



International Peace Support Training Centre Nairobi, Kenya

An Assessment of Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework of the DRC and the Great Lakes Region



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Foreword

The International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) has made considerable contribution in research and training on peace support issues in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. The centre is a training and research institution focusing on capacity building at the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the African Peace and Security Architecture and has developed to be the regional center for the African Standby Force (ASF) in Eastern Africa. It addresses the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated Peace Support Operations through exposing actors to the multi-dimensional nature of these operations. The research conducted covers a broad spectrum ranging from conflict prevention, management, and post conflict reconstruction.

The Peace and Security Research Department (PSRD) of the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) presents Occasional Paper Series 5 of (2014) on various themes on peace and conflict situation in the Great Lakes Region. IPSTC produced seven Occasional Papers in 2014. Three of them focused on Great Lakes Region while the others focused on traditional structures, women and civil society in peace building in Somaliland, Somalia, Kenya and South Sudan. This publication titled: *Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) of DRC and the Great Lakes Region (GLR)* provides an analysis of factors determining successful implementation of the PSCF agreement in eastern DRC.

These papers provide insight into pertinent peace and security issues in the region that are useful to policy makers. These publications also provide significant contribution to the security debate and praxis in the region. The research products from IPSTC have been developed by researchers from Kenya, Burundi and Ethiopia.

This Occasional Paper is an important contribution to the vision and mission of IPSTC. The research and publication of this Occasional Paper has been made possible by the support of the Government of Japan through UNDP and the European Union.

Brigadier Robert Kabage
Director, IPSTC

Abbreviations

ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
ADB	Africa Development Bank
ADEF-NALU	Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
AFDL	Alliance des Forces Democratiques Pour la Liberation du Congo/Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation of Congo
APSA	Africa Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Mission in Burundi (French Acronym)
CEPGL	Communaute Economique des Pays des Grand Lacs/ Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
CNDP	Congress National Pour La Defense du Peuple/ National Congress for the Defence of the People
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Resettlement
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
EALA	East African Legislative Assembly
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EJVEM	Expanded Joint Verification Mission
EU	European Union

EWER	Early Warning and Early Response
FARDC	Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo/ Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDLR	Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FNL	Forces National de Liberationels /National Forces of Liberation
GLR	Great Lakes Region
HDI	Human Development Index
ICD	Inter Congolese Dialogue
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
INEC	Independent National Election Commission
ISSSS	International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
JMC	Joint Military Commission
LCP	Local Capacity for Peace
M-23	March 23, Movement
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MLC	Movement de Liberation Congolais
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en RD Congo/UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilization en RD Congo/UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NOM	National Oversight Mechanism
OAG	Organized Armed Groups
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONUC	Operation Des Nations Unies des Congo/United Nations Organization in Congo
PAP	Pan African Parliament
PSCF	Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework of DRC and the Great Lakes Region
PSSDGLR	Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais Pour la Democratie /Congolese Rally for Democracy
RCM	Regional Certification Mechanism
ROM	Regional Oversight Mechanism
RPA	Rwanda Patriotic Army
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SSR	Security Sector Reforms
STAREC	Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for the eastern DRC
TSC	Technical Support Committee
UK	United Kingdom

UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US/USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank

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Abstract

This study assesses the implementation of Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes Region (GLR). The paper evaluates potential for success of PSCF given the poor track record of previous peace agreements for the DRC and the GLR. The study traces the strengths and weaknesses of the 'Framework of Hope', and identifies areas of improvement for effective implementation of the peace agreement.

The study also provides analysis of options and strategies for effective implementation of the PSCF. Top among the proposed strategies are ownership of the framework by host countries and local communities. Firm guarantee of the agreement through continuous and steady engagement of the signatories and guarantors is also recommended. The study ends with guarded optimism about the possibility of the framework ushering a new dawn of peace and stability for the DRC and the GLR.

Key words: *Peace agreements, peace enforcement, governance, security sector professionalism, DDR, SSR, integration, international cooperation, conflict prevention*

Introduction

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the fourth most populous country in Africa with a population of about 75 million people, after Nigeria (174 Million), Ethiopia (94 Million) and Egypt (82 Million). It is also the third largest country in Africa occupying an area of 2. 345 Million Km².¹ The DRC is one of the richest countries in the world from untapped mineral resources boasting the highest deposits of cobalt, diamond, gold, copper, coltan, timber, rich soils and hydro-electric potential. Amidst this wealth, the DRC was ranked No.186 in 2014, the second poorest country in the world - UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), after Niger.²

The people of the DRC have undergone immense suffering during the colonial and post-colonial periods. There are more than 2.9 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), (60%) in the East, and there are over 400,000 Congolese refugees.³ Conflicts in eastern DRC have often spilled over to the neighbouring countries just as conflicts in Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi have spilled over into the DRC.

The Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) of the DRC and the GLR is the current international framework for addressing the protracted conflict in the region. Under the framework, a peace intervention brigade was formed and it successfully routed out the M-23 rebel group from eastern DRC.

This paper is organized into four sections. Section 1 presents the introduction containing the purpose, scope, methodology, literature and theoretical review and conceptual framework of the study. Section 2 provides an analysis of the peace agreements that have been signed in the GLR, while section 3 covers potential success and challenges of the PSCF. Section 4 is the conclusion.

1 www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography/of_the_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo

2 Human Development Index, 2014, www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/2014/human-development-report

3 UNOCHA, DR Congo, Humanitarian Snapshot, 2014

The DRC remains vulnerable to political instability and external interventions. The security sector remains weak and unprofessional. Neighbouring countries also suffer from significant political and development challenges. The PSCF can provide a road map towards united and peaceful resolution of the protracted conflict. This study has identified key factors that should in future inform implementation of peace agreements in the GLR. Tangible recommendations have been made to improve implementation.⁴

⁴ This agreement, also referred as 'Framework for Hope', is spearheaded by UN Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, Mary Robinson.

Statement of the Problem and Research Questions

Peace implementation involves parties' compliance with their written commitments to peace and it is often the most difficult phase in the resolution of armed conflicts.⁵ Lack of compliance to peace commitments has been the defining feature of the Congolese peace-making journey. Many previous peace agreements in the DRC have failed despite involvement of the Congolese political elites, neighbouring countries and the international community.

As such, the PSCF is poised to be either a '*Roadmap of hope*' or a '*Global grand illusion*'. In 2002, about 11 African states and organized armed groups signed agreements to end a seven year cycle of conflict. More than ten years later, new agreements have been signed to address similar conflicts in the region. Most of the agreements did not address the full range of factors, actors and root causes of the conflict.⁶ There are dangers of regression into conflict if the new dispensation is not well formulated, integrated into other peace processes and implemented. However, few studies done either in Africa or globally appear to adequately explain why peace agreements succeed or fail.⁷

Hypothesis

It is the historical, political, economic, socio-cultural and behavioural factors that determine the success or failure of peace agreements such as those contained in the PSCF of the DRC and the GLR.

