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Editorial

Between conceptualization of a new Journal and its realization, there is a world of difference. It takes the good will and determination of institutional leadership for such a publication to become reality. This is in addition to partners who believe in the vision and mission of the International Peace Support Training Centre and are unwavering in support of new ventures. The first edition of Africa Amani Journal is a leap of both faith and belief that this new edition in Peace and Security in Africa will advance the course of peace in the continent.

The Africa Amani Journal is anchored in the strong desire of the IPSTC to share findings of peace and security research. Many have dedicated themselves to the realization of this journal. The Director who never wavered in saying yes to the new Journal; the heads of research who showed it can be done; the researchers who worked between tight deadlines to hand in their work and all who critiqued the work in its various stages of development. Not the least, all the contributors who believed with us that a journal in peace for Africa can be done and remain viable. To all, the editorial team owes them a debt of gratitude.

The journey for this journal has started. It is a sign of commitment to produce one on a semi annual basis to advance quality peace research in Africa. The success of the journal will depend on the support of all players in peace and security and beyond. The next issue will be in June, 2015. Welcome to the first edition of the Africa Amani Journal.

Prof. Timothy Gatara
Editor.

Research for Peace and Security

*Brigadier Robert Kabage, Director,
International Peace Support Training Centre.*



Research remains key to the development of IPSTC. The training programme of the Centre is anchored in action research that is conceptualized and carried out by researchers in the Peace and Security Research Department (PSRD). In the past one year, the Research Department has provided valuable insights into the peace and security situation in the Great Lakes Region especially DRC, Burundi, South Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. This is in addition to producing several issue briefs and occasional papers that graphically expose the complexities of peace building in the Eastern and Central Africa Regions.

As a way of diversifying and improving our research products, the Africa Amani Journal is now a reality. The purpose of the journal is to report on critical research findings that continue to impact peace and security in the region. The journal will also expand the IPSTC horizons in sharing knowledge and best practices in peace and security. It will be the key medium for scholars in Africa to exchange cutting edge knowhow on emerging peace and security trends and dynamics. The sharing of knowledge will boost the IPSTC standards of research in peace and security.

The coming into being of the Africa Amani Journal is a milestone in generating and sharing knowledge not just in the region but also globally. The first issue of the Journal carries articles on: ‘Diplomatic Manoeuvre and Kenya’s Military Campaign in Somalia’. The article asserts that diplomacy is a major asset of statecraft. The paper proceeds to explore the diplomatic challenges that Kenya faced before and continues to face in its armed engagement with the Al Shabaab, not only in the region but in the global context as well. ‘The Changing Character of Peace Keeping in Africa’, highlights the challenges that traditional UN peace keeping principles face and the need to take these into consideration in the future peace keeping missions. The journal also carries an article on, ‘Predicting State Fragility in Africa’, whose analyses is based on already existing data and posits 6 variables that are most salient in predicting state fragility in Africa: group grievance, state legitimacy, unequal development, human rights, existence of state elites and human flight. This is an area that the IPSTC hopes to do further research on. The article on ‘Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms’ shows that neo-liberal ideas of conflict resolution subordinate the traditional practices of conflict resolution because the interface between the two approaches is discordant. It highlights the need to develop a framework that synergizes workable and appropriate mechanisms and methodologies from both the traditional and modern scenarios.

It is a proud moment for IPSTC to launch this first issue of the Africa Amani Peace Journal and to welcome all to its readership. In doing this, hearty acknowledgments go to our partners, in particular the Government of Japan through UNDP for financially and morally supporting this first issue of the Journal.

Diplomatic Manoeuvre and Kenya's Military Campaign in Somalia

Mumo Nzau & Maj. Gen. (Rtd) Charles Mwanzia

Abstract

From time to time, states resort to armed engagements with others for various reasons. War is mostly considered the last resort in the pursuit of the national interests of states. Throughout the modern nation-state system and more so since the end of the Second World War, states have been slow to resort to war. More often than not they may opt to interact with their potential adversaries through peaceful means before to armed campaigns. Such adversaries may take the form of state or non-state actors, which may include sub-national groups, belligerent movements or any other formation(s) perceived to be a threat to state survival. It was under such circumstances that Kenya sent its troops to Somalia in pursuit of the Al Qaeda-linked terror organization, Al Shabaab in mid-October 2011.

In practical terms, Kenya did not declare war on Somalia but rather she invoked her right to self-defence against a threat emanating from her important neighbour, Somalia. Invoking Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Kenya proclaimed self-defence as an inherent right and declared that she had to do whatever was necessary to keep her borders secure from terrorism and economic sabotage. These events attracted immense academic and policy debates given that this was Kenya's first major military offensive in the region since the Shifta War in 1965. Many questions were posed as to the legality of the offensive dubbed Operation Linda Nchi. While Kenya was not at war with her important neighbour Somalia, her troops were inside Somalia pursuing Al Shabaab on the ground, from the air and at sea. In the first instance, Kenya acted unilaterally but a few weeks later, the armed campaign became a venture involving Somalia's Transitional Federal Government forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops.

It is noteworthy that even as such military campaigns take place, the role of diplomacy never ceases. Diplomacy is a major asset of statecraft. As such the question is, what is the role of diplomacy in Kenya's military campaign in Somalia? In this direction, this paper explores the diplomatic challenges that Kenya faced before and continues to face in its armed engagement with the Al Shabaab, not only in the regional but the global context as well.

Introduction

The state's security is the first imperative of foreign policy. Diplomacy is what gives concrete expression to this imperative. Working diplomats and statesmen can ignore this only at great peril. The management of relationships with neighbours especially those that are a security threat or concern becomes the highest diplomatic priority. While war is the ultimate argument of the state, in wartime however, diplomatic strategy supports military strategy through the management of relations with allies and the disruption of enemy alliances. It strives to translate battlefield victories into post-war gains. Diplomacy therefore struggles to minimize the consequences of military setbacks or defeat

while mapping out the modalities for a stable and sustainable post-war situation. These must be the issues that run through the minds of diplomats and top security operatives with the on-set of Kenya's military campaign in Somalia in October 2011. Kenya sent its troops to Somalia in pursuit of the Al Qaeda-linked terror organization, Al Shabaab that she accused of planning and executing international terrorism in Kenya and the entire Eastern Africa region, thereby threatening state and human security in the region.

In practical terms, Kenya did not declare war on Somalia but rather she invoked her right to self-defence against a threat emanating from her close

and important neighbour, Somalia. Invoking Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Kenya proclaimed self-defence as an inherent right and declared that she had to do whatever was necessary to keep her borders secure from terrorism and economic sabotage. These events attracted immense academic and policy debates given that this was Kenya's first major military offensive in the region since the Shifta War of the 1960s. Many questions were posed as to the legality of the offensive dubbed Operation Linda Nchi. While Kenya was not at war with her important neighbour Somalia, her troops were inside Somalia pursuing the Al Shabaab on the ground, from the air and at sea. In the early days of the campaign, Kenya acted unilaterally in most of southern Somalia. However, by June 2012, the armed campaign transformed into a joint operation involving Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops. This paper addresses the diplomatic challenges that Kenya faced before and during the war in Somalia with specific reference to the period before the formal re-hat of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) into AMISOM.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

War, defined as "direct, systematic violence between state actors" is considered by realists to be intrinsic to the international system, and this is the idea behind the "distinctive hallmark of realism," in other words the political element of warfare (Evans and Newman, 1998). The idea that war is an instrument of state policy was most famously summarized by the Prussian theorist of war Karl Von Clausewitz who argued that: "war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means" (Clausewitz, 1832). The concept of state security is tied to the general scenario described above, especially with respect to the condition of anarchy and its negative consequences. The sovereign state becomes the ultimate guarantor of people's security. Wrapped in the protective mantle of sovereignty people can find a measure

of security that is simply unattainable under other conditions. Thus the state is the primary source of protection for individuals and sub-state groups. This leads directly to the notion that it is the duty of the state to provide this protection, not only from external threats but also from within as well.

But what role does diplomacy play during war? Diplomacy eases and/or lubricates the way for the state while at war. Depending on a state's capabilities, it may need to negotiate with stronger ones in order to meet its policy ends. Similarly, the application of pressure and coercion is a form of diplomacy usually practiced by powerful nations against weaker ones. For greater effectiveness, this is often supplemented with incentives and rewards, which is sometimes called "policy of positive engagement" (Haass and O'Sullivan 2000). Creating a sound frame of regional cooperation on any matter is a key concern of diplomacy. No less important is cross-regional cooperation, especially linking up sets of neighbouring countries that straddle different regions. This usually hinges on sound bilateral relationships between key countries, since bilaterally it is the basic building block of diplomacy. Wider concepts of security concerns suggest the need for alternative and agile diplomacy that looks to building issue-specific coalitions with like-minded nations, putting aside all notions of ideology and division. It also underscores the value of sound relationships with all the major power centres of the globe, even if one does not subscribe to the concepts of multipolarity (Rana, 2002:58).

Against this background, and even though Kenya is arguably a leading economic and military power in the entire Eastern Africa, other states in the region and especially Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti have a stake in the Somalia conflict. Equally, Uganda is also a key party being the leading contributor of troops to AMISOM. Indeed, Kenya required the support and goodwill of not only Somalia's TFG government but also that of its neighbours. Similarly, the stand of international hegemonies such as the United States, the European Union and China would make or break Kenya's war effort. In the same vein, the take of IGAD on the matter is equally

important. As such the role of diplomatic manoeuvre as far as Kenya's military campaign in Somalia is concerned is worth investigating and analyzing.

From a liberal viewpoint, the end of the Cold War presented a wealth of new opportunities for international co-operation, mainly requiring the exercise of political will among key players to bring about an unprecedented level of international peace and security. Thus, the liberal viewpoint subscribes to the possibility of a managed anarchy. Whether designed specifically with economic integration or security issues in mind, the existence of key players, and other such organizations, is seen as constituting an international institutional network; the net effect of which is to enhance the prospects for building a durable regime of international peace and security in the twenty-first century. In this case, the role of diplomatic manoeuvre both at the bilateral and multilateral levels is central to this discussion. This paper relied on secondary sources of data; however, this was complemented by insights from interactions and interviewing with various key actors in the various government agencies involved in Kenya's military campaign in Somalia. Such actors included staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serving and retired military personnel as well as media personalities and fellow scholars engaged in this specific subject matter.

