south-central Somalia. The al-Shabaab has offered little conventional resistance, instead, the group has usually preferred to withdraw but, unfortunately, sowing and propagating inter-clan conflict in the areas it has departed from. This clan-based conflict, for example, has affected the formation of a credible national army. Undoubtedly, building a national army without first getting the national politics right is a recipe for instability because such a force is unlikely to fight as one and would be viewed as an instrument of particular clan interests rather than representing the Somali state for the benefit of all clans and citizens. As things stand now, it is difficult for AMISOM to build a national army in the absence of a national consensus on what the Somali state is and how it should be governed (Gonnelli, 2013).

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Another challenge for AMISOM is how to identify and deal with disengaging fighters and the concomitant issues related to demobilization and reintegration into either civilian life or the SNA. Unfortunately, lack of funds has jeopardized the Federal Government and AMISOM's ability to deal with such fighters. Without adequate financial support, efforts to transition from active fighting to embrace alternative livelihoods will fail and the 'disengagement' will only be temporary as disgruntled individuals turn against the government or to banditry (Cockayne and Siobhan, 2015).

AMISOM has also failed to raise enough resources to comprehensively deal with the al-shabaab. The shortage of helicopters and personnel, lack of coordination among different contingents allow the al Sahabaab militia to move within and out of Somalia and organise deadly attacks on AMISOM personnel as well other soft targets in and outside the country (African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 2012). In addition, militarily, AMISOM is stretched; the 22,000 troops are not adequate to control the whole of the south-central Somalia. However, it is not just a question of numbers but, often, also a question of mobility and the ability to project firepower rapidly to specific areas (Williams, 2015).

## **Lessons Learnt From the UN and AU Interventions**

The Somali crisis has been an especially challenging case for external interventions. The context of the security and politics in Somalia, the conflict dynamics in the region, regional and international interests, the cultural and geographical affinity and the perceived lack of impartiality of practitioners are some of the factors that contribute to the success or challenges of the interventions. These factors have to be clearly delineated and properly addressed in order to end the conflict and create durable peace in Somalia.

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## **The Challenge of PSO in the Context of Failed States**

Without an effective and legitimate local partner, successful military interventions are extremely difficult for external actors to conduct. Military operations in these contexts are difficult to conduct and they can either fail in theater or fail as part of the broader strategy given that conflict resume as soon as the military is withdrawn (Mullen, 2011).

An important factor in the Somali conflict is the prevalence of criminal elements that have expanded their influence, upgraded and perfected their methods of operation, and increasingly have established links that cut across borders in the entire east African region. Activities of these groups and their allies, are a threat to neighboring countries as they cause civil strife, economic collapse, and the breakdown of food and health systems results, among other political, economic, environmental and social challenges (Gordon, 1993).

Peace support operations in an environment in which the basic elements of effective governance are absent or severely weakened result in human rights violations and abuse that precipitates humanitarian crises. Not only do the humanitarian crises affect the choice of instruments used in addressing the conflicts, but also, it complicates the environment in which an intervening military operates. Failure to begin by addressing the precise nature of the underlying causes of conflict, and thereby determining what, if anything, can be done to resolve it, means that decisions to undertake military intervention are almost guaranteed not only to fail but to do so with potentially tragic consequences (Bloomfield and Barnes, 2003).

A failed or failing state is itself a potential target for internal or external disruption and insurgencies. A transnational or sub-state actor, operating either within the unstable or troubled country or from outside, may seek to exploit the instability in order to promote its own agenda. Such activities could lead to the destabilization of an entire region, thereby quickly escalating into a security threat well beyond the relatively minor interests originating from the failed or failing state (Dorff, 2012). As already pointed out, failed or failing states also provide an environment

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in which criminal networks thrive by exploiting the lack of effective governance to engage in crime (Manwaring and Fishel, 1998).

## **Changing Conflict Dynamics**

The Somali conflict has increasingly become more complex, asymmetrical and challenging. In many contemporary conflict situations, terrorists, criminal gangs, traffickers and armed groups or militias deliberately choose to use violence to pursue own objectives. Civilian populations, aid workers and increasingly peacekeepers are usually targeted. The UN and AU operations have to deal with these disparate groups and rapidly change and adapt new effective strategies to combat them (Cedric de Coning, 2015).

Effectively managing such conflicts require robust peace operation capabilities that can contain and manage aggressors and ensure basic stability, so that political and humanitarian work can be undertaken to alleviate suffering and seek medium to longer-term political solutions (Centre for Strategic Research, 2005). Notably, the AU is on course to develop and establish its nascent peace and security tools, and as a result, it has been able to adapt more rapidly to these changing conflict dynamics. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) has demonstrated the political will to engage sooner, more robustly and with greater innovation than the UN Security Council (Cedric de Coning, 2015).

## **Regional and International Interests**

It is generally agreed that the protracted conflict in Somali, is profoundly linked to the country's historical development and its socio-cultural attributes. However, external influences at both regional and international levels, have also contributed to the fragmentation of the political arena, due notably to the emphasis on the use of force as the principal tool for acquiring or maintaining power. In this unfolding crisis, regional pressures and rivalries, international interventions, economic and strategic interests as well as piracy, corruption and Islamic extremism all play an interlocking role (Bryden, 2013).

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On one hand, there is an outside-in dynamic, in that Somalia's neighbours are induced to step in to defend their interests. On the other hand, there are elements of an inside-out dynamic mostly resulting from the myth of the Great Somalia, which calls for the creation of one state regrouping all regions inhabited by Somalis including the territories in the neighbouring countries (Marangio, 2012). This myth has strongly shaped Somalia's foreign policy since the time of the late Muhammad Siad Barre's dictatorial rule (1969-1991) and has influenced the formation of Somali identity around ethnic homogeneity (Balthasar, 2012). A strong Somali state, driven by the myth of the "Great Somalia", is viewed by neighbouring countries as a possible threat, as it would advance territorial claims on Somali inhabited regions in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, as was the case in the Ogaden war in the 1970s (Guglielmo, 2008). There are other external actors who respond to the Somali conflict for different reasons and interests and with different levels of commitment and consistencies. These actors include the Arab countries, United States and the European Union. The different and conflicting regional and international influences allow the conflicting parties in Somalia to access funds, arms and other strategic support (World Bank Report, 2005). These resources are used to advance conflicts.