5 John, P. Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* United States Institute of Peace, 1997, p.20

6 Rigobert Minani, Bihuzo, *Unfinished Business: A Framework for Peace in the Great Lakes*, African Security Brief, No. 21, African Center for Security Studies, July 2012, p.4

7 International Peace Academy (IPA) and Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) *Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policy Makers*, 2001, Stanford University, p.2

Variables

- Clear and predictable mandate
- Contingency planning for PSCF implementation
- Implementation of the PSCF commitments by specific signatories
- Sensitivity to structural causes of conflict
- Cooperation/commitment among signatories
- Lack or availability of resources to support implementation
- Domestic capacity for conflict prevention including linkages with indigenous mechanisms
- Institutional capacity of implementing organs
- Participation of civil society and other key actors
- Coordination and alignment of local, national, regional and international initiatives

Focus and Scope

The study will assess the implementation and achievements of the PSCF for peace building in DRC and the GLR from 2013 to date.

Research Questions

- What key factors have contributed to the success or failure of PSCF?
- What difference has the implementation of PSCF brought to peace and security in the region?
- What conditions must obtain for success of PSCF in the future?

Research Methodology

The research used a qualitative approach. Using purposive and quota sampling methods, a number of respondents were selected based on their presumed knowledge of PSCF by virtue of their official capacity in governments and civil society. Others were selected as beneficiaries of the peace and security strategy. The author used interview guidelines during data collection..

The main respondents were: Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence in member countries;, AU;, International Conference of the Great Lakes region (ICGLR)/ Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVEM); United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO);, and United Nations Integrated Mission in Burundi (BINUB). The main respondents were Heads/ Deputy heads/ Program leaders.

Secondary respondents were: civil society, media and academia. Observation of the situation on the ground was used to gauge the current political mood by looking at a number of factors: Cross-border movement and trade and civil society and media interactions and presence of militias. Focus group discussions (FGDs) were done in four countries. Overall, about 47 respondents were interviewed making about 70% of the target.

Secondary data was accessed through official government documents, books, journals, newspaper articles, periodicals and on-line publications.

The data were examined, classified, tabulated and coded in a number of categories for ease of comparison and analysis. Common, recurrent or cross-cutting as well as disparate patterns and themes were observed and inferences were made about these. Confidentiality of the participants was assured (where privacy is demanded or required) and sources of information were duly acknowledged.

Despite the short period of field research (2 weeks), the study utilized other secondary data to corroborate and triangulate data from the field. The paper also was subjected to peer-review through a symposium. This information is summarized in the table below.

Research Method	Main Respondents	Secondary Respondents	Target	Achieved	percentage
Qualitative	National Coordinators AU, ICGLR, EJVM, MONUSCO BINUB		14	10	71%
Observation		Civil society, Media, Academia, Citizens Total	10 4 4 16 48	8 2 4 8 32	80% 50% 50% 50% 67%
FGD	Burundi Rwanda DRC Uganda	Government International Organizations Civil society, Media, Academia, Citizens	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 -	100% 100% 100% -
Total			20	15	75%
Grand Total			68	47	70%

Data Analysis

Qualitative content analysis was used, by which the data were examined, classified, tabulated and coded in a number of categories for ease of comparison and analysis. Common and disparate patterns and themes were observed. The frequency of specific views was also observed. Inferences and conclusions about similar or unusual patterns were made.

Literature Review

This section surveys writings on implementation of peace agreements and the PSCF in particular.

Success or Failure of Peace Agreements

Going by the findings of research undertaken between 1945 and 1993, it is safe to conclude that half of all peace agreements fail in their first five years of signing ; Licklider (1995: 681 – 690).⁸ Barbara Walter, in *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*, (2002), found out that only 57% of peace agreements succeed during implementation. The International Peace Academy (IPA) and Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) (2001), in a publication titled; *Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policy Makers*; examines the performance of sixteen peace agreements against selected benchmarks. The research identified a number of conditions under which the international community can perform best in supporting peace agreements.

Framing Peace Agreements within Conflict Prevention

The following works have looked at the effectiveness of conflict prevention mechanisms and institutionalization: *Baumens and Reybeler, (1994); Hampson and Malon (2002); GPPAC, (2005); Zartman, (2001); and Lund (2002)*. They hold that policies and strategies should become a matter of routine among established mechanisms of conflict prevention, management and resolution.

Other writers examine whether the PSCF as a conflict prevention mechanism is appropriate to the conflict in the DRC and the GLR. They hold that successful conflict prevention is based on appropriate responses to the specific conflict situation/context (*Bibuzo, 2012; Davis and Hayner, 2009; Jonas et al 2004; Ngambu, 2011*).

⁸ Roy Licklider, *The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-93*, 1995.

Addressing Root Causes of Conflict and Relevance to the Context

Some authors have expressed optimism and hope about the expected success of the PSCF (UN, 2013; Robinson, 2013; Swart, 2013). Other scholars doubt the source of this confidence given the record of failed agreements in the DRC (Kabemba, 2013; Ntalaja, 2013). Alongside this approach is a focus on structural and direct prevention strategies, where long term peace is founded on addressing the structural causes of conflict (Carnegie, 1997; Annan, 1999).

Ntalaja (2013) describes the PSCF as, ‘an international tutelage on DRC’.⁹ This reveals the concerns of local people with perceived externally imposed peace and security mechanisms that do not incorporate local ownership.

9 Nzongola, Ntalaja, Presentations at SARC Conference on Conflict Minerals in DRC, Kinshasa, May, 2013

Theoretical Framework

Liberal Democratic Peace Theory

The liberal democratic peace theory maintains that democratic countries rarely go to conflict with each other. The theory identifies a number of factors that predispose democracies towards peace: leaders must bear accountability for war losses to the electorates; leaders who are accountable to the public are more likely to pursue peace through international diplomacy; democratic countries with similar ideologies and governance practices do not view each other as hostile; democracies favour development and therefore have more to lose during conflict than other systems. This theory rests on three pillars; representation; ideological commitment to fundamental human rights; and transnational interdependence.¹⁰

This approach informs Western-led policy making in the UN and other international organizations in a bid to spread democracy for international peace. The PSCF is influenced by these values and norms.

Conflict Prevention Theory

The conflict prevention approach is an age-old principle of conflict management that promotes practices such as; mutual consultation among states;, demilitarized zones;, and neutrality and peaceful settlement of conflicts.¹¹ The UN charter provides avenues of conflict prevention through Chapter VI and VII where the UN Secretary General, UN Security Council and the General Assembly are given responsibilities for peaceful resolution of disputes and prevention of armed conflict.

Preventive diplomacy was introduced in a UN Secretary General annual report (Hammarskjold, 1960). This concept referred to prevention of localized conflicts from spreading into other regions. The concept was further extended by the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, in his annual report of 1992, where he referred to preventing conflicts from emerging and also from escalating into violence.

¹⁰ Bruce Russett, et Al, *The Democratic Peace*, International Security, Vol. 19, No.4, 1995, pp.164-184


¹¹ Alice Ackerman, *The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention*, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 40, No.3, pp. 339-347

Five measures were listed as necessary to achieve this goal: confidence building measures; fact finding missions; early warning networks; preventive deployment; and demilitarized zones.

Subsequent Secretary Generals have made attempts to shift the focus of the UN from reaction to conflict prevention. Conflict prevention has become a recognized international policy not only used by the UN but also by the African Union (AU) and other regional organizations. This theoretical framework informs the implementation of PSCF through emphasis on a pro-active and long term preventive approach as opposed to *ad hoc* quick fix approaches.

Conceptual Framework

The assessment of the PSCF focuses on the variables below. These variables affect the outcomes of peace agreements differently according to socio-economic, political and historical context.



Peace Agreements for the DRC and the Great Lakes Region

What are Peace Agreements?