Background to Kenya's Military Campaign in Somalia

Following the formation of the TFG in Nairobi in late 2004, President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and his allies, were under pressure from Kenya and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states to relocate to Somalia and set up a provisional capital in Jowhar on the grounds that Mogadishu was insecure. Two assassination attempts on Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi while visiting the old capital city did at least confirm the TFG's fears. Nonetheless, key figures in Yusuf's government led by Hassan Adan (the speaker of Parliament) preferred to operate from the

capital Mogadishu. They finally settled on Baidoa, a neutral town 250 kilometres northwest of Mogadishu. All this while, Mogadishu and its environs were in the hands of warlords who had established strongholds around the ruined city following more than a decade of anarchy. Meanwhile, another force sprung to power, the The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in June 2006. The ICU captured Mogadishu from the warlords who had already formed an alliance, Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT).

The rise of the ICU marked the emergence of militant Islamism as a major ideology that cut across traditional social divisions and challenged traditional modes of dispute resolution by ascending to some degree above the clan structure. The Islamic Courts began a decade ago as a local clan-based mechanism for dealing with chronic lawlessness in Mogadishu (Crisis Group Africa Report No. 116, 2006:16-17). The locals and the business community embraced the Islamic Courts as they provided a semblance of governance in the south and brought some degree of peace and security hitherto unknown to the troubled country. For a long time under its reign, Mogadishu was reunited, militia checkpoints were torn down, weapons were removed from the streets and the international port and airport reopened for business. By December 2006, the courts had expanded from their Mogadishu base to control most of southern Somalia, before they were roused-out by Ethiopian and TFG forces.

The TFG was faced by opposition from two fronts: an associated group of militia led by warlords on one hand and several groups of Muslim leaders who held Islamist and/or anti-western views as far as the future of the country was concerned. During 2009 and early 2010 suicide bombings, particularly by the Al-Shabaab, were rife in and around Mogadishu; Somalia's war-battered capital. Indeed, since June 2009, five Somali ministers have been killed by Al Shabaab suicide bombers. These attacks have demonstrated that the Al Shabaab is a formidable destabilizing factor to the government in Mogadishu.

Washington has maintained that Al-Shabaab

is Al Qaeda's proxy in Somalia, and especially after the then leader of the ICU, Sheikh Dahir Haweys advocated and called for attacks on foreigners until they left Somalia. For a while, it seemed like the activities of the Al-Shabaab were confined to Somalia in its quest to oust the Government of Sheikh Sharrif Ahmed by whatever means possible. However, being a terror group, it should not have come as a surprise when Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the Kampala attacks of 11 July 2010. On 23 July 2010, the eve of African Union's Summit in Kampala, the AU Commission chairperson Jean Ping, announced they had asked countries, to contribute troops to AMISOM, then comprising only Ugandan and Burundian forces. The AU decision to reinforce AMISOM by almost 2,000 troops would increase the size of the force from its current level of around 6,300 (4 Ugandan and 3 Burundian battalions), to the 8,000 mandated in 2007. Some AU member states had even called for the force to be augmented to between 14,000 and 20, 000 troops. Although the African Heads of State strongly condemned the Kampala terror attacks, they seemed unable to provide a final and lasting solution to the 'Somalia Question' (Menkhaus, 2012).

Since attaining independence in 1963, Kenya has enjoyed relative tranquillity, peace and security with her neighbours and the global community. The first terror attack that took place at the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi on 30 December 1980 was seen as a one-time event and no serious measures were put in place to address similar potential threats. However, this began to change after the 7 August 1998 Al Qaeda bomb terror attack targeting the US Embassy in Nairobi. The attack resulted in the loss of over 252 innocent lives with over 5,000 people injured. Majority of the victims were Kenyans. Although Kenya was not the direct target of these attack, the extent of that attack had great implications on the discourse of national security in Kenya (Nzau, 2010).

Barely four years later, a second major terror attack took place on Kenyan soil. On 28 November 2002, terrorists bombed Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Kilifi. Twelve (12) Kenyans and three Israeli Nationals were killed in the

attack. A large portion of the hotel was destroyed. The attack also involved a failed attempt to down an Israel airliner. Since then, international terrorism became a major security concern to Kenyans. Although the terrorist attacks were not specifically targeted at Kenya, they had devastating impacts on the country particularly in the economic, political and social spheres. Principal economic sectors such as tourism were paralyzed as a result of travel bans imposed by different countries owing to the threat posed by terrorism. Despite the absence of a significant terrorist attack in the Greater Horn region since the Kikambala Bombing, terrorist groups remained active in the region with Somalia as the epicentre of anarchy. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was formed in Nairobi, Kenya (following the IGAD-driven Somalia National Reconciliation Conference) in October 2004, was not able to establish its authority over the war torn country.

Frequent albeit low-key terrorist attacks in Kenya, including the abduction of government and Aid workers from North Eastern Kenya, resulted in the deployment of the KDF into Somalia in mid-October 2011 to stop the Al Shabaab. Kenya declared war on the terrorist organization and stated that its security forces would henceforth pursue the aggressors across the border into Somalia (Global Post 2010). The government argued that Kenya had a right to self-defence, adding that its Constitution and the UN Charter were clear on the defence of borders. They invoked Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which pronounces self-defence as an inherent right, which meant that the country could do whatever was necessary to keep its borders secure (Daily Nation, October 18, 2011).

Since the entry of the KDF into Somalia, the Al Shabaab has retaliated by making terror incursions into Kenya. Its spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage, has been quoted threatening to launch terror attacks on Kenyan cities if Kenya does not withdraw its troops from Somalia. Indeed, since the onset of Operation Linda Nchi in 16th October 2011, Nairobi and various parts of the North Eastern and Coast regions have come under terrorist attacks by Al Shabaab

operatives and their local sympathizers. The then Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, reiterated that “Kenya was fighting terrorists and not a community,” adding that Kenya had the reason, the will and capacity to fight the militia and that the terror group leaders should be investigated by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes committed in Somalia, Kenya and the Horn of Africa in general (The Nairobi Law Monthly, December, 2011). The Al Shabaab remains the greatest threat to Kenya’s national security.

Diplomatic Manoeuvre and Kenya’s Military Campaign in Somalia

In this section, the authors delve into a discussion on how diplomatic manoeuvre was applied in order to facilitate and “ease the way” for Kenya’s strategic interests during Operation Linda Nchi (OLN). First it is true in many ways that there were plans and activities in Kenya’s military and diplomatic circles to undertake a military operation in Somalia long before the abduction of a prominent French tourist in Kenya’s north coast as well as aid workers from the Dadaab refugee Camp in Northern Kenya. Kenya had been under growing pressure to take action and attempt to restore confidence that it was capable of not only protecting tourists but also the aid community operating in the country. Since the commencement of “Operation Linda Nchi” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in conjunction with other stakeholders undertook to galvanize international support for the security operation and to consolidate the achievements made thus far.

On 18 October, 2011, a high powered delegation led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs met with H.E. Sheikh Shariff, President of the TFG on the security developments in Somalia. It was a clear case of diplomatic manoeuvre in which the Kenyan delegation attended a joint press conference in Mogadishu where the two sides discussed closer co-operation on security matters aimed at wiping out the Al Shabaab and thereby fortify Somalia-Kenya confidence at that critical early stage of OLN. The parties signed a joint communiqué that undertook among others, to cooperate in

undertaking security military operation and coordinated pre-emptive action; and to reaffirm their commitment to continue to work together in urging the international community to favourably consider the recommendations and decisions of the IGAD and AU in relation to strengthening the Peace Support Operation in Somalia, See (Republic of Kenya. 2011).

On 19 October, 2011, the Kenyan delegation held consultations in Addis Ababa with Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Chairperson of IGAD, and with Dr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union Commission. The delegation briefed both leaders on the visit to Mogadishu and the security situation in Somalia. It was affirmed that better results could be achieved if regional partners, including IGAD and the AU, bolstered the efforts by Kenya and worked together to deal with the Al Shabaab problem.

The 41st Extra-Ordinary Session of IGAD Council of Ministers held on 21 October, 2011 in Addis Ababa, welcomed the agreement signed between the Government of Kenya and the TFG of Somalia on 18 October, 2011 on cooperation in all aspects of the on-going security operations and further endorsed the up-scaling of security operations by Kenya in response to the threats. The Council further called for the enhancement of the capacity of AMISOM, and urged the international community to redistribute the burden of hosting the refugees to ease the staggering refugee burden on Kenya.

Further, the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the TFG held high-level bilateral talks in Nairobi on 31 October 2011. The Prime Minister of the TFG, H.E. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali led the TFG delegation, while the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kenya, Rt. Hon. Raila Odinga led the Kenyan delegation. The bilateral diplomatic discourse was a follow up to the deliberations agreed upon between the two countries in Mogadishu on 18 October 2011 on the operationalization of a Joint Mechanism to manage the joint security operations in Southern Somalia. The meeting agreed that the Government of Kenya should not negotiate with the Al

Shabaab but the TFG was free to negotiate with all armed opposition groups within the instruments provided in various IGAD and AU roadmaps for example, the Djibouti Peace Process and the Kampala Accord as recommended by IGAD and the African Union, on condition that the militants renounced violence. The meeting also discussed the positive outcome of the 41st Extra-Ordinary IGAD Council of Ministers Session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 21 October 2011 on the security developments in Somalia. The meeting strongly affirmed the decision to jointly engage the Kenyan Defence Forces and TFG forces in war against the Al Shabaab.

On 1st November, 2011, the two Premiers briefed the Diplomatic Corp and International Organizations in Kenya on the situation in Somalia and the two countries' strategy to restore stability in Somalia. The Premiers reiterated that the main objective of the military operation in Somali is to incapacitate the Al Shabaab, stabilize the country in order to create safe humanitarian corridors within Somalia and to stem the influx of refugees into the neighbouring countries, especially Kenya. The meeting noted that the KDF in collaboration with the TFG forces had liberated Jubaland and therefore called on the international community to channel its humanitarian support in form of food, medication, shelter and education to these liberated areas. The meeting further reiterated on the need for international support to secure Kismayu; a port town in southern Somalia considered to be the main stronghold and economic lifeline of Al Shabaab.

On 10- 11 November, 2011 Kenya's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moses M. Wetangula, accompanied by the Minister of State for Defence, Mohamed Yusuf Haji, led a Kenyan delegation to Uganda and Burundi to deliver special messages from President Mwai Kibaki on the on-going Kenya security operation inside Somalia in their capacities as Troop Contributing Countries (TCC). Meanwhile, Uganda was requested to consider deploying more troops to AMISOM in Southern Somalia. Burundi had expressed its readiness to deploy more troops to Southern Somalia with authorization from IGAD and the AU. On 25 November, 2011, an Extra-Ordinary

Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia discussed the political and security situation in Somalia. The session directed the Secretariat to ensure continuous consultations of the IGAD Chiefs of Defence staff and military experts on how to support and coordinate the operations. They further called on Ethiopia to support the Kenya-TFG and AMISOM operations.