## **The Importance of Geographical Proximity and Cultural Affinity**

Three considerations explain the importance of regional organizations for involvement in peace operations: conflicts are rarely isolated within state borders, those who are closer to the problem are often in a better position to understand and influence it, and their proximity ensures that they have a long-term interest in its outcomes (Chaudran, 2015).

Geographical affinity, a feature that has a direct security, economic, political and domestic dimension, has contributed to the success of AMISOM. For example, the involvement of Kenya and Ethiopia, countries that faced direct consequences of the al-shabaab threat has largely contributed to enhance the capacity of the

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AMISOM force to weaken the al-qaeda allied al-shabaab group. The regional peacekeeping initiative that comes from a perceived principle of 'African solutions to African problems', brought a measure of legitimacy to AMISOM based on culturally affinitive peacekeepers, a factor that the different UN interventions in Somalia lacked (Grossman and Huber, 2010).

## **Resource and Capacity Constraints**

The greatest challenge to conducting peace operations in a regional context in Africa is the resource and capacity constraints of African organisations and their member states (Franke, 2001). A general lack of capacity among African troop-contributing states (to both AU and sub-regional missions) to deploy and sustain its forces has often neutralised African advantages such as greater consensus and geographical proximity (Wiklund and Ingerstad, 2015). AMISOM was originally intended to be a short-term, intermediate mission pending a handover of responsibility for conducting peace operations in Somalia to the UN within six months, a view clearly expressed in the AUPSC resolution establishing the mission (Ramsbotham, 2013).

When this transition failed, the AU indicated that it lacked the resources and capacity to appropriately sustain the mission. Indeed, the size and scope of AMISOM did not match the situation on the ground (Bouttellis and Williams, 2013). Given that the AU lacked resources, troop-contributing countries (TCCs) were expected to be financially and logistically self-sustaining. However, given the limited resources of the prospective TCCs, force generation to AMISOM proved to be an absolute challenge for several years; for example, two years into the mission's deployment, the force strength was less than half of the authorised number. Only those TCCs which could secure assistance from external partners, including airlifts, equipment, logistics support and sustenance, could in fact deploy (Ali, 2014).

In general, the lack of resources for the AU and capacity constraints are considered to be the largest impediment to african led peace operations. The AU and other sub-regional organisations operate with relatively small budgets and lack the administrative, logistical and command-and-control structures to manage

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large peace operations (Bures, 2006). Indeed, studies of the peace operations undertaken by the AU also show that these missions have been characterised by major ambitions, but deficient resources. Limited capacity to plan and manage operations, difficulties in generating troops and a lack of resources and logistical capacity to deploy and sustain deployment have had severe consequences on the effectiveness of most AU missions (Fanta, 2009). For this reason, the UN support is thus a critical enabler for the AU operations and its exit strategy. Thus, the effective collaboration between the UN and the AU are mutually inter-dependent on several levels (Mateja, 2015).

## **Perceived Lack of Impartiality**

In contrast to the argument that social, cultural and historical affinity, geographical proximity and economic and political interdependence generate trust and legitimacy, direct regional links to a conflict may result in perceived vested interests and partiality. Neighbouring countries may be partial in a conflict, which risks having negative consequences on its resolution (Vorrath, 2014).

The military involvement of Kenya and Ethiopia have so far been with the consent of the FGS but, increasingly, there are regional tensions as these states have different political visions for Somalia. For example, Kenya's involvement in Jubbaland was intended to create a 'buffer zone' against the al Shabaab's destabilizing activities. This vested interest remains at the core of tensions between Kenya and Somalia (Ahmed, 2014).

Like Kenya, Ethiopia's influence in Somalia is significant at both the political and the military levels. Apart from having a military presence in Somalia, it also has strong relations with Somaliland, a region seeking independence from Somalia, and with Puntland, a semi-autonomous region. The Ethiopian intervention is unpopular among Somalis in general, and any actions, however genuine, taken by the country are viewed with suspicion by some Somali decision makers (Erikson, 2013).

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## **Need for Adequate Logistical Support**

Effective command and control is vital to the success of any military operation. The AU is usually placed in the unenviable position of not being in control of the logistics for their own operations. In its first two years, AMISOM's two troop-contributing countries, Burundi and Uganda, struggled with logistics. The situation was dire before the United Nations Support to Somalia (UNSOA) was established and became operational in late 2009. After that, the mission experienced a major improvement in logistical support. However, UNSOA was not a perfect match for AMISOM's needs. Although UNSOA was an unprecedented UN mechanism designed to support the AU forces, it operated within a set of UN frameworks and procedures which were geared to supporting the equivalent of a UN Blue Helmet peacekeeping operation, not a warfighting mission like AMISOM (Bruton, 2014). As a result, UNSOA struggled to keep up with the pace and tempo of operations conducted by AMISOM. This in turn generated tensions between the AU and the UN. While it was possible to stretch some of UNSOA's resources while AMISOM operated in the small geographic theater of Mogadishu, it was simply impossible for UNSOA to cope with the logistical challenges presented by AMISOM's mandate and force posture from early 2012 when its theater of operations expanded across south and central Somalia (Bronwyn, 2013).

## **The Way Forward**

AMISOM has expanded beyond Mogadishu and has faced an al-Shabaab force more intent on harassment of its supply lines and terrorist attacks than open confrontation. The AU operates in an environment where building cooperative political relationships between Somalia's governing authorities and the population is significant besides projecting military power within Somalia (Blanchard, 2010). AMISOM has struggled with insufficient specialist equipment but over time and through a variety of mechanisms the UN and international partners have stepped in to identify and supply some specific military capabilities. To this end, the United Nations and other partners should enhance the support to African troops in terms of intelligence and financial means by helping operationalize both the African Standby Force and the Rapid Deployment Capability (Gorm, 2015)

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## Conclusion

In the face of a deteriorating security situation in Somalia since 1991, the United Nations and the African Union, have made a number of interventions, all of which intended to restore peace and security in the country. The tactical disengagement of the UN since 1995 elicited a strong perception among Somalis that the attempted solutions were a failure especially because they were externally imposed. The disengagement of the international community has compounded the conflict situation in Somalia, especially given that some powerful countries, for example, the USA, have sought to use neighbouring countries as a proxy in the global war on terror (Institute for Security Studies, 2010). Coupled with the radicalisation of Somali armed resistance and emergent linkages with al-Qaeda, the terrorist attacks against neighboring countries constituted a new phase of the conflict that demanded a more holistic and coherent strategy as a solution to global terrorism (Global Terrorism Index, 2014).