Peace agreements are formal contracts among parties in conflict aimed at ending violent conflicts and/or transform them significantly to create conditions for durable peace.¹² The political and legal significance of peace agreements depends on security guarantees from legitimate international organizations such as UN and AU and powerful global powers such as US, UK, France, Russia and China. There are various types of agreement in a peace process such as ceasefire, interim, comprehensive and implementation agreements. Given the failure of many peace agreements, the signing of a peace agreement marks the beginning of conflict management or resolution not the end of the conflict.

Why do Peace Agreements Succeed or Fail?

A number of factors may determine the success or failure of peace agreements: lack of or weak oversight mechanism of peace guarantors; lack of resources to implement specific articles of the agreement; change in perceived power relations among parties; lack of continuous confidence-building measures/mediation, and lack of smart sanctions from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) or AU.¹³

Sometimes parties to a peace agreement enter the contract for tactical reasons - to achieve undeclared political goals. The international community is also blamed for coercing parties into agreements or demanding unrealistic timeframes for implementation or renegeing on financial commitments. Peace pacts may also fail because they do not address fundamental aspects/real causes of the conflict or do not include actors who can derail implementation.¹⁴

Peace agreements may also fail to address sector-specific grievances such as justice, gender, children, youth, minorities and community interests. The degree of ownership

12 Nita Yawanarajah and Julian Ouellet, *Peace Agreements, Beyond Intractability*, 2003

13 Peter Wallensteen and Helena Grusell, *Targeting the Right Targets, The UN Use of Individual Sanctions*, *Global Governance*, 18, 2012, p-207-230

14 Stephen, J. Stedman, *Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policy Makers*, *International Peace Academy (IPA)*, 2001, p.10-12

and participation of civil society can also determine success or failure of peace pacts. Most peace agreements are top-down and do not engage the communities.¹⁵ The International community can intervene in African conflicts to make political and diplomatic gains thus ensuring a higher probability of success.¹⁶

Other criteria for assessing peace agreements are: political, economic and social environments of implementation; number of warring parties; presence of ineffective peace agreements before the current framework; likelihood of spoilers; collapsed state; presence of disposable natural resources; presence of hostile neighbouring states; and whether the intervention enhances accountability.¹⁷

15 Ibid.p.15

16 Catherine Geogut, Causes and Consequences of the EU's Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realist Explanation. *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10: 427-443, 2005, Kluwer Law International, p.16

17 Stephen, J, Stedman, (IPA), 2001, p.10-14

Lessons from Previous Peace Initiatives in the DRC

This study assesses some of the agreements based on significance to the PSCF and impact on the current peace and security in the Great Lakes region. There have been more than ten peace agreements for the DRC and the Great Lakes region since 1999. Most of them failed for various reasons.

Many peace agreements in eastern DRC and the GLR have suffered from poor or lack of implementation. Sometimes agreements are viewed as mere pieces of paper.¹⁸

Most peace agreements for the DRC have involved external actors. The problem of foreign interference in Congolese affairs is rated second after failure of domestic leadership as the main driver of the conflict.¹⁹

Lusaka Peace Agreement (1999)

The Lusaka peace agreement is the first landmark in the long chain of the Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICD) meant to end foreign forces' intervention and create a transitional authority in the DRC. The agreement involved the DRC, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda and was eventually seen as a victory for the two latter countries. The pact authorized the withdrawal of foreign forces from eastern DRC on condition that armed militias from those countries would be disarmed. It also established a joint verification mechanism between Rwanda and DRC against armed groups in eastern DRC. The agreement failed due to mistrust, inadequate resources and capacity.

The outcome of ICD would see incorporation of the opposition in government. The agreement was strongly supported by the United States (US) but opposed by France and Belgium.²⁰ The agreement ignored charges of mineral exploitation in DRC by Rwanda and Uganda and both countries continued exploiting Congolese resources.

18 Epimack Kwokwo (Congolese citizen), Human Rights Officer, Ligue de la Hommes, Rwanda, Interview, May 26, 2014

19 Claude Kabemba and Roger Kibasomba The Democratic Republic of Congo: Diagnosis of the Process for Peace, Issue No. 27, 2003, p.5

20 Francoire, Grignon, International Response to Illegal Exploitation of Resources in the DRC, 2010, p.3

The agreement also legitimized the presence of foreign forces; Zimbabwe, Angola, DRC and Rwanda and rebel groups such as Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) and Uganda/Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) thereby violating territorial integrity.

The Joint Military Commission (JMC) set up to oversee implementation of the agreement was made up of belligerents who mistrusted each other and therefore, in addition to lack of resources and administrative problems, the organ was bound to fail.²¹ The UN was not ready to engage in a peace enforcement mission that was bound to be costly and risky and in addition promise of peace dividends might work better than coercion.²² However, the rebels were not signatories to the agreement and therefore could not voluntarily disarm as envisaged. Though MONUC was established to meet the requirements of the Lusaka agreement, it was not accepted by the parties in conflict and the Congolese people whom it was meant to protect. The ICD stalled even after Sir Ketumile Masire was appointed as the lead facilitator. The agreement achieved a temporary ceasefire but other aspects were not implemented since it did not reflect the root causes of the conflict.²³ The competing interests among the veto wielding powers (P5) in the Security Council were partly responsible for the failure of the Lusaka Peace Agreement, as well as procrastination in deploying a viable peace keeping mission beyond the largely symbolic MONUC.²⁴

Sun City Peace Accord (2003)

The Sun city peace accord was reached after negotiations in the framework of Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) which had been proposed by the Lusaka agreement. It was facilitated by former Botswana president, Sir Ketumile Masire and South African president, Thabo Mbeki. It was meant to reconcile President Joseph Kabila and his main opponent, Jean Pierre Bemba. The negotiations were fraught with major difficulties including disagreement on power sharing at the political and military leadership level.

21 ICG, Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, Africa Report N°26, 20 December 2000, p.70

22 Report of the UN Secretary-General on the DRC/MONUC (UNSG Report) S/2001/970, pars, 59–83

23 Claude Kabemba and Roger Kibasomba, 2003

24 Paraphrasing Mwesiga Baregu, 2002, p.17

The RCD-Goma rebels and their Rwandan backers were not prepared to lose influence of the Kivus as envisaged in re-establishment of the DRC government authority over the region. Rwanda was also adamant to see the reduction of Laurent Kabila's powers under a new dispensation. The ICD process like other agreements for the DRC peace became a cropper in April 2002. However, a number of parallel processes such as agreements between Rwanda and South Africa, Uganda and DRC and further ICD negotiations produced an *All Inclusive Agreement (Pretoria II)* which provided a power sharing formula for the next 24 months. On April 2, 2003, the ICD approved a Final Act that recognized all the previous agreements. However, this agreement did not usher in a period of long term peace in the DRC.