From the on-set, Kenya was faced with the challenge of convincing not only Somalia and IGAD member states but other world states on the rationale behind OLN. The country's war against the Al Shabaab militia got a boost after several countries promised to support Kenya and Somalia. During the bilateral talks between Kenya and Somalia on 31 October 2011; representatives of the European Union, US, Canada, Turkey, Australia, China, India, Japan, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Gulf Corporation and representatives from IGAD were among those who met Kenya's Prime Minister Raila Odinga and his Somali counterpart Abdiweli Mohamed Ali and expressed their support for the military operation. Though the donors did not specify the kind of support they were to offer Kenya and Somalia, it was a clear sign that the international community had been struggling to find a solution to the Somalia crisis and the engagement of Kenya was seen as an opportunity to build upon in an effort to end 20 years of civil war in Somalia. At that meeting, Kenya and Somalia appealed for technical, intelligence, humanitarian and logistical support for their campaign against the Al Shabaab. Similarly, under the advice of his Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers, President Kibaki travelled to the United Arab Emirates and secured support for OLN and humanitarian support for the Somali people within the liberated areas (International Crisis Group, 2012).

Meanwhile, the presence of heavily armed Kenyan troops working together with TFG forces in the entire southern part of Somalia and border areas in parts of northern Kenya heightened tensions among local civilian populations. The diplomatic front on the part of Kenya hence had the task of addressing these regional and international tensions and/or

uncertainties in order to pave way and ensure internal and international confidence in the Somalia campaign. Similarly, within Kenya, the legality of OLN was also questioned with the authorities being accused of blindly getting into a war, without considering the legal, economic and national security repercussions.

Given that Kenya's military budget has dropped from 841 million dollars (2.9 % of GDP) in 1988 to 594 million dollars (2% of GDP) by 2010 (www.sipri.org); a sustained campaign in Somalia would require more resources. As such, increased military outlays were expected in order to replenish worn out equipment, acquire modern weaponry and recruit more troops and increased pay for personnel. Other local critics of the Kenyan involvement in Somalia accused the ruling elite of using the operation as a conduit for grand corruption in which the procurement and purchase of military hardware would be used to enrich a few and raise money to finance the 2012 General Elections. Yet other critics argued that OLN was a calculated move by the ruling elite in the Coalition Government to delay Kenya's General Elections and thus remain in government as no elections can be held when a country is at war. While these accusations and counteraccusations were going around, Al Shabaab linked terror attacks in the country increased in number and in intensity. By 2 June 2012, when OLN formally ended, at least 44 Kenyans had fallen victim to various terror attacks by the Al Shabaab.

To counter the local negative sentiments towards OLN, diplomatic manoeuvre was most at play through weekly media briefings involving the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Kenya Police. The Impact of the Weekly Media Briefings was immense. The role of diplomatic manoeuvre here was to galvanize the nation to support its war mission. The civilian acceptance and pride in their national defence forces was crucial and the weekly media briefings enabled OLN to enjoy national and international support and political goodwill not least that of the Somali people. In order to sustain the justification of its unilateral move to enter Somalia, Kenya had to wedge an effective public relations campaign to isolate the Al-

Shabaab from the larger Somali community, limit collateral damage to Somali civilians and take full responsibility whenever such events occur; while adhering to international laws governing the conduct of war. Towards this end, the Kenyan civilian leadership and defence chiefs displayed a commendable unity of purpose.

Diplomatic manoeuvre in support of the Kenyan military campaign continued to play out through coordinated efforts at the Regional and International Levels throughout the OLN campaign. The Horn of Africa Directorate within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was tasked with this important mission. Its major task was to target various international forums where issues around peace and security in the Greater Horn were discussed. These included for instance; the International Conference on Somalia held in London in February 2012, the International Conference Piracy that was held in February 2012 in Nairobi and the meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the countries in AMISOM held in Nairobi in January 2012 among others.

Further, Kenya's diplomatic manoeuvre enabled her to provide training and logistics support to the TFG forces. As early as 2009, long before OLN, Kenya was involved in training members of Somalia's civilian police force as well as military personnel. It was a move that was meant to give the TFG the necessary technical and logistical support in order to enable the TFG (which Kenya had helped establish under IGAD) ward-off the growing threat from the Al Shabaab. Kenya's diplomatic efforts also bore fruit when the United States in June 2012 managed to name, shame and blacklist at least three Somalia citizens who were known to work closely with the Somali and/or Fundamentalist Diaspora in funding Al Shabaab among other terror-linked groups. In early 2012, Kenya's diplomatic manoeuvre enabled her to take the position of Chair at the IGAD of the Peace and Security Council, a strategic position in enhancing the OLN agenda regionally and internationally.

The Switch from Unilateral to Multilateral Action: Diplomatic Manoeuvre and Kenya's Re-hat into AMISOM

On 2 June 2012 the Government of Kenya and the Commission of the African Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to govern Kenya's contribution of troops and resources to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The signing of the MoU marked the official re-hat of the KDF to AMISOM following the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012) in February 2012 on the increase of AMISOM's force strength from 12,000 to a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel including the 4,664 Kenya Defence Force (KDF), with enhanced mandate from Peace keeping to Peace enforcement. The adoption of the UNSC Resolution 2036 (2012) followed a meeting between the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and members of the UN Security Council on 11th January, 2012 during which the AU presented the Strategic Concept for future operations of AMISOM in Somalia.

The US commended the decision by Kenya and Ethiopia to join the African Union Force fighting Al Shabaab militants in Somalia. US Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, argued that Kenya and Ethiopia should strengthen the AMISOM and use it to fight the militants in Somalia. Carson appreciated the difficulties Kenya was facing in dealing with the insecurity emanating from Somalia and urged the country to work with AMISOM in advancing the stability of Somalia instead of going it alone. While the European Union (EU) backed Kenya's war against the Al Shabaab, the organization however argued that military action alone would not create lasting security in Somalia and underlined need for coordination of military and security operations in Somalia with the TFG, IGAD, AU and the UN to ensure that military action against the Al Shabaab is consolidated to ensure sustainable peace.

Before concluding this paper, it is imperative to pose critical questions in regards to the role

of diplomatic manoeuvre in Kenya's military campaign in Somalia. The main question being to what extent the engagements helped secure Kenya's long and short-term strategic objectives in Somalia and the Greater Horn of Africa region. True enough, diplomatic expediency has worked quite positively for Kenya. However, it is still early in the day to get a comprehensive picture of all the aspects associated with the planning, execution and the actual impact of the military campaign in Somalia. Irrespective of this fact, from the foregoing discussions, the general take is that diplomacy did and still continues to play an important role in securing both regional and international support for the Kenyan engagement in Somalia. The search for lasting peace in Somalia continues and despite the enhancement of AMISOM, the capture of the port town of Kismayu, the war against the Al Shabaab and the stabilization of Somalia remains a challenge. Indeed, it has been demonstrated by experiences from campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere that the search for lasting peace is a long term and arduous task. Military campaigns only part, albeit important, of the required wider-ranging interventions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Through concerted and well implemented diplomatic efforts prior to, during and after the short-lived "Operation Linda Nchi" inside Somalia; Kenya was able to secure the necessary moral, political and financial support from various nations and organizations, including the Commonwealth, AU, EU, Indian Ocean Rim Association, COMESA, South Africa, Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, USA, UK, France, Nigeria, Qatar, Oman, Israel, and South Sudan. Nonetheless while war is the ultimate argument of the state, diplomacy becomes the oil that lubricates the actual conduct of hostilities and to map-out the way for a conclusive and sustainable victory. True enough; an inconclusive peace in Somalia is as bad as an inconclusive war and it is fraught with greater uncertainty not only for Somalia but also for Kenya and the international community at large. Diplomacy therefore does not cease,

even after war. Instead, it becomes focused on the shaping of tomorrow's peace with today's enemy in mind. As role of diplomatic manoeuvre to the very conclusion of the entire exercise cannot be over emphasized. In conclusion, the prediction is that the ongoing military approach to the Somalia question will subsequently require to be succeeded by concerted multilateral diplomatic processes once the Al Shabaab and other major destabilizing elements are eliminated. This way, peace will be institutionalized and sustained. While sustaining the war and achieving victory was the ultimate strategic goal for OLN and now AMISOM, future medium-to-long-term vulnerabilities and retaliatory attacks from the Al-Shabaab and related elements should be expected in the Eastern African region. Thus diplomatic manoeuvre will continue to play an important role in the search for sustainable peace and stability in Somalia.

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Contesting Traditional Conflict Resolutions Mechanisms in a Neo-liberal setting: Lessons from Kenya

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Abstract

There exist challenges of transposing traditional conflict resolution mechanisms into a modern conflict context informed by neoliberal ideas. This article postulates that neo liberal ideas of conflict resolution subordinate the traditional practices of conflict resolution because the interface between the two approaches is discordant. Given the incessant conflict scenarios under interrogation it is prudent to develop a framework that synergizes workable and appropriate mechanisms and methodologies from both the traditional and modern set up.

Introduction

This article interrogates the traditional conflict resolution mechanism in a neoliberal setting. The conflict resolution terminology is used in this study to refer to the termination of conflict situation by applying home grown or indigenous strategies. The article is contextualized in a situational analysis of recurrent conflict environment in the independence era in Kenya and more specifically drawing relevant examples from current conflict situations with regard to northern, eastern, coastal parts and sections of the Rift Valley of Kenya.

The neo liberal approach to peace postulates that security, rule of law, democratic forms and economic reconstruction foster peaceful societies. Further to this, neo liberalists argue that market democracies construct inclusive and emancipatory peaceful processes. Under this framework conflict resolution involves the reduction, elimination, or termination of all forms of conflict using methods and processes that facilitates the peaceful ending of conflict. Neo liberal approach postulates that conflicts may be resolved through negotiation, mediation, diplomacy, and creative peace building and use of non-violent measures (Macmillan, 1997:34; Keohane & Martin, 1995:45-46).

The liberal peace elevates globalization, economic transformation through macro-economic stability and reduction of poverty to minimize the chances

of conflicts. The democratic peace theory argues that democracies have non-aggression tendencies to each other and when conflicts emerge they have incentives to seek alternatives to war. Internally, democracies have mechanisms for resolving conflicts and assured guarantees. Where conflicts occur, particularly in emerging democracies there exist prescribed norms for resolving them (Jervis, 2002:5; Fukuyama, 1992:212; Levy, 1989:88).

Context

Northern Kenya is the home to nomadic societies such as the Turkana, Samburu, Pokot and Somali. Some of these societies share international boundaries with Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. The region has been the centre of local and international conflict over a long period of time (Menkhan, 2005:17-38). This is because of dwindling resources and the modern concepts of border and citizenships that are divorced from the traditional understanding and perceptions of territoriality and neighbourhoods. Territoriality mostly corresponded to seasons while neighbourhoods are highly transitory and randomly formed. Individuals moved in and out of neighbourhoods in accordance with nomadic patterns. Territoriality defined limits of ownership and accessibility of members to resources but under exceptional circumstances allowed non-members into territorial sections. Territoriality and neighbourhoods defined identity, inclusion,

exclusion, borders, borderland and citizenship (Campbell & Axin, 1980).