In seeking a lasting solution to the Somali conflict, the AU and the international community have recognised the critical role of regional engagement in dealing with the conflict within Somalia. Indeed, it is doubtful that a lasting solution to the conflict can be found without the fundamental involvement of regional countries and the support of the international community. The AU has collaborated with other actors and taken a stronger stand on the conflict and has fared relatively better than other interventions implemented in Somalia since 1992. Indeed, the success of AMISOM demonstrates the potential of AU's capacity to implement the principle of 'African solution to African problems'.

Clearly, AU's experience in Somalia suggests that the organisation's engagement and ability to deliver peace and security in the continent is still work-in-progress. The AU's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) remains a vital component of Africa's strategy to consolidate order and stability. Finally, the AU needs to seriously urge the political leadership of its Member States to take decisive and necessary action whenever conflicts arise. Not doing so, the continent will continue to experience challenges in ensuring effective and sustainable peace.

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# Multinational Corporations and Conflict in Africa

*Margaret Cheptile*

## **Paper Overview**

There is documented evidence that Africa is endowed with many natural resources. According to Manji (2014) Africa has 10% of the world's oil reserves, 40% of gold, and 90% of chromium and platinum metal group, with other probable discoveries underway. Other natural resources include diamonds, iron, copper, timber, rubber, water, land and a proportionate number of agricultural produce. Most African countries depend on these resources for their livelihood and survival (Alao, 2007). Also notable is that its booming population is another great resource for Africa; currently estimated at 1.17 billion compared to the global population of 7.3 billion (United Nations, 2015). Yet, in the midst of this wealth, the continent has suffered from protracted poverty and conflicts. It is home to the world's least developed countries with more than two-thirds considered as fragile including Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR) among others (Maphosa, 2012). The estimated economic cost of conflict in Africa is 18 billion United States Dollars (USD) per year, with the average African economy shrinking by 15% as a result of armed conflicts (Hillier, 2007).

Most of the African conflicts (about 40%) have been linked to natural resources. Collier (2008) complements this argument by highlighting that a country whose economy depends on natural resource exports has a higher likelihood of civil conflict and such conflicts are twice as likely to relapse within five years as those that are not associated with natural resources. In addition, the growing numbers of conflicts occurring in regions where Multinational Corporations (MNCs) associated with extraction and trade on natural resource operate have prompted public attention to the role of MNCs in creating, intensifying and sustaining armed conflicts in Africa. This paper aims to further this discussion by examining ways

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in which MNCs contribute to natural resource conflicts in Africa and why this continues to exacerbate despite the various mitigating measures put in place.

Methodologically, this paper is based on a descriptive approach relying on existing secondary data on the issue. Overall, it is structured around four main areas. The first section gives an introduction, which covers the overview of the paper, background to MNC and conflict in Africa, problem statement and the objectives that the paper seeks to address. Section two provides the conceptual framework and theories that guide the paper. Section three provides an examination of the proposed objectives while section four presents the recommendations and conclusion.

## **Background**

The role of MNCs in the global market has become more prominent since the onset of international trade (Batware, 2011). This is due to dramatic social, economic, political and technological developments that have changed the context of the world market economy with increasing acceptance of free market and liberalisation (Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2011). Africa, described as natural resource rich and an under-exploited market, has received a massive increase in foreign investment. For a start, there is need to understand what a MNC entails. A MNC is an enterprise that owns or controls production of goods or services in more than one country but has a centralized head office in its home country (Duesei, 2009). Most MNCs derive a quarter of their revenue from operations in host countries, which mostly give them some economic advantage that they cannot secure at home including labour cost, tax and environmental standards advantages. Most of them are mainly from the United States of America (USA) and Europe and recently Asia and South America. Today, MNCs are key players in the world market as they account for 25-33% of world output, 70% of world trade and 80% of international investment (Baylis *et al.*, 2011).

MNCs are of many kinds depending on the sectors they operate in, which include extraction and mining, energy, manufacturing, telecommunications, and finance among others. While some are making valuable contributions to the economies

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of African countries through taxation and employment, some MNCs undermine human progress, economic development and contribute directly or indirectly to violent conflict, environmental degradation and human rights violations in the host countries (Nelson, 2000). In particular, MNCs in the extractive, mining and energy sectors have particularly been linked to conflicts in Africa hence, the focus of this paper. Examples of these types of MNCs in Africa include Sodian, De Beers, Chevron, Elf, Texaco Total Fina, Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil, British Petroleum (BP), Statoil, and Ranger among others (Ollong, 2014). They have been involved in fuelling conflicts directly by trading arms for natural resources or indirectly by facilitating access to financial resources which are used to purchase weapons (Ollong 2014; Van Dorp 2014). These conflicts have caused devastating effects such as countless killings and displacements, environmental damage, disruption of livelihoods, and massive poverty among other human rights violations (Luvhengo, 2006).

Public attention to the contribution of natural resource based MNCs in civil conflict peaked in 1900s when Ken Saro Wiwa and eight others were executed by the Abacha regime in Nigeria for advocating the rights of the Ogoni people who opposed Shell's oil operations on their land (Alden and Davies, 2006). In theory and as Alao (2007) attests, though research indicates dependency on natural resources make countries more susceptible to civil conflict, there is no innateness of natural resources that compel conflict. It is however, the hegemonic struggles between powerful and subordinate groups and the nature of management and appropriation of resources that stimulate conflicts.

In an effort to promote better appropriation of natural resources and prevention of conflicts, a number of conventions, frameworks and campaigns have been put in place to guide MNCs in their operations. The UN initiated a Global Compact in 1999 that calls on local industries and MNCs to embrace human rights, labour and environment standards in their operations, especially in conflict zones (Kolk and Lenfant, 2010). In addition, UN Security Council Resolution 1625 of 2005 was adopted to reaffirm action against illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural

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resources and high-value commodities in areas where it contributes to the outbreak, escalation or continuation of armed conflict (UNSC Report, 2007). In 2011, the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights was also adopted. It calls on the reduction of risk of gross human rights abuse especially in conflict-affected areas (Grundel, 2011).