Due to a number of political developments including release of the UN experts report on Rwanda and Uganda's role in DRC, both countries withdrew their forces and created ground for deployment of MONUC phase III. However, Rwanda is reported to have retained some of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) soldiers in mining sites but without uniform.²⁵

Like other agreements, Sun City was highly driven from outside including the UN, South Africa and other global powers. The ICD was not a success since it became a forum for political elites and warlords to find space in the new political dispensation. Civil society became polarized after aligning themselves with different political groups.²⁶ Sun City was beholden to belligerents' peace and did not produce credible leadership for installation of democratic governance in the DRC.²⁷

The Goma Agreement (2008)

The Goma agreement was signed between the government of the DRC and various armed groups in Eastern DRC. The agreement provided for immediate cessation of hostilities, disengagement of troops and creation of a buffer zone.²⁸ The signatories to the Goma agreement also agreed to end violence against civilians and to respect human rights. However, the Goma agreement failed to deal with the issue of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) who could neither be

25 ICG, Eastern Congo: Why Stabilization Failed, Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing No. 69, 2012, p.12

26 Emeric Roger, The Inter Congolese Dialogue: A Critical Overview, 2004, p.15

27 Claude Kabemba, South Africa and the DRC: Is a Stable and Developmental State Possible in the Congo?, p.6

28 IRIN, DRC: Cautious Welcome for Kivu Peace Deal, 2008

disarmed nor persuaded to voluntarily lay down their arms. Despite frantic efforts by the UN special representatives in the GLR and the DRC, Olusegun Obasanjo and Benjamin Mkapa, no lasting peace was achieved in eastern DRC.

However, the Goma agreement produced the Amani Programme, which involved integrating various Congolese armed groups into the national army. *Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for the Eastern DRC* (STAREC) was the successor of the Amani Programme and was meant to oversee implementation of the Goma agreement. It was also mandated to clean up the areas where armed groups operated and maintain military/police presence, restore state authority by renovating buildings and sending administrators to the areas and establish initial social, economic and recovery projects.²⁹

The development partners came up with their plan to support STAREC called *International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy* (ISSSS). This project involved restoration of state authority, improvement of state infrastructure, support for political dialogue, return of refugees and recovery and fight against sexual abuse. These projects were less than successful due to minimal support from the government of DRC, lack of consultation with beneficiaries and non-implementation of governance reforms.³⁰ The revised MONUSCO mandate in 2012 set out to correct the mistakes of the (ISSSS) plan.

Ihusi Peace Accords (2009)

The Ihusi Peace agreement, signed on 23rd March 2009 between the government of DRC and National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) rebels sealed the integration of CNDP into Force Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). The CNDP was to hand over integration of its troops to DRC, facilitate state administration of parts of Masisi territory under its control and finally, reform into a political party. The Congolese government accepted to offer CNDP officers military ranks, integrate CNDP political leaders into its administration, recognize CNDP as a political party and facilitate return of IDPs and refugees, and lastly,

29 International Crisis Group (ICG), Eastern Congo: Why Stabilization Failed, Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing No. 69, 2012

30 Fergus Thomas, Return in the Political Context of North Kivu, DRC, MONUSCO, 2011, p.8

introduce an amnesty law.³¹ By 2012, a number of these provisions had not been achieved especially return of refugees and ceding CNDP's administration in Masisi. This agreement translated to granting an upper hand to perceived "Rwandaphones" in DRC which heightened the local ethnic conflicts in the Kivus. By April 2012, the agreement had collapsed and the national implementation committee meant to oversee the agreement hardly met. CNDP leaders such as Sultani Makenga defected and established the March 23 Movement (M-23). Rather than bring about peace, the Ithusi agreement brought more insecurity in the region.

Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region (PSSDGLR) (2006)

This agreement brought together 11 countries of the Great Lakes region to promote the vision of a continent unified by a shared physical and economic infrastructure and civil society principles from East to West. The signatory countries stretched from Angola and Zambia to Kenya and Sudan.

The signing of the PSSDGLR, which formed ICGLR, was preceded by a number of consultations held by the UN, AU and other partners since 2000. This led to the Dar es Salaam Declaration (2004) that preceded the signing of the ICGLR peace agreement in Nairobi, in 2006. The agreement focused on a number of sectors: *peace and security; democracy and good governance; judicial cooperation; prevention of illegal exploitation of natural resources; prevention and curbing of crimes against humanity and genocide; economic development and regional integration; and humanitarian and social issues.*³²

The ICGLR provided a broad-based regional structure for dealing with conflict. This institution enjoys goodwill of the member countries who regard it as a legitimate forum for sharing peace and security concerns in the region. The above pact has been largely implemented and institutionalized.³³ The PSCF borrows heavily from the PSSDGLR and therefore ICGLR is one avenue through which the PSCF can be well implemented but currently the linkages are weak.

31 International Alert, Ending the Deadlock: Towards a new Vision of peace in eastern DRC, p. 27, 2012

32 NORAD, The International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR): Review of Norwegian Support to the ICGLR Secretariat, 2009

33 Ibid.p.11

The Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework of DRC and the Great Lakes Region

The PSCF is the current comprehensive peace agreement for the DRC and the Great Lakes region. It was achieved through the combined efforts of the UN, AU, SADC, ICGLR and 11 countries who are signatory to the agreement.³⁴ Kenya and Sudan later joined in February, 2014. Currently, PSCF is made up of 13 countries and 4 organizations.

The PSCF is anchored on four pillars: Political, legal, military and economic. The political pillar enjoys the ICGLR, AU, UN and SADC support. The legal pillar is anchored in the mandate as outlined by the UNSCR 2098 that formed the UN Force Implementation Brigade (UNFIB). The military pillar is the FIB and its cooperation with the DRC's defence forces (FARDC) embedded in MONUSCO. The economic pillar deals with regional funds for PSCF implementation, the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and support pledged by the World Bank.

UNSCR 2098 recognizes the significance of DRC cooperation with the international community to address the root causes of the conflict and to pacify the armed groups. It also registers support to the leadership of the PSCF as the political wing of the global peace initiative in the GLR. The resolution also undertakes a number of significant reforms to MONUSCO including relocation to Eastern DRC to enable it provide the necessary support to the peace building efforts in the region.³⁵ The PSCF is an evolution from the Pact on Security, Stability and Development (PSSD) in the Great Lakes Region (2006) and most of its articles are directly derived from this agreement.

The PSCF has a stringent oversight mechanism to ensure the targets are met, unlike previous failed peace agreements. This new chapter in the Great Lakes crisis may breathe a new lease of life to the war-weary and long suffering people of the region or it could be yet another chronicle of failed agreements. The framework includes commitments at the national, regional and international levels.

34 Member countries of the PSC Framework are Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, South Africa and Zambia

35 www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/-res-2098.pdf

The office of Special Envoy of the Secretary General together with Regional Oversight Mechanism (ROM) spearheads program implementation. The ROM includes 13 member countries plus 4 – Office of the UN Secretary General, Chairperson of the AU, Chairperson of SADC and Chairperson of the ICGLR. There is also a regional Technical Support Committee (TSC) comprising nominees of Heads of State and Government of the region that assists in developing technical materials such as indicators and benchmarks.