The establishment of colonial administration in Kenya redefined and introduced fixed borders and imposed the notion of citizenship and the process of identification, reducing independent communities into subjects. International and local borders did not take into consideration traditional notions of territoriality but cut across communities and placed them into separate states. People who initially belonged to one community found themselves labelled as citizens of different states. Movement beyond defined borders brought communities into conflict with the colonial and post-colonial state and even among ethnic communities that more often co-existed under well understood notions of territoriality and neighbourhoods. Circumscribing the nomadic communities into fixed zones led to marginalization because the nomadic activities would not thrive in restricted surroundings. What ensued was the pauperization and constant animosity as pastoral communities fought over scarce resources for survival. Stock raiding became a common feature while movement across international boundaries has become a common that raises issues of illegal migrants, citizenship, refugee and insecurity (Dereje and Markus, 2010).

The paper posits that modern conceptualization of borders and citizenship is vaguely understood by the nomadic societies in the region. It is more retrogressive and the source of recurrent conflicts. From the modernist state, borders reinforce governance operation but from the nomadic communities in the region it is a means of marginalization and dispossession. The physical border, to many of the communities does not preclude society from the use of resources. The contestation raises fundamental question on the relevance of modern structures of governance on communities that have traditionalist approach to political, economic and social survival (Mwaniki, et al, 2007:28-31).

The hegemonization of ethnicity, ethnic exclusion and inclusion together with the creation of ethno territorial borders reinforce the process of

inclusion and exclusion through which territories and spaces retain ethnic homogeneity reinforced by sacredness, myths and traditions. Intruding into these spaces result into inter-ethnic conflict, segregation and ethnic cleansing. The politics of zoning ethno territorial spaces into ethnic voting blocs for ethnic based political parties characterize Kenya's political landscape since the advent of multi-party politics in the 1990s. The boundaries of ethnic and political differences trigger political conflicts (Nyanhoga, 2014).

Conflicts have persisted despite the application of the neo liberal conflict resolution mechanisms. This may be due to lack of understanding of the history of the region and particularly how communities over a long period of time have co-existed and resolved conflicts.

Neo-liberal Approach to Conflict Resolution

The following are some neo liberal approaches to conflict resolution:

Prosecution of Criminals

The prosecution of criminals, ordinarily, aims at preventing criminals from perpetuating the crimes. Courts have been used to prosecute criminals and war lords, who have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. But the court process is sometimes slow in issuing verdicts and sometimes judgment decisions are far removed from the people concerned (Tarimo & Manwel, 2007:46-50).

The use of Armed Forces

The armed forces, like the police, the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU) or the army, are used to impose curfews and instil discipline in localized conflicts. This has been witnessed in places like Mt. Elgon, the Mathare slum in Nairobi; Laikipia, Likia, Molo, Lamu and Tana river regions of Kenya. The rationale is that conflicts can be neutralized before they turn violent and widespread. The police are expected to provide appropriate intervention to reduce violence and criminality. However, armed forces

have, more often than not, been accused of human rights abuse that range from rape, extorting money from their victims and taking sides when it comes to inter-ethnic conflicts. The Kenyan Police, for instance, have been accused of extra judicial killings of the adherents of the Mungiki sect (a proscribed group). The use of military may resolve the conflict in the short run but there are long term implications. The recurrence of conflicts in many parts of Kenya raises questions as whether indigenous strategies of resolving conflicts should be applied (Nyanhoga, et al, 2008:95-110).

Education

Following the post elections violence in 2007/8, the Kenya government together with civil society organizations embarked on peace education. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) developed strategies of promoting peaceful co-existence. Peace education became an effective tool for confidence building and to sensitize the people of the need to observe peace and co-existence. But the limit of this was the lack of involvement of the grass root stakeholders. The medium of communication still remained Kiswahili and English yet the vernacular language could do much better for easier understanding of the peace messages. When the government took charge of the process, people felt alienated and detached themselves from the process (NCIC, 12:48; Galtung, 1975: 334-339).

Power Sharing

Power sharing has been used as measures of confidence building. This was applied in the power sharing arrangement between Emilio Mwai Kibaki and Raila Amolo Odinga in Kenya to prevent the escalation of violent conflict over the 2007 disputed presidential elections. The Kibaki and Raila power sharing deal was characterized by intermittent conflicts throughout their tenure (Nyanhoga, 2014).

Amnesty

Amnesty is the offer of immunity from prosecution on condition that the belligerents cease unlawful

activities. It transcends punishment and retribution, for the sake of the common good. In Kenya the members of Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and belligerents groups in many parts of Kenya including the Mungiki groups have on several occasions been offered amnesty. Critics argue that amnesty has limitations, because those that have been involved in killings, looting of public funds and massive corruption, may seek amnesty in order to evade prosecution. It may also be seen as unjust when the state initiates amnesty, to exempt the perpetrators from prosecution; without consultation, or by sacrificing the rights of the victims. This may be seen as overriding the rights of the victims. The victims may feel that the state has used amnesty to protect politically connected personalities (Tarimo & Manwel, 2007:33-38).

Mediation

Mediation builds on negotiations and involves a third party intervention in the conflict. It aims at arriving at a settlement that is acceptable to those involved: one that they could not have achieved on their own. The mediators' role is to reduce tension and endless bargains, for the sake of peace. The choice of mediators is important for they must be acceptable to the parties involved. The objectives to be achieved, and procedures to be followed must be communicated to the parties concerned in advance; in order to facilitate a proper involvement (Tarimo & Manwel, 2007:33-50).

Critique of Neo-liberal Approach to Conflicts

Some of these methodologies to conflict resolution have been contested due to the very fact they seem to take a top to bottom approach. The use of the military to quell conflicts in many parts of Kenya such as in Lamu, Mt. Elgon region, Mandera and Wajir has to a greater extent taken a pacifist approach, and focused on short term truce only for the conflicts to resurface. What lacks is the integration of indigenous or traditional approaches. Secondly the amnesty is heavily contested as a strategy to integrate criminals and perpetrators of conflicts into society. Many

societies had elaborate rituals of cleansing and accepting criminals and perpetrators of crimes in society. The failure to invoke this and enable society own the process jeopardize the chances of having a long lasting solution to conflict.

For instance, after the 2007 and 2008 post-election violence there was blanket amnesty and communities were encouraged to live together in harmony, yet, the level of intolerance is high among the ethnic divide as members of different ethnic groups continue to perceive each other as intruders, burdensome, security threats, exploiters and liars. The failure to invoke traditions and customs of the people into the peace initiatives and resettlement programme is a major impediment.

Traditional Conflict Resolutions Mechanisms in a Neo-Liberal Setting

Kenya's 2010 constitution recognizes the role of local and customary conflict resolution mechanisms. This implies that communal and locally driven conflict resolution is conducive to resolving conflicts (The Constitution of Kenya, 2010: 62; 67).

Militarization of Conflict Resolution

The method is used to resolve conflict as a last resort when all other methods, such as diplomacy, negotiation, payment of fines or other forms of pay-off fail. It is the physical force that realizes the objectives of a community. Armed combat is still fashionable among the various pastoral communities in Kenya to protect livestock, pasture, land, water resources and communities. But the approach seems to go contrary to the tenets of neo liberalism where it is perceived to be criminal or belligerent. The philosophy of militarization as a strategy to resolve conflicts was informed by the principle of self-defence and proportionality. Military build-up was a necessary deterrence mechanism. But neo liberalism strategy of demilitarization to a traditional context without adequate cautionary avenues is counter-productive because it leads to militarization again. Several demilitarization operations in northern Kenya such as Operation

Okoa Maisha (Save Lives) in 2008, Operation Chunga Mpaka (Guard the Border) in 2008 and Operation Dumisha Amani (Peace Operation) in 2010 were driven by national security frameworks that included forceful disarmament leaving many of the communities vulnerable to external attacks.

Commonness of Humanity, Reciprocity and Respect

This is the value of African communal way of life in which sharing was more of a virtue than denying the same to other people. Reciprocity emphasized both the ethics of sharing and a sense of collective security, through a social set-up which supported an egalitarian social living. It was a norm that transformed individual obligations into social welfare security schemes. The process of individualization and privatization of common good and resources encourage competition, conflict and hence undermine the ethics of humanity leading to conflict (Mkangi, 1997).

The Kinship Ideology

According to Ochieng (1974), there existed multiplicity of kinship relations among various Abagusii clans. The principle idea was that such kin clans were relatives by blood and were strictly forbidden from engaging in acts of shedding blood. Such relationship also existed among the Agikũyũ and the Akamba. The two regarded each other as athoni (in-laws); a fact that forbade the two communities from fighting, however serious the provocations and circumstances may be. Thus, inter-ethnic marriages created blood relations within various African communities, making them related in one way or another. It was also common for African communities to exchange brides as means of cementing good relations and avoiding acts of aggression between communities. The emergence of trans-ethnic religions; modern education and urbanization has contributed to the emergence of new social values and the neutralization of this principle in creating and cementing social bonds. Within the emerging urban culture, kinship ideology is increasingly becoming peripheral as

other forms of creating social bonds and social capital emerge. The decline of kinship ideology contributes to the disruption of social networks and promotes individualization, poverty, autonomy and conflict. Among the pastoral communities such as the Turkana, Samburu, Pokot and Somali; the process of urbanization and migration is eroding kinship ideology. There is also commoditization of pastoral economy, land pasture and water resources. This promotes the notion of atomization of kinship ideology and exacerbation of conflicts (Schlee, 1989).

Peaceful Treaties

African communities entered into peace treaties, permanent or otherwise, and sometimes formed alliances against other communities. Among the Abagusii; leaders could prick their small fingers and once blood was oozing out, they could lock them together and chant words and promises of peace and mutual protection. This treaty was called enchabo and was seriously upheld by the local custom; and any party renegeing on it stood to incur the wrath of curses chanted during the treaty. It is also believed that the Abagusii entered into such agreements with their neighbouring communities. During the battle of Saosao in 1891, for instance, the Abagusii allied themselves with their neighbours, the Luo and Kuria against the combined force of the Kipsigis and Nandi who had raided the latter for cattle. Such alliance proved fruitful at the battle of Charachani against the Kipsigis. The Turkana have in the past also entered into such peace treaties with Oromo and Pokot by breaking bones, of sacrificed animals, weapons of war and burying them (Nyanhoga et al 2008). The modernization coupled with the neo liberal approach to peace downgrade the rituals as a strategy in conflict resolution. Customary practices and rituals that promote peace are fast waning due to modern religions and modernity.