As noted in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2013 report, OECD has also put forward a number of conventions. First, the OECD Bribery Convention obligates member states (mostly from Europe and America) to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials in the conduct of international business. Second, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises requires MNCs to consider human rights and environmental standards and to contribute to the host country's socio-economic progress. It also seeks to regulate corporate behaviour through governments where National Contact Points (NCPs) are established to promote corporate responsibility. Third, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-affected and High Risk Areas was adopted in 2010 by OECD and countries of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), extractive industries, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC. It calls for responsible supply chain management of minerals from conflict-affected areas.

Specific African led initiatives include the Kimberly Process that was initiated in 2000 by African governments, diamond industries and CSOs to address the issue of conflict diamonds by breaking the link between trade in illegal diamonds, human rights violations and armed conflict (Alden and Davis, 2006). In addition, the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) calls MNCs to respect human rights and support peace and development through their mineral sourcing practices (Batware, 2011).

Lastly, a number of campaigns against MNCs' role in armed conflicts have been put forward. For example, the UN has condemned MNCs and countries involved in conflict and calls for sanctions against countries, companies and individuals involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources. Human rights CSOs

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have also named and shamed MNCs and other individuals found to contribute to conflicts. The most prominent of these CSOs include Amnesty International, Business for Social Responsibility, Human Rights Watch, International Alert, Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, and the Council on Economic Priorities (Grundel, 2011). Their actions are directed towards ensuring transparency and accountability in MNCs operations especially in conflict-ridden zones. Against this backdrop, the question remains as the extent to which these initiatives have been effective.

## **Problem Statement**

Natural resources such as oil and diamonds in Africa represent a high percentage of any nation's strategic assets and sources of livelihoods (Alao, 2007). However, the relevance of MNCs as a potential source of resource-based conflicts has come to the limelight as they continue to exploit renewable and non-renewable resources of many African countries. It is predicted that these resources are likely to continue being the main source of conflicts in Africa (Collier, 2008). The MNCs' actions have been reported to create, intensify and even prolong civil wars in countries such as Liberia, DRC, CAR, Sudan, South Sudan, Angola and Libya among others. The impacts are devastating; from human, environmental and labour related, poverty, displacement, human right abuses to environmental degradation. Given this scenario, local, regional and international organizations have formulated frameworks and campaigns to guide MNCs and other stakeholders in natural resource management and trade. The aim is to ensure that such actions do not propagate conflict but instead promote social, economic and political development. However, though the existing literature has established the link between MNCs and conflict in Africa, there is dearth of information on why MNCs continue to contribute to natural resource-based conflicts in most parts of Africa despite the regulatory frameworks in place. Therefore, greater understanding is needed on the reasons why this is the case. This article attempts to contribute to fill this gap. The discussion is guided by the hypothesis that MNCs in executive, mining and energy sectors contribute to conflicts in resource rich countries of Africa.

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## Specific Objectives

In order to address the outlined hypothesis, the following objectives will guide the paper:

- i. To examine ways in which MNCs contribute to conflicts in resource rich countries in Africa.
- ii. To establish why MNCs continue to contribute to conflicts in resource rich countries in Africa despite measures put in place.

## Study Justification

This paper aims to contribute to the body of knowledge and intellectual debate about MNCs and conflicts in Africa. It is also hoped that the analysis will shape policy formulation and implementation on the subject area. African countries rich in natural resources have been undergoing conflicts characterized by widespread killings, displacements, poverty and other human rights violations. In the DRC alone, Hillier (2007) notes that over 5.4 million lives have been lost and the cost of armed conflict in the period 1996-2005 was estimated at 29% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Information on the role of MNCs in the ongoing African conflicts will prompt concerned stakeholders to take meaningful action and review the effectiveness of the existing regulatory frameworks. Indeed, MNCs, even those with best intentions, need guidance to ensure that their finances and other support are not channelled into creating, intensifying or prolonging conflicts and human right abuses. In fact, MNCs are capable of contributing immensely to development in Africa if there was fairness in the handling of the natural resources benefits, increased their investment in Africa and reduced the repatriation of income to their home countries.

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## **Conceptual and Theoretical Framework**


The following conceptual and theoretical frameworks are used to guide the discussion in this paper.

### **Conceptual Framework**

The conceptual framework that guides this paper is captured in the schematic Figure 1. It represents the author's own assumption and conceptualization of the contribution of MNCs to resource-based conflicts in Africa and why this continues regardless of the mitigating measures put in place. The independent and dependent variables in this paper are MNCs and conflict respectively. The arrows in the diagram depict the flow of the relationships between the different variables.

While MNCs vary depending on their sectors of operation, this paper focuses on MNCs working in extractive, mining and energy sectors. It has been asserted in various literature that these MNCs cause, intensify or sustain intrastate armed conflicts by supplying arms and offering financial support to warring parties, contributing to human rights violations, exploiting natural resources with little regard to local economy, and supporting bad governance among others. Although a number of regulatory frameworks and guidelines have been established to deter MNCs from contributing to armed conflict, their implementation has been limited. Furthermore, the frameworks are voluntary in nature and hence not legally enforceable. This has allowed MNCs to engage in exploitive operations hence leading to violent confrontations and civil conflicts. Other factors that have provided MNCs with a fertile ground to continue contributing to resource based conflicts include lack of transparency, economic slump, State failures, conflicts used as economic opportunities, and increased market demand for products manufactured from some of the natural resources.

**Figure 1: Conceptual Overview of MNCs and Resource Natural Resource Conflicts**



*Source: Author's Conceptualization*

## Theoretical Framework

The relationship between MNCs and resource-based conflicts in Africa has been defined by mixed views. This largely depends on whether one is analysing such a relationship from a Liberal or Marxist theory perspective. These are the two main theories that guide this paper.