The DRC and the region commit to implementing a number of commitments. The international community, the UN Security Council, AU, ICGLR and SADC committed to act as guarantors of the PSC agreement. The UN also pledged to review MONUSCO with a view to making it more robust in order to achieve its mission.³⁶

36 United Nations, PSC Framework Agreement, February, 2013

United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (UN FIB)

UNFIB was established by the UN security council under resolution 2098. Under the renewed UN efforts to bring lasting peace in the DRC, MONUSCO was to be reviewed in a bid to make it more effective in delivering its mandate. A new Force Intervention Brigade was to be formed as part of MONUSCO, to enhance peace enforcement. The mandate of the intervention brigade is to: neutralize armed groups, strengthen state authority, protect civilians, create conditions for stabilization and ensure that commitments made under the PSCF/Addis Ababa agreement are respected.³⁷ The introduction of peace enforcement was however a stop gap measure meant only to create suitable conditions for long term political solution to the conflict in the DRC and the region. The force was deployed with personnel from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania numbering about 4,000. Contrary to expectation, the force managed to defeat M-23, an otherwise strong propaganda-led rebel group, whose strength appears to have been exaggerated.³⁸

The group did not enjoy the perceived Rwandan backing and most of the rebels fled to Uganda where they were given political asylum. President Kagame of Rwanda appears to have genuinely supported the framework agreement on condition that the FIB would turn its energy with equal zeal towards the Democratic Forces for Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The fate of this rebel group has yet to be determined. UNFIB however, was an innovative approach by ICGLR/SADC in collaboration with AU and UN.

*The UN FIB war against M-23 was successful militarily but it is not a permanent solution to the problems in eastern DRC.*³⁹

37 UN Security Council, Resolution 7094, January, January, 2014, New York

38 UNFIB was first initiated by ICGLR as the Neutral International Force (NIF) composed of about 4,000 troops meant to neutralize the M-23. To avoid issues of neutrality among ICGLR members, SADC was given the responsibility of providing the force. Africa Peace and Security Council Report, Issue 54, ISS, 2014

39 Col Patrick Kashumba, Rwandan Army Officer, EJVM of ICGLR, Interview May, 24, 2014, Goma/Eastern DRC

It was a leap of faith for the UN to undertake peace enforcement, a slippery road whose outcome is not always certain. UN FIB provides a strong guarantee for implementation of the PSCF especially deterring armed groups but it cannot secure commitment or political will among the signatories. UNFIB has boosted the credibility of MONUSCO for its effective efforts to protect civilians in its areas of jurisdiction. This robust force can also add value through training of the DRC professional security sector so as to create a phased-out foreign intervention withdrawal and create reliable and legitimate local forces capable of providing security to the people. Certainly, the UNFIB has provided some teeth to the PSCF and advanced its agenda successfully. Lessons of this experience need to be drawn out well so that they can inform future interventions and avoid the pitfalls that have befallen past interventions.

DRC Achievements under the PSCF

The government of DRC was tasked with a number of responsibilities which would be implemented through creation of an oversight mechanism. DRC will be supported by the UN, AU, African Development Bank and World Bank to implement the commitments.

DRC Benchmarks and Indicators of Progress, February, 2013 – June 30, 2014

No.	A	B
	DRC Government Commitments	Achievements and Gaps by June 30, 2014
1	To deepen security sector reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Process for establishment of a professional, accountable and sustainable national army still ongoing including a rapid reaction force • Finalization of comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) is ongoing • DRC government finalizes and adopts third national plan for DDR • 8,000 ex-combatants have surrendered and are scheduled to be included in the DDR plan • Parliament (of DRC?) earmarked US\$ 260 million to fund the Independent National Election Commission in preparation for General election, 2016

2	To consolidate State Authority, particularly in eastern DRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DRC enacted a law to grant amnesty for acts of insurgency from 2006 to 2013 • The DRC government in cooperation with ICGLR and MONUSCO is in a process of repatriating disarmed M-23 from Uganda to DRC • About 950 security personnel deployed to Rutshuru (eastern DRC) by government in cooperation with MONUSCO after the defeat of M-23 • DRC encouraged to develop defence strategy and policy • MONUSCO deployed military trainers to the Tactical Training Center in Kisangani
3	To make progress especially in decentralization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decentralization enhanced through deployment of administrators in areas hitherto held by armed groups in the Eastern DRC • Establishment of new provinces • Establishment of national stabilization fund • National Dialogue Follow Up Committee established and operational
4	To further economic development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measures have been taken to apply due diligence guidelines on the supply chain of minerals according to Group of Experts and OECD specifications • Adaption of Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) for minerals trade

5	To further structural reform of public institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Oversight Mechanism (NOM) to oversee implementation of PSCF established, February, 2014 • Consultative Council of the National Oversight Mechanism has not yet held its first meeting, February, 2014 • MONUSCO and NOM are cooperating to develop benchmarks and indicators, February, 2014 • Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Code of Conduct for Political Parties established • DRC Cabinet approved DDR Plan, Dec, 2013
6	To further reconciliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promulgation of Amnesty Law • National Dialogue involving Political Parties launched and two chambers of parliament spearheading the dialogue coordination • The National Dialogue Follow – up Committee and MONUSCO are working together to enhance its coordination with National Oversight Mechanism for reconciliation

Regional Achievements under the PSC Framework Agreement

The region includes all the signatories to the PSCF plus regional organizations such as SADC and ICGLR.

Regional Benchmarks and Indicators of Progress, February 2013 – June, 30, 2014

No.	A	B
	Regional Commitments under the PSC Framework	Achievements and Gaps by June 30, 2014
1.	Not to interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rwanda and Uganda have not crossed over to eastern DRC since the agreement, though there have been a number of accusations of cross-border incursions of rebels based in DRC
2.	To neither tolerate nor provide assistance or support of any kind to armed groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rwanda and Uganda stopped supporting M-23 Uganda mediated the talks between M-23 and DRC Uganda disarmed and regrouped 1,325 former M-23 combatants On 23 January 2014, the UN group of experts report for DRC alleged that despite M-23's surrender, they continue to get support from neighbouring countries
3.	To respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deployment of UN Force Implementation Brigade (UN FIB), March 2013 Council of ICGLR Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Defence Staff met in Angola, 13 June, 2014 and produced recommendations

4	<p>To strengthen regional cooperation, including deepening economic integration, with special consideration for the exploitation of natural resources</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region (CEPGL) meeting of foreign ministers held on May 9-10, 2013 in Bujumbura, Burundi • Joint visit of UN Secretary General and President of World Bank to the Great Lakes region in May, 2013 where 1 Billion US\$ was pledged to support investments in the region. • ICGLR has been involved in a number of initiatives to promote regional peace and security • ICGLR held a Summit in Luanda, Angola, 15 January, 2014 where cooperation with the PSCF agreement was pledged • Signing of Mutual Defence Pact and Mutual Peace and Security Pact among Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya, January, 2014 • Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Kenya are participating in regional peace support operations such as AMISOM, UNMISS, MINUSMA (Mali) and UNAMID (Darfur) • Adoption of Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) for mineral trade • 31 January, 2014: Plan of Action drawn by 3rd Regional Oversight Mechanism (ROM) meeting • Technical Support Committee established, May 2013, it developed regional benchmarks • 7th Meeting of Technical Support Committee (TSC) held in Goma, DRC from 20-23, May 2014
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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4th Meeting of ROM scheduled for New York in September, 2014 • Ministerial Conference, Brussels, 1-2, July, 2014 • The presidents of DRC, Rwanda and Uganda met in Oyo, Republic of Congo to renew their commitments to the framework agreement (March 2013) • Angola, South Africa and the DRC established a tripartite mechanism to fast-track implementation of the PSCF in March 2013 • The ICGLR launched training program for SGBV training for the security sector at the Regional Training Center in Kampala in 2014 • Agreement reached between DRC and M-23 in Nairobi, December, 2013
5	To respect the legitimate concerns and interests of the neighbouring countries, in particular regarding security matters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional Benchmarks, Regional Plan of Action and Regional Oversight Mechanism (ROM) established, January 2014 • UNFIB is acting on FDLR, ADEFU-Nalu, Mai Mai militias and other armed groups in eastern DRC • FNL rebels from Burundi still active in eastern DRC though there is no recorded DRC support