Gender and Peace Process

Women were regarded almost everywhere in Africa as the epitome of the principles of common humanity, reciprocity and respect. As such, this made them better emissaries of peace as they were regarded to be the most non-partisan

when it came to wars and extremely distressing situations. Women elders were accorded great respect, due to their social status. The post-menopausal women were accorded hearings and even joined male elders in their councils. They proved very resourceful in both averting conflicts and resolving them through their feminine skills. For example, among the Nandi one way in which women stopped war was through untying their birth belts (legetio) from their waist. The birth belt (legetio) was placed in front of the warriors and it was taboo to jump over it hence the men became impaired and had to stop the war immediately. This was a very powerful cultural mechanism used by women in seeking peace (Nyanhoga and Ndogotho, 2014). But modern security peace frameworks fail to incorporate women in peace initiatives and hence look at women and children as victims in conflict situations Adan & Pkayla, 2006:39).

Council of Elders

The councils of elders were often composed of men, many of them aged and experienced in the art of governance. These were respected senior member of the community and were gifted in wisdom and presided on many social issues and conflicts. Their wisdom in resolving such conflicts was well acknowledged. They also acted as the war council in many communities, deliberating on matters of security, declaring war and negotiating for peace. The declining role of elders in contemporary Kenyan society is due to emerging forms and avenues of attaining social status such as education and wealth. This undermines the authority of elders. Neo liberal approach to peace such as the use of military to resolve conflicts in many parts of the country such as in northern Kenya marginalize the role of community elders in resolving conflicts. Homicide cases and land conflicts are increasingly being referred to courts of law and therefore eroding the legitimacy of elders in conflict resolution. Despite the contextual relevance of the institution of elders in conflict resolution in many conflict situations such as Wajir, Mandera, Lamu and Moyale little has been achieved.

Since 2012 communal conflicts have engulfed

Tana River, Moyale and Mandera leading to the destruction of property and loss of lives. One of the possible reasons is the involvement of elite politics in local communal conflicts that are tied to resources and power politics. Kenya's patrimonial politics, political rent seeking, the local and national political dynamics; the perceived non-partisan role of the government and political elites in local conflicts contribute to the flaring of conflicts and limit the role of elders in conflict resolution mechanism.

Several examples attest to interference of neo-liberal mechanisms in traditional approach to conflict resolution. In 2001 the Modogashe declaration brought together all the elders of the pastoral communities in northern Kenya to manage resource based conflicts (Chopra: 2008:15-17). Similarly in 2008; the Nakuru County Peace Accord brought together the Kalenjin and Kiyuyu elders to resolve politically instigated conflicts in the county. Despite the local initiatives the state interventionist role in resolving conflicts was detested. The state was perceived as self-imposing in the mediation process through its agents. Given the role of ethnicity in Kenyan politics; the state agents were perceived to play into the gallery of ethnic politics and therefore delegitimizing the role of elders in conflict resolution (Chopra: 2008:15-17).

The Third Party Approach

In solving social disputes, African communities used an indirect method of interrogating the combatants, which was referred to as 'the third party approach'. Protagonists addressed the 'court' indirectly through a spokesperson, and this was found to minimize tension and avoid proliferation of the conflict. In such a way, it became easy to arrive at a peaceful resolution without the protagonists being provoked into unnecessary utterances. The third party approach is increasingly taken over by the state machinery and shifting conflict resolution mechanism from the localized process. The third party approach in traditional context relied mostly on processes based on customary institutions, procedures, trust, neutrality, impartiality, legitimacy, facilitation

and consensus rather than leverage (Wepundi et al 2011).

However, in neo-liberal setting, there is increased marginalization of traditional third party approaches in conflict resolution. The government machinery with its resources are taking over the third party roles in conflict resolution. The third party approach modelled along the traditional conflict situation is waning because of institutional incapacity to monitor and enforce the terms of an agreement as well as lack of the resources that the central government possess in contemporaneous conflict situations.

The government as a third party in conflict resolution is seen as an external actor with little or no understanding of local triggers of conflicts. The perception of the government in local conflicts that may involve land, pasture and water may also fuel conflicts. The government views conflict as challenging its authority. Some of the recent communal conflicts including those in Mandera and Wajir Counties where more than 210,500 were displaced between January and May of 2014 are a case in point. Other conflict-affected areas include Baringo, Nyakach in Kisumu, Garissa, Turkana, Samburu and Moyale, Mombasa, Tana River, Kwale and Kilifi. Key drivers for the inter-communal conflicts include competition for scarce resources, border disputes and political differences. These conflicts are seen as a challenge to state's authority.

Age-grade

Age-grade (set) social groups have also been identified as ideal institutions in promoting social cohesion and peace in various African communities. Among the Masaai, it is the Olmorani and riika among the Kikuyu of Kenya. Belonging to an age-group, meant adhering to specific set of rules, duties and rights. It demanded discipline and created a lasting sense of comradeship among people who belonged to the same age-group. Thus, conflict between age-grades and even age-mates was considered a taboo. The age grade system is disintegrating with the decline of traditional rites of passages such as circumcision, and the onset of urbanization, migration and

modern religions. The checks and balances that were promoted through age grade systems are quickly disappearing and hence creating intra and inter community conflicts (Nyanchoga, et al 2008).

Conclusion

The paper has established that neoliberal approach to conflict resolution tend to subordinate the traditional methods of conflict resolution. Consequently, there is a resurgence of conflicts where traditional mechanisms were effective in handling conflict situations. It is the recommendation of this paper that a synergy between neo liberal approach to conflict and traditional conflict resolution methodologies be sought and implemented. Traditional models of conflict resolution such as the use of rituals tend to re-integrate the whole person into society through a cleansing process.

The paper has also established that traditional methods of conflict resolution were localized and given the changing social, political and economic landscape; it is becoming extremely difficult to transpose such ideas and practices into a modern and international context. In view of this and given the contextual analysis of conflict scenario explored, an integrated approach will be more appropriate.

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Predicting State Fragility in Africa: A Multi-factor Analysis - Prof. Gatara Timothy Henry, International Peace Support Training Centre

Abstract

State fragility is a current topical issue in Africa. It has a multiplicity of determinants. These determinants cut across social, cultural, economic and political issues. The paper examines 12 of these determinants including demographic pressure, human rights, unequal development, human flight, state legitimacy, existence of state elites to run regimes, group grievances, existence of refugees and internally displaced persons, security apparatus available to states, poverty and economic decline, public security, and external intervention.

These are variables that the Fund for Peace, (2014) Fragility Index (FI) has generated and used to categorise countries on the basis of a total fragility score derived from these variables. The study hypothesizes that only 6 of these are most salient for Africa: group grievance, State legitimacy, unequal development, human rights, existence of state elites and human flight. These are then entered into a regression model against the total fragility score.

In the final model derived from the above FI, two variables stand out as the most significant: Human Flight and Functioning State Elites. Unequal Development and Group Grievance make the final four.

Introduction and Theoretical Framework

Over the last decade, the subject of state fragility has taken centre stage in many human development fora internationally. This is also the case for Africa. State fragility in its layman's connotation refers to a situation where states are unable to provide basic services to their populations. This definition implies that absence of services has concomitants such as abject poverty, a high propensity to conflict and minimal or total absence of territorial control.

High levels of state fragility pose a serious problem to human development, since they ultimately lead to state collapse, impoverishment and suffering of humans.

Explaining the concept of state fragility is elusive, mainly due to its multivariate nature. Its likely causation is rooted in social, economic, political, historical, demographic and cultural factors.


It is the contention of this paper that a few key social variables, related to governance, management of state affairs and human conditions

determine state fragility and if addressed, they could stabilize African countries to the extent necessary for sustainable human development.

The study focuses on six key likely determinants of state fragility in Africa; the legitimacy of states (X_1), group grievances in states (X_2), human right violations (X_3), existence of unequal development (X_4), existence of competent elites (X_5) to run the country and human flight or displacement due to state fragility (X_6).

This thinking leads to a recursive structural equation model showing the relationship between these variables as shown in figure 1.

Figure 1: Structural Equation Model: Fragility.



This model has context in theories that have been advanced by among others, Paul Collier (2010)¹³. The perspective by Collier posits that civil wars occur when it is both financially and militarily possible. Collier downplays social grievances and emphasizes inequalities and building of strong economies. William Zartman (2007) sees the sequencing of need, greed and greed as key forces behind hostilities inside states. He argues for state intervention before greed finds its way into state systems. Frances Stewart (2009), highlights horizontal inequalities between groups as central in generating negative conflict and sees policies that reduce the inequalities as vital in preventing such conflicts. The World Development Report (2011) recognizes many of the variables used as possible factors behind fragility.

Literature

Scholarly works that have looked at the subject of state fragility include those of Andrea Guerzoni, (2013) who views a myriad of variables ranging from economic, institutional, historical, cultural and demographic. The author also considers ethnic identity as a key factor. The study finds no significant correlation between colonial history and state fragility in Africa. This of course depends on the kind of variables considered to constitute 'colonial history' in the study. Some studies on fragility that consider economic factors find no correlation between income per capita and fragility (Barliamonte and Lutz, 2010). There are studies however that find that state fragility itself impacts human or national development, (Fosu, 2009). Other studies have looked at the effect of international aid to African countries and found that it impacts on development. However, these studies do not go far enough to show whether development emanating from such aid contributes to either stability or fragility of states in Africa (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). This paper challenges the findings by other scholars that report positive effect of foreign aid on state fragility (Stansen & Tap, 2001). There are also studies that indicate that foreign aid in Africa can prolong state fragility (Chauvet and Linker, 2007).

Institutional variables have been shown to be instrumental in the determination of state fragility

(Moreno and Torres, 2005). Indeed, one of the more systematic studies on fragility (Graziella Bertocchi & Andrea Guerzoni, 2010), report a strong influence of institutional variables, followed by income per capita on state fragility. In the study, colonial history is found to be marginally important in determining state fragility. Conversely, the European Development Report (2009) finds a relationship between state fragility and colonial history. The study by Graziella and Bertocchi does not however consider factors such as foreign investment in Africa and capital flight from the continent. The study utilizes data gathered by the International Development Agency (IDA) that focus on economic development factors, structural policies, social inclusion and equity, public sector and institutional management.

Data

Data for this paper comes from the Fund for Peace (2013). In the Fund's compilation of the 'fragile state index', they include 12 key variables that they consider salient in determining state fragility, not just in Africa but globally. These include: Demographic pressure, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, Group grievance, Human Flight, Uneven economic development, Economic Decline, State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, Functionalized Elites and External Intervention. The State fragility indicator is obtained as a total score of these variables by which all the world countries are ranked. In its calculation, this paper uses this score as the dependent variable. In the analysis, these variables are re-coded as: TOTAL [Total Score], DEMPRESS [Demographic Pressure], REFIDIP [Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons], GRGR [Group Grievance], HUF [Human Flight], UNDEV [Uneven Development], PECD [Economic Decline], SLEG [State Legitimacy], PS [Public Service], HR [Human Rights], SECAP [Security Apparatus], FELITE [Functionalised Elites], EXTINTER [External Intervention].