### Liberalism Theory

This perspective is based on the work of Adam Smith (1723-1790) and David Ricardo (1772-1823). It views MNCs as central agents of global socio-economic and political development. Its proponents argue that free trade and movement of capital around the world increase national wealth and satisfaction of human needs. This is because market expansion allows MNCs to spread resources, knowledge, expertise, goods and services that help to develop less developed countries. It also encourages countries to benefit from their comparative advantage. In this case, African countries endowed with natural resources will benefit from their trade and income. Liberalists strengthen their thesis by explaining that developing countries that have been more open to the presence of MNCs have experienced significant improvements in their standards of living (that is, South Korea, Singapore and

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Taiwan) while those that are hostile to MNCs continue to languish in poverty. However, they have failed to identify the countries belonging to the latter category. In summary therefore, liberalists argue that MNCs present positive externalities to host countries and that conflict occurs only when the market economy is restricted.

This theory is relevant to the subject under discussion as it helps us to critique the extent to which the liberalism perspective is applicable in understanding the link between MNCs and conflicts in Africa. A closer look indicates that while some MNCs have contributed positively to African development, others have contributed to conflicts and other socioeconomic challenges regardless of what liberalists attest. Critics state that due to poverty, poor policies and governance, countries such as the DRC, Somalia and South Sudan are not in a position to meaningfully compete with powerful and resourceful MNCs. In this regard, free market has worsened trade inequalities that usually lead to conflict especially where the MNCs collude with selfish elites in resource rich countries at the expense of the majority. The suggestion is that there is need to have guidelines that protect poor countries in a globalised economy. The question, however, remains why natural resource conflicts continue in Africa despite the various frameworks formulated to protect the continent from MNCs' exploitation.

## **Marxism Theory**

The paper is also guided by the Marxist approach traced to the writings of Karl Marx (1818-1883). It rejects the view that every individual, organization or country benefits from free market economy. Rather, it claims that free market that is currently dominated by MNCs creates extremes of wealth for capitalists (including MNCs and home countries) and poverty for the proletariat (including host governments and local populations). In pursuit of interests and profits, MNCs in free market economy exploit developing countries and contribute to problems of human rights abuse, environmental degradation, corruption, and economic fragility that prompt unequal distribution of wealth and subsequent violent conflicts. According to Marxism, the local populations, revolting against

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impoverishment and unequal distribution of resources, will end violent conflicts once the capitalists are overthrown.

The Marxism perspective can be largely applied to the understanding of MNCs and their roles in resource-based conflicts in Africa. Many MNCs, especially those engaged in resource extraction, mining or energy, have been reported to contribute to conflicts either directly or indirectly as they attempt to maximize profits. However, MNCs are credited for the significant economic role they play in today's globalized society. Some of the MNCs have endeavoured to uphold and comply with local and international regulations in their operations. Therefore, critics argue that overthrowing MNCs would not be a solution; rather, the host country and other stakeholders should instead rise against MNCs' exploitation by setting and effectively implementing standards that will ensure fairness in the world market.

In summary, these divergent perspectives are important in understanding the position of MNCs in the global market and their subsequent role in influencing resource-based conflicts in Africa. Their divergent nature provides an in-depth understanding that can enhance the formulation of sound and practical policies and guidelines for natural resource governance in Africa.

## **Methodological Approach and Analysis**

The paper is based on critical review of selected reports, government publications, books, theses and academic journals on the link between MNCs and natural resource-based conflicts in Africa. The literature review was further complemented by personal experience. The arguments herein are therefore based on a combination of these approaches. More specifically, qualitative analysis has been employed to provide an in-depth understanding of the topic under discussion.

## **Ways in Which MNCs Contribute to Conflicts in Africa**

As already alluded to, the theoretical views and opinions that influence the MNCs roles in resource-based conflicts are varied. Furthermore, among those who argue that MNCs contribute to conflicts, a proportion state that they do so directly while

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others argue that their contribution is either indirect or unintended. Whichever the case, the following are some of the ways in which MNCs contribute to conflicts in Africa.

### **a) Supply of Arms**

There is a link between illicit exploitation, trade in natural resources and the proliferation of arms in conflict afflicted African countries (Ballentine and Sherman, 2003). Some MNCs have been reported to supply weapons and arms to warring parties hence sustaining the conflict. For instance, in the Sudan conflict, Canadian company Talisman Energy and other foreign oil companies were reported by Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) as fuelling the civil war by supplying equipment used by the Khartoum Government in human rights abuses against civilians (Bennett, 2001). These abuses included systematic enslavement of children and women. Ikelegbe (2005) asserts that some MNCs in the Niger Delta were reported to purchase arms and provide logistical support to state security agencies that were involved in brutality against a hapless populace. These practices generated resistance from local communities and ultimately resulted in the formation of groups of enraged and militant youths. In due course, these groups were armed and used violence to demand for their share of benefits from the natural resources exploited by the MNCs.

### **b) Financial Support to Warring Parties**

Luvhengo (2006) argues that, after the cold war when foreign financial support that combatants received from the socialist and capitalist blocs ended, warring factions resorted to the exploitation of natural resources to finance conflicts. In this regard, MNCs engaged in natural resource trade have been cited to fund warring parties' repressive activities and facilitate an onset or continuity of conflicts. In the DRC it is documented that a British MNC, Afrimex, gave money to a rebel group responsible for serious human rights violations and in return the rebel group allowed Afrimex to extract minerals from mines under its control (Ollong, 2014). In these mines forced labour and other life-threatening conditions were rampant.

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Another MNC in the DRC, AngloGold Ashanti, has also been reported to provide substantive financial support to the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI), a rebel movement responsible for devastating abuses in the DRC (Pole Institute, 2013). In Sudan, Talisman was sued for financing the Sudanese government's ethnic cleansing campaign against black and non-Muslim minorities (Bennett, 2001). Conflicts in other Africa countries including Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Angola have also been reported to benefit from funding by MNCs.