6	To neither harbour nor provide protection of any kind to persons accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, acts of genocide or crimes of aggression, or persons falling under the United Nations sanctions regime	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FDLR leader Sylvester Mudacumura and other warlords including senior commanders of FARDC remain at large in the Eastern DRC • M-23 members were granted amnesty but it did not cover crimes against humanity; none of them has been arrested to answer such charges
7.	To facilitate the administration of justice through judicial cooperation within the region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Judicial cooperation is still lacking in the region • There are no extradition treaties between DRC and the neighbouring countries

International Achievements under the PSCF

Agreement

The International Community is comprised of the European Union (EU), Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and the United States.⁴⁰ The United Nations, African Union, World Bank and African Development Bank are also supporting members of the international community. Below are the commitments:

International Community’s Indicators of Progress, February 2013 – June, 30, 2014

No.	A	B
	International Community Commitments	Achievements and Gaps By June, 30, 2014
1	For Security Council to remain engaged in seeking long-term stability for the DRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 28 March, 2013: Establishment of UN Force Intervention Brigade (UNFIB), Resolution 2098 • In November 2013, the Security Council visited the Great Lakes region to review implementation of the PSCF • November 2013, MONUSCO/UNFIB in collaboration with FARDC, defeat M-23 • January 2014: UNSC report urges for measures to be put in place to make sure that M-23 does not regroup in line with the Kampala agreement of 12 December 2013 • Calls for enhanced efforts to neutralize armed groups that are still active in the region • Calls for continued enforcement of arms embargo

⁴⁰ Gerrie Swart, The DRC Peace Process: Rebels without a Pause: A Peace Agreement with an Escape Clause? Policy Brief, Southern Africa Peace and Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, p.4

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Noted continued human rights abuses in DRC including those by FARDC • Extended Smart Sanctions regime up to 1 February, 2015 • Group of UN experts on the Great Lakes region term extended to 1 February, 2015 • Calls on PSCF signatories to implement their commitments in collaboration with DRC and MONUSCO • Mandate for MONUSCO extended to 31 March, 2015 • ICC convicts Germain Katanga of War Crimes • 9 June, 2014: ICC confirms 18 counts against former rebel leader, Bosco Ntaganda committed in Ituri in 2003 • 6 June 2014: UNSC and AU PSC meeting to review peace and security progress in Africa
2	A renewed commitment of bilateral partners to remain engaged with the region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • About 950 security personnel deployed to Rutshuru (eastern DRC) by government in cooperation with MONUSCO after the defeat of M-23 • DRC encouraged to develop defence strategy and policy • Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for supporting the framework established, September 2013 • Suspending or altering aid, imposing smart sanctions against M-23 and Rwanda by donor governments and World Bank • US Congress legislation and Multinational cooperation reforms requiring transparency in minerals trade in conflict zones enacted

3	To support economic integration and revitalize the Economic Community of the Great Lakes countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IMF and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) suspended work in DRC until reforms were initiated (The Enough Project, Prendergast, 2012) • This initiative weakened M-23 and other armed groups by reducing their external support and encouraged Rwanda and DRC to cooperate • Oversight mechanism established to create avenues for state communication and cooperation • Head of World Bank pledges to support development in the region with 1 B US\$ with US\$400 million already disbursed • International Contact Group (ICG – UN, EU, US, UK, France, Belgium, Sweden and Germany) of the Great Lakes region has held regular meetings to advance support for security and development in the GLR
4	To review the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formation of UN FIB – UNSC Resolution 2098 • Extension of MONUSCO mandate including UN FIB to 31 March, 2015 • MONUSCO now overseeing armed and civilian personnel (21, 000) • In 2013, the top leadership of MONUSCO including the head of mission, Force Commander and head of the Kivu division were replaced • Undertook measures to prevent illicit trade in minerals by armed groups • MONUSCO transfers two thirds of its staff from Kinshasa to eastern DRC

5	To appoint a UN Special Envoy to foster durable solutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Special envoy of the Secretary General to the Great Lakes region, Mary Robinson, appointed on 18 March, 2013 • She has participated in a number of ICGLR/SADC forums to enhance regional peace and security cooperation • She organized a meeting of women platform to support PSCF in the Great Lakes region (2013) • She is supporting civil society to engage more actively with the PSC Framework • 3 June, 2014:, Special envoy, Mary Robinson, in collaboration with US, EU and AU initiates an evaluation of PSCF implementation according to identified benchmarks • Launching of the Women Platform for PSCF, January 2014 • Great Lakes Private Sector Investment Conference and establishment of permanent private sector desk at ICGLR (Round table held 11 June 2014 (Addis Ababa) • In collaboration with ICGLR, extra ordinary conference on youth employment set for July, 2014, Nairobi, Kenya • Inter-ministerial meeting of 13 PSCF signatories in Luanda, Angola, September 2014
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Role of Regional and International Actors

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)

The ICGLR is the regional focal point for implementation of PSCF. ICGLR was established in 2000 but became operational in 2006. It has been a platform of choice in spearheading cross-border peace and security in the region. ICGLR promotes the collective vision of the leaders to transform the region from a zone of hostilities, conflict and underdevelopment into a zone of security, stability and partnership.

The organization is making efforts to bring various actors in the conflict in a round table to negotiate for peace. ICGLR is helping to control resource-based conflict through certification of minerals to prevent illegal trade. It is also sensitizing the youth and communities on arms proliferation. ICGLR is monitoring the security situation in eastern DRC and the movements of the rebel groups under the Joint Verification Mechanism.⁴¹ ICGLR has a regional legal framework and dedicated project to deal with IDPs and refugees, which has provided a viable framework to address issues of refugees between the respective countries and UNHCR to create conditions that will enable voluntary return of countless refugees to countries of origin.⁴²

The ICGLR however is beholden to its members' interests who are often involved in the DRC conflict. ICGLR also lacks resources to implement some of the grand projects such as peace support operations. However, in cooperation with AU and UN, ICGLR has registered considerable success in dialogue, peace and security stabilization in the region.

The ICGLR's effectiveness is hindered by the divergent interests of the member states and further impaired by the proposed participation of member states from the opposite side of the conflict, with Rwanda and Uganda perceived to have been supporting M-23 before 2013 and Tanzania and Kenya supporting the UN peace enforcement mission.⁴³

41 Wilson Kajwengye, Peace and Security Officer, ICGLR, Interview, May 20, 2014

42 Ambassador Mulamula, *DRC and Its Neighbours: Policy Options for the Great Lakes Region and the International Community*, Statement presented during the EGMONT Conference, Brussels, 2007

43 Members of Joint Verification Mission, Interview, May 24th, 2013, Goma

Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region/ Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL)

The CEPGL is poised to be a major player in the successful implementation of PSCF. One of the commitments requires DRC and the region to revitalize CEPGL to promote integration and economic interdependence as a pillar of peace building. CEPGL was established in 1976 by DRC, Rwanda and Burundi but it was largely inactive. It was later revived in 2007. CEPGL can advance the PSCF through enhancing current economic development initiatives and supplementing regional dialogue and reconciliation initiatives of ICGLR.