The study from which this paper is derived aims at finding out which group of variables has the most influence on state fragility as measured by the total fragility score. It explores data for 53 (N=53) African countries.

The general hypothesis is that high levels of demographic pressure, numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, extreme group grievances, high numbers of human flight, high levels of inequality, high economic decline, existence of illegitimate states, poor public service, violations of human rights, poor security apparatus, non-existence of functionalized elites to run the state, and frequent external intervention, together contribute to high levels of state fragility. It is further hypothesized that in states where these factors are minimal, chances for fragility are minimal. Even without testing all these variables for their importance in determining state fragility, experience thus far, suggests that a few of them have more significance than others. These include state legitimacy, existence of functional elites and human rights. To these, other variables including group grievance, unequal development and human flight are added to the model.

Data Analysis.

In the analysis, data from the State Fragility Index is entered in a multiple regression model containing the six variables as independent; it is then regressed against the total fragility score. This model is of the order:

$$Y = \alpha_{(Constant)} + X_1\beta_1 + X_2\beta_2 + X_3\beta_3 + X_4\beta_4 + X_5\beta_5 + X_6\beta_6 + \dots + \xi$$

Where:

Y = TOTAL

X1 = SLEG

X2 = FELITE

X3 = HR

X4 = GRGR

X5 = UNDEV

X6 = HUF and E the error of prediction.

The influence of a given variable on the dependent variable is considered significant at .05 p significance level.

Findings and discussions.

Table 1 shows the outcome of the regression model when all the six variables are in the model. The regression outcome shows that these six variables taken together explain more than 90% (R2 = 0.914) of the variation in state fragility implying that these variables can predict state fragility when

each variable’s contribution is considered while the other 5 are controlled. The most significant of these variables is Human Flight with a P Value of 9.27e-06. This is an expected result since human flight, in reality, is an indicator of everything that could go wrong in an unstable state. It is usually preceded by breakout of hostilities, violence and forced displacement of human populations. The least significant of these variables is State Legitimacy with a P value of 0.94. This is a telling outcome that indicates that states that are not completely legitimate do not necessarily have to be fragile. All the other variables are significant predictors of state fragility at this stage. The State Legitimacy variable is hence weaned from the next model. The P value of the variable Human Flight is 9.3 implying that this variable may have effect on state fragility even in a random sample. It is possible for human flight to exist in a situation where state fragility is absent. This is because human flight could be due to other factors, like technology-triggered migration that are not necessarily factors related to state fragility. Human flight itself is a composite variable and could show high multi-co-linearity with the other variables including the dependent variable and thus, its explanatory effect may not be real. For this reason, it is hence weaned from the next model.

Table 1: Regression Coefficients of the total model

Residuals:				
Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-11.0862	-2.4431	0.0805	2.1995	6.7230
Coefficients:				
Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr (> t)	
(Intercept)	1.36669	5.32066	0.257	0.798381
GRGR	1.42779	0.49601	2.879	0.005949
HUF	2.80126	0.56488	4.959	9.27e-06
UNDEV	2.97097	0.74687	3.978	0.000234
SLEG	0.07018	1.08722	0.065	0.948799
HR	1.98572	0.89031	2.230	0.030433
FELITE	2.71445	0.76386	3.554	0.000865
Residual standard error: 3.837 on 48 degrees of freedom				

Multiple R-squared: 0.9144, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9037

F-statistic: 85.41 on 6 and 48 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

The 5-variable model turns out highly significant coefficients. It shows how well the five variables, Group Grievance, Human Flight, Unequal Development, Human Rights and State Elites complement each other to strongly predict state fragility. Still in this model, not all the variables are not equally strong predictors of fragility. Two of these variables, Human Rights ($p=0.00139$) and Group Grievance, ($p=0.00159$) are the weakest predictors of fragility. Notably, in scenarios where human right abuse is rampant, group grievances are likely to be rife. Despite these two variables being equally significant, the Human Rights variable is first weaned from the model.

Without the Human Rights variable in the model, Group Grievance ($p = 9.03$) e-05 turns out strongly as a predictor variable for state fragility. This shows how strongly human rights status in any country influences group grievances. Countries with good human rights records can be expected to portray limited group grievances.

Table 2: Regression coefficients: 5-variable model

Residuals:				
Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-11.0756	-2.4484	0.0435	2.2032	6.7380
Coefficients:				
	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	1.3594	5.2651	0.258	0.79734
GRGR	1.4112	0.4203	3.358	-0.00153 **
HUF	2.7969	0.5552	5.038	6.79e-06 ***
UNDEV	2.9882	0.6903	4.329	7.37e-05 ***
HR	2.0279	0.5983	3.389	0.00139 **
FELITE	2.7463	0.5772	4.758	1.77e-05 ***
Significant codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1				

Residual standard error: 3.798 on 49 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.9143, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9056

F-statistic: 104.6 on 5 and 49 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Table 3: Regression Coefficients: 4-variable model

Residuals:				
Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-8.4021	-3.4017	0.3024	3.1962	8.7055
Coefficients:				
	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	4.5872	5.6956	0.805	0.424399
GRGR	1.8661	0.4381	4.259	9.03e-05 ***
HUF	2.7376	0.6103	4.486	4.27e-05 ***
UNDEV	2.9664	0.7592	3.907	0.000281 ***
FELITE	3.9337	0.5046	7.795	3.45e-10 ***
Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1				

Residual standard error: 4.178 on 50 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.8943, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8858

F-statistic: 105.7 on 4 and 50 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Human Rights and existence of state elites

In many African countries, group grievance is usually about unequal development and, it is a variable that would work together with unequal development to explain fragility. In the absence of the unequal development variable, group grievance still remains strong. The lowest p value in the model is shown by the Human Rights variable. It is quite insignificant with a p value that is well beyond the 5% significance level. This variable is therefore dropped from the model.

Table 4: Regression Coefficients: 3-variable model

Residuals:					
Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max	
-11.6508	-3.3298	0.4698	3.0702	8.1487	
Coefficients:					
Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)		
(Intercept)	19.5869	4.7598	4.115	0.000141	***
GRGR	2.0198	0.4936	4.092	0.000153	***
HUF	3.5033	0.6539	5.358	2.04e-06	***
FELITE	4.1144	0.5685	7.238	2.29e-09	***

Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 4.726 on 51 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.862, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8539

F-statistic: 106.2 on 3 and 51 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

The removal of the Human Rights variable from the model still leaves a robust model that can still predict significant state fragility. The Human Rights factor entails issues of violations of basic human rights and violence, and it confounds with Group Grievance in explaining state fragility. For a long period in the political history of Africa, the Human Rights factor could be applied on its own to explain state fragility, especially in the period that followed independence in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, and others where the rulers tended to be despotic with little regard for human rights.

In the 4-variable model (Table 3), Unequal Development though significant is the weakest predictor with a p value of 0.000281. Unequal development has shown to have a staying power of its own, and although it may not directly lead to state fragility, it is a critical long-term factor that is capable of triggering civil strife and revolutions if left un-attended.

Due to its low p value and its high prediction error, this variable is subsequently dropped from

the model.

The removal of Unequal development variable from the model has literally no effect on the explanatory strength of the model. The predicted R2 still remains above 80%. These four variables are strong predictors of fragility and show an expected strong correlation with fragility. This is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 2: Correlation Plots

The three factors that remain, Group Grievance, Existence of State Elites and Human Flight work well together in explaining about 86% of the variation in state fragility. This can be explained by the fact that where a state has a weak power elite in authority, group grievances and unstable human populations are likely to be significant.

From the analysis, one may be tempted to pose the questions: of these three factors which is the least important and which two would hang together in predicting state fragility in Africa? Can the model still hold with two variables?

If it can be argued that when a state has sound leadership, as portrayed by a strong elite in authority, it is likely to be effective in dealing with group grievances. When group grievances are minimal, conflict is less and the state tends to be less fragile. This condition also fosters

population stability and human flight that arises from instability as insignificant. Any of the three remaining factors are strong predictors of state fragility and the removal of one of them still leaves a robust predictive model. The removal of Group Grievance leaves a 2-variable predictive model.

Table 5: Regression Coefficients: 2-variable model

Residuals:				
Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-9.9755	-3.5084	-0.1166	3.0675	12.4735
Coefficients:				
	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr (> t)
(Intercept)	21.2918	5.4119	3.934	0.000249 ***
HUF	3.4324	0.7461	4.601	2.74e-05 ***
FELITE	5.7617	0.4581	12.578	< 2e-16 ***

Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 5.394 on 52 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.8167, Adjusted

R-squared: 0.8096

F-statistic: 115.8 on 2 and 52 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

The model outcomes show that Human Flight and State Elites remain highly significant at levels below 5%, explaining 82% of the variation in state fragility. The model remains sound enough to explain more than 21% of the variation in state fragility even when these two variables are having Zero effect on state fragility. It is possible that these two factors encompass all the other factors in preventing state fragility hence their explanatory power.

Using these models, it is possible to predict state fragility of any country on the basis of any of the models. Fragility scores range from 18 for low fragility states such as Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Norway, to over 100 for countries such as South Sudan, Somalia, Chad, DRC and the CAR. If the scores of the low fragility countries

on Human Flight and State Elites are taken to predict fragility in Africa using the 2-variable model, Africa would have a fragility level of 35, which would be at par with countries such as Japan, United States, Korea, Singapore and Uruguay. The best-placed African country with the least fragility tendencies is Mauritius with a score of 46 and Botswana with 64.

Kenya has a fragility level of 99. With a Human Flight score of 7.8 and State Elites score of 9.3, the model predicts the country's fragility score to be 101, which approximates the 99 it is given globally. With the Group Grievance and Unequal Development in the model, Kenya remains at 99, implying that these are the four priority factors the country needs to address. In other words, Kenya needs efficient leadership elite, tackle group grievances, address Unequal Development and embrace corruption free governance.

This prediction is an indicator that even with the best scores for the above factors in the world, Africa would have a great deal to do in all the other factors, especially unequal development and group grievances to achieve the low fragility levels of the leading states in the world.

Discussions and Conclusions

In perspective, all the fragility variables are critical in predicting state fragility in Africa. However, of these variables, there are those that the continent needs to prioritize as a prerequisite basis for the others.