### **c) Human Rights Violations**

MNCs' involvement in human rights violations is more prevalent in contexts where there are no effective government institutions and legal protection (Nelson, 2000). This is the case in most conflict-affected countries. MNCs' involvement in gross human rights abuses often results in creating or exacerbating conflict. MNCs may be directly involved in human rights violations through operations affecting the environment (water, crops, livestock and land) as the case is in the Niger Delta; causing forced labour and child labour (like the cocoa industry in Cote d'Ivoire); lack of freedom of association (like oil companies in Nigeria); displacement of indigenous communities (like the mining sector in Angola and DRC); disrespecting communities' right to free, prior and informed consent (like in Niger Delta); discriminating certain ethnic groups in recruiting workers; violence against or killings of union activists among others (Van Dorp, 2014). MNCs may also participate in human rights abuses indirectly through financing rebel groups which in turn violate human rights. For example, South African based diamond MNC, De Beers is reported to have accessed diamonds reserves in Angola by supporting the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel group which in turn killed and sexually abused civilians (Luvhengo, 2006).

### **d) Exploitation without Social Development**

In natural resource rich areas, there is often a struggle between those who control and own the production of the resources (MNCs and host government) and those who benefit and bear the social and environmental costs of exploitation

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(local communities). Where appropriations of exploited resources ignore and disempower the local population, resistance and conflict are bound to occur. According to Maphosa (2012), decades of oil exploitation, environmental degradation and neglect of local communities by MNCs in the Niger Delta created impoverished, exploited citizens and an armed rebellion especially among the youth. In fact, local communities have had to threaten, destroy and disrupt the MNC operations before any benefits are extended to them. To date, Nigeria's oil belt has remained a region of intense hostilities and violent struggle for the appropriation of oil resources and benefits.

### **e) Ineffective Community Relation Practices**

As an attempt to manage ensuing hostility and resistance from local populace, some MNCs have established community relation projects where they operate. However, a proportion of these projects have tended to promote more conflicts and illegal appropriation of benefits and are of little benefit to the communities. Ikelegbe (2005) outlines that in the Niger Delta, due to recurrent insecurity, MNCs present have awarded surveillance contracts to youth from the area. While this protects their assets, the project has provided funding for profligate living and purchase of arms that has exacerbated conflict in the region. In other instances, instead of empowering and employing youth, MNCs have made payments to ghost workers and standby capacity and in so doing, either avoid taxes and maximise on profits and/or simply exploit public relations stunts.

### **f) Support Bad Governance**

MNCs, especially those from France, are stated as principle agents of bad governance in Africa especially due to their support to ineffective and exploitative African leaders (Ollong, 2014). For example, ELF exploration Angola, a French oil company, was reported to have sponsored the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) – a government affiliated movement, which controlled oil reserves and the UNITA – a rebel movement that controlled diamond reserves. The two were involved in the Angolan protracted civil war that devastated the

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country since independence. It is documented that ELF gave USD20 million to the UNITA and its leader, Jonas Savimbi, during the 1992 elections. As a result, the rebel movement used the money to buy arms that ravaged the country and whose effects are still evident to date (Collier, 2008). Other oil companies, for example Shell and BP, have been reported to bribe some African leaders as a concession not only for exploitation of natural resources but also to falsify the impacts of the environmental degradation and other mal-development practices (Duese, 2009).

#### **g) Income from Illegal Trade and Conflict Sustainment**

Warlords and insurgents thrive on illegal international trading and export of looted minerals and other resources. This is particularly possible through the support of foreign firms as the case has been in Angola, Liberia, the DRC and Sierra Leone (Alao, 2007). In addition, MNCs in Africa have been cited to actively partake in economic crimes such as smuggling, illicit and clandestine commerce, piracy, arms and drug trafficking, and organized crime in conflict regions (Baylis *et al.*, 2011). De Beers, a South African MNC engaged in the diamond sector, was reported to buy illegal diamonds from the UNITA rebel group in Angola. As a result, the illegal diamond trade became a major hindrance to peace processes in Angola as it enabled UNITA to restock its munitions and thus, prolong the civil war (Luvhengo, 2006). In the DRC, illegal mining by rebels has resulted in serious environmental degradation and destruction. In particular, endangered gorilla populations are being killed or driven out of their natural habitat as rebels illegally plunder the ore-rich lands of the DRC (Pole Institute, 2013). Rebels have also driven farmers off their coltan-rich land and attacked villages partly in order to control strategic mining areas. Among these groups is the Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) which has been accused of abducting children and recruiting them as soldiers. This is in addition to the rape and killing of innocent civilians. In a nutshell, illegal trade does not only provide combatants with income for conflict sustainment but also cause environmental degradation/destruction and the violation of basic human rights.

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## **Reasons Why MNCs Continue to Contribute to Conflicts in Africa**

Despite the frameworks, conventions and campaigns in place, MNCs continue to contribute to conflicts in Africa. Existing literature highlights that this remains the case because the following factors provide a favourable environment for the onset of conflict, its intensification and sustainment.

### **a) Increased Market Demand**

Conflicts in Africa have continued because of the high demand for products, especially in Western countries, that are manufactured from natural resources found in African countries (Dusei, 2009). For example, as Ollong (2014) observes, as MNCs struggle to meet the global demand for products such as cell phones, computer chips, video game consoles, camcorders and other electronics, the DRC has been a focal point of conflict given its extensive reserves of Coltan. It is estimated that the DRC holds about 80% of the world's Coltan and rebel groups earn close to USD20 million per month from selling the same to MNCs. This has accelerated violence in the North Eastern region of DRC where Coltan is mostly found. The income has been used to purchase munitions, which have been used by the militias to terrorise local populations through brutal gang rape, displacement and murder. Such actions are aimed at facilitating the militias' regional domination and uninhibited compliance among local populations. Notably, with the increased development in digital technology, the global market for Coltan will increase and without effective management of the Coltan trade, conflicts are likely to also increase. By 2005, about 6.6 million pounds of Coltan was used globally and this amount has certainly continued to increase (Alao, 2007). Indeed, studies have shown that the world is experiencing a severe shortage of Coltan and this has led to the struggle and conflict over this scarce resource (Grundel, 2011).