CEPGL has potential for opening opportunities for trade cooperation among these countries. Recently, a number of economic initiatives have emerged such as collaboration in electricity generation along the Rusizi River. However, mistrust of DRC towards Rwanda's intentions has prevented progress towards improved economic integration.

There are plans to develop a rice farming project along the Rusizi River to be shared among the 3 countries. The rice project has potential to feed eastern DRC, Burundi and Rwanda.⁴⁴

The East African Community (EAC) is moving at a faster rate than CEPGL through enhanced economic and political integration. The PSCF recognizes the potential for CEPGL to promote peace and security in the region through enhanced economic integration. ICGLR and CEPGL have cooperation agreements on transnational economic development and integration. Francophone countries such as France, Belgium and the European Union (EU) tend to favour CEPGL over ICGLR in funding.⁴⁵ CEPGL remains an important potential institution to boost economic integration in the region.

⁴⁴ Michel Makuza, Interview, May 25, 2014

⁴⁵ Charlotte Heyl, The International Conference of the Great Lakes Region – An African CSCE?, KAS Report, p.16

There should be joint regional mechanisms to enhance trade and free movement of people across the region to create economic interdependence and peace. Kampala, Bujumbura and Kigali are nearer to the people of eastern DRC than Kinshasa. The fact that eastern DRC is Swahili-speaking creates conducive environment for enhancing business with the East African Community.⁴⁶

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)

MONUSCO was established in 2010 after the end of MONUC. MONUSCO has a mandate to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel, defend human rights and support the government of DRC in its peace and security consolidation efforts.⁴⁷ MONUSCO has implemented many projects to build capacity of the DRC's security sector by providing training and security. However the people of eastern DRC have mixed feelings about the mission.

Though MONUC/MONUSCO has been around for the last 14 years gobbling billions of dollars, there is nothing to show on the ground in terms of improvement in peace and security.⁴⁸

Despite the success of UNFIB, MONUSCO has not managed to fulfil its mandate of protecting civilians even after the defeat of M-23. Many atrocities have been committed against civilians in places where MONUSCO has bases such as Pinga, Mijembe (South Kivu) and Walikale.⁴⁹ Since the recent appointment of a new head of mission, Martin Kobler, there is marked improvement in protection of civilians including ongoing pacification of Uganda rebels notably ADEFU-NALU.⁵⁰

46 Lt. Col. Nestor Bahati, Burundian Army Officer, ICGRL-UJVEM, Interview, May 24, 2014, Goma

47 See www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/background.shtml

48 Epimack Kwokwo, Interview, May 26, 2014

49 ICG, Eastern Congo: Why Stabilization Failed, Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing No. 69, 2012, p.12

50 Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, Populations at Risk: Democratic Republic of Congo, June, 2014

Impact of the PSCF on DRC and the GLR

There are a number of political and socio-economic impacts of the PSCF in the region. The guns are largely silent in the region and there is hope for lasting peace and security. Many members of organized armed groups have surrendered and are joining the DRC and MONUSCO-led DDR programmes. The FDLR has been given space for surrender and voluntary disarmament. Neighbouring countries have stopped openly supporting rebel groups and are actually spearheading dialogue and reconciliation. This framework has also united the ICGLR and SADC member countries for a common approach to peace and security in the GLR.

Youth and women issues have been addressed through women and civil society forums. The framework has created incentives for the youth to disarm and find alternative means of livelihood. The WB's economic support for regional economic integration projects under CEPGL has boosted integration. There are changing local perceptions towards UNFIB and MONUSCO, thus creating a suitable ground for long-term peace building. A suitable political and social climate for addressing the root causes of conflict has been created. However, the future of peace in eastern DRC and the GLR is highly dependent on the fate of FDLR.

Strengths of the PSCF

PSCF enjoys high international legitimacy given its top level leadership and UN support. The framework has measures to address root causes of conflict and to include civil society, women and the private sector.⁵¹ There is mutual trust among the signatories which has enabled severing of links with active armed groups in the region, respect for human rights and territorial integrity and commitment to international treaties and agreements.

The UN special envoy for the GLR has been spearheading the involvement of the business sector in the PSCF. Towards this goal, a business round table meeting was held in Addis Ababa in June 2014. The WB made a pledge to commit 1 Billion US\$ to support development projects that implement the PSCF agenda. This fund is already supporting the Rusizi Hydroelectric power project.

There are plans to develop Rusizi 3 Hydroelectric power generation, privatize or rehabilitate Rusizi 2. HEP stations are hardly attacked since they are shared among the 3 countries.⁵²

The PSCF has provided an added impetus for cooperation between SADC and ICGLR member states. President Museveni, then Chairman of the ICGLR, convened five extra-ordinary summits aimed at finding a lasting solution to the recurrent conflicts in the DRC. Four were in Kampala and the sixth took place in Nairobi on 31, July, 2013.⁵³ During a meeting in March 2013, The Angolan President and then head of ICGLR, expressed his willingness to cooperate with the DRC in enhancing peace, security and economic development.⁵⁴

51 SAFPI, Regional Oversight Mechanism of Peace and Security Cooperation Framework for DRC and the Region, South African Foreign Policy Initiative, 2013

52 Michel Makuza - Interview, May 25, 2014

53 Statement by Hon. Sam K. Kutesa, Foreign Affairs Minister, Uganda, to the UNSC, NY, July, 2013

54 SAFPI, 2013

Challenges and Weaknesses of the PSCF

Insecurity and humanitarian crises have continued to deteriorate since the signing of PSCF: more than 100, 000 people have been displaced and there are still more than 2.6 million internally displaced persons. Organized armed groups such as FDLR, ADEFU-NALU and Mai Mai are still operational. Violence, human rights violations, war crimes, crimes against humanity and illegal exploitation of DRC resources are not yet over.⁵⁵

The PSCF is not yet formally recognized within national and regional peace and security frameworks and agenda. Though ICGLR coordination offices in the Great Lakes region also serve as focal points for PSCF, there is still lack of clear relations.

The ICGLR-EJVEM does not report to the PSCF but to ICGLR and member countries.⁵⁶ EJVEM and PSCF interact in regional peace and security meetings.⁵⁷

Civil society and the media in the region are yet to play their watch dog role to effectively demand prompt implementation of the PSCF. Non-specific benchmarks can be easily masked in political rhetoric.⁵⁸ Civil society in eastern DRC is highly intertwined with local politics. It is not independent and impartial. Most of them are beholden to their ethnic communities. CSOs are also highly dependent on donor funding and therefore do not promote their own peace building agenda.

The PSCF does not inform the day to day peace efforts in the region. It is top down and it is rarely recognized at the national peace and security mechanisms of the GLR.⁵⁹

There is no role for the Pan African Parliament (PAP) and the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) in PSCF. The PSCF risks being perceived as a Heads of State organ thus making it vulnerable to national and regional political changes.