Demographic pressure is a silent force that indirectly bears on state fragility. Rapid population growth in many African countries will always put pressure on the available resources, and enhance competition for them. Rapid population growth also cancels out economic gains and the states appear like they are not making any progress to improve or making no improvements on the conditions of life for its citizens. Africa has an abundance of resources and can, undoubtedly, cope with much larger populations. However, the resources need to be managed in a manner that enables the states to cater for these large populations. When this does

not happen, injustices easily creep into state systems. The population competes and fights over scarce resources. The net effect is that the states fall into fragility.

The population pressure factor is compounded with unequal development and group grievances. Where governments are perceived as illegitimate the leadership elites fail to control rampant corruption, the state slides into anarchy and instability. Even without addressing a whole range of issues that make states fragile. One can ensure legitimacy if they deal with group grievances, fight unequal development and where the state elites embrace humane and democratic governance.

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The Changing Nature of Peace Keeping in Africa

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Abstract

This study surveys evolution of peace keeping at the global level and in Africa and the changing conflict dynamics in the continent. A number of trends have been identified on the changing nature of peace keeping in Africa. More and more troop contributions are coming from Africa. Africa still remains the largest recipient of UN troop contributions and there is a growing tendency of United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) collaboration in peacekeeping. Some of the AU missions discussed are AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and missions established by the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS).

There are lessons to be drawn from past missions that can inform current and future Peace Support Operations (PSO) in Africa. The new missions are predominantly dealing with intra state conflicts and their mandates has expanded to include protection of civilians and vulnerable groups and support state stabilization through post conflict peace building, support for elections and other governance issues. The changing dynamics of peace keeping is also noted in the interpretation of the principles of peace keeping whereby consent of the government may be overlooked in cases of gross human rights violations and the limited and targeted use of illegal armed groups.

Africa still dominates the global conflicts hot points. The actors in these conflicts have also increased and they keep on mutating where there is a thin line between combatants and civilians, thereby posing significant challenges to peacekeeping missions. Transnational terrorism such as posed by Al Shabaab in Somalia has also precipitated new approaches. The rampant abuse of human rights and severe humanitarian crises pose challenges to missions that may not be well prepared to handle such cases. Western led peacekeeping operations in Africa have also added a new dimension as witnessed in Libya, Central Africa Republic and Mali.

Scanning the peacekeeping horizon, the study identifies continuing evolution of peacekeeping determined by three parameters, global economic condition, regional organizations contributions and mediated interventions bringing a multiplicity of actors together.

Introduction and Background

Rich documentary evidence exists within the annals of the United Nations (UN) to show the history of peacekeeping in the world since 1948, when the first peace keeping operation was mounted to deal with the Arab-Israeli crisis. More missions followed and increased in the post-cold war period. Thus, 69 peacekeeping operations have taken place since then. In the period following the Iraq-Kuwait war in 1990, more than 60 peacekeeping missions have been dispatched, 40 of which have been to Africa (UN, 2014).

As at September 2014, 16 UN peacekeeping missions were in operation, of which 9 are in Africa. Africa today has the largest concentration of peacekeeping missions on the globe and it also hosts the largest troop and police contributing countries such as Ethiopia (6,528), Rwanda (4,709), Nigeria (4,619), Ghana (2,992) and Senegal (2,967); that are the top five peacekeeping staff contributors among the African states UN, (2014).

The critical aspect of this escalation however has been the rapidly changing nature of peace keeping in the world generally, and Africa in

particular. Most notable has been a growing trend of involving regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) in conflict resolution mechanisms.

The rationale for the participation of regional organizations in peacekeeping can be traced in AU's 'try Africa first' policy and Article 52 of the UN Charter, which states that local disputes should be settled regionally before referral to the global body. This is further reinforced by Article 53 of the Charter, which states that the Security Council can utilize regional arrangements and agencies to enforce and maintain peace and security under its authority. Moreover regional organizations' members are more willing to provide staff for peacekeeping missions owing to their proximity and likelihood of suffering the negative effects of conflict, and because their troops and non-military staff are more 'culturally sensitive' during operations.

Consequently regions and countries in Africa are now engaged in organizing and deploying their own peacekeeping missions. The most known operations include the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003, African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) from 2004 to 2007 and Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from 2007 till present. Kenya following the re-hatting of its troops into AMISOM also has a significant number of troops thereby joining the ranks of top troop contributing countries. The Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) has from time to time dispatched its own missions to sister states to deal with emerging conflict challenges, Barigabek, (2008).

Most Regional arrangements or Multinational models of peacekeeping reflect the changing socio-political and economic conflict context and dynamics. The UN and other partners have supported African peacekeeping, through funding and 'Hybrid' missions due to AU and Regional organization resources constraint. In order for regional mechanisms to strategically direct their missions, financial independence and sustainability will be required as missions evolve.

Peacekeeping interventions can sometimes

lead to conflicts among participating states themselves, states and organizations, and even among organizations as the current disagreement between Rwanda and Tanzania over the UN operation against Force Démocratique pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in eastern DRC indicate. Regional peacekeeping regimes require the on-going development of norms and procedures based on best practices. Both horizontal and vertical cooperation has impacted peacekeeping initiatives. The successes and failures of past operations have affected the current peace keeping work of ECOWAS, IGAD and South African Development Community (SADC) operations and intervention.

Responsibilities for peacekeeping missions have also changed and taken on added dimensions. They no longer just keep peace, but they also engage in other aspects such as demobilization, reintegration and even helping nations organize and hold elections. Further, peacekeeping is increasingly being used to deal with intra-rather than inter-state conflicts. This has added responsibilities that even the normal mandates of UN in peacekeeping did not foresee. The complexity of peace keeping in intra-state circumstances has challenged the extent to which peacekeepers can use force, beyond self-defence, Bruijne and Bloemendaal (2008).

In the light of this background, Africa is itself a perfect demonstration of the changing character of peacekeeping on the continent and globally. This illustrates the challenges posed to the normative principles of peacekeeping, which exist up to date within the definitions of the UN.

The Normative Principles of Peacekeeping and the Challenge they face in Africa

The four pillars of peacekeeping in the world as articulated by the UN still stand today though under serious challenges. The foremost of these principles of peacekeeping is the consent of parties to dialogue and requirement to seek consensus and peace to a conflict; second is the non-use of force except in self-defence; third is the principle of impartiality. However, the mandate to engage in peacekeeping is the pillar

that determines the operations of the missions as well as the application of these principles in any mission. The mandate itself is determined by the nature of the conflict in any given area Neethling, (2008).

In Africa and the world in general, there is little doubt that these principles that have underlain peace operations for a long time have themselves faced serious challenges. These challenges mainly come from the changing environment of conflict on the African continent and the evolving approaches put in place by various players to deal with the conflicts Neethling, (1998); Brahim, (2000). The response to this changing conflict environment has led to pronounced disagreements on how to negotiate and implement peace in Africa, and even on how to implement the principles themselves. Sometimes the implementation of the norms themselves has generated suspicions between the peacekeeping initiatives from global partners and the African players. The changing terrain of conflicts on the African continent demonstrates well the critical challenge that the generic model and principle of peacekeeping in the world face.

The Nature of Conflict on the African Continent

There are about sixty-one countries around the world having some form of armed conflict although the levels and nature vary. Of these twenty four are in Africa alone. The countries in conflict have experienced many difficulties during the period of war. This includes deaths of civilians and soldiers by way of combat, diseases, and increased crime rate among others. For example the Sudan conflict is estimated to have resulted in the deaths of about 2 million people between 1983 and 2002. The economies of the countries have also been left worse off after the war making life more difficult for the civilians. Moreover, displacement of populations has been experienced resulting in regional dimensions to the conflicts, Hoefler, (2008).

The conflicts on the continent have taken a characteristic of their own challenging the very normative principles of the UN. First, these

conflicts are intra rather than inter-state in nature. This is demonstrated by the conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Libya, the DRC Congo, and South Sudan where warring parties are either tribal groupings or clans driven by a variety of underlying problems especially structural ones.

Secondly, the players in these conflicts have also changed in type and composition. They are not necessarily armed combatants operating within the confines of conventional wars. Such players now include rebel groups, ethnic factions, terrorists and criminal gangs, as is the case with piracy on the coast of Somalia. Each of these groups has its own reasons for engaging in conflict. Some of them claim a course, while other conflicts could be religiously motivated. Others could be driven by either economic or religious extremism. Others are driven by the desire to control national resources especially when they are of a lucrative nature. This is the case with oil in South Sudan and diamonds in Sierra Leone. The implication here to peacekeeping is that identification and definition of both actors/players and interests to a conflict is a difficult task. This is shown, for example, by the number of Somali peace negotiations, which are eventually dishonoured, and mediators have to deal with a new crop of aggrieved parties time and time again.

Thirdly the nature of conflict in Africa has also taken a dimension where there is deliberate targeting of the civilian populations. This is a worrying development because it leads to extreme suffering of civilians who are subjected to various violations of their human rights, including torture, forceful displacement, rape, slavery and decapitation. This is well demonstrated in the DRC and Darfur, where extreme violence and abuse of the human rights of women and children are rampant. This is often a result of absence of a legal authority or weak governance structures and the control of society by combatant gangs and rebels who have no recourse to law and order. The current conflicts in Central African Republic (CAR) and Somalia, and recently in South Sudan are other cases in point, Warner, Lesley, A. (2014)

Beyond the conflicts, communities are also being

ravaged by natural catastrophes, which have heightened human insecurity. In Somalia for instance the UN, in July 2014, estimated that at least 350,000 people were at risk of starvation for the next three years owing to the drought being experienced in the country. On the other hand the Ebola Viral Disease (EVD) has been ravaging West African countries since the first case was reported in March 2014 in Sierra Leone, spreading to Guinea and Liberia. As at August 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated the cumulative number of cases attributed to EVD in the three countries to stand at 3069 including 1512 deaths. It is also reported that at least 20,000 people are at risk if control methods are not effectively administered as there lacks a reliable and tested cure. This poses a challenge to peacekeeping, as human security seems to become a trigger to further fuelling conflict. The security sector is thus tasked with the mandate of ensuring that such concerns are addressed. This is exemplified in the case of Liberia, which has had to use the security forces to contain the EVD. The challenge therein has been whether security forces are well trained and equipped to handle such challenges outside the traditional peacekeeping roles.

Due to the changing nature of conflicts on the African continent, the traditional role of peacekeepers is also changing. Their role is no longer confined to separation of combatants and keeping them from engaging in battle. It now covers other humanitarian issues that include, the democratization of countries undergoing war and civil disorder, the management of national elections, protection of human rights, reconstruction and resettlement. This complexity of conflicts in Africa has led to re-interpretation of the UN principles of peace to the extent of allowing states or groups of nations to take their own initiatives to bring peace to warring parties, even when it seems to violate the salient UN principles of peacekeeping. In circumstances where governments target their own populations as was the case with Cote D'Ivoire and the CAR, the situation drew the intervention of countries such as France with a view to causing peace through protection of civilians.