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## **b) Lack of Commitment to Transparency**

MNCs' and African governments' lack of commitment to transparency of their operations and public expenditures respectively have been linked to sustained conflicts in Africa. MNCs that profit most from conflicts in Africa often times claim that they were not aware of the origin of the minerals that they purchased. According to the UN, these claims of ignorance are disingenuous as the MNCs tactfully evade any investigations that might reveal the reality (Van Dorp, 2014). In addition, the MNCs' management often ignores or refuses to perform sufficient due diligence regarding their suppliers, thus failing to meet minimum standards of ethical business conduct (OECD, 2013). As a result, MNCs continue to exploit Africa's mineral wealth with indifference to any consequent negative impacts. On the other hand, even where MNCs want to work in a transparent manner, some African governments have been a hindrance. For example, when BP attempted to publish what it pays the Angolan government to access oil reserves, the government threatened to throw BP out and the other 33 oil companies operating there. As a result, none published their payments to the government (Collier, 2008).

## **c) State Weakness/Failure**

Manji (2014) argues that due to political instability and inadequate capacity, most African States have failed to regulate the MNCs' activities and hold them accountable for their negative externalities. Furthermore, the wealth of these companies has rendered them untouchable in regards to holding them accountable. The MNCs' home countries have also been reluctant to control the companies' business in foreign countries (Dusei, 2009). In fact, where home countries threaten to take action, the MNCs often use trading partners in the host countries to avoid liability. To this end, MNCs get away with violation of minimum ethical standards including causing or sustaining conflicts. In areas such as the Niger Delta, the government was reported to be allied to exploitative MNCs; they provided them with national security agents to intimidate and eliminate anyone opposed to their operations (Ikelegbe, 2005). In this case, government, the institution that is mandated to

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protect citizens, fails to do so in favour of the MNCs. Inadequate capacity of governments has also allowed rebel and criminal groups to control, exploit and illegally sell natural resources (Luvhengo, 2005). This situation has created disorder and a context that exacerbates conflict.

#### **d) Ineffective Corporate Social Responsibility Strategies**

MNCs have increasingly established Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies to guide their operations in host countries. CSR entails company's commitment to operate in an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable manner while recognising the interests of its investors, customers, business partners, and local communities (Eweje, 2011). However, MNCs' adherence to and implementation of CSR practices is limited on the ground. For example, Edoho (2008) outlines that CSR strategies in Nigeria fail to address oil spills caused by the MNCs operations. Most CSR strategies also fail to recognize pertinent issues such as gender equality, corruption, child labour, and community participation that often, leads to violent conflict (Naeem and Welford, 2009). Additionally, there is little corporate awareness on how to operate in conflict contexts. Kolk and Lenfant (2010) argues that MNCs operating in conflict-ridden countries of Central Africa have often reported on their economic and social impacts while being inattentive to the conflict dimensions.

#### **e) Weak Regulatory Frameworks**

Some of the existing regulatory guidelines meant to restrain the MNCs' role in conflicts, fail to consider all the necessary dimensions required for successful action. The Kimberley Process, for instance, only incorporated the diamond industry and governments of producing countries in the certification system but failed to consider artisanal and informal mining (Van Dorp, 2014). The focus was only on legal aspects hence ignoring the improvement of livelihoods of small-scale artisanal miners. This has left an unfilled gap given that more than a million African artisanal diamond miners live in extreme poverty, outside the formal economy (Ollong, 2014). In addition, there is lack of awareness and inability to keep track

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of the multitude frameworks among MNCs. For instance, Anvil, a copper mining industry in DRC reported that it had difficulty comprehending all the international guidelines established over the years (Alden and Davies, 2006). Lastly, Van Dorp (2014) claims that the guidelines have failed to improve MNCs conduct in conflict zones. Besides the low implementation as a result of the African governments' inadequate capacity, most of the guidelines are voluntary in nature and are not legally enforceable. Therefore, weak regulatory frameworks tempts MNCs to engage in repressive actions with limited consideration of labour, environmental and human rights standards (Kolk and Lenfant, 2010).

#### **f) Competition for Natural Resource Control**

The struggle for control of natural resources in many African countries has increased the conflict vulnerability between different factions. This competition has necessitated increased appropriation and privatisation of natural resources especially through exclusive contracts with foreign firms and local commercial networks (Luvhengo, 2006). This has led to resistance and conflict by individuals and groups excluded from the process. This is the case with conflicts in Angola, Sudan, the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone that are characterized by a violent scramble for natural resources. In some instances, governments as well as warlords have hired external private security companies for security support in exchange for privileged resource access (Ikelegbe, 2005). It is highly likely that some indecent MNCs take advantage of this struggle and engage in exploitative operations and illegal trading that worsens the conflict situation.

#### **g) Conflict as an Economic Opportunity**

As Nelson (2001) affirms, conflict and disorder present economic opportunities for MNCs, rulers and warlords in resource rich regions. As depicted in Somalia and Liberia conflict can become a form of business rather than an instrument for furthering any coherent ideological or even community interests (Maphosa, 2012). During the Sierra Leone conflict, government leaders, rebels and MNCs profited from and enriched themselves through blood diamonds (Bennett, 2001). Even the

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armed forces who were officially mandated to provide national security were often drawn into the illegal, informal and violent economy through protection, complicity and other direct activities. The goal became personal enrichment rather than State security. This perspective of conflict motivates actions by conflict factions as well as local and foreign traders towards generating and sustaining conflicts in the continent.

## **h) Economic Slump**

Batware (2011) argues that there is a link between economic recession and intensified conflicts in Africa. This is because financial crisis puts pressure on big corporations to look for alternative ways of compensating the losses on stock markets. Most of the MNCs will do this by engaging in illegal business operations and profiting from conflicts that claim millions of lives in their areas of operations.

# **Recommendations and Conclusion**

## **Recommendations**

As the role of MNCs in the world economy becomes increasing apparent, strategies should be put in place to ensure that they do not continue to cause, intensify or sustain armed conflicts especially in natural resource rich countries. Different stakeholders, including African governments, MNCs and their home countries, local communities and CSOs must work in partnership for greater success. Some recommendations, which will need to be reinforced by substantive field research, are suggested below:

- As a result of global integration, the role of MNCs in the world economy has become clear. This reality requires them to understand that peace is a basic element for successful business and hence they should promote conflict resolution and peacebuilding in their areas of operation. MNCs can do this by partnering with African governments and CSOs. While it is true that the primary responsibility of a government is to ensure the security of its citizens,

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the reality is that MNCs also have the power and capability to foster good will among local communities.