The government of the DRC has been accused of authoritarianism, corruption and

55 ACP-EU, ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly Report, November, 2013, p.3

56 Colonel Kashumba, Interview, May 24, 2014

57 Lt. Colonel Bahati, Burundian Army Officer, ICGLR-EJVEM, Interview May 24, 2014, Goma

58 Nshimirimana, Forum for Civil Society Empowerment (FORSC), Interview, May 20

59 Wilson Kajwengye, Peace and Security Officer, ICGLR, Interview, May 20, 2014

rampant impunity for serious crimes against humanity and human rights abuses. Therefore, it is doubtful whether it will be able to deliver on the PSCF mandate. The DRC national army and the police have not been reformed thus rendering them vulnerable to corruption and to infringement of the rights of civilians.⁶⁰

The PSCF fails to acknowledge that conflict minerals are the main factor fuelling conflict in eastern DRC. Congolese mineral experts are rarely involved in government negotiated pacts with outside parties.⁶¹ Some developed countries do not subject their companies operating in Africa to stringent oversight mechanisms such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the OECD's due diligence guidelines.⁶² Issues of competition between communities for land and economic opportunities are not addressed in the PSCF.⁶³

There is a significant threat from proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), given the number of armed groups and history of violence in the region. The PSCF is not well grounded on an Early Warning and Response (EWER) mechanism ICGLR is also yet to develop a working EWER system. A number of GLR countries will soon have general elections; raising possibilities of national or regional conflicts based on transition politics.

60 ICG, Eastern Congo: Why Stabilization Failed, Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing No. 69, 2012, p.13

61 Ibid. p.2, Eastern region of DRC has valuable and easily mined resources such as Coltan, diamond, gold and timber.

62 Francoire, Grignon, International Response to Illegal Exploitation of Resources in the DRC, 2010, p.9

63 Raymond, M.B., African Security Brief, No. 21, 201

Towards Effective Implementation of the PSCF

In order to consolidate peace and security in the DRC, illicit trade in minerals and proliferation of SALW must be given their due consideration. There is a need for greater involvement of communities, civil society and opposition political parties who bear the brunt of unaccountable political leaders and security forces, especially in strategies designed to tackle the mineral trade conflict.⁶⁴ A parallel strategy of involving grassroots solutions alongside state-centered measures is required. Addressing local conflict dynamics and designing strategies to tackle the root causes of violence and improve relations between communities is essential.

The people of DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda must be the primary drivers of peace and security in the region. Outside parties can only assist and they cannot afford to be there for too long.⁶⁵

The entire enemy of the region is poverty amidst enormous untapped resources in the DRC. The predatory nature of Congolese ruling elites should be checked by constitutional and institutional mechanisms that demand accountability of the public sector.⁶⁶ These elites work in cahoots with some international mining companies to perpetuate denial of mining benefits to the local people.

64 Francoire, Grignon, *International Response to Illegal Exploitation of Resources in the DRC*, 2010, p.9

65 Obianuju Nwobi and Lt. Col Dominic Saudan (BINUB Officers), Bujumbura, Burundi, Interview, May, 2014

66 Aaron Hall, *Field Dispatch: The Need for a Single Peace Process in the African Great Lakes Region*, Enough, 2013

Conclusion

The implementation of the PSCF is still nascent. Skeletal institutional and thematic establishments for implementation have been put in place. Meetings have been held to iron out obstacles and clarify the mode of implementation. Development partners have promised resources and provided significant political backing. There has been ‘relative’ improvement in inter-state relations, reduction in violence and human rights abuses in the region.

The PSCF has immense potential to change perceived non-commitment of the region and international community to durable peace in the DRC. However, current obstacles to effective PSCF implementation should be addressed effectively. The PSCF should continue to permeate to the grassroots in eastern DRC and forge strong networks with regional civil societies. The linkage with private sector is highly welcome. The international community should be prepared for a long haul. Financial and political commitment is required to nudge the DRC into a turning point after 50 years of sliding into the abyss. This is a herculean task that requires cooperation of all the major actors. Given the current goodwill of the PSCF signatories, there is significant political capital to raise the bar of conflict management in the DRC and the GLR.

Recommendations

Government of DRC and Non-State Actors

- Create social ownership of peace agreements and especially involve women as key actors. Include local communities, CSOs, opposition political parties in peace building and in seeking lasting solutions to conflict - move from conflict management and resolution to conflict transformation.
- DRC and MONUSCO should continue building capacity of governance including management of elections
- National dialogue must go hand in hand with provincial and community-based peace building and reconciliation initiatives
- Ensure that the underlying grievances in and between communities are genuinely addressed
- More initiatives are required in the area of formalization of mineral trade to provide taxes to the state, jobs for the youth and enhance regional economic cooperation
- Improve space for private sector role in the economy through provision of security, improvement of infrastructure, elimination of corruption, establishment of fair regulatory system and taxation
- Full integration of PSCF and national development, security plans and regional peace and security agenda
- The security sector (FARDC, national police, justice system) needs to be more professionalized to eliminate impunity
- Fostering Local Capacity for Peace (LCP) linkages with PSCF– national and regional programs must find connection with grassroots projects for ownership and sustainability

Great Lakes Region

- Strengthen ICGLR as focal point for PSCF and address structural or root causes of conflict
- Address economic and social development in line with the ICGLR-Dar Declaration of 2004 and the 2006 PSSDGLR agreement
- Strengthen constitutional and institutional governance to increase accountability of the ruling elites.
- Respect DRC's territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic political affairs
- Neighbouring countries should not support organized armed groups in eastern DRC
- GLR should cooperate with the government of DRC to bring to book rebel leaders accused of committing serious crimes against humanity in the region
- Enhance regional integration and cross-border trade through regional co-operation
- Reactivate the CEPGL and introduce major political and economic integration strategies and projects
- Cooperate and strengthen regional institutions for conflict prevention and management such as ICGLR
- Promote effective partnership with AU, UN and other international partners to harmonize and boost regional peace and security initiatives
- Integrate the PSCF into other regional peace and security pacts
- End proliferation of SALW
- Mix state-centric and grassroots approaches to peace and security

International Community

- MONUSCO should enhance peace enforcement by neutralizing armed groups; strengthen DRC state authority; protect civilians; ensure respect for PSCF's Addis agreement provisions
- Enhance international diplomatic engagement and cooperation to implement PSCF and prevent relapse of conflicts in the region
- Juxtapose military solutions (e.g. neutralization of armed groups) with non-military solutions (e.g. finding solutions to poverty and unemployment). This calls for concurrent if not simultaneous investments in defence, diplomacy, economic cooperation and national development
- Promote and support long-term planning and engagement for peace, security and development in the region
- Introduce and supervise international procedures, mechanisms and requirements for clean mineral trade business in eastern DRC
- UN, MONUSCO and PSCF to continue supporting inclusive national consultations on governance and democratic dispensation in DRC
- Facilitate synergy between national, regional and international security and development policies, pacts, strategies and projects (DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, UN, AU, ICGLR, EAC, EU, World Bank, African Development Bank (ADB), bilateral and multilateral partners)
- Strengthen PSCF implementation oversight
- PSCF should be a dynamic intervention instrument capable of reviewing its project design to accommodate new realities in the region

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Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework of DRC and the Great Lakes Region

This study assesses the implementation of PSCF which began in February, 2013. This United Nations (UN) initiative brought together 11 countries as signatories to the peace agreement. PSCF is a strategy to address the conflict through marshalling local and international actors' cooperation to turn the region towards the path of peace and development. The paper evaluates potential for success of PSCF given the poor track record of previous peace agreements for the DRC and the GLR. The study traces the strengths and weaknesses of the 'Framework of Hope', and identifies areas that require improvement for effective implementation of the peace agreement.

Proposed strategies for effective implementation of the framework are ownership and integration of the framework and firm guarantee of the agreement through continuous and steady engagement of the UN, USA, France and UK, AU, SADC and the ICGLR.

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