The UN itself has given its mandate to such missions based on the new position of Right to Protect (R2P) and the Right to Protect with Responsibility (RwP). However, there has not always been agreement among the African leadership that such missions are strictly for the protection of civilians or have other motives. This is well illustrated by the intervention of NATO in Libya that generated debate as to whether the real aim of the intervention was protection of civilian or it went beyond this principle.

In light of these developments, the world has witnessed new forms of interventions in conflict situations on the continent. The first is the growing interventions in African conflict situations by the West, usually under the 'mandate' of protecting civilians. This is the case in Libya, Mali and CAR. The matter even becomes more challenging when it's not possible to seek consent from parties owing to their non-existence or if they exist, the framework for their involvement. This is itself a challenge to the normative UN principles of peacekeeping. There has also been the use of the Special Forces with stronger mandates aimed at resolving conflicts. This is exemplified by the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (UNFIB) in the DRC, which is primarily made of troops from Tanzania, South Africa and Malawi. This model has been considered successful in bringing some normalcy in the Eastern DRC, Nduwimana (2014).

The second is the increasing role and initiative of the AU. The AU has been involved in peacekeeping missions in Burundi, DRC Congo, Somalia and Mali. Currently the AU Mission in Somalia considered relatively successful has given prominence to the ability of the AU to effectively intervene in Africa conflicts and affairs. However, the regional body is still undergoing several challenges especially as regards funding which then makes the operations to be reliant on external sources. Despite the challenges, the AU framework provides for the increased participation of other parties in resolving conflicts especially at the grassroots levels such as community-based organizations.

Terrorism has added a new dimension to peacekeeping on the continent. Kenya is an example. The first duty of any government is to protect its civilians especially from external aggression, Kenya pursued the Al Shabaab terrorist gangs by crossing the border into Somalia. This intervention sought to achieve two objectives; it was not only directed at protecting Kenya from external aggression, but also to bring peace to Somalia and the region in general. The world community acknowledged this and Kenya became part of the wider AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

The conflict in Somalia shows how the non-use of force as a principle of peacekeeping has been challenged in the African situation. It is also a demonstration of how nation states when threatened by a force that has no legal basis such as the Al Shabaab can get together to confront the threat. A view mainly explained through the concept of national interest. While this may seem justified it has created a new dimension of peacekeeping as it creates a new set of actors to the conflict as has been exemplified in the Somalia conflict. The role of Kenya may be that of securing its borders but this may not be in tandem with for example, the interests of Uganda and Ethiopia. Al Shabaab has continued to launch attacks on Kenyan soil such as the siege of West Gate Mall in Nairobi, bus attacks in Garissa and Thika, among others, killing over 100 civilians, BBC, (December 2, 2014).

The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa

A number of factors will dictate the future of peace and peace keeping in Africa:

- The conflicts that are currently on going may persist for some time. These include the situation in Somalia, DRC, CAR, Mali, South Sudan, Sudan and Burundi. This is not to understate the likelihood of new conflict situations arising.
- Nations have to keep up their efforts in developing and running viable states that meet the needs of their people and minimize conflicts.
- AU's role and that of other regional bodies such as IGAD will increase particularly in

countries such as South Sudan and the DRC.

- The defeat of terrorism in Somalia will lead to a stable Somalia and the Eastern African Region.
- Western nations will continue to play a key role in peace keeping in Africa, given their economic interests and the support of UN through its peace keeping mandates as challenged as they maybe.
- The nature of conflict in Africa will continue to pose challenges to the normative principles of peacekeeping, as they stand defined by the UN.
- Civilian organizations are likely to play a greater role in peace keeping in Africa than in the past. This includes peace centres and institutes and community organizations.

These factors can further be classified into three categories that have a bearing on how peacekeeping will be conducted in the future. These include:

Global Economy versus Peacekeeping Operations: The future of peacekeeping in Africa depends on the state of the world economy. A continued economic crisis will constrain peacekeeping actors in Africa, more so the African ones. The difficulty of funding African missions is likely to reinforce Africa's dependency on the West in terms of resources. External funding comes with strings attached, which curtail 'African ownership.' The question thus is whether African ownership requires African funding for peace operations in the continent? The capabilities of African countries to contribute to the African Peace Fund will have the overall effect of enhancing ownership as well as ensuring that there is accountability and transparency in peace operations. This stems from the fact that AU member states will have a greater propensity to ensuring planning and implementation since they have a stake.

Regional Blocs versus Peacekeeping Operations: The role of regional blocs such as East African Community (EAC), Economic Commission for West African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) is likely to increase. However, their effectiveness in peace keeping will depend on cohesiveness,

collaboration, and political will of the countries involved. These blocs have a greater role beyond conflict resolution as they serve as economic development vehicles and thereby have the capacity to address many of the underlying issues that drive much of the conflict in Africa. Indeed, a bloc like the EAC has taken a greater role in establishing a framework of cooperation for security for its member states while at the same time aligning it to the operations of the community.

Constellation of Actors and their interests versus Peacekeeping: The increased constellation of peace actors in Africa may be an advantage or a challenge to peace operations and to the security of the continent. It could either result into increased self-centred interests and competition or increased teamwork and success in terms of bringing peace. This also relates to the new dimensions/interactions between the new actors, namely China versus old actors in the name of USA and the European countries.

In conclusion, it is evident that peacekeeping operations in Africa have been challenged and it may not be possible to continue working within the existing normative principles. As such, there should be continued interrogation of the issues arising and the proactive seeking of solutions and effective mechanisms of conflict resolution. The role that Africans should take in resolving their affairs is not a matter of choice but a priority as has been exemplified by the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) and Kenya's intervention in Somalia.

Recommendations

There is need to develop a mechanism of funding peace operations in Africa while taking a greater role in the planning and execution of the same. Frontline states that bear the greatest conflict in neighbouring countries should have significant input in AU and UN regional peace keeping

missions

Use of regional economic communities close to the conflict may bring more commitment and appropriate intervention strategies due to proximity and affiliation to cultural environment

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Action Research: IPSTC Experience in Eastern Africa Lt Col *Joyce Sitienei, Head of Applied Research, International Peace Support Training Centre*

In the Post-Cold war era, African states have and continue to experience a myriad of challenges as they attempt to free themselves from their colonial past. The struggle to maintain the Westphalian state in the midst of extreme ethno-religious nationalism, intra-state and inter-state conflicts, economic stagnation, and environmental degradation among other problems has so far proved untenable for most. From the 1990s the African continent has been abound with shattering wars. These problems have continued to collectively pose a threat to the security of the continent. The situation when examined is so grave given that in 1991/92 alone there were eight wars on the continent with the most devastating ones in Somalia and Rwanda. There were 12 coup d'états between 2003 and 2012, while the African Union (AU) suspended eight countries - the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania and Niger from its membership (2003-2011), Magliveras, (2011).

Thus the establishment of the African Union's institutional architecture for the promotion of peace and security; the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), has been met with a lot of hope and enthusiasm within and beyond the continent. APSA's role is to deal with prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. It is envisioned that the operationalization of APSA will be attained through four key structures; the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force (ASF) and African Common Defence Policy. APSA represent a fresh approach to conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa.

The African Standby Force (ASF) is the African Union's multidimensional force composed of military, police and civilian components and is an important tool for maintaining peace and security within the APSA framework. The ASF

has five regional standby Forces, in each of the continent's five regions (North, East, Central, West and South). The five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) /Regional Mechanisms (REMs) - the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Eastern Africa Standby Force Secretariat (EASFSEC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are the building blocks of the ASF. A lot has been done to operationalize the ASF including the development of foundational policy documents and holding of regional and continental exercises. In order to help the regional standby forces build capacity, the African Union has identified regional centres of excellence to support the forces in training their personnel in a harmonized manner.

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi through its Peace and Security Research Department (PSRD), and its two training platforms, the Peace and Conflict Studies School (PCSS) and the Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS), supports the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) through provision of training and up to date knowledge on diverse peace support operations aspects. The PSRD, whose key objective is to produce and disseminate knowledge on emerging peace and security issues in Eastern Africa, has undertaken Applied Research in support of the EASF since 2009. Since 2007 the centre has worked to help build the force's capacity through training and research. The IPSTC began by dedicating its Curriculum Design wing to developing courses in conflict prevention, management and recovery in line with the AU's doctrine and policy. This was supported by intensive research to understand the prevailing conflict situation in Eastern Africa with a view to better inform training. The delivery of training then followed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

The beneficiaries of these courses have been drawn from the twelve member states of the EASF. To date, the Centre has successfully run and continues to run courses in many areas for the Force. These include courses for the civilian, military and police components. Some of the courses provided are; Regional Senior Mission Leaders Course (RSML), Peace Operations Planning Course, Military Observers Course, AU Police Course, and Human Rights Course among others.

Over the years, the department has produced a number of publications on peace and security issues. It has held workshops and symposia to interrogate key peace and security issues affecting the region. This has enabled the centre to engage stakeholders by providing fora to address pertinent issues that affect the continent. The ability to carry out field research and interact with the problems on the ground has enabled the centre better understand the complexities it must prepare its client (EASF) for. This has also helped the centre keep abreast with the conflict dynamics in the region. PSRD has conducted research on a variety of issues in Somalia, South Sudan, Kenya, Burundi, Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania. The issues addressed have included Reintegration of Child Soldiers in the DRC; Cross border Insecurity in the Eastern Region of DRC; Drivers of Insecurity in Somalia; AMISOM in Somalia; Protection of Children in Somalia; Role of Ideology in Somalia; Inter-Communal Conflicts in Kenya; Protection

of Civilians in the DRC and South Sudan; Electoral Violence in Eastern Africa; Sexual and Gender Based Violence in DRC, Women in Peace and Security in Somalia and Kenya and Governance in Burundi just to mention a few. All these publications have contributed to informing training for the Eastern Africa region and helped the Centre to deliver relevant and up-to-date training.

The IPSTC Applied Research Wing has definitely contributed to the development of new and improved training products for the IPSTC courses and at the same time provided suggestions on how to solve security problems in Eastern Africa. It has also documented best practices so that peace and security practitioners in Eastern Africa can learn from success stories on what has worked to advance peace in the region.

The Africa Amani Journal is an important addition to the IPSTC publications that is intended to raise the profile, visibility and influence of the IPSTC as a Centre of Excellence in Peace Support Operations research and training within Eastern Africa and globally. It will disseminate IPSTC's scholarly research works that will promote healthy interaction and discourse amongst professional peace and security actors on a wide scope of subjects such as Peacekeeping/Support Operations, Peace and Security, training for peace and the interrelations between peace and human development.

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