- Experience shows that where resources are utilized responsibly, such as diamonds in Botswana, they can contribute to development and stability. However, where governments are corrupt, rebels are ruthless and borders are porous, as in Angola, the DRC and Sierra Leone, resources have become agents of social, economic and political collapse. MNCs should be transparent with their operations and African governments should encourage it. Indeed, there is need for effective and transparent natural resource management protocols. In addition to host governments and MNCs, financial institutions should also promote transparency and social responsibility in international investment by campaigning against projects by culpable MNCs.
- MNCs should promote greater economic inclusion and social justice in their operations. While their operations may be disruptive to local communities, MNCs can support socio-economic and political development by engaging in positive projects such as poverty reduction, business creation, environmental conservation, capacity building, employment creation, establishment of social amenities, and other activities that support local livelihoods. Local communities must be included in all these projects in order to build close relationships, trust, capacity, and to ensure the sustainability of the engagements.
- Consumers of products manufactured from natural resources, especially those from Western countries, should demand conflict-free products. They can do this by pressuring companies, such as those dealing with electronics, to remove conflict minerals from their supply chains. Consumers must take the lead against conflict minerals because the MNCs may not be willing to lose their profits. MNCs' countries of origin need to understand that corporate responsibility transcends borders and hence they should be proactive in monitoring and responding to the actions of their home-based companies operating overseas.

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- African governments, MNCs and other stakeholders of natural resources need to discuss ways of enhancing the effectiveness of the existing regulatory frameworks. They also need to develop a specific framework for fragile and conflict-affected zones that will bring together all the conflict-specific elements of the UN and OECD guiding principles. There is need to think of moving from a CSR voluntary approach to corporate accountability, which entails holding corporations responsible for social, economic, political and environmental impacts of their operations.

## Conclusion

Natural resource-based conflict is complicated and the suffering of affected populations is immeasurable. MNCs, directly or indirectly, contribute significantly to the onset, escalation and sustainment of resource-based conflicts in Africa. This contribution is estimated to intensify with the increase in global integration and expansion of the free market economy. The various regulatory guidelines put in place to deter MNCs' contribution to violent conflicts have not been effective in Africa largely due to lack of implementation, awareness, political will, and security reasons among others. It is worth noting that MNCs do not contribute to conflict on their own, they have indigenous collaborators such as rebel groups and corrupt government officials. Going forward, MNCs have a moral, leadership and business responsibility to engage in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in their areas of operation. As Van Dorp (2014) notes, this is best exemplified by a quote by Kofi Annan who, in 2005 noted that:

*“Businesses operate in conflict zones and conflict-prone countries around the world. If they make the wrong decisions on investment, employment, community relations, environmental protection and security arrangements, they can exacerbate the tensions that produce conflict. But if they make the right decisions, they can help a country turn its back on conflict, and move towards lasting peace.”*

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## Highlights of Key Messages

This fact sheet is a quick reference guide regarding issues discussed in the two papers. The key messages include:

### **Comparative Analysis of African Union and United Nations Interventions in Somalia**

- Successful military operations campaigns are extremely difficult for external actors to conduct without an effective and legitimate local Government. Without support from a legitimate authority, military operations would be difficult to conduct and they could either fail in theater or fail as part of the broader strategy when the conflict resumes as soon as the military is withdrawn.
- Effective management of conflicts require robust peace operation capabilities that can contain and manage aggressors and ensure basic stability, so that political and humanitarian work can be undertaken to alleviate suffering and seek medium to long-term political solutions.
- Geographical and cultural affinity has played a positive role for AMISOM to realize what other missions failed to do in Somalia. Geographical affinity has direct security, economic, political and domestic dimensions that contribute to the success of AU interventions.
- Learning from the AMISOM's relative success, African Countries have demonstrated that their militaries are capable of conducting peace support operations. Correspondingly, more and more African nations should train, resource, and equip their armed forces to achieve proficiency in the military skillset required against global terrorism and for a peacekeeping environment.
- Since most peace operations occur on the African continent the United Nations and other partners should enhance the current capacities of African practitioners in order to participate, stabilize, and help shape conflict environments by supporting them in training, equipment and financing of different aspects of peace support operations.

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## Multinational Corporations and Conflict in Africa

- More than 40% of conflicts in Africa have been linked to natural resources.
- Increased global integration has highlighted the contribution of Multinational Corporation (MNCs) in natural resource based conflicts in Africa. It includes supplying arms and offering financial support to warring parties, partaking in human rights violations, exploiting natural resources with little regard to the local economy, and supporting bad governance among others.
- Globally and regionally, various regulatory frameworks and campaigns have been put in place to deter MNCs from creating, intensifying or sustaining conflicts in their host countries.
- MNCs continue to contribute to conflicts in Africa despite the mitigating measures put in place. This is partly attributed to limited implementation and the voluntary nature of the frameworks, lack of commitment to transparency, economic slump, State failure, and increased market demand for products manufactured from natural resources from conflict areas.
- To successfully ensure that MNCs do not cause, intensify or sustain armed conflicts in Africa, all the stakeholders (African governments, MNCs and their home countries, local communities and civil society) must work in partnership.
- MNCs should be transparent, promote economic inclusion and social justice and integrate peace building and conflict resolution efforts in their operations.
- Worldwide, all stakeholders of natural resources need to discuss ways of enhancing the effectiveness of the existing management regulatory frameworks. At the same time, consumers of products manufactured from natural resources should demand for ‘conflict-free products’.

## About the Authors



**Lt Col Donatien Nduwimana** is a senior army officer of the Burundi National Defense Forces. He is currently a researcher at the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC). His career as a military Officer began when he was commissioned into the Burundian National defense forces in 1988. He completed military and academic training in 1994. Since then he has held key positions in command and staff some of which include those of Battalion Commander between 2007 and 2010 and Ministry of Defense Advisor in Studies and Strategic Planning in 2012. He has attended several career military courses during his time of service including senior staff course at the Combined War College in Yaoundé, Cameroun, Junior Staff Course in Libreville, Gabon, and Multinational Battalion Commander in peace operations course in Bamako, Mali. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Economics Sciences (Management and Administration) and a Master's Degree in Strategy, Defense, Security, Conflict and Disaster Management from the University of Yaoundé in Cameroun



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